THE DEMOGAPHIC TRANSITION IN POST-INDEPENDENCE
INDIA: SOME ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
R.N. Ghosh
The University of Western Australia
Discussion Paper 81.13
September 1981
•·
THE DEMOGRAPHIC THANSITION IN POST-INDEPENDENCE INDIA:
SOME ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
By R.N. ;Ghosh,
University of Western Australia.
I
'l'he theory of the demographic transition originated
from the historical and statistical evidence of the pattern
of populcition ch<tnge in Europe, particularly Western Enrope,
sir:.ce the Inclustrial Hevolution.
According to this theory, a
nation manifests some characteristic types of demographic
processes which are dependent on its level of economic
development.
Warren Thompson's (1929)
and Prank Notestr.d.n's
(1945) work can be regarded as the most general statement of
the transition theory.
This version of the theory develops
the notion 0£ stages through which a society moves; in general,
the conclusion is reached that there is an inverse relationship
between m::idcrnization, on the one hand, and vital rates, on
the other.
Upon the Thompson-Notestein version a wide
variety of transition theories have been constructed ranging
from diffusion theories to ell sorts of social, cultural and
psychological
theories.
There is, however, general agreement
among demographers that the process of demographic transition
I
The 'high growth potential stage' characterized by
'
both a high CBF. and a high CDn.
Empirical evidence suggests
that most pre-industrial societies are ih Stage I.
II
The 'transitional growth stage' in which.mortality
begins to decline but fertility remains relatively high,
thereby threatening the risk of 'population
r-:,xplo~ion'
.
A
-2-
society on the threshold of industrialization, or which is just
about to experience the early stages of economic growth, is
usually the one in Stage II.
III
In a DC both fertility and mortality rates decline to
a low level, thereby completing the process of demographic
transition from high to low vital rates.
This is called the
'incipient decline stage'.
It is now generally agreed that the Malthusian theory of
·population (1798) is a special case of the general theory of
demographic transition.
Malthus was perhaps the foremost
exponent of the view that economic development tends to increase
fertility but reduce mortality.
He agreed that an increase
in demand for labour (which should result from capital
accumulation and economic development) ·had the effect of
increasing the proportion of persons marrying and reduced
.the average age at marriage.
Such downward change in the
marriage age is expected to increase fertil.i ty.
Hal thus
himself lived during the middle of the Industrial Revolution
in England.
'fhis period roughly corresponds to the early
Stage II of the demographic transition characterized by
high fertility but declining mortality.
It is possible
that Malthus's view was coloured by what he experienced in
England during his own time.
There can perhaps be less arguments on the effect of
modernization on mortality.
assume that
It is certainly reasonable to
ad a community's income rises it can afford to
spend more on public health and sanitation.
Even in the
early nineteenth century England all evidence pointed
towards the trend in declining mortality.
in the second edition (1803) of his Essay:
Malthus admitted
"It would appear,
-3by the present proportion of marriages, that the more
rapid increase of population, supposed to have taken place
since the year 1780, has arisen more from the diminution·
of deaths than the increase of the births."
Malthus was
·unable to see the final stage of the demographic transition
when low fertility together with low mortality
brought
population growth to a halt.
Malthus's idea that fertility increases in response to
economic development received support in a study published by
Dorothy Thomas and Virginia Galbraith (1941).
'.l'he study
showed that for the United States during the period 1919-.37
not only marriages but births were affected by business cycles.
A similar study by Dudley Kirk (1942)
confirmed that fertility
increases in a period of high income and full employment but
declines during a depression.
Two major econometric studies in the 1960s threw new
light on the relationship between economic development and
human fertility.
The first of these studies was by Robert
Weintraub (1962).
He took a sample of 30 nations (which
included both MDCs and LDCs)
and then worked out the partial
regression and correlation co-efficients of the 1953-54 birth
rate on three variables (which served as proxies for economic
development):
m12an per capita income, propo:r-tion of all
population dependent on farms,
infa.nt mortality rate.
The
'
secona study
variables:
qy
Irma Adelman (1963) was concerned with four
per capita income, population density, anff index
of education, and the proportion of labour force employed
outside agriculture.
Both Weintraub and Adelman studies demonstrate a positive
correlation between income and fertility, but a strong inverse
-4relationship between the birth rate and the other variables
used as proxies for economic development.
In the light
of Weintraub-Adelman studies, .it is possible to distinguish
between short term income changes such as can be observed
during business cycles, on the one hand, and long term
increases in real income leading to structural economic
changes and modernization, on the other.
A short term increase
in income has a positive effect on fertility.
However, the
long term effects of rising incomes cannot be isolated from a
structural change in a society.
The structural change involves
a large number of variables but in the main improved education,
particularly female education, urbanization,· diffusion of'
knowledge through developed means of communications and
declining mortality especially infant mortality.
Economic
development th€refore leads not only to an "income effect" on
fertility but also to a·"structural change effect".
Although
the income effect on fertility is positive, the negative
structural change effect more than offsets the positive income
effect, and leads to the third stage of the demographic
transition as a result of modernization and economic development.
David Heer' (1966) made use of data of 41 countries pertaining
to the. decade 0£ 1950s· and confirmed that when controls for
other relevant social variables are instituted, the income
effect on fertility is positive.
When, however, the full
impact of all social variables associated with economic
,
development is taken into account, fertility is seen to decline
despite the positive income effect.
Comparatively recently, somewhat more elaborate versions
of the transition theory have been developed to explain how
modernization causes vital rates to fall.
One common method
-5for explaining the decline in fertility is to use what is
called the diffusion postulates.
rates are lowered through
or equipment.
It is held that vital
dif~usion
of knowledge, methods,
Economic development is looked upon as .the
means of the diffusion of knowledge; and the acceptance of
the new knowledge by the community at large is attributed to
socio-cultural changes initiated and sustained by a process of
modernization.
Davis (1963) extends the diffusion theory to formulate
his multi-phasic theory of demographic change.
He explains
the effect of modernization on the birth rate with the help
of variables such as postponed marriages, ahortion,
contraception, urbanization and migration.
II
We arc! now ready to apply the theory of the demographic
transition to the Indian experience, more particularly since
Independence.
Between 1891 and 1921 the birth ;r:ate, death rate and
natural growth rate in India were as follows:Table I
CBR
CDR
NGR
1891-1901
45.8
44.4
1. 4
1901-1911
49.2
42.6
6.6
1911-1921
48.1
47.1
0.9
Year
The above data clearly present a classic example of
a country in Stage I when CBR is high alid relatively stable
and CDR is high too and fluctuating, so that the natural
growth rate is low.
For these three decades in India, CBR
was almost balanced by CDR, so that the demographic gap
-6was kept to a very low level.
As a result, population in
India increased only very slowly from 238.4 million in 1901
to 251. 3 million in 1921.
. During the same period the
percentage of rural population to total.population remained
stable at 89, while the literacy rate improved marginally
from 54 to 72 per thousand.
The period of relatively stable population in India
came to an end in 1921 when India can be said to have
entered_. the Stage II of the demographic transition.
As has
been stated earlier, a characteristic of this stage is the
growing demographic gap created by a high level of CBR but
a declining CDR.
Referring to the 1921-1931· decade, R.A.-
Gopalaswami, Census Commissioner of 1951, described i t as the
line of the Great Divide.
As the f·ollowing Table shows,
between 1921 and 1972, the demographic gap kept widening, and
then perhaps peaked in the decade 1961-1971:Table II'
Year
CBR
CDR
NGR
1921-31
46.4
36.3
10.l
1931-41
45.2
31. 2
14.0
1941~51
39.9
27. 4
12.5
1951-61
41. 7
22.8
18. 9
1961-71
24.7
The Great War (1914-1918) was, no doubt, a major
factor that led to a period of post-war economic transformation
in India.
To.some extent the post-war economic growth in
India was facilitated by the intensification of the national
movement.
During the inter-war years India witnessed the
emergence of a fairly complex and modern industrial base.
World War II accelerated the process of industrialization.
-7Since Independence, more particularly after the
launchin9 of First Five Year Plan, the rate of economic
growth in India (though still not very impressive by some
international comparisons) increased at an average rate of
3.5 per cent in real terms in GNP.
However, it is difficult to argue that the decline in
mortality in the post-Independence period, or earlier, was
directly because of economic growth and industrialization.
Up till recently economic development in India has taken
the form of "enclaves" or "dualism".
A modern and
sophisticated industrial base has existed side by side with
"subsistence" agriculture.
The overall decline in mortality
in the post-Independence period can therefore be attributed to
better public health and sanitation leading to eradication
of malaria and other debilitating diseases (thanks to the
efforts of World Health Organisation) r'ather than
development per se.
to economic
The fact is that while mortality can be
more directly controlled by public policy, its effect on
fertility is indirect and works through a host of socio-cultural
variables.
Despite several decades of economic planning and
industrialization, Indian economy has remained predominantly
rural and pre-industrial.
Up to 1971 the rate of urbanisation
in India continued to be insignificant.
While some of the major
cities of India have over the past few years experienced
tremendous population pressures due to, rural exodus, the
percentage of rural population to the total population has
remained 80 per cent (1971), and the literacy rate was only
294 per thousand in 1971.
Casteism and communalism continue
to dominate village politics in India, and still influence
-8fertility .behaviour among the illiterate masses.
"The social
and cultural underpinnings of human fertility in rural
India are an unexplored subjec;t in spite of the attention
lavished on family planning and population control by
demographers and planners alike."
(Srinivas and Ramaswamy,
19 7 7) .
III
Up to 1961 fertility in India remained at a fairly
constant level of over 40 per thousand.
The constancy of the
age structure has borne testimony to this basic feature of
India's population between 1891 and 1961.
downward shift in fertility began
(Mitra, 1978)
A
in the latter half of the
1961-71 decade and continued therea:fter.
.rab le III
1
CBR
CDR
NGR
1961-66
42.0
19. 8
22.2
1966-71
40.5
17.8
22.7
19 70
36. B
15.7
21.1
1971
36.9
14.9
22.0
1972
36.G
16.9
19.7
1973
34.6
15. 5
19.l
.19 7 4
34·. 5
14.4
20.l
Year
It is possible that the rate of population growth reached
its peak (2.5 per cent per annum approximately) in 1961-71.
On the basis of very recent reports (Indian Express, July 10,
1980) it seems' that the CBR in India declined to 31.0 in 1979-80.
If the current trend continues, it is unlikely that the
population growth rate would ever exceed 2.5 per cent per
annum, even though the CDR falls below its present level to
say, Kerala's 7.5 (1979-80).
-9The demographic gap which began in 1921 but widened
during U1e two decades after Independence mc>.y have therefore
reached its maximum limit in 1966-71, when India experienced
the beginning of a period of fertility transition for the
first time in her modern history.
It is certainly possible
to argue (cautiously but optimistically) that India has at
last
moved
into the latter half of Stage II of the
demographic transition, marked by a decline in fertility.
The important question is:
What brought about this
fertility transition in India?
There is a fairly strong school of thoughtwhich argues
that the slight decline in fertility in India after 1966 cannot
be attributed to a reduction in marital fertility but to an
increase of age at marriage.
The strength of this line of
argument is derived principally from two sources:
(l) The
Khanna Study and other similar micro-level empirical studies,
and (2) S.N. Agarwala's study of age at marriage in India (1962)
The Khana Study involved a test population of 8000 in
seven villages near the market town of Khanna in the Ludhiana
district of the Punjab.
The study, which covered several
aspects of population behaviour including family planning, was
made between 1953 and 1969 and carried out by the Harvard School
of Public Health in collaboration with Indian Government.
An
aspect of the study was to test the effectiveness of family
planning on fertility control by distributing modern
contraceptive devices to the couples in the test population.
The study revealed that the modern family planning methods
introduced systematically and intensively to some 500 couples
failed to bring down the birth rate in the Khanna region.
(Wyon and Gordon, 1971).
A later study by Mamdani (1972) of
-10a village called Manupur, one of the test villages covered
by the K)1anna study, confirmed that the villagers at all social
and economic levels, attached great importance to the economic
value of children, and that the knowledge and availability
of modern contraceptive techniques therefore failed to have
any appreciable impact on marital fertility.
Srinivas and
Ramaswany (1977) seem to argue that the Khanna study proves
that fa.mily planning and population control would remain
relatively ineffective in rural India without a proper,
understanding of the social and cultural underpinnings of
human fertility.
A comparatively recent study (Mahadevan, 1979) of the
sociological determinants of fertility variation among a
stratified rural population in Tamil Nadu confirmed the
findings of the Khanna study in a different way.
Mahadevan's
study took a random sample of 2,100 wives belonging to three
castes - the high cast Gounders, the low caste Harijans and
the middle range high caste Hindus (called 'others' in the
study)
in the .Madurai district of Tamil Nadu.
The inter-caste
fertility difference was seen to be significant, though
Mahadevan did not observe any apparent biological differences
in fecundity.
The average number of live-births was 3.62
for Gounders, 4.23 for 'others' and 5.12 for the l:Iarijans,
Mahadevan found that the knowledge and practice of modern
methods of contraception did not adequately explain the
inter-caste fertility difference, because the Gounders, who
had the lowest level of fertility, regulated their child birth
by induced abortion, and volun!=ary and involuntary abstinence.
He sought to explain the inter-caste variations in fertility
in terms of socio-cultural and economic variables like caste
-11per se, duration of marriage, family structure, members
economically active, and members economically dependent on
the family.
An earlier micro-level study known as the Mysore
Population Study (1961) underlined a close interconnection
between the status of women, on the one hand, and family size
and fertility behaviour, on the other.
The study revealed
that as a rule women wei-e more against having additional
children than men.
But in a socio-cultural environment in
which women are pushed to an inferior social status, few new
brides tend to discuss with their husbands' their own wishes
regarding the ideal family size.
On the contrary, most women
know that they improve their status both within and outside
family by becoming mothers of a large number of children.
In view of the various micro-level studies of the
sociology of fertility, one school of thought in India
believes that the family planning movement has, on the
whole, failed to reduce marital fertility because of its
emphasis on the knowledge and methods of contraception
rather than on the socio-cultural motivations towards
family size and fertility as embedded in the ideas of
kinship, caste and religion in rural India.
Srinivas and
Ramaswamy (1977) are among the most powerful exponents of :this
school of thought.
However, if this is so, how do we explain
the fertility transition in India since around the middle of
the 1960's?
J.R. Rele (1974)
argues that ... ''A major part of the
decadal decline [in C13R] from .1951-·60 to 1961-70 is, however,
attributed to the change in the age-sex marital status
distribution which was more favourable to a lower birth
-12rate in 1971 than in 1961."
The view that the increase of
age at marriage has been the principal cause in the fertility
decline in India derives much of its strength from
S.N. Aganiala's studies (1962).
Using the techniques developed by John Hajnal (1953),
Agarwala made intensive studies of the trend in the age at
marriage in India, 1891-1961.
Table IV
Mean Age at Marriage of
Census Synthetic Cohorts:
India
1891
1901
1911
1921
1931
1941
1951
1961
Aver;;g,
1les
19.55
20.01
20.26
20.69
18.62
19.91
19. 89
21 . 32
20.03
;males
12.54
13.14
13.16
13.67
12.69
14. 59
15.59
15. 51
13.87
Source:
S.N. Agarwala:
India's Population. Problems, 1972
Agarwala's estimates point out that the mean marriage age
for girls increased from 12.8 in 1891-1901 to 15.43 in 1951-61,
and for boys from 20 to 21. 76 during the same period.
•rhe
rate of increase was very small, 0.44 year per decade for
the period,1891to1961.
However, using Agarwala's method
of decade synthetic cohorts, it has been found (Mitra, 1978)
that the mean age at marriage for females in India rose by
1.1 years from 1951-60 to 17.2 during 1961-70.
Rele (1974)
estimated that there was a substantial difference in rural-urban
fertility in I'ndia and that thi.s could not be adequately
explained in terms of the variations in the general marital
fertility rate.
He concluded that a major part of the rural-urban
differentials in the birth rate in India in 1964-GS period was
due to the difference in the age-sex,mari.tal status composition
in the two areas.
-13-
IV
The view that the recent decline in fertility in India
can be largely explained in terms of (a) rural-urban
fertility differentials, and (b)
the increase in age at
marriage, particularly of urban females in the decade 1961-1971,
cannot be accepted in the light of R.P. Goyal's studies
(1975).
Goyal estimate¢! that the difference between the mean
age at marriage in India of urban and rural females increased
by 0.3 in favour of urban females between 19Gl and 1971, and
this must be regarded as a small var,iation,.
'
'
Moreover, the age-specific fertility of women in India
is very low in the age-group 15-19 but reaches a peak in
the age-group 20-24.
So the increase of the mean age at marriage
of females in India from 16.l (1961)
to 17.2 is unlikely to
have any major impact on the fertility ·schedule.
The age
at marriage will become an important factor in controlling
fertility only if the mean age of marriage of females can
be raised to the middle range of the
maximum fertility
age-group 20-24.
Whatever little impact the rise of age at nuptials may
have on fertility reduction is being offset by an increasing
tendenc:y towards widow remarriage.
Kingsley Davis (1946)
estimated the ban on widow remarriage reduced the birth rate
among the Hindus by an average of 16.4 per cent in the period
1901-1941.
However, in post-Independence India the ban on
widow remarriage in Hindu society has ceased to be an ·
important factor in controlling fertility.
This is partly
because of the improvement in average life expectancy of
males, which has effectively reduced the average period of
-14widowhood.
Agarwala (1968) estimated that Indian women on
the average lost 8.0 years of fertile union because of
widowhood during 1931-41 but that the average period was
reduced to 1.9 years by 1951-61.
Moreover, the taboo
against widow remarriage has been rapidly discarded in the
past few decades.
Young widows below 25 tend to marry frequently again.
Hemarriage rates of up to 89.1 per cent have been reported
in many sample surveys in India in the 1960's.
(Mandelbaum 1 1974).
Widows above the age of 30 find i t more difficult to remarry;
but the loss of fertility due to forced widowhood in later years
of the reproductive cycle for women cannot be significant.
On the whole, it seems that the effect on fertility because of
the rise of age at marriage is to some extent offset by the
increasing number ·of marriages among young widows in India.
.
.
In the absence of reliable time series data it is not
possible to use the Khoo and Park (1978) demographic teclmique
of isolating and measuring the various components of a given
reduction in fertility in India.
However, it is arguable that
the downward trend in the birth rate (since 1966) in India
indicating ·the emergence of a major fertility transition
may have been more due to a decline in marital fertility than
a rise of age at marriage.
'I'he reduction in fertility can be explained in terms of
an irnprovement in education, particularly female education
(Kerala, for example, where 52 per cent is the female literacy
rate has the lowest birth rate in India), the steady
incrcaroe in real income (an average.c;if 3.5 per cent per annum
since 1951), industrialization and urban growth.
But two of
the most important factors influencing marital fertility are
' .
-15the improved means of communications and the diffusion of
knowledge of modern contraceptive methods through an intensive
family planning prograJ11I!le, particularly since the mid-19 6 O's.
By 1971 about 80 per cent of urban and 70 per cent of
rural population in India became aware of modern methods of
f;;unily planning.
(Agarwal.a, 1971) .
There is also a cc.rtain
"easy informality with which the subject of birth control,
oncco a taboo", is discussed in India today.
This is certainly
not a mean achievement of a family planning programme which
had only a modest beginning in 1951.
Recent surveys also
indicate that the much-maligned incentive schemes of family
control were not useless.
Khan and Prasad (1980) made a
systematic critical evaluation of the role of incentives in
inducing industrial workers to accept sterilization.
Their
study claims that.incentives are an effective tool in
motivating couples to sterilization, and that.the impact of
incentives tends to be greater on the lower income groups.
The spread of the knowledge of contraceptives is
adequately backed up by the supply of contraceptives.
Both
production and distribution of contraceptive devices have
kept pace with demand.
Sterilization, particularly, male
sterilization received a temporary set-back during the
excesses of Emergency.
In the long term, however, it is unlikely
that the Emergency will have any serious impact on the
family planning movement.
The greater risk to the :success of the movement seems to
lie elsewhere.
The rate of decline in the death rate since the
1950's has not been as steady .as expected by demographers.
On the contrary, the death rate has risen occasionally such as
during the Bangladesh crisis and during the drought of the
'
,.
-161970's.
Th8 basic implication of the theory of the
demographic transition is tha.t the birth rate tends to
follow the pattern set by the death rate indicating a
ccmmunity's biological struggle for survival.
The slight
downward trend in the birth rate in India may be reversed
mainly because of a reversal in the downward trend in
the death rate.
The recent tendency of malaria to return in
an epidemic form does not portend well (in a demographic
sense) for the future in India.
REFERENCES
Agarwala, S .N. 1962 Age at Marriage in India.
1967. Population
·
1968. "Widowhood age and length of fertile Union in India", World
Views of Population Problems. Edited by Egon" Szabady.
1971. "Three or two or one or none", Illustrated Weekly of India 97 (b).
Adelman, I. 1963. "An Econometric Analysis of Po.pulation Growth",
American Economic Revie\v .
. Davis, Kingsley. 1946. "Human Fertility in India", American Journal of
Sociology.
1963. "The Theory of Change and Response in Modern Demographic History",
Population Index, 29.
Goyal, R.P. 1975. Shifts in Age at Marriage in Indfa and Different States
during 1961-71.
Heer, David M. 1966. - "Economic Development -and Fertility", Demography,
Vol. 3, No. 2
~'ban,
M.E. and Prasad,
c.v.s.
1980
Fertility Control in India.
Khoo, Siew-Ean and Park, Chai Bin. 1978. "The Effect of Family Planning
Programmes on Fertility Decline", International Family Planning
Perspective and Digest, Vol. 4, No-: 3.
Kirk, Dudley. 1942. "The Relation of Employment Levels to Births in
Germany", Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly.
Mahadevan, K .. 1979. Sociology of Fertility:
Differentials in South India.
Determinants of Fertility
Malthus, T.R. (1798 - First Edition) An Essay on Population.
(1803 - Second Edition) An Essay on Population.
Mamdani, ·M. 1972. The Hyth of Population Control:
Class in an Indian Village.
Family Caste, and
Mandelbaum, David G. 1974. Human Fertility in India.
Hitra, Asok. 1978
Mysore. 1961.
India 1 s Population:
Aspects of Quality and Control.
Mysore Population Study, United Nations.
Notestein, Frank. 1945. "Population, The Long View" in T.W. Schultz
edited Food f9r the World.
Rele, J .R. 1974. "Trends in Fertility and Family Planning", in Ashish Bose,
et al edited Population in India's Development 1947-2000.
Srinivas, M.N. and Ramaswamy, E.A. 197.7
Culture and Human Fertility in India..
Thomas, Dorothy and Galbraith, Virginia 1941. "Birth Rates and the
Interwar Business Cycles", ~ournal of the American Statistical
Association.
..
-2-
Thompson, Warren. 1929.
Vol. 34.
Weintraub, R. 1962.
"Population", American Journal of Sociology,
"The Birth Rate. and Economic Development:
An
Empirical Studyn, Econon1etrica.
Wyori, John B. and Gordon, John E. 1971.
Problems in the Rural Punjab.
*
The Khanna Study:
Population
w"'.l
This paperApresented at the Asian Studies Association of Australia
in Brisbane in August 1980.
·.