IJMBS Vol. 2, Issue 4, Oct - Dec 2012
ISSN : 2230-9519 (Online) | ISSN : 2231-2463 (Print)
The Impact of Pyramid Structure Towards Corporate Value
Among Malaysian Firms
1
Irfah Najihah Binti Basir Malan, 2 Dr. Norhana Binti Salamudin, 3 Dr. Noryati Binti Ahmad
1,2,3
Institute of Business Excellence, Arshad Ayub Graduate Business School, Faculty of Business
Management, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of pyramid structure
towards corporate value of Malaysian firms. Pyramid structure
is a business entity whose ownership structure depicts a topdown chain of control. A direct consequence of this structure is
a divergence of ultimate owners’ actual ownership and control,
particularly for firms located at the lower level of the structure.
Previous research have documented that in many East Asian firms,
the ultimate owners show a mismatch in cash flow rights and
control rights which leads to severe expropriation of minority
shareholders’ interest. We adapt the model developed by Attig
and the unit of study is pyramidal firms in Malaysia. Our finding
shows that the mismatch of cash flow rights and control rights of
pyramid structures leads to negative corporate value as well as
dilution of minority interest.
Keywords
Pyramid Structure, Cash Flow Right, Control Right, Corporate
Value, Attig Model
I. Introduction
This study examines the impact of pyramid structure towards
corporate value among Malaysian firms. A pyramid structure is
defined as a business entity comprising of a group of companies
whose ownership structure displays a top-down chain of control.
According to [1], a firm is considered as affiliated to pyramidal
firms if it is controlled through pyramidal structure and has at least
one intermediary firm in its ownership chain. In such a structure,
the ultimate owners are located at the apex with successive layers
of firms below. Accordingly, the length of layers of pyramidal
structures leads to the opportunistic behaviour of ultimate owners
to expropriate the minority shareholders’ interest. Reference [2]
is the first study that investigates the issue of pyramid structure
and its ultimate control. For instance, they trace the chain of
ownership to find who has the most voting rights. Ultimate owners
around the world usually control an array of affiliated companies
through hierarchical intermediary corporations forming a pyramid
structure. fig. 1, shows an example of a pyramid structure with
the ultimate owner located at the apex and successive layers of
firms below [1].
Fig. 1: Example of Pyramid Structure (Arrows Indicate Direction
of ownership)
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International Journal of Management & Business Studies
A direct result of the pyramid structure is a separation of actual
ownership, or cash flow rights, from voting power or control rights,
especially firms placed in the lower level of the structure [3]. Cash
flow rights represent owner’s actual ownership in a company [4].
Reference [5] defined control with respect to the majority voting
rule where the control ratio of a shareholder is obtained by dividing
the share of control he can exercise directly or indirectly over a
given company, by the percentage of shares he actually owns in
that company. Logically, the owner’s cash flow rights that arise
from his actual investment should represent owners’ control rights
in a company. However, because of the pyramid structure effect,
these two rights may not be equal. Specifically, the authors see the
impact of affiliation on corporate value is more obvious.
The divergence of actual ownership and control occurs because the
pyramid structure enables the ultimate owner to establish control
disproportionately to the amount of ownership in each of the
successive firms. Consequently, with such a pyramid structure,
the ultimate owner’s actual ownership position needed for control
becomes smaller at each succeeding layer of the structure.
Reference [6, 7] empirically show that the separation of cash flow
rights and control rights of the ultimate owner devalue the interest
of other shareholders. Both studies conclude that the interest of
other shareholders was adversely affected whenever cash flow
rights and control rights divergence exists because it enables the
ultimate owner to misuse his control rights over the company’s
resources without being penalized for misconduct.
Previous study by [3] on the other hand showed that the level of
control that Asian pyramidal firms have over the Asian economies
is significant. For example, East Asian pyramidal firms controlled
80% of the East Asian economies, as measured in terms of
total corporate assets. Malaysia in particular, pyramidal firms
control around 28% of the value of listed corporate assets for
year 2000. Their study also found that Malaysia has the third
highest concentration of control after Thailand and Indonesia.
Family control in Malaysia increased from 57.5% to 67.2% of
total listed company as the cut off level of voting rights increased
from 10% to 20%. For state-owned firms in Malaysia, these firms
comprised between 13.4% to 18.2% for 20% and 10% cut off
point respectively.
Many studies have been done about pyramidal structure in term
of its separation of ownership and control [2, 3, 8], correlation
between firm performance and ownership structure [7, 9-10],
tunnelling effect of pyramidal structure [11-13] and other aspects.
However, this study investigates the impact of pyramid structure
towards corporate value among Malaysian firms. It is because
dilution and ultimate owner misconduct are more obvious within
the pyramidal structure than other types of firm [1]. Therefore,
the high probability of negative implication of pyramid structure
on corporate value as well as dilution of minority interests has
encouraged studies in this direction.
Empirical evidence of the impact of pyramid structure towards
corporate value is still relatively limited especially in Malaysian
context and an extensive investigation based on Attig Model in this
direction is warranted. With completion of this review process, this
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study would have established the necessary empirical framework
to explain such adverse phenomena. Thus, the objective of this
study is to provide a comprehensive review of the empirical
evidence for understanding the impact of pyramid structure
towards corporate value.
The remainder of this study is as follows. The next section provides
a review of prior literature. Section 3 discusses the methodology
in this study. Section 4 presents the discussion of result in terms
of the impact of pyramid structure on corporate value. Section 5
contains conclusion.
II. Literature Review
Pyramidal structure has been defined as owning a majority of the
stock of one corporation which hold a majority stock at another firm
[14], which he does not totally own [15]. Reference [2-3] found that
controlling shareholders have control rights over firms in excess of
their cash flow rights through a pyramid control structure. Endowed
with a motive due to non-matching significant control rights with
lower cash flow rights, the controlling shareholding proceeds to
entrench and pursue private benefits at the expense of outside
investors. Besides that, Asian firms are perceived to be highly
concentrated. Previous studies have documented that Malaysia
with high ownership concentration which is the second highest in
East Asia as well as high separation of ownership rights and control
rights are vulnerable to controlling shareholders’ expropriation [3].
There is some evidence of ownership concentration in Malaysian
corporate scenarios which studied by [16]. They reported that
ownership concentration is undiluted overtime. It is more apparent
that Malaysian corporate scenario is faced with Type II agency
problem which is between majority shareholders and minority
shareholders [17-18], where high ownership concentration is well
documented [3, 16, 19-20]. The type II agency problem appears
when large shareholders use their controlling position in the firm
to extract benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.
Agency problem basically is related to the issue of separation of
ownership (cash flow right) and control (control right). Control
rights then can far exceed cash flow rights along each chain
given that the latter is the products of all of the ownership in the
intermediate companies along that chain. So, it can be calculated
as the sum of the streams of ownership [21]. Specifically, the total
cash flow rights are equal to the sum of all of the cash flow rights
from all of the ownership chains. The voting rights are aggregated
along the chain with the weakest link of all of the holding layers
[2, 3]. This method allows the controlling shareholder to conceal
the extent of his voting rights from the minority shareholders. To
proxy for the extent of agency problem in Malaysian firms, it is
essential to focus on the ultimate ownership and control structure
of these firms.
There are studies done to comprehend the relationship between
pyramidal ownership structure and investment strategy, capital
structure, dividend policy, risk taking strategy and others. Studies
by [22-24] have explored these topics and they found that that
pyramidal ownership structure has an influence on these factors
and the ultimate owner may undertake policies to facilitate his
private benefits. Reference [22] extended Claessens’s study by
focusing on a small number of Malaysian distressed firms that
had separation of cash flow rights and control rights. The chain
of ownership allowed the ultimate owner to control all the firms,
even the ones in which he has no direct ownership, the voting
rights of the ultimate owner far exceed his cash flow rights, so
that there exists a separation between ownership and control
in such a structure. Their study discovered that because of the
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IJMBS Vol. 2, Issue 4, Oct - Dec 2012
separation, there were incidences of ultimate owner misconduct
behavior through a firm’s capital structure and investment policies.
Another study by [7] acknowledged that firm’s ownership structure
is a main determinant of the extent of agency problems between
controlling shareholders and other investors. They also found
out that those firms which have deviation between the cash flow
rights and control right, the firms’ value drop 10% to 20% lower
than firms without deviations of cash flow right and control right
during the financial crisis.
Meanwhile, reference [25] in their study of benefits and costs of
group affiliation in East Asia realised that complex ownership
and control structure of group affiliated firms may lead to severe
agency problems. In Malaysia alone, the percentage of firms with
pyramidal structure with ultimate owner is about 39.3% [3]. This
phenomenon is also observed in other East Asian countries. The
current importance of pyramidal ownership structure in the East
Asian region encourages examining on the impact of pyramid
structure in Malaysian perspective towards corporate value as
well as dilution of minority interests. For example, high voting
power combined with close relationships between the ultimate
owner and top manager’s increases the possibility of expropriation
of minority shareholders. Reference [1] assumes that dilution
and opportunistic behaviour of ultimate owner are more apparent
within the pyramidal structure than other types of firm. They
analysed a sample of Canadian listed firms and found that there
is divergence between the cash flow rights and control rights in
pyramidal affiliated firms and it has a depressive effect on the
firms’ value as well as dilution of minority interests.
Reference [10] examined the negative impact derived from the
conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority
interest on corporation value. Observation of 1557 companies
from 12 Western European countries found that the presence
of a controller was negatively related to firm’s value and these
might be the result of agency problems that creates opportunity
for expropriation of minority interest. Similar study was done by
[26] about the Chinese listed companies and the evidence from
revealed that firms were devalued when they participated in direct
transfer of resources (tunnelling) from minority shareholders of
Chinese publicly listed companies to their controlling shareholders.
Reference [1] found that the length of layers of pyramidal firms
contributed to the opportunistic behaviour for ultimate owner to
expropriate the minority shareholders’ interest of the pyramidal
firms. It implied that ultimate owner extract private benefits from
the firms he controls at the expense of the minority shareholders
that may lead to devaluation of the firms. Findings from [27]
reported that the expropriation phenomenon that is likely to
dominate the monitoring effect at high levels of ownership
concentration, explained why a highly concentrated ownership
negatively influences corporate value. Another study by [28]
on 600 listed Canadian firms indicated only a weak association
between performance measures and ownership concentration
levels.
The issue of separation of actual ownership as well as agency
problem will serve as the basis for the framework of this study.
The discussions centered on testing for the impact of pyramid
structure towards corporate value specifically for Malaysian firms.
Research on pyramid structure and agency problems of Malaysian
listed firms within agency theory framework is relatively limited
and thus warrants this study to be undertaken.
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IJMBS Vol. 2, Issue 4, Oct - Dec 2012
A. Separation of Actual Ownership and Control
The issue of separation of ownership (cash flow right) and
control (control right) can be illustrated in the case of Malaysian
Corporation (see fig. 2). Ultimate owner, owns 35% of shares of
company A, making him the majority shareholder and ultimate
owner of the company. At the same time, the corporation owns
34% of shares in Company B. Thus, Company A becomes the
controlling shareholder of Company B. The fact that Ultimate
Owner controls Company A Corporation which in turn is a major
shareholder of Company B; this gives Ultimate Owner the right
to control Company B also.
Fig. 2: Pyramidal Structure [14]
In this pyramid group, Ultimate Owner has a direct ownership of
Company A only. For the rest of the firms, the ownership comes
indirectly. For instance, Ultimate Owner’s ownership in Company
B comes through Company A. For Company C, Ultimate Owner’s
ownership arises from his share in Company A and Company B.
Resulting from this particular arrangement, Ultimate Owner’s
actual ownership (CFR) in Company C is 7.43%, determined in
the following manner:
Actual ownership (CFR) in Company C:
= 35% x 34% x 62.4%
= 0.07426 ~ 7.43%
Since, theoretically, ownership arises from one’s investments,
if the amount of Ultimate Owner’s ownership in Company C is
7.43%, this means that his investment in Company C is also 7.43%.
Assuming that Company C is worth RM10,000,000, an investment
worth RM 743,000 (7.43% x RM10,000,000), enables Ultimate
Owner to control a company worth RM10,000,000.
Ultimate Owner’s indirect control of Company C is proxied by the
control right (CR). The control arises from his controlling share
in Company A which then controls Company B, and finally the
control of Company C by Company B. Reference [2, 4] define
the weakest link in the line of control as the control ratio (CR).
Based on this definition, the control ratio (CR) that Ultimate Owner
has over Company C is 35% (i.e., the weakest link in the chain
of ownership).
The structure provides Ultimate Owner the right to influence
(indirectly through Company A and Company B) matters such
as firm policy and board of director (BOD) appointments in
Company C. Evidently, because of the pyramid structure, with
7.43% ownership or RM 743,000 worth of investment, Ultimate
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International Journal of Management & Business Studies
ISSN : 2230-9519 (Online) | ISSN : 2231-2463 (Print)
Owner has 35% Control Ratio (CR) in a firm (Company C) worth
RM10,000,000. This significant separation of ownership (CFR)
and control (CR) clearly deviates from the traditional idea of one
share – one vote [29]. Crucially, the incentives to expropriate other
shareholders may also arise from this separation [4].
As in [2, 4], the separation can be measured by looking at both
the ratio of Cash Flow Right (CFR) to control right (CR) and the
difference between Cash Flow Right (CFR) and control right (CR).
The following illustrates how such separation can be measured
using ownership data in fig. 2.
The separation of cash flow right (CFR) and control right (CR)
in Company C can be measured in two forms:
1. Using the ratio of cash flow right (CFR) to control right
(CR):
= Cash flow right (CFR) / Control Right (CR)
= 7.43% / 35%
= 0.2123
2. Using the difference between cash flow right (CFR) and control
right (CR):
= Control right (CR) – Cash Flow Right (CFR)
= 35% - 7.43%
= 27.57%
Based on these techniques of computation, the smaller the ratio
of Cash Flow Right (CFR) to Control Right (CR) indicates wider
separation between actual ownership (CFR) and control (CR) in
the hand of the Ultimate Owner. In a similar manner, the larger
difference between Cash Flow Right (CFR) and Control Right
(CR) also indicate wider separations between actual ownership
(CFR) and control (CR).
This study is a useful contribution to the literature, in which the
nature of pyramid structure as well as separation of cash flow
right and control right among Malaysian firms will be explored
thoroughly to indicate whether it has a high tendency towards
agency problems. It will examine any indirect expropriation
potential within such structures and thus provide additional
insights into corporate finance and also governance.
III. Methodology
List of pyramidal and non-pyramidal firms of public listed
companies was identified. The sample consists of 136 firms listed
from Main Market of Bursa Malaysia Berhad (BMD) for the
period of 1990 to 2010. Data on the number of pyramidal firms
are collected based on cash flow rights, control rights, duality
function and financial institution as second largest shareholders.
This study adapted Attig Model. This basic model is only including
the variables which fulfill the characteristics of pyramid structure.
This model is consistent with systematic and anecdotal evidence
on pyramid ownership structure which address the incentives for
expropriation.
The research design incorporates balanced panel approach and
estimated the equation using pool Generalised Least Square (GLS)
method to estimate the regression. Pyramid and non pyramid
firms basically are selected based on total assets. The data and
other corporate information are gathered from Bursa Malaysia
Berhad (BMD), OSIRIS database and Datastream database. All
the variables studied are depicted in Table 1.
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IJMBS Vol. 2, Issue 4, Oct - Dec 2012
ISSN : 2230-9519 (Online) | ISSN : 2231-2463 (Print)
Table 1: Methods of Variables Calculation
Variable
Risk
Performance
Debt Ratio
Cash
Size
Capital
Expenditure
Pyramidal Firm
Duality
Description and Calculation
{(Value of Stock Day 2 - Value
of Stock Day 1)/Value of Stock
Day 1}
SD = √ 1/N Σn i=1(x1- µ)2
(Market Value of Equity + Total
Debt)/Total Assets
Total Debt/Total Assets
Natural Logarithm of Total Cash
Natural Logarithm of Total
Assets
Total Fixed Asset over Total
Asset
(PAFF = 1, NAFF = 0)
(Takes value of 1 if the same
person serves as both the
CEO and the chairman and 0
otherwise)
Financial
Institution
(Status = 1, Non-Status = 0)
Holding
Dividend Payout Cash Dividends/(Pre Tax
Ratio
Income - Income tax)
BASP = (Ask-Bid)/[(Ask +
Stock Liquidity
Bid)/2]*100
A. Empirical Model: The Impact of Pyramid Structure on
Corporate Value
Reference [1] suggested that affiliation to pyramidal structure
and corporate value can be either positive or negative. From
positive side, pyramidal structure may create value through
financial synergies (financing, smoothing and other benefits)
especially for financially constrained affiliates. However, in the
case of unequal benefits of affiliation to minority shareholders,
pyramidal firm may destruct value. Using the model as stated
follows, the authors are expected the result to show that pyramidal
structure will give negative impact towards corporate value among
Malaysian firms.
In this model, pyramidal affiliated firm (PAFF) is a dummy
variable for firm that has an affiliation with pyramidal structure
and is assigned a value of one (1) and zero (0) if otherwise. α, β and
δ are estimated parameters and ε is an error term. δ will measure
the relation between firm’s pyramidal affiliation to TOBQ. TOBQ
is a measure for firm’s performance which is also known as Tobin
Q. The number of control variables is also considered to capture
the potential dilution effects associated with pyramidal structure
in the Tobin’s Q regressions. Γ is a set of firm specific control
variables. The model for the impact of pyramid structure towards
corporate value to test is as in (1) and (1a):
TOBQ = α + β Γ + δ * PAFF + ε
(1)
P (TobinQ) = f (Pyramid, Risk, Size, Cash,
CAPEX, DebtR, DivR, Duality, FIH, Liquidity)
(1a)
Table 2, illustrates the expected coefficient signs for the relationship
between pyramid structure and corporate value.
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Table 2: Variables Relationship for Model Pyramid Structure with
Corporate Value
Variables
Coefficient signs
Pyramidal Firm
Negative (-)
Risk
Negative (-)
Cash
Positive (+)
Size
Positive (+)
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) Negative (-)
Firm Performance (TobinQ)
DV
Debt Ratio (DebtR)
Positive (+)
Dividend Payout Ratio (DivR) Positive (+)
Duality
Positive (+)
Financial Institution Holding
(FIH)
Positive (+)
Stock Liquidity
Negative (-)
Notes: DV = Dependent Variable
IV. Discussion of Result
A. Model for the Impact of Pyramid Structure on Corporate
Value
Table 2 as described previously shows the result of the impact
of pyramid structure on corporate value. It can be summarized
that affiliation to a pyramidal ownership is negatively related to
the corporate value. The result suggests that firms affiliated to a
pyramidal ownership underperforms unaffiliated ones in term of
market valuation [1] and this is supported with [30] prediction
that corporate value and performance should be lower in firms
that are owned through pyramids.
Other studies by [27] also stated that the expropriation phenomenon
is likely to dominate the monitoring effect especially at high
levels of ownership concentration. They found that a highly
concentrated ownership negatively influences corporate value.
Meanwhile, research done by [31] suggested that market will
discount corporate value if minority shareholders are exposed to
the risk of exploitation from insiders.
Table 3: Result of Regression Analysis on Model (Corporate
Value)
Variable
PH
Risk
Cash
Size
CPEX
Debt
Ratio
Div.
Ratio
Duality
Fin. Inst
Liquidity
Coeff.
-0.139106
-0.348095
0.003306
0.070217
-0.178782
0.745349
Std. Error
0.054368
0.179632
0.010064
0.011956
0.062067
t-Statistic
-2.558630
-1.937822
0.328478
5.872990
-2.880489
0.027750
26.85967
0.060664
0.022542
2.691185
0.097442
0.020238
-0.016179
0.053008
0.021099
0.005905
1.838243
0.959229
-2.739658
Prob.
0.0106***
0.0529**
0.7426
0.0000***
0.0040***
0.0000***
0.0072***
0.0663
0.3376
0.0062***
International Journal of Management & Business Studies 21
ISSN : 2230-9519 (Online) | ISSN : 2231-2463 (Print)
IJMBS Vol. 2, Issue 4, Oct - Dec 2012
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.252771
Adjusted
0.221421
R-squared
S.E. of
0.794240
regression
DurbinWatson
1.894872
stat
Mean dependent var
1.052867
S.D. dependent var
1.225338
Sum squared resid
288.4862
*significant at 10% confidence level; **significant at 5% confidence
level; ***significant at 1% confidence level.
Table 3 shows the result of regression analysis for the impact of
pyramidal affiliation on corporate value. Firm’s size recorded
positive relation with TobinQ. This means that larger firms will
to have better performance. Firms endowed with larger free cash
flows display a higher probability of pyramidal affiliation which
leads to severe agency problem. Such firms (cash cows) might
satisfy the cash preference of the ultimate owners [1]. Capital
expenditure gives negative impact to corporate value. Higher
capital expenditures will depress the value because capital
expenditures will be likely to be associated with overinvestment
by ultimate owner and as a mean of empire building. Higher
dividend payout ratio will get more positive valuation. Higher
dividend will give the impression that the ultimate owner did
not keep larger total of retained earnings that can be expropriate
later for the benefits of ultimate owner. Debt has positive impact
towards firms’ corporate value which means that firms are able
to borrow externally. According to [11], pyramidal firms with
good corporate governance may find it easier to issue debt. Risk
is negatively related to firm’s corporate value. Results for this
model show that in Malaysia, risk has positive relation with firms’
affiliation to pyramid structure and these results conform to [1]
finding that pyramidal affiliation may be associated with value
discount. Liquidity also has negative impact to firm’s corporate
value. From the previous research, pyramidal structures tend to
expropriate more. Liquidity means the flow of information which
is good to other investors. The higher flow of information will
increase the level of exposure to the public. This fact give negative
impact to firm’s corporate value because investors / shareholders
become more pessimistic towards pyramidal structure that seems
to expropriate in order to avoid them from being exposed most
on any losses.
V. Conclusion
The exacerbation of agency problems among Malaysian pyramid
structure may have detrimental influence towards corporate value
as well as dilution on minority interest. The expropriation of the
minority interest becomes prominent when the separation between
the cash flow right and control right is wide. Finding from the study
reveals that pyramidal structure, risk, size, capital expenditure
(CAPEX), debt, dividend payout ratio and liquidity are among
the factors that affect the corporate value as well as the dilution
of minority interest. This result is in line with the hypothesis that
pyramidal ownership depresses the firm’s corporate value. This
study can be extended to pyramid structure in other countries in
the region in order to provide better generalization. For future
research, it is recommended to use the other possible method
such as Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to strengthen
the empirical results and that could provide a robustness check on
the results. Based on the findings of [6, 15, 7, 32], the separation
of cash flow rights and control rights has a negative impact on the
22
International Journal of Management & Business Studies
valuation of the region’s pyramid structures. Dividend based on
rent-extraction hypothesis can be used as a governance mechanism
to prevent aversive behaviour of the ultimate owner that insulated
to pursue their interest through pyramidal structure.
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IJMBS Vol. 2, Issue 4, Oct - Dec 2012
Irfah Najihah Basir Malan is currently
embarked on a PhD degree in Finance at
the Universiti Teknologi MARA. Prior to
this, she received her Master’s in Finance
from Graduate School of Management,
Universiti Putra Malaysia. She has
two years experience as researcher.
Additionally, she also obtained
Fundamental Research Grants Scheme
(FRGS 2010) under Ministry of Higher
Education. Her research articles have
been published in refereed journals like
Business Management Quarterly Review and International Review
of Business Research Papers. She has been involved actively in
numerous seminars, workshops, symposiums and conferences
both locally and internationally. Her research interests embrace
include corporate governance, financial derivatives, investment
analysis, accounting, auditing and corporate finance.
Norhana Salamudin graduated from
Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM) with
PhD (Finance) in 1998. Prior to that,
she received an MBA (Finance) from
American University, Washington
D.C. in 1983. Her first degree is BS
(Microbiology) from Ohio University,
Athens Ohio, USA in 1978. Norhana
is currently Director of the Institute
of Business Excellence (IBE) and a
faculty member of the Arshad Ayub
Graduate Business School, Universiti
Teknologi MARA (UiTM). She used to be Deputy Dean (Quality
and Research) at Faculty of Business Management, UiTM from
2003 to 2006. She joins the faculty since 1984 and has been
teaching corporate finance, strategic finance and investment since
then. Norhana is an active researcher and her research articles has
been published in refereed journals like the Pacific-Basin Finance
Journal, Capital Market Review, Journal of Intellectual Capital,
Business Management Quarterly Review, etc. Her research
interests include capital raising, market efficiency, corporate
governance and portfolio management.
International Journal of Management & Business Studies 23
IJMBS Vol. 2, Issue 4, Oct - Dec 2012
ISSN : 2230-9519 (Online) | ISSN : 2231-2463 (Print)
Noryati Ahmad earned her Doctorate
at Universiti Sains Malaysian, Penang
in 2005 and has 25 years of working
experience in the academic world. She
taught mainly finance courses such as
Derivatives, International Financial
Management, Corporate Finance and
Managerial Finance. Currently she is the
Deputy Director for Research Program
under the Arshad Ayub Graduate
Business School. She is an active panel
of examiner for Malaysia Qualifying Agency (MQA).She has
been involved in numerous training courses and undertook various
contract researches works for both the government and the private
sectors. She is also active in research and paper presentations.
She has published her works in several journals like Research
Journal of Finance and Economics, International Journal of
Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, Journal
of International Review of Business Research Papers and coauthored a book entitled “Introduction to Malaysian Derivative”.
She has also supervised PhD and Masters students in the finance
area. One such student graduated recently and his thesis title was:
Modelling Stock Index and Stock Index Futures Interdependence:
A Multivariate Analysis on the Developed and Emerging Markets.
She has collaborated with an international author from USA,
Simon Beninga, to produce an adaptation book for the South
East Asia edition entitled “Fundamental of Finance.”
24
International Journal of Management & Business Studies
w w w. i j m b s. c o m