Framing the Truth: U.S. Media Coverage during the War on Terror

Framing the Truth
Running head: Framing and the War on Terror
Framing the Truth: U.S. Media Coverage during the War on Terror
Bradley E. Wiggins
Doctoral Candidate
Department of Communications Media
Indiana University of Pennsylvania
121 Stouffer Hall
1175 Maple Street
Indiana, PA 15705
[email protected]
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Abstract
The events of September 11, 2001 challenged preconceived notions of the world for most
Americans, and it left an indelible impact on how news media frame events for audience
interpretation and consumption. This article suggests that U.S. news media, especially television,
covered events during the War on Terror differently from other times of war, conflict, or crisis.
The presence of internal changes within news media caused the news to be reported differently
thus affecting the way audiences interpret framed messages. Indeed, the 24-hour news channel
has impacted the journalistic tradition of objectivity, and the use of affective language coupled
with selective news coverage suggests that there are larger changes which deserve critical
analysis. This article presents a modified interpretation of traditional frames in order to
understand the interconnected frames throughout the War on Terror.
Keywords: War on Terror, framing, 9/11, embedded journalists, 24-hour news channel, and
affective media coverage
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Introduction
A frame is essentially a way to interpret events. In news media, a frame is equivalent to
manufactured context through which reporters communicate a story. Elements of rhetoric are
framed in order to promote certain interpretations and to discourage others. Similar to looking
out a window to determine what kind of day it is, individuals consume media texts framed in
such a way to communicate intended information and to encourage the appropriate
interpretation. Research has shown that the way a televised news story is framed will explicitly
influence audience opinion on a variety of subjects. For the medium of television, frames are
either episodic or thematic. An episodic frame concentrates on unique cases or recalls associative
examples descriptive of a larger trend. A thematic frame considers “larger social and political
trends” (Morris, 2005, p.58). How a news story is framed has an enormous impact on how
individuals perceive all aspects of a given issue. Additionally, frames tend to set the language
and tone of an issue and how individuals should interpret them. Frames can limit debate or,
conversely, make the range of issues appear broad because they are the ones news media discuss.
Thus, frames influence perception and memory.
The purpose of this article is to discuss how U.S. news media frame events during times
of crisis, war, and conflict. Following a brief introduction to the way news media shifted
somewhat after the events of 9/11, there is a detailed comparative discussion of how news media
covered the Gulf War, Vietnam War, and to a lesser degree, the Second World War. The
discussion then turns to the Iraq War and how the inclusion of embedded journalists affected
news content. The growth of 24-hour news channels is explored with emphasis given to issues of
affective language, credibility, and the economic restraints of filling a 24-hour television slot
with significant content. This article then examines the language of the War on Terror. Given the
changes in news coverage after 9/11 and during the War on Terror, the multitude and complexity
of frames throughout the War on Terror suggest that we make an adjustment to the term frame in
order to capture the breadth of intended messages. It is the position of the author that a metaframe of events related to 9/11, global terrorism, and the War on Terror emerged as a result of
Framing the Truth
the interaction among external factors, agents, and effects. Below is a visualization of the metaframe of global terror.
The graphic represents the successive stages creating the components of the meta-frame.
Whereas a frame is the singular context of a news story, a meta-frame includes the frame(s)
themselves and their interconnectedness as conveyed through various communications media.
The graphic above specifically points to the 24-hour news channel since it was a larger part of
the discussion than other forms of news media such as newspapers or radio. It is expected that
similar patterns would be discovered in other media as well. This remains an area for further
investigation. It would be helpful to learn what effects on content and reception exist in other
countries where 24-hour news channels are present. Additionally, a statistical analysis would
determine if there is any correlation between how a story is framed and if an individual who has
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consumed the story seeks out similar stories. This could potentially add significance to the metaframe model.
Media Shift at 9/11
News coverage in the U.S. since 9/11 became narrow and increased thematic similarity
among frames and decreased the credibility of the news media. Ruigrok and van Atteveldt
(2007, p.80) found that the U.S. localized events with an average of ten, which suggests that
“local actors were associated with 9/11 ten times more often that global actors”. In addition, U.S.
news media covered the London bombings in 2005 within the framework of 9/11 (Ruigrok &
van Atteveldt, 2007). The Madrid bombing in 2003 also received a similar treatment, but with a
quicker retreat to U.S. affairs than with the London example. British newspapers mentioned the
Madrid bombing with references to the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and
Freedom), while U.S. press referred to 9/11 only as part of its relatively brief coverage of the
events in Madrid. News media in the U.S. filtered events to reflect the views of the U.S.
administration since the events of 9/11 and throughout the War on Terror (Papacharissi &
Oliveira, 2008; Seib, 2004).
News media coverage since 9/11 and during the subsequent War on Terror has led to a
meta-frame in terms of how U.S. news media cover events. Cold War journalism, like that
during the War on Terror, fell under an “us-versus-them” frame (Seib, 2004, p.72). U.S. news
media retained this framing approach to international news coverage as a result of the events of
9/11 (Kellner, 2004; Elter, 2008). Coverage of terrorist activity abroad as well as the war in Iraq
in The Washington Post and The New York Times focused on military strategy and the implicit
support of the Bush administration. News media did not include diplomatic options, divergent
viewpoints, or critique of the Iraq War or the War on Terror.
Media Coverage of the Gulf War, Vietnam, WWII
In the interest of providing the clarity of historical perspective on media coverage during
the War on Terror, this section shall examine how media covered the Gulf War, Vietnam War,
and the Second World War. Despite a popularly held belief that media coverage of the Vietnam
War was negative, U.S. news media chiefly practiced patriotic journalism until at least the Tet
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Offensive in 1968. Journalists reporting from Vietnam were committed to advocating a
consensus true to the national security of the United States (Jensen, 1992). Hallin (1986) outlined
several conventions which relate directly to the notion of consensus. According to Hallin, these
conventions are (a) a “reliance on official sources and deference to their authority”, (b) “a focus
on the president, with the assumption that his newsworthiness overrides any other story”, (c) “an
absence of interpretation or analysis in straight journalism” and, (d) “a focus on immediate and
discrete events” (Hallin, 1986). At home in the U.S., media framed anti-war protests against
Vietnam as violent, pro-Communist, threatening, and deviant (Hackett & Zhao, 1994). In a
similar vein, coverage of World War II followed the assumption that war is a part of the
American tradition. Journalists during that time, such as Ernie Pyle, reported the news as
“member[s] of the team” (Aday, Livingston, & Hebert, 2005, p. 5). All these conventions and
approaches forged a frame during media coverage of the Vietnam War (Hoskins, 2004). Lessons
learned from a negative tone that emerged in media coverage of Vietnam (when it was clear that
victory would be unattainable) would later become part of the template during the Gulf War.
The U.S. government limited journalistic access to subsequent military engagements, in
part because of the negative tone in media coverage after the Tet Offensive, as mentioned above
(Calabrese, 2005). Graber (2005) notes that there was a media blackout during the U.S. invasion
of Grenada in 1983 with the exception of a rotating pool system of reporters after complaints that
the military unfairly censored the media. At the start of the Gulf War, the U.S. president was
adamant that the war must not be a repeat of Vietnam. The fear of repeat was rooted in a desire
to ensure public support of the war effort. Thus began efforts toward managing public perception
of war specifically for the purpose of guaranteeing support (Herman & Chomsky, 2002;
Calabrese, 2005). If information about a given military conflict were more tightly controlled,
then media coverage would likely reflect official positions, and public opinion would support a
given military conflict. This was the case in the Gulf War and the recent wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq (Calabrese, 2005; Hoskins, 2004). However, unique to the Iraq War was the inclusion of
embedded journalists alongside coalition forces on the ground. While the frame of Vietnam was
applied to both the Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, U.S. media coverage of the latter, as well as
throughout the War on Terror, differed in terms of greater affective content and the loss of
journalistic objective detachment (Snow & Taylor, 2006; Aday, Livingston, & Hebert, 2005;
Iyengar & Simon, 1993).
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Media Coverage of the Iraq War. Baudrillard (1994) maintains that there is truth in war, and the
truth is that news media serve as stewards of the artifice that a war never exists as an event, but
only as something to perceive as a mediated event. While unconventional, this sentiment helps to
describe how U.S. news media treated the Iraq War. Media are a “strategic enabler” when the
public supports military efforts, and media are an “operational risk” when their coverage moves
away from the intended message the military wishes to communicate (Belknap, 2002, p.101).
Thus a supportive media system is crucial lest military and governmental officials become the
target of criticisms, inquiries, and protest (Cortell, Eisinger, & Althaus, 2009).
Media made war palatable and enjoyable, fair and balanced in 2003. Graber (2005) posits
that media presented a largely sanitized war and focused on military successes as reported by
embeds. Further she states that news media presented few questions about the goals and
justification for the Iraq War. Likewise, news media examined neither the purported connection
between Iraq and al Qaeda nor the evidence linking weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to the
Iraqi government (Calabrese, 2005). Media were supportive of the war effort. However, a
supportive media is not necessarily equivalent to an objective media. Perceptions of reality
varied within the American public due to the skewed media coverage of the Iraq War and larger
War on Terror. Prior to the start of the Iraq War in 2003, 68% of those polled in the University of
Maryland’s Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) believed that irrefutable evidence
had been found linking Iraq to September 11 (Kull, Ramsay, Subias, Lewis, & Warf, 2003).
Although coalition forces located no WMDs, nor did they find evidence of a program to develop
WMDs, 34% of Americans believed that the U.S. military “found Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction” (Kull et al. 2003). The frame used in Vietnam and the Gulf War was applied to the
Iraq War. However, new features such as embedded journalists, sanitized and selective war
coverage, the 24-hour news channel, and the memory of 9/11 suggest that media covered the Iraq
War in a new and different way.
Embedded journalists. The inclusion of embedded journalists, the first such media-military
synergy of its kind in the history of the United States, in the Iraq War led to a short-term narrow
view of reported events through the filter of U.S. military interests. The decision to include
embedded journalists in the Iraq War resulted from how the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
managed media access to the conflict in Afghanistan and from a desire to gain national and
global support for the Iraq War. The DoD responded to media complaints of limited access by
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creating an “embedded reporting strategy” (Cortell, Eisinger, & Althaus, 2009, p. 658; Aday,
Livingston, & Hebert, 2005). In terms of tone, embeds reported stories that were statistically
found to be neutral 91% of the time (Aday, Livingston, & Hebert, 2005, p.15). However,
embeds tended to focus on the battle and the coalition itself far more than journalists who were
not embedded with the military, the so-called unilaterals. Indeed, embeds produced 57.5 % more
reports of battles and 83.2 % more reports on coalition soldiers than did unilaterals (Aday,
Livingston, & Hebert, 2005, p. 15). Graber (2005, p.335) noted that an embedded journalist
could not be objective about “those who are protecting his or her life”. One possible explanation
for this difference in content is that embeds signed a 50-point contract with the military which
determined what they could report (Kumar, 2006). Nevertheless, it was the DoD’s intention that
embedded journalists provide broad coverage of the war; the consequence was fragmented
coverage (Fahmy, 2007).
Overall, unilateral coverage included a less sanitized version of the war that included
images of dead or wounded Iraqis. However, the embedded journalists, numbering over 700, did
not overwhelmingly represent the coalition forces, as one might suspect. One study in particular
found no correlation between whether a country is a member of the coalition and whether a
coalition country is represented by embedded journalists (Cortell, Eisinger, & Althaus, 2009).
The 24-hour News Channel
The dominance of the 24-hour news channel and the emergence of global media
corporations and the Internet suggest that news media would represent diverse, divergent, and
critical views of U.S. foreign and domestic affairs. The opposite appears to be the case. Although
CNN was the primary source of information for television audiences during the Gulf War, Fox
News Channel emerged as the leader in ratings starting in 2001 (Morris, 2005). Along with
CNN, MSNBC, and CNN Headline News, Fox News Channel represents a new stage in the
development of news media. Twenty-four hour news channel accounts at the time of and since
9/11 contextualized the attacks in terms of American interests and superiority (Barker, 2008;
Snow & Taylor, 2006). These events triggered a trend in the way U.S. news media covered
news in the meta-frame established by 9/11 and the War on Terror.
Affective media coverage, especially on Fox News Channel, relied on adopting an overt
tone of patriotism to the exclusion of contrary viewpoints, similar to the use of soft power. By
tapping into conservative political viewpoints and employing kinetic audio and visual
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presentation Fox News Channel created a model based on biased coverage and the abandonment
of impartiality (McDonald & Lawrence, 2004). Though this was the case for Fox News Channel
before 9/11, it became increasingly affective and has largely discarded journalistic objectivity
since 9/11 and throughout the War on Terror (Morris, 2005; Cushion & Lewis, 2009). One
possible explanation, at least for Fox News Channel, is that its affective content is a response to
the so-called liberal media, and that it offers news which is intentionally conservative and rightof-center (Dutta-Bergman, 2005; Alterman, 2003). In any case CNN, MSNBC, CNN Headline
News, and especially Fox News Channel tend to include soft news in programming to increase
and maintain viewership (Morris, 2005, p.70). The 24-hour news channel, faced with a constant
need for content, resorted to entertainment-based programming in between affective media
coverage during the War on Terror.
Some studies indicate that audiences perceive lower levels of credibility and
trustworthiness with the onset of the 24-hour news channel. In terms of the trustworthiness of the
content there are occasional fluctuations due to mitigating factors, such as checking the facts,
rushing to meet deadlines, and assuring enough content for a 24-hour news channel (Graber,
2005; McDonald & Lawrence, 2004). Credibility in a particular medium is not intrinsic to that
medium. Rather it is a perception from among members of a given audience (Johnson & Fahmy,
2008). Although the United States officially labeled Al-Jazeera unreliable, Al-Jazeera’s Arab
audience considers it highly credible. This is perhaps due to the widespread belief held in the
Arab world that networks such as CNN and BBC broadcast the dominant western perspective
(el-Nawawy, 2003). Journalistic integrity and credibility triumphed at the end of the Cold War
(Snow & Taylor, 2006), but have been threatened by a preference for affect and the push to fill
24 hours of news (Cushion & Lewis, 2009; Barker, 2008). This preference coupled with
reporting news compliant with military interests led to a decrease in credibility in U.S. news
media. Further, the emergence of blogging indicates that the American public has sought out
alternative sources of news information (Kumar, 2006). News media strive to maintain a sense of
fair and balanced reporting, although their perceived credibility may be low or high depending
on the audience, range of views presented, amount of soft news, and the economics behind the
24-hour news channel (Johnson & Fahmy, 2008).
The 24-hour news channels adhered to a breaking news format after the attacks on 9/11.
This format became a standard when reporting other breaking news stories occurring after 9/11.
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The breaking news format, with its emphasis on “repetitious and extemporaneous” content, is
less expensive and less demanding to produce (McDonald & Lawrence, 2004, p.337). Fox News
Channel and its competitors continued to use similar breaking news formats during the War on
Terror.
After 9/11 news coverage of international issues increased, but was still less than the
amount of coverage from about twenty years earlier. Research indicates that while there were
many newsworthy events that occurred on the continent of Africa, for example, U.S. news media
covered either a small number of African nations or none at all between 2002 and 2004 (Golan,
2008). The content of included news reports reflected the need for support of the U.S.-driven
campaign against terror (Kumar, 2006; Kellner, 2004). While foreign news agencies included
images of deceased U.S. soldiers in media coverage, these images were largely absent from U.S.
coverage. Dominating U.S news media during the build up to the Iraq War was coverage of
information on WMDs and the purported Al Qaeda-Iraq connection, despite apparent
contradictory evidence. Instead of covering the historical background of Iraq or including images
of deceased Iraqis and Afghanis and destruction of cities, news media focused on stories whose
factual basis was questioned (Snow & Taylor, 2006). In addition, cost concerns for maintaining
24-hour news coverage determine what stories news media cover. The reduction in the number
of foreign news bureaus reflects these cost concerns in terms of what to cover and what not to
cover in international news (Seib, 2004).
Inclusion and Exclusion
The exclusion of images of U.S. casualties, protestors, and the indigenous population of
Afghanistan and its affected neighbors helped to sanitize the U.S. audience’s consumption of
news reports. The inclusion of images in U.S. news reports helped to further cultural discourses
corresponding with the dominant policy (Banks, 1994). It is a fallacy to believe that
photojournalism is somehow able to capture an objective sense of reality. Photographs, images,
and even drawings are political tools in that they help to mold our memory of the past as well as
to sanitize the unpleasantness associated with war, as in the case of covering certain stories over
others during the War on Terror. For example, whereas the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter
employed a negative tone when covering the publication of Mohammed cartoons in Danish
newspapers, the New York Times framed the cartoons and their publication as an example of a
democratic and free press (Strömbäck, Shehata, & Dimitrova, 2008). The U.S. news media
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framed that event to match the pre-existing schema supported by the U.S. government, namely
that of a free press.
Research indicates that photographs help a viewer to link memory to a particular news
type or category. The use of key images helped viewers to link current events with the frames of
heroism, tragedy, freedom, and a nation at war (Goodall, 2006). This resulted in implicit support
for the visual representation of U.S. military and political might at home and abroad (Griffin,
2004). Hall (1980) argued that in order for messages (photographs, images, etc.) to have an
effect, they must first be assimilated for the appropriate discourse and decoded accordingly. The
driving force behind including (or excluding) certain images (or messages) is related to how the
image is “‘translated’ [and] ‘consumed’ [to] ‘appeal to certain culturally embedded codes of
signification’” (Hall, 1980, p. 180 in Banks, 1994, p.120). This treatment of images resembles
the handling of news stories during the same period.
Language
A War on Terror discourse emerged as another symptom of the global terrorism metaframe. Although news media have long employed positive language when referencing U.S.
personnel and concerns and negative language to describe a perceived enemy, the presence of
24-hour news channels complicates this practice due to the economics of production and
maintaining substantive content. Jensen (1992) found that during media coverage of the Gulf
War there lacked any historical analysis of Iraq and its position in the Middle East. In addition,
he found that language used in reporting on the Gulf War was dichotomous in that the U.S. had
“smart bombs and laser-guided bombs” whereas Iraq used “chemical weapons” to carry out
“atrocities” (Jensen, 1992, p.23-24). However, the difference in reporting during the Gulf War
and during the War on Terror is that the presence of 24-hour news channels, as well as the
abovementioned discourse of fear and uncertainty, intensified this use (or misuse) of language to
promote the interests of the U.S. administration. Word choice, linguistic devices, and affective
language all worked in concert to create the War on Terror discourse as part of the meta-frame.
Anchors and reporters on Fox News Channel in particular spoke in the first person when
describing coalition forces. This linguistic cue established consensus and stimulated support
from audiences (Aday et al. 2005). In reference to German and Italian claims made by the
respective governments, the impact of qualifying the discourse (i.e. using words like
“purported”, “allegedly”, and “supposedly”) adds doubt for the receiver of the message
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(Altheide, 2007). The repetition of key words or phrases represents another facet to the discourse
(Kellner, 2004). For example, in comparison to U.S. news media coverage of 9/11, which
emphasized patriotic themes, German reports focused on the coming need for international
partnership. In comparing the New York Times with the Washington Post, the study found an
emphasis on the U.S. and its interests in the War on Terror due to the presence of repeated
terminology such as terrorist, Al-Qaeda, homeland, policy, combatant, attack, war, Iraq, and
others (Altheide, 2007). While the New York Times focused on politicians and people whom it
linked to key events, the Washington Post leaned more toward the issues. In referencing Iraqi
soldiers devoted to Saddam Hussein, the Office of Global Communication (OGC), an office set
up by the Bush administration to act as a public relations intermediary, mandated that military
representatives call the loyal Iraqis terrorists, death squads, or thugs (Kumar, 2006; Elter, 2008).
The OGC mandated this since the accurate term Fedayeen (meaning Iraqi soldiers loyal to
Hussein) connotes a positive meaning.
A sub-discourse of fear and uncertainty emerged in U.S. media coverage of news events
during the War on Terror. News media coverage directly after 9/11 and during the War on Terror
stressed fear and uncertainty (Altheide, 2007; Calabrese, 2005). Similar to Cold War rhetoric,
this version painted the War on Terror with hues of anxiety and fear (Goodall, 2006). Audiences
received narrow information about the justification for the Iraq War and what the Bush
administration hoped to accomplish with the War on Terror. The events of 9/11 resulted in a
polarization of the world as seen by much of the initial news coverage during and after the
attacks (Seib, 2004).
Conclusion
The author has endeavored to present a clear and unbiased articulation on news media
coverage in the United States during the War on Terror. This article suggests that while previous
media coverage of the Gulf War, Vietnam War, and Cold War has similarities to coverage of the
War on Terror and associative events, there were significant and possibly indelible changes to
how media frame and communicate news stories. Individually these frames could be grouped
according to whether they are episodic or thematic and according to their subject matter. One
might suggest that a frame by its nature exists to facilitate interpretation of the news story, and
positing an overarching, all-encompassing meta-frame only serves to generalize the concept of
frames. The author would disagree. The meta-frame facilitates comprehension of a larger set of
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occurrences related to the process by which news media communicate a series of interrelated
messages. 9/11 was the catalyst that triggered a cascade of reactions which all form part of the
greater meta-frame of global terror. It is not sufficient to call it a global terror frame as that
would suggest either an episodic or thematic frame. The meta-frame is all-inclusive and can be
episodic and thematic depending solely upon the intent of the mediated message and its intended
interpretation.
This article suggests that 9/11 acted as a catalyst to the emergence of a meta-frame;
however, the interaction among the three agents (events during the War on Terror, the discourse
that developed, and the 24-hour news channel) represents the primary basis for the meta-frame.
These three agents were not present in other instances of war, conflict, or crisis. Interestingly,
after the presidency of George W. Bush came to a close, the meta-frame of global terror
appeared to have vanished. It would seem that the financial crisis currently in discussion at all
levels of government on a global scale suggests that a new meta-frame is materializing. Time
will tell if this is the case.
Brief biography:
The author is currently a doctoral candidate in the Department of Communications Media at
Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP). Additionally, as a graduate assistant he has been
actively engaged with the faculty in organizing the department’s first academic conference,
entitled the Laurel Highlands Communications Conference. He is also helping to develop the
department’s first academic journal, called the Journal of Communications Media Studies.
He remains passionate about the link between language and culture and has strived to maintain
exposure to languages and cultures in all his endeavors. His research interests focus on news
framing, language and intercultural training in the global workforce, virtual teams, media and
cultural theory, and instructional technology.
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