Netherlands: Tax
treatment of AT1 capital
G.C.F. van Gelder ; S. Frankenberg
1. Introduction
As of 1 January 2015, the newly introduced article 29a of the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act
1969 (CITA) deals with the tax classification of Additional Tier 1 capital (AT1 capital) issued by
banks and insurance companies. [1] In brief, Dutch banks must satisfy the capital requirements
under the Capital Requirements Regulation and Capital Requirement IV Directive (CRD IV Directive)
in order to increase their required equity capital. [2] The requirements under the CRD IV Directive
and the Capital Requirements Regulation derive from the Basel III accord, the purpose of which is
to improve the ability of the banking sector to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic
stress. [3] The reason for implementation of the Basel III accord is to reform both the quality and
quantity of the regulatory capital base and enhance the risk coverage of the capital framework of
banks.
As of 1 January 2016, insurance companies must comply with the stringent conditions of the
Solvency II Directive. [4] The main purpose of this Directive is to protect the interests of
policyholders. This objective is achieved by quantitative capital requirements, requirements as
regards the quality of the operational management and increased transparency to the public and
regulators. Consequently in the 2015 Dutch Tax Plan, article 29a of the CITA is amended such that
a tax deduction is allowed for payments on subordinated liabilities, which are part of AT1 capital,
but do not form part of the share capital, share premium, capital guarantee, member
contributions, surplus funds or reconciliation reserves of insurance companies.
The Dutch State Secretary for Finance has commented several times on the Dutch tax treatment of
AT1 capital. The question was whether payments on AT1 capital should be deductible at the level
of the issuing party and taxed at the level of the recipient. [5] During the parliamentary proceedings
of the 2014 Dutch Tax Plan, the Senate finance committee indicated in its final report that the
enactment of this legislative proposal can be dealt with as a formality. [6] Notably, the committee
also expressed a reservation in its final report, stating that the exchange of views on AT1 capital
must be continued at a later time.
It is the authors’ hope that this article will contribute to the discussion on AT1 capital.
2. Background: AT1 Capital
The Basel accords set out the capital requirements relating to the solvency of banks. [7] Considering
the size and function of such financial institutions, there is a need to strictly regulate the extent to
which they are able to absorb potential losses on risk-adjusted assets with their capital. The
defined solvency ratios are formed by the credit risk, market risk and operational risk which banks
are exposed to with regard to their assets, although in different weighting percentages. The capital
of banks consists of two main categories, namely core capital (Tier 1 capital) and additional capital
(Tier 2 capital).
Tier 1 capital (also referred to as “going-concern capital”) does not contain any contractual
repayment obligations for the issuer and is therefore placed permanently at the disposal of the
bank. The main elements of this capital consist of ordinary share capital, share premium reserves
and retained profits. On the other hand, Tier 2 capital includes long-term subordinated debt and
Netherlands: Tax treatment of AT1 capital / G.C.F. van Gelder ; S. Frankenberg. - IBFD dfi 2015/05/04
revaluation reserves. With regard to Tier 2 capital (also referred to as “gone-concern capital”),
there are more obligations from the issuer’s perspective in comparison to Tier 1 capital and as
such, these assets are considered to be less valuable than the assets included in Tier 1 capital from
a financial regulator perspective. Consequently, one can say that while Tier 1 capital is focused on
preventing insolvency, Tier 2 capital contributes to depositors and preferential creditors’ being
reimbursed if such financial institution were to collapse.
An intermediate category is formed by AT1 capital. The distinguishing features of this capital
relate to the perpetual character of such instruments and the fact that the provisions governing
them include no incentive for the institution to redeem them. Furthermore, the instruments may be
“called”, “redeemed” or “repurchased” only where the conditions laid down in article 72 of the
above-mentioned EU Capital Requirements Regulation are met, and not prior to five years after the
date of issuance with consent of the financial regulator. Moreover, some additional requirements
are laid down with regard to AT1 capital under which the instruments may not be subject to any
arrangement – contractual or otherwise – enhancing the seniority of the claim under the
instruments in the case of insolvency or liquidation, and in addition rank the instruments below Tier
2 instruments. The provisions governing the instruments require the principal amount of the
instruments to be written down, or the instruments to be converted into Common Equity Tier 1
instruments, upon the occurrence of a triggering event (for example if a bank drops under a certain
solvency ratio).
Under the new Basel III rules, banks will be required to hold at least 6% of their risk-weighted assets
in the form of Tier 1 capital. Of that, up to 1.5% of the risk-weighted assets may be in the form of
AT1 capital, and 4.5% of risk-weighted assets in the form of Common Equity Tier 1. The total
capital ratio will remain 8% of risk-weighted assets and as such, the Tier 2 ratio is 2% of riskweighted assets. With regard to future capital requirements under Basel III, an overview is shown
below. [8]
Netherlands: Tax treatment of AT1 capital / G.C.F. van Gelder ; S. Frankenberg. - IBFD dfi 2015/05/04
An example of an AT1 instrument is a (perpetual) convertible subordinated debenture loan
(contingent convertibles, popularly abbreviated as CoCos). Recently, Rabobank was the first Dutch
bank to issue such instruments. Rabobank postponed the issuing of CoCos until it was clear that
the payments on these coupons would be tax deductible. Furthermore, another Dutch major bank,
ABN AMRO Bank, announced that it intends to issue CoCos in order to strengthen its capital
position. [9]
3. Classification AT1 Capital for Dutch Corporate Income Tax Purposes
First, article 29a of the CITA focuses on the determination of profit. This is seen in the wording of
article 29a: “with the determination of profit”. It could therefore be argued that this provision does
not make any judgement related to the tax classification or form of AT1 instruments, but solely
concerns the determination of profit. In this regard, one should consider the Caspian Sea case, in
which the Dutch Supreme Court made clear that the essential characteristic of a loan is the
repayment obligation of the debtor.[10] This is the relevant criterion to determine whether a
financial instrument qualifies as a loan under civil law, in accordance with the decision of the
Supreme Court. The parliament issued a classification for tax purposes on AT1 instruments in
article 29a of the CITA. Here, the question is whether this classification is correct and whether the
classification will hold in cross-border situations.
With his letter of 16 December 2013, the State Secretary for Finance intended to inform the Dutch
parliament in advance with regard to the proposed changes to the Dutch tax law related to AT1
instruments. [11] However, the State Secretary stated therein only that such financial instruments
issued by banks have a hybrid character and – without the intervention of the parliament – the tax
treatment of these hybrid instruments would change as a result of the Basel III accord.
In the authors’ opinion, the State Secretary for Finance has been inconsistent with his remarks in
advance of the implementation of article 29a of the CITA, and has insufficiently clarified the
definition of his interpretation of hybrid instruments. In a letter dated 10 April 2014, [12] the State
Secretary initially made a reference to Supreme Court case law dating from 7 February 2014 (the
Bank Consortium case [13] and the Australian redeemable preference shares (RPS) case) [14] and
claims for hybrid instruments to be assessed on the essential characteristics that apply to capital
funding. In this regard, the State Secretary refers to the fact that this capital becomes part of the
risk-sharing capital which is affected in the event of losses and is liable to the company’s debt. It is
noteworthy that the State Secretary cited this passage from the Bank Consortium case in his
letter, as the Supreme Court did not agreed that hybrid instruments (which are regarded as equity
under civil law) could qualify as debt for tax purposes. The Supreme Court made clear that if a
hybrid instrument is regarded as equity under civil law, it may never be reclassified as debt for tax
purposes. [15]
During the parliamentary proceedings of the 2014 Dutch Tax Plan, the State Secretary once more
made a remark about the classification of hybrid instruments, in which he explicitly refers to the
subordinated and perpetual characteristics of capital funding. [16] However, in contrast to his
previous letter, the State Secretary takes a different approach. He previously pointed out the
essential characteristics that inhere to hybrid instruments (i.e. part of the risk sharing capital
which is affected in the event of losses and is liable to the company’s debt). The State Secretary
Netherlands: Tax treatment of AT1 capital / G.C.F. van Gelder ; S. Frankenberg. - IBFD dfi 2015/05/04
now solely refers to civil law characteristics of equity, namely the exclusive right to repayment of
the principal amount in the event of a bankruptcy or liquidation and to take a similar position in the
ranking order of debtors as (usually preferred) shareholders. In the authors’ opinion, the only right
assumption is that the civil law classification of hybrid instruments should be based only on the
applicable civil law. The applicable civil law could be Dutch civil law, as well as foreign civil law, as
decided by the Supreme Court in the Australian RPS case. Thus, the 7 February 2014 judicial
doctrine remains in place: if a loan is regarded as equity under civil law, it may never be reclassified
as debt for Dutch tax purposes.
As regards the comments made by the State Secretary in April 2014 which refer to the right of
repayment and the position in the ranking order of debtors, the question concerns the extent to
which the civil law assumption has led to the correct classification. It is to be examined whether
there is an actual obligation of repayment with these hybrid instruments. Furthermore, under
certain circumstances it is obligatory to convert the hybrid instrument into share capital. In such
case, it can be argued that the position of the owner of the hybrid instrument is similar to that of a
shareholder. However, until the instrument is converted, it cannot be considered a share.
3.1. Dutch dividend withholding tax position of AT1 capital
Article 29a of the CITA solely relates to Dutch corporate income tax. The State Secretary of
Finance did not make any comments in his letter dated 16 December 2013, nor in his letter dated
10 April 2014, regarding the treatment of hybrid instruments from a Dutch dividend withholding
tax perspective. However, Senate members asked some questions about this matter during the
parliamentary proceedings before the Senate. [17] In his response, the State Secretary indicated
that the coupon payments on AT1 instruments will not be subject to Dutch dividend withholding
tax. The State Secretary commented that if article 29a of the CITA would not have been
implemented, AT1 instruments would have been classified as capital. So it seems – following the
comments by the State Secretary – that if article 29a would not have been implemented, this AT1
instrument would qualify as capital whereby any payment on that capital could be subject to Dutch
dividend withholding tax. In this regard, there must be income deriving from shares, profit-sharing
certificates or participation loans, before any payment will be subject to Dutch dividend
withholding tax.
3.2. Cross-border situations
The State Secretary of Finance indicated that as a result of the introduction of article 29a of the
CITA, international mismatches will be prevented. In his letter of 16 December 2013, as well as in
his letter of 10 April 2014, the State Secretary indicated that the payment on the hybrid
instrument from the issuing party’s perspective is tax deductible, but that the recipient of the
payment will be subject to tax thereon. The authors endorse this point of view in a solely (Dutch)
domestic situation. The question is whether this holds true in cross-border situations. It cannot be
excluded that the jurisdiction of the recipient of the AT1 instrument payment will classify the
payment as a dividend (for which an exemption is given) or it might not tax the income from the
AT1 instrument at all. Of course, this depends on the national legislation of the country of
residence of the recipient and whether there is a tax treaty between the Netherlands and the
country of residence of the Tier 1 instrument recipient.
Netherlands: Tax treatment of AT1 capital / G.C.F. van Gelder ; S. Frankenberg. - IBFD dfi 2015/05/04
In this context, paragraph 25 of the Commentary on article 10 of the OECD Model Convention
(2014) states that, under certain circumstances, interest payments may be classified as dividends
for purposes of the application of tax treaties. [18] These conditions relate to whether:
– a loan very heavily outweighs any other contribution to the enterprise’s capital (or was taken out
to replace a substantial proportion of capital which has been lost) and is substantially unmatched
by redeemable assets;
– the creditor will share in any profits of the company;
– the repayment of the loan is subordinated to claims of other creditors or to the payment of
dividends;
– the level or payment of interest would depend on the profits of the company; and
– the loan contract contains fixed provisions for repayment by a definite date.
Clearly, these characteristics show some similarities with the conditions as set for AT1 capital. [19]
Some tax treaties have explicitly incorporated provisions under which payments arising from
instruments that show characteristics of AT1 instruments are considered to be a dividend for tax
treaty purposes. In this respect, one should consider the new tax treaty between the Netherlands
and Germany and, in particular, article 9 of the protocol to this treaty. [20]
It cannot be excluded that if a foreign entity holds an AT1 instrument and owns a participation in
the issuing entity, the benefit may qualify as an exempt dividend under the participation exemption
rules. This would be the case if the income in the jurisdiction of the beneficiary were to qualify as a
dividend and an equivalent of the Dutch participation exemption rules is applicable. In the authors’
opinion, instead of avoiding international mismatches, a new international mismatch will be
created. [21]
Alternatively, one could argue that this international mismatch relates to the fact that other
jurisdictions classify such AT1 instruments as debt and therefore allow the payment to be tax
deductible at the level of the issuing entity. It seems that the State Secretary for Finance is
referring to this, as in his letter dated 10 April 2014, he explicitly brings attention to the unfair
playing field between Dutch banks and other European banks. However, in the authors’ opinion, it
is a feeble argument to implement an article in the CITA which has as its guiding argument that
other countries have a similar provision in their respective national laws. The State Secretary
wants to level the unfair playing field by allowing Dutch banks a deductible expenditure. However,
by doing so, the State Secretary, in the authors’ opinion, creates a new unfair playing field. When a
specific group of taxpayers (for example banks and insurance companies) receives an advantage
on a specific basis, this could be regarded as State aid.
Netherlands: Tax treatment of AT1 capital / G.C.F. van Gelder ; S. Frankenberg. - IBFD dfi 2015/05/04
4. Forbidden State Aid?
The introduction of article 29a of the CITA raises the question as to whether the facility smacks of
forbidden State aid as mentioned in article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union. Pursuant to established case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), State aid is
present if (i) the relevant measure is financed directly or indirectly through State resources, (ii) it
has an effect on intra-Community trade, (iii) the advantage is selective and distorts or threatens to
distort competition and (iv) the measure confers an economic advantage to undertakings
exercising an economic activity. [22] The latter condition will be discussed further, as this criterion is
the most debatable, in the authors’ opinion, with regard to the introduction of article 29a of the
CITA. Where the State Secretary for Finance characterizes the provision as a generic defining
position that falls within the scope of the current legislation and case law and, moreover, explicitly
indicates that similar instruments in other European countries already are being treated as debt
capital, it is debatable whether the State Secretary has drawn a correct conclusion.
First and foremost, in order to assess whether forbidden State aid is present, the potential aid
measure must be assessed on a national level. In the letters of the State Secretary for Finance,
reference is made several times to the fact that the payments on these hybrid instruments are
already deductible in other EU Member States. However, the existence of a potential State aid
measure must be reviewed in accordance with Dutch standards. Hence, it is of importance whether
such measure falls within the scope of the Dutch legal methodology and, in that context, whether
the measure can be regarded as generic. The frame of reference is therefore being formed by the
relevant provisions of the domestic law of the Member State itself. [23] One can argue that article
29a of the CITA formally is open to all taxpayers and, therefore, can be regarded as (sufficiently)
generic. However, the relevant provision refers unsparingly to the EU Regulation on prudential
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and the EU Directive on access to the
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment
firms. [24] If (Dutch) entities not falling within the scope of the EU Regulation or Directive would like
to issue such “hybrids”, it becomes quite apparent that article 29a of the CITA is, materially, far
from open to all taxpayers. [25]
Consequently, the selectivity criterion for forbidden State aid is fulfilled in the authors’ opinion. In
this regard, the State Secretary for Finance has indicated as a counterargument that this
distinction is a logical result of the fact that only banks (and insurers) must comply with the new
capital regulations. Although this is a correct observation, the State Secretary disregards the fact
that such institutions, in comparison to other – regular – companies, are the least capitalized
entities. These other companies must maintain proportionally more capital to carry out their
activities properly. Therefore, in the authors’ opinion, the comments of the State Secretary are
therefore not very well founded.
Moreover, the State Secretary, in fact, strengthened the existence of forbidden State aid by his
comments relating to the international playing field for banks and other financial institutions. As a
justification for the introduced measure, the State Secretary asserted that this measure is
prompted by a competitor perspective in the context of the international “level playing field”
between Dutch banks and banks in other EU Member States. In the authors’ opinion, with this
remark the State Secretary, in fact, emphasizes that the introduction of article 29a of the CITA
Netherlands: Tax treatment of AT1 capital / G.C.F. van Gelder ; S. Frankenberg. - IBFD dfi 2015/05/04
was expressly prompted from a perspective under which a specific group of taxpayers is being
favoured and hence – to use the words of the ECJ – “forms a departure from the general tax rules,
which cannot, in principle, be justified by the nature or logic of the tax system in question”. [26]
Finally, one should consider the Unicredito Italiano case in which the ECJ ruled that if an advantage
is attributable to a whole economic sector, the selectivity criterion is fulfilled. [27] That case
concerned a tax relief for the (Italian) banking sector. The ECJ ruled that this relief was not for the
benefit of companies in other sectors of the economy and, moreover, that this relief within the
banking sector was only for the benefit of companies that were involved in the underlying
transactions. In the authors’ opinion, it therefore requires no further explanation that article 29a
of the CITA should have been notified, prior to its introduction, to the European Commission.
However, if the State Secretary for Finance were to reconsider granting the same benefit also to
companies other than solely banks and insurers to issue such hybrid instruments (in conjunction
with the deductibility of the payments on these instruments), the selective economic advantage
would cease to apply, as the arrangement of article 29a of the CITA in such case would be open to
all taxpayers.
5. Conclusion
The introduction of article 29a of the CITA raises various questions with regard to the Dutch tax
implications of AT1 instruments. The difficulty relates to the fact that these kinds of instruments
contain specific characteristics which cannot be defined in an unambiguous manner. That such
“hybrid” instruments are permanently placed at the disposal of the bank and do not contain any
contractual repayment obligations are already familiar features with regard to the classification of
capital under Dutch tax law. However, the fact that such instruments may be “called”, “redeemed”
or “repurchased”, contributes to the conclusion that the tax classification of AT1 capital is not as
straightforward as may be assumed. More specifically, the question concerns whether this
classification should be in accordance with the essential characteristics pertaining to such capital
payments or, on the contrary, solely in accordance with the characteristics of such payments
under civil law. It seems that the State Secretary for Finance is not very consistent in his approach,
especially with regard to his rather unfortunate reference to specific Dutch case law (i.e. the Bank
Consortium case and the Australian RPS case).
In addition, some critical comments can be offered with regard to its application in dividend
withholding tax and cross-border situations, which make one wonder whether the parliament did
succeed in preventing international mismatches. The level playing field that was pursued by the
State Secretary for Finance also resulted in another undesirable outcome. Equal treatment for
financial institutions was intended, but the State Secretary in fact created a specific preferential
treatment for the banking sector that smacks of forbidden State aid as mentioned in article 107 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. As a consequence, in the authors’ opinion,
article 29a of the CITA should have been notified prior to its introduction to the European
Commission. As the Dutch Senate committee already stated at the time of the introduction of
article 29a that an exchange of views should be continued at a later stage, the authors urge the
State Secretary for Finance to clarify any remaining uncertainties with regard to the application
AT1 capital for Dutch tax purposes.
Netherlands: Tax treatment of AT1 capital / G.C.F. van Gelder ; S. Frankenberg. - IBFD dfi 2015/05/04
Voetnoten
[*]
Gabriël van Gelder is a senior tax manager affiliated with EY Netherlands and Sebastian Frankenberg is an
associate affiliated with DLA Piper Netherlands.
[1]
For banks art. 29a CITA has retroactive effect as to 1 Jan. 2014.
[2]
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms,
amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (CRD IV Directive)
and Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No.
648/2012.
[3]
From Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems
(http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf ).
[4]
The Solvency II Directive will not be applicable to funeral insurance companies and most small insurance
companies.
[5]
NL: Parliamentary notes, II 2013/2014, 32 013, no. 48: letter from the State Secretary of Finance, 16 Dec.
2014, DB/2013/593M; Parliamentary notes, II 2013/2014, 32 013, no. 58: decision of the State Secretary
of Finance, 10 Apr. 2014, FM/ 2014/670M.
[6]
NL: Parliamentary notes, I 2014/2015, 33950, D.
[7]
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel Capital Accord, 1988 (Basel I); Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, 2007 (Basel II); Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, Nov. 2010, G20 Seoul meeting (Basel III).
[8]
Source: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/basel3_phase_in_arrangements.pdf .
[9]
Rabobank stort zich op de coco, Dutch Financial Times (14 Jan. 2015), available at
http://fd.nl/ondernemen/1088570/rabobank-stort-zich-op-de-coco.
[10]
NL: Hoge Raad (HR), 8 Sept. 2006, BNB 2007/104.
[11]
NL: State Secretary of Finance, Letter of 16 Dec. 2014, DB/2013/593M.
[12]
NL: State Secretary of Finance, Decision of 10 Apr. 2014, FM/2014/670M.
[13]
NL: HR, 7 Feb. 2014, 12/04640, BNB 2014/80.
[14]
NL: HR, 7 Feb. 2014, 12/03540, BNB 2014/79.
Netherlands: Tax treatment of AT1 capital / G.C.F. van Gelder ; S. Frankenberg. - IBFD dfi 2015/05/04
[15]
Note in V/N 2014/19.9.
[16]
NL: Parliamentary notes, I 2014/2015, 33 950, p. 1.
[17]
NL: Parliamentary notes, I 2014/2015, 33 950, B, p. 1 and 2.
[18]
The Netherlands did not make a reservation for this section of the Commentary on the OECD Model.
[19]
In this regard, the criteria from the Commentary on the OECD Model do not correspond integrally with the
provisions in the treaty, but there are similarities. It cannot be excluded that certain AT1 instruments have the
same characteristics as mentioned in the Commentary on the OECD Model.
[20]
Convention between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains
(12 Apr. 2012), Treaties IBFD. This treaty will be effective from 1 Jan. 2016.
[21]
The question concerns whether this mismatch will continue to exist following the proposal from the European
Commission to amend the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive
2011/96/EU on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of
different Member States European Commission, COM(2013) 814 Final, 25 Nov. 2013, 2013/0400 (CNS), EU
Law IBFD.
[22]
DE: ECJ, 24 July 2003, Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans en Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg.
[23]
See A.F. Gunn, Reactie op formele onderzoeksprocedure vermeende staatssteun Starbucks, Nederlands
Tijdschrift voor Fiscaal Recht 2014 (2737) (arguing that, as a result, Member States preserve their
sovereignty in relation to direct taxes).
[24]
EC Regulation 575/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2013 amending Regulation
648/2012 (PbEU 2013, L 176); Directive 2009/138/EG, PbEU 2009, L 335.
[25]
In this regard, see ES: ECJ, 15 Nov. 2011, Case C-106/09_P and C-107/09_P, European Commission and
Kingdom of Spain v. Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ECJ
Case Law IBFD. It follows from this case that a potential aid measure must be assessed on the basis of material
selectivity.
[26]
IT: ECJ, 10 Jan. 2006, Case C-222/04, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze.
[27]
IT: ECJ, 15 Dec. 2005, C-148/04, Unicredito Italiano, legal ground no. 45.
Netherlands: Tax treatment of AT1 capital / G.C.F. van Gelder ; S. Frankenberg. - IBFD dfi 2015/05/04
Ernst & Young LLP
Accountancy | Belastingen |
Transacties | Advies
Over Ernst & Young
Ernst & Young is wereldwijd
toonaangevend op het gebied van
accountancy, belastingen, transacties
en advies. Onze 135.000 mensen
delen wereldwijd dezelfde waarden en
staan voor kwaliteit. Wij maken het
verschil door onze mensen, onze
cliënten en de samenleving te helpen
hun mogelijkheden optimaal te
benutten.
Gabriël van Gelder
is verbonden aan
Ernst & Young Belastingadviseurs LLP
Tel:
088-4079265
E-mail: [email protected]
Voor meer informatie: www.ey.nl
Disclaimer
Dit bericht is met grote
zorgvuldigheid samengesteld. Voor
mogelijke onjuistheid en/of
onvolledigheid van de hierin
Verschenen in:
Derivatives & Financial Instruments 2015 nr. 5
17 september 2015,
een uitgave van
IBFD Publications te Amsterdam
verstrekte informatie aanvaardt Ernst
& Young geen aansprakelijkheid,
evenmin kunnen aan de inhoud van
dit bericht rechten worden ontleend.
© Ernst & Young 2015
Netherlands: Tax treatment of AT1 capital / G.C.F. van Gelder ; S. Frankenberg. - IBFD dfi 2015/05/04