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© 2004 Journal of Peace Research,
vol. 41, no. 3, 2004, pp. 243–252
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New Delhi) www.sagepublications.com
DOI 10.1177/0022343304043768 ISSN 0022-3433
The Duration and Termination of Civil War*
HÅVARD HEGRE
Department of Political Science, University of Oslo & Centre for the Study of
Civil War, PRIO
An important key to reducing the suffering due to civil war is to shorten conflicts. The marked decrease
in the incidence of conflicts in the 1990s was mostly due to a high number of conflict terminations,
not to a decrease in the number of new wars. The articles in this special issue treat theoretically and
empirically the determinants of civil war onset, duration, and termination, with particular emphasis on
duration and termination. This introduction gives an overview of the articles in the special issue and
discusses a few central topics covered by the different contributions: rebel group motivations, the
importance of financing, military factors, misperception, and commitment problems. Finally, the article
sums up some policy recommendations that may be derived from the articles in the issue.
Why Study the Duration of Civil
War?
Figure 1 shows how the global incidence of
civil war has changed over the last halfcentury.1 The incidence is the share of the
world’s countries where at least one war is
active during a year. In the absence of good
measures of the number of people killed in
war every year and the amount of physical
destruction, the incidence is the best measure
* This introductory essay and several of the articles
included in the special issue are outputs from the ‘Economics of Civil War, Crime, and Violence’ project in the
World Bank Development Research Group. The project
was initiated and directed by Paul Collier, and received
funding from the Norwegian, Swiss, and Greek governments, the World Bank Post-Conflict Fund, and the World
Bank Research Committee. I am grateful for comments on
the introduction by Jim Fearon, Heather Congdon Fors,
Nils Petter Gleditsch, Anke Hoeffler, and Michael Ross.
1 The figure is based on the armed conflict data in Gleditsch et al. (2002) and Eriksson, Wallensteen & Sollenberg
(2003). The figure includes all conflicts that have led to at
least 1,000 deaths over the course of the conflict. The
graphs were smoothed with a five-year moving average. See
Collier et al. (2003) for regional breakdowns of the incidence of civil war.
to gauge the scope of civil war as a global
problem. The figure shows that the incidence
was increasing dramatically up to 1990. At
the peak in 1990, the incidence was almost
four times higher than in the 1950s. Since
then, the incidence declined and then stabilized around 12% from 1995.
The proportion of countries that started a
new war (or took part in one that re-erupted
after at least a year’s peace) is represented
with a dark shade in Figure 1. What is
striking about the figure is that the change in
incidence is not due to any change over time
in the frequency of war onsets. The fraction
of the world’s countries that experienced new
conflicts has been stable at between 1% and
2% during the entire period. The increase up
to 1990 was not caused by an explosion in
the number of new conflicts, nor was the
subsequent decline due to a dearth of new
conflicts. This confirms Fearon & Laitin’s
(2003: 78) observation that the increase
must be due to a steady accumulation of conflicts that start at a higher rate than they end
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volume 41 / number 3 / may 2004
Figure 1. The Global Incidence of Civil War, 1950–2002
0.20
Proportion of countries in war
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0.18
0.16
0.14
0.12
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Ongoing wars
(also see Collier et al., 2003: ch. 4) and an
increase in average duration.2 Moreover, the
decline in the early 1990s is to a large extent
due to changes in the duration of civil wars.
This underscores the importance of
research on civil war duration to guide the
policies of the international community.
Policies targeted at shortening conflict and
reducing the risk of recurrence are a necessary supplement to policies aimed at
reducing the risk of war initiation. First, at
the global level, the impact of effective
conflict prevention will be felt only after
many years, when older conflicts finally die
out. Second, over time there is more variation in war duration than in the rate of war
onset, possibly implying that means to alter
the prospects for war termination are more
2
Fearon (2004: 276) presents a similar figure based on his
compilation of civil wars. The figure shows the same
pattern, and also shows that the average duration of wars
in progress increased up to 1990. Collier, Hoeffler &
Söderbom (2004: 260) include period dummies in their
model that confirm this impression.
New wars
readily available than measures for conflict
prevention.
The first papers from the ‘Economics of
Civil War, Crime, and Violence’ project
investigated which factors are systematically
associated with a high risk of onset of
conflict.3 Some of the articles in this issue
add to this research, but the majority of the
articles seek to increase our understanding of
why civil wars endure and how they end.
Topics in the Civil War Literature
This introduction discusses some selected
topics as they are covered by the articles in
the issue, with particular emphasis on issues
relevant to explaining the duration of civil
3
See Collier et al. (2003) for an overview of the project.
Prominent publications from the project are Collier &
Hoeffler (2002), Elbadawi & Sambanis (2002), Hegre et
al. (2001), and the special issues edited by Collier &
Sambanis (2002) and Hegre & Sandler (2002). For work
on similar topics, see Esty et al. (1998), Fearon & Laitin
(2003), Sandler (2000), and Murshed (2002).
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war. The articles formulate various models of
how civil wars erupt and evolve. These discussions highlight the heterogeneity of civil
wars, and the articles suggest different ways
to categorize civil wars in order to explain
their onset, duration, or risk of recurrence.
Below, I review some of the recurrent topics.
What motivates rebel groups is one of these.
Related to this is the issue of rebel group
financing. Military factors are also discussed,
as well as problems related to misperceptions
and credible commitments. In the last
section, I discuss some possible policy implications of the research.
Rebel Group Motivations
Collier & Hoeffler’s work on why civil war
starts (1998, 2002; see also Collier, 2000)
sparked a lively debate on whether rebel
groups most commonly are motivated by
‘grievance’ or ‘greed’ – whether the aim of the
rebels is to generate public goods such as
equal political rights or redistribution, or to
yield private gains for the rebels. They argue
that the latter more often is the case, partly
because of the collective action problems
involved in bringing about public goods (see
Olson, 1965; Lichbach, 1995), and partly
because their empirical analysis indicates that
civil wars occur where the opportunities for
armed predation are present rather than
where injustice is particularly prevalent.
Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom (2004)
spell out the implications of this argument
for the duration of civil war. They restate the
two conceptualizations as rebellion-asinvestment and rebellion-as-business. If most
rebellions are best seen as investments where
the payoff is attainment of some political
goal in the future, wars are expected to last
longer the larger are the contested stakes, as
long as there is no funding or credit constraint. If for instance the goal is release from
repression, wars should be longer the more
severe is the prewar repression. Stakes will
also be high if control of the government
I N T RO D U C T I O N
gives access to large revenues from natural
resource extraction (see Olsson & Fors,
2004). A different empirical implication
follows from conceptualizing rebellion as
business, where only the profitability of the
rebellion as it proceeds should affect
duration – not the gains that can be reaped
only upon victory. Collier, Hoeffler &
Söderbom (2004) conclude from the empirical analysis that the rebellion-as-investment
conceptualization sits less well with the data
than the rebellion-as-business one: neither
prewar repression nor high primary commodity dependence is associated with longer
wars. Declines in commodity prices that may
hurt the profitability of the rebellion, on the
other hand, are found to increase the chances
of war termination.
Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom infer rebel
motivations from how observed duration is
empirically related to characteristics of the
conflict and the country in which it takes
place. Fearon (2004) instead chooses to code
all the wars in his sample into different types.
These types are to some extent based on rebel
group motivations: he finds that wars
emerging from coups, revolutions, and anticolonial struggles are relatively brief. On the
other hand, ‘sons of the soil’ conflicts – ‘land
or natural resource conflicts between a
peripheral ethnic minority and state-supported migrants of a dominant ethnic group’
(Fearon, 2004: 277) – and wars where the
rebel group is funded by contraband such as
drugs or diamonds tend to be long.
However, Fearon explains the variance in
civil war duration less with reference to the
motivations of the rebels than to the commitment problems involved in reaching a
negotiated solution.
The formal model developed by Olsson
& Fors (2004) and their case study of the
Democratic Republic of Congo in the 1990s
refer back to Collier & Hoeffler’s (2002) distinction between greed and grievance. The
article develops a formal model of conflict
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which distinguishes between greed, conceptualized as the desire to gain control of
natural resource rents, and grievance,
thought of as the ruler’s deliberate institutional distinction between the formal and
the informal sector. Their terminology is
slightly different from Collier & Hoeffler’s,
since the ‘grievance’ term partly models the
opportunity costs for potential rebels. Rebels
choose to devote resources to predation if the
expected gain is large relative to what they
earn through production in the non-formal
sector. On the basis of the model and the case
study, the article argues that the onsets of the
two wars in Congo are best explained by
grievance and the effectiveness of defense.
An abundance of appropriable resources
increases the incentives for predation, but it
also increases the ruler’s ability to defend his
riches. Hence, the risk of war onset may not
be affected by the amount of resource rents.
The vast amount of resource rent and the
widespread appropriation by both Mobutu
and Kabila, on the other hand, provide a
better explanation of the intensity of the conflicts. When war erupts, the amount of rents
to fight over affects the scale of the conflict.
Walter (2004) also focuses on the opportunity costs for the potential recruits to rebel
organizations. Civil wars are more likely to
recur where living conditions are poor.
Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom (2004: 262)
note that wars are longer where average
income is low or inequality is high. This may
be because opportunity costs are low so that
rebel recruitment is inexpensive.
Demands for secession or regional
autonomy form another class of motivations
for war. Ross (2004: 342) notes that oil, in
particular, increases the risk of the outbreak of
separatist conflicts. Fearon’s long-standing
‘sons of the soil’ conflicts regularly involve
such demands, in particular where the
government has strong interests in controlling
the region. These interests make it difficult for
governments to reach agreements, even when
volume 41 / number 3 / may 2004
they lack the military means to settle the
conflict. Walter (2003) notes that governments are likely to fear demands from other
groups if they give in to one, and Sambanis
(2000) and Walter (2004) show that wars
ending with partition are disproportionately
likely to experiencing war recurrence.
Different motivations are likely to lead to
different outcomes for the wars. DeRouen &
Sobek (2004) estimate a multinomial logit
model of civil war outcomes, distinguishing
between government victory, rebel victory,
truce, treaty, or continued war. If wars are
consistent with the ‘rebellion as business’
conceptualization, rebel victory may not be
the goal. Rebels might prefer a truce, where
they are allowed de facto control of a region.
DeRouen & Sobek support this idea by
showing that truces are most likely in countries with high dependence on primary commodities. They also find wars in ethnically
heterogeneous countries to be unlikely to
lead to rebel victory, either because of the
coordination problems for rebel groups that
cannot draw on one large ethnic group, or
because the wars in ethnically heterogeneous
countries typically follow ‘sons of the soil’
dynamics.
Rebel Group Financing
Central to the arguments of Collier &
Hoeffler (2002) and Fearon & Laitin (2003)
is the question of opportunities available for
rebel groups to organize an army, recruit
soldiers, and obtain the funds to cover
running costs. Collier & Hoeffler focus in
particular on the importance of natural
resources as sources of rebel group finances.
The article by Ross (2004) reviews the
evidence for the relationship between natural
resources and civil war in a set of recent
empirical studies. The article surveys both
case studies and cross-national statistical
analyses of civil war onset and duration. He
shows that there is an emerging consensus
that oil increases the risk of the outbreak of
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conflicts, and that conflicts are longer where
there exist natural resources that can finance
rebel group financing (e.g. diamonds or
drugs). The article also points out issues
where empirical studies reach different conclusions: for instance, whether all types of
primary commodity extraction and exports
are related to conflict, or whether such commodities are related to revolutionary wars
and not to ethnic ones. Ross also surveys the
debate on the causal mechanisms that link
resources with conflict.
Fearon (2004) shows that wars where the
rebels have access to contraband finance are
long. Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom (2004)
present results indicating that increases in the
prices of primary commodities tend to
prolong war, and DeRouen & Sobek (2004)
show that dependence on primary commodities increases the chance that civil wars
will end in truces rather than outright
victories for either side.
The last article in the issue studies the
‘conflict trap’. Walter (2004) seeks an explanation of why conflicts re-erupt in the incentives for individuals to join or rejoin a rebel
group. This focus on the incentives for enlistment as they evolve in the postwar period is
in contrast to earlier studies on why war
recurs. These often explain recurrence by
looking at the nature of the original war: why
it started, how it was fought, or how it
ended. The empirical analysis in the article
indicates that some aspects of the previous
war are important, such as the duration of
the war and whether it ended in partition.
Equally important are the living conditions
after the war: war is most likely to re-erupt
in those post-conflict countries that have the
poorest living conditions, or have semidemocratic political systems.
Misperceptions and Commitment
Problems
Misperceptions are an important cause of
war onset (Blainey, 1973; Fearon, 1995;
I N T RO D U C T I O N
Gartzke, 1999), since wars are costly and
most conflicts could be solved by bargaining.
The argument is also relevant for war termination: the literature on war and misperceptions also shows that war ‘provides a means
of revealing information that is not available
in the standard bargaining models’ (Wagner,
2000: 472; see also Fearon, 1995; Wittman,
1979; Goemans, 2000; Filson & Werner,
2002). Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom (2004)
note the empirical implication of this: the
probability of reaching an agreement should
increase with time after the war started. Both
their empirical analysis and that of Fearon
(2004) and Regan (2002: 70) indicate that
the longer a war has lasted, the better is the
chance that it will end. Mason & Fett (1996)
find long wars to be more likely to end with
negotiated settlements than short wars,
strengthening the interpretation that the rise
is due to revelation of information rather
than military victory due to attrition of the
weaker side. The effect is not very strong,
however, and Fearon (2004: 291ff.) argues
that commitment problems are an alternative explanation to misperceptions of why
parties are unable to reach mutually preferred agreements (see also Walter, 2002).
Fearon develops a game model where
secessionist war is modeled as a commitment
problem. Even though peaceful solutions
that are preferable to both the rebel group
and the government always exist in the
model, it shows that there are conditions in
which the parties will never reach such a
solution. The problem is that the government cannot commit credibly to autonomy
deals signed in periods when it is relatively
weak. When the government regains
strength, nothing will stop it from overturning the agreement. As mentioned above, this
commitment problem is more severe when
the government’s stakes in the conflict are
high.
Walter (2004) finds that the risk of war
recurrence is higher after long wars. This
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result seems more consistent with explanations based on commitment problems
than those based on misperceptions.
Military Factors and State Capacity
Fearon’s (2004: 276) point of departure is
that wars are short when conditions favor a
decisive military victory. Moreover, both
Fearon’s and Olsson & Fors’s models point
out the importance of fluctuations in relative
power or the effectiveness of defense. As we
have seen, gaining access to finance is crucial
for rebel group strength. But the balance of
power obviously also depends on the
government side. Herbst (2004) focuses on
the government side of conflicts in Africa.
The behavior of the armed forces is crucial
to understand the development and outcome of civil wars. Herbst studies this by
discussing how the threats to governments
typically develop over the course of a
conflict: in the initial stage, the insurgency
is generally small and should be easy to
defeat. As the insurgency grows, the
required organization, political support, and
financing of the military campaign become
ever more challenging to the government.
Hence, effective counter-insurgency strategies require swift mobilization. Herbst
shows that governments very often are not
able to do this, and argues this is due to poor
intelligence capabilities, limited resources,
and political systems that often are authoritarian and non-responsive to local demands.
Especially in large countries, this often leads
to long conflicts where neither the government nor the rebel group is able to win. In
contrast, African countries have been more
successful in mobilization against foreign
countries. DeRouen & Sobek (2004)
confirm Herbst’s description of African
governments when showing that wars in
African countries are disproportionately
long and much more likely to end with rebel
group victories than wars on other continents. They also find that the size of the
volume 41 / number 3 / may 2004
army has little impact on the chance of
government victory.
External military intervention is another
means to alter the military balance. Olsson
& Fors (2004) note the importance of
Mobutu’s and Kabila’s changing allies for the
development of the conflict in Congo. How
intervention affects the duration of war
depends on which side the intervener lines
up with, and on the initial distribution of
power between the parties. An intervention
that enables one side to achieve outright
military victory is likely to shorten wars. It is
difficult to test this with cross-national
studies, however, since it is hard to measure
relative power and since military strength is
only one factor determining duration.
Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom (2004) find
only military interventions on the rebel side
to decrease the duration of war. Largely consistent with this, Balch-Lindsay & Enterline
(2000) find that interventions on the side of
the government increase duration. Regan
(2002) and Balch-Lindsay & Enterline
(2000) also look at the impact of interventions that support both sides of the
conflict. Such interventions are likely to
increase the chance of stalemated conflicts,
and their results confirm this expectation.
DeRouen & Sobek (2004) show that UN
interventions are not associated with shorter
wars, but tend to be followed by negotiated
settlements.
Counter-insurgency measures do not
have to be military to be effective. Herbst
(2004: 362) asks whether Mandela’s efficient
handling of the conflict with Inkatha in
1994 could serve as a template for other
African governments.4 However, very few
African governments can afford that type of
agreement. DeRouen & Sobek (2004) show
4 The model in Olsson & Fors (2004: 332) also indicates
how improvement of the rebels’ institutional environment
may reduce conflict intensity. The effect of this improvement is dependent on the effectiveness of the ruling group’s
defense, however.
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that an efficient bureaucracy increases the
chance of reaching negotiated outcomes
(although it does not reduce the duration of
civil wars).
Policy Implications
How can the international community contribute to ending wars? As all the articles
point out, civil wars are very heterogeneous
in both why and how they start, how they
develop, and how they end (see Licklider,
1993: 303ff.). The policy recommendations
of the articles in the issue are consequently
diverse.5
The first set of policy recommendations is
to promote equitable development. Several
of the articles note how poor access to
alternative employment increases the
chances that potential recruits will join and
remain in a rebel organization. Increasing the
opportunity costs for recruits is likely to
reduce both the risk of onset and recurrence
and the duration and intensity of wars.
Development assistance is often feasible only
after the war has ended, however.
The empirical articles in this issue show
that the curbing of rebel group finances is
effective to shorten at least some types of conflicts. One well-known initiative to achieve
this is the Kimberley Process, which aims to
shut diamonds from conflict zones out of the
market.6 Depending on how successful the
Kimberley Process turns out to be, this
research suggests that corresponding
initiatives could be applied to other commodities such as other gemstones and timber.
However, this type of regulation will be effective only when the goods are legally traded
and where the trading firms are concerned
with their reputation. Hence, rebel group
income from drugs, extortion, and kidnapping have to be curbed by other means.
I N T RO D U C T I O N
Increasing rebel group costs by impeding the
trade in small arms could also be effective.
Civil wars become long when no parties
have the ability to achieve a decisive victory.
Shifting the military balance of a conflict is
therefore a possible way to end wars. Herbst
points out how inadequate military mobilization has served to lengthen many conflicts
in Africa, and suggests that assistance
targeted at strengthening governments’
military capabilities may serve both to
shorten and deter destructive wars. Such
assistance is always controversial, however,
especially in cases where the legitimacy of the
government is very poor. As Herbst points
out, governments in Africa have been more
adept at mobilizing against external than
internal enemies, implying that pure military
power alone is insufficient to maintain
internal order. DeRouen & Sobek’s study
supports this conclusion. Moreover, the
empirical studies reviewed here show that
external military interventions have at best a
mixed record of success.
As Fearon and Herbst point out, it may be
difficult for a government to defeat a rebel
group decisively even when it is poorly
funded. Fearon argues that the parties in
secessionist conflicts are not able to reach an
agreement because of commitment problems:
the government, which will retain its military
capacity after a peace agreement, may have an
incentive to renege when it has regained
strength. This suggests a role for third parties
to serve as guarantors for such agreements.7
Monitoring military aspects of agreements
has been an explicit objective in UN peacekeeping missions. Such missions are much
less controversial than other military interventions and have had some success (see
Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). Monitoring legal
aspects and contributing to fulfilling financial
aspects of agreements are other possible ways
5
See Collier et al. (2003) for a more extended discussion
of some of the policy recommendations mentioned here.
6 See http://www.kimberleyprocess.com.
7 For studies on third-party mediation in civil war, see
Pillar (1983) and Pearson (2001).
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for the UN, international financial institutions, and individual governments to help
parties solve the commitment problems.
Walter shows that partition is a poor
solution to secessionist conflicts, although it
would terminate the conflict and solve the
commitment problem. Partition dramatically increases the risk of recurrent war in the
same country, and may also encourage separatism in other countries.
Conclusion
This overview has surveyed some of the most
important topics in the small but growing
theoretical and empirical literature on the
duration and termination of civil war. Like
civil wars themselves, the articles are highly
diverse, and they formulate different
positions in an ongoing debate. The articles
are not in strong disagreement, but the differences in the approaches preclude drawing
very firm conclusions as to where a consensus is forming. All the empirical studies have
to confront the fact that theoretical concepts
such as motivations or perceptions are not
directly observable, and the studies are forced
to rely on proxies. This may explain why the
articles present fairly divergent results. As in
the study of civil war onset, many differences
in results are due to different civil war datasets
(see Ross, 2004). The process of coding when
civil wars start and end is also more difficult
than just coding that they occurred (see
Fearon, 2004: 278–279), introducing
another source of variation. There is also
much less of a consensus of what are the
appropriate explanatory variables to include
in studies of civil war duration than in studies
of onset. This is partly due to the heterogeneity of civil wars and to the variety of
theoretical approaches this inevitably entails.8
8 The heterogeneity of civil wars is arguably less of a
problem in studies of civil war onset, since it is not possible
to know what type of civil war a country will experience
before it starts.
volume 41 / number 3 / may 2004
Still, there is convergence on a few issues.
Many of the studies note the importance of
rebel group finances and bring evidence that
the presence of various sources of finance
prolongs war. This finding seems to be more
robust in studies of civil war duration than
the claim that sources of finance increase the
risk of civil war onset. Many of the studies
also find that civil wars are longer or more
likely to re-erupt in low-income countries.
This is either because of the lack of state
capacity to achieve military victory or to
produce credible negotiated outcomes, or
because of the low opportunity costs for
potential rebels. This finding closely reflects a
similar finding in the study of civil war onset.
The discussion of topics and of possible
policy implications above provides only a
brief sketch of where the research is heading
and what conclusions may be drawn. These
topics and several other aspects of civil war
are treated in much more detail in the individual articles in the issue.
References
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HÅVARD HEGRE, b. 1964, cand.polit. in
Political Science (University of Oslo, 1999).
Economist, Development Research Group,
the World Bank (2001–03); Research Fellow,
Department of Political Science, University of
Oslo, and Centre for the Study of Civil War,
PRIO (2003– ); Associate Editor, Journal of
Peace Research. Recent publication: co-author
of World Bank Policy Research Report
Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and
Development Policy.
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