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Olivia Leboyer
[email protected]
Doctor in political science, IEP de Paris
Assistant Professor at IEP Paris
Research associate at PACTE - Grenoble
IPSA 2014, Montreal, Session RC02: Types of Political Elites Yesterday and Today
Liberal thinkers’ views of the political elite. François Guizot,
Friedrich A. Hayek and John Rawls : three visions of democracy
The political elite is a reality, a phenomenon, which, paradoxically, provokes
controversial statements. It appears as a stumbling-block in modern times. In
analyzing the place of autority and hierarchies we examine where the limits of
liberalism and representative democracy lay. Indeed, liberal thinkers have a complex
relationship towards the notion of democracy. They don’t praise equally all liberal
principles.
The difficulty in building a conception of the political elite is striking. Is the
difficulty amplified in the liberal school of thought?
I am to examine here three liberal thoughts : François Guizot, who steadily opposed
democracy; Friedrich A. Hayek, a liberal who placed liberal values before
democratic ones; and finally John Rawls, who considered that democracy and
liberalism were the condition of each other, their principles being harmoniously
bound in the liberal democracy.
Through this comparison, I intend to highlight three polarities of liberalism, on three
ways to understand democracy. Liberalism, in its diversity, is concerned about the
elite which would be the most desirable one. Does it make sense to speak of liberal
elitism? Which values should convey such formulation? These questions should help
us to shed light on the mysteries of liberal democracy.
The paradox of modernity
The elite phenomenon is a fact you can’t deny in political life. There is always a
ruling minority and a governed majority. But the principle of hierarchy also appears
as a striking phenomenon in our democracies, based on the Tocquevillian idea of an
equalization of the conditions. That’s what Raymond Aron called the paradox of
modernity : the elite phenomenon is a necessity and, at the same time, the principle
of equality should be prevalent.
Today, in social sciences, we often found the same charge against democracy, as
well as against liberalism: democracy would be partly aristocratic, as if nothing had
really changed since the Old Regime. In the same way, it is often argued that liberal
thinkers promote the existence of a political elite. By saying that democracy is partly
aristocratic, you can also mean two different things. Bernard Manin, in Principles of
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representative governement, uses the word „aristocratic“ in a quite neutral sense.
„Aristocratic“ is here taken as the opposite of democratic, as the other face. It simply
means that some people have been chosen to be the leaders.
A great part of political thinkers, from Charles Wright Mills1 to Pierre Bourdieu2 or
Daniel Gaxie3, make use of the aristocratic metaphor, which is used to denounce the
democratic promise as an illusion. Hierarchies still persist. According to such
analysis, the political elite constitutes a kind of social class. What is the main
difference, then, between democracy and the former aristocracy ? And moreover, do
these charges of elitism attack democracy or liberal democracy ?
The principle of distinction
For Alexis de Tocqueville, the birth of democracy means that the old hierarchical
order, based on nature, is bound to disappear. Instead of it, a new order must be built,
which would be entirely based on liberty. Relationships between people have now a
completely different meaning, in so far as they don’t derive from an essentialist point
of view. On top of that, Tocqueville believes that the « feeling of similarity» is a
natural one in democracy, so that the equalization of the conditions between men
would be an irresistible process. As democrat friendly as he may be, Tocqueville is
never able entirely to shake off his nostalgia for the lost world, the Old Regime.
Political thinkers can’t help feeling interest, but also worry towards a democracy that
is at its very beginning. Democracy appears as a completely new phenomenon:
You must remember clearly, moreover, that the men who destroy an aristocracy lived under ist laws;
they saw ist splendors and allowed themselves, without knowing it, to be penetrated by the sentiments
and the ideas that the aristocracy had conceived. So at the moment when an aristocracy dissolves, ist
spirit still hovers over the mass, and ist instincts are conserved for a long time after it has been
vanquished.
1
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Charles Wright Mills, The Power Elite, 1956.
Pierre Bourdieu, especially La Distinction: critique sociale du jugement, Minuit,
1979.
3
Daniel Gaxie, Le Sens Caché : inégalités culturelles et ségrégation politique, Paris,
Le Seuil, coll. « Sociologie politique », 1978.
4
« Ambitious men and great ambitions », chapter 19: « Why in the United States you
find so many ambitious men and so few great ambitions », IV, 19.
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3
Tocqueville insists strongly on the ambivalence of political representation. Indeed,
democratic peoples feel a kind of fascination towards power, as well as resent or
envy :
Democratic peoples often hate the agents of the central power; but they always love this power itself.
(...) Because they consider it as the most powerful instrument that they could use as needed to help
them make everyone who escapes from the common rule come back to it.5
For among a democratic nation, only the State inspires confidence in individuals,
because only it alone looks to them as having some strength and some duration. It
therefore seems strange and contre-intuitive to put your trust into some individuals:
do the men whom you have chosen as governants, really have something special,
above their assumed competence? It looks as if the election would confer to them a
kind of superiority.
The man of democratic centuries obeys only with an extreme repugnance his neighbor who is his
equal; he refuses to acknowledge in him an enlightenment superior to his own; he mistrusts his
neighbor’s justice and regards his power with jealousy; he fears and despises him; he loves to make
him feel at every instant the common dependence that they both have on the same master.
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The transformation from an aristocratic link between men to a democratic link has
indeed taken place in the nineteenth century, with the process of democratization.
The relation between representatives and the people has now a different
philosophical meaning. The questions of equality, citizenship, sovereignty and so on
were much discussed in the nineteenth century, and they were discussed openly, in a
complex and deep way, for the process of democratization provoked hopes as well as
fears and doubts. There was an aristocratic world, with its own values and principles
(social inequalities, hierarchy, a communautarian link between men, all principles
that were perceived as a natural and substantial thing), and there is a democratic
world (where equality is now perceived as a natural thing, whereas hierarchy has
become a structural necessity), these two worlds being completely separate. The
5
Part IV, chapter 3, « That the sentiments of democratic peoples are in agreement
with their ideas for bringing them to concentrate power. »
6
Ibid.
4
aristocratic world is dead, and we can only refer to it in a metaphoric way, since the
aristocratic principles aren’t solvable into democracy :
In aristocracies, the course of ambitions is often extensive; but ist limits are fixed. In democratic
countries, it moves usually in a narrow field; but if it happens to go beyond those limits, you would
say that there is no longer anything that limits it. (...) A multitude of small, very judicious ambitions,
out of which now and then spring a few great, badly ordered desires: such usually is the picture
presented by democratic nations. A measured, moderate and vast ambition is hardly ever found there.
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Study of the past should help us to understand today’s issues. The hierarchical order
was considered as natural and legitimate, whereas the democratic link is nothing but
the consequence of a free human decision.
In the 20th century, democracy is no longer seen as a new phenomenon, but rather as
a practice. Political thinkers express usually less their worry, curiosity or enthusiasm
than a kind of disappointment towards the failure of the democratic ideal. They have
seen how representative democracies work, even if it would be exaggerated to assert
that they perfectly understand what democracy is. But, anyway, they are more
familiar with this regime, and with the question of equalization between men.
Raymond Aron was very interested in this question of democracy and elitism, so that
he proposed to consider at the same time two traditions of thought: the tocquevillian
tradition, underlining the importance of equality, and the machiavellian tradition,
which insists on the notions of force and domination. Aron was about to theorize a
kind of « machiavello-tocquevillian paradigm » ; he himself would rather speak of
the « paradox of modernity » to shed light on the tensions and ambiguities within
democracy itself.
The tension between liberalism and democracy in modern societies
I propose to examine if we can speak of a liberal elitism, a kind of elitism which
would be built on some principles such as liberty and authority. Is the notion of
authority a more convenient one than the notion of domination to understand the
power in our societies? Indeed, these societies are rather split between a demand for
democracy and equality and the need of a clear leadership.
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Ibid.
5
Liberalism is often critized as an ideology promoting nothing substantial, this
thought being a very convenient one for our modern and globalized societies,
caracterized by the dissolution of relations between people and the loss of steady
certainties. As if the word liberalism should recall the ideas of separation and
distinction between men, and thus of deregulation and social inequalities. Public
opinion does not spontaneously associate liberalism with the notions of equality or
social justice.
In fact, the relation between liberal thought and democracy has always been a
complex one. History shows us that liberal thinkers were not all convinced
democrats. Let us examine liberals such as François Guizot, who was opposed to
democracy, or more recently Friedrich A. Hayek, who found the sacralization of
democracy very dangerous, thus considered as an ideal.
The study of the elite phenomenon shows how ambiguous liberalism, as well as
representative democracy, are.
Our democratic and liberal societies are governed by a little political elite. Raymond
Aron used the expression « paradox of modernity » to describe the fact that
democratic societies are still hierarchically organized ones. It sounds quite natural to
say that our societies are democratic and liberal ones, as if democratic and liberal
principles would constitute the core of their identity. What does this mean exactly?
Democracy and liberalism are both very difficult to define. But, to make it short,
democracy implies that equality should be considered as the main value. Thus, how
can we understand the elite phenomenon ? The liberal thought seems to have placed
this question at the core of its analysis. Indeed, there is a tension between the notion
of equality and the notion of liberty. Liberalism has always had a complex
relationship towards democracy, which could explain that so many liberal thinkers
have been writing on the topic of elite and democracy.
Satisfactory definitions of the notions of elite, elitism, liberalism and representative
democracy do not exist. There is no agreement among historians or political thinkers
about the boundaries, meanings or impact of these concepts. It is thus very
challenging to shed light on the tension between these three notions.
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Liberalism could not be defined easily. In line with Pierre Manent, I think we should
examine liberal thinkers in their diversity, since liberal thoughts are not all built on
the same values. Even if they all praise liberty as a main value, they don’t necessarily
mean the same thing by this word. It is not exactly the same kind of liberty, whether
we study it by John Stuart Mill or by Isahia Berlin, for example. Some authors, such
as Alan Kahan, sustain that one stream of liberalism can be described as
« aristocratic liberalism ». I don’t agree with this appellation, since the notion of
aristocracy has a strong power of suggestion. It is not innocent to use it, since
speaking of liberalism as aristocratic implies some criticism. It is a metaphoric way
to mean injustice, domination of one social class over another. Is the notion of
elitism more accurate to describe the spirit of liberal societies ?
-
- Liberalism implies separation, disconnection between power and opinion.
Liberal thought opens a space for liberty : so we may wonder if the political
field can take place in this space. In other words, does the liberal discourse
still make sense and convey values? Or does it lead to relativism?
-
- Is democracy compatible with the notions of domination and leadership?
Does democracy necessarily imply some form of inequality? Does it make
sense to speak of « elitist liberalism », or of « liberal elitism » ?
These notions of elite and elitism are not easy to describe either. They can’t be
referred for sure to one or to certain social groups. They can, on the contrary, be used
to describe some contradictory social forces.
François Guizot, Friedrich A. Hayek, John Rawls: three visions of what political
elite should be
- François Guizot, who is both a politician and an historian, writes for a small circle
liberal elite of the nineteenth century, for he hopes these men could take the power in
France. He wants these « natural superiorities » to get aware of the importance of the
political role they could play. Guizot uses the art of « unveiling », in order to reveal
the authentic sense of the concept of equality, of liberty or of aristocracy, for
example. Therefore, he first exposes the « false sense » of a concept, it means the
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common sense. Then, he develops what he calls the right sense. For instance, Guizot
says that the word « equality » would have been misunderstood. It is considered as a
key concept for democrats, whereas there is a risk that it leads to a kind of
« demolâtrie ». Guizot fears about the consequences of democracy. Firmly
antidemocrat, he wishes a kind of authentic aristocracy could exist. Guizot
understands the modern evolution as a process of civilization, but not of
democratization.
Guizot thus praises the value of inequality which could lead to the Sovereignty of
Reason, Justice and Right. Guizot wants to show that he knows the real meaning of
concepts. He aims at explaining the « authentic aristocracy ». Natural superiorities
belong to this Small circle liberal elite. They naturally recognize the authentic
aristocracy, which differs from the one of the Old Regime. Guizot’s attempt consists
in inventing a new language, in which the word « authentic » would have a kind of
magic power. By saying that aristocracy or the natural superiorities are to be
« authentic », Guizot made of this adjective a kind of sesame. As if it was possible
and also desirable to create an adamic language, perfectly suitable for an adamic
world.
Guizot denies that the whole people could ever exercise political power in the proper
sense of the word. « Like aristocratic government », writes Guizot, popular
sovereignty connects the right to govern, not with capacity, but with birth and
overlooks or denies the presence of legitimate forms of inequality established by
nature between the capacities, abilities and skills of different individuals. Guizot
argues that, under the pretext of establishing legitimate equality, the doctrine of
popular sovereignty violently introduced equality where it does not exist and proves
to be « a weapon of attack and destruction, never an instrument for the foundation of
liberty ».
As a historian, Guizot wrote about subjects as diverse as the origins of representative
government, the history of European civilization, decentralization, Shakespeare,
Cromwell and the English Revolution, Montaigne, Gibbon, George Washington. As
a political philosopher, he addressed topics as diverse as the nature of representation
and sovereignty, the origins of political power, constitutionalism, publicity and
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democracy. Guizot was also an outstanding orator, versed in the art of rhetoric.
Guizot was fully capable of dominating large audience. His writings are often
composed like rhetorical discourses (for instance, Des Moyens de gouvernement et
d’opposition dans l’état actuel de la France, 1821).
The Doctrinaires develop a systematic sociological approach to political theory,
which relies upon the assumption that political questions can’t be divorced from
questions about social structure. Their main concern is the government of society,
which lets them to develop a complex mode of argument. It shows how various
concepts such as democracy, freedom, and rights are related to specific social
conditions. However conservative they may be, the Doctrinaires are almost the first
to describe democracy as social condition. Full implications of this theme have been
spelled out a decade later by Tocqueville in Democracy in America.
- Tocqueville, on the contrary to Guizot, is trying to depict democracy as a painting.
He wants to communicate some enthusiasm, some love for democracy. On the other
hand, he also wants people to examine all possible dangers the process of
democratization could lead to. Therefore, his style is always ambivalent. Tocqueville
expresses strong worries about the evolution of democracy. But, in spite of these
worries, he is still a convinced democrat. That’s the reason why he always draws the
two sides of the democratic process, which might be disappointing but also fruitful.
Among the Works used by Tocqueville when he was writing Democracy in America,
we can find some rhetoricians such as Aristotle or Plutarque (Vie de Marcellus, La
vie des hommes illustres). Tocqueville also read Bossuet’s Works, and Madame de
Sévigné ones, characterized by a great sense of nuance and the use of rhetorical
means. The Tocqueville Library also contains the Œuvres of Jean Racine (1755,
three volumes).
Through Tocqueville’s eyes, « democracy » acquires almost the same meaning that
« « civilization » had for Guizot. Tocqueville reformulates and qualifies some of
Guizot’s political ideas. In Histoire de la civilisation en Europe, Guizot argues that
« whether individuality predominates exclusively, wherever man considers no one
but himself, and his ideas do not extend beyond himself, permanent society becomes
for him almost impossible ». Tocqueville is strongly interested in this idea. In a letter
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(from 1830, before his trip to America), Tocqueville contrasts the social condition of
a semi-enlightened people with that of a highly civilized people. In the latter case,
the individual is gradually replaced by the social group and society becomes a new
Leviathan. This Leviathan tends to take care of all the aspects of social life. We
recognize the description of democratic despotism, already expressed in this letter.
Tocqueville might have conceived this idea by reading Guizot.
Tocqueville’s main theme, the equalization of conditions, appears clearly in the first
chapter of Democracy in America:
Among the new objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United States, none struck
me more vividly than the equality of conditions. I discovered without difficulty the prodigious
influence that this primary fact exercises on the march of society; it gives a certain direction to the
public mind, a certain turn to the laws; to those governing, new maxims, and particular habits to the
governed.
The ambivalence of Tocqueville’s writings is all the most subtitle as the sentences
are very clear. The comparison between France and America, the deep gap between
aristocracy and democracy, the balance between the chances and the possible
shortcomings of democratization, are exposed with a great simplicity. This simplicity
serves to show that democratization, as the main process of the 19th century, is bound
to happen. Tocqueville makes a frequent use of rhetorical questions, such as this one:
Would it be Wise to believe that a social movement that comes from so far could be suspended by the
efforts of a generation? Do you think that after having destroyed feudalism and vanquished Kings,
democracy will retreat before the bourgeois and the rich? Will it stop now that is has become so strong
and its adversaries so weak? (Democracy in America, Introduction)
Tocqueville also makes a frequent use of oratorical precautions:
In all that precedes, I have been careful to point out only the main points of difference. If I had wanted
to get into details, the picture would have been still more striking. But I have too much to say not to
want to be brief. (in Federal Constitution)
Tocqueville main rhetorical tool consists in presenting, each time, both sides of the
democratic idea. Every theme is declined in two possible paths. The sentences are
always built on a balanced structure :
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The nations of today cannot make conditions among them not be equal; but it depends on them
whether equality leads them to servitude or liberty; to enlightenment or barbarism, to prosperity or
misery. (Democracy in America, last sentence of the conclusion)
The liberal thought and the question of the political elite in the twentieth
century : Friedrich A. Hayek and John Rawls, two conceptions of equality and
social justice
Political representation may be the main problem a political thinker has to deal with.
Indeed, representative democracy still remains a mystery, in so far as nobody knows
for sure what the people is exactly, and how its representatives could reflect its will.
This problem is all the more accurate in the European Union. Indeed, political
representation in Europe should be based on a precise idea of the people to be
represented. How can we describe the European people? Is it possible to draw such a
description? What would be the features of the European people? Which values
could bring all these peoples together? These are not easy questions. In fact, Europe
seems to be an open space, an open idea, so that it is very difficult to determine its
boundaries.
We know representation is always an imperfect process, for nobody can say for sure
what the people to be represented look like. This is a case at the national level.
Obviously, the problem is all the more complex at the supranational level. When the
size of democracy changes, does it mean that the role and nature of the political elite
have to change either?
If thinkers of the nineteenth century were attached to describe as precisely as
possible the kind of political elite they considered as desirable, things are quite
different a century later. Indeed, liberal thinkers of the twentieth century seem more
interested in describing the rules and laws that should be implemented, rather than
the virtuous or competences of men themselves. Their elitism is not intimately linked
to the characters of men, but rather to the structure of society. The most important, in
the nineteenth century, was perhaps the problem of education. In the twentieth
century, the most important one seems to be the question of social justice. But this
expression does not mean the same when we examine different thoughts: for
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instance, between Friedrich A. Hayek, who is liberal above all, and John Rawls, who
is a democrat as well as a liberal, the distance is important. These two thinkers
exemplify two different attitudes liberals could adopt towards democracy.
Hayek: Liberalism as a priority
Friedrich A. Hayek is a democrat, but he praises the liberal principles more than the
democratic ones. For him, equality shouldn’t be seen as the main question. The
principle of hierarchy, liked to the value of liberty, does not constitute a kind of
injustice. Society is not to blame if all men are not equal, at once. The thought of
Hayek is quite brutal, for liberty is placed at the core of his system. But, it is
interesting to notice that Hayek does not often use the term of « elite ». Indeed, the
political elite could have, in his eyes, a pejorative meaning: when the elite
phenomenon tends to concentrate power into the hands of a little circle. Inequalities
between men are considered as something inevitable, but the superiority of one little
group appears as a kind of perverse effect. A good elite shouldn’t feel the desire of
domination. What thus characterizes good elite is the consciousness of its own limits.
The great quality good political elite should have is a kind of real humility. It is
necessary for an elite to avoid the trap of narcissism.
For Friedrich A. Hayek, there is no certainty about the virtues or the competences
elite should possess, the most important thing being the laws that give society its
ground basis. Hayek mistrusts the politicians, who could always be tempted to abuse
of their power, but he trusts the course of society as a whole. That’s what he calls
catallaxy. According to him, the process of selection in political life does not
automatically lead to the choice of the best men: it leads, however, to the production
of the best decision-making process. Hayek’s liberalism praises the value of liberty
as the most precious one. Hayek sees indeed the passion for equality as merely
idealizing envy:
Not only has liberty nothing to do with any other sort of equality, but it is even bound to produce
inequality in many respects.8
8
Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (1960, Routledge), chapter 6
« Equality, Value and Merit », p. 75.
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On the distinction between value and merit, Hayek also writes:
Yet it is difficult to see why the same useful quality which is welcomed when it is the result of a
person’s natural endowment should be less valuable when it is the product of such circumstances as
intelligent parents or a good home.9
Liberty is all the more important as it couldn’t be defined exactly. As well as John
Stuart Mill wrote in On Liberty, Hayek thinks that the price of liberty resides in its
indetermination. In this perspective, even a good political elite can’t pretend knowing
which certainty what the best for society is. The decision-making is a process in
which liberty has the greatest part. For Hayek, the question of elitism has nothing to
do with the problem of social justice.
John Rawls: the harmony of liberal democracy
On the contrary, social justice is a main concept by John Rawls’ thought. Rawls
doesn’t use often the concept of elite. Instead of elite, he would rather speak of
« partners », a concept which stresses an idea of cooperation rather than an idea of
hierarchy and inequality. The « partners » represent thus the members of society,
whose particularities are suspended. This is the original position, a theoretical fiction
built by Rawls in order to emphasize the tension between the concept of equality and
the concept of inequalities.
The rawlsian principle of difference leads us to question the principle of distinction
in a new way, in which light is shed on the idea of plurality and diversity, rather than
on the concepts of domination and subordination. John Rawls cares about the
problem of common goods and well-being of society. To think about these issues, he
uses new concepts, this special vocabulary helping him to deal with the question of
hierarchy without speaking about domination. In this perspective, John Rawls
doesn’t use often the concept of « elite ». He would rather use concepts such as
« merit », or « gift », these qualities being described as a common characterization of
human mankind. Indeed, John Rawls doesn’t consider the individual only, but
society as a whole. He doesn’t analyze the concept of elite, which is quite impossible
to define exactly, but rather its components, such as « merits », « talents », « gifts »,
9
Ibid.
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in order to think about the relationship between the concepts of equality and
inequality.
John Rawls may be the liberal thinker whose conception of democracy could appear
as the closest to the « European idea ». In fact, in the dual juridical European order,
with the European Court of Men’s Right and the Court of Justice of the European
Community, national disagreements about what should be a « fair society » shows
some resemblance to John Rawls’ « overlapping consensus » that constitutes, for
him, the ground of a democratic society.
Conclusion
To describe the elite phenomenon, the English language mostly uses the word
« leadership », which conveys connotations that are different from those carried out
by « elite ». Indeed, « to lead » recalls the idea of guidance, whereas the French
translation calls for an idea of domination. Even if a very complex one, the question
of elitism does not necessarily imply the notion of social domination. Therefore, I
think it would be more useful to use the term of « authority » to shed light on the
processes of decision in the EU, for instance. Indeed, the distribution of powers
within the EU (especially with the principle of subsidiarity) would lead us to speak
of « influences », « authority », even « partnership » or « cooperation », in the
Rawlsian acception, rather than of « domination ». The study of the elite
phenomenon leads us to consider the various tensions between liberalism and
democracy, and within democracy itself.
Liberal thinkers try to describe the elite phenomenon in a way that could avoid the
concept of social domination. It is thus possible either to merely forget to think about
social domination, as François Guizot or Friedrich A. Hayek, or to deal with the
problem of social justice with a new vocabulary and new concepts. That’s the aim of
John Rawls’ theory. It is striking to see that the notions of equality and inequality
don’t have the same meaning for all liberal thinkers.
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