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tapraid1/emo-emo/emo-emo/emo00106/emo0109d06g yodert S⫽6 2/13/06 10:25 Art: E04-102
Emotion
2006, Vol. 6, No. 1, 000 – 000
Copyright 2006 by the American Psychological Association
1528-3542/06/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/1528-3542.6.1.000
Embodied Temporal Perception of Emotion
Daniel A. Effron
Paula M. Niedenthal
Yale University
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and University of
Clermont-Ferrand
Sandrine Gil and Sylvie Droit-Volet
FS
University of Clermont-Ferrand
induce emotions and to represent the passage of time, none of the
studies has considered how perceived emotional stimuli instigate
arousal. We address this question from the perspective of recent
theories of embodied cognition. We begin by reviewing recent
models of time perception and their account of the influences of
emotion in this process. We then suggest how the embodiment of
the stimulus may be required for stimulus characteristics, such as
its emotionality, to influence time perception.
For better or for worse, emotional experiences often seem to last
longer than they really are. An argument with an angry lover may
seem to last an eternity; time may seem to stand still as people
cherish a child’s joy upon opening a longed-for gift. Recent
empirical evidence supports the idea that the subjective temporal
experience of at least some kinds of emotional events differs from
that of neutral events (Angrilli, Cherubini, Pavese, & Manfredini,
1997; Droit-Volet, Brunot, & Niedenthal, 2004). For example,
simply by altering the facial expressions depicted in a series of
photographs, Droit-Volet et al. (2004) were able to affect subjects’
estimations of the length of time for which the photographs were
displayed, such that the duration of emotional faces was overestimated relative to neutral ones. Why did the subjective duration of
these stimuli depend on the emotions that they represented? As we
develop below, arousal seems to be implicated. However, although
the few previous studies devoted to the exploration of effects of
emotion on time perception have used emotional stimuli both to
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The role of embodiment in the perception of the duration of emotional stimuli was investigated with a
temporal bisection task. Previous research has shown that individuals overestimate the duration of
emotional, compared with neutral, faces (S. Droit-Volet, S. Brunot, & P. M. Niedenthal, 2004). The
authors tested a role for embodiment in this effect. Participants estimated the duration of angry, happy,
and neutral faces by comparing them to 2 durations learned during a training phase. Experimental
participants held a pen in their mouths so as to inhibit imitation of the faces, whereas control participants
could imitate freely. Results revealed that participants overestimated the duration of emotional faces
relative to the neutral faces only when imitation was possible. Implications for the role of embodiment
in emotional perception are discussed.
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According to the most developed models of time perception
(i.e., scalar timing models), humans as well as animals are
equipped with a biologically based internal clock (Gibbon &
Church, 1984; Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984). The clock is
assumed to be composed of a pacemaker, a switch, and an accumulator. The switch closes at the beginning of an event to be
timed, thereby causing the pulses emitted by the pacemaker to
enter the accumulator, and opens at the end of the event to
terminate the collection of pulses. Perceived duration is thus based
on the number of pulses collected in the accumulator; the more
pulses accumulated, the longer the perceived duration.
Two mechanisms, those of attention and arousal, can influence
the functioning of the internal clock in such a way as to bias
temporal perception. A large number of studies using dual-task or
attention-distracting paradigms have shown that when attentional
resources are diverted from the processing of time, duration is
typically underestimated (e.g., Brown, 1997; Casini & Macar,
1997; Macar, Grondin, & Casini, 1994; Zakay, 1989). This underestimation occurs because the lack of attention to time processing
disrupts the accumulation process, resulting in fewer pulses accumulated (Burle & Casini, 2001; Lejeune, 1998; Zakay, 2005). In
contrast, arousal has been shown to increase the speed of the
pacemaker (e.g., Droit-Volet & Wearden, 2002; Maricq, Roberts,
& Church, 1981; Meck, 1983; Treisman, Cook, Naish, & McCrone, 1994; Wearden & Penton-Voak, 1995). This increase in
AP
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Emotion and Time Perception
Daniel A. Effron, Department of Psychology, Yale University; Paula M.
Niedenthal, Centre de la Recherche Scientifique and University of
Clermont-Ferrand, Clermont-Ferrand, France; Sandrine Gil and Sylvie
Droit-Volet, Department of Psychology, University of Clermont-Ferrand,
Clermont-Ferrand, France.
Preparation of this article was supported in part by the Robert C. Bates
Summer Traveling Fellowship from Jonathan Edwards College, Yale University, to Daniel A. Effron; by Prosodie ACI Grant PRO-0052, Ministère
de la Recherche (France), to Sylvie Droit-Volet and Paula M. Niedenthal;
and by National Science Foundation Grant 0350687 to Piotr Winkielman
and Paula M. Niedenthal. We thank Markus Brauer and Anne-Claire Rattat
for their insightful comments about data analysis and to Aurélie Oziol for
her help with data collection.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sylvie
Droit-Volet or Paula M. Niedenthal, Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale et
Cognitive, CNRS (UMR 6024), Université Blaise Pascal 34, Avenue
Carnot, 63000, Clermont-Ferrand, France. Electronic mail: droit@srvpsy
.univ-bpclermont.fr or [email protected].
1
tapraid1/emo-emo/emo-emo/emo00106/emo0109d06g yodert S⫽6 2/13/06 10:25 Art: E04-102
EFFRON, NIEDENTHAL, GIL, AND DROIT-VOLET
cluded that, at least at quite short durations (i.e., ⬍2 s), emotional
faces increase the speed of the pacemaker of the internal clock,
with the result that duration is overestimated. It thus seems that
observing emotional expressions affects the subjective experience
of time by increasing the level of arousal of the perceiver.
Whereas the overestimation of time can arise from nonemotional sources of arousal, such as drugs in rats (Maricq et al., 1981;
Meck, 1983) and body heat in humans (Wearden & Penton-Voak,
1995), the temporal perception of emotion is especially noteworthy
because it allows us to investigate the social mechanisms that
might be at play in time perception. The study by Droit-Volet et al.
(2004) did not address the mechanisms by which emotions cause
the arousal that yields the overestimation effect. The present study
was designed to investigate a particular social mechanism by
which this arousal may be accomplished: imitation of emotional
facial expressions.
Theories of Embodied Cognition
Why posit that imitation plays a role in time perception? The
justification comes from the literature on theories of embodied
cognition. Embodiment refers to physical states that arise during
interaction with the world and that arise from introspection. These
physical states appear to play an important role in cognition
(Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & Rupert, 2003; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, in press, for reviews),
and they include postures, facial expressions, or partial simulations
of physical states in the relevant neurological sensory systems.
Most important for the present discussion is the observation that
embodied states occur in the imitation of others’ gestures and
expressions. Individuals spontaneously mimic positive and negative facial expressions (Dimberg, 1982, 1990), even when the faces
are presented below conscious awareness (Dimberg, Thunberg, &
Elmehed, 2000) or when the perceivers consciously attempt to
inhibit their facial musculature (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Grunedal,
2002). Evidence from neuropsychology suggests that facial mimicry plays an important role in the perception of emotions in others
(Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & Damasio, 2000; Décety &
Chaminade, 2003; Gallese, 2003). It thus seems reasonable to
speculate that spontaneous mimicry contributes to other forms of
emotional cognition. Indeed, embodied emotion seems to affect
memory, stimulus identification, and evaluation (see Barsalou et
al., 2003, for a review). Given these previous observations, it
seems plausible that embodiment would also play a role in the
temporal perception of emotion.
A more specific reason to posit a relationship between embodiment and the temporal perception of emotion relates to research
associated with the facial feedback hypothesis, which states that
feedback from facial expressions by itself can induce or at least
enhance or suppress an emotion (see Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989;
McIntosh, 1996, for reviews). In one relevant study (Lanzetta,
Cartwright-Smith, & Kleck, 1976), participants simulated with
their facial expressions the anticipation of either a painful shock or
no shock. When subjects simulated painful-shock anticipation,
they rated the actual shock as more painful and experienced a
higher level of autonomic arousal (measured by skin conductance)
as compared with when they simulated anticipating no shock.
Similarly, Kleck et al. (1976) found that when, due to the presence
of an observer, participants inhibited their facial reactions to re-
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speed in turn increases the number of pulses emitted per unit of
time and, consequently, collected in the accumulator. Thus, when
individuals are aroused, they typically overestimate duration. The
clearest demonstrations of this arousal-lengthening effect come
from pharmacological studies that have selectively increased the
pacemaker speed by administering amphetamine (for a review, see
Harrington & Haaland, 1999; Meck, 1996). It is interesting that felt
emotions and emotional events, because of their importance, could
detract attention from the processing of time. But they are also
arousing. Which of these two mechanisms wins out in the case of
the temporal perception of emotion?
Few studies have investigated the effect of emotion on time
perception. However, in a recent study, Angrilli et al. (1997)
showed participants images depicting scenes that were fully
crossed for valence (positive, negative) and arousal (high, low) at
durations of 2, 4, and 6 s. Participants were then instructed to either
estimate or reproduce the slides’ durations. Results revealed an
interaction between valence and arousal in the perceived duration
of the images. For low-arousal slides, the duration of unpleasant
slides was underestimated relative to pleasant ones, whereas for
high-arousal slides, the duration of unpleasant slides was overestimated relative to pleasant ones. Given that negative events often
arouse more attention than do positive ones (e.g., Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001), Angrilli et al. concluded that an attentional mechanism is most influential in the temporal perception of
low-arousal events, whereas for high-arousal events, the effect of
attention is minimized, and arousal provoked by the images plays
a greater role.
Droit-Volet et al. (2004) pointed out a number of potential
shortcomings of the work of Angrilli and colleagues (Angrilli et
al., 1997), including the complexity of participants’ task as well as
the possible insensitivity of the relatively long durations used to
detect influences of arousal. Droit-Volet et al. (2004) therefore
conducted a study using a temporal bisection task typically used in
tests of scalar timing models (e.g., Church & Deluty, 1977; Wearden, 1991), and they used somewhat short presentation durations
(i.e., less than 2 s). In the first phase of this task, participants were
presented with a neutral visual stimulus (a pink oval) for 400 and
1,600 ms, identified as the short and long standard durations,
respectively. In a subsequent test phase, participants were shown
pictures of faces that expressed anger, happiness, sadness, or
neutrality. Each face appeared for one of the standard durations or
for intermediate durations. Participants were required to categorize
the comparison durations as the short or the long standard. Results
supported the predictions of an arousal-based mechanism in several ways. First, subjects categorized more of the emotional faces
than the neutral faces as long, indicating that the duration of
presentations of emotional expressions was overestimated relative
to neutral expressions. Second, this overestimation effect was
larger for faces expressing anger, a highly arousing emotion, than
for faces expressing the less arousing emotions of happiness and
sadness (see Russel & Mehrabian, 1977). Third, consistent with an
arousal interpretation, the overestimation of especially the angry
faces increased with the duration values, such that overestimation
was more marked at longer durations. Such an interaction between
emotion and duration is not expected under an attentional hypothesis, which predicts not a multiplicative but an additive effect, that
is, one independent of the durations judged (for a discussion, see
Burle & Casini, 1999). Droit-Volet et al. (2004) therefore con-
FS
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tapraid1/emo-emo/emo-emo/emo00106/emo0109d06g yodert S⫽6 2/13/06 10:25 Art: E04-102
EMBODIED TIME
FS
inhibited or allowed to take place spontaneously. Because the
effect of emotional expression on time perception in the 2004
study by Droit-Volet and her colleagues was greatest for angry
faces, and next greatest for happy faces, we chose to use these two
emotions in the present study. We expected to replicate the overestimation of the duration of emotional faces relative to neutral
ones when imitation was allowed to occur spontaneously, but not
when imitation was inhibited. As a secondary hypothesis, we also
expected to replicate the finding, predicted by an arousal-based
mechanism, of a larger overestimation effect for anger than for
happiness.
Method
Participants
Forty female1 students were recruited from the University of Clermont- Fn1
Ferrand, France, for participation in the study. They received course credit
as compensation.
OO
ceiving a shock, they experienced less autonomic arousal and
reported feeling less discomfort than when not observed. In a
related paradigm, Zuckerman, Klorman, Larrance, and Spiegel
(1981) reported that exaggeration of emotional facial expressions
led to increased arousal (measured by skin conductance, blood
volume, and heart rate) upon viewing pleasant, unpleasant, and
neutral film clips relative to arousal when inhibiting expression.
Finally, Vaughan and Lanzetta (1981) instructed participants to
either amplify or inhibit their facial reactions to a film of a model
wincing with pain. A previous study (Vaughan & Lanzetta, 1980)
showed that participants not asked to inhibit their reactions would
imitate the model’s facial expressions. In the 1981 Vaughan and
Lanzetta study, subjects instructed to amplify their reactions (and
thus exaggerate their mimicry) displayed greater arousal (i.e.,
heightened skin conductance and heart rate acceleration) than
those instructed to inhibit. Taken together, these studies suggest
that exaggeration or suppression of facial expressions can, respectively, induce or inhibit physiological arousal. Perhaps mimicry of
such emotional expressions can therefore activate the arousalbased mechanism that seems to be responsible for the temporal
overestimation effect (Droit-Volet et al., 2004).
It is worth noting that these studies in general do not make clear
the precise mechanism by which arousal arises from embodied
emotion. Other embodiment effects have been explained by vicarious experience of the embodied emotion (e.g., Hsee, Hatfield,
Carlson, & Chemtob, 1990; Laird, Wagener, Halal, & Szegda,
1982), simple association of the embodied state with arousal (e.g.,
Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), or a more direct mechanism in which
both arousal and embodied states represent the core knowledge of
the emotional concept (e.g., Barsalou, 1999). Although any of
these explanations could account for an embodied instigation of
arousal, the point of greater importance for our study is simply that
the embodiment of emotional facial expressions is required for
arousal to be produced and to affect subsequent processing.
To summarize, previous research has found that individuals
spontaneously imitate emotional expressions and that the embodiment of facial expressions can affect autonomic arousal. Considering these findings, and given that arousal facilitates the ability of
emotional faces to cause a subjective lengthening in time perception (Droit-Volet et al., 2004), it seems likely that the embodiment
of facial expressions is directly involved in this overestimation
effect. If this were the case, we would predict that subjects who are
free to imitate emotional facial expressions would show the subjective lengthening effect, whereas subjects whose imitation is
inhibited would show no such change in time perception. From the
perspective of the time perception literature, such a finding should
be noteworthy because it would help explain why merely viewing
pictures of faces for short durations is sufficient to activate the
arousal-based mechanism that causes the subjective lengthening
effect; of importance to the embodied cognition literature, such a
finding would also suggest that mimicry plays an important role in
a basic cognitive process that functions during social interactions.
3
Materials
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Participants sat in a quiet room in front of a computer that presented the
stimuli, one at a time, in the center of each participant’s field of vision.
Stimuli were presented and data recorded with a program created on
PsyScope for Macintosh (Cohen, McWhinne, Flatt, & Provost, 1993). For AQ: 6
the training phase of the experiment, a pink oval 12 ⫻ 16 cm was used as
the stimulus. The testing phase of the experiment used six photographs,
each showing one of three women expressing anger, happiness, or neutrality (see Figure 1 for examples). These photographs had been normed to F1
verify their depiction of these facial expressions (Niedenthal, Brauer,
Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, 2001).
Overview of the Study
To test the hypothesized effects of imitation on time perception,
we used a temporal bisection task (Allan & Gibbon, 1991) with
emotional faces as stimuli (as in Droit-Volet et al., 2004) to
examine participants’ perception of time while imitation was either
Procedure
The temporal bisection task consisted of a training phase and a test
phase. During the training phase, the neutral stimulus (a pink oval) was
presented to participants five times in alteration, for standard durations
labeled as either short (400 ms) or long (1,600 ms). For each presentation,
participants were instructed to indicate whether they had seen the short or
the long duration by pressing either the D or K key on the computer
keyboard. The key assigned to each of the two standard durations was
counterbalanced across participants. Next, participants completed eight
practice trials with the neutral stimulus, which had a 50% chance of
appearing for each of the two standard durations on each trial. The
computer displayed accuracy feedback after each trial for 2 s, after which
it paused for 1–3 s before beginning the next trial.
During the test phase, participants were shown the women’s faces and
asked to indicate on the keyboard whether these stimuli were presented for
a duration closer to the long or the short standard. The actual duration of
the presentation of the face was 400, 600, 800, 1,000, 1,200, 1,400, or
1,600 ms, that is, one of the two standard durations or one of five
intermediate values. The faces were presented in three blocks of 63 trials,
in which the nine photographs (3 different women ⫻ 3 different expressions) were presented for each of the seven durations in a random order.
1
Only female subjects were used because the subject population to
which we had access was primarily female, and we anticipated that gender
congruity between participants and the models used in the stimuli would be
a significant factor in our hypothesized effect. Other research using the
present paradigm has found that such congruity leads to the largest effects
(Chambon & Droit-Volet, 2004).
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EFFRON, NIEDENTHAL, GIL, AND DROIT-VOLET
Figure 1.
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Examples of happy, angry, and neutral faces used as stimuli.
face. The 7 durations and 2 emotion pairs (happy–neutral and
sad–neutral) yielded 14 d⬘ scores. Each score represents the extent
to which participants’ categorization of emotional faces differed
from that of neutral faces; a positive score therefore represents an
overestimation, and a negative score represents an underestimation
of duration relative to the neutral baseline. The d⬘ scores for each
duration and emotion are shown in Figure 2. Note that participants
seemed to overestimate duration overall for angry faces, and to a
lesser extent happy faces, in the spontaneous imitation condition
(top) but not in the inhibited imitation condition (bottom).
To test this apparent pattern statistically, d⬘ scores were submitted to a 7 ⫻ 2 ⫻ 2 repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA), using, respectively, actual stimulus duration and emotion as within-subject factors and condition as a between-subjects
factor. We found main effects of emotion, F(1, 37) ⫽ 27.98, p ⬍
.001, and condition, F(1, 37) ⫽ 10.43, p ⬍ .01, as well as an
interaction between these two variables, F(1, 37) ⫽ 5.10, p ⬍ .05.
Because there was no main effect of stimulus duration, F(6,
222) ⫽ 1.95, we averaged d⬘ across duration and tested whether
this average was different from 0 for both emotions in both
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Each participant thus completed 189 trials. The interval between trials
varied randomly between 1 and 3 s; participants paused for 1–2 min
between blocks.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions in order to
manipulate imitation. In the inhibited imitation condition, participants held
a pen lightly in their mouth, between their lips and their teeth, in such a
way that their lower facial musculature remained fixed in a neutral expression for the entire test phase of the experiment. While this task does not, of
course, prevent participants from moving their upper facial musculature, it
does prevent complete imitation of the faces without inducing an emotional
state (Niedenthal et al., 2001). In the spontaneous imitation control condition, participants were given the standard instructions for the bisection
task without reference to the pen. As discussed in the introduction, previous research has shown that people spontaneously imitate the expressions
of faces that are presented for short periods (Dimberg et al., 2002), so we
can assume that imitation takes place spontaneously in this condition.
Results
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One woman in the inhibited imitation condition was excluded
due to her status as an outlier.2 The sample therefore consisted of
39 women, 19 in the inhibited imitation condition and 20 in the
spontaneous imitation condition.
It was hypothesized that women in the spontaneous imitation
condition but not in the inhibited imitation condition would overestimate the duration of angry and happy faces as compared with
neutral faces. We also expected the overestimation effect to be
larger for angry than for happy faces (Droit-Volet et al., 2004).
To test these predictions, the average proportion of trials that
participants categorized as long at each duration were first transformed with the probit function into z scores.3 Then d⬘ was
calculated in accordance with signal detection theory (Macmillan
& Creelman, 1991) for each stimulus duration by subtracting the z
scores for each emotional face from the z scores for the neutral
2
Post hoc examination, however, showed that inclusion of this subject
did not significantly alter the results.
3
It should be noted that, although z scores sometimes refer to standardized scores, signal detection theory defines z as the inverse function of the
normal distribution curve (cf. Macmillan & Creelman, 1991), which is how
we use the term. Note also that, in order for this transformation to be
accomplished on proportions, values of 1 and 0 had to be replaced with a
high and low decimal, respectively. We substituted .944 for 1, and .056
for 0.
F2
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EMBODIED TIME
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Figure 2.
d⬘ scores plotted against actual stimulus duration for each emotion-neutral pair.
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the latter condition. This finding is clearly consistent with our
primary hypothesis. Consistent with our secondary hypothesis, the
tendency to categorize emotional faces as long more frequently
than neutral faces was greater overall for angry faces than for
happy faces.
Discussion
When participants were able to spontaneously imitate the faces
they saw, they overestimated the duration of angry and, to a lesser
extent, happy faces as compared with neutral faces. Replicating the
findings of Droit-Volet et al. (2004), these results suggest that
viewing emotional faces can cause a subjective lengthening of
their duration and that this effect may be more pronounced for
more arousing emotions (i.e., anger as opposed to happiness).
When imitation was inhibited by holding a pen in the mouth,
however, participants’ overall estimates of the duration of all three
facial expressions were equivalent. This result is consistent with
the hypothesis that imitation facilitates the effect of emotional
stimuli on time perception. Given that the subjective lengthening
effect for emotions seems to function via a quickening of the
internal pacemaker in response to arousal (Droit-Volet et al.,
2004), it therefore appears that spontaneous imitation of emotional
facial expressions plays a central role in instigating this arousal.
Specifically, we can extrapolate based on scalar timing models that
viewing arousing facial expressions seems to quicken the cognitive
pacemaker, leading to a greater number of pulses accumulating in
the timer and an overestimation of the duration of these emotional
stimuli.
It was somewhat surprising that participants in the inhibited
imitation condition significantly underestimated the duration of
emotional relative to neutral faces at the 800-ms actual stimulus
duration. This underestimation was not observed across durations,
however, as would have been expected if attentional mechanisms,
as discussed in the introduction, had played a significant role in
this condition. We attribute this finding simply to variability inherent in the task. We favor a similar explanation for why participants overestimated the duration of emotional faces at 1,400 ms in
the inhibited imitation condition, although it is possible that a
small amount of arousal was able to take place at this relatively
long duration regardless of the pen task (which inhibited, but may
not have eliminated, imitation), thus causing an overestimation.
Indeed, our results suggest that the women had a small tendency to
show a greater difference in time estimations between emotional
and neutral faces at longer durations than at shorter ones, which is
predicted by the arousal hypothesis (see Burle & Casini, 1999;
Droit-Volet et al., 2004). Future research, however, should repli-
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conditions.4 Single-sample t tests confirmed the hypothesized difference between conditions. In the spontaneous imitation condition, participants significantly overestimated the duration (relative
to neutral) of both angry and happy faces, t(19) ⫽ 6.65, p ⬍ .001,
and t(19) ⫽ 2.15, p ⬍ .05, respectively. In contrast, no significant
differences between categorizations of emotional and neutral faces
were found in the inhibited imitation condition for angry faces,
t(18) ⫽ 1.30 or for happy faces, t(18) ⫽ ⫺.55. Furthermore,
consistent with our prediction, paired-samples t tests revealed that
d⬘ was significantly larger for angry than for happy faces in the
spontaneous imitation condition, t(18) ⫽ 4.57, p ⬍ .001. This was
also the case in the inhibited imitation condition, t(18) ⫽ 2.79, p ⬍
.02, but to a lesser extent (M ⫽ 0.06 for inhibited imitation, and
M ⫽ 0.15 for spontaneous imitation).
No three-way interaction was found for stimulus duration, emotion, and condition, F(6, 222) ⫽ 1.40, ns. However, stimulus
duration did seem to play some role, as revealed by a Stimulus
Duration ⫻ Emotion and a Stimulus Duration ⫻ Condition interaction, F(6, 222) ⫽ 2.42, p ⬍ .05, and F(6, ???) ⫽ 2.65, p ⬍ .05,
respectively. Although the hypotheses central to the present experiment did not specify how duration would interact with emotion, the arousal hypothesis nonetheless predicts that the difference
between emotional and neutral faces will increase as (relatively
short) durations lengthen (as discussed in the introduction; see
Burle & Casini, 1999; Droit-Volet et al., 2004). We tested to see
if this would be the case in our results by first recoding the
stimulus durations into two groups: longer (i.e., 1,000 ms) and
shorter (i.e., d⬘ at longer durations was greater than d⬘ at shorter
durations for both happy (M difference ⫽ 0.09) and angry (M
difference ⫽ 0.10) faces. This difference did not reach significance
for happy faces, t(38) ⫽ 1.53 but represented a trend for angry
faces, t(38) ⫽ 1.80, p ⫽ .08. Thus, as predicted by an arousal
hypothesis, d⬘ tended to be larger for longer than for shorter
durations, at least by a marginally significant amount for angry
faces.
Because we made no a priori predictions concerning how stimulus duration would affect d⬘ within conditions, we took the
exploratory step of decomposing the Stimulus Duration ⫻ Condition interaction. The d⬘ scores were averaged across both emotions
at each stimulus duration, and two repeated-measures ANOVAs
were performed, one within each condition, on these averaged
scores. Results revealed a simple effect of duration in the inhibited
imitation condition only, F(3.89, 69.98) ⫽ 2.99, p ⬍ .05. Note that
this statistic contains degrees of freedom adjusted with a
Greenhouse–Geisser epsilon (␧ ⫽ .69), used because the sphericity
assumption was violated, Mauchley’s W(20) ⫽ 0.11, p ⬍ .05.5 To
determine the nature of the effect of duration, post hoc singlesample t tests examined the difference from 0 of d⬘, averaged
across both emotions, at each duration in the inhibited imitation
condition. A significant difference was found only at 800 and
1,400 ms, t(18) ⫽ ⫺2.60, p ⬍ .05, and t(18) ⫽ 2.25, p ⬍ .05,
respectively. Note that participants appear to have overestimated
the duration of emotional relative to neutral faces in this condition
at 1,400 ms (M ⫽ 0.14), but underestimated the duration of
emotional relative to neutral faces at 800 ms (M ⫽ ⫺0.30).
In summary, these results indicate that, overall, participants
categorized emotional faces more frequently than neutral faces as
long in the spontaneous imitation condition but not in the inhibited
imitation condition, with the exception of the 1,400-ms duration in
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EFFRON, NIEDENTHAL, GIL, AND DROIT-VOLET
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6
4
For tests in this ANOVA involving stimulus duration and its interactions, Mauchley’s test of sphericity indicated that we needed to adjust the
degrees of freedom. In no cases did adjusting with either a Greenhouse–
Geisser or a Huynh–Feldt epsilon significantly alter the p value associated
with these tests, except where indicated. We thus report unadjusted degrees
of freedom and p values.
5
In addition, when we used a Greenhouse-–Geisser epsilon to adjust our
degrees of freedom after Mauchly’s test suggested we reject the sphericity
assumption, this interaction’s significance fell below conventional levels
( p ⫽ .054).
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EMBODIED TIME
Although these data cannot rule out such an explanation, it seems
unlikely given the results of the Droit-Volet et al. (2004) study. As
mentioned above, support for an arousal-based mechanism in this
study came not only from the observation that the overestimation
of angry faces was greater than that of faces with happy and sad
(i.e., less arousing) expressions, but also from the finding that all
emotional faces were overestimated relative to neutral ones and
that the actual stimulus duration interacted with the degree of
overestimation. Given the diverse support offered by Droit-Volet
et al. (2004) for arousal’s role in the temporal perception of
emotion, it seems unparsimonious to posit the existence of a
second mechanism that functions with embodiment to create the
same pattern of results that are predicted by arousal.
It is also perhaps worth noting that the different degrees of
overestimation found between anger and happiness in this study
might have been obtained if anger instigated a prolonged state of
arousal relative to happiness, rather than causing a heightened
degree of arousal. In this view, the cognitive pacemaker would
increase its speed by the same amount for happy and angry faces,
but more pulses would accumulate in the cognitive timer while
viewing angry faces because the pacemaker would maintain this
increased speed for a longer period. Although our data cannot rule
out this explanation, it seems unlikely given previous research that
shows that anger is more arousing than happiness is (e.g., Russel
& Mehrabian, 1977) and that arousal increases the speed of the
pacemaker (e.g., Droit-Volet & Wearden, 2002). Furthermore, the
distinction between these two models is peripheral to the present
study’s focus; in either case, arousal would play a role.
It is interesting to consider whether heightened emotional states
would cause a similar subjective lengthening effect in the temporal
perception of nonemotional stimuli. Participants in our study as
well as those in the study by Angrilli et al. (1997) estimated the
duration of the same emotional events that presumably instigated
emotional arousal. It seems extremely likely, however, that substituting nonemotional stimuli for emotional ones would not significantly change time estimations, so long as subjects remained
aroused. Studies that used amphetamine (Maricq et al., 1981;
Meck, 1983) or body heat (Wearden & Penton-Voak, 1995) to
instigate arousal demonstrated an apparent subjective lengthening
of time using nonemotional stimuli. These findings are predicted
by the pacemaker–accumulator model of time perception, which
posits that because arousal increases the speed of the pacemaker,
the duration of any stimulus viewed while aroused should be
overestimated, or at least, when stimuli are viewed for the relatively short durations examined in our study.
This study joins the research reviewed above in providing evidence
for the role of embodiment in social perception. Just as imitating or
affecting a facial expression can modulate autonomic arousal and
phenomenological experience of pain (Kleck et al., 1976; Lanzetta et
al., 1976; Vaughan & Lanzetta, 1981; Zuckerman et al., 1981), the
FS
cate the 800- and 1,400-ms findings before drawing conclusions
about what happened at these durations.6
An alternative explanation for the present results might argue
that attention, rather than imitation, facilitates the effect of emotion
on time perception. Specifically, perhaps participants did not display the overestimation effect in the inhibited imitation condition
simply because the task of holding a pen in the mouth distracted
them from attending to the stimuli and fully processing the emotional content. While future research is needed to test this explanation directly, several considerations make it unlikely. First,
previous research in which participants held a pen in their mouths
found evidence that this task was not distracting (Niedenthal et al.,
2001). Second, as discussed above, when people do not attend to
stimuli, they tend to underestimate duration (e.g., Brown, 1997;
Casini & Macar, 1997; Macar et al., 1994; Zakay, 1989). If holding
a pen distracted participants from attending to the stimuli, we
would thus expect to see an underestimation of the duration of
neutral faces in the inhibited imitation condition as compared with
neutral faces in the spontaneous imitation condition, in which the
only task was to attend to the stimuli. Instead, our data showed no
significant differences between the estimations of neutral faces
between conditions, t(37) ⫽ .22. Therefore, it seems unlikely that
the results of the current study can be attributed to attention
required for the pen-in-mouth task.
It is possible, though, that the pen task somehow drew attention
to, rather than away from, the faces, perhaps by first drawing
attention to participants’ own faces. Although it might seem that
attending to the faces would increase the accuracy of temporal
perception (thereby eliminating the overestimation effect), the
same counterargument advanced above against attention applies
here. The pacemaker–accumulator model of time perception implies that anything that distracts attention away from the duration
of a stimulus, even nontemporal properties of the stimulus itself
(e.g., emotion), will lead to an underestimation effect. In this case,
as above, an attentional mechanism would thus predict an underestimation of the neutral faces’ duration in the inhibited imitation
condition relative to that in the spontaneous imitation condition,
which is at odds with our results.
Perhaps, then, the pen in the mouth drew attention to the
stimuli’s duration without drawing attention to their other (emotional) features. This suggestion could explain the overall lack of
an overestimation of the duration of emotional relative to neutral
faces in the inhibited imitation condition. Without any theoretical
reason to posit a connection between a motor task and increased
attention to duration only, we favor the explanation from arousal.
Although attention does not seem to play a significant role in
these results, we did not assess arousal directly, so it is possible
that some other embodied mechanism was responsible for the
overestimation effect. Although the observation that angry faces
were overestimated to a greater extent than happy faces seems best
explained by the fact that anger is more arousing than happiness
(Russel & Mehrabian, 1977), it is possible that other characteristics of anger were more important in this paradigm. For example,
perhaps something about an angry expression made participants
imitate it longer, past the stimuli’s actual duration, than they
imitated happy expressions. If time estimation of facial expressions were based on the duration of one’s imitation, then such a
“lingering effect” would lead to the same overestimation of angry
as compared with happy faces that the present data revealed.
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Longer durations should be more likely to reveal an overestimation AQ: 24
effect only to a point. As duration increases, so does the potential for
attention (which begets underestimation; e.g., Brown, 1997; Casini &
Macar, 1997; Macar et al., 1994; Zakay, 1989) to confound arousal (see
Droit-Volet et al., 2004). Thus, Angrilli et al. (1997) found that highly
arousing stimuli elicited an overestimation at 2 s, but elicited an underestimation at 4 and 6 s when attention may have played more of a role.
tapraid1/emo-emo/emo-emo/emo00106/emo0109d06g yodert S⫽6 2/13/06 10:25 Art: E04-102
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literature to suggest otherwise. Still future work should certainly
redress this limitation.
Future research should also seek to establish a clearer link
between imitation and arousal and to rule out attention more
decisively as an explanatory mechanism for the present results. For
example, physiological measures could be used during a bisection
task to correlate the extent of facial imitation (measured by electromyography) with the level of physiological arousal (sensitive
measures of, e.g., skin conductance, heart rate, or blood pressure)
and the relative overestimation of emotional faces. Our results
suggest that a positive correlation would be found between all
three variables. In addition, neutral faces exclusively could be used
as stimuli in the bisection task while participants expressed anger,
happiness, or neutrality with their own faces, covertly induced via
muscle-by-muscle instruction (as in Laird, 1974) or by holding a
pen in the mouth in different ways (Strack, Martin, & Stepper,
1988). We would expect participants to overestimate the duration
of the neutral stimuli while simulating an emotional expression as
compared with when holding the face in a neutral position. This
procedure has the advantage of controlling for effects of attention,
because all conditions contain essentially the same task.
In summary, this study supports the idea that imitating emotional faces facilitates the effect of emotion on the subjective
experience of time. Physically inhibiting imitation seems to prevent or at least significantly reduce the overestimation of the
duration of emotional faces that occurs when imitation is permitted
to occur spontaneously. These findings thus add to the mounting
evidence suggesting that embodiment plays an important, if not a
central, role in social cognition.
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results of our study suggest that imitating emotional faces can facilitate the subjective experience of time, presumably by inducing
arousal. But what is the precise nature of embodiment’s role in social
cognition? Until recently, no one theory had attempted to unify the
diverse embodiment effects shown throughout the literature (Barsalou
et al., 2003). In the context of modern cognitive theories, embodied
effects have been traditionally viewed as stemming from or resulting
in the activation of amodal concepts—abstract symbols that bear no
direct relation to physical states (see Niedenthal et al., in press). In
such a view, for example, the concept anger might be represented by
a feature list of related or definitional components, and imitation of an
angry face could activate them through association. In contrast to such
amodal theories, Barsalou (1999) has proposed a modal theory of
cognition in which embodiment, whether expressed by full enactment
of bodily states or by partial simulation in relevant sensorimotor areas,
represents the concepts themselves. In this view, imitating an angry
face would be a central component in processing anger (Barsalou et
al., 2003; Niedenthal et al., in press). Inhibiting imitation would
therefore inhibit the perception of the emotion and hinder its related
effects (i.e., arousal, subjective lengthening).
Our data also bolster other recent studies that found a role for
embodiment in temporal perception in particular. In a study by
Chambon and Droit-Volet (2004), for example, male and female
participants performed a temporal bisection task similar to the one
we used. Durations were represented by faces of young and old
men and women (expressing neutral emotion). Results showed that
men tended to underestimate the duration of presentations of the
elderly faces, as compared with the young faces, but more particularly for elderly men’s rather than elderly women’s faces. On the
other hand, women tended to underestimate the duration of presentations of elderly women’s compared with young women’s
faces, whereas their perception of the durations of young and
elderly male faces were identical. We interpret the findings to
mean that male participants embodied the motoric style of young
and old men and the women embodied the motoric style of young
and old women. Because older men (and women) tend to produce
slower motor movements, the embodiment of an old man (or
woman) would have the effect of slowing the cognitive pacemaker,
which would result in fewer pulses collected in the accumulator.
This slowing effect would result in an underestimation of duration
(see Chambon, Gil, Niedenthal, & Droit-Volet, 2005, for discussion). Furthermore, the finding that embodiment occurred within
sex is not only unsurprising but is even consistent with the embodiment hypothesis. Other work has shown that the imitation of
expressions of other individuals is moderated by factors such as
the motivation to empathize (e.g., Zajonc, Adelmann, Murphy, &
Niedenthal, 1987). It is indeed difficult to interpret the specific
effects of sex without the notion of embodiment and the psychological and biological ability to embody some individuals better
than or more than others.
A limitation of the present study is that the sample was composed entirely of women, which was the sample available to us.
There are some differences between men’s and women’s ability to
accurately decode and to accurately encode facial expression of
emotion (e.g., McClure, 2000). However, our study did not examine the types of facial expression processing that are known to
differ across the sexes. We would expect the role of embodiment
in the effect of emotion on time perception to be largely the same
for males and females, and have not yet seen any findings in the
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AP
A
AQ: 18
PR
OO
AQ: 17
9
Received July 29, 2004
Revision received May 19, 2005
Accepted May 25, 2005 䡲
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EFFRON, NIEDENTHAL, GIL, AND DROIT-VOLET
10
AQ1: savor tends to be associated with food; alternative okay?
AQ2: Spelled Russell in list. Which is correct?
AQ3: Casini throughout list, so I’ve changed citations to match.
AQ4: Spelled Ruppert in list. Which is correct?
AQ5: Spelled Adelman in list. Which is correct?
AQ7: Please provide second degree of freedom for second F stat.
AQ8: Please check spelling of second author, Casini.
FS
AQ6: Spelled MacWhinney in list. Which is correct?
AQ10: Please indicate proper placement of Footnote 6.
AQ11: Please check spelling of first author, Russel.
AQ12: Please check spelling of first author, Russel.
OO
AQ9: Please check placement of Footnote 5, which was not called out in the manuscript.
AQ13: Which reference do you mean: Niedenthal, Barsalou, Ric et al., or Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman et al.?
AQ15: “neutral” meant?
PR
AQ14: Again, which Niedenthal in-press reference do you mean?
AQ16: Please include Manfredini’s initials.
AQ17: Please provide English translation of article title for Chambon et al. (2005).
AP
A
AQ18: Please provide chapter page numbers for Gibbon and Church (1984).
AQ19: Update available for the two Niedenthal et al. (in press) articles?
AQ20: Please provide chapter page numbers for Zakay (1989).
AQ21: Please provide publisher’s name and city for Zakay (2005). Also, please provide page numbers of chapter.
AQ22: We need to include departmental affiliations for all authors. Please revise as needed.
AQ23: At the request of the editors, we do not include general thanks to anonymous reviewers and others involved in the
formal process of peer review. If you wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for a specific contribution, you may add a
footnote in an appropriate place within the text of the article.
AQ24: Please indicate in text where Footnote 6 should go.
EQ1: Delete period at end of e-mail address per style?