SYS 612 Final Project
The Hubble Space Telescope - Misalignment and Mismanagement
Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
The Hubble Space Telescope
Misalignment and Mismanagement
Team 1
Christopher Slater
Joshua Goshman
Andrew Bell
28 August 2007
The Hubble Space Telescope
http://www.jackkennedy.net/hubblehuddle.ppt
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SYS 612 Final Project
The Hubble Space Telescope - Misalignment and Mismanagement
Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
Executive Summary
"The difficulties with the Hubble and the space shuttle program are very disturbing
and, without judging the cause of these two incidents, they have served to reaffirm my strong
belief in the need for established quality assurance procedures and strong effective program
management by NASA. Both are essential to successful development of the long-term,
technically complex programs NASA has under way to explore our solar system, reveal the
secrets of distant planets, and uncover the origins of the universe." Senator Al Gore, S. HRG.
101-1087, July 10, 1990. These words by Senator Al Gore lay the foundation of the
perceived problems with the Hubble, quality control and effective program management.
This paper will use the NCTP Framework Analysis approach to evaluate the style used by the
Marshall Space Flight Center HST Program Management team to direct the design and
mitigate the risks for the Hubble.
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) was carried into orbit on Space Shuttle
Discovery on April 24, 1990. Three days latter it was determined that the telescope failed to
focus correctly. Errors in the polishing of the primary mirror were eventually traced back to
Perkin-Elmer, the designers of the Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA). However, failures in
Program Management which were also part of the problem could be traced to the Marshall
Space Flight Center (MSFC) who was ultimately responsible for the program management
oversight. Besides the problems with the primary mirror there were significant cost overruns
(463%), a failure to understand the total system testing requirements and a less than
harmonious environment between the participating space centers and the major contractors.
The NCTP framework was used to classify the four dimensions of the HST project
and comparisons were made to show correlations to the Challenger Space Shuttle NCTP
framework. This technique is used to show what went wrong relative to the style used by
program management. The assessments show that both the Hubble and Challenger
underestimated the Technology and Novelty of the projects. In both cases these incorrect
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Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
assessments contributed to the failure of the programs because the incorrect style or
environment was used. Significant technical issues arose on both programs but if the correct
management “style” had been used those technical risks might have been mitigated.
Background Setting - History of the Hubble
In 1977, Congress funded a 200 million dollar Large Space Telescope which was
later named the Hubble Space Telescope after Dr. Edwin P. Hubble. When the Hubble was
finally launched in 1990 it had cost 1.5 billion dollars. Images after launch showed that the
main 2.4 meter mirror had spherical aberration of about 1/50th the thickness of a human hair.
This flaw in the optics prevented the focus of the telescope and jeopardized the entire project.
In 1993, COSTAR was launched aboard the STS-61 and repairs were made on the
telescope to correct for the spherical aberration. The estimated cost of the first service
mission was 250 million dollars excluding launch costs of approximately 450 million dollars.
The Hubble Space Telescope was completed in December 19851 and scheduled to be
launched in October 1986. However, on January 28, 1986, the Challenger Space Shuttle
exploded 73 seconds after liftoff. This tragic accident pushed HST back as the shuttle was
redesigned and improved. During this down time, improvements were made to the Hubble
Space Telescope but the spherical aberration with the primary mirror was not found.
The main mirror was built by Perkin-Elmer and required 2.5 years to polish. MSFC
approved Perkin-Elmer (PE) as the OTA contractor due in part to the lowest cost proposal.
The primary mirror was completed in 1981 a good 9 years before the launch but never tested
for the spherical aberration. Several tests on the ground showed that spherical aberration
existed in the interferograms and would suggest problems with the OTA. Likewise tests
using the refractive null corrector showed spherical aberration. In both cases Perkin-Elmer
1
http://history.nasa.gov/hubble/index.html
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Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
discounted the errors believing that the OTA were more precise than could be measured with
these tests. The end-to end test of the OTA was considered to be much too costly and based
on the tight cost environment and the potential for program cancellation additional testing
was not performed.
The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) was selected over the Goddard Space
Flight Center (GSFC) to manage the Hubble Space Telescope. Clearly, GSFC had more
scientific expertise but MSFC had a large idle staff. There was a threat of cutbacks within
NASA and MSFC really wanted the program.
There existed a certain amount of unhealthy competition between GSFC and MSFC
and between Perkin-Elmer and Kodak (who built the backup primary mirror and had bid on
the original OTA effort). In addition, PE had worked on spy satellites and there was a
definite lack of access for MSFC due to DoD restrictions. All of the communication
obstacles inhibited the exposure of the spherical aberration of the primary mirror.
Figure 1 shows the communication and program interactions between the Marshall
Space Flight Center (MSFC) and the other members of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST)
Figure 1 The 1977 HST Program/Communications Interfaces
http://www.afit.edu/cse/casedocs/files/Hubble%20SE%20Case%20Study.pdf
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Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
team. MSFC was overall responsible for the program management of the HST program.
MSFC selected the prime contractor Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (LMSC) to
develop the Support Systems Module (SSM) and supervised many subcontracts. LMSC
selected the second prime contractor Perkin-Elmer Corporation (PE) to design and test the
Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA), including the fabrication of the primary and secondary
mirrors. Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) was responsible for the development of some
of the scientific instruments and eventually operating the telescope. The European Space
Agency (ESA) was added to the team and provided the solar arrays.
Statement of Problem
Much emphasis has been placed on the incorrect shaping of the primary mirror on the
Hubble Space Telescope and the lack of end-to-end testing prior to the launch of the Hubble.
However, the environment that allowed these mistakes to occur was under the control of the
Marshall Space Flight Center HST Program Management. This paper will use the NCTP
Framework to analyze the risks the Program Management took during the prelaunch phase of
the program. Information used for this analysis is based on publicly available documents.
This analysis will compare the “actual” versus the “required” four dimensions of the NCTP
to demonstrate that if the management style (work environment) had changed, the likelihood
of the failure in the OTA subsystem could have been greatly reduced. How the program
management failed in the establishment of an environment which allowed the primary mirror
to be built incorrectly and with no end-to-end testing will be addressed in the following
analysis.
Overview of the Project
The Hubble Space Telescope was chosen as our project because of the well known
problem it had with this primary mirror. This suggested that there might be other issues like
program management problems which could have fostered an environment for weak risk
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Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
mitigation for technical problems. There was also a wealth of information available on the
Hubble to use for the NCTP Framework Analysis. No previous NCTP analysis for the
Hubble was found but there was a NCTP Framework developed for the Challenger Space
Shuttle. The Challenger disaster occurred during the development of the Hubble and a
comparison of the two NCTPs might suggest systemic problems within NASA. In addition,
it is believe that the Hubble was a sufficiently complex system and represented a real
challenge for program management within NASA.
The focus of the project will be to evaluate how the program management style
needed to change to insure program success and not the technical issues with the primary
mirror.
Approach
The NCTP Framework analysis of the Hubble Space Telescope is based on how the
Marshall Space Flight Center actually managed the Hubble Space Telescope between 1977 to
1990. The specific technical failure of the Hubble during this time was the incorrect
fabrication of the Primary Mirror which was built by Perkin-Elmer. The mirror was
incorrectly fabricated and an end-to-end test which would have found the problem was never
performed. However, other mitigating issues helped establish an environment which allowed
this failure to happen.
The approach that was used to analyze the problems with the program management of
the HST will include a NCTP Framework analysis of the actual versus required management
styles. This risk analysis tool stratifies four dimensions of the program management into the
actual and required levels within Novelty, Complexity, Technology and Pace or the four
dimensions of the NCTP Framework. Each dimension has multi levels and the actual levels
were determined based on a review of publicly available documents which were collected
from the web. Since the Hubble was effectively a disaster in the early years a
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The Hubble Space Telescope - Misalignment and Mismanagement
Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
proposed new required management style is recommended based on the perceived issues
within each dimension.
To facilitate the analysis a spreadsheet was created for each dimension and for both
the actual and required views. Each worksheet contained the various levels, characteristics,
and managerial styles for each level. A score was created for closeness to each characteristic
and the level with the largest number of selected characteristics became the level for that
dimension of the NCTP. For the required NCTP Framework view, an assessment was made
for each dimension to determine if the actual levels were adequate.
Results - Hubble
The actual versus required NCTP Framework analysis of the PM style relative to the
Hubble Space Telescope during the prelaunch period shows some noticeable issues as can be
seen in Figure 2. In most cases, the required level for each dimension needs to increase from
the actuals with the exception of Pace. Below are the justifications for the actuals and
required level selections.
Figure 2 NCTP Framework for Hubble Space Telescope
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The Hubble Space Telescope - Misalignment and Mismanagement
Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
Actuals - Hubble
Novelty (Platform) – Marshall may have treated the Hubble as an extension of the
LSTs that previously were built but failed. Based on lessons learned, they could have
believed that with some upgrades the Hubble could be produced as a successful design. In
addition, based on the possible early freeze of requirements and reduction in the size of the
primary mirror, they could have been more confident in the design and test methodology than
should have been. This may also demonstrate the nativity of Marshall in accessing the
design risks.
Complexity (System) – Clearly Marshall had problems with Perkin-Elmer which
resulted in a management style that was less ridged. Part of the managerial style was a direct
by product that DoD may have limited access to some of the technical oversight for security
reasons. This forced Marshall to trust Perkin-Elmer more with the design and test of the
OTA resulting in a weaker technical oversight.
Technology (Medium Technology) – “Limited development and some testing” and
early requirements freeze may have caused Marshall to underestimate the technology
dimension of the NCTP. Marshall also had access to the bids from the three OTA
contractors and was aware that Perkin-Elmer did not include end-to-end testing which the
other contractors bid. This lack of end-to-end testing was a gross oversight and ultimately
enabled the failure.
Pace (Fast/Competitive) – The design appears to have been managed with more
emphasis placed on cost verses schedule. A quicker pace was not deemed necessary. From a
Pace standpoint the timelines was interrupted due to the Challenger disaster. Although the
system was ready for its 1986 launch it was postponed until 1990.
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The Hubble Space Telescope - Misalignment and Mismanagement
Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
Required – Hubble
Novelty (Breakthrough) – Marshall should have managed the Hubble as a totally new
systems regardless of previous systems. It was truly “New to the World” and very important
to the study of the universe. For years, scientists had dreamed of a space based telescope like
Hubble and Marshall should have managed the project as a Breakthrough. This would have
helped ensure that all systems including the OTA would have received proper focus.
Complexity (Array) – Marshall needed to insure that the telescope was ready to fly
and that it would meet the requirements. Regardless of the DoD influence, Marshall was
responsible as well as Perkin-Elmer to insure that the OTA was built correctly. This should
have required more technical oversight by Marshall.
Technology (High Technology) – Marshall should have realized that the OTA had not
been bid correctly because of the lack of end-to-end testing bid. A closer review of test data
and closer scrutiny of the OTA design was Marshall’s responsibility and adequate staffing
should have been in place to oversee the task. It may have been prudent to engage the other
OTA bidders to help with some of the technical reviews. If additional funds were needed for
testing, Marshall should have championed this added expense.
Pace (Fast/Competitive) – The actual and required Pace for this system are in
agreement and no changes are suggested.
Results – Challenger
July 1969, Neil Armstrong was famously quoted for saying “That‘s one small step for
(a) man, one giant leap for mankind.” This marked the early beginnings of what has become
a remarkable entry into space by humankind. Over the last several decades, humans have
landed on the moon, sent deep space probes into the furthest reaches of our galaxy, and
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The Hubble Space Telescope - Misalignment and Mismanagement
Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
collected enough data to analyze for years to come. And while curiosity and audacity propels
humans to explore space, the journey comes at a cost. On January 28, 1986, the cost was paid
by the lives of seven astronauts onboard the space shuttle Challenger – STS flight 51-L when their shuttle exploded in mid-flight, just shortly after takeoff. After the disaster, a
Presidential Commission was launched to investigate the cause of the accident. The
Commission, headed by William P. Rogers, uncovered some very revealing problems within
the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA). From a program management
perspective, the investigation illuminated the importance of properly classifying project and
to develop a framework in which to govern the major forces in the project. In the case of
NASA and the space shuttle program, the inaccurate classification of this program
contributed to the challenger disaster.
Figure 3 shows the NCTP Framework for the Challenger Space Shuttle.
Figure 3 NCTP Framework for Challenger Space Shuttle
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SYS 612 Final Project
The Hubble Space Telescope - Misalignment and Mismanagement
Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
Actuals – Challenger
Novelty (Platform) – One of the intriguing factors associated with NASA’s
framework was the attempt to manage the Space Shuttle program as a platform product. The
perception by NASA was the customer was familiar with what this product embodies by
virtue of the Apollo program. The decision to manage by product novelty may stem from
NASA’s belief they could leverage from the knowledge, technology, and experience gained
from sending vehicles, such as Snoopy, Eagle, and Spider, into space. This would be a
miscalculation on the part of the program management.
Complexity (System) - The complexity factor actually espoused by NASA and what
was required is in agreement with each other. There is no disagreement that the Space Shuttle
was a “complex collection of interactive elements and subsystems…” (p.15, How Projects
Differ, Shenhar, et al) Many field agency’s and contractors were involved in the management
and production of the various components necessary to fly the final product. The
organization was setup in a manner to allow management of the product across
organizational borders.
Technology (Medium Technology) - The Apollo capsule design was considered the
“Safest, most reliable and affordable approach…”2 Yet, many new technologies and a new
design was developed to support the Shuttle’s mission. Unlike the Apollo vehicles, the
Shuttle’s mission varied. The vehicle was expected to serve as a laboratory, a payload
delivery vehicle, and a service vehicle for other things such as Hubble, the International
Space Station, etc. Furthermore, even the shuttle design significantly differed and required
new technology. The Apollo program used a capsule design that was better suited for
delivering it into space; however, the Shuttle was intended for reuse. With the advent of new
technologies to protect the shuttle during reentry, and designing the shuttle in an aircraft like
configuration, the Shuttle was reusable. This was certainly new technology and the
2
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/exploration/spacecraft/cev_faq.html
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Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
management of it needed to reflect this fact in the form of a super high-tech project.
Pace (Fast/Competitive) – NASA’s pace was artificially set political and budgetary
forces. The pressure applied on NASA dictated the shuttle must sustain a high operational
tempo. The national reliance of the shuttle grew, especially its ability to perform servicing
missions and deliver payloads. This pace was unrealistic and caused an environment within
NASA that pushed the technology, the knowledge, and experience currently present to the
point of failure. This was part of the issue that led to the Challenger disaster. NASA was
under significant pressure to increase its flight rate, while also coping with decreasing
budgetary support to maintain the fleet. The Rogers Commission revealed that the
management structure was overly consumed by these issues that disregard for safety and
reliability was acceptable. One of the findings of the Commission identified a organizational
structure in which those personnel responsible for safety were nearly non-existent – two
people, applying only 10 to 25 percent of their time, oversaw safety and reliability issues.
(p.570, Safeware, Levenson)
Required – Challenger
Novelty (Breakthrough) - The Space Shuttle program may have been just as
challenging, if not more challenging than the Apollo program. Unlike the Apollo vehicles,
the Space Shuttle was to be reusable, carry a larger crew, and deliver payloads into space.
This is drastically a different mission from that of the Apollo program. In the case of the
Challenger, the reuse of existing rocket technology for use by the fleet proved to be a critical
flaw. The attempt to reuse a preexisting design allowed NASA to freeze the Shuttle Design
earlier to ensure earlier time-to-market. If NASA treated this program as a breakthrough, an
assumption could be made that designers could have found a better design for the SRB. This
could have been accomplished by more prototyping, increased tests, etc, which was the staple
of the Apollo program. In either case, the Shuttle program should have been classified as a
breakthrough, primarily due to the amount of unknowns.
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Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
Complexity (System) – The required and actual styles are in agreement. No proposed
change is recommended.
Technology (Super High Technology) - The reality was NASA managed the
technology aspects of the Shuttle program by considering it medium-tech. The idea was the
base technology was present in the form of the Apollo program. The reuse of the technology
would mitigate risk and aid in the development of the Shuttle, while still allowing for the
introduction of new features and technology yet being developed.
Pace (Regular) - While NASA managed under a competitive pace, the required pace
should have been regular. Because the space shuttle supported a wide variety of missions,
there was no need to execute the program under a fast pace. The missions the Shuttle
supported could have still been accomplished in a more regular pace. The effort should have
been to develop the Shuttle into a more stable platform and find ways to increase its
reliability and decrease its cost.
Summary & Conclusions
Both the Hubble and the Challenger suffered technical failures which drew national
and international attention. Both programs underestimated the Novelty and Technology of
the design by trying to reuse technology from other programs. Design reuse is a common
concept used to reduce development costs and reduce test time. However, the misapplication
of reuse can lull the program management team into a false sense of security and an incorrect
assessment of the design maturity, development costs and risk assessments. Without
appropriate test and development time, the program can actually cost more in terms of dollars
and human lives due to redesigns and loss of hardware. It is always better to build it right in
the first place and test before it is flown.
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Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
The Complexity dimension of the Hubble and Challenger differed in that the required
Hubble Complexity was Array while the Challenger was System. This seems somewhat
confusing but if Complexity translates into many subcontractors with a need for overall
program management supervision and technical oversight then the suggestion is that the
Challenger Complexity dimension should be increased to Array.
The Pace for both programs could have been slowed to make sure that the design was
sound and the product was flight worthy. For the Hubble, the Pace was artificially slowed by
the Challenger disaster and not because of program management per se. The Challenger
should have been slowed to ensure that no design issues existed and adequate safety and
reliability were included.
The NCTP Framework appears to struggle with both cost and reliability because no
dimension addresses specifically either constraint. The Regular level of Pace also seems to
need more characteristics because a “Regular” Pace may be taken to insure that the product
reliability is achieved. (The design is going slow because the risks are so high and it needs to
be done right.) Finally, the characteristics typically used for complex space or defense
programs do not include marketing the product once the contract has been awarded. Instead,
the focus is on keeping the customer happy and involved with the product development.
In the end both the Hubble and the Shuttle programs have been tremendously
successful and NASA has much to be proud of. However, the cost pressures persist and new
systems promise to be even more complex (James Webb Space Telescope and the Crew
Exploration Vehicle). NASA must use management tools, like the NCTP Framework, to
help establish the correct working environment for future success.
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Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
References
A Return to the Moon: A System Engineering Management Framework and the Success of
Lunar Prospector by Brian J. Sauser, Stevens Institute of Technology (2006)
Toward Mission Assurance: A Framework for Systems Engineering Management by Brian
Sauser, Stevens Institute of Technology (2006)
Hubble Space Telescope Systems Engineering Case Study by James J. Mattice SES (Ret)
from the Air Force Center of Systems Engineering (2004)
http://www.afit.edu/cse/casedocs/files/Hubble%20SE%20Case%20Study.pdf
The Hubble Space Telescope Optical Systems Failure Report, November 1990, NASA
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19910003124_1991003124.pdf
The Interdisciplinary Evolution of the Hubble Space Telescope, An Historical Examination
of Key Interdisciplinary Interactions by Greg Carras, Jerry Cordaro, Andrew Daga, Sean
Decker, Jack Kennedy, Susan Raizer (24 April 2006)
http://www.jackkennedy.net/hubblehuddle.ppt
Selected Systems Engineering Process Deficiencies & Their Consequences by L. Dale
Thomas, PhD, PE, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, George C. Marshall
Space Flight Center (2006)
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20070002067_2007001525.pdf
At the Crossroads: The Evolution of Project Management by Dr. Jerry Mulenburg, PMP
(February 6-7 2007)
http://pmchallenge.gsfc.nasa.gov/docs/2007Presentations/Presentations/Mulenburg_Jerry.pdf
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Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE AND THE SPACE SHUTTLE PROBLEMS, HEARING
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION UNITED
STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON
OVERSIGHT ON RECENT PROBLEMS WITH THE HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE
AND THE SPACE SHUTTLE JULY 10, 1990, S. HRG. 101-1087
http://klabs.org/richcontent/Reports/Failure_Reports/challenger/congress/36_688.pdf
The Hubble Experience: Working in a Multiple-Center Environment by Frank J. Cepollina,
Deputy Associate Director, HST Development Office, (March 21, 2006)
http://pmchallenge.gsfc.nasa.gov/Docs/2006attendee-presentations/2006presentationsCDattendee/Frank.Cepollina.pdf
Why Good People Do Bad Things: A Retrospective on the Hubble Fiasco by Barry A. Stein
and Rosabeth Moss Kanter (2006)
http://www.goodmeasure.com/frameset/library/articles/article2.htm
The Hubble Space Telescope: Ten Times Better by Herbert Friedman (1997)
http://www.cosmos-club.org/web/journals/1997/hubble.html
NASA (2005, September 9). Frequently Asked Questions. National Aeronautical and Space
Administration. http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/exploration/spacecraft/cev_faq.html
(2007, August 20)
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Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
Shenhar, S. J., & Dvir, D. (2003, June). How Projects Differ, And What to Do About It.
Retrieved July 2, 2007 from the World Wide Web:
http://webct.stevens.edu/SCRIPT/104962007A/scripts/serve_home
Leveson, N. G. (2001). Safeware: System Safety and Reliability. Boston: Addison-Wesley
Publishing Company. (Original work 1995)
Vaughan, D. (1996). The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and
Deviance at NASA. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Websites
Main Hubble Page
http://hubble.nasa.gov/index.php
Telescope: Hubble Space Telescope
http://amazingspace.stsci.edu/resources/explorations/groundup/lesson/scopes/hubble/index.php
Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Archive System
http://setas-www.larc.nasa.gov/HUBBLE/hst.html
Hubble Space Telescope Historical Timeline
http://www.planetary.org/explore/topics/hubble/history.html
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Hubble Space Telescope - Facts & Figures
http://space.about.com/od/telescopesandoptics/p/hubbleinfo.htm
HubbleSite - The Telescope - Hubble Essentials
http://hubblesite.org/the_telescope/hubble_essentials/
A Brief History of the Hubble Space Telescope
http://history.nasa.gov/hubble/index.html
NASA - Space Shuttle and International Space Station
http://www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/about/information/shuttle_faq.html#10
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Appendix – Q & A
Questions and Answers
1. What is your NCTP classification of the project you have chosen?
Ans: Based on available information it is believed that the actuals NCTP Framework used by
the Program Management on the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) were:
Novelty = Platform
Technology = Medium-tech
Complexity = System
Pace = Fast-Competitive
2. Is this project using the correct approach based on your analysis with the NTCP
framework? Why?
Ans: No, Marshall did not apply the correct style to manage HST especially when it came to
the OTA built by Perkin-Elmer.
3. What is the project doing right and what should the project do differently based on what
the NCTP analysis has showed you?
Ans: The Novelty, Technology and Complexity dimension of the NCTP Framework were all
underestimated by Marshal. However, the Pace seems to be correct even when there was a
time lag introduced into launch because of the Challenger disaster. The required NCTP
dimensions are:
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Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
Novelty = Breakthrough
Technology = High-tech
Complexity = Array
Pace = Fast-Competitive
4. Classification frameworks should be unique for organizations. Based on what you
learned from the project you analyzed, how would you change the NCTP framework to
better fit the organization this project came from? Or would you develop a different
framework and what would it look like?
Ans: Marshall and indeed all of NASA typically work on programs that are very difficult.
Failures often are public and there is a great deal of financial pressure being bought to bear
on all space programs. However, NASA needs to continue to maintain and fund technical
and managerial oversight on all programs. Money continues to be a problem and NASA
needs to continue to prioritize jobs based on need and probability of success. Regarding
Frameworks for complex systems and NASA, it is recommended that an NCTP framework
will fit the dynamics of a program. The NCTP framework should evolve based on the
perceived needs in the project design cycle and contractor. To properly manage a program
some contractors may need more direction and oversight to be successful while other
contractors need less because of their experience.
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Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
Appendix - Hubble Optics Failure
The Hubble Space Telescope (shown in Figure 4) was designed so that researches
could get a better view of the galaxy by observing space through a telescope outside of the
earth’s atmosphere. Telescopes on earth suffer from distortion due to the atmosphere and
clouds, as well as lights from human development. The answer was to build a telescope that
could orbit the earth free from these distortions.
The problems with the
program began from the very
beginning when an unrealistic
estimate of schedule and cost
were used to sell the project.
The initial estimates of the cost
of the program were between
$570 million and $715 million
dollars. NASA pressured the
program for a cost target of
around $300 million so that the
program could be sold.
At the HST launch, the
program was well over cost at a
Figure 4 The Hubble Space Telescope
http://www.jackkennedy.net/hubblehuddle.ppt
total of $2.2 billion dollars, not
including the flight to put it into space. The HST experienced many delays in the program
which caused it to miss its original launch of 1983. The unit was finally assembled in 1985,
NASA had the telescope slated to launch in 1986 but after the tragic loss of the Challenger in
January of 1986, the launch was delayed once again. Finally after space operations resumed
in 1988, the launch date of April 24th, 1990. This time it would be carried into orbit by the
space shuttle Discovery.
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Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
Shortly after the HST was launched another problem was discovered; the telescope
seemed to be displaying distorted images. After a few tests were carried out, it was verified
that the primary mirror was causing a spherical aberration due to the primary mirror being
out of spec. Analysis of the images from the HST determined that the error rate of the
mirror was about ten times greater than the specification in the contract called for.
The mirror in question had
been manufactured by the PerkinElmer Corporation, so an
investigation began on tracing what
went wrong in the manufacturing of
the optics. The team identified that
the Reflective Null Corrector (RNC),
a set of optics used to test the
primary mirror (shown in Figure 5)
was not built correctly. The device
Figure 5 Primary Mirror
is constructed of two mirrors and a
http://www.jackkennedy.net/hubblehuddle.ppt
lens spaced apart from each other. The spacing of these components was out of spec which
threw the polishing of the primary mirror off. The problem was that Perkin-Elmer never
carried out any verification of the RNC’s dimensions. After much research it was determined
that the tests to ensure that the mirror was polished into the correct geometry may have been
set up incorrectly, this raised many questions about the manufacturing and the quality
inspection of the mirror.
The manufacturing of the mirror was exposed to a single point failure; Perkin-Elmer
relied on a single test to verify the mirrors accuracy. Even though signs of the trouble with
the primary mirror were present during manufacturing, they were ignored, leading to a very
costly repair required. The repairs of the HST required that roughly $20 million dollars
were required to repair the spherical aberration of the primary mirror. The mirror itself was
22
SYS 612 Final Project
The Hubble Space Telescope - Misalignment and Mismanagement
Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
not designed to be replaceable so the solution was remarkably similar to what an optometrist
would do to fix a humans eye. This mission was called COSTAR, Corrective Optics Space
Telescope Axial Replacement. Its purpose was to replace the high speed photometer, and use
special relay mirrors on movable arms to correct the light entering the primary mirror
removing the spherical aberration.
The Hubble Space Telescope project management had failed two key management
points, quality and communication. The Perkin-Elmer team should have looked into the
RNC failure further rather than risk a misshapen mirror. Instead no alternate tests were
conducted and a mirror ten times out of specification was delivered to NASA for use in the
telescope. If the team had communicated its suspicions that the mirror may be out of spec
and followed quality procedures, the defects would have been detected and a back up mirror
being produced by the Kodak Corporation could have been delivered in its place.
23
SYS 612 Final Project
The Hubble Space Telescope - Misalignment and Mismanagement
Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
Appendix – Challenger
Following on the heels of the Apollo program, NASA conceived the Space
Transportation System (STS). This new program would see to the construction and
deployment of a “manned Mars expedition, a space station in lunar orbit, and an Earth
orbiting station serviced by a reusable ferry.” (Leveson, 2001, p. 569) In order to realize STS,
the level of investment in effort and resources required needed to match, if not exceed that of
the Apollo program. This factor weakened the government’s support for STS; ultimately,
NASA regrouped and refocused STS primarily around the space shuttle program. Figure 6
identifies the various NASA field centers and their responsibility to the program. Also,
Figure 6 NASA Field Centers for the Challenger Space Shuttle
24
SYS 612 Final Project
The Hubble Space Telescope - Misalignment and Mismanagement
Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
Figure 7 identifies the contractors involved in the construction of the shuttles main three
systems.
Figure 7 Major Contractors who Worked on the Challenger
Unfortunately, the rescaling of STS to focus primarily on the shuttle program did not
ensure the adequate environment needed to construct and maintain the space shuttle program.
In fact, budget cuts and constraints continually plagued NASA. Many compromises and
sacrifices were made, such as reducing the number of orbiters constructed from five to four.
During the operational phase, conditions did not improve. In fact, despite the heavy reliance
25
SYS 612 Final Project
The Hubble Space Telescope - Misalignment and Mismanagement
Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
on the Shuttle to deliver payloads into space, there was “… relentless pressure on NASA to
increase the flight rate.” (Leveson, 2001, p. 570,) Attempts to increase the flight rate caused
reciprocal problems by compressing training schedules, reducing availability of parts,
decreasing the amount of skilled personnel to sustain the desired flight operations, etc. The
Rogers Commission even noted an alarming perception where NASA assumed “less safety,
reliability, and quality assurance activity would be required during routine Shuttle
operations.” (Leveson, 2001, p.570)
Technically, the Rogers Commission concluded the accident was “…a failure of a
pressure seal in the aft field joint of the right solid rocket motor.” (Leveson, 2001, p. 570,)
The design concept for the solid rocket boosters (SRB) was reused from the U.S. Air Force
Titan III rocket. The Titan rocket was used by the U.S. Air Force as a booster rocket to
deliver large-class payloads into space and was considered one the best and most reliable.
When the Shuttle program reused the Titan’s design, modifications were made. Once such
significant modification was the addition of a second O-ring, as backup, should the primary
seal fail. Unfortunately, adding a second O-ring, engineers lengthened part of the joint and
made it susceptible to bending and rotation during combustion pressures.
A Marshall engineer, Leon Ray, noted the bending and rotation caused a “loss of the
secondary O-ring as a backup seal.” (Leveson, 2001, p. 571) This problem served as a point
of contention between NASA and Morton Thiokol. Both sides agreed there was bending or
rotation at the joint, but they disagree on the implications. Morton Thiokol “did not believe
joint rotation would cause a problem.” (Vaughan, 1996, p. 99) Despite these differences,
NASA classified the problem 1R in 1980. Classifying the problem as 1R, NASA therefore
believed the secondary O-ring was a redundancy and the secondary O-ring would seal if the
primary seal failed.
26
SYS 612 Final Project
The Hubble Space Telescope - Misalignment and Mismanagement
Stevens Institute of Technology
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
There was another problem contributing to the Challenger disaster. During several
exchanges between Morton Thiokol and NASA, the classification of the problem changed
from 1R to 1. A classification of 1 indicates a failure could cause the loss of life or vehicle.
(Leveson, 2001, p. 751) The Rogers Commission noted that this information did not enter
NASA’s tracking system. Furthermore, since the data did not enter the system, managers
were basing their decisions on incorrect information. This may explain the events
surrounding STS flight 41-B, when Morton Thiokol filed a problem report that indicated the
secondary O-ring would still seal in the event of a primary seal failure. Both Morton Thiokol
and NASA engineers disagreed with this report and believed the O-ring erosion experienced
by flight 41-B indicated the O-ring was compromised and would not seal should a primary
seal fail.
Up until the Challenger disaster, NASA enjoyed 24 successful launches spanning 57
months. Unfortunately, the problems accumulated over the years would prove
insurmountable, and the day prior to the Shuttle launch would seal the fate of the seven
crewmembers onboard. This was a day when a temperature mattered. On the January 27,
1986, a Morton Thiokol engineer, Robert Ebeling, called for a meeting with the engineering
staff. Mr. Ebeling was concerned about the safety of the Shuttle operating in weather
conditions below the certified levels. This was a legitimate concern, considering STS flight
51-C launched in 53 degree environment and experienced “as bad or worse than previously
experienced…” (Leveson, 2001, p. 573) This prompted several rounds of meetings between
NASA and Morton Thiokol throughout the day and night. During these meetings, Morton
Thiokol engineers reviewed the O-ring erosion problem and voiced serious concern for safety
of flight. Their recommendation for a delay in launch was staunchly rebuffed by NASA
officials – primarily program managers from Marshall. In the end, Morton Thiokol
management, and not the engineering team, relented to the pressures of NASA to maintain
the launch schedule. The information and events of the meetings between Marshall and
Morton Thiokol never reached the higher levels of NASA. So, on January 28, 1986 the crew
of the Space Shuttle Challenger perished.
27
Actual
Required
Novelty
Platform
Breakthrough
Technology
Medium-tech
High-tech
Complexity
System
Array
Pace
Fast-Competitive
Fast-Competitive
The following worksheets were used to score or grade the Hubble relative to
the four dimensions of the NCTP Framework for the actuals and required.
This information was translated from the article "How Projects Differ, And What
to Do About It" by Shenhar, S. J., & Dvir, D. (2003, June).
http://webct.stevens.edu/SCRIPT/104962007A/scripts/serve_home
Novelty
Definition
Data on Market
Derivative
score
Platform
A new generation in an
An extension or
0
existing product family
improvement of an existing
product
Accurate market data exists
Need extensive market
research
0
Product Definition Clear understanding of
required cost, functionality,
features, etc.
Early freeze of product
requirements
1
Careful analysis of
previous generations,
competitors, & markets
Invest extensively in
product definition.
Involve potential customers
in process.
score
1
Non reliable market data
1
Emphasize product
advantage in comparison to
previous model.
Focus on existing as well
as gaining new customers
based on added product
features and varieties
0
Emphasize product
advantages.
Differentiate from
competitors
0
Fast prototyping is
necessary to obtain market
feedback.
0
Very late freeze of
requirements
Creating customer
attention.
Create product image.
0
Market needs not clear
No experience with similar
products
Product definition based on
intuition, and trial and
error.
Freeze requirements later,
usually at mid project
Marketing
Breakthrough
score
A new-to-the-world product
0
1
Educating customers about
potential of product.
Articulate hidden customer
needs.
0
Extensive effort to create
the standard
1
Max =
Choice =
3
3
Platform
Novelty-Actual
0
Novelty
Definition
Data on Market
Derivative
score
Platform
A new generation in an
An extension or
0
existing product family
improvement of an existing
product
Accurate market data exists
Need extensive market
research
0
Product Definition Clear understanding of
required cost, functionality,
features, etc.
Early freeze of product
requirements
0
Careful analysis of
previous generations,
competitors, & markets
Invest extensively in
product definition.
Involve potential customers
in process.
score
0
Non reliable market data
0
Emphasize product
advantage in comparison to
previous model.
Focus on existing as well
as gaining new customers
based on added product
features and varieties
0
Emphasize product
advantages.
Differentiate from
competitors
1
Fast prototyping is
necessary to obtain market
feedback.
1
Very late freeze of
requirements
Creating customer
attention.
Create product image.
0
Market needs not clear
No experience with similar
products
Product definition based on
intuition, and trial and
error.
Freeze requirements later,
usually at mid project
Marketing
Breakthrough
score
A new-to-the-world product
1
0
Educating customers about
potential of product.
Articulate hidden customer
needs.
1
Extensive effort to create
the standard
0
Max =
Choice =
0
4
Breakthrough
Novelty-Required
4
Complexity
Definition
Examples
Customers
Form of purchase
and delivery
Assembly
System
Score
A collection of components
A complex collection of
and modules in one unit,
assemblies that is
0
performing a single
performing multiple
function
functions
A system's power supply; a
VCR, a single functional
service
Consumers or a
subcontractor of a larger
project
Direct purchase or a simple
contract; Contract ends
after of product
Project organization Performed within one
organization, usually under
a single functional group;
almost no administrative
staff in project organization
Planning
Control and
reporting
Simple tools, often manual;
rarely more than 100
activities in the network
0
0
0
0
0
Simple, in-house control;
reporting to management or
main contractor
0
Documentation
Simple, mostly technical
documents
0
Management style, Mostly informal style;
attitude and concern family-like atmosphere
0
A complete building; a
radar; an aircraft; a
business unit
Consumers, industry,
public, government or
military agencies
Complex contract;
payments by milestones;
Delivery accompanied by
logistic support
A main contractor, usually
organized in a matrix or
pure project form; many
internal and external
subcontractors; technical
and administrative staff
Complex planning;
advanced computerized
tools and software
packages; hundreds or
thousands activities
Tight and formal control on
technical, financial and
schedule issues; reviews
with customers and
management
Many technical and
managerial formal
documents
Formal and bureaucratic
style; some informal
relationship with
subcontractors and
customers; often political
and inter-organizational
issues
0
Max =
Choice =
9
System
Complexity-Actual
Score
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
9
Array
Score
A widespread collection of
systems functioning
0
together to achieve a
common mission
A city's highway system; an
air fleet; a national
communication network; a
global corporation.
Public organizations,
government or military
agencies
Multiple contracts;
sequential and evolutionary
delivery as various
components are completed
An umbrella organization –
usually a program office to
coordinate subprojects;
many staff experts:
technical, administrative,
finance, legal, etc.
A central master plan with
separate plans for
subprojects; advanced
computerized tools; up-to
ten thousands activities
Master or central control by
program office; separate
additional control for
subprojects; many reports
and meetings with
contractors
Mostly managerial
documents at program
office level; technical and
managerial documents at
lower level
Formal, tight bureaucracy;
high awareness to political,
environmental, and social
issues
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Complexity
Definition
Examples
Customers
Form of purchase
and delivery
Assembly
System
Score
A collection of components
A complex collection of
and modules in one unit,
assemblies that is
0
performing a single
performing multiple
function
functions
A system's power supply; a
VCR, a single functional
service
Consumers or a
subcontractor of a larger
project
Direct purchase or a simple
contract; Contract ends
after of product
Project organization Performed within one
organization, usually under
a single functional group;
almost no administrative
staff in project organization
Planning
Control and
reporting
Simple tools, often manual;
rarely more than 100
activities in the network
0
0
0
0
0
Simple, in-house control;
reporting to management or
main contractor
0
Documentation
Simple, mostly technical
documents
0
Management style, Mostly informal style;
attitude and concern family-like atmosphere
0
A complete building; a
radar; an aircraft; a
business unit
Consumers, industry,
public, government or
military agencies
Complex contract;
payments by milestones;
Delivery accompanied by
logistic support
A main contractor, usually
organized in a matrix or
pure project form; many
internal and external
subcontractors; technical
and administrative staff
Complex planning;
advanced computerized
tools and software
packages; hundreds or
thousands activities
Tight and formal control on
technical, financial and
schedule issues; reviews
with customers and
management
Many technical and
managerial formal
documents
Formal and bureaucratic
style; some informal
relationship with
subcontractors and
customers; often political
and inter-organizational
issues
0
Max =
Choice =
8
Array
Complexity-Required
Score
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Array
Score
A widespread collection of
systems functioning
1
together to achieve a
common mission
A city's highway system; an
air fleet; a national
communication network; a
global corporation.
Public organizations,
government or military
agencies
Multiple contracts;
sequential and evolutionary
delivery as various
components are completed
An umbrella organization –
usually a program office to
coordinate subprojects;
many staff experts:
technical, administrative,
finance, legal, etc.
A central master plan with
separate plans for
subprojects; advanced
computerized tools; up-to
ten thousands activities
Master or central control by
program office; separate
additional control for
subprojects; many reports
and meetings with
contractors
Mostly managerial
documents at program
office level; technical and
managerial documents at
lower level
Formal, tight bureaucracy;
high awareness to political,
environmental, and social
issues
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
8
Technology
Technology
Typical industries
Low-tech
No new technology
Score
0
Construction, production,
utilities, public works
Medium-tech
Some new technology
Development and
testing
Buildings, bridges,
telephone installation, buildto-print
0
No development, no testing
0
Nonrevolutionary models,
derivatives or improvement
Communication and Mostly formal
communication during
interaction
scheduled meetings
Project manager and Administrative skills.
Mostly semi-skilled
project team
workers, few academicians
Management style
and attitude
Firm style. Sticking to the
initial plan
0
0
0
0
0
Max =
Choice =
0
Limited development, some
testing
0
Design cycles and Only one cycle. Design
freeze before start of project
design freeze
execution
0
Mechanical, electrical,
chemical, some electronics
0
Type of products
Score
1
One to two cycles. Early
design freeze, in first
quarter
More frequent
communication, some
informal interaction
Some technical skills.
Considerable proportion of
academicians
Less firm style. Readiness
to accept some changes
1
1
1
1
High-tech
Score
New, but existing
1
technologies
High-tech and technology
based industries; computers,
aerospace, electronics
1
Super High-tech
Key technologies do not
exist at project's initiation
Advanced High-tech and
leading industries;
electronics, aerospace,
computers, biotechnology
New, first of its kind family
of products, new military
systems (within state of the
art)
Considerable development
and testing. Prototypes
usually used during
development
New, non-proven concept
beyond existing state of the
art
At least two to three cycles.
Design freeze usually
during second quarter
Frequent communication
through multiple channels;
Informal interaction
Manger with good technical
skills. Many professionals
and academicians on project
team
More flexible style. Many
changes are expected
5
5
Medium-tech
Technology-Actual
1
0
0
0
0
0
3
Develop of key
technologies needed. Smallscale prototype is used to
test concepts and new
technologies
Three to five cycles. Late
design freeze, usually
during third or even forth
quarter
Many communication
channels; Informal
interaction encouraged by
management
Project manager with
exceptional technical skills.
Highly skilled professionals
and many academicians
Highly flexible style. Living
with continuous change,
'looking for trouble'
Score
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Technology
Technology
Typical industries
Low-tech
No new technology
Score
0
Construction, production,
utilities, public works
Medium-tech
Some new technology
Development and
testing
Buildings, bridges,
telephone installation, buildto-print
0
No development, no testing
0
Nonrevolutionary models,
derivatives or improvement
Communication and Mostly formal
communication during
interaction
scheduled meetings
Project manager and Administrative skills.
Mostly semi-skilled
project team
workers, few academicians
Management style
and attitude
Firm style. Sticking to the
initial plan
0
0
0
0
0
Max =
Choice =
0
Limited development, some
testing
0
Design cycles and Only one cycle. Design
freeze before start of project
design freeze
execution
0
Mechanical, electrical,
chemical, some electronics
0
Type of products
Score
0
One to two cycles. Early
design freeze, in first
quarter
More frequent
communication, some
informal interaction
Some technical skills.
Considerable proportion of
academicians
Less firm style. Readiness
to accept some changes
0
0
0
0
High-tech
Score
New, but existing
1
technologies
High-tech and technology
based industries; computers,
aerospace, electronics
1
Super High-tech
Key technologies do not
exist at project's initiation
Advanced High-tech and
leading industries;
electronics, aerospace,
computers, biotechnology
New, first of its kind family
of products, new military
systems (within state of the
art)
Considerable development
and testing. Prototypes
usually used during
development
New, non-proven concept
beyond existing state of the
art
At least two to three cycles.
Design freeze usually
during second quarter
Frequent communication
through multiple channels;
Informal interaction
Manger with good technical
skills. Many professionals
and academicians on project
team
More flexible style. Many
changes are expected
0
6
High-tech
Technology-Required
1
1
1
0
0
1
6
Develop of key
technologies needed. Smallscale prototype is used to
test concepts and new
technologies
Three to five cycles. Late
design freeze, usually
during third or even forth
quarter
Many communication
channels; Informal
interaction encouraged by
management
Project manager with
exceptional technical skills.
Highly skilled professionals
and many academicians
Highly flexible style. Living
with continuous change,
'looking for trouble'
Score
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
2
Pace
Definition
Examples
Regular
Time not critical to
organizational success
Score
0
Public works, government
initiative, internal projects
0
Organization
Matrix or functional
Personnel
Focus
(none)
No particular focus
Procedures
No specific attention
Top Management
Involvement
Management by exception
Max =
Choice =
7
Fast-Competitive
0
0
0
0
0
Fast-Competitive
Score
Blitz-Critical
Time to market is a
Time is critical for project
competitive advantage, and
success. Delays mean
1
has an impact on business
project failure
success
Business related projects,
Crisis situations, war, fast
new product introduction
response to natural
1
disasters, fast response to
business related surprises
Matrix, teams,
subcontractors
Qualified to the job
Strategically focused on
time to market
Structured procedures
Go ahead at stages
0
1
1
1
1
1
7
Pace-Actual
Pure project, special task
force
Specifically picked
Swift solution of the crisis
Shortened, simple,
nonbureaucratic
Highly involved and
constantly supportive
Score
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Pace
Definition
Examples
Regular
Time not critical to
organizational success
Score
0
Public works, government
initiative, internal projects
0
Organization
Matrix or functional
Personnel
Focus
(none)
No particular focus
Procedures
No specific attention
Top Management
Involvement
Management by exception
Max =
Choice =
7
Fast-Competitive
0
0
0
0
0
Fast-Competitive
Score
Blitz-Critical
Time to market is a
Time is critical for project
competitive advantage, and
success. Delays mean
1
has an impact on business
project failure
success
Business related projects,
Crisis situations, war, fast
new product introduction
response to natural
1
disasters, fast response to
business related surprises
Matrix, teams,
subcontractors
Qualified to the job
Strategically focused on
time to market
Structured procedures
Go ahead at stages
0
1
1
1
1
1
7
Pace-Required
Pure project, special task
force
Specifically picked
Swift solution of the crisis
Shortened, simple,
nonbureaucratic
Highly involved and
constantly supportive
Score
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1