Agence Française de Développement
working
paper
June 2012
Development Aid Reforms
in the Context of New Public Management
Jean-David Naudet, Agence Française de Développement
([email protected])
Research Department
Agence Française de Développement 5 rue Roland Barthes
75012 Paris - France
Direction de la Stratégie
www.afd.fr
Département de la Recherche
119
Acknowledgements
The author used research conducted by Vincent Kienzler in the drafting of this article. He would also like to thank
Thomas Mélonio for the reflection they conducted together on a similar subject.
Disclaimer
The analyses and conclusions formulated in this Working Paper are solely the responsibility of its author. They do not necessarily reflect the position of Agence Française de Développement or its partner institutions.
Publications Director: Dov ZERAH
Editorial Director: Robert PECCOUD
ISSN: 1958-539X
Copyright: 2nd quarter 2012
Layout: Denise PERRIN
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
2
Contents
Abstract
5
Introduction
7
1.
New Public Management
9
1.2.
The extension of New Public Management
11
Development Aid Policy Reforms
13
1.1.
2.
2.1.
The four characteristics of New Public Management
Segmentation of responsibilities
13
Performance-based management
15
2.2.
Accountability
2.4.
Systemic reforms
2.3.
9
14
16
3.
The Challenge of Implementation
17
3.2.
Collective accountability and individual responsibility
21
3.1.
3.3.
Management of intangible performance
18
From segmentation to fragmentation
23
Conclusion
25
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
26
Bibliography
27
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
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Abstract
The purpose of this article is to analyse reforms to the international development aid policy based on the concepts of New
Public Management. Three principles are particularly discussed: the segmentation of development policy implementation, the
growing concern for accountability, and the establishment of performance-based management systems. The analysis of
developments in official development assistance clearly shows that New Public Management principles are being applied to
aid policies. Yet the distinctive characteristics of aid – difficulty to define performance, extreme heterogeneity of results,
systematic collective responsibility, disconnection between those who pay for policies and those who benefit from them,
absence of global regulation – make it an inappropriate example of the application of these management principles. As a result,
a number of implementation difficulties appear as challenges for the future of aid policies.
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
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Introduction
Development aid has always been the focus of a flow of
place in public management, the so-called New Public
different types of criticism, including that of being managed
Management (NPM).
in an ineffective and excessively bureaucratic manner.
The purpose of this article is precisely to provide an
Some of the proponents of this criticism, such as Bishop
analytical grid for the changes taking place in aid policy
and Green (2008), base their hope on private aid and what
management using the wider framework of NPM.
seeks to demonstrate how development results could be
The first section briefly describes the principles of NPM
employed by the great corporate capitalists to official
literature that is available on this topic. The second section
has recently been called philanthrocapitalism. Their work
significantly improved by applying the methods and rigour
using a brief and simplified summary of the abundant
development assistance. Another author (Edwards, 2010)
draws a parallel between these principles and recent aid
challenges this position by arguing that these methods do
policy reforms. By focusing on the three fundamental
activities are based.
accountability and the segmentation of responsibilities), the
This debate is timely and salutary. It should therefore have
that have emerged from the application of these principles
not reflect the values and specificities on which cooperation
aspects of NPM (performance-based management,
third section subsequently highlights the practical issues
taken place in the sphere of official development assis-
to aid policies. This analysis seeks to pinpoint what, among
programs have been seeking to make aid management
appear to stem from the specificities of development aid.
tance a long time ago. Indeed, since the 1990s, reform
the different implementation difficulties encountered, would
less bureaucratic and to bring its management principles
Finally, a brief conclusion outlines the main points that have
movement is clearly inspired by the wave of change taking
how to adapt to NPM in the specific case of aid policies.
more into line with private management principles. This
been dealt with and highlights the need for reflection on
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
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1. New Public Management
NPM came about in the 1980s, at the same time as the
The integration of the options and choices (empowerment)
objective was to emerge from bureaucratic public manage-
beneficiary, is regarded as a determining factor in improving
liberal “counter-revolution”. The political plan was clear: the
of the “client/user” of policies, who is both the payer and
ment, regarded as ineffective, and to reverse the seemingly
them.
relentless upward trend in public expenditure. The guiding
principle was to bring public entities’ management methods
The concept of efficiency in policy implementation becomes
more into line with those of private company manage-
the overarching objective. In the 1990s, it was replaced by
for public policies (Ferlie, 1996) that allows effective incen-
United Kingdom. The aim of public management is to be
ment. This involves building a quasi-market environment
the similar notion of “value for money”, especially in the
tives to be defined for stakeholders. NPM supports and is
able to provide the largest possible quantity and quality of
and privatisation.
seen as playing a role in public management that is similar
complementary to the movement in favour of deregulation
goods and services at the lowest cost. Efficiency can be
to productivity in private management.
There is extensive literature on the characteristics of the
principles of NPM (Hood, 1991 and 1995; Mac Laughin et al.,
The public manager replaces the former administrative
the core “concepts” of public management.
procedures and managing processes and personnel, but of
For example, public policy implementation is compared to a
delegation of responsibility and the autonomy of the public
2002; Barzelay, 2001) and on the gradual transformation of
official. It is no longer so much a question of respecting
organising the appropriate means to achieve results. The
process to produce goods and/or services. This blurs the
manager, as with his private counterpart, become conditions
difference between public entities and private companies,
for public policy efficiency.
which are both regarded as service providers. The notion of
a user, or even a client, of public policies becomes central
Beyond these conceptual developments, NPM can be
in describing someone who was previously the beneficiary.
generally defined by four main characteristics.
1.1. The four characteristics of New Public Management
●
The first characteristic of NPM is that public policy
units (often agencies) organised by “manageable
delegated to autonomous managerial units that are
implemented horizontally, i.e. in the form of competition
implementation is segmented through missions being
products” (Hood, 1995). Segmentation is sometimes
given the responsibility for clearly identifiable objec-
between public entities that may be given the responsi-
tives. This fragmentation may be achieved within the
bility for similar objectives, or even between public and
institutions, in the form of project teams for example,
private entities. However, it is also carried out vertically,
policy implementation being segmented into strategic
mentation based on principal/agent-type relations.
but often leads to the institutional framework for public
creating chains of delegation for public policy imple-
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
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1. New Public Management
The main instrument governing the relations between
objective- and performance-based contracts. The latter
these different entities is the contract (Lane, 2000). It
are more or less formalised, their performance is eva-
generally defines objectives and performance and is
luated and, in principle, they provide the basis for
binding upon the entities in charge of the different
promotion, sanctions and wage policies.
management and implementation levels for public
policies (or is between these entities and users’
●
representatives). One emblematic example is the
●
assessments is central to the way in which NPM
Public Sector Agreement (PSA) established in the
United Kingdom for the main public operators1.
operates and constitutes the fourth characteristic.
The segmentation of responsibilities is based on a
instrument for managerial and human resource
Performance Measurement and Management Systems
– PMMS (cf. Politt, 1986) serve as an accountability
widespread practice of accountability (Mulgan, 2000),
management units. They provide the basis for the
the second characteristic of NPM. Managerial units and
relationship between the public authority/different
the managers themselves are given the responsibility
entities in charge of policy implementation and the
(often under contract) for the results to be achieved.
clients/citizens along with their representations (Radin,
They are also accountable for performance towards all
2006).
the stakeholders. The term that is sometimes used is
360-degree accountability: it is vertical towards the
Performance, a central concept of NPM, is generally
the different control and transparency bodies and social
moving closer towards a maximum ratio between the
authorities responsible for policies, horizontal towards
directly related to the notion of efficiency. It involves
towards public policy users and their representations
resources allocated and the results achieved (value for
The third characteristic concerns the principles of
public policy productivity.
govern human resource management. It involves going
PMMS are very often based on sets of indicators that give
sic bureaucratic management and establishing incenti-
resources, the results achieved and performance. One of
often requires going beyond the excessively inflexible
of indicators. However, this is not the only instrument in the
(Goetz and Jenkins, 2005).
●
The definition of target objectives and performance
money). If one continues the comparison with private
management further, performance is the measurement of
responsibility, autonomy and initiative taking that
beyond the crippling divesting of responsibility of clas-
a practical shape to the target objectives, the use of
ve measures that promote individual effectiveness. This
the specific markers of NPM would appear to be a wide use
rules that govern public service personnel. NPM the-
specific toolbox of PMMS, which also contains certain
refore often relies on semi-autonomous entities
forms of evaluation, performance audits and benchmarking.
dedicated to specific tasks, the growing number of
which is sometimes referred to as a phenomenon of
agencification. Here again, managers and their teams
are individually bound to public policy actors under
1 PSAs are organised in the following manner: mission, objectives, performance
indicators, “value for money” targets and responsibilities.
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
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1. New Public Management
1.2. The extension of New Public Management
All analysts observe that NPM methods have been
NPM has also been taken on board by international
extended to a large number of countries and to an
organisations, particularly the World Bank and the
experimented in pioneering countries, such as New
(OECD) through its Public Management Committee.
gradually spread to all Western countries and beyond
Developing countries, partly under this impetus and more
political contexts, as can be seen, for example, with the
are not left out of the movement. On the contrary, the
increasingly wider scope of public policies. NPM was first
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and has
(Hood, 1995). It has particularly been adapted to different
generally that of the international aid system as a whole,
case of the United Kingdom, where Tony Blair’s Labour
principles of NPM are quite in harmony with the manage-
government resumed the movement initiated in this
ment message conveyed by donors (depolitisation of policy
direction by the previous Conservative governments.
implementation, priority to efficiency, “agencification”,
accountability and results-based management). As a result,
In other countries, such as France and Germany, NPM was
many of the principles (more or less appropriated) of NPM
introduced later and more gradually. This was the case in
are to be found in developing countries and are often taken
France in the early 2000s (Berrebi-Hoffmann and Grémion,
on board by Ministries of Finance.
2009), where the adoption of the Organic Law on Finance
Laws (LOLF) and the principles of the General Review of
Public Policies provide clear examples.
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
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2. Development Aid Policy Reform
To our knowledge, there is not one analysis in the literature
(iii) the establishment of PMMS. In Northern countries,
and NPM. Yet the application of its principles to development
developments in the internal management of aid institutions,
devoted to the linkage between aid management reforms
these phenomena may systematically be analysed as being
aid policies can be clearly seen. Among the many ways to
but also in Southern countries as the consequence that the
segmentation of the implementation of development
on development policies.
illustrate this, we shall successively be looking at (i) the
“management conditionalities” of aid instruments have had
policies, (ii) the growing concern for accountability and
2.1. Segmentation of responsibilities
Prior to the wave of NPM, development aid implementation
mentation and has resulted in “implementation chains” (Aid
was widely segmented into projects, i.e. into “managerial
Chains, according to Wallace et al., 2007) governed by
units” with responsibility for specific objectives. This method
contracts based on logical frameworks that function through
of organisation, a forerunner to new public management,
vertical feedback reporting on activities and their results.
was extensively developed in the 1980s and 1990s. At the
end of this period, the proliferation of projects did, however,
Finally, at the third level of segmentation, since the late
tation of implementation, which is a classic consequence of
institutions in charge of defining and managing aid policies.
pose a problem as it demonstrated the excessive fragmen-
1990s there has been a large increase in the number of
NPM (see below). In the 2000s, programme aid, coordination
This fragmentation sometimes occurs at the national level,
development community. Although the aim was to reduce
fragmentation, the managerial system, which functioned on
empowered by public authorities. This is the case in various
countries2: in New Zealand with the creation of the New
was nevertheless not transformed. This can be seen, for
2002; in Australia, with the establishment of the Australian
and alignment became the overarching maxim for the
where the trend is to scale up delegation to “agencies”
the basis of a segmentation of objective-based policies,
Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID) in
example, with the ever-increasing use of the logical
Agency for International Development (AUSAID) in 2010 as
framework tool that links objectively verifiable activities,
an autonomous aid implementation agency; in Spain with
targets and indicators.
the creation in 1998 of the Agencia Española de
At the same time, since the 1980s, aid policy implementation
charge of implementing Spanish cooperation, or again in
Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID) in
(which used to be widely based on local and international
the United States with the creation of the Millennium
administrative apparatus, such as technical assistance) has
increasingly been relying on specialised entities. They are
mainly non-governmental organisations (NGOs), but also
2 It should be noted that certain countries have taken an opposite or more complex course.
New Zealand reversed its decision to empower NZAID (this point is dealt with further on). In
Norway, NORAD reintegrated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Japan, the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) integrated the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC),
but at the same time became an autonomous agency for the Japanese aid policy.
public agencies, associations and civil society organi-
sations, sometimes even private entities. This has led to
a form of inter-institutional competition in aid policy imple-
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
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2. Development Aid Policy Reform
Challenge Corporation in 2002 with a mandate to implement
(GFFATM) and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and
Agency for International Development (USAID).
organise vertical chains for the implementation of aid
selective and effective aid alongside the United
States
Immunisation (GAVI). As their name implies, these funds
programmes. At the local level, they establish competition
However, it is at the multilateral level that the majority of
between different implementation entities on the basis of
instruments and institutions dedicated to specific objectives
specific international objectives. Similarly, there has been a
have been created. According to Severino and Ray (2010),
proliferation in the number of Trust Funds created, which
2000 and 2005. They are mainly vertical funds, such as the
managed by multilateral institutions.
twenty-five multilateral institutions were set up between
are basket funds dedicated to a specific objective and
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
2.2. Accountability
The issue of accountability, like that of the segmentation of
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
responsibilities, did not wait for the development of NPM
(SIDA) and from other entities in charge of implementing
before it emerged in debates on aid policies and this was
Swedish aid. In 2010, the Independent Commission for Aid
even before it began to concern other sectoral policies.
Impact (ICAI) was set up in the United Kingdom with the
Indeed, in a review of the history of aid evaluation,
same mandate to independently evaluate the impact of
Cracknell (2000) observes that development institutions’
British aid. Several countries are planning to set up other
cated to this task date back to 1979. However, it would
aid policies.
strong interest in evaluation and the creation of units dedi-
similar control entities (watchdogs) specifically dedicated to
appear that at the time, the focus was clearly more on
learning than on the need to “be accountable”. Independent
At the international level, an Oxford Policy Management
this same concern3.
tional mechanisms working for aid accountability, such as,
analyses of aid effectiveness also attest to the existence of
(OPM) study (2008) provides a “selection” of twenty interna-
for example, the Commitment to Development Index of the
However, it was from the 1990s onwards that the concept
Center for Global Development (CGDev), the Annual
on aid and for aid practices. Consequently, development aid
of the NGO CONCORD coordination group.
public policies in the world (hundreds of evaluations of dif-
The concern for accountability was initially oriented vertically
of accountability became a common tool for the discourse
Report of the Reality of Aid Network and the Watch Report
certainly went on to become one of the most evaluated
ferent tools or areas related to it are indeed conducted
towards Northern political structures, but went on to
every year).
become mutual between partners from the North and
partners from the North and South, then social, i.e. directed
The agenda increasingly focused on setting up totally
towards the users/clients of development policies.
independent evaluation, audit, supervision and bench-
Mutual accountability was, moreover, adopted as one of
marking mechanisms alongside the dedicated departments
the five principles of the 2005 Paris Declaration.
within each cooperation organisation. In 2006, Sweden set
up the Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation
(SADEV) as a new institution totally independent from the
3 These analyses have been regular since Cassen (1985).
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
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2. Development Aid Policy Reform
All these mechanisms, along with the exchanges related
Accountability is also promoted in Southern countries
to the complex aid implementation chains, create a
through the activities of aid agencies to support par-
reporting activity that is central to the way in which the
liaments, through the media, control bodies and, more
current system operates. At the institutional (corporate)
generally, the countervailing power (Hudson, 2009), but
ration of scorecards, which are different types of indicator
ability towards authorities and citizens in development
level, this activity materialises, for example, in the prepa-
also through the inclusion of transparency and account-
dashboards (see below) specific to each institution or
programmes and projects.
entity. This type of reporting mechanism is a very recent
phenomenon and all the main multilateral organisations
have adopted it or are in the process of doing so.
2.3. Performance-based management
Performance-based management (or PMMS) is the third
the impetus of the European Commission, budget support
management since the end of the 1990s. USAID was the
tionality on the reforms to be implemented to an ex post
pillar of NPM and has been an integral part of aid
therefore (partially) evolved from being an ex ante condi-
first agency to propose introducing PMMS (Results-Based
conditionality based on performance evaluation. This con-
NPM Foundation Act in the United States: the 1993 US
ficiaries and donors on the results achieved, set out in
the other cooperation agencies, which in turn adopted
support and the approach through national poverty reduction
Management Framework) in 1994, immediately after the
tributed to focusing political dialogue between aid bene-
Government Results and Performance Act. It was joined by
Performance Assessment Frameworks. Both budget
mechanisms that were different but based on the same
strategies have also been tools that encourage budget
Management Policy), the Department for International
expenditures and indicators – to be established in a large
principles: ACDI in Canada in 1996 (Results-Based
programmes – based on sets linking target objectives,
Development (DFID) in the United Kingdom in 1998
number of developing countries.
(Performance-Based Management [Hood, 2006]), the
United Nations (Results-Based Management in 2001), the
Output-based aid is the most recent in the family of
European Union (Results-Oriented Monitoring System set
performance-based management tools and is promoted
that concerned all cooperation organisations, even more so
the World Bank. It involves an ex post allocation of aid
up in 2002), etc. These are just a few examples of a trend
by numerous actors in the international community, notably
from 2005 onwards when results-based management was
depending
Declaration with a view to enhancing aid effectiveness.
ambitious instrument of this kind destined to finance deve-
adopted as one of the five principles of the Paris
on
the
results
achieved.
The
Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) was certainly the first
lopment projects in the field of climate change. This form of
Similarly, performance-based management was transplanted
aid is currently developing, for example in the health sector
to management systems in partner countries through the
where funds for decentralised healthcare centres (including
instrumentation related to programmes and projects
for wage incentives) are allocated on the basis of an
financed by aid. From the end of the 1990s onwards, under
evaluation of the number and quality of treatments.
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
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2. Development Aid Policy Reform
2.4. Systemic reforms
These three phenomena – segmentation of responsibilities,
temptation to see a management learning process that is
enhanced accountability and performance-based
endogenous to the aid policy or development sector. For
m a n a g e m e n t – are, of course, interrelated. Vertical,
example, results-based management would therefore be
horizontal and social accountability are indeed based on
justified by the fact that aid management had previously
performance assessments. This accountability is core to
been based too much on processes and had not managed
and, first and foremost, their efficiency, as it retroactively
These interpretations do hold some truth. However, the aim
implementation. This can only work if the institutional archi-
article, is to show that all these developments form an
the process to continuously improve policies and projects
to demonstrate the effectiveness of the actions carried out.
creates incentives for the different levels of responsibility for
of this description, and the main argument of the present
tecture is segmented into autonomous “units” that are given
integrated and perfectly coherent whole. They also originate
the responsibility for specific targets, such as the provision
from a powerful global movement to change public
of a certain number of goods and services.
management which, admittedly, can be adapted to the aid
A factual, isolated and contextual interpretation (depending
it. The fact that developments in the aid system are not put
policy, but on the basis of principles that are exogenous to
on the countries studied) is often made of the different
into perspective within the analytical framework of new
changes at work in aid management (for example, by
public management conceals this convergence which
observing the development of earmarked vertical funds or
should, however, be perfectly clear.
independent evaluation entities). There may also be a
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
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3. The Challenge of Implementation
There is extensive literature on the ways in which NPM is
achieved and on the difficulties encountered.
applied in practice to different public policies, on the results
Box 1. The “pluses” and “minuses” of the implementation of NPM
Ferlie (1996)
The “pluses”
•
Greater focus on efficiency and value for taxpayers
•
Transparency through contracts and contestability
•
Champions consumers against public sector producers
•
•
Active management not passive administration
Challenging poor performance
The “minuses”
•
Contract based modes of steering are weak
•
Proliferation of contracts and subcontracts
•
Poor lateral communication around ‘wicked problems’
•
•
•
Vertical lines of reporting
No theory of organisational learning
Loss of creative policy making capacity
The blocking factors in public management – heavy
Indeed, this section places more emphasis on the weak-
bureaucratisation, excessive and ever-increasing expen-
nesses and limits related to the implementation of NPM in
managerialism – as identified in the pre-NPM diagnostics
have, in many cases, been greatly mitigated4.
The former are easier to document because they are
By contrast, here again, when we look at aid policies, to our
present aid policy management that is difficult to consider,
dit u r e s , a l l - powerful professional cultures that resist
aid policies than on the progress that it has brought about.
derived from the analysis of the difficulties of day-to-day
practice. The latter merit a comparative analysis of past and
knowledge there is no overall analytical reflection on the
all things being equal.
management changes that were mentioned in the previous
4 For example, Amar and Berthier (2007) note: “Moreover, the introduction of NPM has
made it possible to avoid significant waste and to make substantial savings. This is the case in
Australia, without it having any impacts on the quality of services offered (Domberger and
Hall, 1996). In New Zealand, according to the former Minister of Industry, Mac Tigue (2005),
employment in the administration has been reduced by 66 % and the share of the State in
GNP has fallen from 44 % to 27 %, while productivity has increased. The budget surpluses
have made it possible to reduce public debt from 63 % to 17% of GNP and to bring down
income tax rates.This reduction has led to an additional income of 20 %. According to
Burnham (2000), in the United Kingdom, NMP has reduced costs, improved service
quality, increased productivity and greatly reduced the number of civil servants (down 34 %
since 1979) (…)”.
section. This section provides elements that are quite
exploratory on this topic by focusing on the management of
aid institutions. The scope of management changes in
Southern countries – the consequences of aid policy
reforms – merits a separate analysis and will not be
addressed below.
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
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3. The Challenge of Implementation
In fact, it does not seem possible to compare aid effective-
aim to conduct an assessment and make a judgment, but to
reforms, although this could contribute to a real evaluation
brought about. We shall proceed by examining in turn what
ness or efficiency prior to and following these managerial
identify the new managerial issues that these reforms have
of the latter. To our knowledge, the very abundant literature
we have identified as being the three characteristic
on aid evaluation never raises this question of how aid
phenomena of the implementation of NPM in policies in the
effectiveness evolves over time. And, if this were the case,
reverse order to the previous section: performance-based
changes rather than to changes in political or economic
tation of responsibilities.
it would be extremely difficult to attribute it to management
management, multi-faceted accountability and the segmen-
contexts. Consequently, the critical analyses below do not
3.1. The management of intangible performance
The great merit of performance-based management
has on public health (Is prevention taken into account?
(decision-makers, users, managers, etc.) to the results of
actions, whereas experience shows that resource-based
Is morbidity reduced?) and take account of the equity of
access to the service5.
focus of attention for the institutions that implement these
These ambiguities over the definition of performance can
However, generally speaking, NPM analysts observe that
indicators on resources (percentages of resources and of
cult to define, and that it is both a political and technical
achievements (irrigated areas and number of classrooms
systems is that they draw the attention of aid actors
Does the care provided meet the priorities of public health?
management has been, and remains to a large extent, the
policies.
clearly be seen on the lists of indicators defined in the
scorecards of multilateral institutions6, which integrate
the concept of public policy performance is extremely diffi-
projects allocated to different sectors to be developed),
issue. First of all, at what level in the results chain should
built), intermediary results (outcomes, such as the primary
this performance be situated? Bouckaert (2005) draws a
completion rate), sectoral impact (infant and maternal
line between private and public activities by assuming that
mortality rate) and overall impact (growth and Gini
for private activities, outputs are an end in themselves,
coefficient), efficiency (ratio of operating costs to aid trans-
perspective that is necessary in order to give meaning to a
(percentage of projects rated satisfactory at completion)
while their consequences (outcomes or impacts) provide a
fers and appraisal time periods), judgment of effectiveness
public activity. Moreover, beyond effectiveness and
efficiency, the values are an element of judgment that is
essential for assessing public policies: are they fair or
5 To give a literary parallel, Dr. Knock in the play by Jules Romains, “Doctor Knock or the
triumph of medicine”, is an efficient private service provider, but a mediocre public doctor.
unfair, equitable or not, coercive or not, participatory or not,
socially useful or not etc.? (Dalton and Dalton, 1988).
6 The scorecards of sixteen multilateral institutions were examined: World Bank
(International Development Association – IDA – and European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development – EBRD), African Development Bank (ADB),
Asian Development Bank (AsDB), European Investment Bank (EIB), Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), European Commission, Global Environment Facility
(GEF), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFFATM), Multilateral Fund for the
Implementation of the Montreal Protocol (MLF), Clean Technology Fund (CTF),
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI), International Finance
Corporation (IFC) and UNITAID. All the indicators referred to in the rest of this
section are extracts from these different scorecards.
To illustrate these points, one could basically say that the
performance of a private healthcare centre can be gauged
by the quantity and quality of the services delivered
compared to their cost, while that of a public healthcare
centre must integrate the impact that the service provided
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
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3. The Challenge of Implementation
and organisational effectiveness (number of supervisory
irrigation systems is an equally important dimension of the
activities per operation). Few of these indicators reflect
characterisation of the performance of the policy in
questions of value and when they do (percentage of local
question. A managerial use entirely focused on the “surface
teams and corporate social responsibility – CSR – indica-
performance.
that are intrinsic to aid policies or policies financed by aid
Finally, management requires aggregated information. This
the poverty rate or the Gini coefficient).
types of indicator (outputs, outcomes and impact, for
personnel in teams, percentage of executive women in
area” indicator would be likely to lead to poor actual
tors), it is a question of corporate ethics and not of values
(or they are otherwise highly aggregated indicators, such as
point poses a fresh problem as the aggregation of different
example) is difficult to conceive, and even the aggregation
We shall briefly mention the problems of measuring these
magnitudes7 that can be illustrated by an indicator used by
of results of a similar nature often leads to results that are
meaningless. For example, the indicator “kilometres of
most institutions: the reduction of CO 2 emissions. By
definition, this indicator is not observable as it quantifies an
avoided nuisance8. In order to be measured, it requires
transport routes built or rehabilitated” includes new rapid
urban routes and rehabilitated rural roads in the same
calculation and excludes issues of distribution and equity.
modelling based on a reference scenario, the definition of
which raises considerable methodological difficulties9.
whether the classrooms have been built in poor or more
Some areas that are difficult to quantify – such as education
quality10, healthcare quality, capacity development, the
All these points have been commented on by PMMS
Similarly, “the number of classrooms built” does not indicate
advantaged regions.
reduction in corruption and the improvement in governance
analysts concerning policies that are different to the one
that they are often priorities for the relevant institutions.
“pathologies” by way of response to these difficulties to
– have no (or few) performance indicators, despite the fact
analysed here. They identify two types of institutional
grasp, interpret and use public policy performance.
However, it is just as difficult to interpret and use indicators
as it is to define and measure them. Indeed, it is the causes
The first is often mentioned (Hood and Peters, 2004; Pollitt
of the variations in performance that a priori provide
et al., 1999) and involves adopting only the appearance
operational managerial data (Smith, 1990). This causal
and rhetoric of performance-based management, while
relationship is sometimes included in a performance
retaining real, more bureaucratic and less formalised
case with the “reduction in CO2 emissions” or the “number
of jobs created”. The difficulty then lies in how to measure
it11. The indicators are often more the result of multiple
appear to provide examples of this type of gap between
indicator that implicitly integrates a counterfactual, as is the
management methods. Aid policies would certainly
discourse and practice.
causes (maternal mortality rate or primary completion rate),
7 Extensively documented, particularly in the case of poverty rates (see, for example Bhalla,
2002).
the effects of which would need to be evaluated separately
for a managerial use.
8 It should be noted that aid used to prevent nuisances or disasters systematically comes up
against this difficulty of delivering results and notably, therefore, of measuring the latter.
9 This has been widely studied, for example under the CDM, and for a few technologies has
(with difficulty) given rise to shared methodological principles.
Indicators generally reflect part of the complex notion of
performance. To take one example used in several score-
10 It should be noted that measurement systems in developing countries are making
headway on this topic.
cards, “the surface area of land put under irrigation” clearly
reflects a dimension of the efficiency of an agricultural
11 Concerning the number of jobs created, another difficulty in terms of both measurement
and interpretation is the integration of the leakage effect, i.e., for example, unproductive
jobs that are suppressed due to the creation of more productive jobs under a
modernisation process.
development project or policy, but this dimension is not
sufficient in itself. Experience tells us that the durability of
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
19
3. The Challenge of Implementation
For example, the first phase of the evaluation of the Paris
sectors. The debate on aid selectivity, which is typical of
mentation of the principles of the text in aid agencies
attention that international aid pays to the countries in
Declaration (OECD, 2007) focusing on the level of imple-
creaming, has until recently contributed to reducing the
observed “the relative… lack of progress recorded” in the
greatest difficulty.
field of management based on development results, noting
that “indicators and conceptual understandings are still
The same causes produce the same effects. It is not
the level at which results are to be defined”. It also points
to the application of PMMS as in the other policies.
in discussion about indicators”. The second phase of this
the specificities of the aid policy may be vis-à-vis
been “advancing least”. Another example of the gap
their consequences.
internally debated issues”, as well as “a lack of clarity about
surprising to find the same symptoms in aid policies linked
out that “donors and the government seem frequently to be
Conversely, it is perhaps more interesting to look at what
evaluation (2011) in turn observes that this principle has
performance-based management and to seek to identify
between theory and practice is the Peer Review of Swedish
aid (OECD, 2009), which, from the very first pages, high-
The first of these specificities is probably the heterogeneity
lights the aid policy commitment to results-based manage-
of the targeted results. Performance includes different types
the future. However, about ten pages on, the report
ratings) that have different maturities in the impact chain
ment and the aim of placing even more emphasis on it in
of results (organisational, field, cost-benefit ratios and
observes that “At the time of the peer review visits, few staff
(outputs, outcomes and impact). This is not specific to the
means in practice ”. The same observation could certainly
aid finances nearly all the public policies and therefore aims
aid policy, but the specificity encountered here is that the
were clear on what results-based management really
be made for other institutions.
to achieve different types of results in all sectors. Moreover,
these results are obtained in a wide range of contexts,
A second institutional pathology is goal displacement (cf.
which makes comparisons and aggregations difficult. In
multiple and often ambiguous objectives, focus on a small
comparative cost of connecting urban families in India and
Gregory, 1995). The fact that complex public policies, with
terms of performance, what can be said, for example, of the
number of quantitative targets leads to the purpose and
rural families in Niger to drinking water? Or again, of the
meaning of these policies being “distorted”. This goal
aggregation of children in school in Peru and in the
displacement may take several forms: performance may
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)? The extreme
prevail over relevance (notably by dividing up specific
heterogeneity of results that are relevant to describe aid
micro-objectives, which masks the overall relevance of the
performance certainly seriously hampers the implemen-
policy in question); beneficiaries that are least able to
tation of operating systems for performance-based
achieve “performance” may be excluded from the benefits
management in this field.
health and employment policies. It has become known as
A second characteristic of the aid policy is its great need to
typical of performance-based management); decision-
public support and attention. They seem particularly eager
are difficult and slow to measure; etc. These phenomena
transparent vis-à-vis all stakeholders. For example, the
of public policies (a well-known phenomenon, notably in
“creaming” and is considered to be a perverse effect that is
acquire legitimacy. ODA actors are anxious to benefit from
makers' attention may exclude quality objectives as they
to communicate to the public and to be accountable and
exist, to a certain extent, in aid policies. The focus on the
OECD’s Development Co-operation Report 2010 mentions:
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has undoubtedly
“It is not easy to demonstrate and communicate that aid
prompted a crowding out effect on all that is not included in
money is well managed and that it is having an impact. (…)
them; service quality versus service access; electricity
As taxpayers and legislators are really only interested in
equipment versus water equipment; infrastructure or
results and impacts, not process, this is where the focus of
supp o r t to the private sector versus financing for social
communication should be.” (OECD/DAC, 2010).
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
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3. The Challenge of Implementation
One could therefore assume that one of the mainsprings of
explain the gap that exists between a highly proactive
ment is the aim of contributing to an argument for
measurement for the purpose of gaining legitimacy would
instrument to manage aid policies. This could then partly
for managerial purposes.
institutions’ willingness to commit to performance measure-
discourse and a more moderate practice: performance
advocacy at the same time as, or even before, having an
appear to take the place of performance-based management
3.2. Collective accountability and individual responsibility
As we have just seen, the increasing concern for account-
However, accountability is not just a principle of transpa-
ability in aid policies appears to be one of the major trends
rency. It is the cornerstone of a continual improvement loop
policy may appear to be one of the most “virtuous” policies
which relies on mechanisms for feedback, learning and
of recent decades. In many ways, the development aid
for the effectiveness and efficiency of the policy in question,
in this respect compared to other public policies: evaluation,
incentive changes.
audit and reporting practices are not only extremely widespread and formalised in each aid institution, interna-
Yet aid policy responsiveness to the results achieved partly
encourages the entire system to approximate to best prac-
sibility” and “accountability”. Development professionals
tional coordination is also strong in this field and certainly
comes up against the issue of the gap between “respon-
tices in this field.
feel that they are expected to be accountable for the outputs
and, even more so, for the outcomes of their activities.
This progress towards accountability has nevertheless
However, as these results are attributed to various causes,
difficulties.
sibility concerns different types of elements: compliance
been accompanied by a number of implementation
depending on the activities, much of their feeling of responwith the mission, reputation, respect of procedures, good
The first, of course, stems from the analyses of the previous
professional practices, cooperation and coordination,
section. Performance assessment provides the basis for
quality, level of resources earmarked for an objective and,
measure and interpret the performance of aid policies
comes.
“quality” of accountability, independently of the scale of the
More generally speaking, the responsibility is individual
accountability. Yet the fact that it is difficult to define,
when it is possible, outputs, or even the contribution to out-
obviously has repercussions on what could be called the
systems in question.
(and concerns a manager, a department or an institution),
There would appear to exist a gap in all donor countries
the level of outcomes. The ambition of dividing up the
on public aid and the feeling frequently expressed by politi-
between institutions or within institutions, that would be
whereas the results are always a group effort, especially at
between the intensive practice of evaluating and reporting
overall results of a policy into a multitude of smaller results,
cians and citizens that the policy is opaque, lacks clarity
measurable and attributable to an individually identifiable
and transparency and is not sufficiently accountable for its
organisational element is often only a question of mana-
accountability – and particularly its performance indicators
c o m bination of the sound of each instrument made
of aid, notably as a result of the complexity and hetero-
ments are rarely accessible and relevant to the different
actions. It is postulated that this gap is due to the content of
gerial utopia (just as the sound of an orchestra is the
– which ultimately provides little information on the “quality”
harmonious by the conductor). In practice, results measure-
geneity described above.
levels of aggregation and attribution (Bouckaert, 2005).
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
21
3. The Challenge of Implementation
All in all, in terms of learning loops, analysts have mixed
This burden varies depending on the level of confidence
Peters, 2004). The focus on accountability is, of course,
generally conducted between institutions of a different nature
views over the practices that stem from NPM (Hood and
that exists in the relations between actors. Reporting is
accompanied by a significant increase in the number of
and culture that are linked by a vertical principal/agent
potential feedback tools (reporting, evaluations and
t y p e o f r e l a t i o n : pa r l i a m e n ts a n d a i d i n s t i t u tions,
performance audits), but the latter may end up competing
bilateral donors and multilateral funds, aid institutions and
sometimes bureaucratic use as part of a necessary stage in
funds and implementation entities, aid donors and NGOs,
with each other. Their learning function also suffers from a
contracting authorities in developing countries, vertical
implementation processes.
NGOs from the North and NGOs from the South, etc. It is
based on tools which, for the reasons mentioned above,
In the field of aid, an OECD report observes that:
only partly provide an objective and shared basis for
“Regrettably, increased emphasis on performance moni-
performance assessment. The system that is designed is
deficient as a result of a lack of confidence and thus
toring and reporting often came at the expense of more
generates high transaction costs. Beyond the case of aid
rigorous program and project evaluation, which declined
markedly at most bilateral agencies during the 1990s. The
activities, some analysts even refer to the risk of there being
over 50 per cent in this period, and other donors witnessed
similar declines” (Cooley and Katz, 2011)12.
numbers”) on performance measurements that have a
an excessive incentive to achieve targets (“meet the
number of evaluations conducted by USAID dropped by
degree of flexibility in their calculation method. Gregory
(1995) uses the evocative expression of “creative
The low level of knowledge accumulation generally recurs
a c c o u n t ing” to qualify the materialisation of this risk.
respect, assume that a large part of accountability practices
Once these practical implementation difficulties have been
accountable and that the control function often outweighs
cities of the aid policy would be in this respect.
as a leitmotiv in development aid policies. We may, in this
first and foremost meet the increasing obligation to be
explained, it is necessary to re-examine what the specifi-
that of learning.
The first specificity would appear to us the fact that it is
A second practical difficulty stems from the fact that
systematically based on collective responsibility. Most
accountability is more demanding. The idea that each
public policies are multi-actor and partnership-based; this is
individual is accountable to all for the achievement of their
therefore a common characteristic, but in some cases they
feasibility in its implementation.
responsibilities. In the case of the aid policy, the partnership
objectives raises the issue of relevance and even of
can give rise to certain actors being assigned specific
is inherent to the activity and poses the well-known problem
The culture of accountability and control creates a need for
of the division of responsibilities (Ostrom, 2004): what type
constant justification, an attitude of adversity to risk (Ferlie
of development results can an aid institution be held
et al., 2008) and an administrative burden that is sometimes extremely heavy, to the detriment of the man-
12 This phenomenon has been observed with NPM in other policies, notably in the United
States where there has been a sharp decline in evaluation following the 1993 Government
Performance and Results Acts (GPRA) (Varone and Jacob, 2004).
agement of the policies themselves (Wallace et al., 2006).
For example, a recent study conducted by USAID shows
13 Once again, this observation is not confined to aid policies. For example, the US
Government reconsidered the Government Performance and Results Act, mainly for
reasons of bureaucratic congestion: “Nearly 10 years have passed since the Government
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) was enacted. Agencies spend an inordinate
amount of time preparing reports to comply with it, producing volumes of information of
questionable value. If one were to stack up all the GPRA documents produced for
Congress last year, the pile would measure over a yard high. A policy-maker would
need to wade through reams of paper to find a few kernels of useful information.” (The
White House, 2003).
that field officers devote 36 % of their time to external reporting (quoted by Cooley and Katz, 2011)13. At a
certain level, accountability is certainly no longer a factor of efficiency.
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
22
3. The Challenge of Implementation
accountable for? The commitment to the MDGs clearly
connected and, especially, very distant. Consequently, the
users of these policies are less demanding15 and corrective
shows the kind of collective responsibility (and even “hypercollective” to use the concept developed by Severino and
incentives prove hard to put in place.
Ray, 2010) that can only be accompanied by a limited
individualisation of accountability.
Accountability is partly a good in itself, but it is especially a
tool for improving policies and adjusting incentives. Here
The second specificity has been analysed several times
again, the shared responsibility and absence of an institu-
and lies in the fact that it is more difficult to have feedback
from accountability because the learning loop is broken14.
tional feedback loop are a major obstacle to creating a
“quasi-market” to regulate public aid management
The taxpayers and beneficiaries of aid policies are dis-
according to the principles of NPM.
3.3. From segmentation to fragmentation
It would be wrong to associate the increasing fragmentation
often prohibitive costs, as clearly illustrated by Severino
of aid architecture with the progress made by the principles
and Ray (2010).
of NPM too closely. There have undoubtedly been different
trends at work that explain this phenomenon: increase in
It is, once again, a phenomenon that is traditionally asso-
forms of cooperation (decentralised cooperation, non-
to New Zealand’s experience and observes that “Problems
the number of donor countries, development of non-State
ciated with NPM, beyond aid policies. Gregory (2003) refers
governmental cooperation and philanthropy), increasing
of coordination and integration have resulted from having
concern for political visibility that fosters the launch of new
about 170 central government agencies in a country with a
initiatives, etc.
population of four million people” and analyses that the
excessive vertical accountabilities – which he qualifies as
However, the result is indeed an institutional fragmentation
the “siloisation” of public policies – have made us lose sight
that is partly in line with the principles of NPM: implemen-
of an overall view of the government’s approach.
tation chains based on the principal/agent model, instruments
earmarked for refocused objectives, decentralised decision-
This analysis could be applied to aid policies, despite the
making and principal of autonomy of the empowered
fact that quite considerable progress has been achieved in
working for development. The World Bank manages over
there is one thing that makes these aid policies different
contribute to the national cooperation effort. These few
are not dominated by an authority capable of defining
entities. There are today 263 multilateral organisations
terms of coordination (OECD, 2011). However, once again,
1,000 trust funds. In the United States, 26 agencies
from other policies: they are comprehensive policies and
examples from Severino and Ray (2010) could be multiplied
incentives or laying down regulatory rules. All efforts
at different levels to illustrate the extensive and increasing
towards transparency, coordination, standardisation or
fragmentation of the system for implementing aid policies.
convergence are made in a collaborative manner within
consultative bodies that generate significant transaction
Here again, it is clear that this trend, which has partly met
costs and cannot prevent “free-rider” approaches.
real challenges (such as excessive centralisation or the
lack of autonomy) has in turn become a source of problems.
14 Broken Accountability Feedback Loop, Svensson 2006 and Martens, 2002.
The number of actors in aid policies makes it difficult to
15 See Lavigne Delville and Abdelkader, 2010.
have a comprehensive view and results in a coordination of
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
23
3. The Challenge of Implementation
It would therefore appear to be difficult to reverse the
New Zealand’s aid, this led to the reintegration of NZAID
fragmentation of the institutional landscape of aid policies,
(established as a semi-autonomous agency in 2002) into
as the New Zealand government did when it embarked on
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2009.
a post-NPM refocusing of its public system. Moreover, for
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
24
Conclusion
Although this article elaborates on the difficulties encoun-
accountable to clients who have the power to make their
intended to be a critique of the current management of
improved through regulatory political institutions. Yet this
tered in managing and implementing aid policies, it is not
voices heard. This allows services to be retroactively
these public policies. Indeed, the management methods
ideal is out of touch with the complex system for the actual
that have been established have replaced the former
implementation of aid policies, thus revealing a number of
f e a tured prominently and that give little reason to be
article.
bureaucratic systems where vote-catching may have
difficulties in policy management, which are analysed in this
nostalgic.
According to the recent evaluation of the Paris Declaration,
The aim of this article is to offer an external analytical
results-based management is advancing at a snail’s pace.
framework – that of NPM – in order to put into perspective
In view of this fact, we cannot simply recommend a more
recent decades. This framework makes it possible to
this system over fifteen years ago. What is needed is to
in public management and what is specific to the aid
resources of management sciences and organisational
and understand the reforms implemented in aid policies in
proactive political approach, some agencies having set up
measure what has been the result of overall developments
conduct in-depth collective reflection, notably using the
policies themselves.
theories, in order to understand the issues, obstacles,
actors’ strategies and prospects for these ongoing reforms.
A first point that appears from this analysis is that the
This is also the case for the other areas mentioned in this
principles of NPM have been applied in a rather implicit
article, such as accountability or institutional segmentation.
were endogenous to the policy in question, and therefore
This collective reflection may become essential in view of
principles of exogenous origin to the specific case of deve-
international commitment to development would appear to
manner, as if they were the result of developments that
without reflection being conducted on how to adapt
the current weakening of aid policies. Advocacy for the
lopment aid. This is demonstrated by the fact that, to our
have reached an impasse: there is an increasing demand
linkage between NPM and aid management. There
this is, moreover, fuelled by the promises of the aid system
knowledge, there have been no articles about the close
from politicians and citizens to demonstrate “results” and
are simply a few references made to this topic, particularly
itself. The analyses of this article lead us to believe that it
in OECD documents.
will be difficult to be up to the mark on this performance
accountability. Severe budgetary pressure in Northern
The second point, which results from the first, is that some
countries will then pose a real risk for a policy that has not
management methods appear to be adapted to a certain
managed to justify itself under the terms that it has
ideal type of public policy: autonomous entities that produce
contributed to defining.
well-identified and measurable services for which they are
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
25
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
ADB
African Development Bank
AFD
Agence Française de Développement
AECID
Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo
AsDB
Asian Development Bank
CDM
Clean Development Mechanism
CSR
Corporate Social Responsibility
AUSAID
CGD
CTF
DFID
DRC
EBRD
Australian Agency for International Development
Center for Global Development
Clean Technology Fund
Department for International Development
Democratic Republic of Congo
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EIB
European Investment Bank
GEF
Global Environment Facility
GAVI
GFFATM
GPRA
ICAI
IDA
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
Government Performance and Results Act
Independent Commission for Aid Impact
International Development Association
IFAD
International Fund for Agricultural Development
JBIC
Japan Bank for International Cooperation
IFC
International Finance Corporation
JICA
Japan International Cooperation Agency
MDGs
Millennium Development Goals
LOLF
MLF
NGO
Loi organique relative aux lois de finances (Organic Law on Finance Laws)
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
Non-governmental Organisation
NPM
New Public Management
OECD
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
NZAID
PMMS
PSA
New Zealand Agency for International Development
Performance Measurement and Management System
Public Sector Agreement
SADEV
Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
SIDA
USAID
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
United States Agency for International Development
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
26
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SMITH, P. (1990), “The Use of Performance Indicators in the Public Sector”, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A
(Statistics in Society) n° 153, pp. 53-72, London.
SVENSSON, J. (2006), “Absorption Capacity and Disbursement Constraints” in AFD (2006), “Financing Development: What
are the Challenges in Expanding Aid Flows?”, Proceedings of the 3rd AFD-EUDN Conference, 2005, Notes et documents
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Série Documents de travail / Working Papers Series
Publiés depuis janvier 2009 / published since January 2009
Les numéros antérieurs sont consultables sur le site : http://recherche.afd.fr
Previous publications can be consulted online at: http://recherche.afd.fr
N° 78
« L’itinéraire professionnel du jeune Africain » Les résultats d’une enquête auprès de jeunes leaders Africains sur
les « dispositifs de formation professionnelle post-primaire »
Richard Walther, consultant ITG, Marie Tamoifo, porte-parole de la jeunesse africaine et de la diaspora
N° 79
N° 80
Contact : Nicolas Lejosne, département de la Recherche, AFD - janvier 2009.
Le ciblage des politiques de lutte contre la pauvreté : quel bilan des expériences dans les pays en développement ?
Emmanuelle Lavallée, Anne Olivier, Laure Pasquier-Doumer, Anne-Sophie Robilliard, DIAL - février 2009.
Les nouveaux dispositifs de formation professionnelle post-primaire. Les résultats d’une enquête terrain au Cameroun,
Mali et Maroc
Richard Walther, Consultant ITG
Contact : Nicolas Lejosne, département de la Recherche, AFD - mars 2009.
N° 81
Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries
N° 82
Capital naturel et développement durable en Nouvelle-Calédonie - Etude 1. Mesures de la « richesse totale »
Emmanuelle Auriol, Toulouse School of Economics, Sara Biancini, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA,
Comments by : Yannick Perez and Vincent Rious - April 2009.
et soutenabilité du développement de la Nouvelle-Calédonie
Clément Brelaud, Cécile Couharde, Vincent Géronimi, Elodie Maître d’Hôtel, Katia Radja, Patrick Schembri,
Armand Taranco, Université de Versailles - Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, GEMDEV
N° 83
N° 84
N° 85
N° 86
N° 87
N° 88
N° 89
Contact : Valérie Reboud, département de la Recherche, AFD - juin 2009.
The Global Discourse on “Participation” and its Emergence in Biodiversity Protection
Olivier Charnoz. - July 2009.
Community Participation in Biodiversity Protection: an Enhanced Analytical Framework for Practitioners
Olivier Charnoz - August 2009.
Les Petits opérateurs privés de la distribution d’eau à Maputo : d’un problème à une solution ?
Aymeric Blanc, Jérémie Cavé, LATTS, Emmanuel Chaponnière, Hydroconseil
Contact : Aymeric Blanc, département de la recherche, AFD - août 2009.
Les transports face aux défis de l’énergie et du climat
Benjamin Dessus, Global Chance.
Contact : Nils Devernois, département de la Recherche, AFD - septembre 2009.
Fiscalité locale : une grille de lecture économique
Guy Gilbert, professeur des universités à l’Ecole normale supérieure (ENS) de Cachan
Contact : Réjane Hugounenq, département de la Recherche, AFD - septembre 2009.
Les coûts de formation et d’insertion professionnelles - Conclusions d’une enquête terrain en Côte d’Ivoire
Richard Walther, expert AFD avec la collaboration de Boubakar Savadogo (Akilia) et de Borel Foko (Pôle de Dakar)
Contact : Nicolas Lejosne, département de la Recherche, AFD - octobre 2009.
Présentation de la base de données. Institutional Profiles Database 2009 (IPD 2009)
Institutional Profiles Database III - Presentation of the Institutional Profiles Database 2009 (IPD 2009)
Denis de Crombrugghe, Kristine Farla, Nicolas Meisel, Chris de Neubourg, Jacques Ould Aoudia, Adam Szirmai
Contact : Nicolas Meisel, département de la Recherche, AFD - décembre 2009.
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N° 90
Migration, santé et soins médicaux à Mayotte
Sophie Florence, Jacques Lebas, Pierre Chauvin, Equipe de recherche sur les déterminants sociaux de la santé et
du recours aux soins UMRS 707 (Inserm - UPMC)
N° 91
Contact : Christophe Paquet, département Technique opérationnel (DTO), AFD - janvier 2010.
Capital naturel et developpement durable en Nouvelle-Calédonie - Etude 2. Soutenabilité de la croissance néo-
calédonienne : un enjeu de politiques publiques
Cécile Couharde, Vincent Géronimi, Elodie Maître d’Hôtel, Katia Radja, Patrick Schembri, Armand Taranco
Université de Versailles – Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, GEMDEV
N° 92
N° 93
N° 94
N° 95
N° 96
N° 97
N° 98
N° 99
N° 100
Contact : Valérie Reboud, département Technique opérationnel, AFD - janvier 2010.
Community Participation Beyond Idealisation and Demonisation: Biodiversity Protection in Soufrière, St. Lucia
Olivier Charnoz, Research Department, AFD - January 2010.
Community participation in the Pantanal, Brazil: containment games and learning processes
Participation communautaire dans le Pantanal au Brésil : stratégies d’endiguement et processus d’apprentissage
Olivier Charnoz, département de la Recherche, AFD - février 2010.
Développer le premier cycle secondaire : enjeu rural et défis pour l'Afrique subsaharienne
Alain Mingat et Francis Ndem, IREDU, CNRS et université de Bourgogne
Contact : Jean-Claude Balmès, département Education et formation professionnelle, AFD - avril 2010
Prévenir les crises alimentaires au Sahel : des indicateurs basés sur les prix de marché
Catherine Araujo Bonjean, Stéphanie Brunelin, Catherine Simonet, CERDI - mai 2010.
La Thaïlande : premier exportateur de caoutchouc naturel grâce à ses agriculteurs familiaux
Jocelyne Delarue, Département de la Recherche, AFD - mai 2010.
Les réformes curriculaires par l’approche par compétences en Afrique
Francoise Cros, Jean-Marie de Ketele, Martial Dembélé, Michel Develay, Roger-François Gauthier, Najoua Ghriss,
Yves Lenoir, Augustin Murayi, Bruno Suchaut, Valérie Tehio - juin 2010.
Les coûts de formation et d’insertion professionnelles - Les conclusions d’une enquête terrain au Burkina Faso
Richard Walther, Boubakar Savadogo, consultants en partenariat avec le Pôle de Dakar/UNESCO-BREDA.
Contact : Nicolas Lejosne, département de la Recherche, AFD - juin 2010.
Private Sector Participation in the Indian Power Sector and Climate Change
Shashanka Bhide, Payal Malik, S.K.N. Nair, Consultants, NCAER
Contact : Aymeric Blanc, Research Department, AFD - June 2010.
Normes sanitaires et phytosanitaires : accès des pays de l’Afrique de l’Ouest au marché européen - Une étude
empirique
Abdelhakim Hammoudi, Fathi Fakhfakh, Cristina Grazia, Marie-Pierre Merlateau.
N° 101
Contact : Marie-Cécile Thirion, département de la Recherche, AFD - juillet 2010.
Hétérogénéité internationale des standards de sécurité sanitaire des aliments : Quelles stratégies pour les filières
d’exportation des PED ? - Une analyse normative
Abdelhakim Hammoudi, Cristina Grazia, Eric Giraud-Héraud, Oualid Hamza.
N° 102
N° 103
Contact : Marie-Cécile Thirion, département de la Recherche, AFD - juillet 2010.
Développement touristique de l’outre-mer et dépendance au carbone
Jean-Paul Ceron, Ghislain Dubois et Louise de Torcy.
Contact : Valérie Reboud, AFD - octobre 2010.
Les approches de la pauvreté en Polynésie française : résultats et apports de l’enquête sur les conditions de vie en 2009
Javier Herrera, IRD-DIAL, Sébastien Merceron, Insee - novembre 2010.
Contact : Cécile Valadier, département de la Recherche
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N° 104
La gestion des déchets à Coimbatore (Inde) : frictions entre politique publique et initiatives privées
N° 105
Migrations et soins en Guyane - Rapport final à l’Agence Française de Développement dans le cadre du contrat
Jérémie Cavé, Laboratoire Techniques, Territoires et Sociétés (LATTS), CNRS - décembre 2010.
AFD-Inserm
Anne Jolivet, Emmanuelle Cadot, Estelle Carde, Sophie Florence, Sophie Lesieur, Jacques Lebas, Pierre Chauvin
N° 106
Contact : Christophe Paquet, département Technique opérationnel (DTO), AFD - décembre 2010.
Les enjeux d'un bon usage de l'électricité : Chine, Etats-Unis, Inde et Union européenne
Benjamin Dessus et Bernard Laponche avec la collaboration de Sophie Attali (Topten International Services),
Robert Angioletti (Ademe), Michel Raoust (Terao)
N° 107
Contact : Nils Devernois, département de la Recherche, AFD - février 2011.
Hospitalisation des patients des pays de l’Océan indien - Prises en charges spécialisées dans les hôpitaux de la Réunion
Catherine Dupilet, Dr Roland Cash, Dr Olivier Weil et Dr Georges Maguerez (cabinet AGEAL)
En partenariat avec le Centre Hospitalier Régional de la Réunion et le Fonds de coopération régionale de la Réunion
N° 108
Contact : Philippe Renault, AFD - février 2011.
Peasants against Private Property Rights: A Review of the Literature
Thomas Vendryes, Paris School of Economics - February 2011.
N° 109
Le mécanisme REDD+ de l’échelle mondiale à l’échelle locale - Enjeux et conditions de mise en oeuvre
N° 110
L’aide au Commerce : état des lieux et analyse
ONF International
Tiphaine Leménager, département de la Recherche, AFD - mars 2011.
Aid for trade: A survey
Mariana Vijil, Marilyne Huchet-Bourdon et Chantal Le Mouël
N° 111
N° 112
AGROCAMPUS OUEST, INRA, Rennes - avril 2011.
Métiers porteurs : le rôle de l’entrepreneuriat, de la formation et de l'insertion professionnelle
Sandra Barlet et Christian Baron, GRET
Nicolas Lejosne, département de la Recherche, AFD ([email protected]) - avril 2011.
Charbon de bois et sidérurgie en Amazonie brésilienne : quelles pistes d’améliorations environnementales ?
L’exemple du pôle de Carajas
Ouvrage collectif sous la direction de Marie-Gabrielle Piketty, Cirad, UMR Marchés,
N° 113
Contact : Tiphaine Leménager, département de la Recherche, AFD ([email protected]) - avril 2011.
Gestion des risques agricoles par les petits producteurs Focus sur l'assurance-récolte indicielle et le warrantage
Guillaume Horréard, Bastien Oggeri, Ilan Rozenkopf sous l’encadrement de :
Anne Chetaille, Aurore Duffau, Damien Lagandré
N° 114
N° 115
Contact : Bruno Vindel, département des Politiques alimentaires, AFD - mai 2011.
Analyse de la cohérence des politiques commerciales en Afrique de l’Ouest
Jean-Pierre Rolland, Arlène Alpha, GRET
Contact : Jean-René Cuzon, département PSP, AFD ([email protected]) - juin 2011
L’accès à l’eau et à l’assainissement pour les populations en situation de crise :
comment passer de l’urgence à la reconstruction et au développement ?
Julie Patinet (Groupe URD) et Martina Rama (Académie de l’eau),
sous la direction de François Grünewald (Groupe URD)
Contact : Thierry Liscia, département du Pilotage stratégique et de la Prospective, AFD ([email protected])
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N° 116
Formation et emploi au Maroc - Etat des lieux et recommandations
N° 117
Student Loans : Liquidity Constraint and Higher Education in South Africa
N° 118
N° 119
Jean-Christophe Maurin, division Education et Formation professionnelle, AFD
Thomas Melonio, département de la Recherche, AFD
Marc Gurgand, Adrien Lorenceau, Paris School of Economics
Thomas Mélonio, département de la Recherche, AFD
Quelle(s) classe(s) moyenne(s) en Afrique ? Une revue de littérature
Dominique Darbon, IEP Bordeaux, Comi Toulabor, LAM Bordeaux
Contacts : Virginie Diaz et Thomas Mélonio, département de la Recherche, AFD
Les réformes de l’aide au développement en perspective de la nouvelle gestion publique
Jean-David Naudet, division Evaluation et Capitalisation, AFD
© AFD Working Paper No. 119 • Development Aid Reforms • June 2012
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