C H A P T E R I1
THE AUSTRALIAN OFFER
I N the days of intense anxiety immediately before the declaration of war, when the entrance of Britain into it and the steps
which she would take if she did enter were equally uncertain,
there was a feeling in the British dominions that a declaration
of their support would strengthen her position in the eyes of
the world. New Zealand on July 30th offered to send a
force of New Zealand troops if need arose. I n Canada, on
July 31st, Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister, hurriedly
returned to Ottawa, summoned a meeting of the Cabinet, and
telegraphed to the British Government that it could count on
the fullest aid from Canada.
The Canadian Government
asked its Ministry of Militia and Defence for advice as to the
force which could be sent at an early date. During the next
few days several telegrams reached the Australian newspapers reporting statements attributed to Colonel Sam Hughes,
the talkative Minister of Militia and Defence in Canada. He
had said that “an offer of 30,000 men had been practically
decided upon,” and that 20,000 Canadians would be ready to
sail within a fortnight if required. This news appeared in the
Australian journals on Monday, August 3rd. under large
headlines: “Canada offers 30,000.” As a matter of fact
Canada had offered to send 20,000 men, and more if required,
but the actual terms passed unnoticed in Australia. Within
two months in Canada, as in Australia, the men in training
were far more than were originally contemplated.
I t so happened at this perilous time there was brewing in
Australia a Federal election, and one in which the political
struggle was particularly bitter and the tactics intricate. The
two parties in the country were Liberal and Labour.
The
Liberals had been in office, with Joseph Cook as Prime
Minister and Senator Millen as Minister for Defence, but
during their whole term they had been hampered by a heavy
majority of their opponents in the Senate. Senator Millen,
one of the most experienced and astute of Australian politicians.
had been worried to the limit of endurance by the task of
piloting Government measures through a hostile House. The
20
June-Aug., 19141
T H E AUSTRALIAN OFFER
21
Ministry, in order to rid itself of this obstacle, had introduced a Bill specially designed to bring the deadlock to an
acute stage, so that it might apply the remedy laid down in
the Australian Constitution for such a situation, to wit, a
dissolution of both Houses of Parliament. The newly-arrived
Governor-General, Sir Ronald Craufurd Munro Ferguson.‘
had given his assent. Feelings ran high and bitter. Parliament
had been dissolved on June 27th, and polling was to take
place on September 5th. The Ministers were mostly in the
constituencies far from Melbourne (the temporary Capital
and Seat of Government), pursuing the business of the
election.
Under the arrangements made at the Imperial Conferences
mentioned in the last chapter, the Committee of Imperial
Defence, in assisting the dominions to draw up their “Defence
Schemes,” had arranged certain warnings which should be
sent to them by the British Government whenever there was
danger of war. There are certain precautionary steps which,
for reasons of prudence, every country takes when the international situation is so threatening that war seems imminent. It
may be necessary, for example, immediately to enforce certain
measures in regard to the merchant ships of an enemy then
lying in the country’s ports, and also certain precautions in
the case of neutral ships, which might carry enemy spies or
goods, or might be fired on by forts at night or wander into
minefields. These and many other steps, which constitute the
‘‘ precautionary stage ” of mobilisation, are in prudence planned
beforehand, so that they can be taken immediately upon the
receipt of a warning that war is probably impending. The
country is thus put into a position-its
forts manned, its
garrisons ready, its wireless stations and railway bridges
guarded-in which it cannot be taken unprepared. Later, if
word is received that war has actually broken out, a further
and different set of measures can be applied.
The Committee of Imperial Defence had drafted two
messages which could be sent in times of peril by the British
Government to the Governor-General of each dominion : the
first warning him that there was imminent danger of war: the
’Rt
1g14-zo
1934.
Hon. Vlscount Novar, K T , G C.M G., Governor-General of Australia,
Of Raith, Kirkcaldy, Scotland: b. Raith, 6 March 1860. Died, 30 March
22
THE STORY OF ANZAC
[1908-14
second, if war arrived, notifying him of the fact.
On the
receipt of the first iiiessage the Government of the dominion
would, if it thought fit, order the “precautionary stage” of
mobilisation. On receiving the second it would take whatever steps it had decided upon for a time of war.
Australia, fortunately, had her “Defence Scheme” almost
ready. It so happened that in Igo8-the
year following the
Imperial Conference which originated the plan-the Chief of
Staff of the Australian Forces was Colonel IVilliam Throsby
Bridges,2 an able soldier and a man whose grim driving force
at all times strongly influenced whatever Minister he might be
working with. Bridges (whose title was Chief of Intelligence,
inasmuch as the “General Staff” had only been established since
the South African War and was a new thing at the date in
question) started upon a Defence Scheme of his own. H e
first sketched in his mind the scheme as a whole, and then decided to begin upon the detailed measures to be taken by the
Commandants in the six States, each of which is a ‘‘District’] in
the Australian army ~ y s t e r n .H
~ e left until later the proceedings to be undertaken by the central authority of the Commonwealth acting from Melbourne, such as censorship of letters,
cables, and newspapers. I n this work, shortly after he had
besin it, he was joined by a young oflicer of the Royal Australian Garrison Artillery, newly returned from two years in
the British Staff College, Major C. B. B.
When Colonel
Bridges left the Headquarters Staff in Melbourne in order to
become the Australian representative on the Imperial General
Staff i n London, the work was continued under his successor,
Brigadier-General Joseph Maria Gordon.
The steps to be
taken by the States had been completely drawn up. For those
to be taken by the Commonwealth a beginning had been made
by Bridges himself, who drafted them with a stern rigidity.
He laid down the conditions to be imposed upon the press. “I
~~
Commanded 1st Aust. Div
3 Major General Sir W. T Bridges, K C B.. C.11 G
and A I F . 1 9 1 4 / 1 5 ; b. Greenock, Scotland, 1 8 Tcb, 1 S 6 1 ; died of wounds,
1 8 May. I915
‘The six States and the S I X Vilitary Districts are almost identical. the only
important difference being that Broken Hill in New South Wales belongs, for
ronrcnicnce, to the 4th Military District (South -4nstralia), and part of the
h-orthern Rirers of N.S W. to the 1st Military District IQucensland).
4 General
Sir C B B White. K C B , K C hI G . K C V O D S 0 . p s c
Chief of General
Puring the last offensive of the war Chief of Staff. ith Armv
Staff of Australian Forces, r q z o i 2 3 and 1950 Chairman. Commonwealth Puhlic
Service Board. 1923/28, h St Arnaud, V i c , 2 3 Sept.. 1 8 j h Killed in aeroplane
craqh, 13 A u g , 1940
1908-141
THE AUSTRALIAN OFFER
23
never for a moment believed they’d stand ’em,” he told a
friend, long afterwards, expressing his surprise at the publicspirited manner in which the newspapers had accepted the
restrictions designed to prevent information from reaching
the enemy. After Bridges left Melbourne, considerable
additions were made to the Defence Scheme by Major White.
At the outbreak of the war it was still incomplete. But the
instructions to the States were ready. The sentling of a certain telegram from Melbourne would put into force sets of
printed orders which lay in the safes of the District Commandants, waiting only to be unsealed.
On Wednesday, July zgth, the British Government despatched the first of the two warning telegrams.
This was
received by the Governor-General of Australia on July 3oth.6
It informed the Government that the time had arrived for
bringing into force the “precautionary stage” of the Defence
Scheme. This was immediately followed by a second telegram, instructing the Australian Government that the
measures for the examination of ships entering Australia11
ports were not at the moment required, but that arrangements
should be made to enforce them when necessary. On
Saturday, August Ist, the word came that this precaution
also should be taken. On Thursday, July goth, when the first
critical news arrived, the Governor-General was in Sydney,
as was also Senator Millen, the Minister for Defence. Joseph
Cook. the Prime Minister, alone was at the seat of Government
in Melbourne: he had arranged to follow Andrew Fisher, the
leader of the Opposition, in an important election speech at
Colac on Saturday.
I t will appear to future generations of Australians a strange
token of the manner in which Australia stood on the brink
of the precipice without suspecting the tremendous plunge
ahead of her that, even on the receipt of this warning,
the Prime Minister (whose whole-hearted unswerving
devotion to the British Empire was and is one of the main
principles of his life) did not instantly call the niemhers of
A n indirect warnma v a s received
from the Senior Naval Officer on the
HT
in-chlef of the China Station
Squadron, which had been cruising off
under orders from Senator Millen and
hy the Yzvy Office
New Zealand Station
I O 10 p m
on Julv
the Queensland coast,
the Naval Board
about tltc same time
and the Coinmanrler.
30th the Arlstralian
was on its way south
24
THE STORY OF ANZAC
[July-Aug., 1914
his Cabinet to meet him the next day or the day after in Melbourne; that the Minister for Defence did not immediately
return to the Navy and Defence Departments at the seat of
Government ; and that the Governor-General did not forthwith move to Melbourne and ask the Prime Minister to
confer with him.* Certain swift and comprehensive orders
were given to the Fleet; but, except for this, the only definite
step was that the Minister for Defence sent for the actingChief of the Military Staff to travel up to confer with him in
Sydney. This was the officer on whom at the moment rested
almast the entire responsibility for the control of Australia’s
military system. Its headquarters in Melbourne were thus left
temporarily without the normal head of the most important
branch.
I t so happened that at this crisis the Australian army was
without its Chief of Staff. Brigadier-General Gordon, who
succeeded Colonel Bridges, had recently retired. Bridges, now
Brigadier-General, having established the Military College had
been made Inspector-General, and was absent in the north of
Australia. Colonel Legge,s an Australian officer who had
made his name by his administrative ability, and who was
largely responsible for the details of Lord Kitchener’s scheme,
upon which the Australian army was now organised, had been
in England as Australia’s representative on the Imperial
General Staff.
H e had been recalled to succeed General
Gordon as Chief of the General Staff, but was at sea on the outbreak of war, and did not reach Melbourne till August 8th.
The officer who was filling the position in the meantime was
Major C. B. B. White, upon whom, during these days, there
fell almost the sole responsibility for advising the Government.
On the night of Friday, July 31st, Senator Millen, by his
statement in Sydney that Australia was “no fair-weather
partner” in the Empire, and Andrew Fisher at Colac. by
pledging to the support of Great Britain, if necessary, Australia’s “last man and last shilling,” placed the position of AUStralia beyond doubt before the world. The European newspapers spread the news of those promises next day. During
But see pp z z - I
‘Licut.-Ceneral J. C. Legge, C.B., C.M.G. Commanded 1st Auot. Dir.. r g r j .
Aust nix. , i q i : / i b .
Commandant Royal hIilltary College of Australla,
Duntroon. I O Z O / ~ Z : of Sjdney, N.S.\V.; b. London. Eng.. 1 5 Aug, 1863.
2nd
30th July-2nd Aug., 19141
T H E AUSTRALIAN OFFER
25
the two days which followed, Senator Millen in Sydney conferred with Major White, and also with the Governor-General
and William Irvine, the Federal Attorney-General, who happened to be in that city. But even yet the “precautionary steps”
recommended by the telegram received on July 30th were
not taken. The Prime Minister was speaking at Colac, and the
rest of the Government was scattered throughout Australia.
It was reported that an urgent telegram reached one of them
in the country, but that there was no one with him who could
decode it. On Sunday, August 2nd. a further telegram came
from the British Government asking that precautionary
measures should be taken at defended ports.
The greatest haste ensued. Heads of military departments,
Mr. T. Trumble (the acting-Secretary) Colonel Sellheim
( Adjutant-General) ,’ Lieutenant-Colonel Forsyth (actingQuartermaster-General) ,* Lieutenant-Colonel Horace Dangar
(acting-Chief of Ordnance), J. B. Laing (Finance Member of
the Military Board), and Captain T. Griffiths (Secretary of the
Military Board)s were brought in by motor-car to their departments. Later in the morning they met the Prime Minister
at his office. The Prime Minister held the first call on all
telegraph and telephone lines during that day. Separated from
his Minister for Defence and from the Chief of the General
Staff at a moment when the precautions laid down for times
of “danger of war” were due to be promulgated, he was in a
position of great anxiety: but the situation was eased by a
meeting of the Minister for Defence, the Attorney-General,
and the Governor-General in Sydney, where it was decided to
put the “precautionary stage” into force. At 1 . 5 0 p m . on
Sunday, August 2nd. Senator Millen telegraphed to the Prime
Minister that this action was proposed. That afternoon orders
were issued bringing into effect (as the press said) “the first
statre of an ordinarv mobilisation.”
‘Major General V. C. M. Sellheim, C.B.. C.M.G. Comdt. Admin. H -Q.. A . I . F .
Egypt. 1 0 1 5/16, London, 1916: Adjutant-General and Second nlilitary Member of
Militarv Board of Australian Forces 1 9 1 4 and 1 9 1 7 / 2 4 . Administrator of Norfolk
Island.. 1q26/28: of Brisbane: b. SGdney. 1 2 May, 1866. Died, z j Jan., 1928.
* Major-General J. K. Forsyth C.M.G.
Commanded and Inf. Bde., 1915/!6.
~uartermaster-Genera1 and Third ’Military Member of Military Board of Australian
Forces, rgrg/zz; of Fortitude Valley, Brisbane, Q’land; b. Brisbane, g Feb , 1867.
Died, 1 2 Nov.. 1928.
‘Brig.-General T. Griffiths. C.M.G.. C.B.E. D.S.O.
A A . G . , A I . F . , 1916;
Commandant Admin. H -Q., A.I.F.. 1917/18 ;nd 1919. Administrator of New
Guinea, I ~ Z O / Z I and r q 3 a / 3 j : Admmlstrator of Nauru. 1qa1/27; officer of Aust
Permanent Forces, b. Prcsteigne. Radnor, S. \Vales. 29 Sept.. 1865
26
THE STORY OF ANZAC
[~st-sthAug., 1914
All that the people knew of these proceedings was that the
Prime Minister had received certain messages from England.
“I cannot talk about these things,” he said to the pressmen.
‘“They are too grave. AI1 I can say is that we are not asleep.”
I t was announced that he had called a special Cabinet meeting
for the next day. The Minister for Defence and the AttorneyGeneral were leaving Sydney by that night’s express, and
Senator McColl, the Vice-president of the Executive Council,
was in Melbourne. The Cabinet meeting was to be held at
three in the afternoon, immediately after the Sydney express
arrived.
I t was indeed time for swift action. On August 1st a wireless message in the secret German code was received by many
German merchant ships which were loading or unloading in
Australian ports. On Sunday, August 2nd. two of the German steamers which were taking in coal at Newcastle in New
South Wales suddenly left. I t had previously been intended
that they should sail r o m d the north of Australia through the
intricate navigation of Torres Straits, and they had, according
to custom, taken on board Torres Straits pilots for the passage. As soon as they were clear of Newcastle they stopped,
sending the pilots back to port with the intimation that they
would not be needed. The steamer Westfalen did the same
next day. Another fine German ship, the Elsass, which was
lying in Sydney Harbour at the wharves in Woolloomooloo
Bay, with papers for a voyage to Antwerp, pushed off as early
as she could on the morning of Tuesday, August 4th, and in
the hurry of swinging round made a large hole in the Woolloomooloo Baths. There were no instructions to stop her, and
she cleared at 8.5 a.m. through Sydney Heads. There were
no recognised means of detaining such ships until a state of
war was actually recognised. On August 5th the steamer
Pfalc tried to get away shortly after noon through the heads
of Port Phillip (Melbourne), but was stopped by a shot from
the forts, which had just heard of the outbreak of war.
The Governor-General and Major White returned with the
two Ministers to Melbourne. The special Cabinet meeting,
held immediately on Monday afternoon (August 3rd),
decided to offer to the mother country the assistance both of
rgrz-14J
THE AUSTRALIAN OFFER
27
the navy and of a force of Australian troops.
G. L.
Macandie, Secretary of the Board of Naval Administration,
and Major White, acting-Chief of the General Staff of the
army, were instructed to be in attendance, and the latter was
asked to furnish any plans that might exist for the sending
of an expeditionary force from Australia oversea.
I t has been mentioned in the last chapter that the majority
of the Ministers from oversea dominions who attended the
Imperial Conferences in London were shy of making any
provision, however tentative, for such a contingency. I t is
true that, under Richard Seddon, New Zealand did undertake
the creation of a “reserve” pledged to serve abroad if required, and that Natal was willing to do the same. In 1913
New Zealand agreed to a definite scheme for an expeditionary
force. But in other dominions ministers were nervous of the
opposition which the mere suggestion might create among
their respective peoples. The contingency was almost certain
eventually to arise, unless history contradicted itself. During
his work upon the Defence Scheme Major White had asked
to be allowed to draw up a provisional plan on which such a
force could at any time be quickly organised, if Parliament
ever so required, but the permission was withheld. The Defence Scheme of Australia provided only for the chance of an
enemy raiding or invading her shores. A plan for meeting
the enemy in the enemy’s own country-or.
indeed. anywhere
except within Australia-officially
had no existence.
One Australian Defence Minister, however, had faced the
problem of sending a force to combine with New Zealand if
ever need arose. Senator Pearce, Minister for Defence from
1910 to 1913, undertook such provision in the face of whatever political consequences it might bring.
Major-General
Alexander Godley, who had been lent by the British Government to inaugurate Lord Kitchener’s defence scheme in New
Zealand, had chanced to visit Sydney in 1912. RrigadierGeneral Gordon suggested that the opportunity was a good one
for a meeting to discuss common action between Australia and
New Zealand in case either were invaded. Senator Pearce
agreed. At that meeting a scheme was proposed by which
Australia and New Zealand should each provide contingents
based upon the number of troops which they had respectively
26:
THE STORY OF ANZAC
[ I912-1‘$
sent to the South African War, but so organised as to compose, not a series of unconnected contingents, but a single
fully-organised ‘‘ division.*’ A division at that time was
18.000 strong. Australia was to provide 12,000 men, and
New Zealand about 6,000, orgaiiised in the appropriate units
-two infantry brigades coniing from Australia and one from
New Zealand, each with its proportion of ambulances and
The details of Australia’s share in such a
other troops.
scheme-as to how the force should be raised and organised
-were worked out by Major White. New Zealand’s share
in it was elaborated in Wellington. This measure was one of
co-operation between Australia and New Zealand only. But
in August. rg13$the New Zealand Minister for Defence, visiting London, discussed with the British Army Council a
provisional arrangement for an expeditionary force. The
composition of the New Zealand quota of such a force, though
independently arrived at, was almost the same as that in the
previous arrangement with Australia. At the outbreak of
war it had not yet been effectively organised; but as the
scheme was ready and considered, it became the basis of New
Zealand’s offer of troops to Great Britain. Now, therefore,
when the Prime Minister of Australia needed a plan for the
vast and urgent work of raising and training a force to be sent
oversea, the notes formulated by the young Chief of Staff
were the one piece of forethought on which the country
depended in this emergency. Major White could guarantee
that it was possible to raise and organise for service abroad
a volunteer force of 12,000 men of all arms, and to have
them ready for sailing within six weeks.
The Prime Minister was determined that Australia’s contribution should be on a greater scale than this. If Canada
had offered (as was believed) 30,000 men, Australia could not
offer fewer than Z O , O ~ O . White agreed that ~0,000Australians
could be raised, and that there was a fair prospect that they
would be ready to sail within six weeks. H e was asked to
draft a cablegram to the British Government embodying that
offer. The cable, which was immediately sent, ran as follows:
In the event of war the Government (of Australia) is
pared to place the vessels of the Australian Navy under the
trol of t h e British Admiralty when desired.
I t is further
pared to despatch an expeditionary force of 20,000 men of
preconpreany
grddth Aug., 19141 T H E AUSTRALIAN OFFER
29
suggested composition t o any destination desired by the Home
Government, the force to be a t the complete disposal of the
Home Government. T h e cost of despatch and maintenance will
be borne by this (i.e., the Australian) Government.
The Prime Minister, at the close of the Cabinet meeting,
announced this offer to the press. It was at once posted outside the newspaper offices, where the crowds who read it burst
into cheers.
The force had so far merely been offered “in the event of
war.” The offer was published in the British press next day,
August qth, before war had been declared. The British Government on the same day replied that there was no immediate
need for the force, but that it would be wise to take steps
in case the necessity arose. Two days later, on August 6th,
the Secretary of State for the Colonies telegraphed that the
British Government “gratefully accepted the offer . . . to
send a force of 20,000 men. and would be glad if it could
be despatched as soon as possible.”
But already before
that date men had begun to appear from a11 directions
at the headquarters in Sydney and Melbourne begging to enlist, and on August 5th a small staff had been established in
the Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, for registering their names.
As yet it was not known what form the contingent would
be required to take. The British Government had not stated
what composition it desired. An inquiry was therefore despatched as to whether the War Office preferred the force to
be sent organised as a division, or otherwise.
On this
apparently minor question, arising at the very birth of the
Australian force, hung an issue all-important for Australia
and of immense influence upon the development of the Empire.
The young acting-Chief of the Australian General Staff, who
was well acquainted with the British Staff, had fears that the
latter would prefer the Australian force to be organised
in small formations-such
as infantry brigades, with the
proper proportion of artillery, field ambulances, engineers,
and transport attached-so that each Australian unit could be
separated from the others and incorporated in a British
division. From the British Staff Officer’s point of view the
Australian troops were unlikely to be so efficiently organised or
disciplined as those coming from the British army dCpbts, where
the tradition of the British regular army and the efficiency of
30
THE STORY O F ANZAC
[5th-7th Aug., 1914
the British regular non-commissioned officer served as the
foundation on which to build the new army. Moreover the
British Staff would probably mistrust the capacity of senior
Australian ofticers to command a large body of men in the
field. British officers, and indeed British citizens, would not
realise that there was any special desire on the part of Australian soldiers to retain their national identity. They did not
themselves object to having a “colonial” brigade in most of
their divisions, and they would naturally not realise what
objection the Australian should have to such an arrangement.
For these reasons the acting-Chief of Staff, although he
drafted the cable so as to hint that Australia was capable of
organising a division, rather feared that the W a r Office would
ask for Australian troops in a form in which they could be
split up amongst British divisions. And so it happened. The
British Government’s answer, on August 7th, ran : “The Army
Council suggest that a suitable composition of the expeditionary force would be two infantry brigades, one light horse
brigade, and one field artillery brigade.”
This answer suggested a force very similar to that which
had been discussed in Australia’s arrangements with New
Zealand-a force which would comprise only 12,000 men. It
was quite clear that any force so composed would be dismembered and incorporated with units from other parts of the
Empire in such a way that its national character would be lost.
But the man in whose hands the Australian Government had
placed the organisation of Australia’s contribution to the army
of the Empire abroad was one who saw far ahead, and who
realised somethirig of what it would mean to her that this
force should go to the war as a national unit. William
Throsby Bridges, Inspector-General of the Australian Military Forces, had been in Queensland when the war broke out,
but had been recalled to Melbourne. H e was a man of great
knowledge, slow of thought, but always thinking and thinking deeply, and when he arrived at a purpose lie held inflexibly
to it. From August 5th, when he reached Melbourne and was
entrusted with the organising of the expeditionary force, he
was determined that Australia should send to this war an
Australian “division”-a compact unit, to be kept and fought
as an Australian unit wherever it might go.
5th-9th Aug., 19x41 THE AUSTRALIAN OFFER
31
To begin with, he took two steps. H e appointed Major
White as the chief of his staff in the new force; and he drafted
for the Minister such a reply to the Army Council’s proposal
as he knew would decide the matter in accordance with his
resolve.
I t stated that Australia “fully expected 20,000 to
go” and had begun organising a division of infantry, including
-in accordance with the regular Home Army organisationthree brigades of 3-gun batteries of artillery, but without the
howitzer brigade and heavy battery prescribed for a British
division. ( A full Eritish division at that time would amount
lo IS,OOOmen).
The telegram added that, in addition, a
light horse brigade was being constituted, consisting of
2 , 2 2 6 men and 2,315 horses.
“Do you concur,” it ended,
“or still wish your proposal adopted? Anticipating embarking in four to six weeks. An early answer is requested.”
Nest day the British Government replied that it gladly availed
itself of this offer in place of the force which the Army
Council had suggested.
The stand thus taken by the far-sighted, sardonic soldierstatesman was the first and greatest step towards settling the
character which the expeditionary force was destined to
assume-that
of a national Australian army. The same
question subsequently arose many times, in Gallipoli. France,
and Palestine, the British Staff having the greatest difficulty in
understanding Australian nationalism or grasping the fact that
it could be used to the benefit of the allies. H e was a longheaded man who saw, though dimly, even at this early stage,
the national interest in keeping Australia’s force together.
I n the stand which he had made General Bridges was
actuated by pure Australian nationalism. H e does not appear
to have had at the time the faintest idea that the division
w h k h he advocated woiild ever be commanded by himself.
At the moment he was much more concerned with getting t h e
Defence Scheme. which lie had fathered, into smooth working. I n that scheme there was a provision that, in the event
of war, the Inspector-General was to become automatically
the commander of the troops in Australia. I t was this
position which he espected to occupy, and he believed that,
if he could take it over promptly, he would be of use to the
country. H e saw that this was to be mainly an infantry war,
32
THE STORY O F ANZAC
[gth-10th Aug., 1914
and he considered that Australia would best be represented at
the heart of it by an infantry division. At the same time he
realised that light horse was the national arm of Australia,
and he desired that arm to be represented. A brigade of light
horse would roughly make up the 2,000 men required to complete the offer of 20,000. Accordingly such a brigade was
suggested. H e had no expectation of personally commanding
either the force or the division. Indeed he himself suggested
that the command should be given to Lieutenant-General Sir
Edward Hutton,lo the brilliant British officer who had been lent
to Australia as the first commander of her forces after the
federation of the Australian States into the Commonwealth.
Such were the events by which the Australian force was
shaped. Had it fought through the war in the form favoured
by the Army Council, there would have heen no Anzac Corps.
Australia would have had to its credit no “Landing,” no Lone
Pine, neither Poziitres nor Broodseinde, no Villers-Bretonneux,
no Mont St. Quentin, neither Romani nor Damascus, no battle
of the Hindenburg Line. The allies would have lacked an
element whose enthusiasm was not without its influence upon
the war. The Australian nation would not have existed in
the same sense as to-day.
The British Goveriimerlt on August 10th announced that
it had gratefully accepted the offers of the dominions to
supply the following forces :
CANADA-The
cruisers Niobe and Rainbow, and an
expeditionary force of 20,om men; also such further
numbers as might be required.
AusTRALIA-The
Royal Australian Navy, and an
expeditionary force of 20,000 men.
NEW ZEALAND-The New Zealand Naval Force, and an
expeditionary force of over 8,000 men.
The numbers of this first contingent from New Zealand
were far greater in proportion to the population than those of
the other oversea States. Her population at this time was
1,128,160: Australia’s 4,972,059 ; Canada’s 7,758,000. The
Organlsed and
IO Lieut -General Sir E. T H. Hutton K C.B , K C h l . G , p s.c
commanded a I s t Division. 1 g r 4 / 1 j , bdt retired through 1ll.health; b. Torquay,
Eng , 6 Dec , 1848. Died 4 Aug., 1923
I 9 14-20]
THE AUSTRALIAX OFFER
33
oversea States each offered to maintain their respective forces;
from the first they paid the expense of every man whom they
sent to the front, his sea transport, food, clothing, his horse
and motor transport, the repair of his arms, and the ammunition
fired by his guns. At first elaborate cross accounts were kept of
the actual goods supplied; but from the commencement of the
Gallipoli campaign a calculation was made of the cost per day
of each man, and Australia paid a fised sum for the upkeep of
every Australian soldier in the various theatres of the war.
The arrangement worked most smoothly. The Australian
Government was anxious to pay its full share, and the British
Government showed in the details a large-minded liberality
which was characteristic of Great Britain’s financial policy
throughout the war. Up to the 30th of June, 1920, the expenditure of Australia upon war purposes was f385,760,402.
Of this sum she had raised from revenue and internal loans
f268.122,381,while f ~ ~ , ~ 0 0 ,had
000
been lent by Great Britain,
to which a large amount was further owing for various services.
It became necessary to appoint a commander for the Australian Infantry Division and Light Horse Brigade. The Australian Government refused General Bridges’ suggestion that
the position should he offered to General Hutton. The command was given to Bridges himself, and the work of creating
the force was put into his hands. From that day forth Bridges.
working continuously and inseparably with White as his Chief
of Staff, in Melbourne, in Egypt, and in Gallipoli, organised
the field army which was Australia’s main contribution to the
war.
The first question was whether the expeditionary force
could be formed from the existing regiments and battalions
of the Australian Army, or whether an entirely new army
must be founded and trained. In Canada some of the existing regiments volunteered bodily for the front. In New Zealand the system was that each of the battalions and mounted
regiments of the New Zealand Army provided a company or
a squadron in the expeditionary force ; these companies and
squadrons carried the names and badges of their old regiments.
But, as was explained in the last chapter, Australia had just
accepted Lord Kitchener’s new army system. It had been a
wholesale change: the old system of a militia was given up for
I
34
THE STORY OF ANZAC
[ 191 1-14
one in which the country was divided into 224 training areas.
In each of these the boys were compulsorily trained as cadets
from the age of twelve. At the age of eighteen they passed
into the “Active” battalions and regiments of the Commonwealth Army, where they received a short annual training for
a further seven years. The new system had been launched in
1911. The members of the old militia army had been permitted to complete the three years for which they had enlisted,
but the only new blood allowed into the army from 1911 onwards was the young draft of 18-year-old boys (or “trainees”),
about 17,000 in number, which came in every year from the
senior cadets. Of the old militia only the officers and noncommissioned officers were allowed to re-engage in the new
army.
The result was that, although the numbers of the Australian
forces had risen from 23,000 of the militia days to 45,000
under the compulsory training scheme, and were rising fast
each year, they consisted almost entirely of boys of from 19
to 2 1 , commanded largely by officers and non-commissioned
officers of the old force. If the system had reached its full
development (which would not have been until ~ g ~ g the
),
expeditionary force could more easily have been constituted
upon the basis of the existing army. But as Australia could
not send away an army of boys, however willing, and as
large numbers were needed in a short time, it was decided to
raise a separate army specially for this service. That army
eventually existed as a parallel force to the “Australian
Military Forces” (as the army for home service was called).
The expeditionary army had its own commaqder, its own headquarters and staff; and ultimately, when established in London,
its Administrative Headquarters became a miniature War
Office as large and important as the Central Administration of
the Australian Army in Melbourne. It had its own rates of
pay, its own rules for promotion, its own seniority and
gradation list of officers.
It must not be supposed that, when the first two Australian
“ formations ” were
offered to Great Britain, Bridges, or
anyone else, had any idea of the size to which this army would
grow. H e was organising simply an infantry division and a
light horse brigade. The popular idea was that the war would
19141
THE AUSTRALIAN OFFER
35
last for possibly five or six months, by which time the allies
would be across the Rhine. Indeed more than one officer
during the voyage studied Baedeker’s guidebook to the Rhine
Valley, and wondered if he would be in time to reach the
scene before the war was over.
The contingent now being raised seemed an immense
one for Australia. No provision for anything so large as a
division existed in the Australian Army system ; a brigade
was the largest formation yet provided for.
Even Great
Britain herself had never, before the present war, sent a fullyorganised modern division across the seas as one compact unit.
No one at this time dreamed that further contingents
approaching the same size would be needed from Australia.
For nearly a year the infantry division which Australia sent
was commonly I<nown as “The Australian Division” simply.
Yet the long-sighted soldier who raised them, though he had
fallen to a Turkish bullet before a second Australian division
was born, had himself named these two units the “First” Australian Division and the “First” Australian Light Horse
Brigade.
At this very early stage no clear distinction was realised
between the two “units” of the expeditionary force and the
“force” of which they formed part. General Bridges was
responsible for raising them both.
H e commanded the
Infantry division in person, administering both that division
and the light horse brigade-that
is to say, he approved the
promotions (subject to confirmation by the Minister for
Defence), laid down the provisions as to discipline and
issues of equipment, and so forth.
No one yet clearly saw
that a different staff would be necessary for these two d u t ~ e s
-one to administer, and the other to fight the division in the
field. At the beginning the General administered the force
with the staff of the First Australian Division. Nevertheless
he and his Chief of Staff did realise that a large question lay
ahead of them in regard to this point. The impressioll
was that the force would be administered by the British War
Ofice to a much greater extent than it eventually was,
although General Bridges was determined never to let the
control pass from Australia. In his own mind all the
6.4
36
THE STORY OF ANZAC
[ 1914
time was the conviction that, when the force arrived overseas, there must be some Australian headquarters at the base
to keep touch between the units of the Australian force in the
field and the Australian Government; and he was haunted by
the fear that he might be required to take charge of those
duties and to leave his division. As time went on, it became
manifest that such a staff was indeed required, and eventually,
in Egypt, it was established. But on one thing Bridges was
resolved-that, come what might, he would never be induced
to leave his division in the field in order to command the force
at the base.
Such were the vague notions entertained at this early stage
concerning the main expeditionary army which Australia set
out to create. A second expeditionary force, smaller and quite
distinct, was being raised at the same time, in order to comply
with a request of the British Government for the seizure of
German possessions and wireless stations in the Pacific. This
force, whose establishment came under the new Chief of the
General Staff, Colonel J. G. Legge, and which sailed on August
rgth, was known as the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force. The history of that expedition is told in
another volume. It was necessary to give the main force a
name to distinguish it from the smaller one, and at one of the
earliest meetings with his new staff General Bridges asked for
suggestions. About a dozen titles were put forward by various
officers.
“TOOlong!’’ said the General bluntly to some of these
proposals. H e would not on any consideration have the title
“expeditionary.” “It’s not an expedition.” he said. “I want
a name that will sound well when they call us by our initials.
That’s how they’ll speak of us. W e don’t want to be called
the ‘B.L.U.F.’!” “Australian Imperial Force” was his own
suggestion, and, like most strong men. he adopted his own proposal in the end. Though the day when every military institution was called by its initials-as happened during the warhad not yet arrived, he was perfectly right in his forecast. It
was by the letters “A.I.F.” that the Australian Imperial Force
became known throughout the Empire