THE GRIFFITH-TSINGHUA
‘HOW CHINA SEES
THE WORLD’
Working Paper Series, No 2 (2016)
To Ally or Not to Ally:Debating China's Non-Alliance
Strategy in the 21st Century
By LIU Ruonan and LIU Feng
griffith.edu.au/asiainstitute
imir.tsinghua.edu.cn
To Ally or Not to Ally?
Debating China’s Non-Alliance
Strategy in the 21st Century
Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng
The Griffith-Tsinghua Project “How China Sees the World” Working
Paper Series No. 2 (2016)
Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University
Griffith was the first University in Australia to offer Asian Studies to undergraduate
students and remains a pioneer in this field. This strong history means that today the
Griffith Asia Institute can draw on the expertise of some 50 Asia-Pacific-focused
academics from many disciplines across the university. Our Strategic Vision is to
promote greater interest in and awareness of Australia’s changing region and its
importance to Australia among the public, universities, policy makers and the media.
The Griffith Asia Institute produces innovative, interdisciplinary research on key
developments in the politics, economics, societies, and cultures of Asia and the South
Pacific. By promoting knowledge of Australia’s changing region and its importance to
our future, the Griffith Asia Institute seeks to inform and foster academic scholarship,
public awareness, and responsive policy making. The Institute’s work builds on over
40 years of Griffith University tradition of providing cutting-edge research on issues
of contemporary significance in the region.
Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University
Tsinghua University’s Institute of International Relations (TUIIR) is a university-level
academic institution with a strategic goal of becoming a leading international research
think-tank in China. TUIIR concentrates on both research and instruction. Currently,
there are seven research centers, three research programs, and two editorial departments.
The faculty of the institution acts as both instructors and researchers. The TUIIR
organizes a variety of academic activities every year, such as forums, seminars and
lectures. We have held the Community Conference of Political Science and International
Relations eight times, in which more than 700 scholars participated each year. Also,
TUIIR has held the Tsinghua International Security Forum 15 times, the Theory
Seminar Youth International Relations Scholars four times, and the Summer School
of the International Relations Research Methods and Arms Control Seminar nine
times. In 2012, TUIIR successfully organized the first World Peace Forum, which
made a major impact globally.
This project is supported by a research Grant (No.16-1512-150509-IPS) from the
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
Project Introduction
How to understand China’s rise and its implications for Asia and the world is an
imperative task for both scholars and policy makers. China has become the second
largest economy next to the United States since 2010. China is also the major trading
partner for over 140 countries in the world. As United States-China relations will
define the next century, it is essential to build mutual understanding for policy
makers. If strategic distrust is a major obstacle in US-China relations, as Kenneth
Lieberthal and Jisi Wang have suggested, deepening our understanding of Chinese
perceptions and views on international relations will be a crucial task for bridging
the perception gap and mitigating the strategic distrust between the two nations.
This project aims to make sense of China’s rise in world politics through examining
Chinese International Relations (IR) scholars’ perceptions and debates on key issues
in international relations and Asian security. This project will deepen our understanding
of Chinese scholars, especially regarding how they perceive world politics and how
they can impact Chinese policy making via internal debates. There are two parts in this
project. First, we organize and conduct onsite surveys of IR scholars at the annual
conference of the Chinese Community of Political Science and International Studies
in Beijing. Second, we examine the internal debates among Chinese scholars over
international politics, Asian security, and Chinese foreign policy.
With generous support from the MacArthur Foundation (grant No.
16-1512-150509- IPS), the Griffith Asia Institute is able to successfully
collaborate with Tsinghua University’s Institute of International Relations to carry
out the survey research as well as conduct the research project on the Chinese IR
debates through expert conferences and other academic exchanges. This working
paper series will feature major Chinese scholars’ analyses of internal debates and
our survey findings.
We appreciate your comments and suggestions very much.
Kai He and Huiyun Feng (Co-Chief Investigators, Griffith University)
Xuetong Yan (Lead Project Collaborator, Tsinghua University)
To Ally or Not to Ally?
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the
21st Century
Abstract
As China’s rise continues to shape its role in international affairs, Chinese international
relations scholars are engaging in a lively debate about its grand strategy, especially
whether China should abandon the non-alliance strategy adopted since the early 1980s.
Some scholars contend that a non-alliance strategy cannot safeguard China’s national
interests in the face of the United States’ security alliance network throughout East
Asia, and without allies, China’s rise will be contained by the US. To that end, proalliance scholars are especially favorable towards a formal alliance with Russia.
However, orthodox scholars, in favor of supporting the official position of non-alliance,
argue that a formal alliance deviates from the fundamental principles of independence
and self-reliance that have historically guided China’s foreign policy. Moreover, a
number of alternative strategies have been proposed to replace or complement the
non-alliance strategy; among them are quasi-alliances, coalitions and strategic
partnerships. In practice, whether China will form alliances with other powers and
neighboring countries depends on its self-defined role within the current international
system as well as its perception on external security threats. Considering both external
and internal constraints it faces, China is highly likely to maintain the non-alliance
stance while pursuing other desirable approaches to making friends and partners.
About the Authors:
LIU Ruonan is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Politics,
University of International Business and Economics. She was a visiting scholar at
the University of Groningen (2014) and the University of California, San Diego
(2014-2015). Her research mainly deals with international relations of Southeast
Asia, with a special focus on the security strategies of the Southeast Asian States and
China-ASEAN relations.
LIU Feng is Associate Professor and Vice Chair at the Department of International
Relations, Nankai University. His research focuses on international relations theory,
international relations in East Asia and China’s foreign policy. He is the author of
The Logic of Balancing: Systemic Pressure, Hegemonic Legitimacy, and Great Power
Behaviour, and the translator of several books, among them including Realism and
International Politics, Unanswered Threats, and Rational Theory of International
Politics.
*The authors would like to express their sincere appreciation to Antonio Douglas for
his excellent assistance, and to Li Mingjiang, Zhao Kejin, and other particpants at the
Griffith-Tsinghua Conference on “Chinese Scholars Debate International Relations”
for their helpful comments.
This Working Paper Series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to
stimulate debates and discussions among scholars and policy analysts. The views
expressed are entirely the authors’ own.
To Ally or Not to Ally?
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the
21st Century
Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng
Introduction
In contrast to the contention and discussion surrounding China’s economic and
social policies among economists and sociologists, Chinese international relations
scholars rarely openly debate the government’s foreign policy choices for long.
Instead, the government’s stance on foreign policy is usually adopted by Chinese
scholars and analysts as the orthodox view. However, in the last few years, particularly
after the recent leadership transition in 2012, Chinese international relations scholars
become more active in debating China’s foreign policy. China’s ascension to the
international stage has caused many in Chinese academia to openly voice their
opinions on which policies might best serve China’s national interests, leading many
scholars to debate the necessity of the recent policy shift from the traditional principle
of ‘keeping a low profile’ (Tao guang yang hui), to a more proactive foreign policy
(feng fa you wei) (Zhu 2010; Xu and Du 2015; Lynch 2015). This is a broad debate
that engages many different schools of thought, and among the most contentious
issues, is whether China needs to ally with other states. China’s alliance posture is an
important part of the overall discourse surrounding China’s foreign policy.
Forming alliances has been an essential instrument that states have used to
achieve security in an anarchic system since ancient times. In essence, alliances are
mutual security commitments between two or more states (Osgood 1968: 17; Walt
1987: 12). Throughout history, alliances between international actors have formed,
collapsed, and reformed. Although Chinese history is rich with examples of the
successes and weaknesses of the alliance system, this paper will focus on contemporary
China, and how its current policies are informed by its recent past.
The People’s Republic of China rose amidst the Cold War, an era that saw the
United States and Soviet Union attempt to divide the world into two opposing
ideological camps. As a newly-formed nation, and unable to be completely
self-reliant, it was unlikely that China would be able to remain neutral. The United
States’ heavy presence throughout East Asia, and China’s ideological adherence to
2
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century
Marxism led China to formally ally with the Soviet Union during the 1950s.
However, border disputes and ideological rivalry caused Sino-Soviet relations to
gradually deteriorate, and by the 1970s China had tilted to the US-led bloc. During
this period of rapprochement the United States and China were “tacit allies”, bonded
by their mutual desire to check the Soviet Union’s power. Upon observation, it is
clear that the first 30 years of modern China’s foreign policy primarily consisted of
playing the superpowers against each other as national interest dictated.
However, the early 1980s saw China tire of being caught between the geopolitical
confrontation of the world’s two superpowers, instilling the sentiments that would
become the foundation of the non-alliance policy. When the second generation of
Chinese leaders designed a new “reform and opening-up” strategy, China decided
not to ally with any other states. It is widely believed that the non-alliance policy
first gained formal recognition when Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping articulated
the strategy to a foreign guest in 1983 (Ling 2013: 21). Since Deng Xiaoping,
successive Chinese presidents have maintained the non-alliance principle, and
during the 14th Party Congress Committee in 1992, Jiang Zemin reiterated the policy
by stating that China “will not enter into
Since the end of the Cold War, the
alliance with any country or group of
Chinese government has viewed
countries and will not join any military
alliances as an archaic, entangling
bloc” (Jiang 1992). The principle has
system that only increases the chance
since been quoted at various at times in
of costly military conflict.
Party speeches and government reports.
For example, a 2011 government White Paper titled “China’s Peaceful Development”
states that China, “does not form alliance with any other country or group of
countries, nor does it use social system or ideology as a yardstick to determine what
kind of relations it should have with other countries” (Information Office of the
State Council 2011). Since the end of the Cold War, the Chinese government has
viewed alliances as an archaic, entangling system that only increases the chance of
costly military conflict.
The non-alliance policy has provided measurable benefits to China, even though
China’s changing security environment has caused a debate amongst Chinese
academia about the policy’s relevance. Under the non-alliance policy, China has
maintained a relatively benign regional environment, allowing the government to
focus on the central task of economic development and power accumulation.
However, in the post-Cold War era, China is once again under the scrutiny of
dominant powers, particularly the United States. China’s continued economic and
military rise has given the Chinese populace high expectations of the government’s
foreign policy, especially in maritime affairs. These factors have led many to believe
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century
3
that China cannot afford to be passive in its foreign affairs. The implications of an
assertive China have caused heated debate among academics both for and against
the non-alliance policy (Zhang F. 2012; Xu 2016).
This paper aims to compile and analyze the mainstream arguments made by
Chinese scholars as they debate China’s foreign policy, as well as answer the
following questions: Which schools of thought have gained the most prominence in
this debate? Are there alternatives to these schools of thought? What significance
does this debate have in understanding China’s foreign policy? This paper concludes
with an evaluation of the relationship between this debate and China’s policy shifts
in practice.
Three Schools of Thoughts in the Debate
The current debate on whether China should abandon its non-alliance stance is
emerging under the context of changing international and regional realities, as well
as China’s own shifting policy objectives. It should be noted that most international
relations scholars and foreign policy analysts in Chinese academia do not have a
well-defined theoretical position, although some prominent scholars do have clear
preferences on IR theories (Shambaugh 2011; Feng and He 2016). For example, Yan
Xuetong is a self-proclaimed realist, though it is rare for most Chinese scholars to
describe themselves as realists, liberalists,
scholarly positions on whether China
or constructivists. Therefore, scholarly
needs to abandon its non-alliance
positions on whether China needs to
principle do not tend to fit the
abandon its non-alliance principle do
traditional theoretical framework...
not tend to fit the traditional theoretical
framework found in international relations literature.
In this paper, We divide scholarly positions into three approximate groups based
on their core arguments: (1) the orthodoxy, which generally accepts the view posited
by the Chinese government, primarily defending the official standpoint on this question
in addition to extant policy issues. In short, this argument assumes that non-alliance
has been, and will continue to be an optimal choice for China to realize its national
interests; (2) the revisionists, by contrast, challenge the official standpoint and advocate
an alliance policy to attract security allies and partners in order to extend China’s
influence and (3) the moderates, who take a middle ground between the extremes of
orthodoxy and revision, and attempt to find alternative measures that overcome the
shortcomings of both alliance and non-alliance positions. For moderates, it is better to
find more flexible and effective ways to develop security cooperation with other states.
The Orthodoxy: The Continuing Relevance of the Non-Alliance Principle
Orthodox scholars generally support the existing policies that have been designed by
4
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century
the Party, and implemented by the government. From this perspective, the idea of
forming alliances deviates from the fundamental principles of independence and selfreliance that have historically guided China’s foreign policy. Some specific reasons
for adhering to the non-alliance principle have been proposed by different scholars.
First, orthodox scholars argue that traditional alliances are fundamentally flawed
because they force nations into a dilemma of security and independence. Every alliance
has a cost, and that cost is inevitably a nation’s ability to act independently of its
alliance partners; therefore, under an alliance system nations gain security at the
expense of flexibility on the international
orthodox scholars argue that tradistage. Non-alignment supporters refer to
tional alliances are fundamentally
this problem as the “alliance dilemma”.
flawed because they force nations
Orthodox scholars propose that in light
into a dilemma of security and
of the alliance dilemma, it is far better
independence.
for a nation to preserve its independence.
This allows a state the flexibility and diplomatic space needed to implement a
comprehensive foreign policy that can react as needed, as opposed to being entangled
in an alliance where a nation can both unwillingly and inadvertently be thrust into an
international crisis (Xu 2010; Jiang 2012).
Second, non-alliance scholars often believe that an alliance system is beyond
China’s capabilities. Alliance candidates are few, and of those available, many are
poor or developing nations with which an alliance would cost more than it is worth.
Sun Ru warns that allying with underdeveloped states would only give China
motivation for abandoning the partnership soon after its formation (Sun 2015). In
addition, orthodox scholars argue that a Chinese alliance system could very well
heighten tensions in East Asia, by forcing regional neighbors to band together to
balance against China through political and military means (Zhang 2000).
China’s non-alliance policy has been its primary foreign policy principle for
nearly a decade. Although a newly-formed China allied itself with the Soviet Union
for survival, it only served to limit China’s international flexibility while at the same
time not meeting the strategic interests of either party. It wasn’t until after China
abandoned its alliance with the Soviet Union that the Chinese strategic environment
started to improve. China extended its relations beyond socialist nations, and normalized
relations with the West. The consistent implementation of the non-alliance policy
has allowed China to avoid being restricted in international affairs due to the actions
of others, in addition to allowing China to contribute to global security and stability
(Liu 2000).
Third, a major factor in the debate surrounding the non-alliance policy is
US-China relations. Since the end of the Cold War, China and the United States have
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century
5
been neither friends nor enemies. However, even some pro-non-alliance scholars are
starting to admit that the United States poses a threat to some of China’s national
security aspects, especially when considering the US-led security alliance system in
East Asia. Since 2009, when the Obama administration announced its “pivot to
Asia” strategy, the US has strengthened its military commitments with its formal
allies and informal partners throughout the region, while also getting involved in the
territorial disputes in both the East China and South China Seas. These actions are
interpreted by scholars in both camps as efforts to contain China. However, orthodox
scholars still emphasize the importance of maintaining a low profile and moderate
conflicts with the United States, largely in recognition of China’s relative weakness
when matched against the United States
An alliance system would not address
(Li and Shi 1999). From this angle, Zhu
the root cause of China’s security
Feng questions the feasibility of an
challenges, it would only exacerbate
alliance. He points out that few states
regional tensions.
would like to ally with China at the
expense of confronting the US. In addition, the likelihood of an alliance changing
the current balance of power is very low; therefore, there is no need to establish an
alliance (Zhu 2012).
Finally, orthodox scholars argue that the utility of military alliances in the modern
era is continuously diminishing (Liu J. 2012). Traditional military alliances are narrow
and only allow for limited types of aid and cooperation between nations. These
kinds of alliances are unfit to respond to the increasingly varied threats of the 21st
century, particularly threats posed by non-state actors such as piracy, terrorism, and
nuclear proliferation. Non-alliance scholars propose that the best way to realize China’s
interests is to maintain a defensive national security posture, while contributing to
the construction of a new multipolar world order with a neutral security environment
(Ling 2013; Wang C. 2012). This would allow China to maintain its independence
and satisfy its national security requirements while adhering to the non-alliance
policy. Orthodox scholars do not believe that China’s current security problems stem
from a lack of allies, they argue that they are instead due to the complex interaction
of domestic and international politics. An alliance system would not address the root
cause of China’s security challenges, it would only exacerbate regional tensions.
Therefore, orthodox scholars maintain that China’s foreign policy should continue to
be based on non-alliance.
The Revisionists: Forming Alliances to Defend China’s Rise
Revisionist views are best expressed in a quote from Professor Yan Xuetong: “[the]
international order is decided by the balance of power between great powers, and an
alliance policy would help China increase its strategic partners” (Yan 2013a).
6
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century
History has only rarely seen a great power rise or expand without allies, and
whenever states did employ a non-alliance policy, it was always temporary. China’s
long-term implementation of a non-alliance policy is a historical aberration.
Revisionists argue that the non-alliance strategy is only suitable for weak nations,
and if China does not abandon its non-alignment posture, it will only lead to more
security challenges (Yan 2013b).
Many scholars believe that China’s security environment is already facing large
challenges that would be helped by an alliance. First is the eastward expansion of
NATO, and the increased scope of the United States-Japan security partnership, both
of which threaten the relevance of China’s non-alliance strategy. Second, the United
States’ pursuit of interventionist policies
Many scholars believe that China’s
threatens China’s growth, as well as
security environment is already
undermining China’s support of nonfacing large challenges that would
interstate intervention as a core tenet of
be helped by an alliance.
the international order. Finally, the role
and impact of Third World nations in international affairs are steadily declining as
the influence of developed nations increases. Given that a significant portion of
China’s non-alliance strategy relies on developing nations having a sizeable role in
international affairs, the ever-increasing gap between rich and poor nations makes
the continuation of a non-alliance policy challenging (Ye 2000). At the same time,
there is broad domestic support for a formal alliance, as evidenced by recent
reflections over the dissolution of the USSR-China alliance. Alliances are not a relic
of Cold War antagonism, instead they are a way for nations to gain partners, and
foster good relations (Li 2012). China’s current security environment should be what
informs China’s foreign policy, and in light of the dangers posed to China’s national
security by the United States, revisionist scholars believe that China needs alliances.
Revisionist scholars hold that the “alliance dilemma” mistakenly reduces alliances
to zero-sum relationships. In fact, revisionists argue that China’s unwillingness to
give regional neighbors security guarantees through alliances has already caused
neighboring states to view their relationship with China as zero-sum, and dominated
by fear. Therefore, a China which continues to implement a non-alliance strategy
will increasingly find itself surrounded by nations that distrust it, and turn to the
United States for security guarantees (Yan 2013b).
Revisionists argue that a rising China needs friends (Yan 2012a; Yan 2012b; Yan
2015). Even though the current international order has been beneficial to China’s
economic and military rise, it has not aided China’s strategic relationships. The United
States is still the most allied nation in the world, while China has no significant allies.
The United States’ alliance structure has become a significant obstacle in China’s
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century
7
efforts to improve relations with its neighbors. After the Obama administration
adopted “smart power” as a foreign policy principle, the United States consolidated
and strengthened its strategic partnerships. If China does not ally with other nations
soon, it will lose the ability to realize interests in its own backyard.
Revisionists believe non-alignment theories misunderstand alliances. An alliance
does not automatically equate to Cold War mentality. The Cold War was an
ideological confrontation between superpower blocs wherein alliances were merely
a peripheral method superpowers used to achieve victory. Therefore, alliances are
not inherently a step towards confrontation. Defensive alliances that encourage
international cooperation on security concerns do not threaten regional security.
Second, revisionists argue that alliances do not bind a nation’s hands and feet, but
instead bind two or more nations together
Revisionists believe non-alignment
in a mutually restrictive agreement in
theories misunderstand alliances. An
order to achieve shared interests. Alliances
alliance does not automatically equate
are a system of disparate parts that work
to Cold War mentality.
together to be mutually binding and
beneficial to their members. Alliances also contribute to global stability by
dis-incentivizing allied nations to act against each other’s interests. Finally, since
ancient times, Chinese history has recognized the value and utility of alliances. From
the Flame and Yellow Emperor’s alliance against Chiyou, to Mao Zedong and
Chiang-Kai-Shek’s alliance against the Japanese, Chinese leaders have used alliances.
It is time for modern China to abandon its antiquated model of understanding
alliances and align with nations that will contribute to the common good of a new
world order (Tang 2010).
The Moderates: Seeking Alternatives
Aside from pro- and anti-alliance scholars, are moderates who seek a solution to
China’s security dilemma that rests between a formal alliance and the non-alliance
policy. Moderates believe that the United States is employing various aspects of its
hard and soft power to obstruct China’s growth and peaceful development, and that
by itself China is unable to stop US containment. However, realists believe complete
abandonment of the non-alliance strategy is unrealistic as potential alliance partners
are few and any alliance formed would not only be weak, but likely to provoke a
strong response from the United States. Therefore, realists propose that as China
rises in a changing international environment, it needs to develop a certain degree of
security cooperation with other countries. This would fulfill the dual purpose of
liberating China from its isolationist position whilst also gradually allowing for a
discourse about alliances to evolve. Three main alternative strategies have been
proposed: coalitions, strategic partnerships, and quasi-alliances.
8
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century
Coalitions
In international politics, states understand that some interests are better realized
through coalitions. Coalitions allow for nations to discuss and reach a consensus on
specific issue areas and are also suitable for solving a number of disputes outside of
national security. Although there are few cases of prominent coalitions in international
relations history, it is an avenue that has not been duly explored. Unlike alliances,
coalitions emphasize specialized and informal cooperation to solve particular issues.
This kind of informal cooperation certainly can include national security, but can
also extend to politics, economics, and atypical security concerns. Furthermore,
coalitions rely on cooperation with relevant international institutions to solve
international crises and conflicts. Alliances tend to form in times of peace, and
generally target a third party. Juxtaposed
Moderates believe that coalitions
with alliances, in the event of armed
possess more utility than alliances
conflict, coalitions of like-minded parties
temporarily form to respond to a common threat, and dissolve afterwards. As
coalitions are inherently less cohesive and more flexible than alliances, member
states focus more on negotiating a fair cost and interest system than on creating
binding rules (Liu F. 2012).
Moderates believe that coalitions possess more utility than alliances, and that by
using coalitions to develop diverse methods of cooperation and engagement, arguments
over the non-alliance policy can be superseded. Coalitions will allow China the
flexibility to analyze the significance of a particular issue area and then decide
whether it merits cooperation. Ultimately, coalitions sustain the premises of a nonalliance strategy while still enabling China to partner with nations on a variety of
issues.
Strategic Partners
Modern China has pioneered the use of strategic partners as a mainstay of the
foreign policy toolkit. Strategic partnerships do not target a third party, and lack an
antagonistic connotation. Moderates like Tang Shiping argue that partnerships
between nations are fairly common and are based on mutual interest (Tang 2010).
Although collaboration between partners is often intense, the states themselves do
not need to have an intimate relationship; within a strategic partnership, states are
relatively autonomous. This independence enables actors to abandon, change, or
modify partnerships as needed. Strategic partnerships are allowed to be devoid of
military commitments, as represented by the current partnership between China and
Russia. Zhao Huasheng believes that the Chinese-Russian partnership best fits the
current geopolitical landscape; though Sino-Russian cooperation does not reach that
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century
9
of a formal alliance, the current level of cooperation between the two nations fits
their capabilities while satisfying their respective domestic audiences (Zhao 2013).
Years of implementation verify the feasibility of strategic partnerships. China has
already partnered with 67 other countries, in five different global regions, and has
organized or established at least 72 different kinds of strategic relationships (Su
2015; Men and Liu 2015).
Quasi-alliances
Beyond those two alternatives, Sun Degang believes quasi-alliances are an informal
method of collaboration between states. He posits that, “two or more states form an
informal arrangement that targets an
... quasi-alliances possess a dynamic
opponent’s security system” (Sun 2011,
quality to their agreements, thus
61). There are key differences between
avoiding the rigidity of traditional
a quasi-alliance and an alliance in
alliances.
foreign policy. Alliances are based on
stringent contracts with binding legal restrictions, while quasi-alliances are based on
informal contracts with lax legal conditions. Formal alliances depend on static
security arrangements while quasi-alliances possess a dynamic quality to their
agreements, thus avoiding the rigidity of traditional alliances. Furthermore, alliances
are often very exclusive by nature, whereas quasi-alliances have fluid membership
with a low barrier-to-entry. Finally, traditional alliances are structured around the
conformity of interests and values, whereas quasi-alliances can be comprised of
nations with differing values but common interests.
Sun Degang believes China should pursue a quasi-alliance-based foreign policy
termed “Three-Ring Quasi-Alliance Diplomacy” (Sun 2012). The first ring is forming
quasi-alliances within multilateral organizations. The second is building quasi-alliances
with key nations in East Asia based on a new model of cooperation, and the third
is maintaining the model of friendly diplomacy. “Three-Ring Quasi-Alliance
Diplomacy” will promote China’s rise from a great power to a dominant power by
eliminating China’s isolation within the international system. Aside from Sun
Degang, there are other scholars in China who have proposed the quasi-alliance
strategy. For example, Yu Zhengliang believes that Russia is the ideal candidate for
establishing a quasi-alliance strategy, as Sino-Russian core national interests
increasingly require cooperation in order to break the United States’ global hegemony
(Yu 2012). Wang Haiyun has proposed a quasi-alliance strategy that rests upon three
strategic aims: continue to declare, “non-alliance, non-antagonistic, and non-third
party directed” foreign policy. This policy is referred to as “The Three Nons”. Wang
Haiyun further advises that China should not form any alliances in the near future
10
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century
and instead strive to create a series of “belts” for nations on its periphery: “The belt
of friendly relations. The belt of strategic stability and the belt of economic
cooperation.” The three belts will promote China’s image as a reliable partner with
nations on its periphery while also increasing its hard and soft power (Wang H.
2012).
Should China and Russia Ally? A Specific Focus of the Debate
It is commonly believed that China and Russia might form an alliance, and Chinese
scholars continue to debate its feasibility. This case provides us with a specific focus
for the broader debate over China’s non-alliance policy.
Pro-alliance scholars suggest that there are common interests in a China-Russia
alliance. In regards to their national security, both nations are unable to completely
integrate into the Western-dominated international system, and both nations contend
with antagonism from the United States. Particularly after the start of the Ukrainian
Crisis, Western nations have increased their pressure against Russia, inadvertently
creating a situation where China is an increasingly attractive military and economic
partner. Neither Russia nor China can
Pro-alliance scholars suggest that
individually match the United States’
there are common interests in a
military prowess; however, together the
China-Russia alliance.
two nations are a formidable force.
Furthermore, China and Russia’s economies are naturally complementary, and with
coordination, the two nations could avoid American market restrictions and obtain
economic independence. Russia and China have the world’s second and third
strongest militaries respectively, and as two nuclear powers, their alliance could
attract other nations such as Iran, Pakistan, and even some countries in mainland
Europe. Were China and Russia to achieve such an expansive alliance network, the
United States, even with NATO, would not be able to reasonably contain it. With
Russia as an ally, China need not fear being drawn into an unnecessary war. Russia’s
nuclear arsenal greatly dis-incentivizes large-scale warfare, and in any small-scale
conflict Russia would not need to rely on China’s military.
Yan Xuetong points out that US unipolarity has intensified rather than relaxed in
recent years. China and the US are competing for international leadership while
Moscow is in strategic competition with Washington. Neither Russia nor China is
able to alleviate pressure from the United States alone. Since alliance making and
annexation are common strategies in history to compete for dominance, as long as
China regards national rejuvenation as its policy goal, it has to abandon the principle
of non-alliance and ally with Russia (Yan 2014). Yan Xuetong also notes that “the
United States’ unwillingness to accept China in the international arena, Russia’s
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century
11
potential as an ally, and China’s continued rise as a military power, make it increasingly
clear that the benefits of a Sino-Russian alliance would greatly outweigh the costs”
(Yan 2012, 25). Dai Xu also advocates a Sino-Russia alliance from the perspective
of geopolitical competition with the US in Eurasia (Dai 2012).
Luo Yuan and Zhang Wenmu hold more moderate attitudes on China’s alliance
strategy, although both of them point out the need to build alliances. Luo posits that
Sino-Russia security cooperation could take the form of a quasi-alliance, while
Zhang emphasizes the defensive objectives of the alliance through which both the
legitimate interests of China and Russia can be preserved. Other than the need to
cope with US pressure, Zhang points out that China has traditional experience
managing alliances. Tang Shiping, a moderate proponent of the alignment policy,
has mentioned China’s alliance history and further noted that the history of
Sino-Soviet alliance should not be the burden of contemporary foreign policy. Any
strategic tool effective in promoting national interest should be on the list for
consideration. Aside from Russia, members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and North
Korea are all potential Chinese allies (Yan and Qi 2012; Yan 2011).
Anti-alliance academics suggest that there simply is not enough to be gained from
a Sino-Russian Alliance. These scholars believe that the current level of multi-tier
cooperation between Russia and China already satisfies their mutual interests.
Although both nations face similar
There is no guarantee that a Sinosecurity challenges, neither faces the
Russian alliance would not be
threat of large-scale invasion, lessening
fraught with as much, if not more
the need for a military alliance. Second,
conflict than the current US-China
there is a large disparity between the
relationship.
two nations in regards to their ideology
and respective security challenges. It is unlikely that the two nations would be able
to form a consensus on many issues, let alone give each other military support. The
aftermath of the 2008 Georgian-Russo War provides a good example. The Russian
State Duma passed a resolution recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. The reaction from China was muted, and certainly did not align with
Russia’s policies. China’s reticence was fueled by its own domestic issues with
Taiwan. There is no guarantee that a Sino-Russian alliance would not be fraught
with as much, if not more conflict than the current US-China relationship.
Li Kaisheng argues that the nature of geopolitics makes competition between
Russian and China hard to avoid, whereas China and the United States, already
being separated by thousands of miles, have no fundamental security conflicts (Li K.
2012). A Sino-Russian alliance would still be subject to the alliance dilemma, with
12
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century
both nations concerned about being abandoned in time of need, or being entangled
in conflicts decoupled from national security interests (Zhao 2013). Neither Russia
nor China has the political foundation needed to resolve the security dilemma. At the
same time, once allied nations find that they cannot reach an accord with one
another, they will find it more difficult to set aside their own interests for the sake of
the alliance (Jiang 2012). Wang Jisi, a professor from Peking University, argues that
the proposal of allying with Russia is based on the view that the US is China’s main
adversary. He acknowledges that the United States does pose certain challenges to
China, but proposes that there is no need for the US to be treated as a threat or
enemy if China does not want military confrontation (Wang 2011). China’s continued
economic success needs a cooperative partnership with the United States. Moreover,
few countries, if any, would want to join China in an anti-US alliance (Wang 2011).
Anti-alliance scholars argue that from an economic perspective, Russia and China
are not suitable allies. Sino-Russian trade volume falls far below that of the
China-US relationship; neither Russia
Sino-Russian trade volume falls
nor China wish to harm trade relations
far below that of the China-US
with the United States, the European
relationship; neither Russia nor
Union or any large trading partner, as
China wish to harm trade relations
both nations rely on these trading partners
with the United States, the European
for economic exchange and investment
Union or any large trading partner
(Yu et al. 2015). The unrest caused by a
Sino-Russian alliance would inevitably spread to trade relations, needlessly harming
both nations’ economies. Finally, the core interest of a Sino-Russian alliance would
be resisting Western powers and establishing a new international order that is fair to
both middle and developing nations. Since 1992, both Russia and China have
emphasized transparency in bilateral relations. Their commitment to the three “nons”
(non-alliance, non-confrontation, non-third-party directed policy) has been the
foundation for a new style of relations between the two nations. In 2001, both
nations signed the Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship, further embedding the three
“nons” into the bedrock of their relationship. China and Russia have jointly
promoted peace and international stability through cooperation, consultation,
dialogue, mutual respect, and compromise; anti-alliance scholars believe an alliance
would in no way affirm these principles.
Feng Huiyun points out the current problems in Sino-Russia relations which
prevent them from allying with each other. Although both countries employ foreign
policies that challenge Western legitimacy and weaken US dominance, China and
Russia compete for geopolitical influence in Eurasia through arms sales. Their trade
imbalance and divergent interests on sovereignty issues are also obstacles to
deepening strategic coordination (Feng 2015).
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century
13
Aside from the pro- and anti-alliance scholars, there is another group of scholars
who believe that the conditions for a Sino-Russian alliance have yet to be met. Were
the conditions for an alliance to be met in the future, this group of scholars would
not necessarily support or oppose the alliance. For example, scholar Zhao Huasheng
(2013) does not completely reject the possibility of a future Sino-Russian alliance,
but he maintains that if both governments do not make the necessary preparations,
and force an alliance simply on the pretense of Sino-Russian cooperation, the
alliance would only bring harm to both countries (Wang and Wan 2013; Huang
2008). Therefore, as long as there remains no major changes to the international
arena for the foreseeable future, moderates propose that China and Russia maintain
their strategic partnership.
When assessing the possibility of a China-Russia alliance, the Russian position
must also be taken into consideration. A few Russian scholars do support a SinoRussian alliance. For example, Alexander Korolev argues that a formal alliance
should be expected (Korolev 2015). In contrast, Xie Chao, a student of Yan Xuetong,
provides a dissenting answer. Based on a systematic study of Russian strategic
consideration, Xie Chao finds that Russia does not have much incentive to form a
military alliance with China. As he
articulates, “from Russia’s point of view, as long as there remains no major
changes to the international arena
it has the necessary state power to
for the foreseeable future, moderates
respond to regional security pressures,
propose that China and Russia
and as such, Russia will opt to maintain
maintain their strategic partnership.
the present alliance structure, and will
not attempt to expand its alliances. In the coming years, establishing an alliance with
China is neither important nor necessary” (Xie 2016, 44).
As noted above, only a few Chinese scholars have a clear theoretical orientation,
elaborating their policy positions from one or another theoretical perspective.
However, putting the debate roughly into the spectrum of international relations
theories may give us a better understanding of the differences of these positions.
Three broad policy preferences surveyed in the sections above reflect at least five
theoretical positions. The first group is in essence non-theoretical and located in the
orthodox camp. These scholars do not rely on any theoretical concepts or logics, but
only defend the official positon. In the current situation, they tend to defend the
non-alliance policy. But if the Chinese government was to shift to another side, they
would also move to that side. Second, there are some defensive realists, for example,
Zhu Feng and others, who generally prefer non-alliance or other alternatives to
alliance. Third, the advocates of the alliance position can be put into in the camp of
hard or offensive realism, with Yan Xuetong and some military academics as leading
14
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century
scholars. Fourth, some widely recognized Chinese liberalists, including Wang Jisi
and Wang Yizhou, are advocating a non-alliance strategy mainly because it
emphasizes the importance of interdependence and a non-conflictual relationship
with the United States. Finally, Qin Yaqing, a prominent constructivist in China,
explains China’s non-alliance strategy from an idealist perspective. For him, China’s
foreign policy is shaped by the background knowledge, more specifically the
Chinese dialectic, the zhongyong, which assumes the inclusiveness of two opposite
extremes as indispensable parts of an organic whole (Qin 2014).
Policy Implications of the Debate over Non-Alliance Strategy
In the international relations scholarship, the linkage between academic research and
policy making is a controversial issue. In US academia, a mainstream consensus
seems to have emerged that the gap between these two worlds needs to be bridged,
stressing the importance of policy relevant research (George 1993; Nye 2008; Avey
and Desch 2013). In contrast, the relationship between Chinese academia and the
policy making circle is quite different from its US counterpart, which is
characterized by a revolving-door mechanism. Chinese IR scholars seldom have
systematic and institutionalized approaches to infiltrating into foreign policy making.
Therefore, the separation between theory and policy is even more evident in China.
However, Chinese IR scholars’ role in foreign policy making has recently been
enhanced. As the Chinese government has become more and more active in
international affairs, a lot of new issues and challenges have emerged. In this context,
both public and academic opinion have
... the patterns and effects of Chinese
been collected and studied by various
IR scholars’ influence on the actual
institutions and bureaucracies at different
policy making process are largely
levels to provide consultation for policy
dependent on the individual scholars’
design. At the same time, Chinese
personal relationship with specific
scholars now strive to supply knowledge
officials and bureaucracies.
and advice to the policy circle. It should
be noted that the patterns and effects of Chinese IR scholars’ influence on the actual
policy making process are largely dependent on the individual scholars’ personal
relationship with specific officials and bureaucracies.
In their insightful analysis on the role of Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy,
Huiyun Feng and Kai He propose four ideal models: epistemic community, free
market, policy signaling, and mirroring policy (Feng and He 2016). As far as the
subject of discussion is concerned, the “free market” model seems to make more
sense than the others because the Chinese government has a strong preference for
maintaining the established non-alliance strategy at this stage, but also tends to
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century
15
tolerate alternative voices. As can be seen in official media commentaries and other
sources, the central authority also needs to respond to the academic debates over
some strategic issues, particularly when the official guidelines and principles have
been challenged. For example, Fu Ying, an experienced Chinese diplomat and
former vice minister of foreign affairs, recently published a piece in Foreign Affairs,
in which she responds to the debate on “the nature of the Chinese-Russian
partnership” and “whether it will evolve into an alliance” (Fu 2016). Based on a
comprehensive analysis of the China-Russia relationship, she clarifies that these two
countries will not enter into a formal alliance (Fu 2016). This is a very authoritative
response to the debate on China’s non-alliance policy in general, and the envisioned
China-Russia alliance in particular. In this case, Chinese policy makers have a clear
sense of the different views that have emerged.
Although a complete policy shift in the short term, Chinese leaders also recognize
the importance of making friends and recruiting support in international politics. In
his address at the Chinese Communist Party’s the Central Conference on Work
Relating to Foreign Affairs in November 2014, Xi Jinping called on China to
“develop a distinctive diplomatic approach befitting its role of a major country”
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2014). Building and cultivating partnership
relations with major powers, neighboring countries, and developing countries is
central to China’s aspiration of being a
... the strong emphasis placed on
great power. Xi said that China should
partnership diplomacy in recent official
“make more friends while abiding by the
discourse is unprecedented and leads
principle of non-alignment and build a
to the assumption that partnerships
global network of partnerships” (Ministry
might play an even bigger role in the
restructuring of China’s external
of Foreign Affairs of China, 2014).
relations in the years to come ...
Partnership diplomacy is not a new
concept in Chinese diplomacy. According
to official statements, China has established partnership relations with 67 individual
countries and five regions or regional organizations until the end of 2014 (Wang
2014). Moreover, the strong emphasis placed on partnership diplomacy in recent
official discourse is unprecedented and leads to the assumption that partnerships
might play an even bigger role in the restructuring of China’s external relations in
the years to come (Swaine 2015; Wu 2014).
The newly proposed “global network of partnerships” can also be interpreted as
an official response to the scholarly debate on non-alliance. Compared to China’s
partnership diplomacy of the past two decades, President Xi Jinping has expanded
understandings of strategic partnerships by defining them with different characteristics,
16
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century
especially seeking to establish a global network with China at its center. The emphasis
on global partnerships in President Xi’s speech shows that Chinese leaders and
policy makers are aware of the discourse surrounding the non-alliance policy. They
are also aware that there are not many nations that can be relied on to defend China’s
strategic interests; therefore, continued adherence to non-alliance is not due to its
efficacy, but because the government does not see many desirable alternatives.
It is easy to see that the dilemma of a rising power lies at the core of most of the
above debates. For those who call for a
Whether China will form alliances
change of China’s strategy, allying with
with other powers and neighboring
other nations is necessary and urgent,
countries depends on its self-defined
while those who advocate adhering to
role within the current international
non-alliance emphasize the cost and
system.
consequences of alignment. In practice,
China’s official stance on non-alliance has changed little. The Chinese government
has clearly stated in the Peaceful Development White Paper, published in 2011, that
its foreign policy is based on Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and that it
does not form alliances with any other country or group of countries (Information
Office of the State Council 2011). Beyond diplomatic rhetoric, however, Beijing’s
foreign policy has indeed become more proactive.
Whether China will form alliances with other powers and neighboring countries
depends on its self-defined role within the current international system. More
specifically, there are two important considerations for China: whether China can
continue to benefit from the current US dominated international system, and whether
China can bear the costs of challenging US dominance. Only if China views the
current international system as more of a constraint to its legitimate national
interests than an enabler of power and influence, will it choose to ally with other
nations that view the United States as a threat to their national interests.
Alliances have played a central role in international politics since ancient times.
Alliances form, collapse, and transform in response to changes in the security
environment. China will not change its position in the near future, but in the long
term China may ally with other countries again, when external conditions permit and
internal strategic calculations change. As Xu Jin sharply argues, “China should not
give up the option of alliance in the future, but it must change its traditional mindset
before altering its policy stance” (Xu 2015). It is necessary to note that the Chinese
government tends to articulate its foreign policy principles and strategies using
absolute and negative terminology such as, “China will never enter in any military
alliance”. For foreign audiences, such terminology is unpalatable because it conveys
an aggressive and uncompromising posture. For domestic audiences, these negative
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century
17
absolutes are misleading as they deny the reality of dynamic actors operating in
international relations. The absolute discourse the Chinese government employs in
international relations severely harms China’s reputation and prestige. In fact, some
Chinese policies are simply propaganda and have no actual bearing on China’s
foreign policy. When China does make changes to its foreign policy, i.e. shifting
from a non-alliance strategy to an alliance strategy, this inconsistency undermines
China’s strategic reputation. Wise politicians understand that policy choices are
designed to serve temporary aims, which need to be adjusted in accordance with
changes in the international system. Absolutes unnecessarily limit foreign policy
choices and show a lack of foresight. China’s foreign policy aims would be better
served by employing flexible terminology that enables China to operate dynamically
in response to changes in the international system.
Conclusion
Since the early 1980s, the Chinese government has firmly maintained a non-alliance
policy. Wary of getting unnecessarily entangled in interstate conflicts, China has
implemented this policy mainly in reaction to unpleasant experiences with Cold War
allies such as the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and North Korea. As China continues to
rise, scholars and strategic analysts are beginning to question whether a non-alliance
policy should be maintained. Some scholars contend that a non-alliance strategy
cannot safeguard China’s national interests in the face of the United States’ security
alliance network throughout East Asia, and without allies, China’s rise will be
contained by the US. To that end, pro-alliance scholars are especially favorable
towards a formal alliance with Russia.
China’s foreign policy aims would be
However, orthodox scholars, in favor
better served by employing flexible
of maintaining China’s non-alignment,
terminology that enables China to
argue that a formal alliance deviates
operate dynamically in response to
from the fundamental principles of
changes in the international system.
independence and self-reliance that
have historically guided China’s foreign policy. Furthermore, few of the remaining
options would even be considered trustworthy. A number of alternative strategies
have been proposed to replace or complement the non-alliance strategy; among them
are quasi-alliances, coalitions and strategic partnerships. Although it will not lead to
dramatic policy change in the short-term, the debate surrounding the non-alliance
strategy has significant implications for understanding China’s foreign policy
behavior as well as its relations with other major powers and its neighboring
countries.
18
Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century
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