Policy Brief
Foreign Policy Program
August 2011
Summary: Like Eastern Europe
under Soviet domination,
most Arab societies have
never experienced democratic
government. Arab countries
are unlikely to ever experience
Soviet style economic control.
However, there are similarities
in the nature of the centralized
oligarchic control over the
economy that was practiced in
the Soviet system and the one
dominating the Arab hierarchies
of power. The economic system
of Arab societies shares
significant similarities with the
centralized oligarchic feudalism
underlying the Soviet societal
system, and which proved to
be a successful strategy for
recapturing economic and
political power after the collapse
of the Soviet bloc. Can the
post-communist oligarchic
capture of state and society be
avoided? Yes, if a strategy of
modernization prior or parallel to
the strategies of democratization
and market reform is adopted.
The views expressed here are
the views of the author’s alone
and do not necessarily reflect
the stance of the German
Marshall Fund of the United
States.
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Modernization: The Forgotten Strategy of
Social Transformation
Post-Communist Lessons for the Arab Revolutions
by Ognyan Minchev
The Arab Spring — as the Middle
Eastern revolutionary movements of
the past six months have been labeled
— needs all the support it can get
in order to pass through the Scylla
and Charybdis of the status quo into
more friendly waters of democratic
development. Arab societies need to
cope with a unique agenda of political
and societal change complicated by
the dramatic diversity among their
respective countries. Yet there is
a pattern of recently accumulated
experience in peaceful transformation, that of Central and Eastern
European countries over the past 20
years, that could provide food for
strategic thought in order to bypass
some major obstacles on the road of
democratic transition.
Like Eastern Europe under Soviet
domination, most Arab societies
have never experienced democratic
government. Even those societies in
Eastern Europe — like the Czechs,
the Bulgarians, and the Poles —
that have a history of democratic
political systems in the first half of
the 20th century faced a tremendous struggle to develop systems
of democratic representation and
economic freedom, departing from
a sterile totalitarian system of strict
control over state and society. Political
strategist and Soviet expert Zbigniew Brzezinski defines this struggle
with a picturesque metaphor: “We
all know how to make omelet out of
an egg,” he admitted, “yet no one has
tried to do the reverse — to make an
egg out of an omelet.” Communism
destroyed the natural bonds between
humans and their society, and it was
not evident where to start rebuilding
them. This was one major reason why
post-communist transition started
with a very general, and quite simple,
recipe for transformation. This paradigm of transition involved two major
tasks for the revolutionaries trying to
dismantle communist dictatorships:
first, develop the constitutional and
institutional system of democratic
representation of the peoples’ will
and add guarantees for human rights
and citizens’ equality; and second,
immediately start the “invisible hand”
of the market by quickly privatizing the major assets controlled by
governments, reducing government
spending, and letting the market go
its own way.
With all their diversity, Arab countries
are unlikely to ever experience Soviet
style economic control. However, we
need to explore some visible similari-
Foreign Policy Program
Policy Brief
ties in the nature of the centralized oligarchic control over
the economy that was practiced in the Soviet system and
the one dominating the Arab hierarchies of power. Soviet
communism was largely a system of state capitalism based
on Eastern models of deep, centralized, “feudal” types of
control over society. Eastern feudalism had nothing to
do with the dispersed milieu of Europe’s West, but rather
represented a hierarchy of centralized political and clientelist control over the instruments of economic development and distribution. This legacy of oligarchic feudalism
seems to be much stronger and more deeply rooted than
the system of ideologically based central planning claimed
by communist ideology. While dismantling the communist system, the reformers of Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE) had no insight into this deeper layer. The reformers’
aims were to destroy the political tools of economic control
exercised by the communist parties in their countries. They
believed that once free markets were established, all of the
communist powers’ sources of ideological and political
support would dry up. However, the communist elites
had chosen another strategy for their survival: sacrifice
the direct political control over the economy in favor of
shifting to the traditional Eastern format of centralized
feudal/oligarchic control over society.
dealers — carved out of the former party and political
police apparatchiks — immediately took advantage of the
new and fragile democratic institutions by starting to buy
political support. Political brokers emerged and widened
their control over the decision-making process, both in
representative institutions and in the public administrative
system.
The economic system of Arab societies shares significant
similarities with the centralized oligarchic feudalism
underlying the Soviet societal system, and which proved
to be a successful strategy for recapturing economic and
political power after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. It is
very likely that the present day Arab oligarchies, shaken
by rebels in Tahrir and other squares, could evolve in a
similar manner out of the governing ideologies of traditional Arab nationalism and authoritarianism. They will
adapt in formal terms to the values and ideas of the young
revolutionaries or of the older Islamists, only to get the
opportunity to seize economic and political power back in
a new — democratic — environment. Why is it so easy to
“change horses” in an ideological revolutionary swing and
remain on the top?
Democratization and radical market reform are strategies for transforming sufficiently modernized societies
out of a dictatorial regime. As we look at the experience
of post-communist Europe after 1989, we clearly identify
the division between modern societies of Central Europe
(the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) and the other
countries of Eastern Europe hosting a mixture of traditional and modern patterns of life. Central Europeans had
a relatively strong urban middle class, and an experienced
dissident movement that became a successful political elite
opposed to the ex-communist establishment. Most important, Central Europeans had an efficient public administrative system inherited from the Habsburg Empire, which
survived the communist rule, and stood in the background
of post-communist reforms following the “velvet” revolutions of 1989.
The legacy of oligarchic feudalism
seems to be much stronger and
more deeply rooted than the
system of ideologically based
central planning claimed by
communist ideology.
Communist elites embraced the rhetoric of the free market
and took advantage of democratic institutional transformation in order to transfer centralized state assets into
selective private hands, re-emerging as the new corporate
elite of transitional societies. This transition, known as the
“great criminal revolution,” was only the first part of the
ex-communist elites’ strategy of reasserting their power
in the new transitional environment. The new corporate
The post-communist countries of Southern and Eastern
Europe did not share those Central European assets of
modern society. The urban middle class was fragile and
heavily oppressed throughout the decades of communist
rule. Dissident movements — where present — were small
groups of heavily persecuted individuals with a limited
capacity to transform into political decision-makers.
Eastern societies were dominated by a working class of
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Foreign Policy Program
Policy Brief
peasant origin representing the culture and lifestyles of
a traditional society. The institutional system (public
administration included) was heavily dependent upon
the old statist model of oligarchic feudalism re-imposed
as a communist hierarchy of power. The strategy of direct
democratization, combined with a radical market reform,
practically impeded the functioning of institutions and
opened an enormous grey space for the illegitimate control
of national economic assets. The result was a state capture
through the great criminal revolution after communism.
The dual strategy of rapid democratization and swift
market reform was aimed at cutting off the capacity of old
communists to regain power after Gorbachev’s perestroika,
and after the velvet revolutions in the Soviet bloc. Yet the
old communists successfully bypassed the revolutionary
limits and re-emerged as the new corporate-oligarchic
rulers of post-communist societies.
Most Arab countries in the mid 20th century were deeply
traditional societies. Post-colonial revolutions were driven
by modern Arab nationalism. These Arab nationalists were
based in a narrow elite of young officers and nationalist
intellectuals, who would later establish populist revolutionary dictatorships. This is how regimes of the Nasser
— Assad — Boumediene type emerged, contributing to
Arab modernization at the expense of political freedom.
In Arab countries today, democratic revolutions are being
carried out by relatively numerous communities of young,
educated, and urban professionals and intellectuals,
claiming democracy and freedom as established norms
of ordinary life in the contemporary world. This marks a
significant departure from the Arab nationalism of the mid
20th century. Yet, we still associate modernization with the
revolutionary agenda.
Can the post-communist oligarchic capture of state and
society be avoided? Yes, if a strategy of modernization
prior or parallel to the strategies of democratization and
market reform is adopted. Modernization was the dominant strategy of post-colonial nation-building throughout
the third world. The priorities of institution-building
used to be the core of a modernization strategy in the
newly born states, states that had to govern and transform
traditional societies at different stages of development.1 A
modern state with strong and efficient institutions could
undertake further strategies of development in education,
social welfare, the economy, etc. Why did the democratic
reformers after communism forget this? First, the need
to cut off a counter-revolution back to Soviet-communist
rule by implementing democratic and market reforms took
precedent over a slower modernization strategy. Secondly,
“post-modern” Europe and the United States influenced
the post-communist transition. Modernization is a strategy
that presumes a particular hierarchy of cultures: less developed societies evolve up to modern levels. The ideological
template of post-modernism imposes a politically correct
vision of universal equality of cultures — no culture is
superior to any other cultural identity. Modernization
proved a concept that brought discomfort.
Modernization proved a concept
that brought discomfort.
Young — modern — Arab reformers filled Tahrir Square,
yet they represent a minority among masses of traditional
society, poorer classes on the margins of urban life and the
peasantry. Those masses would rather support a conservative version of Islamic rule (possibly involving Sharia
law) rather than a modern individualist political project of
democracy and pluralism in all sections of public life. This
is the dilemma: how to run an efficient democratic system
without risking a counter-revolutionary slide towards an
oppressive Islamist regime or an old dictatorial oligarchic
takeover? Drawing on the lessons of post-communist
Europe, democratic reform should reflect the levels of
societal modernization. Arab revolutionaries need not
open grey areas where old oligarchies or radical Islamists
could exploit democratic enthusiasm within the revolutionary chaos. Western democracies developed over the
course of two centuries, opening the space for universal
suffrage step by step. We live in an age where the principle
of democratic access to the communities is universal,
yet we must be conscious of their potential to utilize that
access to democracy. Combining strategies of democratization and modernization could require different steps and
instruments in different countries of the Middle East. Some
potentially important instruments are as follows:
1
The famous book of Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, used to
be the “Bible” of post-colonial modernization together with the programs for development of the UNDP, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and European
Developmental Agencies. Soviet bloc assistance to the third world was also based on
instruments for economic-industrial development together with the efforts to establish
socialist-like dictatorial systems in the newly created states.
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Foreign Policy Program
Policy Brief
1. Arab revolutionaries should try to establish a stable
alliance of empowered reformist elites at the top of
the state before carrying out broad elections. In Egypt
and Tunisia, this alliance most likely represents the
reformist sectors of the army elite, together with the
young intellectuals and professionals, the urban middle
class, etc. In Libya, the process may require a new
balance of tribal elites, organized around a program of
modern development, and power de-centralization. In
Syria, an interethnic balance within the potential new
power block will be crucial for the country’s transformation. Different institutional designs could be chosen
to integrate new political coalitions of transformation. In post-communist Europe, we had the “round
tables” format of power transition. Yet round tables in
different countries reached different results. In Poland
and Czechoslovakia, round tables were organized as
a means of power transition from the old communist governments to the movements of democratic
reformers. In Bulgaria, the relatively weak democratic
coalition chose to negotiate with the reformist wing
of the Communist Party rather than the government
itself.
for free market took precedence over careful and pragmatic policies to tap into national intellectual potential
and expertise within the post-communist transition.
Arab revolutions should not neglect this problem,
given the crucial political and economic importance of
the middle class for the success of democratic transformation.
4. Successful public administration reform is the key
to efficient institutional transformation. Representative democratic institutions remain hollow shells of
citizens’ representation without a real contribution to
good governance unless an efficient public administration system is present, capable of delivering services
to the people. A strong institutional-administrative
system is a major obstacle to a potential oligarchic
takeover of the institutions of government. Developing
the formalized rules and procedures of administering
public life must be the key priority of institutional
transformation in order to give democracy a chance to
function.
About the Author
2. All major reforms toward democracy and free markets
should be undertaken by a strong governmental,
institutional system. When we transform institutions,
they lose parts of their capacity to operate efficiently.
Therefore, reforms carried out under weak institutions
will likely result in powerful oligarchic takeovers rather
than free markets, establishing a social-Darwinist
jungle rather than a competitive marketplace. Strong
political order and strong institutions necessarily
precede efficient market institutions. Failure to first
establish strong institutions in Eastern Europe resulted
in weak democracies and strong oligarchic monopolies
on the economy and governments of the region.
Ognyan Minchev is a scholar-professor of political science at the University of Sofia, and a policy analyst heading the Institute for Regional
and International Studies (IRIS). He is a leading commentator on
political developments in the Balkans and the Black Sea region.
About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated
to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North
America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does
this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the
transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy
and business communities, by contributing research and analysis
on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to
foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent
memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong
presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters
in Washington, DC, GMF has six offices in Europe: Berlin, Paris,
Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest. GMF also has smaller
representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.
3. Economic and institutional measures should be undertaken to prevent disintegration and pauperization of
the modern middle class. The Tunisian revolution
started as a consequence of the regime’s inability to
utilize the potential of the young and educated people
of the country. The result was humiliation for the
regime. Many post-communist and post-Soviet societies suffered a powerful process of de-modernization
as a consequence of the middle classes’ disintegration,
a process triggered by economic hardship and mismanaged economic reforms. Simplified ideological claims
4