Special Report: The Taliban in Afghanistan
Key Observations
> In December 2014, NATO’s International Security Assistance Force
formally ended its combat mission in Afghanistan.
> The Afghan National Security Forces remain incipient and unable to
hold ground against a resurgent Taliban.
> There has been an increase in the frequency and volume of terrorist
attacks across the country, in particular the capital Kabul.
> Further exacerbating the security situation, the Islamic State have
established a presence primarily in the east and north-east of the
country, focusing attacks against the Afghan people while competing
for influence and control with the Taliban.
> The kidnap risk for foreigners and local nationals alike remains
extreme, with the first eight months of 2015 already witnessing a 38
percent increase in foreigner kidnappings compared to the same
period in 2014.
> Construction workers are among the most targeted group, with
regional expatriates accounting for the greater percentage of those
kidnapped. While foreign aid workers run a close second, with
westerners increasingly targeted throughout the year.
> In the near-term, rising violence will only be countered through peace
talks between Kabul and the Taliban. Any negotiation could offer
Afghanistan an opportunity to heal itself and, at the very least, provide
some short-term relief from the growing frequency of attacks across
the country.
Special Report: The Taliban in Afghanistan – September 2015
2
The Taliban in Afghanistan
The Taliban’s Early Days
The origins of the Taliban can be traced to Pakistanitrained and US-supported mujahedeen which
expanded across Afghanistan during the 1980s Soviet
war. Following the group’s first major victory in
Kandahar in 1994, the Taliban went onto declare
Afghanistan an Islamic Emirate in 1996. The following
year the Taliban under the leadership of Mullah Omar
controlled about two thirds of the country, with only
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
recognising its government as legitimate. Pakistan
supported the Taliban financially and militarily,
essentially while trying to mould the group into a
proxy for Islamabad’s regional interests. At the same
time, Osama bin Laden had moved to Afghanistan in
1996 and in return for receiving Mullah Omar’s
protection, provided resources and technical support
to the Taliban.
The Taliban Insurgency
After the Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin
Laden following the World Trade Centre attacks on 11
September 2001, a US-led coalition invaded
Afghanistan. At the beginning of 2002, remnants of the
Taliban and newly recruited Afghanis and Pakistanis
from largely Pashtun areas regrouped as an insurgency
movement. Their goal was and continues to be the
withdrawal of foreign forces and the fall of the
western-backed Afghan government.
Back in 2001, the Taliban was a ‘hit-and-run’ guerrillafighting group comprised of approximately 2,000 foot
soldiers. Some estimates deemed the Afghan Taliban
to number 60,000 by 2014, with 20,000-35,000
reportedly killed over the past decade. As the war in
Afghanistan unfolded, Pakistan-based insurgents grew
stronger along the 2,250km long border, stretching
from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). They would
eventually evolve into the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP), which are ideologically aligned to the Afghan
Taliban, but operate independently and focus on
Civilian Fatalities
overthrowing the Pakistani government. Throughout
this report, the term Taliban refers to the formal
Taliban Quetta Shura group, as well as associated
groups such as the Haqqani network operating mainly
in the southeast. Essentially, the Taliban is a movement
comprised of disparate groups, with cells inspired by
local, national and religious motives.
The Taliban’s Tactics
In October 2006, NATO assumed security duties across
the country. This was met with an overwhelming wave
of suicide attacks and roadside bombings, which have
become the trademark tactics of present-day Taliban
operations. Measuring their effectiveness, in 2011,
1,400 civilians were killed from IEDs or suicide
bombings, constituting 60 percent of all fatalities
attributed to insurgent violence. 2014 was the first
year since 2009 in which more Afghan civilians were
killed in ground engagements than by asymmetrical
attacks, indicating an increase of conventional warfare.
In the first half of 2015, over 5,000 IEDs were cleared.
On the one hand this statistic demonstrated the
effectiveness of Afghan security forces to detect and
clear IEDs, while conversely showing the continued
capability and intent of the Taliban to manufacture and
utilise these improvised devices. The main objective of
Taliban forces in Afghanistan is to undermine the
western-backed government by launching attacks to
destabilize the security progress.
Special Report: The Taliban in Afghanistan – September 2015
3
Major Taliban Attacks in Kabul since 2014
The most commonly targeted areas are Afghan
government compounds, US and NATO-troop convoys,
security checkpoints, Afghan police forces, embassies,
hotels and guest houses hosting foreigners, NGO
offices, and civilian institutions. The militant group is
well versed in urban fighting, having attacked Kabul on
a number of occasions, while more frequently firing
rockets against military and government installations.
Perhaps most threatening to western interests are the
coordinated unit-size raids initiated by suicide bombers
against the capital as well as a growth in kidnappings.
At a local level, the Taliban’s strategy is to subvert,
weaken and eventually drive out state institutions and
governing bodies, while building parallel structures
with which to increase influence across the country. For
example, the group moved to regain parts of the
Kunduz province following the withdrawal of NATO’s
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The
militants quickly established a system of governance
including tax, justice and education. Locals refusing to
pay taxes were executed or forced out of the province,
and a strict interpretation of Sharia law quickly brought
order in the absence of central government control.
Major Taliban Attacks in Kabul since 2014
2015
10 August: VBIED at Kabul International
Airport Entrance Security CP, killing five
08 August: Three coordinated attacks overall killing
50: VBIED in a residential neighbourhood, BBIED
against the Afghan National Police Academy, and a
complex attack against Camp Integrity
25 July: Two rockets targeted Kabul International Airport
07 July: SVBIED on NATO convoy followed by an attack
on an Afghanistan intelligence agency compound
30 June: SVBIED on NATO troops IVO Kabul airport on
the road close to the US Embassy, killed one civilian
22 June: Gunmen attack the Parliament
27 May: All night gun battle as insurgents stormed
a guesthouse in the diplomatic quarter
17 May: Suicide attack near Hamid Karzai
International Airport targeting a European police
training vehicle, killing 3 civilians
14 May: A hotel hosting a cultural event was
attacked killing 14 including: 1 US, 1 Italian, 4
Indians, 2 Pakistanis, and 1 Kazak
27 March: SVBIED near crowded area IVO presidential
palace and the defence ministry killing 7
26 February: SVBIED targeted Turkish
embassy convoy, killing one Turkish soldier
5 January: SVBIED targeted HQ of EUPOL
Afghanistan, killing 1 civilian, wounding 16
2014
29 November: SVEST on foreign NGO guest house, killing 2
16 September: SVBIED attack on ISAF convoy
in Kabul killing 2 US and 1 Polish soldier
22 July: BBIED outside Kabul International
Airport killing 3 foreign advisers and 1 Afghani
18 January: Suicide squad hits a restaurant in the
diplomatic quarter killing 13 foreigners including
IMF and UN employees
29 August: SVBIED on NATO convoy
killed 12 including 3 US contractors
11 December: SVEST targeted French-run High
School in Kabul killing 1 German national,
wounding 16 Afghanis
27 November: Suicide attack on UK Embassy vehicle
killed 1 Brit and 5 Afghanis. Followed by more SVBIEDs
on guesthouses used by foreigners
21 March: Shooting of 9 civilians including foreigners
at Kabul’s Serena hotel incl. a Paraguayan diplomat, a
Pakistani, a New Zealander and 2 Canadians
Special Report: The Taliban in Afghanistan – September 2015
4
“The increased frequency of attacks in Kabul demonstrates
the growing risk to international operations”
A Resurgent Taliban
In December 2014, the ISAF formally ended its 13-year
long combat mission in Afghanistan, with the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) taking over.
Approximately 10,000 US troops will remain in country
until the end of 2016, focusing on training and
assistance to the ANSF.
According to UN data, 2015 is on track to be
Afghanistan’s bloodiest year in over a decade. There
was an estimated 1,600 Afghan civilians killed in the
first half the year, which at the current rate will easily
surpass the overall civilian death toll of more than
3,500 in 2014.
The above timeline illustrates a significant increase in
terrorist attacks in Kabul, with Afghan security
personnel, foreign troops and western civilians
targeted. According to the Institute for the Study of
War (ISW), 2014 witnessed a 150 percent increase of
attacks in Kabul compared to 2013. As the timeline
denotes, those attacks occurred in cycles, and by spring
2015 they were taking place with increasing frequency.
This demonstrates the growing risk to international
operations across Afghanistan, but more specifically in
Kabul where many foreigners reside and work. It also
highlights that the ANSF remain insipient and unable to
fill the security vacuum left behind by the withdrawing
foreign forces.
The uptick of violence in the capital is indicative of the
Taliban’s operational reach. Maintaining a presence in
areas adjacent to at least three of the six major
highways leading into Kabul, allows the group to funnel
resources and fighters in support of operations in the
capital. There has also been a significant deterioration
of security in the traditional battlegrounds of Helmand,
Ghazni, Logar, Kunar, Nangarhar and Kunduz over the
past year. Kunduz city remains under pressure from the
Taliban and should it fall, it would be the first time a
major urban centre has been taken from government
control since the war began.
The Taliban also increasingly threatens to destabilise
areas that have traditionally supported the central
government. In Badakhshan, localised insurgents have
conducted attacks on checkpoints in the last 12
months, and the relative backwaters of the country,
including Faryab, Ghor, and Sar-e-Pol have been
subjected to an influx of insurgents since the beginning
of this year.
Meanwhile, some northern communities have
militarised to resist the Taliban independently, leading
to a development of additional anti-Taliban militias.
Although some have been persuaded by the
government to battle the insurgents, the majority do
not report to a central authority. Instead, they have
their own local agendas, which often leads to intramilitia or militia-government competition over control
of territory and resources.
ANSF Preparedness
The inability of the ANSF to hold ground against massed
Taliban attacks indicates the limitations of ANSF
capabilities. The Afghan forces are underequipped and
suffer from inefficiency and corruption. With the recent
surge in casualties, the ANSF is having difficulties
retaining soldiers and attracting new recruits.
Successful Taliban assaults like the overrunning of
military outposts in Badakhshan’s Warduj district in July
– the single largest surrender of Afghan forces in recent
years – hampers recruitment and further demoralises
the ANSF.
Limited close air support following the withdrawal of
the international forces has provided the Taliban with a
tactical advantage, enabling them to assemble in large
numbers without fear of being targeted from above.
Another contributing factor behind the success of
Taliban operations is the diminished Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability
following the NATO withdrawal. This is apparent in
remote and mountainous areas such as Badakhshan,
where insurgents have proliferated largely
unchallenged.
Special Report: The Taliban in Afghanistan – September 2015
5
“The kidnap risk for foreigners is extreme in Afghanistan, and
the security situation is unlikely to improve in the near future”
The Emergence of Islamic State Groups
The first half of 2015 witnessed the emergence of
Islamic militant groups pledging allegiance to the
Islamic State (IS). Many new members are disaffected
Taliban insurgents. The presence of established IS
pockets appears to be most apparent in the north and
east of Afghanistan, but other formations have been
reported in in the south-east and the deep west.
The confirmation of Mullah Omar’s death in July could
lead to a weakening of the Taliban. The appointment of
Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour as his successor
has been heavily disputed between Taliban leaders,
and reports of infighting could benefit the IS in
Afghanistan. This June there were battles in the eastern
border province close to Pakistan in which IS affiliates
were simultaneously fighting the Taliban and Afghan
forces, while US drones targeted both militant groups.
Afghan commentators expect Mansour to assert
himself as a strong leader and push forward with a
military campaign to counter the shift to IS by some
Taliban members. The prison break in Ghazni in midSeptember which involved three suicide bombers and
raiding militants, freed 352 prisoners including 150
Taliban. The assault was carried out with the goal of
bolstering the Taliban’s ranks and to promote its
operational strengths after Mullah Omar’s death.
appears the security situation is unlikely to improve in
the near future. The first eight months of 2015 already
witnessed a 38 percent increase in foreigner
kidnappings compared to the same period in 2014. Of
all westerners kidnapped since 2013, 53 percent were
aid workers, indicating that foreign NGO employees
remain a primary target, due to their remote working
conditions and because of a perception that aid
organisation will pay a ransom.
Top Industry Targeted since 2013
Journalists
Diplomats
Businesspeople
Laborers
Security Officers
Aid Workers
Construction Workers
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Route Selection
Throughout the first half of 2015, there has been an
increase of abductions of both local civilians and
foreigners along major highways. For example, this
April, a German aid worker was abducted at an illegal
IS-affiliated groups, including the Islamic Movement of Taliban checkpoint as he travelled from Mazar-e-Sharif
Uzbekistan (IMU), have been accused of abducting Shia to Kunduz city. He was rescued after five weeks in
Hazaras across Afghanistan. This raises concerns of
captivity following a police operation. In western Herat,
sectarian targeting in Afghanistan – where historically
at least three Iranian truck drivers were reportedly
crimes based on sectarian affiliation have been rare.
kidnapped on the western Herat-Islam Qala road during
This February , IMU members abducted 31 Shia Hazaras June 2015. While this could be a possible targeting of
in Zabul, and in September, IS-affiliates murdered 13
Shias, it highlights a growth of instability in an area
Shia Hazaras in the northern Balkh province, which is
considered relatively safe following ISAF operations.
considered a safer part of the country.
Over the past six months, numerous Afghani civilians
were also abducted on the Herat-Farah highway, as
well as the road between Kabul and Jalalabad running
Foreigner Kidnapping in Afghanistan
through the Jowzjan’s Sheberghan to Sar-e-Pol
The kidnap risk for foreigners is extreme in Afghanistan, provinces.
and with renewed instability across the country it
Special Report: The Taliban in Afghanistan – September 2015
6
“Sophisticated militant attacks will continue in major cities due to
inadequate intelligence and deeply rooted insurgent networks”
Kidnapping Motivations
While most foreigner abductions are attributed to the
Taliban and emerging IS-affiliated groups, the
kidnapping of Afghanis are often administered by local
groups taking advantage of the poor security situation.
Both insurgents and criminal groups seize locals and
foreigners (often regional nationals) employed in
construction projects, to extract concessions from the
local administration.
The porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan,
coupled with cross-border smuggling, means that
victims kidnapped in Pakistan run the risk of being
upsold to militants in Afghanistan. At the beginning of
this year, a Germany-based Pakistani was kidnapped in
Faisalabad, and a month later transferred to militants in
Afghanistan. Relocation of a victim from Pakistan to
Afghanistan is likely to prolong the captivity period,
complicating rescue efforts, while ransom demands by
militants tend to be far higher than by criminals.
The average captivity period for a local national
kidnapped in Afghanistan is ten days – most of who
tend to be released following tribal negotiations.
Ransom payments for family members of wealthy
Afghanis mostly range from $20,000 to $50,000 USD
according to cases recorded by Unity this year.
Captivity periods for foreigners held by the Taliban
average three and a half months. A Dutch aid worker
was released in June 2015, after being abducted
approximately three months prior in Kabul. It remains
unclear whether a ransom was paid, or if negotiations
secured the release of militant prisoners instead.
Outcome (Victims since 2013)
33%
Released
31%
Rescued
Still captive
Perpetrators
7%
2%
5%
16%
15%
Killed
5%
Escaped
Taliban
Unknown
Criminal
18%
68%
Militant (other
than Taliban)
Hezb e Islami
further territorial gains. The militant group has already
demonstrated, in recent months, its ability to project
into previously secured population centres.
Sophisticated militant attacks will also continue in major
cities including Kabul due to inadequate intelligence and
deeply rooted insurgent networks that have been
largely unchallenged by Afghanistan’s security and
police services. In the near-term, this rising violence will
only be countered through peace talks between Kabul
Conclusion And Outlook
and the Taliban. Any negotiation could offer Afghanistan
As the report outlined, Afghanistan is witnessing an era an opportunity to heal itself and, at the very least,
provide some short-term relief from the growing
of worsening violence in both rural and urban areas,
frequency of attacks across the country. For the timewith government forces seemingly incapable of
being however, the security environment will remain
enforcing law and order following the withdrawal of
ISAF. Poor coordination and military leadership within unpredictable and extremely dangerous for
international operations going forward.
the Afghan forces will allow the Taliban to make
Special Report: The Taliban in Afghanistan – September 2015
7
Kidnap Hotspots for Foreigners and Afghan
Nationals
Foreigner Kidnap Hotspots (data since 2013)
Number of Victims
20 -30
10 -20
5 - 10
0-5
Afghan Nationals Kidnap Hotspots (data since Jan 2015)
Number of Victims
30 - 50
20 - 30
10 - 20
0 - 10
Special Report: The Taliban in Afghanistan – September 2015
8
Glossary
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces
BBIED – Body Borne Improvised Explosive Device
CP – Checkpoint
EUPOL – European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan
HQ - Headquarter
IED – Improvised Explosive Device
IMU – Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
IS – Islamic State
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force
IVO – In Vicinity Of
SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
SVEST – Suicide Vest
TTP – Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan
VBIED – Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
Special Report: The Taliban in Afghanistan – September 2015
9