Security-Vulnerability Audits
One or more individuals should perform an audit of the existing security features of a site. This would include a
study of the precautions that are taken for individuals and vehicles entering the plant, a tour around the inside and
outside of the site boundary, study of line-of-sights from outside the boundary toward storage tanks of hazardous
materials, and an expert review of PHAs of processes, to verify the absence of vulnerability to loss of utilities and
to inadvertent or deliberate process upsets.
CHEMICAL
PLANT
Hazards Control
& AssessVULNERABILITY
References
1. Center for Chemical Process Safety [AIChE], “Guidelines for Analyzing and Managing the Security
Vulnerabilities of Fixed Chemical Sites” (2003).
2. International Society of Automation [ISA], “Industrial Automation and Control Systems (AICS) Security”,
ISA/IEC 62443; formerly ISA99 (2015; some sections are under development).
Richard W. Prugh
Richard W. Prugh, M.S.Ch.E., CSP, PE (Engineering and Fire Protection), Mr. Prugh is the Principal Process
Safety Specialist at Chilworth and provides process safety engineering expertise to
clients at large and small plants, to improve the safety of manufacturing and operations
for multiple industries. During his career with the Du Pont Company, he was involved
in instrument engineering, explosion-hazards testing, explosives manufacturing and
testing, pilot-plant supervision, organic-chemicals research, safety and fire protection
audits, and process-safety consulting. Since 1985, he has provided process safety
services to chemical and petrochemical plants in thirty-two states and in twenty
foreign countries. He is the author of “Guidelines for Vapor Release Mitigation” and 25
presentations to Loss Prevention Symposia, and he prepared the “Toxicity” section for
the 8th edition of “Perry’s Chemical Engineers’ Handbook” and the “Safety” sections for
three encyclopedias. His experience involved overseeing the safety analyses of nervegas destruction plants and auditing the safety status of a dozen off-shore installations,
including evaluation of management and employee safety culture.
CHILWORTH TECHNOLOGY, INC.
Chilworth Technology, a DEKRA company, helps its clients achieve enabling and sustainable Process Safety Management
programs, Process Safety Proficiency (competency, know-how, and experience), and a culture that encourages excellence
in process safety. Our full range of services includes:
Process Safety Management (PSM) Programs
•
Design and creation of relevant PSM programs
•
Support the implementation, monitoring, and sustainability of PSM programs
•
Audit existing PSM programs, comparing with best practices around the world
•
Correct and improve deficient programs
Process Safety Information (Laboratory Testing)
•
Flammability/combustibility properties of dusts, gases, vapors, mists, and hybrid atmospheres
•
Chemical reaction hazards and chemical process optimization (reaction and adiabatic calorimetry RC1, ARC, VSP, Dewar)
•
Thermal instability (DSC, DTA, and powder specific tests)
•
Energetic materials, explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics to DOT, UN, etc. protocols
•
Regulatory testing: REACH, UN, CLP, ADR, OSHA, DOT
•
Electrostatic testing for powders, liquids, process equipment, liners, shoes, FIBCs
Specialist Consulting (technical/engineering)
•
Dust, gas, and vapor flash fire and explosion hazards
•
Electrostatic hazards, problems, and applications
•
Reactive chemical, self-heating, and thermal instability hazards
•
Hazardous area classification
•
Mechanical equipment ignition risk assessment
•
Transport & classification of dangerous goods
Chilworth serves clients throughout the agrochemical, chemical, engineering, food processing, government, insurance/legal, metals, oil/gas, pharmaceutical, plastics, rubber and other industries. Chilworth has offices throughout North America,
Europe, and Asia. For more information about Chilworth, visit www.chilworth.com.
PS - US - WP - 045 -01
To contact us:
> France:
[email protected]
>Spain
: [email protected]
> Netherlands: [email protected]
>UK
: [email protected]
> India:
[email protected]
>USA
: [email protected]
>Italy
: [email protected]
>China
: [email protected]
>Germany
: [email protected]
>Wallonia : [email protected]
CHEMICAL PLANT VULNERABILITY
CONSIDERATION OF “PROACTIVE” METHODS WHEN
PROTECTING HAZARDOUS-MATERIALS ASSETS
Richard W. Prugh, PE, CSP, Principal Process Safety Engineer
Introduction
For several decades, there have been increasing corporate “self-preservation” efforts – such as Process Hazards
Analysis, and self-audits – to prevent injuries and property loss from incidents in chemical plants that involve
releases of hazardous materials and events such as runaway reactions. There also have been externally-imposed
requirements for protection of employees [OSHA PSM] and for the protection of the public and the environment
[EPA RMP]. It is now becoming more apparent that similar efforts are needed to protect chemical plants and
their employees from more-insidious internal threats [sabotage] and external threats [terrorism]. This webinar will
present guidelines for reducing the vulnerability of such threats to site employees, to the plant infra-structure, and
to plant equipment. With decreased on-site vulnerability, the surrounding public and the environment also would
be better-protected.
Of particular importance are the protection of “safety-critical” process-control devices, protection of pressurized
containers of hazardous materials, and engineering and administrative measures to prevent unauthorized changes
to programmable electronic systems [cyber security]. The following discussion follows the outline for Security
Vulnerability Analysis that is presented in the publication of the Center for Chemical Process Safety [Reference 1].
Facility Characterization for the Security of Hazardous Materials
It is most important that every hazardous material on-site be well-protected from intentional release, whether by
merely opening a valve or by causing rupture of a container. The risk associated with release would depend on the
type of hazard – fire, flash fire, explosion, or toxicity – and the quantity that could be released. Thus, an injury-causing
fire hazard usually would involve thousands of gallons of a flammable liquid, or hundreds of pounds of a liquefied
flammable gas. A hazardous flash fire could result from a release of a few gallons of flammable vapor or a few pounds
of a flammable gas. An explosion hazard usually would involve a few dozen cubic feet of a mixture of flammable gas or
vapor and air, a few gallons of a reactive mixture, or a few pounds of a solid explosive. A toxicity hazard might involve
release of a few pounds of a low-toxicity gas, vapor, or dust or a few grams of a high-toxicity material. Thus, a first
step in characterizing the vulnerability of a chemical plant would be to list the flammable, toxic, reactive, and explosive
materials and the quantities that are typically on-site. The next step would be to determine how well-protected the
containers and containment systems of such materials are from “mischief” or malicious intent.
An evaluation of site security would provide an estimate of the “ease of access” to containers or locations of hazardous
materials. This would involve the physical security of the site, as would be provided by perimeter fencing, wellcontrolled gates, and monitoring of the areas along the fence. Site security is particularly difficult when a plant is
located on a river or in a coastal area, since there may be floodplain, high-tide, or easement restrictions concerning
installation of fencing along a shoreline.
Another type of site vulnerability could involve the theft of materials, and this could range from precious metals that
might be used as catalysts, to chemicals that could be used to manufacture explosives or toxic materials, including
toxins for the environment. Thus, such materials should be included in the listing of “assets” that might be subjected
to a threat from inside or outside the site boundaries.
During periods when road or railway gates are open, entry through the gates should be controlled by guards or
other personnel who have authority to stop unauthorized access. It is important that guards have continuous radio
communication with site management and/or a continuously-attended station, to warn of an impending dangerous
security violation. In relatively rare situations, it may be advisable to station armed guards at or near entry points into
the plant, depending on the surrounding security or political environment.
Risk Assessment for Hazardous Materials
An important part of a Security Vulnerability study is an assessment of risk, in terms of hazard, exposure to threat,
and the consequences of an incident occurrence. Thus, the listing of the flammable, reactive, and explosive materials
and the typical inventory should include the locations where such materials are within the plant. For example, storage
locations along or near the site boundary usually would be at much greater risk than locations well inside the plant.
However, the consequences of threat occurrence might be more severe for a location inside the plant (due to population
densities). Therefore, a risk assessment would include the following:
a. Identity and character of the hazardous material, including flammability, explosibility, reactivity, pyrophoricity,
and toxicity, with consideration of materials that would be inherently safer;
b. Typical or maximum quantity/inventory of the hazardous material, with consideration of reduced quantities
because of volatility, employee population near storage locations, and wind direction;
c. The existing storage conditions and material state, such as indoor, outdoor, or underground location, waterspray protection, protection of liquefied-gas tanks, and dike protection for liquids, with consideration of
improved storage and protection;
d. Storage or use location of the hazardous material, including distance to the site boundary, and limitations on
day-tank and drum storage in operating areas, with considerations of storage re-location; and
e. Existing protection against malicious threats, including site-entry requirements, procedures for telephoned or
email threats, and cyber hacking, with consideration of improved methods of protection against such threats.
For the use of persons who are responsible for minimizing security threats, it would be helpful to identify the locations
of hazardous-materials storage and use. However, the distribution of such a map should be limited and closelycontrolled, to prevent its misuse.
Countermeasures against Threats to Hazardous Materials
The objectives of countermeasures are to identify possible source(s) of the attack and to prevent or deter a malicious
attack on the site’s assets, to detect an attack if it were to occur, to identify the source of the attack and/or immobilize
or delay the escape of the attacker until the appropriate authorities can arrive and intervene.
Hazardous-materials “assets” can be protected by “pro-active”, “passive”, and “active” methods. Methods for “proactive” protection would include the use of less-hazardous materials, smaller quantities of hazardous materials, “failsafe” design of processes, and emergency systems such as shutdown interlocks and overpressure protection.
Among the “passive” methods are fencing around individual containers of flammable and toxic materials, with locked
access gates. In some cases, concrete barriers [walls and/or shells] or underground storage might be needed to
protect large tanks of hazardous materials – such as chlorine – from attack by rifle fire or other munitions at long
range. Where roadways or railways pass near containers of hazardous materials, reinforced-concrete bollards, or
crash-resistant barricades might be required. Passive methods also include locks on drain valves at tanks [and dikes]
and/or pipe caps on drains.
“Active” methods include closed-circuit television with motion detection, frequent patrols of the fenceline, visible
passes [with photographs] worn by all personnel within the site boundaries, flammable-gas and flammable-vapor
detection and alarm systems, and toxic-gas detection and alarm systems. This also would include searches of
all personnel entering the site, with metal detectors and/or “pat-down”, and thorough searches of all passenger
vehicles and small trucks entering the site. Active methods also include thorough background checks or “vetting”
of contractors’ employees and all service employees.
Countermeasures against vulnerability threats also includes the appropriate responses to malicious releases of
hazardous materials. The site should have an alarm system that warns the site occupants that an emergency
situation has developed, and all personnel should be well-trained in the appropriate responses to such an alarm.
The site’s emergency-response team should be equipped and trained to respond to releases of flammable liquids
and gases and to releases of toxic materials, and this would include the rescue of persons who are not accountedfor at assembly points. Members of the local fire and police departments and ambulance services should be made
aware of the site’s hazardous materials, so that they would be prepared to assist the site in responding to likely or
possible hazardous-release scenarios.
An important vulnerability hazard is the entry of large delivery trucks into the site. Delivery trucks should be
required to stop outside the site boundary until a thorough check can be made concerning the origin of the truck,
verification of all of the contents of the truck against purchases of the materials, and the proper identification of the
driver. The travel of the truck into the plant ideally should be physically limited – by fences or other barricades – to
a route directly from the plant gate to the delivery point, such as a warehouse or an unloading dock, to prevent
entry into processing areas. Similar precautions should be taken for “empty” bulk trucks and rail cars that enter
the plant to receive the site’s products. It may be advisable to install derailers outside the site boundary, to prevent
unauthorized entry to the site.
Facility Characterization for the Security of Other Assets
There may be other vulnerability threats to a chemical plant. They could include electrical-power supplies and other
utilities such as natural gas, fire-protection systems, process-control systems, and potable-water, process-water,
and cooling-water supplies. Chemical processes – and particularly chemical reactions – should be acceptably
“immune” to loss of utilities, as determined by an appropriate Process Hazards Analysis and “fail-safe” control
systems. Stand-by power systems may be needed for some safety-critical items such as reactor agitators and
cooling-water pumps.
Risk Assessment for Process-Control Systems
The site’s control of process hazards – as evaluated by Process Hazards Analysis [PHA] – should include protection
against deliberate impairment of process-control systems. The PHA should identify “safety-critical” devices and
systems, and the consequences of failures (deliberate impairments) of such devices and systems. This would
include electronic controllers, the sensors that provide input to control systems, and the process-control elements
such as valves, pumps, switches, fans and blowers, and other powered devices. The PHA should show how the
safety-critical devices and systems have real-time protection against deliberate impairment, as contrasted with
periodic and relatively-infrequent inspections and tests.
Countermeasures against Threats to Process-Control Systems
Safety-critical safety devices and systems should be protected against deliberate impairment by one or more layers
of security. In addition to site security, process-area security should be provided by sign-in of entrants including
contractors, service providers, and visitors. Service providers and visitors should be escorted into process areas,
and employees should be vigilant concerning unusual, out-of-scope, and hazardous activities of contractors. Further,
individual components of process-control and emergency systems may need to be protected by locks, mechanical
guards, or other devices that would prevent or deter impairment or prevent access. This would include locked-open
shutoff valves in utilities supplies and fire-protection systems; locked doors to instrument, analytical, and electronics
rooms; locked-closed bypass valves around process-control valves; locked-open valves in pressure-control piping;
restricted access to explosion vents and rupture disks, locked-closed or capped drain valves in process piping and
at storage tanks; and locked doors to storage rooms containing explosive or refrigerated materials, or liquefied
toxic gases. Depending on an evaluation of the consequences, the doors to electrical/motor control rooms should
be locked, and valves in natural-gas supplies should be locked open. Also, depending on their critical nature
on process control, block valves at pressure, flow, level, and analytical instruments should be locked open. The
evaluation would determine the possible negative effects of locking valves on the safety of processes that would be
affected by inability to quickly change the position of such valves or to access switchgear.
The process-control systems on a plant should be well-isolated from outside interference, such as might result
from “cyber-hacking” into the system. Ideally, there would be no possibility of control of a process from outside the
plant, and only indications of process conditions could be transmitted outside the plant. The site’s Management of
Change procedure should apply to significant changes to control systems, including alarm and interlock settings. A
previous standard on cyber security is being updated and revised [Reference 2].
Facility Characterization for the Security of Hazardous Materials
It is most important that every hazardous material on-site be well-protected from intentional release, whether by
merely opening a valve or by causing rupture of a container. The risk associated with release would depend on the
type of hazard – fire, flash fire, explosion, or toxicity – and the quantity that could be released. Thus, an injury-causing
fire hazard usually would involve thousands of gallons of a flammable liquid, or hundreds of pounds of a liquefied
flammable gas. A hazardous flash fire could result from a release of a few gallons of flammable vapor or a few pounds
of a flammable gas. An explosion hazard usually would involve a few dozen cubic feet of a mixture of flammable gas or
vapor and air, a few gallons of a reactive mixture, or a few pounds of a solid explosive. A toxicity hazard might involve
release of a few pounds of a low-toxicity gas, vapor, or dust or a few grams of a high-toxicity material. Thus, a first
step in characterizing the vulnerability of a chemical plant would be to list the flammable, toxic, reactive, and explosive
materials and the quantities that are typically on-site. The next step would be to determine how well-protected the
containers and containment systems of such materials are from “mischief” or malicious intent.
An evaluation of site security would provide an estimate of the “ease of access” to containers or locations of hazardous
materials. This would involve the physical security of the site, as would be provided by perimeter fencing, wellcontrolled gates, and monitoring of the areas along the fence. Site security is particularly difficult when a plant is
located on a river or in a coastal area, since there may be floodplain, high-tide, or easement restrictions concerning
installation of fencing along a shoreline.
Another type of site vulnerability could involve the theft of materials, and this could range from precious metals that
might be used as catalysts, to chemicals that could be used to manufacture explosives or toxic materials, including
toxins for the environment. Thus, such materials should be included in the listing of “assets” that might be subjected
to a threat from inside or outside the site boundaries.
During periods when road or railway gates are open, entry through the gates should be controlled by guards or
other personnel who have authority to stop unauthorized access. It is important that guards have continuous radio
communication with site management and/or a continuously-attended station, to warn of an impending dangerous
security violation. In relatively rare situations, it may be advisable to station armed guards at or near entry points into
the plant, depending on the surrounding security or political environment.
Risk Assessment for Hazardous Materials
An important part of a Security Vulnerability study is an assessment of risk, in terms of hazard, exposure to threat,
and the consequences of an incident occurrence. Thus, the listing of the flammable, reactive, and explosive materials
and the typical inventory should include the locations where such materials are within the plant. For example, storage
locations along or near the site boundary usually would be at much greater risk than locations well inside the plant.
However, the consequences of threat occurrence might be more severe for a location inside the plant (due to population
densities). Therefore, a risk assessment would include the following:
a. Identity and character of the hazardous material, including flammability, explosibility, reactivity, pyrophoricity,
and toxicity, with consideration of materials that would be inherently safer;
b. Typical or maximum quantity/inventory of the hazardous material, with consideration of reduced quantities
because of volatility, employee population near storage locations, and wind direction;
c. The existing storage conditions and material state, such as indoor, outdoor, or underground location, waterspray protection, protection of liquefied-gas tanks, and dike protection for liquids, with consideration of
improved storage and protection;
d. Storage or use location of the hazardous material, including distance to the site boundary, and limitations on
day-tank and drum storage in operating areas, with considerations of storage re-location; and
e. Existing protection against malicious threats, including site-entry requirements, procedures for telephoned or
email threats, and cyber hacking, with consideration of improved methods of protection against such threats.
For the use of persons who are responsible for minimizing security threats, it would be helpful to identify the locations
of hazardous-materials storage and use. However, the distribution of such a map should be limited and closelycontrolled, to prevent its misuse.
Countermeasures against Threats to Hazardous Materials
The objectives of countermeasures are to identify possible source(s) of the attack and to prevent or deter a malicious
attack on the site’s assets, to detect an attack if it were to occur, to identify the source of the attack and/or immobilize
or delay the escape of the attacker until the appropriate authorities can arrive and intervene.
Hazardous-materials “assets” can be protected by “pro-active”, “passive”, and “active” methods. Methods for “proactive” protection would include the use of less-hazardous materials, smaller quantities of hazardous materials, “failsafe” design of processes, and emergency systems such as shutdown interlocks and overpressure protection.
Among the “passive” methods are fencing around individual containers of flammable and toxic materials, with locked
access gates. In some cases, concrete barriers [walls and/or shells] or underground storage might be needed to
protect large tanks of hazardous materials – such as chlorine – from attack by rifle fire or other munitions at long
range. Where roadways or railways pass near containers of hazardous materials, reinforced-concrete bollards, or
crash-resistant barricades might be required. Passive methods also include locks on drain valves at tanks [and dikes]
and/or pipe caps on drains.
“Active” methods include closed-circuit television with motion detection, frequent patrols of the fenceline, visible
passes [with photographs] worn by all personnel within the site boundaries, flammable-gas and flammable-vapor
detection and alarm systems, and toxic-gas detection and alarm systems. This also would include searches of
all personnel entering the site, with metal detectors and/or “pat-down”, and thorough searches of all passenger
vehicles and small trucks entering the site. Active methods also include thorough background checks or “vetting”
of contractors’ employees and all service employees.
Countermeasures against vulnerability threats also includes the appropriate responses to malicious releases of
hazardous materials. The site should have an alarm system that warns the site occupants that an emergency
situation has developed, and all personnel should be well-trained in the appropriate responses to such an alarm.
The site’s emergency-response team should be equipped and trained to respond to releases of flammable liquids
and gases and to releases of toxic materials, and this would include the rescue of persons who are not accountedfor at assembly points. Members of the local fire and police departments and ambulance services should be made
aware of the site’s hazardous materials, so that they would be prepared to assist the site in responding to likely or
possible hazardous-release scenarios.
An important vulnerability hazard is the entry of large delivery trucks into the site. Delivery trucks should be
required to stop outside the site boundary until a thorough check can be made concerning the origin of the truck,
verification of all of the contents of the truck against purchases of the materials, and the proper identification of the
driver. The travel of the truck into the plant ideally should be physically limited – by fences or other barricades – to
a route directly from the plant gate to the delivery point, such as a warehouse or an unloading dock, to prevent
entry into processing areas. Similar precautions should be taken for “empty” bulk trucks and rail cars that enter
the plant to receive the site’s products. It may be advisable to install derailers outside the site boundary, to prevent
unauthorized entry to the site.
Facility Characterization for the Security of Other Assets
There may be other vulnerability threats to a chemical plant. They could include electrical-power supplies and other
utilities such as natural gas, fire-protection systems, process-control systems, and potable-water, process-water,
and cooling-water supplies. Chemical processes – and particularly chemical reactions – should be acceptably
“immune” to loss of utilities, as determined by an appropriate Process Hazards Analysis and “fail-safe” control
systems. Stand-by power systems may be needed for some safety-critical items such as reactor agitators and
cooling-water pumps.
Risk Assessment for Process-Control Systems
The site’s control of process hazards – as evaluated by Process Hazards Analysis [PHA] – should include protection
against deliberate impairment of process-control systems. The PHA should identify “safety-critical” devices and
systems, and the consequences of failures (deliberate impairments) of such devices and systems. This would
include electronic controllers, the sensors that provide input to control systems, and the process-control elements
such as valves, pumps, switches, fans and blowers, and other powered devices. The PHA should show how the
safety-critical devices and systems have real-time protection against deliberate impairment, as contrasted with
periodic and relatively-infrequent inspections and tests.
Countermeasures against Threats to Process-Control Systems
Safety-critical safety devices and systems should be protected against deliberate impairment by one or more layers
of security. In addition to site security, process-area security should be provided by sign-in of entrants including
contractors, service providers, and visitors. Service providers and visitors should be escorted into process areas,
and employees should be vigilant concerning unusual, out-of-scope, and hazardous activities of contractors. Further,
individual components of process-control and emergency systems may need to be protected by locks, mechanical
guards, or other devices that would prevent or deter impairment or prevent access. This would include locked-open
shutoff valves in utilities supplies and fire-protection systems; locked doors to instrument, analytical, and electronics
rooms; locked-closed bypass valves around process-control valves; locked-open valves in pressure-control piping;
restricted access to explosion vents and rupture disks, locked-closed or capped drain valves in process piping and
at storage tanks; and locked doors to storage rooms containing explosive or refrigerated materials, or liquefied
toxic gases. Depending on an evaluation of the consequences, the doors to electrical/motor control rooms should
be locked, and valves in natural-gas supplies should be locked open. Also, depending on their critical nature
on process control, block valves at pressure, flow, level, and analytical instruments should be locked open. The
evaluation would determine the possible negative effects of locking valves on the safety of processes that would be
affected by inability to quickly change the position of such valves or to access switchgear.
The process-control systems on a plant should be well-isolated from outside interference, such as might result
from “cyber-hacking” into the system. Ideally, there would be no possibility of control of a process from outside the
plant, and only indications of process conditions could be transmitted outside the plant. The site’s Management of
Change procedure should apply to significant changes to control systems, including alarm and interlock settings. A
previous standard on cyber security is being updated and revised [Reference 2].
Security-Vulnerability Audits
One or more individuals should perform an audit of the existing security features of a site. This would include a
study of the precautions that are taken for individuals and vehicles entering the plant, a tour around the inside and
outside of the site boundary, study of line-of-sights from outside the boundary toward storage tanks of hazardous
materials, and an expert review of PHAs of processes, to verify the absence of vulnerability to loss of utilities and
to inadvertent or deliberate process upsets.
CHEMICAL
PLANT
Hazards Control
& AssessVULNERABILITY
References
1. Center for Chemical Process Safety [AIChE], “Guidelines for Analyzing and Managing the Security
Vulnerabilities of Fixed Chemical Sites” (2003).
2. International Society of Automation [ISA], “Industrial Automation and Control Systems (AICS) Security”,
ISA/IEC 62443; formerly ISA99 (2015; some sections are under development).
Richard W. Prugh
Richard W. Prugh, M.S.Ch.E., CSP, PE (Engineering and Fire Protection), Mr. Prugh is the Principal Process
Safety Specialist at Chilworth and provides process safety engineering expertise to
clients at large and small plants, to improve the safety of manufacturing and operations
for multiple industries. During his career with the Du Pont Company, he was involved
in instrument engineering, explosion-hazards testing, explosives manufacturing and
testing, pilot-plant supervision, organic-chemicals research, safety and fire protection
audits, and process-safety consulting. Since 1985, he has provided process safety
services to chemical and petrochemical plants in thirty-two states and in twenty
foreign countries. He is the author of “Guidelines for Vapor Release Mitigation” and 25
presentations to Loss Prevention Symposia, and he prepared the “Toxicity” section for
the 8th edition of “Perry’s Chemical Engineers’ Handbook” and the “Safety” sections for
three encyclopedias. His experience involved overseeing the safety analyses of nervegas destruction plants and auditing the safety status of a dozen off-shore installations,
including evaluation of management and employee safety culture.
CHILWORTH TECHNOLOGY, INC.
Chilworth Technology, a DEKRA company, helps its clients achieve enabling and sustainable Process Safety Management
programs, Process Safety Proficiency (competency, know-how, and experience), and a culture that encourages excellence
in process safety. Our full range of services includes:
Process Safety Management (PSM) Programs
•
Design and creation of relevant PSM programs
•
Support the implementation, monitoring, and sustainability of PSM programs
•
Audit existing PSM programs, comparing with best practices around the world
•
Correct and improve deficient programs
Process Safety Information (Laboratory Testing)
•
Flammability/combustibility properties of dusts, gases, vapors, mists, and hybrid atmospheres
•
Chemical reaction hazards and chemical process optimization (reaction and adiabatic calorimetry RC1, ARC, VSP, Dewar)
•
Thermal instability (DSC, DTA, and powder specific tests)
•
Energetic materials, explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics to DOT, UN, etc. protocols
•
Regulatory testing: REACH, UN, CLP, ADR, OSHA, DOT
•
Electrostatic testing for powders, liquids, process equipment, liners, shoes, FIBCs
Specialist Consulting (technical/engineering)
•
Dust, gas, and vapor flash fire and explosion hazards
•
Electrostatic hazards, problems, and applications
•
Reactive chemical, self-heating, and thermal instability hazards
•
Hazardous area classification
•
Mechanical equipment ignition risk assessment
•
Transport & classification of dangerous goods
Chilworth serves clients throughout the agrochemical, chemical, engineering, food processing, government, insurance/legal, metals, oil/gas, pharmaceutical, plastics, rubber and other industries. Chilworth has offices throughout North America,
Europe, and Asia. For more information about Chilworth, visit www.chilworth.com.
PS - US - WP - 045 -01
To contact us:
> France:
[email protected]
>Spain
: [email protected]
> Netherlands: [email protected]
>UK
: [email protected]
> India:
[email protected]
>USA
: [email protected]
>Italy
: [email protected]
>China
: [email protected]
>Germany
: [email protected]
>Wallonia : [email protected]
CHEMICAL PLANT VULNERABILITY
CONSIDERATION OF “PROACTIVE” METHODS WHEN
PROTECTING HAZARDOUS-MATERIALS ASSETS
Richard W. Prugh, PE, CSP, Principal Process Safety Engineer
Introduction
For several decades, there have been increasing corporate “self-preservation” efforts – such as Process Hazards
Analysis, and self-audits – to prevent injuries and property loss from incidents in chemical plants that involve
releases of hazardous materials and events such as runaway reactions. There also have been externally-imposed
requirements for protection of employees [OSHA PSM] and for the protection of the public and the environment
[EPA RMP]. It is now becoming more apparent that similar efforts are needed to protect chemical plants and
their employees from more-insidious internal threats [sabotage] and external threats [terrorism]. This webinar will
present guidelines for reducing the vulnerability of such threats to site employees, to the plant infra-structure, and
to plant equipment. With decreased on-site vulnerability, the surrounding public and the environment also would
be better-protected.
Of particular importance are the protection of “safety-critical” process-control devices, protection of pressurized
containers of hazardous materials, and engineering and administrative measures to prevent unauthorized changes
to programmable electronic systems [cyber security]. The following discussion follows the outline for Security
Vulnerability Analysis that is presented in the publication of the Center for Chemical Process Safety [Reference 1].