Ideological Quietism? Ideology and Party Politics in Britain*
Dr Katharine Dommett
University of Sheffield
[email protected]
DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE AUTHOR
Ideology and political parties are frequently depicted as disparate
entities, with scholars citing a range of exogenous and endogenous
changes to demonstrate the decreasing relevance of ideology to party
politics. This article moves away from such accounts by looking at the
role of actors, and specifically party leaders, in contributing to
perceptions of ideological decline. Through an examination of the
rhetoric of Labour and Conservative Party leaders in Britain between
1945 and 1997, this article contends that politicians have engaged in,
what is termed here, ideological quietism. In this sense parties have
by not abandoned ideology, but have made rhetorical shifts indicative
of ideological decline.
The relationship between political parties and ideology is by no means uncontested. Since
Daniel Bell’s declaration that we were facing the ‘end of ideology’ (1961) and Francis
Fukuyama’s assertion that we are at ‘the end of history’ (1992) scholars have engaged in a
fierce debate over the relevance of ideology to political parties (Lemert, 1991; Lipset, 1966).
Whilst some have asserted, in the manner of Steven Buckler and David Dolowitz, that
‘ideology matters’ (2012) others, such as Ferdinand Mount, continue to contend that
‘Fukuyama got it right first time’ (2012, p.118). Such interventions have dominated
characterisations of party politics, focusing attention on party convergence, the emergence of
party cartels, and the decline of grand ideologies, to paint a picture of party behaviour in
which ideology is a marginal or increasingly irrelevant concern. This depiction has
widespread purchase, permeating into public conceptions of political parties as ‘all the same’.
Unlike many recent contributions to debates on party ideology this article does not seek to
attest the continued pertinence of ideas and ideology or to proclaim their increasing
marginalisation, rather it examines why, despite an array of scholarship accepting the
relevance and explanatory purchase of ideology (Atkins, 2011; Béland and Cox, 2009;
Finlayson, 2012; Griffiths and Hickson, 2010), conceptions of ideological decline prevail. In
considering this question attention is paid to the role of party actors in directing perceptions
of ideology, exploring the possibility that rather than being passive actors subject to global
and domestic shifts (as often portrayed), politicians themselves have contributed to the
perception that parties are less ideological. By analysing the way ideology is communicated
to audiences through political speeches this article argues that politicians’ own utterances
The author would like to thank Professor James Martin and Professor Colin Hay for their instructive
comments in the drafting of this article.
*
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have given the impression that ideology no longer matters by engaging in, what is termed
here, ideological quietism. This article therefore offers empirical and theoretical insight into
the way ideology is conveyed through speech and how this has altered since 1946. In so
doing it moves existing debates around party ideology beyond a binary focus on ideological
relevance to offer a more nuanced narrative of parties’ relationship with ideology.
In embarking on any study of ideology it is necessary to define the meaning of the term as an
array of competing definitions are evident (see Eagleton, 2007). Ideology understood here
refers to systems of ideas which stand in conflict to prevailing attitudes. In line with Michael
Freeden (1996) these visions are seen to be constructed from concepts invested with a
contestable meaning and arranged in patterns of significance to provide each ideology (and
hence party) with a unique but essentially contestable outlook. In the party context these
ideational webs can motivate party behaviour and inspire objectives and policies, a definition
which aligns with much established literature (see for example Adams, 2001; Vincent, 2010).
The interesting dynamic of parties’ relationship with ideology lies in the fact that parties both
formulate an ideological position which they possess and adapt over time, and they
communicate (or project) an ideological identity to an external audience (Dommett, 2014).
These two levels can be commensurate, but they are not always so as parties can act (for a
variety of reasons) in a manner that causes external perceptions of party ideology to differ
from a party actor’s own perception. It is this possibility and level of analysis which is of
interest here. When seeking to understand why ideology is often deemed in decline or
irrelevant, and why it can simultaneously be seen to ‘matter’, a study of ideology as projected
reveals how changes in the presentation of ideology can affect understanding of relevance.
The perceived pertinence of ideology can therefore differ dependent on the level of analysis.
By highlighting this possibility rhetorical analysis moves the study of party ideology beyond
dichotomous contentions of relevance and, as such, aims to revitalise study in this area.
In exploring the ideological picture projected by parties this article is structured as follows.
First, attention is directed to the existing literature on party ideology, exploring three
accounts which, from differing perspectives, convey ideology’s diminished significance.
Building on this literature the article, second, explores ideology in parties in greater detail and
introduces the notion of ideological quietism. On this foundation the article, third, outlines
the framework for subsequent analysis, presenting three markers by which to monitor
changes in the depiction of ideology. In the fourth section this method is applied to consider
changes in the political communication of Conservative and Labour Party leaders in Britain
since 1946. Drawing on analysis of over 100 leaders’ speeches† it is argued that parties’
depiction of ideology has altered over time, resulting in ideological quietism which limited
the audible ideological difference between the parties. Finally this article reflects on the
implications of this analysis for party ideology and posits future avenues of research on
parties’ relationship with ideology.
The speeches examined here can be accessed at http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speecharchive.htm or, in the case of Churchill’s speeches from James, R. R. (1974) Winston Churchill His Complete
Speeches, 1897-1963, New York: Chelsea House Publishers.
†
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Political Parties and Ideological Decline
To date the status of ideology in party politics has been the subject of a range of analyses, yet
throughout existing literature the notion that ideology has become less important is recurrent.
Indeed it is possible to identify three broad analyses which respectively advance historical,
electoral and strategic depictions of ideological decline.
First and most recognisably are historical accounts of the kind advanced by Bell and
Fukuyama which, from different perspectives, diagnose a decline in ideology. In Fukuyama’s
writing, which does not focus primarily on ideology, it is argued that the ‘end point of
mankind’s ideological evolution’ (1992, p.xi) has been reached, evident in the triumph of
liberal democracy over other social models. A similar, but more overtly ideological,
argument is advanced by Bell who, describing widespread acceptance of the Welfare State,
decentred power, the mixed economy, and political pluralism in Western democracies, argues
that ‘the ideological age had ended’ (Bell, 1961, p.403). Whilst widely critiqued (Hodges,
1967; La Palombara, 1966; Weltman & Billig, 2001), this approach has inspired the
perception that ‘“conservative socialism” has become the ideology of the major parties in the
developed states of Europe and America’, resulting in limited competition as positions which
‘once sharply separated the left from the right’ are no longer in evidence’ (Lipset, 1966,
p.17). On this account exogenous global changes are seen to have undermined the relevance
of ideology to party politics as a new ideological consensus has emerged.
The second narrative comes in the form of electoral accounts which depict party ideology as
subverted by the creation of catch-all and cartel models of party behaviour (Bolleyer, 2009;
for a discussion see: Koole, 1996). In response to the decline in class based voting it is argued
that parties are turning ‘more fully to the electoral science’ in order to gain ‘a wider audience
and more immediate electoral success’ (Kirchheimer, 1971, p.153). This is seen to have
prompted the emergence of catch-all parties which seek to gain a majority by drastically
reducing ‘the party’s ideological baggage’ and instead promoting an image which enters ‘into
millions of minds as a familiar object fulfilling in politics a role analogous as to that of a
major brand in the marketing of a universally needed and highly standardised article of mass
consumption’ (Kirchheimer, 1971, p.157; 159). This approach is seen to have prompted
convergence upon the centre ground, with parties attempting to accommodate rather than
shape public ideas and beliefs. Convergence is also seen to result from the rise of party
cartels. In this view the rise of state subsidies has meant that ‘parties need not be in
competition for survival in the same way that they once competed to determine policy’ hence
they have an incentive to form a cartel in which ‘all parties share in resources, and in which
all survive’ (Katz and Mair, 1997, p.105-7 cf. Bolleyer, 2009). This is seen to produce a
dynamic in which ‘parties still compete, but they do so in the knowledge that they share with
their competitors a mutual interest in collective organisational survival’ (Katz and Mair,
1997, p.112; 1995; 1996). This incentivises parties to maintain the cartel by converging on
the centre ground, hence campaigns become ‘orientated towards agreed goals rather than
contentious means’ (Katz and Mair, 1997, p.115). Parties are accordingly seen to focus on
‘managerial competence’ (Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.34), becoming dedicated to bidding ‘for
support from voters by promising more services (especially on the left) and lower taxes
3
(especially on the right)’ (Katz & Mair, 2009, p.757). Party cartels therefore inspire ‘an
‘ideology’ of managerial competence to replace the various ideologies of principle’ as the
basis for choice among parties (Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.46). Hence ideology in the sense of
grand competing visions has less explanatory purchase.
Finally a range of strategic explanations have emerged from scholars of party behaviour and
political communication which, from a different direction, echo the conclusions of catch-all
party theorists. Such scholars argue that the rise of a more personalized and presidential form
of politics has reduced the importance of ideology in favour of polices aligned with voter
preferences, leading party leaders to compete to gain ‘personal issue ownership’ (Blondel and
Thiébault, 2010, pp.92-3). On this account parties’ identities and apparent credibility are seen
to be of prime importance as they compete ‘for votes on the basis of how good their leaders
are, their priorities in government and how well they can deliver policies’, a pitch which
means that the ‘differences between parties can appear vanishingly small’ (Driver, 2011,
p.212). In this vein parties are seen as more concerned with appearing as ‘a proficient
alternative administration rather than an ideologically inspiring but potentially fissiparous
crusade’ (Bale, 2010, p.365), adopting a pragmatic approach to politics where campaign
promises are geared ‘not to beliefs founded on doctrine, but to programs that it believes will
have the greatest appeal to the public’ (Dickerson, Flanagan & O’Neill, 2010, p.362). Whilst
a range of scholars have criticised the distinction drawn between ideology and pragmatism
(c.f. Sartori, 1969), within much existing literature on parties and political campaigning it is
argued that parties have moved away from ideational visions to become pragmatic bodies
competing for electoral dominance. Indeed, Ralph Negrine has argued that parties have
eschewed ‘strong ideological positions in favour of positions with broad electoral appeal’ a
move which means that ‘[d]ifferences between the parties, once sharp and clear, become little
more than differences concerning which party is better able to manage the socio-political
environment’ (Negrine, 2008, p.61; for more see Stanyer, 2007, p.10).
Whilst based on very different, though often overlapping analyses, these three accounts have
helped embed perceptions of ideological convergence and decline, leading party politics to be
characterised as an ‘increasingly acrimonious battle for the narrow strip of political [centre]
ground’ (Parker and Pickard, 2008). However, such accounts have not gone unchallenged,
indeed, a range of counter narratives have been posited by scholars asserting the continued
relevance of ideology and ideas in the party context (and more widely). To give but a few
examples, Buckler and Dolowitz have argued through a series of articles that ‘ideology and
ideological difference remain central features of modern British politics and that ideological
positioning is an important, challenging concern for political parties’ (2012, p.576; see also
2009). Sheri Berman has asserted that ideologies should not be dismissed as an
‘epiphenomena, rising and falling thanks to changes in underlying economic interests or
material conditions and not exerting a significant independent impact on political life’, but
rather should be examined as providing ‘coherent interpretations of the world and guidelines
for dealing with it’ (2011, p.105). Whilst Freeden has asserted that ideologies are central to
understanding political behaviour because they ‘mobilize support, they construct appeals ...
[and] supply the justification for a particular ordering of conceptual priority from core to
4
periphery, as well as reasons for overriding that order in cases of emergency or at the whim
of power-wielders’ (2008, p.2). However, despite continued interest in parties’ ideological
positions and assertions of ideological relevance (see for example: Atkins, 2010; Bevir, 2000)
the perception that party politics is no longer defined by ideological division remains
prevalent.
In what follows this article does not seek to perpetuate a dualistic debate around the relevance
of ideology, but rather examines how agential behaviour has contributed to perceptions of
ideological marginalisation. Inspired by accounts of historical, electoral and strategic change
this article focuses on the role of politicians in communicating ideology and considers
whether changes in leaders’ speeches may have contributed to perceptions of ideological
decline by masking the ongoing relevance of ideas.
Parties and Ideology
Little attention has hitherto been paid to the way in which politicians and party activists
themselves contribute to current perceptions of ideological relevance. The existing literature
has tended to present politicians as rational, self-interested actors pursuing electoral
objectives at the expense of ideology, or as defenceless in the face of external forces which
have redefined ideology. However, as indicated in the above definition, party ideology is not
innate but rather something which can be affected, and indeed used, by politicians. As
LaPalombara argues, it ‘may or may not be believed by those who articulate it’, it can be
used as a ‘weapon or instrument of control’, can emanate from ‘subconscious needs or
drives’ or be ‘rationally formulated and incorporated into one’s belief system’ (LaPalombara,
1996, p.7). Ideology defined in this way is not passive but something which actors help
define and can consciously deploy to serve their own ends - a point recognised in Henry
Drucker’s distinction between doctrine, (the ideological message presented to an audience)
and ethos (the motivations which constitute an ideology) (Drucker, 1979). This does not
mean that party actors are unfettered in determining ideology, as context and competing
motivations affect the formation and adaptation of an ideology, yet their actions are
significant. Limited attention has been paid to the possibility that party leaders may
themselves contribute to perceptions of ideological decline by deliberately or unconsciously
altering their rhetoric to suppress ideology. There are, however, some notable exceptions as
LaPalombara has attested that ‘a decline or, better, a change in rhetoric should not be
confused with a decline in ideology itself’ (1996, p.7). Despite this scholarship has not
directed significant attention to how party ideology is communicated to an audience, how this
has changed over time, and what implications these shifts may have for understanding of the
relationship between parties and ideology.
To explore ideology at this level this article introduces the concept of ideological quietism.
Quietism refers to the process of quieting, subduing or lessening an idea and hence
emphasises the possibility that actors can depict ideology in a way that lessens its apparent
significance. By selecting different rhetorical strategies an actor can (often unconsciously)
project a message which does not appear to be ideological. This can be done by avoiding
indicators of ideology which, in this article, are seen to come in three forms: first, as direct
5
references to ideology or ideological traditions, second as a move away from concepts, and
third as a decline in ideational conflict. Whilst these changes can occur for a variety of
reasons (which are not explored in this article) they can give the impression that ideology has
diminished significance in party politics. Such changes do not, however, belie the ongoing
significance of ideology to individuals within parties, hence analysis at this level can help to
reconcile the binary depiction of ideological relevance discussed above.
Analytical Method
In advancing this argument this article examines political speeches for evidence of
ideological quietism. The study of ideology through language has a rich provenance. As Paul
Chilton asserts ‘political activity does not exist without the use of language’ (Chilton, 2004,
p.6; Chilton & Schäffner, 2002, p.3) and numerous scholars have engaged in analysis at this
level, studying actors’ visions of the world, implicit assumptions, key ideas and modes of
persuasion to determine their ideological message and/or position (for example see CharterisBlack, 2006; Chadwick, 2000; Fairclough, 1995; 2000; 2003; Finlayson, 2004; 2007;
Finlayson and Martin, 2008). In adopting this form of inquiry this study moves away from
existing methods such as Discourse Analysis (and its Critical variant) as rather than
perceiving ideology to be a static entity embedded in linguistic signals this article examines
ideology as, what James Martin terms, a ‘projectile’ (2013). In this sense ideology can be
used for strategic-reapproriation, it can be used to shape circumstances by attempting to
persuade an audience of the virtue of an idea and re-shape expectations of common sense,
rendering politicians critical to the construction of the political landscape.
This focus on language as a persuasive device inspires study through political rhetoric, yet
rather than examining the rhetorical tools used by politicians to promote their message
(Finlayson and Martin, 2008; Martin, 2014), this study seeks to detect ideological indicators
in language designed to persuade. Attention is specifically paid to party leader’s conference
speeches, a data source which provides annual contributions for each major party in Britain
and can be studied longitudinally to determine change in the way ideology is communicated.
Such study is informative because whilst previous attempts have been made to explore the
relationship between ideology and rhetoric (Weltman and Billig, 2001) these have tended to
focus on small samples of data, offering limited insight into change over time. It should be
noted, however, that this data source does have limitations. The context of conference
speeches has changed, moving, in the case of Labour, from being an internal ‘Parliamentary
Report’ (Minkin, 1980) to becoming an externally facing media event (Faucher-King, 2005).
These shifts have implications for the study of ideology as the context and purpose of
political speeches is not constant, with different private and public audiences present. Yet,
constant to these speeches is their presentational nature. Leaders’ speeches represent an
attempt to ‘sell’ parties’ actions and ideas to different audiences, crafting a message designed
to reassure, persuade or cajole internal and/or external audiences. It is this attribute which is
of interest in this analysis; exploring how party leaders present their message, and where
ideology features within their rhetoric. Due to constraints of space conference speeches alone
are considered, but this source could be analysed comparatively, examining, for example,
6
speeches made to different audiences at different times to determine contextual variations in
presentation.
The time series examined here is 1946 to 1997, with specific attention paid to two periods
widely seen to exhibit ideological diversity and ideological convergence respectively, namely
1946-1950 and 1994-1997. In these periods Clement Attlee is seen to have promoted a highly
ideological agenda which led to the creation of the welfare state, the NHS and widespread
nationalisation, a programme which was roundly opposed by the Conservatives under
Winston Churchill’s leadership. In contrast 1994 marked the advent of New Labour under
Tony Blair’s leadership, a political project which, for many, represented ideological
convergence between the Conservatives and Labour (Hay, 1997). Whilst other periods
provide equally interesting points of apparent convergence (1950s) and divergence
(1970s/early 1980s) these two periods are examined at they represent key historical markers
in the narrative around ideology. Drawing on data gathered as part of a wider project this
article scrutinises three prevalent ideas within the existing literature on parties’ relationship
with ideology (Table 1).
----INSERT TABLE 1 HERE--The first area concerns the claim that parties have moved away from or abandoned ideology.
Emphasising global shifts, pragmatism and vote maximisation the existing literature depicts
parties’ ideological identities as increasingly irrelevant or subordinated to rational
calculations. In assessing such claims and party leaders’ contribution to these narratives
analysis focuses on whether there has been a decrease in the number of direct, positive
references to the term ideology, or to established ideological positions such as socialism,
conservatism, liberalism, communism, social democracy etcetera. Given the anathema which
surrounds the term ideology in contemporary political debate this analysis seeks to determine
if ideology was depicted positively, how this was apparent, and whether this has changed
over time. Whilst basic this offers a preliminary indicator as to whether politicians have
changed their representation of ideology over time.
Second, attention is turned to the idea that parties have neglected grand ideological narratives
in favour of pragmatic appeals based on policies, party credibility and personal appeal – ideas
advanced by electoral and strategic narratives. To examine this tendency attention is paid to
the place of concepts in political speech. The work of Freeden has emphasised the
significance of concepts, with his principle of ideological morphology mapping webs of
decontested concepts such as democracy, liberty, equality and order to determine a party’s
ideological position in relation to previously dominant ideological perspectives (1996). This
approach has been widely utilised by scholars of party ideology (Atkins, 2010; Finlayson,
2012) who map concepts evident in policies or speeches to determine ideology. Inspired by
this logic a lack of concepts in speeches, or the relative insignificance of concepts when
compared to other concerns such as a party’s policy agenda or credibility, indicates the
decreased importance of ideology. Hence by mapping the presence of concepts in speeches
and their significance relative to other concerns it is possible to assess politicians’
contribution to perceptions of ideological marginalisation.
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Finally, the article examines the notion that an ideational consensus has been reached
between the parties, an assertion made by historical accounts and, to a lesser degree, electoral
and strategic scholarship. If ideologies, as John Zaller asserts, ‘organise political conflict’
then a decline in conflict over ideas would signal an apparent decline in the relevance of
ideology (2009, p.70). This prompts attention to be paid to how conflict is apparent in
political rhetoric, considering whether conflict is focused upon personality, policies and party
credibility as opposed to ideas and concepts, and whether this is a new development.
To enable this analysis each speech was coded according to these three markers. References
to ideology were identified by a simple key word search, monitoring mentions of ‘ideology’,
‘socialism’, ‘conservatism’ etcetera, and derivatives of these ideologies such as ‘social
democracy’ and ‘socialist’ to determine how ideology is depicted, and whether political
rhetoric has changed in the period examined. The second two indicators, concepts and
references to conflict, were somewhat more problematic to code. The approach taken here
involved detailed textual analysis whereby concepts were coded in accordance with the
specific nuances of each leaders’ speech. Hence, rather than coding instances of predefined
concepts such as fairness, equality and liberty, speeches were analysed inductively to identify
conceptual references. This allowed the diversity of conceptual references to be captured,
resulting in references such ‘fairness’, ‘fair society’, and ‘free and fair’ being coded as
separate examples of conceptual use, rather than as evidence of one concept (fairness). By
comparing the prevalence of concepts with references to specific policy ideas, contextual
events, illustrations of personal credibility, or record, the content of speeches was examined.
In regards to conflict, a multi-stage process of coding was undertaken. First speeches were
read to identify examples of conflict, extracting sentences which exhibited a range of
different forms of criticisms and attack. Once pinpointed these examples were re-coded to
identify instances of conflict over ideas, record and people, and examples where a party was
rebuffing external criticism. Hence, John Major’s 1994 assertion that: ‘Labour filched two of
the principles on which we fought the last general election: opportunity and responsibility.
But wasn't it interesting that they left out two others: personal choice and private ownership’
was coded as a conflict over ideas. Attlee’s 1947 assertion that: ‘the times in which we live
demand great changes, and there was a great legacy of past neglect which we inherited’ was
coded as a conflict over record. And Blair’s comment in 1994 that ‘Michael Howard, protests
that he has been attacked week after week for being too tough. He is dreaming. He would
love to be attacked for being too tough’ was coded as an example of a personal attack. By
monitoring the extent to which each form of attack featured in political speech inferences
were drawn concerning the nature of conflict.
In using this data to attest evidence of ideological quietism it is important to recognise that
the depiction of ideology can change for a variety of reasons. Contextual factors, changing
cultural norms or individual leadership style can result in shifts in the presentation of
ideology. Rather than examining the precise cause of ideological change, in interpreting this
data this article looks at overarching trends and as such, highlights long term changes rather
than short term variations in the presentation of ideology.
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Analysis
Has party rhetoric moved away from the language of ideology?
The depiction of ideology in party conference speeches is in some ways remarkably
consistent. In the entire period examined the term ‘ideology’ has not experienced popularity;
rather post-war Attlee voiced ideology through the language of socialism and social
democracy, and Churchill utilised concepts and attacked the ideological traditions of
socialism and communism. The two parties therefore took different approaches. Within
Attlee’s speeches ideological traditions played a defining role as evident in assertions such
as:
I stand here with this experience of Government to reaffirm my faith
in democratic Socialism. We will never sacrifice the liberties won by
our forefathers. It is social democracy which can set us free from the
tyranny of economic power and preserve us, too, from the dangers of
the absolute power of the State (1946).
This positive expression of ‘social democracy’ was bolstered by ideological contentions such
as: ‘Socialism is a way of life, not just an economic theory, and in the process of achieving
Socialism we have got to be good citizens of the Socialist State’ (1948). Attlee’s rhetoric
therefore depicted ideology as key, using references to specific traditions to outline the party’s
vision, policies and credibility. This approached offered a highly ideological picture of the
party’s identity and provided a clear indication that it was ideology that underpinned actions,
a depiction widely noted in the existing literature (Francis, 1997) and articulated by Attlee
himself (1937).
In contrast, under Churchill the Conservative’s ideological position was far less recognisable.
Far from embracing ideological labels Churchill voiced vehement criticism of ideology,
depicting it as doctrine and dogma within his rhetoric. Indeed in 1946 he asserted:
We ought not to seek after some rigid, symmetrical form of doctrine,
such as delights the minds of Socialists and Communists. Our own
feelings and the British temperament are quite different. So are our
aims. We seek a free and varied society, where there is room for many
kinds of men and women to lead happy, honourable and useful lives.
We are fundamentally opposed to all systems of rigid uniformity in
our national life and we have grown great as a nation by indulging
tolerance, rather than logic.
This language juxtaposed Labour’s socialism and ‘Communist doctrines’ with the
Conservative’s common sense position; an antithesis evident in the contention that ‘we
Conservatives do not believe there is a quack cure-all for the trouble and tribulations of
human life’ (1947). This portrayal of Conservative ideas was loosely articulated as a
9
‘Conservative aim’ (1946) but pre-existing ideological traditions and labels were not utilised,
offering a quietist depiction of ideology.
In the period 1951-1994 these trends largely endured. Successive Labour leaders continued to
utilise ideological labels to promote their ideas. Harold Wilson depicted his agenda as
‘socialist in its inspiration, conception and its formulation’ (1964), James Callaghan
emphasised his Government’s ‘socialist measures’ (1976) and Michael Foot similarly attested
Labour’s ‘obligations as socialists to other people in other lands’ (1982). Conservative leaders
did however change their approach slightly. The party continued to attack Labour’s
ideological identity, with Anthony Eden deriding Labour’s ‘Socialism’ as ‘just a little bit out
of date’ (1955), and Ted Heath depicting Labour as ‘wishing to march back into the 19th
century to the time of the birth of their doctrine’ (1965). Yet, party leaders began to offer a
clearer picture of conservative ideas and adopt the language of conservatism. Hence Harold
MacMillan asserted that ‘Conservatives felt the need to counteract the excess of individualism
and laissez faire’ (1960), Heath described how ‘The Great Divide between freedom and
compulsion represents perhaps the widest, the most dramatic gulf between Conservatism and
Socialism today’ (1966), and Margaret Thatcher emphasised how ‘We Conservatives hate
unemployment’ (1975). However, this use of ideological terminology differed to Labour’s, as
by rejecting ideology as dogmatic Conservative leaders’ portrayed their ideas as common
sense, offering a series of values which (erroneously) appeared divorced from the kind of
ideology promoted by Labour.
In the latter period examined (1994-1997) the depiction of ideology becomes more uniform as
Labour begin to replicate the Conservative’s vocal scepticism of ideology, and move away
from ideological traditions such as socialism and social democracy to talk instead of the
party’s ideas and beliefs. Whilst wishing ‘success to socialist and social democratic parties in
Austria and Germany in their forthcoming elections’ (1994) Blair described Labour as based
on ‘a tradition far above ideology but not beyond ideas’ (1996), and rejected ‘outdated
ideology’ in favour of updated labour values (1995). This shift saw Labour exercise caution
around ideological terms, using such references to communicate change, redefine the party’s
goals, or attack the opposition, rather than as projectiles for promoting the party’s beliefs.
Hence, in addressing the socialist label Blair asserted that he promoted ‘social-ism’ that was
‘rooted in a straightforward view of society, in the understanding that the individual does best
in a strong and decent community of people with principles and standards and common aims
and values’ (1994). As such he re-appropriated a traditional ideological label to emphasise the
links between Labour’s conceptual perspective and the public good. This reliance on concepts
as opposed to ideological traditions was also evident in Major’s rhetoric in assertions such as
‘We Conservatives are: for the individual, not the state; for choice, not direction; for
ownership, not dependence; for liberty, not control’ (1995) and ‘I am a Conservative. I
believe we should give families opportunity and choice and a wider, warmer view of life’
(1996). Both parties therefore emphasised their values through the language of concepts and
goals rather than ideological traditions, offering a less overt depiction of ideological identity.
10
On this analysis political rhetoric does not exhibit a collapse in ideological references, but
rather shows a move by Labour away from the overt promotion of established ideological
traditions towards the articulation of concepts, beliefs and values. This approach mirrors the
rhetorical strategy of the Conservative Party which dismissed ideology and instead presented
its values as common sense, suggesting a convergence in rhetorical style. Rather than
abandoning ideology, it therefore appears that Labour altered its ideological language to
exhibit ideological quietism, adopting a rhetorical strategy that gives the impression of
declining ideological relevance.
Has there been a move from grand visions towards procedural and policy focused language
in party rhetoric?
Turning to the second criterion, evidence of change is once again apparent, but the observed
shift runs counter to expectations. Whilst concepts are envisaged, in line with existing
accounts, to have declined in prominence in relation to other party concerns, analysis reveals
that in the post-war period Attlee made little use of concepts in comparison with Churchill,
and that over time concepts have become more rather than less prominent in the speeches of
political leaders. Furthermore, it appears that non-ideological concerns such as policies and
assertions of credibility are not novel, but are a prominent feature of political speeches across
the time period. Far from reinforcing the prevalent narrative this analysis therefore offers an
alternative account in which concepts have not declined, but remain prominent, simply
exhibiting a shift in usage by Labour post-1994.
As seen above, Attlee’s speeches are filled with references to socialism and the ‘principles of
the Labour Party’ but relative to Churchill, and contrary to expectations, his speeches only
sparingly use concepts. Where evident concepts serve to delineate the substance of socialist
ideology, hence Attlee articulates the party’s ‘living faith in freedom, democracy, and social
justice’ (1946), outlines how the touchstone of our Socialist faith leads the party ‘to promote
world peace by collective security’ (1946), and asserts that ‘Socialism demands a higher
standard of civic virtue than capitalism. It demands a conscious and active participation in
public affairs’ (1948). In this way concepts augment the party’s clear social
democratic/socialist perspective, providing further detail rather than conveying ideology
through concepts alone. This approach differs to Churchill’s speeches where concepts are
presented in the absence of a larger philosophy to promote a non-ideological Conservative
vision which, in contrast to Labour’s ‘Party aims’ (1946), is in the national interest.
Mobilising concepts such as security, freedom, choice, justice, order, enterprise,
independence, production, thrift and rights Churchill presents the party’s ‘strong principles’
which are ‘not up for auction’ (1946) and which are ‘very often identical with national
interests’ (1949).
This alternative use of concepts is evident until 1994. In Labour, democratic socialism
continues to provide an overarching framework which is supplemented by concepts. Hence
Callaghan asserts that ‘Democratic socialists emphasise that a fundamental aspect of freedom
is the freedom of minorities without our society’ (1976) and Wilson calls for ‘a new system of
11
privilege in this country, based on need and not birth, too, on a fair and equal chance in life
for all Britain’s children’ (1966). Successive Conservative leaders also continue earlier trends
by relying on concepts aligned with the ‘common good’ (MacMillan, 1957) or ‘nation’s good’
(Eden, 1955). A contrast therefore exists between Labour leaders who utilise concepts to
illustrate an ideological tradition, and Conservative leaders who deploy concepts to underline
their (supposedly) non-ideological position and affiliation with national interests. This
difference suggests a diverse landscape in which audible differences of approach can be
discerned between parties. Yet when turning to the later period examined in detail, it is
appears that from 1994 Labour shifted its position to adopt the form of concept heavy rhetoric
promoted by Conservative leaders. Whilst Major and Blair promote different concepts (and
place different emphases), both align their principles with the national interest. Echoing his
predecessors Major asserts ‘this nation can trust that instinct for security that is a defining
characteristic of the Conservative Party’ (1994). Blair deploys similar language depicting
Labour as ‘once again able to represent all the British people’ (1994), portraying Labour
values as ‘shared by the vast majority of British people’ (1995) and condemning the
Conservatives for never having ‘the best vision for Britain’ (1996). Concepts are therefore
used by both parties to align their vision with the national interest, revealing a shift in
Labour’s rhetoric which compounds the impression of consensus.
Turning to non-conceptual references analysis reveals no such differences as both parties
continually place emphasis on non-ideological concerns such as policies, credibility, record
and personality. Detailed study reveals some differences in the deployment of these references
as whilst Labour integrates them into its broader ideological message the Conservatives
largely use them to emphasise their capacities and practical expertise. Hence, Attlee’s
speeches abound with references such as ‘It is a remarkable thing that confidence in our
British financial system has risen steadily with the work of the Socialist Chancellor of the
Exchequer’ (1946) and ‘It’s a very unusual thing for a Government to have a clearly defined
plan and policy for its work during the life-time of a Parliament’ (1949), comments which
underline the party’s practical achievements, capacities and policies to demonstrate the
viability of their socialist perspective. In contrast the Conservatives place emphasis upon
personal credentials, with Churchill asserting in 1946 ‘that the situation is so serious and what
may have to come so grave, that I am resolved to go forward carrying the flag as long as I
have the necessary strength and energy, and have your confidence’. These leadership
credentials are deployed to attack Labour, with Churchill deeming the decision to nationalise
Cables and Wireless ‘a dead loss to this island’ (1946) and criticising ‘the unskilful manner in
which our foreign affairs have been handled’ (1948). This trend is continued throughout the
period examined here, but from 1994 Blair places greater emphasis on the party’s viability
and his personality – mirroring Major’s (and indeed Churchill’s) approach. Blair’s speeches
are accordingly peppered with assertions such as ‘we are back as the party of the majority in
British politics, back to speak up for Britain, back as the people’s party’ (1994), and emphasis
is placed on his own personal leadership capacities by announcing, in a prime ministerial
manner, new policy initiatives and appointments (1994). These techniques reflect Major’s
assertion that ‘This time we have built a recovery to last, built on firm foundations, on export
and investment’ (1994) and his statesmanlike recollection that ‘Boris Yeltzin was my guest,
12
and the President of Russia and the British Prime Minister shared a country house weekend, a
walk in the English countryside, and a pint of beer in a British pub’ (1994). Whilst nonideological concerns are therefore not novel, it appears that both parties focus on similar nonideological points post-1994. Such trends illustrate complex developments in parties’
relationship with ideology, and suggest a form of quietism manifest as a convergence in tone
post-1994.
Has party rhetoric moved away from conflict over ideas to conflict focused on other
concerns?
Finally, the third criterion outlined above turns attention to the role of conflict in political
speeches. In line with the existing literature a decline in ideational conflict can be expected,
and yet the speeches examined show no radical change. In Attlee’s speeches conflict is
apparent in a number of forms. Ideationally, Labour’s socialist vision is depicted in direct
contrast to the existing ‘tyranny of economic power’ (1946), and seeks to move from ‘a
capitalism based on private enterprise and property to a Socialist economy based on the
control and direction of the wealth and resources of the country in the interests of all the
people’ (1947). This ideational conflict is accompanied by attacks on the Conservative Party
for having ‘no policy of its own’ and ‘not the faintest idea as to what it would do if by some
misfortune it were called to power’ (1949). Similarly conflict is evident in criticism of a ‘great
legacy of past neglect’ (1947) and ‘the somewhat intermittent leadership of Mr. Churchill’
(1948), signalling clear antipathy between the two parties over vision, record and personality.
Churchill’s speeches are similarly conflict laden, as he repeatedly criticises ‘Socialist
Ministers [who] are so much wrapped up in their Party doctrines that they cannot give a fair
chance to our national interests and prosperity’ (1946). Specific attention is paid to Labour’s
ideology and communism with Churchill critiquing ‘the fallacious, narrowing doctrines of
Socialism’ (1946), the ‘Crazy doctrines, clumsy fingers, Meddlesome Matties, vicious and
morbid trends of policy [which] are manufacturing shortages and misery by their vice and
folly’ (1947) and ‘class hatred and envy’ which is seen as the ‘driving force of Socialism’
(1949). Conflict is thus key to the Conservative message and attempts are made to discredit
Labour ideas, competence, record, leadership, management, legitimacy and credibility. The
extensive use of conflict continues throughout the speeches examined here. Even in the period
of apparent consensus Major contests Labour’s character, credibility and ideas to bolster the
Conservative’s credentials, asserting ‘unlike Labour, we are not ashamed of our past. Unlike
Labour, we have not abandoned our principles. Unlike Labour, we have not had to reinvent
ourselves’ (1996). Similarly Blair depicts the right-wing as ‘lost and disillusioned’ (1994) and
as the ‘most feckless, irresponsible, incompetent managers of the British economy in this
country’s history’ (1996). He also defines his own ideas in contrast to the Conservative’s
prescriptions in comments such as ‘The Tory view of the family is the same as its view of the
individual: you are on your own. But the essence of family life is that you are not on your
own, you are in it together, and families work best when the members of it help and sustain
each other; and the same is true of communities and nations’ (1994). On this account the place
of conflict in political speeches does not appear to have altered as throughout the period
13
examined here both parties attack each other’s ideas, policies, record, credibility, leadership
and vision, offering no indication of ideological irrelevance or quietism.
Analysis
On this evidence it seems that the rhetorical depiction of ideology has altered over time, but
not in line with the narrative offered by the existing literature. Far from passively responding
to external or endogenous changes, the speeches examined here show that political leaders
have altered their rhetoric in a manner likely to affect perceptions of ideology. In the
Conservative case the depiction of ideology has not fundamentally changed as Conservative
leaders have consistently depicted ideological traditions as negative, dogmatic phenomena,
and have outlined conservative principles through concepts and ideas aligned with ‘common
sense’ and the national interest. Labour leaders have, however, altered their rhetorical
depiction of ideology. Between 1946 and 1994 Labour promoted a socialist identity and
agenda, referencing socialism and social democracy to outline and justify their vision. As
such the party projected an overtly ideological persona which reified ideological traditions.
However, in 1994 the dynamics of ideological debate changed markedly as Labour’s rhetoric
began to mirror the Conservatives. This change saw Labour move away from the positive
deployment of words such as socialism and social democracy to instead project a message
focused on concepts and the national interest. As such the party shed its previous rhetorical
tropes, engaging in a form of ideological quietism by emphasising values and ideals rather
than ideological traditions.
These findings are significant as they reveal key insights about the nature of parties’
relationship with ideology. First, it suggests that, contrary to the existing literature, actors
within political parties are not passive but can affect how party ideology is depicted by
(consciously or unconsciously) altering their rhetoric. By deploying different rhetorical
strategies politicians can (intentionally or unintentionally) alter perceptions of the
significance of ideology. Second, it suggests that political parties are not uniform
organisations as the above analysis has shown Labour and the Conservatives to exhibit
different rhetorical relationships with ideology which, in the Labour case, evolved over time.
As such it is important to explore trends common to all political parties, but also to consider
individual cases, using comparative analysis to highlight contextual influences on party
behaviour. Third, it reveals that parties have a complex and often multi-faceted relationship
with ideology. Whilst ideological traditions were largely absent from political rhetoric after
1994 this analysis has shown a continued reliance upon concepts, the presence of different
visions for society, and interparty conflict. Hence, although the language of ideology was
rejected in these cases, concepts, ideas and conflict – the currency of ideology – remained
pivotal.
Ideological quietism therefore provides a useful conceptual tool with which to move beyond
binary debates about ideological relevance as it shows that politicians can offer a negative
depiction of ideology, or minimise evidence of ideological difference and yet remain wedded
to ideas. In this light party ideology is not something passive which is buffeted by external
14
changes, nor does it exist in a zero-sum relationship with other electoral or strategic concerns,
rather it is something which can be both possessed and projected by party actors.
Conclusion
In returning to debates over the relevance of ideology it appears that politicians have played a
role in contributing to and/or compounding the impression that ideology is a marginal
concern in contemporary party politics. If ideology is a projectile which can be used by
parties to define their identity and spell out their vision for society than it appears that Labour
have changed their weaponry to align with Conservative techniques. The convergence upon
concepts and caution around ideological references has unified the landscape of party
communication, removing differences which once divided parties. As such the ideological
positions which characterised the early to mid twentieth century no longer appear to have
purchase in contemporary political speech, with socialism and social democracy being
replaced by a language of beliefs, values and concepts.
This conclusion is by no means incompatible with the existing historical, electoral and
strategic narratives outlined at the beginning of this article as ideological quietism may result
from a variety of pressures cited by these literatures. Rather than seeking to explain why
change has occurred this article has sought to emphasise the presence of rhetorical change,
highlighting the significance of party actors, and their capacity to alter the depiction of
ideology. By studying ideology as communicated through speech this article transcends the
tendency to either dismiss or defend ideology, asserting that whilst ideology remains pivotal
to party politics, it should not be seen as a static construct. As such the article seeks to reset
the debate around party ideology, offering analysis which re-emphasises the significance of
ideology and the importance of political actors.
In advancing this research further the landscape for future study is both wide and deep.
Building on this investigation it is pertinent to inquire how ideological quietism is manifest
and how successful it is as a rhetorical strategy? As such it would be fruitful to map different
forms of ideological quietism, focusing on the specific form of rhetoric (e.g. national interest,
crisis, pragmatism) used by party leaders in place of ideological references, and the trends
evident in different kinds of political speech. Similarly scholars could consider the goals of
ideological quietism, tracing how different leaders have used this strategy to induce different
outcomes such as party change or ideological realignment. International, comparative
analysis of the prevalence of quietism would also help expose the extent of this phenomenon
on the global stage. Furthermore, scholars could examine the causes of quietism, considering
whether changes in context and culture affected the formulation of ideology? Or they could
examine the implications of quietism for ideology, contemplating whether quietism causes
ideology to stagnate or evolve, and whether it helps politicians achieve their desired goals?
These avenues for future inquiry have the potential to rejuvenate debate in this area,
refocusing academic attention on the complex dynamics of the relationship between parties
and ideology.
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