THE POLITICAL TRANSITION IN MYANMAR: INTERNAL DISPUTES AND
FOREIGN INTERESTS
Erik Herejk Ribeiro21 and Maria Gabriela Vieira22

The 2015 elections in Myanmar brought civilian elites to the central
government after five decades of regimes controlled by military elites.

The gradual democratic opening sought to normalize foreign relations,
to accelerate economic modernization and to preserve the interests of
military elites.

The rise of civilian elites may result in instability and setbacks in the
opening process due to disputes between elites and the foreign interests of
China and US.
Presentation
In November 2015, elections in
Myanmar (former Burma) drew global
attention under headlines of renovation
of hope and democracy in the country. In
the previous election, in 2010, the Union
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP),
which represents the military elites, won
large majority in Parliament (Pyithu
Hluttaw). In contrast, the 2015 elections
gave victory to the National League for
Democracy (NLD),which won 60% of
parliamentary participation. So far, we
observe respect for the results of the
polls by the old elites. On the other hand,
historical
tensions
between
the
traditional military elite, the new civilian
elites and the local insurgent groups
remain. Although national reconciliation
prospects are positive, the path to
democratization is complex and involves
different interest groups in the country
and abroad.
PhD candidate and Master in International Strategic Studies at the Federal University of Rio Grande do
Sul (UFRGS). Contact: [email protected]
21
22
Undergraduate student in International Relations at UFRGS. Contact: [email protected]
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Brief history
nation's largest exponent, despite his
early death in 1947. Suu Kyi, who visited
the country during the 1988 protests,
lived in England and decided to get
involved in national politics after the
encouragement of the protesters, who
saw her father's legacy in her image
(Charney, 2009).
Myanmar is located in a true
crossroads of Asia, surrounded by the
Indian subcontinent, China and the
Southeast Asia. A country of rich history
and culture, it was colonized by the British
Empire in the nineteenth century, gaining
its independence in 1948. In the next
decades, Burma suffered from external
threats23, separatist pressures and
divisions among the ruling elites. After the
first decade of democratic rule, the
country had a transitional military
government (1958-1960) and the
instability culminated in a coup organized
by the military elite in 1962. The new
regime sought a synthesis of national
traditions and reformist socialism,
rejecting any revolutionary way (Taylor,
2009).
The road to democratization
The international situation in
1990 was undergoing intense systemic
changes resulting from the normalization
of US-USSR relations and the progressive
fall of socialism in Eastern Europe. The
"Third Wave" of democratizations had
also been striking much of the Third
World and dismantled their old local
political arrangements (Huntington,
1991). Gene Sharp (1993), professor of
Dartmouth, promptly produced a manual
of nonviolent overthrow of "dictatorial"
political systems, using Burma as a model
and inspiration. Later, this very work
influenced the Colored Revolutions in the
former Soviet space and the Arab
uprisings of 2011.
After several economic and
political difficulties, the socialist regime
collapsed in 1988. Similarly to the events
of Tiananmen Square (China), student
protests were suppressed and resulted in
intense international pressure. The
interim military government agreed to
hold elections in 1990, in which it ended
predictably defeated by the NLD.The
League grew out of student movements
and civil organizations, led by the
surprising figure of Aung San Suu Kyi. The
leader of the NLD is daughter of Aung
San, the main articulator of the
anticolonial movement and still the
The military interim government,
although pressured by internal and
external elements, gradually decided to
boycott the election results and establish
a regime of exception under its
command. In its view, Myanmar was the
target of an organized international
movement that had Suu Kyi and the NLD
as partners to force both a radical
23
We can mention the revolutionary stance of China in the 1950s and 1960s and the support of the
American CIA to the Kuomintang Army stationed in Burma since the defeat in the Chinese Civil War. Later,
the leaders of these Chinese nationalist forces began to run a lucrative heroin trafficking business in the
north.
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economic
liberalization
and
the
establishment of a liberal democracy.
(ASEAN), that wished to advance a
political, economic and regional cultural
community (Charney, 2009).
Successive Socialist and military
governments have always had national
autonomy and nonalignment as priorities
(Egreteau
and
Jagan,
2013).
Economically, unlike most of Third-World
experiences in the 1990s, the military in
Myanmar carried out a transition to
capitalism in which privatizations were
open only to local elites, preventing
greater integration with international
capital.
Although relatively isolated in the
international system, Myanmar went
through a process of modernization since
1988. Due to internal and external
threats to its security, the partnership
with China was important to import
modern military systems, including the
absorption of technology for production of
tanks and stealth frigates, for example.
In addition, the construction of the
new capital Naypyidaw, at the
geographical and civilizational center of
the country, sought to accelerate the
economic integration between regions
and a return to local cultural
backgrounds. The former capital Yangon
alluded to the period of British
colonization and still represents the
major
national
economic
and
demographic center. Its coastal location
facilitates a possible scenario of foreign
military intervention, supported by
eventual protests of urban social strata.
Over the 1990s and 2000s,
Myanmar suffered intense international
pressure for political and economic
opening. Suu Kyi was placed under house
arrest, being released and rearrested a
few times in the period. The country
remained closed to outside influences,
while on your neighbors, especially
Indonesia and Thailand went through
accelerated processes of economic
liberalization with unstable results, such
as the downfall of Suharto in Indonesia
and the Asian financial crisis of 1997.
Nevertheless, Southeast Asian countries
achieved high levels of economic growth,
while Myanmar suffered economic
embargo of Western countries.
In 2003, the military regime began
a controlled seven step process for a
democratic transition, called "Roadmap
to Democracy". However, Saffron
Revolution (2007) protests were a new
attempt to impose accelerated political
opening of Myanmar, based on the
experiences of the Colored Revolutions of
the former Soviet space. This time, the
harsh repression of the police had
coverage of international and alternative
media. The resulting proposals for
The new US-led unipolar order did
not support or tolerate military regimes
anymore, with rare exceptions of older
key allies. Thus, Myanmar was placed as
an obstacle to the triumph of global
liberalism, impassive
to
external
influences. Threatened diplomatically
and economically, the Burmese generals
turned to the protection of China and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
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sanctions in the UN Security Council were
barred by a joint veto of China and Russia.
national security issues, including those
handled by the office of the Presidency,
will continue to be dominated by the
military.
As pointed out by Steinberg
(2010), the US largely based its foreign
policy on Burma in the figure of Suu Kyi in
recent decades. The episode of the
Saffron Revolution revealed the interest,
mainly from political sectors of the United
States, in co-opting local civilian elites to
the American liberal project. On the other
hand, China invested in a controlled and
limited transition, to prevent the
immediate rise of new elites and the
following collapse of the state and local
social order.
The NLD, without Suu Kyi’s
leadership (who had returned to house
arrest), decided not to participate initially
in the democratization process. The party
still demanded the recognition of the
results obtained in the 1990 elections.
Only in 2012 the League decided to
return to the national stage in midterm
elections.
Political transition and the
interests at stake
Thus, the political transition was
accelerated under the tacit approval of
China and with support of ASEAN. The
Obama administration, realizing that the
regime was sustained even without
Western
support,
initiated
the
rapprochement with Myanmar authorities
in 2009 (Haacke, 2012). The gradual
normalization of relations with the United
States enabled the subsequent dialogue
of military elites with Suu Kyi, who had no
unconditional support of the West to rely
on.
Initially, it is important to move
away from Manichaean analyses, usually
journalistic, concerning the interests at
stake in Myanmar's political transition. It
is not simply a repressive military elite
versus new democratic civilian elites.
Domestically, there are conservative
hardline and also pragmatic currents in
the military. Similarly, civilian elites are
divided between reformists and radical
liberals associated with foreign groups of
interest. Still, there are dozens of political
parties representing ethnic minority
groups in Myanmar, which are roughly a
third of the population. In some cases,
these parties are the political face of
heavily armed guerrilla groups.
The new Constitution of Myanmar
was drafted in 2008 and elections were
held in 2010. Due to the Armed Forces
(Tatmadaw) central role in national
politics, it was provided for articles in the
constitution that favored them. We can
mention two important features: 25%
reservation of seats in the upper and
lower houses; appointment of a vice
president and the Ministers of Interior,
Defense and Border Affairs. In short,
The new government, elected in
2010, still contained strong traces of the
former military regime, now nominally a
'Disclipined Democracy’. Even though, it
was already possible to identify the
political transition from a centralized,
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unitary and authoritarian power to the
diffusion of power between the military
elite and the ‘quasi-civil’ elected
government (Callahan and Steinberg,
2012). The government of President
Thein Sein took important steps towards
the gradual opening of the economy and
the reconciliation of national political
groups.
on the Malacca Strait chokepoint. From a
military and strategic point of view, the
country can be an alternative route for
China’s war effort in case of conflict in the
Western Pacific (the example of what
happened in World War II). On the other
hand, the use of its territory against China
would put in check the security of all its
interior (Ribeiro, 2015).
The last major initiative Thein Sein
was seeking a national ceasefire between
the government and all armed groups in
the country . The agreement was barred
by the Wa ethnic group, residing on the
border with China and currently
Myanmar’s main insurgent force. The
Was are the main drivers of drug
trafficking in the "Golden Triangle" (Laos,
Myanmar, Thailand), the world’s largest
heroin producing region.
The United States, in turn,
adopted a pragmatic approach to meet
their greater geopolitical interests,
leaving in a second plan the export of
democracy and liberalism. Immersed in
its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US
acted late in Asia, almost passively
watching the rising economic, political
and military of China. The new policy for
Myanmar is part of a new US strategic
offensive called ‘Asia Pivot’. To resume its
relations with Southeast Asian countries,
it was also necessary to have an
engagement posture, not confrontation,
with Myanmar (Haacke, 2012). Moreover,
in a context of rapid geopolitical changes,
Washington doesn’t discard any country
as a potential ally, especially after the
weakening of their relations with Thailand
due to a military coup in 2014. It should
be noted that, already in 2013, the US
partially resumed their program of
military officer training to Myanmar,
suspended since 1988. In a more
conciliatory position, India and the ASEAN
countries may have a stabilizing role on
the international stage. The Indian
Northeast is a remote area from New
Delhi and has suffered for decades with
armed insurgencies, which maintain
connections and arms flows from groups
in Myanmar (Lintner, 2012). This makes
Behind its intransigence there is a
tacit support from China, which does not
want to lose an important element of
bargaining with the Myanmarese
government. While the Chinese want and
explicitly support the political openness
and national reconciliation, they fear that
a new autonomous and consolidated
government might feel safe enough to
approach the West.
Thus, the economic and political
interests of China would be at risk
because the country has critical
infrastructure investments that can turn
its neighbor into a "Chinese California"
(Thant Myint-U, 2011). In other words,
Myanmar is a geo-economic output of
China to the Indian Ocean and a
complementary route to China’s energy
security, which now essentially depends
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India the main interested in achieving
national reconciliation in the neighboring
country. ASEAN is a regional integration
project that values noninterference in
internal affairs and informal mechanisms
of diplomacy, known as ASEAN Way
(Beukel, 2008). For the continuity of
Southeast Asia’s integration process, it is
essential that all countries reach
compatible levels of growth and
economic development, though naturally
in distinct stages. Japan also closely
observes events in Myanmar and has
also provided economic aid and
investments in the manufacturing sector.
railway and pipeline projects along the
Kyaukpyu-Kunming track. On the other
hand, the major productive investments
in the country occur only in extractive
business (mining, vegetal extraction, gas
and oil) (Steinberg and Fan, 2012). The
normalization of foreign relations can
fulfill the intended national strategy of
bargaining for economic modernization
and the attraction of investments that
generate added value and income.
Analyzing the civilian elites is a
more complex task. While Suu Kyi has
great control over the activities of NLD,
there’s a number of interest groups
supporting the League whose projects
are less publicized. Even so, it’s expected
a moderate reformist stance from the
elected government, which took office on
March 30, 2016. Due to legal restrictions,
Aung San Suu Kyi can not be president,
because her children have British
nationality. The new president, Htin Kyaw,
was personally appointed by her and
works on a mostly decorative role. Suu Kyi
was officially in charge of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
While organizing the political
transition, the military in Myanmar sought
to rebalance its foreign relations, also
intending to legitimize its national
political and economic influence. With the
arrival of Arab uprisings in 2011, the
Myanmarese leaders feared that a new
civilian government might confiscate
their property and condemn them to
prison for crimes committed during the
military regime. In this sense, the
controlled transition served as a tool to
legalize the new role of active and retired
military leadership, who control much of
the national economy and have
constitutional veto power24.
First of all, Suu Kyi met in recent
years almost every major actor interested
in Myanmar's political transition. These
include both US and Chinese authorities,
as conservative and pragmatic military
leaders. The most meaningful episodes
were her visit to Prime Minister Xi Jinping,
in China (June 2015) and her meeting
with the former commander of the
From an economic point of view,
the old elites were aware that it was not
possible to maintain indefinitely a regime
boycotted internationally and closed to
foreign investment. China plays a key role
in terms of infrastructure, with road,
24
Any major reforms in the 2008 Constitution can be made only with the approval of 75% of the Parliament.
As the military have 25% of the seats, it would be necessary just one vote among elected parliamentarians
to stall unwanted changes.
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military junta, Than Shwe (December
2015).
greater openness to external influences.
In terms of economic policy and tax, there
seems to be a trend of resource
decentralization.
China sought dialogue to resume
some of its stalled infrastructure projects
in Myanmar and the region as a whole,
and also intending to establish diplomatic
bridges with possible new national
leadership. However, the election
manifesto of the NLD indicates that the
construction of large dams causes great
environmental impact, referring indirectly
to Chinese Myitsone project, which is
paralyzed. Therefore, the manifesto
continues, it is necessary to seek other
sources of energy and just keep the
existing
hydroelectric
structures.
Importantly, the Thein Sein government
had paralyzed the works in 2011
responding
to
the
appeal
of
nongovernmental organizations and
other sectors of society.
One of the issues most sensitive in
the political economy of transition in
Myanmar is the role of military
entrepreneurs, which currently dominate
the industrial and extractive sectors. So
far, the economic opening has been
gradual and negotiated. The commission
for foreign investment, based on the
2008 Constitution, has prioritized
concessions to joint ventures with large
share of domestic capital. The gradual
opening and the protection of national
companies is to avoid a ‘shock doctrine’
adopted as a solution by many countries
in the 1990s. In most cases, the result
was the exaggerated dependence on
foreign capital and the destruction of
local productive base.
The meeting with former General
Than Shwe signs, on behalf of Suu Kyi,
the respect paid to the Armed Forces and,
more than that, the acceptance of the
status quo. At first, she seems cautious to
meet demands from her political allies
that could threaten the national status of
the military. One of the most sensitive
issues, which seems to be currently out of
question, is any kind of civilian control
over the military organizations or over
national security issues.
Although they have an important
role in the national economy, the military
companies also engage in exploration
businesses outside the law, such as jade
mining in the north (Kachin state), made
jointly with Chinese companies. If there
are greater signs of the civilian
government’s
interference
towards
accelerated
opening
or
greater
fiscalization, the military elites will
probably react and the risk of political and
socio-economic crises will grow.
The NLD election manifesto also
gives us clues about other possible
changes. In the international economic
level, it defends strong and close
relations with the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, signaling
Another important result of the
2015 elections was the loss of influence
of groups representing ethnic minorities.
In most of these regions, the NLD also
won majority, showing their political force
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also among minorities. From the point of
view of national reconciliation, the
opening, whether for reasons of internal
or external politics. However, the political
transition made room for processes that
are no longer under their control.
massive victory of the NLD in all regions
indicates legitimacy to lead the process of
ceasefire against many of the traditional
groups, which have lost representation in
the national parliament.
The Suu Kyi government will go
through various tests overtime. First, the
NLD never ruled any administrative unit
of the country and lacks experience in the
formulation and implementation of public
policy. This is actually their highest
challenge and, although the Parliament
has undergone radical changes, the
bureaucracy basically remains the same.
However, government relations
with the paramilitary groups are mainly
conducted by the Armed Forces, which
run key ministries of national security and
have an approach often antagonistic to
the NLD. Still, the issue can serve as a
bargaining chip to the military, who lost
much of parliamentary representation
and do not want to lose even more
influence in national politics.
In terms of foreign policy,
Myanmar can return to its history of
international neutrality. This basic
principle of independent Burma has been
suppressed by the need to subordinate to
China’s interests in the last two decades.
With the positive engagement of the West
and Japan, Myanmar tends to bargain
between old and new partners,
resembling the posture of other ASEAN
countries in their relations with Asia’s
Great Powers (Ciorciari, 2009). Myanmar
is a country with a low level of
development that needs further reform
and foreign investment. However, a
negative scenario of political crisis and
military intervention would provoke the
return of external power politics, and
probably characterized as a fierce
competition between China, India and US
(Ribeiro, 2015).
The last relevant event for
Myanmar's political transition was the law
project proposing the creation of the post
of "State Counselor", which would be
taken over by Suu Kyi. Despite having
suffered strong military opposition in
parliament, the project now needs only
the approval of the President Htin Kyaw
to be put into practice. Through this law,
Suu Kyi would be formally in the center of
the new government administration in
Myanmar, with nearly equivalent powers
of a Prime Minister.
Final considerations
The political landscape in
Myanmar is going through a historic
transition, which is expected to produce
new winners and losers. Precisely
because of its uniqueness, it is difficult to
predict results with high degree of
certainty. On one hand, it seems clear
that military elites facilitated the political
The greatest objective is national
reconciliation, a task not met by any
national government, be it democratic,
socialist or military. The country has
always had difficulty to control its own
territory and prevent the proliferation of
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58
armed insurgencies in remote areas. This
mission can be accomplished only with
the help and backing of the Tatmadaw
(Armed
Forces),
which
initiated
significant efforts for reconciliation in
recent years.
However, there are several
political
and
economic
interests
permeating the transition. Although
military elites have great interest in
maintaining the current process, many of
its members may react to reforms they
deem potentially harmful to national
sovereignty or to the role of current
economic elites. So far, Suu Kyi had a
pendulous posture, alternating between
reconciliation with the military and
sometimes challenging the existing
political order. It is up to the new civilian
leadership to balance antagonisms and
get closer to a national consensus,
avoiding setbacks and the consequent
return of the interference of external
powers.
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