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NATO Mediterranean dialogue and
Istanbul initiative: an assessment
Professor Bichara KHADER
[email protected]
I am really honoured to address this political Committee of NATO
Parliamentary Assembly. The Mediterranean basin and more
generally the Arab World have been at the heart of my research in
the last forty years. Unsurprisingly, I have been a regular visitor to
NATO College in Rome dealing with the geopolitical transformation of
the Southern rim of the Mediterranean and the role of NATO in its
nearest abroad.
1. Security environment in the
Mediterranean and NATO Mediterranean
Dialogue
Let us briefly look back at the context in which NATO launched its
Mediterranean Dialogue. In the beginning of the 1990’s, the collapse
of the Soviet Union has triggered a wave of optimism, quickly
theorized by Francis Fukuyama as “the end of history". This naive
optimism has been watered down by Samuel Huntington who
advised the West to remain vigilant as the waning Cold war may just
be replaced by a “clash of civilisation”, with new enemies striving to
fill the vacuum left by the vanishing Soviet Union.
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While academic debates were taking place in the West, the Arab
World was plunged in anxiety. The occupation of Kuwait (2 nd of
August 1990) by Saddam Hussein's army took every body off guard.
Other Gulf States felt threatened. The USA immediately sent troops
to the region and in the beginning of 1991 the war of liberation of
Kuwait started. While the Kuwaitis danced in the streets to celebrate
their recovered freedom, other Arab peoples , although sharing the
joy of the Kuwaitis, did not understand the haste with which the USA
engaged their military in the Gulf, while they have shown
complacency with regard to the Israeli occupation of Palestine. The
accusation of “double-standards" has casted a shadow of doubt on
the sincerity of the West claiming the restoration of international
legitimacy. Why Kuwait and not Palestine? chanted the protesters in
various Arab capitals.
In order to appease Arab peoples, President Bush addressed the
Congress, on March 8, 1991, saying: “It is now ripe time to solve the
Arab-Israeli conflict". And indeed the United States and Russia
convened the first Arab-Israeli Peace Conference in Madrid at the
end of October 1991 which ended in fiasco. Nevertheless, secret
negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians took place in Norway
and an interim peace agreement, called the Oslo Agreement, has
been signed in the White House between Rabin and Arafat, in the
presence of President Clinton, on the 13 th of September 1993.
In North Africa, the Algerian government decided to cancel the
second round of the elections in 1992. A merciless war opposed the
army to the Islamist organisations and lasted almost 8 years with
huge loss of lives and properties. Eventually this bloody war spilled
over Europe in scattered acts of terrorism that took place in France in
the mid-90’s.
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It is in this turbulent environment that NATO launched, in 1994, its
Dialogue with 5 Mediterranean countries "Mauritania, Morocco,
Tunisia, Egypt and Israel”, joined later by Jordan and Algeria.
The idea behind this dialogue is to reach out to Mediterranean
countries through public diplomacy and practical cooperation. It was
part of a flurry of other initiatives targeting the Mediterranean region
(5+5), Forum of the Mediterranean, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
(1995).
From the onset, NATO Mediterranean dialogue was based on nondiscrimination, self-differentiation, inclusiveness, joined ownership,
bilateralism, and complementarity with other European initiatives.
When I was invited for the first time to NATO College in Rome, in
1995, to discuss this dialogue from Southern perspective, I remember
warning NATO not to move quickly, not to formalise the dialogue, not
to convey the impression that it was a disguised attempt of
normalizing the relations between the Arab countries and Israel. At
that time, NATO was perceived in many Arab countries as a “military
alliance" not qualified to deal with the socio-economic challenges in
the region. It was perceived also as “an instrument of the USA which
is the principal ally of Israel". Many Arab analysts saw the NATO
dialogue as a way of shoring up corrupt authoritarian regimes while
others did not understand this “traffic jam" of European and NATO
initiatives targeting the Mediterranean with a great risk of
duplication and overlapping.
And indeed NATO moved carefully, step by step. Starting as a public
diplomacy exercise in the 1990’s, the dialogue moved to discussing
serious issues as the proliferation of arms of mass destruction. Later
on, NATO proposed to Mediterranean partners to take part in NATO’s
policing activities in the Mediterranean such as Operation Active
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Endeavour launched after the 9/11 aimed at monitoring shipping
activities in the Mediterranean in order to deter,defend and disrupt
terrorist networks. NATO offered a menu of other activities to
improve inter-operability, to encourage defence reform, to upgrade
military professionalism, and to increase awareness on important
issues such as border security and civil emergency planning.
In the beginning of the year 2000, the image of NATO has positively
changed. Researchers and think-tanks started pinpointing to the
added -value of Nato Med Dialogue. The inability of the European
Union to deliver on the question of “security and stability" convinced
governments and experts that NATO has the clout and the
experience to deal with security issues better than the EU.
But storms started to gather. In October 2000, the Al Aqsa Intifada
ignited the Palestinian territories. Israel reoccupied the territory
under the control of the Palestinian Authority. MED partners felt
uneasy about Israel's participation in NATO MED dialogue. Tensions
were visible as Israel has forcefully confined President Arafat in his
semi-destroyed headquarters in Ramallah in total impunity. No word
of condemnation from NATO or from the USA. Such a silence from
NATO put Nato-Med partners at odds with the popular sentiment.
Things got worse with the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Based
on the fallacious theory of " creative destruction" this invasion has
been the " straw which broke the camel's back" , as it resulted in the
fragmentation of the country, the empowerment of the Shiites as the
new leaders of Iraq , and indirectly the promotion of Iranian activism
and leadership in the gulf region.
Curiously enough, American disastrous invasion did not adversely
affect NATO, as big European countries, such as France and Germany,
members of NATO, distanced themselves from this American policy.
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The Istanbul Initiative was launched in 2004 in the wake of American
invasion of Iraq. It was meant to appease Gulf Countries' and to
safeguard their stability in face of a pro-active Iranian regime that
does not hide its hegemonic ambitions in the region. Four small Gulf
countries (Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrein and Qatar
immediately joined the Initiative, but Saudi Arabia and Oman
preferred to stay out : Saudi Arabia did not want to alienate the USA
as their principal security - provider , while Oman has always been
reluctant to adopt a confrontational stance with its Iranian
neighbour.
The Istanbul Initiative does not contradict but complement the
NATO MED Dialogue. By extending its outreach to the Gulf countries
NATO has increased its legitimacy. Gulf countries were asking for
help and pushing for Nate’s involvement in order to diversify their
security relationships. In a certain way, Istanbul initiative was
supply-driven while NATO Mediterranean Dialogue was offerdriven. As a matter of fact, implicit resistance to the Istanbul
Initiative came from the USA and some European Countries who
have already military bases and defence agreements and who look at
their Gulf clients as a " captive market".
By mid-2000, I could notice the changing image of NATO in Arab
media. There has been a widespread recognition that it is preferable
to deal with a multilateral institution than to rely on the USA alone, in
times where anti-American sentiment was skyrocketing in all Arab
countries, fuelled by the invasion of Iraq and the obvious pro-Israeli
bias. For Arab countries, NATO was seen as offering better
guarantee of security without engaging in unilateral military
adventures. This sentiment was reinforced by the fact that NATO
adapts more quickly to changing security environment, that its
cooperation is based on voluntary engagement and is multi-faceted,
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and that it invites its partners in its peace-keeping or crisis management activities. Indeed, countries like Jordan and Morocco
have taken part in the 90's in NATO operations in the Balkans. Jordan
is part of NATO Response Force and NATO is providing assistance to
build security institutions in some Med and Gulf countries. In Tunisia,
NATO is collaborating on " Special operations forces and on
intelligence gathering" as the country suffered from terrorists
attacks and is still exposed to terrorist cells aiming at derailing the
transitional process.
Within few weeks from now, a NATO Regional Centre will be
inaugurated in Kuwait. The first of its kind in the region to serve as a
platform boosting cooperation and coordination among Gulf
countries and between them and NATO.
In Iraq, NATO is providing support to the coalition with Awakes
surveillance planes and training Iraqi officers and troops, as it is
becoming common wisdom in NATO headquarters that in order to
fight terrorism , it is preferable to enable local forces and build local
capacity than to send expeditionary forces.
Thus on the whole NATO MED Dialogue and the Istanbul Initiative
have been a good exercise of a learning process, allowing NATO to
increase its senility to the concerns of the region and allowing its
partners to benefit from NATO expertise in various fields and to
understand the decision-making process within NATO.
Paradoxically, this gradual deepening of NATO’s external relations in
its nearest southern naighbourhood has been possible due to the fact
that defence policy of the European Union is still in limbo and that
the EU is not perceived as " a security provider". Individual European
countries have not the resources and even the military capabilities to
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project power in complex geopolitical theaters like North Africa or
the Middle East.
But NATO MED Dialogue and the Istanbul Initiative fall short of a
Partnership for Peace. It is high time to consider upgrading the
relationship setting up “a NATO-Arab partnership for Peace". This
proposal is not meant to antagonise or exclude Israel , as Nato-Israel
relations are old and getting stronger. On the June 21, 2016, Israeli
President, Reuven Rivlin visited NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The
Israeli Ambassador to Belgium will also act as Mission's Chief for
NATO. Both NATO and Israel signed different agreements on various
issues. Several Israeli projects have been funded by the Science for
Peace and Security Program (SPS).
Arab countries are not entitled to object to such privileged relation.
But they feel offended when NATO Secretary General , Mr.
Stoltenberg, recalls on many occasions that " NATO and Israel share
the same values of respect of human rights and the principal of
law" without never referring to the 50 years-long occupation of
Palestinian territories and the continuous breach of international law.
2. Future challenges are enormous
Since 5 years, the Mediterranean region and the Middle East are
literally sank up and stuck in havoc and regional conflagration.
Security environment has worsened to such an extent that the "old
regional and territorial order” is on the brink of collapse. With the
exception of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, security vacuum is
widening in Libya, war is being waged in Yemen, Iraqi polity is
infested by sectarianism, and in Syria many wars are raging
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simultaneously. While “frozen conflicts" as the Arab-Israeli conflict
are looming again as “time-bombs".
While in 2011, millions of young Arabs took to the streets chanting
“democracy, freedom, justice and jobs”, today in 2016, disenchanted
Youth are joining, in thousands, jihadist groups like Daesh.
As power balances and alliances are shifting very rapidly, countries
engaged in arms race, deflecting resources from development needs.
Sectarian overtones make things worse and hinder the very
possibility of a regional security architecture.
As it was expected, this unhealthy and unstable environment
reverberate outside the region. The spill-over on Europe has been
immediate and translated in waves of refugees and indiscriminate
acts of terrorism.
Such a geopolitical "tsunami" occurs in a period of economic
turndown that spares nobody. The very model of market liberal
economy is being questioned. Unemployment, mainly youth
unemployment, has reached alarming proportions. Terrorist groups
are using increased youth disarray to recruit. But the fight against
jihadism is not coupled with policies that can ward off social
discontent.
That's why NATO initiatives, cantered on security and defence, can
only produce results if they complement other EU initiatives cantered
on promoting a ring of well-governed, prosperous and stable
neighbours.
In such a turbulent new environment NATO need a determined
political leadership backed up by a long -term strategy to increase its
power and purpose. The debate on whether NATO should be
identified as a “defence alliance" or a “pro-active crisis
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management organisation " is obsolete. NATO should be both. But it
should envisage its “out-of-area- operations" with great care and not
be sucked into a war without clear strategic objectives or without
assessing, ex-ante, possible strategic fall-outs.
Some policy recommendations
1. NATO has been diversifying its offer to its Mediterranean and Gulf
countries. Politically it is not a game-changer, as it is not its role and
mission. But this does not mean that NATO should shore up
authoritarian regimes. Moving with great caution, NATO can
however insist on security reform, transparency and civil-military
relationship.
2. Training Iraqi officers and troops is a good initiative but NATO
should understand that security issue in Iraq to intimately link to
the lack of inclusiveness and the incapacity of the current Iraqi
regime to address legitimate Sunni grievances.
3. The stalemate in the Arab-Israeli conflict is unteenable from longterm security perspective. Current Jihadists, like Daesh, have put the
Palestinian question on the backburner. If it remains unresolved, the
conflict may generate a next of wave of jihadism. So for the sake of
everybody in the region, NATO should make it clear to its Israeli
partner that it is willing to provide assistance in a post-peace
situation whether in controlling the external borders or monitoring
the peace arrangements.
4. The EU includes the Palestinian Authority in all its policies (the
European Neighbourhood and the Union for the Mediterranean).
NATO can do the same putting the Palestinians on the same footing
with other partners.
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5. NATO is already engaged in saving lives in the Mediterranean Sea
and disrupting the traffickers' business model. But a humane
approach to the refugee crisis should remain a top agenda.
6. NATO is the glue that binds Europe to the United States, as about
63.000 American troops are still stationed on European soil. NATO
should do its best to ensure American support and participation,
otherwise, the whole transatlantic relationship may collapse putting
in jeopardy NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Initiative.