DE RE A ND DE DICTO BELIEFS (1
R. E. JENNINGS and P. K. SCHOTCH
The intensionality o f beliefs consists in p a rt in the fact that
a statement o f one's beliefs is accurate o n ly insofar as i t does
justice t o one's misconceptions. B u t i t does n o t d icta te t h a t
one believes e ve ryth in g th a t one believes th a t one believes.
Thus, although o n e ma y b e lie ve t h a t Samuel d e Ch a mp la in
founded Stadacona, i t does n o t f o llo w th a t one believes th a t
he founded Quebec. B u t although one ma y b e lie ve th a t one
believes that the founded Chibougamau because one thinks that
«Chibougamau» is an alternative name f o r Quebec, one wo u ld
be wrong. Chibougamau is a dreadful place, f a r f ro m Quebec
and founded in 1950. I t isn 't that one has a false b e lie f about
Chibougamau. We wo u ld wa n t to contrast the p o ssib ility ju st
mentioned w i t h t h e p o ssib ilit y t h a t o n e sh o u ld k n o w v e r y
we ll th a t Chibougamau is a dreadful place f a r f ro m Quebec
and nevertheless b e lie ve t h a t Samuel d e Ch a mp la in wa s it s
founder. I n th is case one is mista ke n about Chibougamau; in
the fo rme r one is mistaken about one's beliefs.
In a f o rma l st u d y o f belief, in f a llib ilit y co n ce rn in g one's
own b e lie fs wo u ld b e represented b y t h e co lla p se f o rmu la
Ba
is
B that no co rre ct fo rma l account o f belief wo u ld countenance
a collapse f o rmu la a s representing a necessary feature o f
the
belief.
Th e reason, stated generally, is that in order fo r one to
p
hold
- - a b e lie f one mu st have ce rta in background information.
It
- -is a point which Professor David Ha mlyn has made in another
connection.
>
B
«If the belief that p in vo lve s o r presupposes the thought
a
that p, anyone wh o believes th a t p mu st have the co n p
cepts t h a t t h e th o u g h t it s e lf imp lie s. I n o t h e r wo rd s,
,
w
h ( ) W e a r e in d e b t e d
writ in g o f t his essay.
e
r
e
'
B
a
a
'
i
s
r
e
t o M . A. H a r t l e y wh o s e re ma rk s p ro mp t e d t h e
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E. J ENNI NG S and P. K. S CHO TCH
thinking that S is P involves having the concepts of S and
P, and th is in tu rn in vo lve s kn o win g in some sense what
it is fo r something to be S and P. I t wo u ld thus seem that
the possibility of believing something already presupposes
a ce rta in f o rm o f knowledge. I t is th is th a t renders i mpossible a re d u ctive b u t n o n circu la r analysis o f kn o wledge in to belief plus something else» (1.
Thinking o f belief as a mental state, we w i l l n a tu ra lly see
the fa ilu re o f the collapse fo rmu la as th e fa ilu re o f the p rin ciple o f in f a llib ilit y — But th in kin g o f belief as a mental act,
we w i l l understand the repudiation o f the collapse fo rmu la as
a re je ctio n o f the p rin cip le th a t no me n ta l a ct is beyond o u r
power. Fo r, h e re we see a me n ia l me n ta l act, ( i f e ve r there
was one), i n wh ich , u n d e r ce rta in circumstances w e mig h t
suppose ourselves t o h a ve b e e n successful wh e n w e h a ve
failed. O n the f irst v i e w i t is o u r confidence i n introspection
wh ich is p rin cip a lly undermined; o n the second it is to smugness concerning o u r powers o f b e lie f that reason administers
its ic y douche.
It will be immediately apparent that many purported instances o f religious b e lie f must, o n this account, n o t be instances
of belief at a ll. Fe w people, even fe w Christians, n o w suppose
that Christ, on the day of what is called his ascension a ctu a lly
ascended, at least in the o rd in a ry sense o f 'ascend' in wh ich a
fish on a lin e mig h t be said to ascend in to th e a ir. Ce rta in ly,
even if th e y imagine th a t he re a lly d id ascend, t h e y imagine
that he ascended o n ly u n til he was out o f sight — not u n til he
reached Heaven. I f h e we n t in t o heaven, i t wa sn 't th ro u g h
ascending t o a su fficie n t altitude. «Going in t o Heaven», t h e
young Ryle -n u rtu re d cle rg yma n w i l l , doubtless, t e l l u s, « is
more like going into a coma than like going into a closet». He
will g o o n t o quote Ca rl Solomon's re co lle ctio n s o f th e i n sulin ward:
I am reminded of the day I went into a coma free of crab(
1
)
D
a
v
i
d
H
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DE RE A ND DE DI CTO BELIEFS
4
5
3
lice a n d e me rg e d t h ro u g h ly in fe ste d (t h e sh e e ts a r e
sterilized d a ily). I had caught the lice in someone else's
coma... th is was so credited b y one o f my fe llo w patients
that he refused to submit to the needle the next day out of
fear o f venturing in to one o f my old comas and infesting
himself (
2
No w ).
i t is also th e case th a t entering th is state requires th e
embracing o f ce rta in beliefs — one o f wh ich is t h a t Ch rist
entered t h is state u n d e r ra th e r e xtra o rd in a ry circumstances.
But what of the many millio n s of the faithful who departed this
life with o u t the benefits o f modern theological methods, wh o
cherished a t great imaginative expense, th e b e lie f that Ch rist
reached Heaven a fte r a ve rtica l jo u rn e y o f some unspecified
duration ? Th e ir beliefs we re false, l i k e those o f th e A ria n s
and th e Albigensians. N o r does i t h e lp t o re ma rk th a t t h e ir
belief contained t h e re q u ire d ke rn e l o f t ru t h , n a me ly, t h a t
Christ entered the presence o f God. Fo r doubtless t h e y to o k
that altogether too p h ysica lly as we ll.
Some slig h t hesitancy o f th e sp irit is o n ly t o b e expected
under the circumstances. For it salvation depends upon having
the correct beliefs, o u r situation is poignant indeed. Give one's
religious beliefs sufficient factual content that one knows wh a t
one believes and the beliefs do d ivin e re a lity an injustice. Rob
the doctrines o f o rd in a ry factual content and i t becomes i mpossible t o t e ll wh e th e r one believes th e m o r not. No t o n ly
must one accept the doctrine on faith; one must accept on faith
that one has accepted the doctrine.
Ho w then is one to give an account o f the h isto rica l attitude
according to wh ich :
(a) Th e o n l y re lig io u s b e lie fs wh ic h in su re sa lva tio n a re
true beliefs.
(b) The beliefs o f e a rlie r believers we re false.
(c) The beliefs o f e a rlie r believers ensured t h e ir salvation.
(
Generation
and t he A n g ry Y oung Men.
2
)
C
a
r
l
S
O
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O
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E. J ENNI NG S and P. K. S CHO TCH
(d) The beliefs o f mo re sophisticated modern believers e n sure t h e ir salvation.
It is not sufficient to say «They believed that Christ ascended
into He a ve n a n d wh a te ve r t h e y me a n t b y that, i t wa s su f ficient». Fo r if someone meant b y that that his dog had psoriasis, the Inquisition at least would not have taken it lig h tly. Yet
when w e lo o k f o r t h e co mmo n g ro u n d between t h e n a ive
physicalistic beliefs o f e a rlie r believers and the sophisticated
beliefs o f modern believers a ll th a t presents itse lf is the f o rm
of words in wh ich the belief is expressed. But there is more to
be found. F o r wh a t th e e a rlie r a n d la t e r b e lie ve rs disagree
about is what it is that some religious a u th o rity has said. Th e y
share t h e b e lie f t h a t wh a t t h e re lig io u s a u t h o rit y h a s sa id
(whatever that ma y be) is true. Th is belief, however, is n o t a
belief de re a t a ll; ra th e r i t is a b e lie f de dicto, a belief, n o t
about Christ, but about a proposition. The theology, simp listic
or sophisticated, can be vie we d as a subsidiary attempt to say
what the proposition is. But it is possible to h o ld the de dicto
belief with o u t theologizing a t a ll. I t ma y n o t commend itse lf
to the in te lle ctu a lly fastidious, b u t it is a t least possible. I t is
not essentially d iffe re n t f ro m b e lie vin g th a t wh a te ve r Jones
has sa id i n some unopened le tte r is tru e . W e ma y n o rma lly
speak a b o u t propositions b y n o min a lizin g sentences w h i c h
express them, as in «The proposition that a ll men are mo ra l is
false», but we can also refer to th e m b y description: «The p ro position that is expressed by the first complete sentence on the
previous page i s true» o r « Wh a t Ma t t h e w sa id t o Hild a i s
bound to be false». Th is is n o t to sa y that reference b y description is su re fire . I t ma y t u rn o u t t h a t t h e f irs t co mp le te
sentence o n the previous page expresses n o proposition, th a t
Matthew said nothing to Hild a . H o w we treat such sentences
whose d e fin ite descriptions p u rp o rt t o re f e r t o propositions
but f a il t o d o s o w i l l depend u p o n t h e g e n e ra l t h e o ry o f
definite descriptions we adopt. But in the case o f de d ie t° beliefs wh o se p ro p o sitio n a l descriptions f a i l o f reference, w e
need o n ly say that th e y are false o r vacuously tru e o r fa ilin g
in a presupposition, depending u p o n t h e dictates o f o u r f a -
DE RE A ND DE DiCTO BELIEFS
4
5
5
vourite theory. Fo r present purposes w e need o n ly sa y th a t
the man who accepts on faith that what some religious authority was saying when he uttered the sentence « Ch rist ascended
into Heaven» is true, also accepts o n fa ith th a t th e re lig io u s
authority was saying something.
One ma y fe e l in clin e d t o g ru mb le th a t i t is sophistical t o
say that in such a case a believer knows what he believes. Fo r
if he does n o t kn o w wh a t proposition i t is th a t th e re lig io u s
authority's sentence expresses, h e does n o t k n o w wh a t i t is
that he believes t o be true. B u t even wit h in the re a lm o f de
re beliefs, w e a d mit th e p o ssib ility o f beliefs wh ic h a re in definite i n th is wa y. C y r i l ma y believe th a t th e ma n o n th e
corner has a stoop wit h o u t kn o win g the id e n t it y o f the man.
This is different fro m cla imin g that Cy ril believes th a t horses
are perissodactyl ungulates wh ils t a d mittin g th a t C y r i l does
not kn o w wh a t horses a re o r perissodactyls o r ungulates.
De d ict a b e lie f sentences m a y present d ifficu ltie s f o r t h e
formal analyst who is accustomed to th in kin g of the concept of
a proposition as a semantic notion. H o w th e n t o develop a
semantics f o r a belief lo g ic wh ich tolerates both beliefs de re
and beliefs d e d icto ? I f propositions a re regarded as sets o f
possible worlds, then beliefs de dicta are beliefs about sets o f
possible wo rld s. Th is seems unpromising. A mo re l i k e l y a p proach is one in wh ich de dicta beliefs are regarded as beliefs
about the meaning and reference o f the te rms o f a sentence.
To sa y that a sentence expresses a tru e proposition is t o sa y
that the meaning and reference o f its te rms a re such that the
sentence describes things th e wa y th e y are. Wh a t is needed
is a structure sufficiently rich that one can plausibly ta lk about
meanings o f fo rmu la e a t p o in ts i n i t a s w e l l a s t ru t h a n d
falsity.
Consider th e language L o f some person, A rt h u r (we w i l l
refer to h im in more formal contexts b y his in itia l in lo we r case
italics). A rt h u r' s language L p ro vid e s t h e resources f o r t h e
construction o f in d e fin ite ly ma n y declarative sentences. But L
is a natural language wh ich has evolved to meet a wid e range
of communicational needs determined by the changing physical
and social circumstances o f Arth u r's tribe. We w i l l expect the
456
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E. J ENNI NG S and P. IC S CHO TCH
language to be usable even in circumstances wh ich the t rib e
has n e ve r encountered — b u t n o t i n a ll such circumstances.
We w i l l lik e ly grant the p o ssib ility that in a b iza rre ly altered
universe ma n y o f the sentences o f the language could not be
assigned a tru th -va lu e . Th e situ a tio n is , o f course, o n l y a
variant o f the situation we a re in wit h some o f the re lig io u s
sentence constructible in English where nothing in our common
experience enables us t o assign them a tru th value — where
the u n ive rse o f o u r experience wo u ld h a ve t o b e b iza rre ly
altered i n o rd e r f o r th e m t o b e assigned t ru t h va lu e s o t h e r
than as an act o f faith.
A model fo r such a language w i l l not be a ll that simple. But
we can g ive a rough p ictu re i n the f o llo win g wa y: L e t U be
any non-empty set together wit h a mapping of the sentences of
some more basic language — say those of physics in to 2u. The
idea of this is that each element of U together wit h this assignment can be seen as representing a set o f p h ysica lly possible
circumstances. A mo d e l f o r L w i l l be a map V f ro m the sentences o f L in t o 3u. W e ma y t h in k o f th e sentences a s re ceiving at each point in U a value fro m the set 11. 0, *1. I t re ceives 1 i n those circumstances wh ich make i t tru e ; 0 wh e re
the circumstances make it false and * where the circumstances
provide no basis fo r assigning it one o f the other of 1 and O.
A model d t
f f oset
r o f physical circumstances (indexed b y I) and V is a
empty
L
function
f ro m the sentence o f L in t o 3u. W e ca n sa y th a t a
model
i s d i makes a sentence a propositional at u if V (a, u) e 20
and
t otherwise
h e
not. I n addition we wa n t to impose restrictions
upon
wa y in wh ich V evaluates sentences about A rth u r's
n the
,
beliefs.
We r e a l l t h e sentences o f A rt h u r' s language ma d e
a
propositional
a t U a n d h is b e lie fs wit h o u t e xce p tio n d e r e
p
a
i
rwe would associate with A rth u r a function NB : U —> 2
beliefs
a
<
2U
and say that
, U
,
VE U, V e t e L, V (u, B
u
> a )
a
= this fo rma lly in the fo llo win g way: NB
understanding
w
1
.
#
set
o
f
subsets
a (u )
i s o“ f Uw
t wh
h ich
e seem t o A rt h u r t o co n ta in u . A c :h
e
V
(r
w
,
e
a
)
U
=
i
1
}
s
E
a
N
B
n
a
DE RE A N D DE DI CTO BELIEFS
4
5
7
cordingly we wo u ld say at u that A rt h u r believes tha t a if f u
seems to A rt h u r to be contained in the set o f points wh e re a
is true. But we have no reason to suppose fo r a given sentence
a th a t a mo d e l o f th e so rt we h a ve envisaged w i l l ma ke a
propositional at u, and fo r reasons outlined in the first section
of this paper we w i l l want to say that A rt h u r deceives himself
in supposing that he believes that a under circumstances wh ich
make et non-propositional. We w i l l not, however, wish to deny
h im the corresponding de dicto belief. Ho w, in semantic terms,
to make this distinction ?
The p a ir < U , NB > mig h t b e ca lle d a b e lie f fra me f o r a.
An enrichment of the semantic resources of this structure ma y
be obtained in the fo llo win g wa y: Consider the set I such that
i I, V
arei not belief sentences.
:No w fro m the frame F < U , N
A called
t - - the intensification o f F:
be
B
G
-> - w e
>
c 3o n s t r u . c. / rt
1
w
h
a
tB a
UX
J
w
i
l
l
>
w
i
h
• rB a issa function (U X I) 2
e
2 (u t I )
u r
.
h
u e
,Truth
A conditions on e,9
i
d-7 t f o r
es ie n t e n c e n
t
uo
ns s
f
e
i
oL t
nwe distinguish t wo operators B and B' o f
tFor
a h b e lie
r kf sentences
e
s
ede
g ere and
i a de
v d icte belief
respectively. Th e ir t ru t h conditions
i
f
are:
<
se s
n
i
ta e d i - s
c di
h: t
a
>B
e o
t i
Va
p f
o
ka
a s
n
(<
i e
o
a=
r n
f
,>
c t
F
u{
o e
i
iu
n n
f
)i
s c
f
—k
i e
458
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E. J ENNI NG S and P. K. S CHO TCH
and
II
.
1
1
B'
U i ka
U
l
al
E
Setting the requirement
4
that a must be propositional at u
t
what
amounts to is the tru th condition
i i n the 1first tru
I th -condition
k ,
given earlier. I f we> re st rict ourselves t o a sin g le model, th e
distinction between{ p o in t and model-point p a ir is id le . a b e I
lieves that a, if his circumstances
seem to be circumstances in
l
which a is true.
i
It is in the second
i tru th condition that the intensification o f
:
F becomes important.
Th is co n d itio n requires th a t the mo d e l
seem to a t o be a model
a
wh ich makes a true at u. The fo rme r
)
examines o th e r points in the same model, the la tte r examines
E
the same point in other
models.
A
P
B
(
U
)