Russia’s Armed Forces and the Arctic:
All Quiet on the Northern Front?
K R I S T I A N Å T L A N D
Because of its size, its geographical location, and the length of its northern coastline,
Russia has traditionally been a key player in international Arctic affairs. This is likely
to remain the case in the years and decades to come. The country attaches much
importance to its economic and security interests in the northernmost part of the
globe. Faced with the challenges of climate change, summer sea ice melting, and
growing interest in the region from other Arctic coastal states and other global
powers, Russia has in recent years developed strategies in which the country’s consolidation as the world’s leading Arctic power appears to be a key goal.1
The strategies make it clear that Russia sees the Arctic region as its ‘primary
resource base’ in the 21st century, and as a potentially important corridor for
future ship traffic between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The Russian strategies
also recognize the region’s still-relevant role as a basing, transit, and operation
area for ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs). As of February 2011, 67 per
cent of Russia’s 576 sea-based nuclear warheads can be found on nuclear submarines
operating from the Northern Fleet’s home bases on the Kola Peninsula. The rest are
found on Pacific Fleet SSBNs based at Vilyuchinsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula.2
These, too, occasionally venture into Arctic waters.
During Vladimir Putin’s two presidential terms (2000 – 2008), Russia experienced
significant economic growth, fueled by high oil and gas prices. The country began to
modernize its decaying nuclear arsenal, including the part of it located in the country’s northwestern corner. For the first time in over a decade, Russian nuclear submarines were able to resume patrols under the Arctic ice cover and in waters far from the
littoral zone. Since 2004, missile tests have been conducted on a more or less regular
basis in the White Sea, the Barents Sea, and the Arctic Ocean. In 2007, Russia also
resumed long-range bomber patrols in the international air space over the Barents,
Norwegian, and Greenland Seas. The Putin-era increase in Russian military activity
in the Arctic was generally in line with the country’s new assertiveness in international affairs at the time, which has been apparent also under President Medvedev.
Following Russia’s flag planting on the ocean floor at the North Pole in August
2007, there has been much talk about the danger of a ‘resource race’ in the
Arctic.3 Issues pertaining to borders and jurisdiction in the northern waters, including
shelf areas beyond the coastal states’ 200-mile exclusive economic zones, are gradually coming to the surface as temperatures in the region heat up and the ice cover
recedes. Russian parliamentarians and military officers frequently voice the
opinion that ‘the Arctic is Russian’.4 Such statements, as well as Russia’s occasional
displays of military power in the region, have raised concern among observers in
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.32, No.2 (August 2011), pp.267–285
ISSN 1352-3260 print/1743-8764 online
DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2011.590354 # 2011 Taylor & Francis
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other Arctic and non-Arctic states. Some fear that a new military build-up may be
underway.5
In February 2011, First Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin announced
that Russia would spend approximately 22 trillion roubles (US$730 billion) on the
acquisition of advanced weaponry as part of the recently adopted State Arms Procurement Program for the period up to 2020 (GPV-2020).6 The list of acquisitions
planned for the 2011– 2020 period includes 20 new nuclear submarines (of which
eight are strategic), 80 new naval surface vessels (of which 15 are frigates and 35
corvettes), 600 new warplanes, and 1,000 new helicopters. Several hundred
modern S-400 and S-500 air defence systems are also on order.7 In the words of
Rob Huebert, ‘the Russians’ proposed rearmament plans greatly exceed the plans
of any other Arctic state’.8
Based on past experiences, there is reason to question the economic realism of the
Russian rearmament plans.9 It should also be pointed that many (and in the case of the
non-naval systems, most) of the weapon systems mentioned in GPV-2020, if produced in sufficient volumes and on time, will end up in places other than the
Arctic. The scope and scale of Russia’s military activity in the north will depend
on a number of factors, including the policies of other Arctic states and the perceived
level of tension in the region. Much like Canada, the US, Denmark, and Norway,
Russia has in recent years taken steps to strengthen its naval and coastguard presence
in the Arctic.10 Calls for further and more extensive defence measures on the country’s northern frontier are not uncommon in Russian newspapers and defence periodicals. These calls are often made in reference to recently taken or expected
rearmament measures in one or more of the other Arctic coastal states, all four of
which are NATO members. Thus, Russia tends to see its moves in the region as a
defensive response to increasing pressures from the outside world, including the
Atlantic alliance.11 A deterioration of Russia’s currently pragmatic relationship
with NATO, and/or an increase in interstate tensions over access to the region’s
natural resources, may lead to further increases in Russia’s military activity in the
region – at sea, in the air, and even on land.
However, as this article will argue, the interstate conflict potential in the Arctic
should not be exaggerated. Neither should Russia’s military ambitions in the
region, nor the role of the region in contemporary Russian security policy and
defence planning. The Arctic is today a peaceful and stable region, surrounded by
countries which have many shared interests, institutionalized cooperation arrangements, and a long history of peaceful coexistence. Russia appears to have more pressing security challenges elsewhere, most notably in the south, and limited means to
handle them. Thus, a return to Cold War levels of military spending and activity in
the Arctic seems both far-fetched and unrealistic, at least in the foreseeable future.
Whether Russia might be inclined to, and capable of, producing a more moderatescale but still significant increase in its military presence in the Arctic is, of
course, another question. Analyses of the country’s previous behaviour in the
region, contemporary Russian strategy documents, the pattern of civil-military
relations, and the state and development prospects of the country’s military and security forces in the Arctic may shed light on this issue.
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The article first introduces some of the factors that led to the militarization of the
Arctic in the Cold War period. Section two discusses the growing importance of
economic interests in Russia’s Arctic policy and its implications for civil-military
relations in the region. Based on recent Russian strategy and doctrine documents,
section three explores the country’s current threat perceptions and strategic priorities
relating to the Arctic, as well as the domestic debate on Arctic security. Section four
looks at Russia’s current military and paramilitary capabilities in the Arctic and the
ongoing modernization efforts.
This analysis concludes that the character of Russian Arctic policy will largely
depend on relations with and policies of other Arctic rim states. The region’s
growing economic significance, the unresolved jurisdictional issues, and the
present action-reaction dynamics in the military field may lead to a strengthening
of the military dimension in Russia’s Arctic policies, but this does not mean ‘remilitarization’ of the region is in inevitable or even likely. Tensions in the Barents Sea
region and other parts of the Arctic are much lower today than in the days of the
Cold War, and hard security concerns in the Arctic do not figure at the top of
Russia’s current security agenda. Whereas Russia’s Arctic policy in the past was governed by national security interests, it is now increasingly governed by national economic interests and the interests of companies closely associated with the Russian
state.
The Arctic in Russian Military Strategy: The Legacy of the Past
Unlike Antarctica, which is a demilitarized continent surrounded by water, the Arctic
is an ocean surrounded by land, and an important arena for military, including
nuclear, operations. Climatic conditions are harsh in both places, but the mean
average temperature at the South Pole (2458C) is much lower than at the mean
average temperature at the North Pole (2158C). Some parts of the Arctic, such as
northwestern Europe, have a more hospitable climate than regions of similar latitude
elsewhere, primarily due to the Gulf Stream, which keeps the southern part of the
Barents Sea ice-free year round. These two factors – the favourable ice conditions
and the far northern location – are key to understanding the strategic significance
of the Kola Peninsula.
A third factor, related to the second, is the geographical proximity between
Russia’s northern coast and the North American continent. The fact that the shortest
air route between the industrial heartlands and populated centres of the Soviet Union
and the United States is across the Arctic Ocean had far-reaching implications for the
two superpowers’ defence strategies during the Cold War. A central feature of Soviet
and US deterrence strategy in the Cold War period was the development of sophisticated long-range nuclear weapons that could be launched across the Arctic Ocean,
either from locations on land (intercontinental ballistic missiles), from the sea (ballistic missiles carried by nuclear submarines), or from the air (bombs or cruise missiles
carried by long-range bomber planes).
It was also important for the superpowers to have the ability to detect and repel
incoming attacks across the Arctic Ocean. For this reason, a network of radar stations,
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known as the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line, was built across the North American continent. Like the US, the Soviet Union feared an attack across the Arctic,
either by strategic bombers or inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and the
country therefore invested significant resources in the development of strategic
surveillance and air defence capabilities in the north. The capabilities included interceptor and surveillance aircraft as well as a comprehensive early-warning system
combining ground- and space-based assets. The Soviet early-warning system,
known as Sistema Preduprezhdeniya o Raketnom Napadnii, or SPRN, entered into
service in the late 1960s and was further developed throughout the 1970s and 80s.
It consisted of long-range radars designed for the detection of incoming ICBMs.
For instance, the country’s northwestern strategic direction (the Barents-Baltic
area) was covered by radars located in Olenogorsk on the Kola Peninsula and
Skrunda near Riga, Latvia. These radars also provided early-warning information
to the Moscow anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system.
As an additional deterrence measure, the Soviet Union established a chain of
eleven forward bomber bases in the Arctic, stretching from the Kola Peninsula in
the west to Chukotka in the east. All of the long-range bomber airfields, some of
which were located on remote islands such as Franz Josef Land, Novaya Zemlya,
and Severnaya Zemlya, had runways that were more than four kilometres long, in
order to allow for heavy bombers to take off fully fuelled and with full weapons
payload.12
At sea, NATO spent much time and energy tracking and trailing Soviet submarines operating from the Kola Peninsula. A large part of the anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) operations were concentrated in natural ‘choke points’ such as the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap. Here, and in the Norwegian Sea between Andøya
and Bear Island, the US Navy had strung out a chain of underwater listening posts,
known as the Sound Surveillance System, or SOSUS. The Soviets had similar hydrophone systems in waters adjacent to their submarine bases on the Kola Peninsula and
Kamchatka, in order to detect intruders. In these waters, the underwater ‘cat and
mouse’ games between NATO and Soviet/Russian nuclear submarines went on for
several decades. As late as 1992 and 1993, there were collisions between Russian
and American nuclear submarines in the Barents Sea, just off the coast of the Kola
Peninsula.13
Seen from a naval perspective, the westernmost part of the Russia’s Arctic
‘sector’14 has traditionally been of greater significance than the shallow and seasonally ice-beset waters north of Siberia and the Russian Far East. The ice-free naval
bases on the Kola Peninsula offer convenient access for Russian surface and subsurface vessels into the North Atlantic via the Barents and Norwegian Seas and the
GIUK gap. Russia’s nuclear submarines can also sail northwards into the Arctic
Ocean through the Barents or Kara Seas. The deep and partially ice-covered
waters of the Arctic Ocean offer plenty of hiding places for nuclear submarines,
which can stay submerged for weeks and months at a time and hide in the creaking
noise of the marginal ice zone. Upon launch orders, they can go to the surface, push
through several metres of ice, and launch their missiles from almost any position in
the central Arctic Basin.
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The Arctic Ocean and its adjacent seas were also considered important in terms of
inter-theatre manoeuvrability between the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet. In the
Cold War period, the Soviet Navy experimented with icebreaker-supported convoys
of naval vessels along the Northern Sea Route. The success of these endeavours was
limited, as the thin-hulled vessels were often damaged by drift ice, and sometimes got
stuck for the winter. The coastal waters along the Siberian coast are shallow and not
suited for large surface vessels. Some of the straits are but a few metres deep. Starting
in 1950, inter-fleet transits were also made by diesel-electric submarines, and the first
successful under-ice transit by a nuclear submarine took place in 1963.15 Since then,
Russian nuclear submarines have sporadically used the Arctic Ocean as a transit area
for SSBNs. The most recent trans-Arctic cruise took place in 2008, by a Delta III submarine (‘Ryazan’). Its under-ice transit from the Kola Peninsula to Kamchatka took
30 days.16
Today, Russia’s military infrastructure in the Arctic is mainly concentrated on the
Kola Peninsula. The remaining 97.5 per cent of Russia’s northern coastline, from the
White Sea to Bering Strait, is considered to be of limited military utility.17 It is important to emphasize that the concentration of naval and air defence forces on the Kola
Peninsula neither was nor is motivated by military or other threats emanating in the
region. The historical reason why one of the world’s largest fleets was based here was
rather, as noted above, the favourable ice conditions in the southern Barents Sea and
the easy access to the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. These conditions made – and still
make – the area well suited for strategic naval operations.
It should also be noted that the underlying dynamics of intra- and interstate
relations in the region have changed significantly in the time that has passed since
the end of the Cold War. Up to the late 1980s, the Arctic was divided into
‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ sectors, between which there was little or no interaction.
The lack of state-to-state and people-to-people cooperation in and on the Arctic in
the Cold War period was largely a product of the nuclear stand-off and the dominance
of national security concerns in national perceptions and policies. This changed in the
1990s and 2000s, in the sense that economic interests today play a more prominent
role in the formation of national policies, including those of Russia.
The Russian Military and the Coming of the Oil Age
Russia’s current strategic interests in the Arctic are closely linked to the country’s
economic interests in the region. The US Geological Survey estimates that some
30 per cent of the world’s undiscovered reserves of natural gas, and 13 per cent of
the undiscovered reserves of oil, are located north of the Arctic Circle.18 Among
the areas specified for future development are the Yamal Peninsula and the continental shelf in the Barents and Kara Seas. In the more distant future, petroleum operations in areas further north may become a reality. Russia is currently in the
process of preparing a claim to a shelf area of some 1.2 million square kilometres
between the outer limit of the country’s 200-mile economic zone in Siberia and
the North Pole. This is being undertaken largely in reference to the Lomonosov
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Ridge – a trans-Arctic underwater ridge which is said to be an extension of Russia’s
Siberian continental shelf.
In the central part of the Barents Sea, 540 kilometres off the coast of the Kola
Peninsula, lies one of the world’s biggest proven offshore gas fields. The still undeveloped Shtokman field holds an estimated 3.7 trillion cubic metres of gas and 31
million metric tons of gas condensate – enough to supply most of the European
Union for a period of seven years. However, recent developments such as the post2007 global financial crisis and the discovery of vast natural gas reserves from
shale rock formations in the US, Europe, and elsewhere have led to a fall in gas
prices and the temporary postponement of costly offshore projects in the Arctic. In
February 2010 the production start date for the Shtokman project was postponed
by three years, until 2016 – 2017, and the investment decision is still pending.
For the time being, western Siberia, including the province of Khanty-Mansiysk,
is the main area for Russia’s Arctic petroleum activities, counting for some 70 per
cent of the country’s oil production. Here, operations are being pursued on land,
rather than offshore. At the same time, it is worth noting that companies such as
Gazprom, Rosneft, and Lukoil are positioning themselves for future projects in
other parts of the Arctic, including the offshore domain. Significant investments
have already been made in production infrastructure and ice-enforced tankers to
transport the oil. The Russian nuclear icebreaker fleet is also being upgraded. An
ice-capable production platform for the Prirazlomnoye field has long been under
construction at the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk. This field, located in the
ice-ridden Pechora Sea, is scheduled to enter into production in 2011.
An important point to make in this regard is that the development of oil and gas
fields on the Russian Arctic shelf is likely to impose new responsibilities on the
Russian Navy and the FSB, which is in charge of the Russian Border Guard
Service. The Northern Fleet is likely to be tasked with the anti-terrorism protection
of the new installations (platforms, pipelines, terminals, et cetera) and tanker
traffic. If additional resources are not made available for this purpose, it may lead
to a reduction in other activities. The Northern Fleet’s new ‘brown water’ functions
in the Arctic are different from, and come in addition to, its traditional function of
providing credible nuclear deterrence, and may require new categories of vessels.
The expected increase in industrial and commercial activities in the littoral zone
appears to be seen as argument in favour of strengthening the naval and/or FSB presence in the region.19
It is also worth noting that the advent of the oil age has led to significant changes
in the patterns of civil-military relations in the Russian Arctic. Throughout the 1990s,
the Northern Fleet found itself in a very difficult situation. Its previous position of
dominance and autonomy was challenged by the influx of powerful commercial
actors. The needs and interests of the military were often overlooked and/or disregarded by the political elite. Initial rivalry and conflicts of interest between the
Navy and the Russian petroleum industry, for instance over the location of offshore
installations in the Barents Sea and the access to port facilities on the Kola Peninsula,
were gradually replaced by a more cooperative and pragmatic relationship.20 Now,
the Ministry of Defence and the Northern Fleet seem to have come to the conclusion
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that oil and gas extraction in, and transportation through, the Barents Sea under
current conditions will not jeopardize Russia’s military security interests in the
region.
Part of the reason for this is that the spatial needs of the Northern Fleet, on land
and at sea, have been reduced. In 1986, the Northern Fleet comprised some 180
nuclear-powered submarines of different classes. Today, it has around 23 – less
than 13 per cent of its Cold War inventory. The slimming down of the fleet is also
reflected in the number of patrols. In the period from 1965 to 1993, the Soviet/
Russian submarine fleet conducted some 4600 patrols, of which a significant part
started and ended at the Northern Fleet’s bases on the Kola Peninsula.21 In the
year 1985 alone, the nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet conducted 80
patrols. Ten years later, the number of patrols had fallen to 18, and it continued to
fall throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s.22 Despite a slight increase in the
late 2000s, the number of patrols is still fairly limited – typically between five and
ten per year for the SSBNs.
Some of the former naval bases on the northern coast of the Kola Peninsula have
been converted to civilian use, and the naval yards in Severodvinsk have long since
been diversified to handle assignments for Russian and foreign petroleum companies.
The village of Teriberka, located northeast of Murmansk, within the closed administrative-territorial unit (ZATO) of Severomorsk, has been designated as the location of
the Shtokman field’s LNG plant, and was in March 2009 opened to public access.23
All of this is a testament to the post-Cold War commercialization and ‘desecuritization’ of Russia’s Arctic policy.
The advent of the ‘oil age’ and the toning down of the security dimension in
Russia’s Arctic policy has also contributed to a resolution of one of the most difficult
and long-standing maritime delimitation disputes in the region – the delimitation of
Russia’s and Norway’s continental shelves and economic zones in the Barents Sea
and the Arctic Ocean. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the petroleum industries
in Norway and Russia lobbied actively for swift solution to this issue, envisaging a
future opening of parts of the disputed area of 175,000 square kilometres (11 per
cent of the Barents Sea) to seismic surveying and exploration drilling. On 15 September 2010, after more than 40 years of negotiations, a bilateral delimitation treaty was
signed by the two countries’ Foreign Ministers, dividing the disputed area into ‘two
parts of approximately the same size’.24 The new delimitation line is roughly 1,700
kilometres long and stretches all the way from the mainland to the international
seabed in the Arctic Ocean. The delimitation treaty has already been ratified by the
two countries’ parliaments (against the votes of Communist deputies in the Duma),
and entered into force on 7 July 2011.25 It may serve as a model for other delimitations in the Arctic.
Recent Strategy Documents and the Domestic Debate on Arctic Security
Before turning to the issue of Russia’s current threat perceptions and strategic priorities in the Arctic, it may be appropriate to reflect a little on what constitutes ‘the
Russian security policy-making community’. Crucial in this regard are state organs
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such as the Office of the President, the National Security Council, the Russian Parliament, the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff, and the Federal Security Service
(FSB). These organs’ roles, interrelations, and modes of operation are to be understood in view of official institutional arrangements as well as informal relationship
patterns and bureaucratic cultures shaped in previous times.
The Russian defence and security community has traditionally enjoyed a high
degree of autonomy, and rather than serving the common good of the nation and
its citizens, it has often ended up serving its own interests, including those of the
Russian military-industrial complex. This is not to say that the Russian defence
and security community is a monolithic structure consisting of actors who share
the same or similar political objectives and world views. The security environment
– in the Arctic or elsewhere – is apparently interpreted differently by different
members of the community. Decision-makers may also differ on issues such as a
policy’s aims and means, not to mention distribution of resources. This occasionally
leads to fierce debates within the Government, Parliament, or at the inter-agency
level.
In Russia, as in other countries, the process of policy-making in the security field
can be divided into different stages, such as agenda-setting, decision-making, and
implementation. At all of the three stages, the involved actors presumably make
cost/benefit assessments of various policies and strategies.26 Based on the content
of these strategies, as well as what the key actors say and do and how they relate
to each other, we can attempt to draw conclusions about the overall direction of
the policy that is being adopted and implemented.
There are, however, obvious challenges associated with such an approach. One of
the things making the security field different from many others is that the process of
policy-making usually takes place in an environment which for various reasons is
partly or fully closed to outsiders. This is particularly the case in Russia, where security debates are still dominated by state institutions and federal security agencies.
Russian security policy decision-makers do not always want the outside world, or
even the general public of their own country, to know what their intentions and strategies are, at least not in detail.
Still, recently published Russian strategy documents such as the new National
Security Strategy, published in May 2009, and the new Military Doctrine, published
in February 2010,27 may give us an idea of the political and military establishment’s
current thinking with regard to the Arctic and the place of the region in the country’s
security and defence policy. A region-specific strategy document adopted in 2008 –
‘Fundamentals of the Russian Federation state policy in the Arctic for the period up to
2020 and beyond’,28 often referred to as Russia’s ‘Arctic Strategy’ – may also give us
valuable insights. If supplemented by analyses of ‘non-official’ statements made by
informed actors within and outside the Russian defence and security establishment,
including those representing alternative interpretations of the security situation in
the Arctic and/or the role of military power, this material may enhance our understanding of mainstream policy as well as the domestic debate in Russia.
The 2009 National Security Strategy lays out the major trends in global politics,
Russia’s national interests and strategic priorities, and the organizational and political
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framework within which Russia will work to strengthen its national, economic, and
societal security. In the strategy, the concept of security is interpreted according to its
broader definition, covering not only the traditional ‘hard’ security dimension and the
use of military means, but also a variety of ‘soft’ security concerns requiring the use
of non-military means. Compared to the 1997 edition, modified in 2000, the current
strategy is less confrontational in tone, and to some extent less state-centric. For
instance, it contains sections on topics such as ‘science’, ‘healthcare’, ‘culture’,
and ‘the rational use of nature’. A large portion of the strategy is devoted to economic
issues, highlighting in particular the dimension of ‘energy security’.
The National Security Strategy points out that ‘[i]n the long term, the attention of
international politics will be focused on ownership of energy resources, including
in. . . the Barents Sea shelf and other parts of the Arctic. . .’.29 Thus, the strategy
reflects Russia’s concern that other state or non-state actors may attempt to take
control of oil, gas, or other natural resources perceived as belonging to Russia.
However, it also highlights the role of bi- and multilateral diplomacy, international
law, and UN organs in the settlement of disputes and disagreements over access to
natural resources, rather than the use of military force.30
The strategy outlines ‘a rational and pragmatic foreign policy, one which
excludes expensive confrontation, including a new arms race’.31 To some extent,
this runs contrary to the sections which deal with Russia’s relationship with
NATO. The strategy reiterates the main elements in Russia’s well-known stance
on NATO enlargement and anti-ballistic missile defense, and argues in favour of
an all-encompassing European security system. However, the anti-NATO rhetoric
of the previous editions of the strategy – particularly the revised one, which was published shortly after the 1999 war in Kosovo – appears to have been toned down.
The same goes for the nuclear weapons dimension, which is highly relevant to the
Arctic. The 2009 National Security Strategy and the 2010 Military Doctrine appear to
be more restrictive than previous editions when it comes to the conditions under
which nuclear weapons may be used.32 Both documents seem to place more
weight on the conventional capabilities of Russian Armed Forces, and the need to
the develop these. This indicates that the Arctic, where sea-based nuclear weapons
have traditionally been Russia’s main military asset, may not be the top of the priority
list. The picture is, however, far from clear, and the Russian political and military
establishment is sending mixed, and sometimes contradictory, messages when it
comes to the role of the Arctic in contemporary Russian security and defence policy.
A good example of this is the confusion and controversy surrounding the publication of the 2008 Arctic Strategy.33 Like the National Security Strategy, this
Arctic strategy document was prepared by the Russian Security Council, led by
former FSB director Nikolai Patrushev, and signed by President Medvedev in the
spring of 2008. However, it was not made public until March 2009. The Arctic Strategy included the following passage, which was interpreted in the media as signalling
a possible Russian military build-up in the Arctic: ‘The main goals of the state policy
of the Russian Federation in the Arctic are. . . b) in the sphere of military security,
defense and border protection; [to] create groupings of Russian Army general
purpose troops (forces) as well as other troops and military units and organs. . .
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capable of providing military security in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation
under various military-political situations’.34
This sentence was largely in line with signals that in the preceding months and
years had come from hard-liners within the Russian political and military establishment, such as Airborne Forces Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov, head of the
Defence Ministry’s unit for combat readiness.35 Also, the Secretary of the Security
Council, Nikolai Patrushev, and the former Chief of the General Staff, General
Yuri Baluyevskiy, had on a number of previous occasions signalled an intention to
beef up Russia’s military presence in the region. In addition, the issue was being discussed in connection with the reorganization of the command and control structure of
the Russian Armed Forces and the plans that were underway to merge military
districts and establish regionally based joint commands resembling those of the
United States.
However, as later became clear, the wording in the Arctic Strategy was not meant
to signal an intention to establish new military units in the Arctic. The intention had
rather been to emphasize the need for a more efficient border and coast guard service
in the Russian Arctic. These tasks belong under the operational authority of units controlled by the FSB and other organs not subordinated to the Ministry of Defence.
Thus, the publication of the Arctic Strategy spurred much unnecessary concern
among Russia’s Arctic neighbours, and apparently a round of inter-agency discussions in Moscow.
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who met with his Arctic Council colleagues in
Tromsø shortly after the publication of the Russian Arctic Strategy, found it necessary to underline that Russia was ‘not planning to increase [its] military presence in the
Arctic and to deploy [general purpose] armed forces there’.36 The Ministry of
Defence, on its part, later rejected the interpretation that the regular armed forces
did not have a role to play in the maintenance of security in the Russian Arctic,
and that the FSB was about to take over the operational control of the region. One
Ministry of Defence spokesman was quoted as saying ‘it never has been and never
will be the case in Russia that some piece of its territory is handed over to one
agency. The north is not a private possession; all [Russian] power structures are
responsible for its security’.37
Compared to statements made by representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the
General Staff, the Navy, and other branches of the Russian Armed Forces, statements
made by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are generally more cautious in tone, particularly when it comes to issues such as the conflict potential in
the Arctic and the role of military power. Whereas the military tend to highlight
the need for a radically enhanced military presence in the region,38 diplomats tend
to tone down the conflict potential and warn about the dangers of excessive military
muscle-flexing.39
The Russian officer corps does not, however, constitute a homogenous group.
Neither does the Russian diplomatic corps. Some of the diplomats, such as NATO
ambassador Dmitriy Rogozin, have been known to hold political views that are
close to those of the nationalist camp.40 Rogozin has on several occasions raised
Russian security concerns related to the Arctic. In the fall of 2010, he threatened
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that Russia would withdraw from its missile defence cooperation with NATO and
take appropriate countermeasures if NATO deployed ship-based missile interceptors
on Aegis-capable surface vessels in the Barents Sea.41
In the Russian Duma, the left- and right-wing opposition parties – respectively,
the Communist Party (CPRF) and the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDPR) – occasionally attempt to challenge the line of the ruling majority, usually without any luck.
Since the Parliament’s real influence on the country’s security policy is relatively
limited, parliamentary debates on security tend to centre on symbolic issues which
may yield domestic political dividends, rather than on practically oriented
problem-solving. To the extent that there is real opposition to the President and Government’s Arctic policy, it is usually weak and fragmented.
The distribution of military resources between various geographical regions and
Russia’s naval fleets42 is a recurring topic in Russian security debates. Since the
Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, the Black Sea Fleet has been strengthened,43
apparently at the expense of the Baltic Fleet. Calls have also been made for a strengthening of the Russian Pacific Fleet in light of China’s rise and other developments in
the Asia-Pacific region. For instance, under current plans, the first three of Russia’s
new ballistic missile submarines (the Borei class) will be commissioned in the
Pacific Fleet, replacing the oldest of the Delta III SSBNs based on Kamchatka.44
However, the Northern Fleet still seems to get the lion’s share of the resources allocated for force modernization, exercises, and patrols. The main competition for
resources in the years to come is likely to arise between the Northern and the
Black Sea fleets.45
Russia’s Military and Paramilitary Capabilities in the Arctic
Although the role of military power in the Arctic has been redefined and toned down
after the end of the Cold War, the region has not ceased to be a training and operation
area for military and security forces. As stated in the 2010 Military Doctrine, Russia’s
military policy is aimed at ‘. . . preventing an arms race, deterring and preventing
military conflicts, improving the military organization, the forms and methods of
the utilization of the Armed Forces and other troops, and also [improving the]
means of attack for the purpose of defending and safeguarding the security of the
Russian Federation and the interests of its allies’.46 When it comes to geographical
priorities in Russia’s military policy, the Military Doctrine offers little or no guidance. Until recently, Russia was divided into six military districts, of which four
– Leningrad, Volga/Urals, Siberia, and the Far East – bordered on the Arctic. In
the Soviet period, and in the first two decades of the post-Soviet period, military districts were mainly seen as a way to organize and lead ground forces, and to some
extent air defence forces. Russia’s naval forces have traditionally had a more independent position.
In the late 2008, Defence Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov announced that plans were
underway to merge some of the military districts and establish four regionally based
‘operational-strategic commands’, one for each strategic direction (West, East, North,
and South), somewhat similar to the American model. These commands would be
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‘joint’, in the sense that they would exercise control over all non-nuclear military
forces located within their command area, including the designated naval forces
(VMF), air force units (VVS), and special operations forces (Spetsnaz). In
wartime, the regional commands would even be in charge of non-military forces
such as those of the FSB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Ministry of
Emergency Situations (EMERCOM), et cetera.
Details of the reorganization were announced by the Chief of the General Staff,
General Nikolai Makarov, in April 2010.47 The Western Command was to be located
in St Petersburg and would include the former Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts, as well as the Baltic and Northern Fleets. The Eastern Command would be
located in Khabarovsk and include the easternmost part of the Siberian Military District, all of the Far Eastern Military District, and the Pacific Fleet. The Southern
Command would be located in Rostov-na-Donu and include the North Caucasus
Military District, the Black Sea Fleet, and the Caspian Flotilla. Instead of a Northern
Command, a Central Command was to be set up in Yekaterinburg, encompassing the
Volga/Urals Military District and the western part of the Siberian Military District.
The start date for the implementation of the new command system was set as 1
December 2010.
As regards the Arctic, three things about the new command structure are worth
noting: firstly, that the conventional naval units operating in the Arctic will belong
to the Western Command, located in St Petersburg; secondly, that the Central
Command will be located in the southern part of Siberia, rather than in the northern;
and thirdly, that the Central Command, which is responsible for a large (but seasonally ice-covered) portion of Russia’s Arctic coastline, will not have a naval element of
its own.48 It is also worth noting that Russia’s land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear
weapons and delivery platforms will remain under the operational control of the
General Staff in Moscow, as well as under political control. And as in previous
times, ground, naval, and air forces based in one part of the country may well train
and conduct operations in another part of the country, upon agreement between the
regional commanders.
The naval surface and subsurface forces on the Kola Peninsula constitute the
lion’s share of Russia’s current military assets north of the Arctic Circle. This is
likely to remain the situation in the years ahead. The Northern Fleet’s nuclear submarines were until recently organized into two squadrons, each with several subunits.
In February 2010, the submarine squadrons were merged into a new structure called
‘the submarine forces’, the headquarters of which is located in the closed town of
Gadzhievo, close to the mouth of the Kola fiord. In addition to Gadzhievo, which
is the easternmost of the submarine bases (formerly known as Skalisty), the submarines are based in Vidyayevo and Zaozersk, closer to the Russian-Norwegian border.49
At present, the Northern Fleet’s submarine force consists of one Typhoon-class
SSBN (Dmitriy Donskoi), which is mainly being used as a test platform for the
new sea-launched ballistic missile (Bulava); six operational Delta IV-class SSBNs
(+ one in reserve); and one Borei-class SSBN (Yuri Dolgorukiy), which does not
yet have a fully operational missile system.50 Two additional Borei submarines are
under construction, and five more have been planned for the period to 2015 (and
RUSSIA’S ARMED FORCES AND THE ARCTIC
279
most likely beyond). The Borei class, whose missile system is still in the test phase, is
an advanced, fourth-generation class of ballistic missile submarines. It is expected to
replace, inter alia, the Delta III submarines of the Pacific Fleet. The submarine forces
of Northern Fleet also include a number of nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs). The most modern of these is of the Yasen class, which is more advanced
than its predecessor, the Akula, of which the Northern Fleet today has six operational
boats. The Fleet’s inventory also includes three nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) of the Oscar II class, and six-seven diesel-electric submarines
(SSKs) of the Kilo class.
As for surface forces, the Northern Fleet includes one aircraft carrier (Admiral
Kuznetsov), which is due for a major overhaul in 2012; a nuclear-powered heavy
missile cruiser (‘Peter the Great’); a handful of Udaloy- and Sovremenniy-class
destroyers; and a dozen medium-sized and numerous smaller vessels. The Udaloyclass destroyers are mainly intended to be used in an anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) role, whereas the Sovremenniy-class destroyers are mainly intended to be
used in an anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and/or anti-air (AAW) role. The different
qualities of the vessels are being taken into account when surface action groups
are put together for exercises and operations. However, in terms of numbers and capabilities, the surface force of the Northern Fleet is much less potent than that of the
former Soviet Northern Fleet, and its operational radius is significantly smaller. In
1985, the Northern Fleet had 81 heavy surface combatants (aircraft carriers, cruisers,
destroyers, and frigates) in its inventory.51 Today, it has around ten.52
In terms of age, the vessels of the Russian Navy are on average 25 years old (the
surface vessels are generally older than the subsurface vessels), and many of them are
in dire need of repair or replacement. This fact, along with the miserable state of the
Russian military-industrial complex and Russia’s experiences in the 2008 war against
Georgia, have given rise to a growing Russian desire to purchase naval vessels from
abroad. The vessel of primary interest today is a French amphibious assault ship,
Mistral, which is a helicopter carrier, rather than an aircraft carrier. In April 2010
the Russian government approved the purchase of four of these vessels, the first of
which is to be built and assembled in France as soon as a formal contract is concluded.
The second may be built in France and assembled in Russia, and the last two may be
built jointly in Russia around 2015 – 2020.53 According to Defence Minister Serdyukov, the first two Mistrals will be assigned to the Northern and Pacific Fleets,54
though many suspect that they may be more needed in the Black Sea region.
In light of Russia’s still unsettled dispute with Japan over the Kuril Islands,
located between the Sea of Okhotsk and the North Pacific, it is also possible that
the Pacific Fleet will receive both of the first two Mistrals, and that the Northern
Fleet will receive vessel number three and/or four.55
Upgrades are also needed for the Russian air forces that are based – or operate –
in the Arctic. These include local air and air defence forces, maritime patrol aircraft,
naval aviation, and the long-range bomber force, which is mainly based at the Engels
air force base near Saratov in Southern Russia. Many of the formerly potent fighter
and interceptor aviation regiments in the Russian Northwest have been downsized,
relocated, disbanded, or merged with other units. Among the air bases still in
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CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY
operation are the Olenya base near Olenegorsk on the Kola Peninsula, 92 kilometres
south of Murmansk, and the Besovets base outside Petrozavodsk in Karelia. The
bases feature a number of Soviet-era fighter and interceptor aircraft such as Su-27
(‘Flanker’), MiG-25 (‘Foxbat’), and MiG-31 (‘Foxhound’).56 When it comes to
naval aviation, the Northern Fleet possesses a fleet of 19 carrier-based and aerial
refueling-capable Su-33 (‘Flanker-D’). These, too, are relatively old, and their
pilots often lack sufficient training and flight hours.57 The strategic bomber force,
which mainly consists of turboprop Tu-95 (‘Bear’) and supersonic Tu-160 (‘Blackjack’) aircraft, has in recent years increased the number of patrols in and through
the Arctic airspace, but the total number of patrols is still fairly modest.58 Needless
to say, the bombers do not carry nuclear weapons during their training sorties.
In terms of ground forces, the Russian north does not appear to be an area of priority, at least not compared to the North Caucasus Military District, where Russia is
facing a number of difficult and long-term security challenges. The Kola Peninsula
still hosts an independent motorized infantry brigade (the ‘200th’), located in
Pechenga, close to the Norwegian border. There is also a motorized infantry
brigade (the ‘138th Guards’) in Kamenka, Karelia. Other than that, few ground
force units of any significance are located in the Russian north, and no new ones
are planned. A number of ground force units based elsewhere in Russia, including
regular infantry, airborne, and special (Spetsnaz) forces, regularly train in the
Arctic, and may be transferred to the region in the (unlikely) event of an emerging
land military threat against the region.
This leaves a heavy responsibility on paramilitary structures such as the FSB
Border Guard Service. The headquarters of the Arctic Regional Border Directorate
of the FSB is located in Murmansk and since December 2009 has been led by FSB
Lieutenant General Sergei Kudryashov. As far as maritime areas are concerned, its
area of responsibility stretches all the way from the Norwegian-Russian maritime
border to the Wrangel Island in the Chukchi Sea. The Border Guard Service,
which also performs the role of coast guard, has a number of stations on locations
along Russia’s northern frontier, including on Franz Josef Land, Novaya Zemlya,
and Severnaya Zemlya. It also controls a fleet of corvette-size patrol vessels and maritime patrol aircraft. Still, its operational means are limited, considering the vast area
that it is supposed to patrol. On the other hand, it can be argued that the area in question is sparsely populated, and that large parts of it, at least for the time being, feature
limited human activity. The only major exception is the Barents Sea region, where the
activity level is high, and where the FSB cooperates closely with its Norwegian
counterpart (the Norwegian Coast Guard).
Conclusion
If we compare Russia’s current strategic interests in the Arctic with those of the
Soviet Union in the Cold War period, we find both similarities and differences. As
Russia’s gateway to the North Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea
region still plays an important role in the country’s nuclear deterrence strategy.
Russia’s sea-based nuclear arsenal has shrunk in size and deteriorated badly, but
RUSSIA’S ARMED FORCES AND THE ARCTIC
281
measures are being taken to modernize it and to uphold the country’s status as a
nuclear-armed great power and an important player in international and Arctic
affairs. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the relative importance of
Russia’s ice-free ports on the Kola Peninsula has grown, rather than diminished,
mainly because Russia has lost access to naval bases and ship repair facilities elsewhere, most notably in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. The northern regions
today constitute some 65 per cent of the land territory of the Russian Federation.
The corresponding figure for the Soviet Union was 49 per cent. Russia has in other
words become more of a ‘northern’ country. More than half the coastline of postSoviet Russia borders on the Arctic Ocean and its adjacent seas.
In addition to the Arctic region’s traditional role in Russian nuclear deterrence
strategy comes the region’s new role as the country’s ‘primary resource base’. The
melting of the Arctic ice cap and innovations in petroleum technology may in the
not-so-distant future open the region to year-round and ship traffic and offshore petroleum activity. An estimated 80 per cent of Russia’s remaining oil and gas reserves
are located north of the Arctic Circle, and Russia is expected to (re)submit a shelf
claim covering an area of approximately 1.2 million square kilometres between the
outer limit of its 200-mile economic zone and the North Pole. The protection of
Russia’s economic interests and maritime border in the northern waters is likely to
impose new tasks and responsibilities on the FSB and the Northern Fleet. These
tasks will require new categories of vessels, capable of operating in the ‘brown
water’ zone.
Russia’s future behaviour in the Arctic, and the region’s place in the country’s
future security and defence policy, will depend on domestic as well as international
factors. In the domestic arena, the outcome of the 2012 presidential election may have
significant bearing on the policies pursued. The ruling Putin-Medvedev ‘tandem’ and
the country’s political elite have in recent months shown growing signs of disintegration. Disagreements over foreign and domestic policy issues such as the Libya
intervention, the direction of Russia’s political and economic modernization, and
whether government officials should be allowed to serve on the corporate boards
of Russian companies, have come to the fore. Whether Dmitriy Medvedev will run
for re-election, or whether Vladimir Putin will make a comeback as president, this
time for a six-year term with a legal option for a fourth term to 2024, is still an
open question.
Russia’s foreign policy in the Arctic will largely depend on – and influence – the
nature of Russia’s relationship with NATO and the policies adopted by other Arctic
rim states. The pragmatism that marks Russia’s current relationship with NATO may
be replaced by a more confrontational stance, particularly if Russia and NATO fail to
reach agreement on a pan-European missile defence system. Similarly, there is no
guarantee that the progress that has been made in Russia’s relations with its Arctic
neighbours in recent years will continue throughout the 21st century. The region’s
growing economic significance, the existence of unresolved jurisdictional issues,
and the present action-reaction dynamics in the military field may lead to a strengthening of the military dimension in Russia’s Arctic policies.
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CONTEMPO RA RY SECURITY POLICY
This does not mean, however, that remilitarization of the region is on the cards.
The tension level in the Barents Sea region and other parts of the Arctic is much lower
today than it was in the days of the Cold War, and hard security concerns in the Arctic
do not figure at the top of Russia’s current security agenda. Russia has other and more
pressing security challenges elsewhere, in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Far
East. Recent Russian strategy documents, such as the National Security Strategy,
the Military Doctrine, and the Arctic Strategy, highlight the crucial role of diplomacy
and international law in the settlement of interstate disputes in the northern part of the
globe. Whereas Russia’s Arctic policy in the past was governed by national security
interests, it is now increasingly governed by national economic interests and the interests of companies closely associated with the Russian state.
Though not at the level of previous times in terms of volume, Russia’s military
power is and will continue to be a factor in frontier regions such as the Arctic, and
as such it cannot be neglected by international security experts and defence planners.
But, if subjected to a sober assessment, neither the pattern of Russia’s current military
activity in the Arctic nor the content of strategy documents adopted in recent years
should give cause for alarm.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This study has been financed by the Research Council of Norway under the ‘Geopolitics in the High North’
programme – a five-year (2008–2012) research programme conducted by the Norwegian Institute for
Defence Studies with partners and associates. Parts of the article are based on some of the author’s previous
publications, including a German piece entitled ‘Im Norden nichts Neues? Die Arktis in Russland’s
Sicherheitspolitik’, published in Osteuropa, Vol. 61, Nos. 2 –3 (2011). The author would like to thank
Tor Bukkvoll, Anders Kjølberg, Rolf-Inge Vogt Andresen, and CSP’s anonymous reviewers for taking
the time to read and comment on earlier drafts of the manuscript.
NOTES
1. Michael L. Roi, ‘Russia: the Greatest Arctic Power?’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4
(December 2010), p. 551f.
2. Pavel Podvig, ‘Strategic Fleet’, posted 20 December 2010 at http://russianforces.org/navy/
3. See for instance Scott G. Borgerson, ‘Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of
Global Warming’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 2 (March/April 2008), pp. 63– 77; Mark Galeotti,
‘Cold Calling: Competition Heats Up for Arctic Resources’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 20,
No 10 (October 2008), pp. 9–15; David Fairhall, Cold Front: Conflict Ahead in Arctic Waters
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2010).
4. Barry Scott Zellen, Arctic Doom, Arctic Boom: The Geopolitics of Climate Change in the Arctic (Santa
Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2009), p. 93.
5. See for instance Rob Huebert, ‘The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment’, Paper, Canadian
Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2010, available at http://www.cdfai.org/publicationsyear.htm, pp.
15–18; Ariel Cohen, Lajos F. Szaszdi and Jim Dolbow, ‘The New Cold War: Reviving the U.S. Presence in the Arctic’, Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, 30 October 2008, available at http://s3.
amazonaws.com/thf_media/2008/pdf/bg2202.pdf, pp. 10–11; Adrian Blomfield, ‘Russia plans Arctic
military build-up’, Daily Telegraph, 12 June 2008, p. 17.
6. Valery Melnikov, ‘Russia to Prioritize Modern Weaponry in New Arms Acquisition Program’, RIA
Novosti, 11 March 2011, available at http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20110311/162956743.html
7. David Nowak, ‘Russian military to purchase 600 planes, 100 ships’, Associated Press Archive, 25 February 2011, http://www.ap.org/
8. Rob Huebert, ‘The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment’ (note 5), p. 18.
RUSSIA’S ARMED FORCES AND THE ARCTIC
283
9. Up to February 2011, Russia was only able to deliver one of the seven nuclear submarines planned for
procurement in the 2007– 2015 period, two of twelve of the planned corvettes and frigates, and 22 of
the 116 planned warplanes. As with the previous State Arms Procurement Program (GPV-2015), there
are many uncertainties when it comes to the financing and implementation of the current, and considerably more ambitious, programme (GPV-2020). For details, see Ivan Safronov, ‘Minoborony pereshlo
ot slov k 19 trillionam’ [The Ministry of Defense went from Words to 19 Trillion], Kommersant Daily,
25 February 2011, p. 2.
10. Rob Huebert, ‘The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment’ (note 5), p. 18.
11. Atle Staalesen, ‘Medvedev: The Arctic is Best Without NATO’, BarentsObserver, 17 September 2010,
available at http://www.barentsobserver.com/medvedev-the-arctic-is-best-without-nato.482004458932.html
12. Tønne Huitfeldt, Tomas Ries and Gunvald Øyna, Strategic Interests in the Arctic (Oslo: Norwegian
Institute for Defence Studies, 1992), p. 93.
13. Kristian Åtland, ‘The Introduction, Adoption and Implementation of Russia’s Northern Strategic
Bastion Concept, 1992-1999’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4 (October 2007),
p. 510.
14. In the so-called ‘Sector decree’, issued in 1926, the Soviet Government claimed all lands and islands
between the meridians 328 Eastern and 1688 Western longitude. In Soviet times, the entire ‘sector’ was
largely perceived as Soviet internal waters. Today, the applicability of the Sector decree to contemporary maritime law is highly contested. Nevertheless, the principle has a special place in Russian thinking
with regard to the Arctic. See Leonid Timtchenko, ‘The Russian Arctic Sectoral Concept: Past and
Present’, Arctic, Vol. 50, No. 1 (March 1997), pp. 29– 35.
15. Rudolf A. Golosov, ‘Osvoenie Arktiki i podvodnyi flot Rossii’ [The Conquest of the Arctic and
Russia’s Submarine Fleet], Voyennaia Mysl’, No. 3 (March 2006), pp. 49–50.
16. Aleksandr Kots, ‘Ryazan’ podo l’dami Arktiki’ [Ryazan’ under the Arctic Ice], Komsomol’skaya
Pravda, 1 October 2008, p. 4.
17. Ilya Mogilevkin, Arktika: Interesy Rossii i mezhdunarodnye usloviya ikh realizatsii (The Arctic:
Russia’s interests and the international conditions of their realization) (Moscow: Nauka, 2002), p. 39.
18. USGS, ‘90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic’,
press release, 23 July 2008, available at http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980&from=
rss_home
19. See for instance Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov’s 2005 address to the Russian Maritime Collegium,
‘O sozdanii kompleksnoi sistemy bezopasnosti neftegazovykh kompleksov na kontinental’noi shel’fe’(On the Establishment of a Complex Security System for Petroleum Installations on the Continental
Shelf), Morskoi sbornik, No. 12 (December 2005), pp. 5– 6.
20. Kristian Åtland, ‘Russia’s Northern Fleet and the Oil Industry – Rivals or Partners? Petroleum,
Security, and Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Cold War Arctic’, Armed Forces & Society,
Vol. 35, No. 2 (January 2009), p. 378.
21. Vladimir Gundarov, ‘Pogruzivshis’, nadeemsya vsplyt’’ [Having Taken a Dive, we Hope to
Resurface], Rossiyskoe voennoye obozrenie, Nos. 3– 4 (March/April 2005), p. 21.
22. Dmitriy Litovkin, ‘Nash flot snova zavoyevaet mir’ [Our Navy Again Conquers the World], Izvestiya,
9 June 2003, p. 4.
23. ‘FSB opens Shtokman village’, BarentsObserver, 5 March 2009, available at http://www.
barentsobserver.com/fsb-opens-shtokman-village.4563718-16178.html.
24. ‘Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean’, signed in Murmansk on 15 September
2009, available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/avtale_engelsk.pdf
25. Howard Amos, ‘Arctic Treaty with Norway Opens Fields’, Moscow Times, 7 July 2011, p. 1.
26. Donald N. Jensen, ‘How Russia is Ruled – 1998’, Report E102, Conflict Studies Research Centre, p.
24.
27. These documents replace, respectively, the 1997/2000 National Security Concept and the 2000 Military Doctrine. They are available (in Russian) on the website of the Russian Security Council, http://
www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/sections/3/
28. This document was published in 2009, and is available at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html.
It replaces a similar document from 2001: see http://www.arctictoday.ru/region/economics/469.html
29. ‘Strategia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiyskoi Federatsii do 2020 goda’ [National Security Strategy
of the Russian Federation to 2020], 2009, available at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html.
My translation (KÅ).
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30. Russia’s long-standing maritime delimitation dispute with Norway in the Barents Sea and the Arctic
Ocean was resolved on 15 September 2010, after more than 40 years of bilateral negotiations. The full
text of the delimitation treaty is available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/
avtale_engelsk.pdf
31. ‘Strategia natsional’noi bezopasnosti’ (note 29).
32. For a detailed discussion, see Nikolai Sokov, ‘The New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: the Nuclear
Angle’, posted 5 February 2010 at http://cns.miis.edu/stories/100205_russian_nuclear_doctrine.htm;
Roger McDermott, ‘Russia’s National Security Strategy’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 19 May 2009, available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35010
33. ‘Osnovy gosudarstvennoy politiki Rossiyskoi Federatsii v Arktike na period do 2020 goda i dal’neishuyu perspektivu’ [Fundamentals of the Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic for the
Period up to 2020 and beyond], 18 September 2008, available at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/
98.html My translation (KÅ).
34. Ibid.
35. See for instance ‘Rossiyskaia Armia gotovitsya k bitve v Arktike’ [The Russian Army Prepares to
Fight in the Arctic], Izvestiya, 24 June 2008, available at http://www.izvestia.ru/news/news179190
36. Trude Pettersen, ‘Lavrov: No Enhancement of Russian Military Presence in the North’, BarentsObserver, 30 April 2009, available at http://www.barentsobserver.com/index.php?id=4586694. Lavrov’s
opening remarks at the Arctic Council meeting in Tromsø on 29 April 2009 are available at the
website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.ln.mid.ru
37. Viktor Baranets, ‘Rossiya gotova vysadit’ arkticheskiy desant dlya zaschity svoikh polyarnykh granits’
[Russia is Ready to Put Airborne Forces in the Arctic to Protect its Polar Borders], Komsomol’skaya
Pravda, 28 March 2009, p. 1. My translation (KÅ)
38. See for instance Konstantin Rashepkin and Andrei Lunyov, ‘General-leytenant Vladimir Shamanov:
Podgotovka i oblik Armii budet menyat’sya’ [Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov: The Training
and Appearance of the Army will Change], Kraznaya zvezda, 24 June 2008, p. 1, cited the same day in
‘Russia prepares for future combat in the Arctic’, RIA Novosti, http://en.beta.rian.ru/russia/20080624/
111915879.html
39. See for instance the statement made by Russia’s Arctic Council representative, Ambassador Anton
Vasilyev, prior to the Council’s Ministerial in Troms, 28– 29 April 2009, referenced in Denis Tel’manov, ‘Chasovye Arktiki stoyat’ [Safeguarding the Arctic], Gazeta, 21 April 2001, p. 7.
40. ‘Putin Appoints “Nationalist” Rogozin as Russia’s NATO Envoy’, RIA Novosti, 10 January 2008,
available at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080110/95978194.html
41. Dmitry Korobeinikov, ‘U.S. Could Deploy Missile Shield in Arctic – Russia’s NATO Envoy’, RIA
Novosti, 28 September 2010, available at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090929/156282845.html; Mikhail
Fomichev, ‘European Missile Defense System Either with Russia or against Russia – NATO
Envoy’, RIA Novosti, 2 December 2010, available at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20101202/161595398.
html
42. The Russian Navy is divided into four fleets (the Northern, Pacific, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleet) and one
independent flotilla (the Caspian Flotilla). Two of the fleets are nuclear-armed (the Northern and the
Pacific).
43. Taras Kuzio, ‘Russia Plans to Strengthen the Black Sea Fleet’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 7 December
2010, available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=
37255
44. Ilya Pitalev, ‘Russia’s Pacific Fleet Ready to Receive Borey Class Submarines’, RIA Novosti, 19
October 2010, available at http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20101019/161011788.html
45. Mikhail Tsypkin, ‘The Challenge of Understanding the Russian Navy’, in Stephen J. Blank and
Richard Weitz (eds), The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2010), pp. 331– 57.
46. ‘Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoi Federatsii’ [Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation], 2010,
available at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/sections/3/
47. Roger McDermott, ‘Makarov Announces “New Look” Operational-Strategic Commands’, Eurasia
Daily Monitor, 15 June 2010, available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/
48. In discussions relating to the new command structure, it was suggested that all or parts of the Northern
Fleet could be attributed to the new Northern/Central Command, possibly located in the North. This
did not happen. The regional command headquarters for the central district are now (that is, since 1
December 2010) located in Yekaterinburg, some 1,300 kilometres south of the Arctic Ocean.
Unlike the new Western, Southern, and Eastern Commands, the Yekaterinburg command controls
no separate naval units.
RUSSIA’S ARMED FORCES AND THE ARCTIC
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49. Aleksei Elkin, ‘Podvodnye sily: novoye ob’’edinenie – starye zadachy’ [The Submarine Forces: New
Organization, Old Tasks], GTRK Murman, 11 February 2010, http://murman.rfn.ru/rnews.html?id=
849491
50. Podvig, ‘Strategic Fleet’ (note 2).
51. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: Routledge, 1985), p. 26.
52. Ibid., p. 223.
53. Alexei Danichev, ‘Russia, France Open Exclusive Talks on Sale of Four Mistral Warships’, RIA
Novosti, 1 March 2010, available at http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100301/158057156.html
54. Trude Pettersen, ‘Northern Fleet to get Helicopter Carrier First’, BarentsObserver, 26 May 2010, available at http://barentsobserver.com/northern-fleet-to-get-helicopter-carriers-first.4786923-116321.html
55. For further details, see Patrick Thomas Baker’s recent Master’s Degree thesis, A Study of the Russian
Postgraduate School, 2011), pp. 61– 72.
56. Stefan Büttner, ‘New Look for the Russian AF’, Combat Aircraft Monthly, Vol. 11, No. 6 (June 2010),
pp. 26–33; Aleksandr Pinchuk, ‘Na aviabaze Besovets’ [At Besovets Air Base], Krasnaya zvezda, 24
March 2010, p. 12.
57. Mikhail Barabanov, ‘Kuda idet rossiyskiy flot?’ [Where Does the Russian Navy Go?], Kommersant
Vlast’, 25 February 2008, p. 73.
58. According to the Norwegian Joint Headquarters, the Russian strategic bomber fleet carried out ten
patrol missions in the northwest (that is, west of 30 degrees east) in 2010, two less than in 2009 and
2008. Only one of the missions was carried out by a Tu-160 bomber. The remaining nine were
carried out by older Tu-95 bombers. See Thomas Nilsen, ‘Less Russian Military Aircrafts in the Vicinity of Norwegian Airspace’, BarentsObserver, 7 January 2011, available at http://www.barentsobs
erver.com/security.58932.en.html