PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT :
IRAQ
Compilation of the information available in the Global IDP
Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council
(as of 19 February, 2004)
Also available at http://www.idpproject.org
Users of this document are welcome to credit the Global IDP Database for the collection of information.
The opinions expressed here are those of the sources and are not necessarily shared by the Global IDP
Project or NRC
Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project
Chemin Moïse Duboule, 59
1209 Geneva - Switzerland
Tel: + 41 22 799 07 00
Fax: + 41 22 799 07 01
E-mail : [email protected]
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
1
PROFILE SUMMARY
7
IRAQ: RETURN OF EVICTED KURDS CAUSES NEW DISPLACEMENTS
7
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT
11
B ACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT
11
VULNERABLE ETHNIC GROUPS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE REGIME (1998-2002)
11
FIGHTING BETWEEN KURDISH MILITIA AND IRAQI GOVERNMENT (1960-1975)
14
IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KURDS (1980-1988)
15
THE INVASION OF KUWAIT HAD SEVERE CONSEQUENCES FOR IRAQ (1990-1992)
17
SINCE THE GULF WAR TWO KURDISH PARTIES HAVE BEEN CONTROLLING NORTHERN IRAQ (19912000)
17
IMPROVEMENT OF KDP-PUK RELATIONS (2001-2002)
19
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES CONDUCTED ATTACKS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ AND DIVERTED WATER IN THE
SOUTHERN MARSHES TO BETTER ACCESS THE REGION (1999-2002)
21
DIFFICULT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE IRAQI REGIME AND THE UN FOLLOWING THE GULF WAR
(1991-2003)
23
THE US-LED MILITARY CAMPAIGN ON IRAQ (MARCH/APRIL 2003)
25
IRAQI POLITICAL OPPOSITION OUTSIDE OF IRAQ REMAINS RIFE WITH FRACTURE (AUG 02)
26
P OST -SADDAM HUSSEIN AUTHORITIES
26
P OST -WAR TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY
30
CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT
31
KURDISH FIGHTERS, THREATENED ARABS WITH AK-47S, TELLING THEM TO LEAVE THEIR HOUSES
WITHIN 24 HOURS (JANUARY 2004)
31
CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENTS IN THE NORTH (JANUARY 2004)
33
P ALESTINIAN FAMILIES EVICTED IN BAGHDAD (NOVEMBER 2003)
34
P OST -WAR CHALLENGES (2003)
34
TURKISH , IRAQI AND IRANIAN INCURSIONS ALL CAUSED INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN THE NORTH
(1998-2002)
42
EXPULSION OF PEOPLE FROM THEIR HOMES AS STATE POLICY (2002)
44
KURDISH IN-FIGHTING HAS CAUSED INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN THE NORTH (1998-2002)
44
IRAQI GOVERNMENT IS DISPLACING KURDS, ASSYRIAN AND TURKOMAN INHABITANTS FROM THE
CITIES OF KIRKUK AND MOSUL (1998-2002)
45
IRAQI GOVERNMENT IS DISPLACING SHI'A INHABITANTS FROM THE MARSH AREA (1999-2003) 46
DIFFICULT TO ASSESS EXTENT OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT CAUSED BY U.S. AND BRITISH
BOMBING RAIDS (2000)
48
POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES
49
GLOBAL FIGURES
49
ESTIMATED 900,000 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDPS) IN IRAQ -BASED ON PRE-WAR
FIGURES (JANUARY 2004)
49
ABOUT 100,000 NEWLY DISPLACED IDPS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED (OCTOBER 2003)
49
IDP FIGURES AS RESULT OF RECENT CONFLICT (NEW CASE-LOAD)
50
ABOUT 700,000 TO 1 MILLION INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN 2001 (2001-2002)
53
USCR REPORTED A GREAT INCREASE OF IDP S FROM 640,000 IN 1994 TO 1 MILLION IN 1995 TO
THEN DECREASE THE FOLLOWING YEARS (1994-2002)
54
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
54
UN-HABITAT SURVEY REPORTED HIGHEST CONCENTRATION OF IDP S IN SULAIMANIYAH (2001)
54
EVOLUTION OF NUMBER OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ (1994-2002)
55
EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER OF DISPLACED IN SOUTHERN IRAQ (1994-2002)
57
PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT
59
GENERAL
59
THE RETURN OF KURDS TO THEIR FORMER HOMES HAS IN TURN DISPLACED THE ARABS LIVING IN
THEM (NOVEMBER 2003)
59
DISPLACEMENTS AS OF THE RECENT WAR (MARCH/APRIL 2003)
59
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT FORECASTS IN CASE OF WAR (2002-2003)
66
EVICTION OF KURDS BUT ALSO OF TURKMEN AND ASSYRIANS FROM THE KIRKUK AREA (19972002)
67
MULTIPLE DISPLACEMENTS IN NORTHERN IRAQ (1998-2001)
69
LOCAL OFFICIALS IN KIRKUK AREA ARE GRANTED IMPUNITY TO CARRY OUT EXPULSION PROCESS
DESCRIBED IN GOVERNMENT DECREE (1998-2000)
70
MOST MARSH ARABS HAVE BEEN DISPLACED OR HAD TO GIVE UP THEIR TRADITIONAL WAY OF
LIVING (1998-2002)
71
OTHER DISPLACEMENTS INCLUDE FLIGHT OF POLITICAL OPPONENTS AND FORCED RELOCATION
OF PEOPLE WHO HAD FOUND REFUGE IN BAGHDAD (1998-2000)
73
PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
74
PHYSICAL S ECURITY
74
KIRKUK IS THE NEXUS OF AN ETHNIC AND HISTORICAL STRUGGLE THAT COULD ENDANGER
IRAQ'S DELICATE SOCIAL FABRIC ALIGHT (FEBRUARY 2004)
74
REPORTS OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY GOVERNM ENT , DESPITE
OBSTACLES TO ASSESS ABUSES (1999-2003)
74
P OST -WAR SECURITY CONCERNS
76
MILITARY TRAINING OF IRAQI CHILDREN IN PREPARATION OF WAR (AUG 2002)
83
HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRAQ HAS IMPROVED OVER RECENT YEARS (2000-2003)
84
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
85
UNEXPLODED ORDNANCES POSES GREAT PROBLEMS
85
SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)
88
2
GENERAL
88
THE OIL-FOR-FOOD P ROGRAMME
88
WFP: HOPE FOR A GOOD HARVEST , YET DEPENDENCE ON FOOD IMPORT (2003)
91
A WAR WILL BRING ADDITIONAL HARDSHIP TO CURRENT IDPS AND NEW ONES (2003)
93
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS' LIVING CONDITIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ ARE LOWER THAN
THE ONES OF THE REST OF THE POPULATION IN THE NORTH (2001-2002)
94
HEALTH & NUTRITION
95
STRUGGLE TO RESTORE BASIC SERVICES IN POST -WAR IRAQ
95
DIFFICULT TO ASSESS ADEQUACY OF HEALTH SERVICES FOR IDPS IN NORTHERN IRAQ (2002) 98
CLOSE TO ONE MILLION CHILDREN ARE CHRONICALLY MALNOURISHED IN IRAQ (2002-2003) 98
UNICEF SURVEY FOUND THAT CHILD MORTALITY INCREASED IN GOVERNMENT -CONTROLLED
IRAQ WHILE DECREASING SLIGHTLY IN NORTHERN IRAQ (1999)
100
SPREAD OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE DUE TO LACK OF DRINKING WATER AND ADEQUATE SEWAGE
SYSTEMS IN GOVERNMENT -CONTROLLED IRAQ (1999-2003)
101
IN THE SOUTH , GOVERNMENT LIMITED ACCESS TO FOOD, MEDICINE, DRINKING WATER AND
TRANSPORTATION FOR SHI'A ARABS (1999-2000)
103
WFP SURVEY IN CENTRE/SOUTH SHOWS ONE-IN-FIVE UNABLE TO MEET BASIC NEEDS
103
SHELTER
104
KURDS RETURNING TO DESTROYED HOMES (DECEMBER 2003)
104
HUNDREDS OF EVICTED FAMILIES IN BAGHDAD ARE BRACING FOR THE FREEZING WINTER
(OCTOBER 2003)
106
UN-HABITAT ASSISTS IN PROVIDING SHELTER FOR IDPS IN NORTHERN IRAQ
107
HOUSES DESTROYED BY FIGHTING AND SHELLING
108
AID AGENCIES WARN OF DELAY IN RETURN DUE TO CHRONIC HOUSING SHORTAGE (JULY 2003)
110
DISPLACED MARSH ARABS IN THE CITY IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE (JUNE 2003)
111
UNHCR ASSISTING INTERNALLY DISPLACED IRAQI KURDS (2003)
112
DETERIORATION OF SHELTER CONDITIONS FOR THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED IN NORTHERN IRAQ
(2000-2002)
112
ACCESS TO EDUCATION
115
GENERAL
SCHOOLS REOPEN DESPITE SECURITY CONCERNS
A QUARTER OF IRAQI CHILDREN ARE NO LONGER ATTENDING SCHOOL (MAY 2002)
115
115
117
ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
118
SELF-RELIANCE
118
RUBBISH DUMP GIVES IDPS ECONOMIC MEANS (JANUARY 2004)
118
NORTH SETS RECONSTRUCTION EXAMPLE ( JANUARY 2004)
119
SCF-SURVEY: 60% OF THE POPULATION OF NORTHERN IRAQ IS POOR, AND 20 PERCENT ARE
TOTALLY RELIANT ON T HE WFP FOOD RATIONS (2002)
120
ARABS REQUESTED THAT THEY BE PROVIDED WITH 50% OF THE HARVEST AS PART OF A SHARING
AGREEMENT WITH RETURNING KURDS (AUGUST 2003)
120
THE MARSH ARABS DIVIDED BETWEEN THEIR OLD AND NEW LIVES
121
REVITALIZING AGRICULTURE SHOULD BE A PRIORITY FOR EMPLOYMENT AND TO REDUCE
DEPENDENCE
123
IN SEARCH OF SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS FOR THE MARSH ARABS
125
3
DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP
127
GENERAL
127
IRAQI GOVERNMENT IS DESTROYING EVIDENCE THAT KURDISH FAMILIES WERE EXPELLED FROM
KIRKUK (AUGUST 2001)
127
ETHNIC MINORITY MEMBERS FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN SIGNING A FORM CORRECTING THEIR
NATIONALITY OR BEING EXPELLED (2000-2002)
127
ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE
129
GENERAL
129
KURDS DISPLACED TO NORTHERN IRAQ ARE LESS AND LESS WELCOME BY TRIBE MEMBERS AND
LOCAL AUTHORITIES (2000)
129
PROPERTY ISSUES
130
GENERAL
130
IDPS PAYING TO SQUAT IN GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS (DECEMBER 2003)
130
CONFUSION OVER IDPS INGOVERNMENT BUILDINGS (DECEMBER 2003)
131
INADEQUACY OF IRAQ'S LAND MANAGEMENT AND PROPERTY TITLE SYSTEMS (OCTOBER 2003)
132
KURDS OWN THE LAND, ARABS OWN THE HOUSES (SEPTEMBER 2003)
133
P ROPERTY DISPUTES IN POST -WAR IRAQ
134
ETHNIC KURDS WHO CHANGED THEIR IDENTITY TO ARAB RECEIVED PLOTS OF LAND IN CERTAIN
AREAS ONLY (SEPTEMBER 2001)
136
KURDISH PARTY DENOUNCES IRAQI AUTHORITIES' NEW DECREE ON LAND COMPENSATION IN
KIRKUK (2001)
136
KURDS ARE FORCED TO SELL HOMES TO ARABS IN KIRKUK (1999-2002)
137
IRAQI GOVERNMENT 'S FINANCIAL COMPENSATION TO PEOPLE DISPLACED IN THE LATE 1980' S
DENOUNCED BY KURDISH OFFICIAL (1999)
138
PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT
139
GENERAL
139
WEALTHY AND ASTUTE POLITICAL LEADERS SPURRING KURDISH RETURN MOVEMENTS
(FEBRUARY 2004)
139
P ROBLEMS OF RECONSTRUCTING WAR-RAVAGED IRAQI SOCIETY (FEBRUARY 2004)
139
THOUSANDS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS HAVE TRIED TO MOVE BACK TO THEIR
ORIGINAL HOMES (DECEMBER 2003)
141
HRW AND UNHCR ON THE RIGHT OF RETURN FOR IDPS IN IRAQ
142
HRW RECOMMENDATIONS ON RETURN OF IDPS
143
REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL ON THE CHALLENGE OF IDP RETURN FOR THE COALITION
P ROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA)
145
NORTHERN IRAQ
146
IDP SITUATION BY FAR T HE BIGGEST PROBLEM THE GOVERNING COUNCIL IS FACING (JANUARY
2004)
146
1,000 RETURNED KURDS SHELTERING IN STADIUM IN KIRKUK (JANUARY 2004)
148
FEAR OF ETHNIC CLEANSING IN KIRKUK AS ARABS ARE DISPLACED
149
4
RETURN MOVEMENTS
151
KURDISH PARTIES START TO IMPLEMENT AGREEMENT OF THE RETURN OF INTERNALLY
DISPLACED WITHIN NORTHERN IRAQ (2001-2002)
152
OBSTACLES TO RETURN
153
ARAB IDP S IN KIRKUK REGION : "WE ARE IRAQIS, BUT NOW WE HAVE NO PLACE TO GO "
156
IN NORTHERN IRAQ LANDMINES PREVENT RETURN (1998-2002)
157
GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED IRAQ
159
U.S.-LED FORCES ARE TRYING TO KEEP KURDS FROM COMING BACK TOO QUICKLY (FEBRUARY
2004)
159
DIFFICULT RETURN POST -WAR IRAQ (APRIL 2003)
160
FORCED RETURN OF FAMILIES ORIGINALLY FROM THE P ROVINCES AND LIVING IN BAGHDAD
(1999)
163
RETURN OF SHI'A DISPLACED COULD CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVE SHI'A AND SUNNI RELATIONS IN
IRAQ (2002)
163
OBSTACLES TO RETURN
164
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS
165
GENERAL
165
FURTHER ATTACKS ANTICIPATED ESPECIALLY IN NORTHERN IRAQ (FEBRUARY 2004)
165
UN WITHDRAWN THE LAST OF ITS 20 FOREIGN STAFF IN BAGHDAD (NOVEMBER 2003)
165
ANYBODY TRYING TO BETTER THE SITUATION IN IRAQ IS LIABLE TO BE ATTACKED (OCTOBER
2003)
166
BOMB ATTACKS AGAINST BUILDINGS USED BY UN PERSONNEL AND BY NGO S IN ARBIL END 2001
(2002)
168
THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT SEVERELY RESTRICTS ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL NGO S AND TO THE
UN (2000-2002)
168
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
171
NATIONAL RESPONSE
171
AUTHORITIES WRANGLE OVER WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY IT IS TO CARE FOR INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PEOPLE (JANUARY 2004)
171
THE PRIVATE SECTOR WILL SOLVE HOUSING CRISIS FOR DISPLACED (DECEMBER 2003)
172
SLOWLY RETURNING WATER TO THE MARSHLANDS (NOVEMBER 2003)
174
USAID ON RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION, AND THE ROLE OF CPA
175
OCCUPYING POWERS RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESPONSE
176
IRAQ IS A STATE PARTY TO SEVERAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AGREEMENTS (2000) 180
GOVERNMENT DENIES POLICY OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT FROM KIRKUK AND THE SOUTHERN
MARSHES DESPITE LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACCUSATIONS (1998-2002)
181
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRAQ WORKS WITH THE UN TO IMPLEMENT PROGRAMS IN
FAVOR OF THE DISPLACED AND OTHER VULNERABLE GROUPS (2001-2003)
183
CREATION OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON DISPLACED P ERSONS BY KURDISH AUTHORITIES
FOLLOWING 1998 ACCORD (2002)
185
KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CRITICIZED SLOW PACE OF UN AID PROGRAMS
(2002)
185
SELECTED UN ACTIVITIES
186
UN SEEKING WAYS TO ASSIST INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN NON-CONTENTIOUS AREAS IN
THE NORTH (JANUARY 2004)
186
5
UN/WORLD BANK ADDRESSES POST -WAR RECONSTRUCTION NEEDS (OCTOBER 2003)
187
SHELTER AND BASIC SERVICES TO 120,000 INTERNALLY DISPLACED P ERSONS (AUGUST 2003)
188
THE UN HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE - THE FLASH APPEAL REVISED
189
UNHCR CHOOSES 4 VILLAGES FOR INITIAL RETURN SHOWCASE (SEPTEMBER 2003)
196
UNHCR AND IDP S (JULY 2003)
197
UNDP TO FINANCE THE BUILDING OF HOMES FOR RETURNEES
199
UNICEF PREPARES TO RESPOND TO IMMEDIATE AND BASIC NEEDS OF CHILDREN AND WOMEN IN
IRAQ, INCLUDING IDP S (JAN 03)
200
WFP STOCK FOOD FOR 900,000 IRAQIS IN CASE OF CONFLICT (JAN 03)
201
OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM ESTABLISHED TO ALLEVIATE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF IRAQI
POPULATION (1996-2002)
201
LITTLE FOCUS ON THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED FROM THE UNITED NATIONS (OCT 02)
203
IN THE NORTH , UN ASSISTANCE TO IDPS HAS BEEN SPOTTY ACCORDING TO REPORT BY
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (2002)
204
SANCTIONS RAISE SERIOUS CONCERN AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL DESPITE "OIL-FOR-FOOD"
P ROGRAM (1999-2002)
204
UNICEF AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS HIGHLIGHT REASONS FOR NORTH -SOUTH ECONOMIC
DISPARITIES (2000-2002)
207
HABITAT (UNCHS) PROVIDES SHELTER, INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES ACTIVITIES TO
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (1999-2002)
208
WFP DISTRIBUTES FOOD TO THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED IN NORTHERN IRAQ AND OBSERVES
ADEQUACY OF RATIONS IN GOVERNMENT -CONTROLLED AREA (2000-2002)
210
UN OFFICE OF THE HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR WILL BE FOCAL POINT ON IDP S (2003)
211
UN HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES CONDEMN FORCED DISPLACEMENT FROM KIRKUK AND OTHER
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN IRAQ (2000-2002)
211
UNOPS AND SEVERAL NGO S CONDUCT MINE CLEARING PROGRAMS IN NORT HERN IRAQ (20002002)
213
SELECTED NGO & DONOR RESPONSE
214
IRAQ NEEDS $36 BILLION FOR RECONSTRUCTION 2004-2007
214
SCHOOLS FOR MARSH ARABS (DECEMBER 2003)
214
EUROPEAN COMMISSION PLEDGES SUPPORT FOR RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS (OCTOBER 2003) 215
ICRC, IFRC AND NGO S ARE PLANNING ASSISTANCE TO ANSWER THE NEEDS OF IDPS AND OTHER
CIVILIANS IN CASE OF A CONFLICT IN IRAQ (2002)
216
ICRC & IFRC PROVIDE ASSSISTANCE TO THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATION IN
NORTHERN IRAQ (2000-2002)
217
DONORS' AND INTERNATIONAL NGO S' ACTIVITIES AIM TO COMPLEMENT OIL-FOR-FOOD
P ROGRAM (1999-2003)
218
NGO S LEAD RELIEF EFFORTS - GOVERNORATE FOCAL POINTS FOR IDP S
219
ALLIANCE INTERNATIONALE POUR LA JUSTICE (AIJ) ORGANIZED A CONFERENCE ON IRAQI
REFUGEES AND IDP S (JULY 2002)
221
REFERENCES TO THE GUIDING P RINCIPLES ON INTERNAL D ISPLACEMENT
221
KNOWN REFERENCES TO THE GUIDING P RINCIPLES (AS OF JANUARY 03)
221
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
222
LIST OF SOURCES USED
223
6
PROFILE SUMMARY
Iraq: return of evicted Kurds causes new displacements
•
The collapse of the regime of Saddam Hussein following the US-led war in Iraq in March 2003 created the
political conditions for the 800,000 Kurds who had been forcibly displaced under a brutal policy of
“Arabisation” to return to their homes. But the beginning of these return movements has also caused a new
wave of displacement. As several thousand Kurds began to reclaim their homes in the north of Iraq, about
100,000 Arabs who had been installed there by the previous regime fled in the months following the war.
While the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime raised hopes of return for the Kurds as well as large
numbers of Shi’a Arabs uprooted following an uprising in 1991, life for a majority of the hundreds of
thousand people still displaced has meant a daily struggle to survive in a country without proper rule of
law, and in which because of the security situation, most international humanitarian help has fled. The
“oil-for-food” programme, handed over to the US led Coalition Provisional Authority in November 2003,
avoided an immediate humanitarian crisis for the majority of the population. But the widespread break down of water and sanitation, electricity, health and education services in the whole country affects most
Iraqis, particularly the internally displaced squatting in public building or lingering in camps and
barracks. Following the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003 most
humanitarian agencies withdrew, and now only limited assistance reaches the internally displaced and
little information is available on their situation. The restoration of the rule of law throughout Iraq and the
establishment of an efficient system to resolve property disputes are key challenges which need to be
addressed by the current authorities if there is to be a safe and orderly return process.
Background of displacement
Following the rise of the Ba’ath party in 1968, Iraq suffered decade after decade of repeated forced
displacements, deportations and voluntary waves of migration. From the mid-1970s, much of this resulted
from the Iraqi authorities’ campaigns in the north of the country to neutralise Kurdish aspirations for
independence and to strengthen control over some of the world’s largest oil-reserves. These campaigns
involved the violent, large-scale and systematic alteration of the ethnic composition of the northern region
where forced displacements of one group went hand in hand with the settlement of another. The Iraqi
authorities destroyed up to 4,000 Kurdish villages and caused the displacements of around 800,000 Kurds.
Arabs, mainly Shi’a families from central and southern Iraq, were brought in to replace the Kurds, as part
of a wider “Arabisation” of the region. Non-ethnic Arab Iraqis, mostly Kurds, but also Turkmen and
Assyrians were forced to either leave the oil-rich areas or to sign a form “correcting their nationality” so as
to be considered as ethnic Arabs. To increase the number of Arabs in the region, incentives, such as free
land and free houses which had mostly belonged to the evicted Kurds, were offered by the Baghdad regime
(RI, 21 November 2003; CHR, 26 February 1999).
The end of the Iraq-Iran war in 1988 saw the intensification of the atrocities committed against the Kurds.
In the course of a campaign code-named Al-Anfal, the authorities committed mass executions, poisoned
entire villages with noxious gas and imposed economic blockades on others. The Al-Anfal campaign left
more than 180,000 people missing, who are now presumed dead (Alliance International pour la Justice,
December 2002). Most survivors were relocated into settlements or “collective towns” controlled by the
army where they became dependent on the Iraqi authorities for food, water and other basic services
(Fawcett and Tanner, October 2002, pp. 8-10).
7
After the Iraqi defeat in Kuwait in 1991, the United States imposed a no-fly zone in the north, which
established a de facto autonomous Kurdish region in the northern governorates of Erbil, Suleimaniyeh and
Dohuk. Since then, these governorates have been under the control of the two major Kurdish parties that
are governing jointly as the Kurdish Regional Government.
Displacements in the south and centre in the early 1990s
There were forced displacements in the south and centre of the country resulting from the regime’s
campaign against the majority Shi’a Muslim population and Marsh Arabs who had rebelled in the wake of
the Iraqi defeat in Kuwait in 1991. Many of the Shi’a opponents fled from Baghdad and Basra to the
Kurdish-controlled governorates in the north, but also to the marshlands of the Tigris -Euphrates Delta, in
the south of Iraq.
The Marsh Arabs were accused by the authorities of supporting the Shi’a rebellion in 1991. Subsequently,
the marshes, which were used as rear-bases and hiding places for the Shi’a insurgents, became the target of
a massive campaign to drain and destroy them. The campaign included the use of chemical weapons,
shelling and burning of villages, assassinations, contamination of water, police raids and large-scale dam
projects. The government forces managed to crush the rebellion by penetrating formerly inaccessible areas
where the insurgents had found refuge (Fawcett and Tanner, October 2002, p. 28-30; USCR, 2001).
The consequences for the Marsh Arabs were dis astrous. Following the destruction of their villages and the
drainage of the marshes, perhaps only 10,000 of the estimated 200,000-300,000 Marsh Arabs are still living
in their traditional marshlands and between 100,000 and 200,000 are internally displaced (UN OHCI, June
2003) As regards the Shi’a Arabs there are no accurate estimates of the number of displaced apart from
around 25,000 that the former government admitted to having expelled from Baghdad in 1998 (Fawcett and
Tanner, October 2002, p. 33).
Current phase of return and displacement
The recent displacements which took place following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 are a direct
consequence of the previous state-induced forced displacements of Kurds and the accompanying policy of
“Arabis ation”. The change in political climate in 2003 triggered a revolving door effect whereby returning
Kurds, sometimes with the support of Kurdish militia, displaced the Arabs who had been brought in by the
ousted authorities. This happened mainly in Kirkuk, but also in other governorates in the north that were
controlled by the regime until it was toppled in March 2003. Since then, around 30,000 Kurds have
reportedly returned to their places of origin, which are now under control of the US-led Coalition
Provisional Authorities and the Governing Council in Baghdad.
Either as a direct result of Kurdish return movements or out of fear for revenge attacks, around 100,000
people are secondary displaced, mainly Arabs who have fled to non-Kurdish areas in the governorates north
and north-east of Baghdad. In addition, there are around 10,500 people in Baghdad displaced as a result of
the US-led war or by returning Kurds in the north (UN OCHA, 16 December, 3 December 2003; UNAMI,
18 October 2003; UN OHCI, 10 October 2003).
Although the majority of those displaced by the previous regime have integrated into their host
communities or have lost the incentive to return, large numbers may still wish to return (Al Jazeera, 18
January 2004). If massive return movements do take place, the already simmering tensions between the
ethnic groups in the region are likely to worsen and cause more displacements. In Kirkuk around 2,000
Turkmen and Arabs demonstrated in late December 2003 against aspirations by the Kurds to incorporate
the city into an autonomous Kurdish province. Three people were killed and 31 injured in the
demonstration (Reuters AlertNet, 3 February 2004; Al Jazeera.Net, 2 January 2004).
Displaced Kurds are reportedly also exposed to direct or indirect pressure to return by the Kurdish Regional
Government, which further exacerbates the problem. Turkmen and Arabs claim for example that the
8
humanitarian assistance provided by the Kurdish Regional Government to returning Kurds is simply a
political tool to gain control over the city’s vast oil-reserves. The underlying fear for Arabs and Turkmen in
Kirkuk is that the returning Kurdish population will leave them outnumbered in the event of a referendum
on the future status of the city and the Kurdish region. To contain increasing tensions between the different
groups that these returns create, the Coalition Provisional Authority has tried to prevent Kurds from
entering Kirkuk. The interim US-led authorities have also requested the Kurdish Regional Government to
stop providing humanitarian assistance until a Property Claims Commission is operational and the
conditions for return are more favourable (AP, 10 February 2004).
Living conditions and protection concerns
On 14 April 1995, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council adopted
resolution 986, establishing the "oil-for-food" programme, which provided Iraq with the means to sell oil to
finance the purchase of humanitarian goods. The programme was then handed over to the Coalition
Provisional Authority on 21 November 2003 and remains the only sustenance for around 60 per cent of
Iraqis, including most internally displaced people (UN OIP, 4 November 2003). As the main lifeline for so
many people, the programme has averted a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions (UN SC, 16
January 2004; UNOCHI, 10 October 2003). It nevertheless has not managed to prevent thousands of
internally displaced, both in the Kurdish controlled governorates and the rest of the country from living in
dire conditions, which were exacerbated by harsh winters and the wide-spread break down of water and
sanitation, electricity and health services (Al Jazeera, 5 February 2004; UN OCHA, 19 Jan 2004; ECHO, 5
January 2004).
Neither has the programme prevented malnutrition amongst the most dispossessed. The situation of female headed households in central and southern Iraq is a particular concern, the hardest hit of whom are the
internally displaced and refugees (IRIN 24 September 2003). The Food and Agricultural Organisation
(FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) estimate that nearly half of Iraq’s 26.3 million people are in
need of humanitarian aid despite a good harvest and the removal of sanctions (IRIN 24 September 2003).
Moreover, IDPs in the Kurdish-controlled governorates in the north are reported to live in an environment
of violence, social and material exclusion, unemployment, mutual distrust and suspicion (Lynne Jones, 1
and 9 September 2003).
About 70,000 newly displaced Arabs in the governorates of Diyala and Ninewa are sheltering in abandoned
military installations and public buildings, most without regular access to health services, electricity or
running water. Others have set up tents next to their destroyed houses or inhabit abandoned buildings and
warehouses (UNHCR, 22 October 2003).
Some displaced and dispossessed people risk being evicted from public buildings by the Coalition Forces to
make space for government offices and the new Iraqi administration (UN OCHA, 16 December 2003). In
addition there are concerns over hazardous shelter, the denial of basic services, and the lack of
documentation to obtain ration cards for food distribution.
In Kirkuk most of the displaced are staying with host families, while around 10,000 returning Kurds live in
public buildings (UN OHCI, 10 October 2003). Some 1,000 Kurds squat in mud huts in a stadium in
Kirkuk (UN OCHA, 19 January 2004; UNHCR, 22 October 2003).
The humanitarian needs for the Marsh Arabs in the south are characterised by loss of livelihood, poor
access to health care services, shortage of school structures and supplies. Moreover, many Iraqis in the
southern region, including the uprooted Marsh Arabs, lack proper documentation such as birth certificates,
ration cards and national ID cards (UN OHCI, June 2003 p. 12).
Unexploded ordnance and mines are of particular concern in northern Iraq and in the south in the marsh
areas adjacent to the Iranian border. Living conditions are jeopardized, villages have been made
9
uninhabitable and many people in the north have been killed and maimed by mines (MAG, 5 February
2004; UN OHCI, June 2003 p. 12).
International response and humanitarian access
The responsibility for protecting the rights of IDPs remains, first and foremost, with those who administer
Iraq and are vested with legislative and executive authority, even if only on an interim basis. The
establishment of Property Claims Commissions in each of the country’s governorates in June 2003 was, in
principle, an important step forward for the rights of IDPs (CPA, 14 January 2004). As of February 2004,
however, the commissions are still not operational (AP, 10 February 2004).
Following the bombing of the UN compound in Baghdad on 19 August 2003 and the withdrawal of most
international humanitarian staff, the Coalition Provisional Authorities and the Governing Council in
Baghdad have struggled to carry on the assistance and protection programmes to the internally displaced.
As a result, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was asked to assist the Iraqi
Minister of Displacement and Migration to develop national capacity to address the IDP situation
(UNHCR, 19 December 2003). The absence of international humanitarian workers inside Iraq, however,
and an average of 20-30 security incidents a day, lessens the possibility of implementing programmes that
will address the humanitarian needs of internally displaced people in the foreseeable future (Updated
February 2004).
10
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT
Background of the conflict
Vulnerable ethnic groups and their relationship to the regime (1998-2002)
•
•
•
•
Predominantly Arab Shi'a Muslims constitute a 60-65% majority
Sunni Muslims (Kurds, Arabs and Turkomans) make up 32-27% of the population
Christians and Yazidis represent about 3%
Part of the Shi'a, Kurdish, Christian, Turkoman, "Marsh Arab", Yazidi and "Bidoon" population
has had conflicting relations with the Iraqi regime
"While a precise statistical breakdown is impossible because of likely inaccuracies in the latest census
(taken in 1997), according to conservative estimates, 97 percent of the population of 22 million persons are
Muslim. The (predominantly Arab) Shi'a Muslims constitute a 60 to 65 percent majority, while Sunni
Muslims make up 32 to 37 percent (approximately 18 to 20 percent are Sunni Kurds, 12 to 15 percent are
Sunni Arabs, and the rest are Sunni Turkomans). The remaining approximately 3 percent consist of
Christians (Assyrians, Chaldeans, Roman Catholics, and Armenians), Yazidis, and a small number of Jews.
The Shi'a, though predominantly located in the south, also are present in large numbers in Baghdad and
have communities in most parts of the country. Sunnis form the majority in the center of the country and in
the north." (US DOS, 5 September 2000, sect.I)
"There is no way to know what portions of Iraq's population is loyal to the present regime or loyal to the
concept of Iraq as a state – as distinguished from exhibiting primary loyalty to a religious or ethnic group. It
is obvious, however, that many Iraqis resent the fact that the present authoritarian regime is controlled by a
small group of extended Sunni families. It is obvious that the regime has had to deal with major Kurdish
and Shi'ite uprisings, and faces a continuing problem with a separate Kurdish enclave.
It is equally obvious that Saddam's rule on policies designed to divide and paralyze Iraq's ethnic factions
while using Iraqi military forces, overlapping and competing Iraqi intelligence and security services, the
Ba'ath Party, and paramilitary forces to ensure that they remain under control. (Cordesman November
1998, p.4)
The Shi'ites
"Although Shi'a Arabs are the largest religious group, Sunni Arabs traditionally have dominated economic
and political life. Sunni Arabs are at a distinct advantage in all areas of secular life. The Government also
severely restricts or bans outright many Shi'a religious practices. The Government has for decades
conduced a brutal campaign of murder, summary execution, arbitrary arrest, and protracted detention
against the religious leaders and followers of the majority Shi'a Muslim population […]." (US DOS 5
September 2000)
However, "The vast majority of Iraq's Shi'ites remained loyal during the Iran-Iraq War, and probably think
of themselves primarily as Iraqi and Arab, rather than as Shi'ites. They may want equality or proportionate
political power as Iraqis, but it is far from clear that they have any interest in a separate political entity or
any ties to Iran." (Cordesman November 1998, p.5)
The Iraqi Kurds
11
"Saddam practiced near-genocide against the Kurdish tribes he felt support Iran during the Iran-Iraq War,
and has been ruthless in putting down the Kurdish uprisings of 1991 and threatening the Kurdish security
zone. Iraq, however, has a total of roughly 3.2 million to 4.3 million Kurds and it is far from clear that a
majority of them would choose independence or autonomy […] if Saddam was no longer in power or if any
Iraqi regime made good on a long series of promises to give them more rights and a larger share of Iraq's
oil wealth. […]
Most of Iraq's Kurds remained loyal to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, and only about half of Iraq's Kurds
were involved at even the peak of the uprising in 1997. Iraqi Kurdish separatists represent a major force
within Iraq, but they do not speak for the Kurds per se. The separatists are also deeply divided into rival
factions that are never quite clear as to whether they are seeking rights and faire treatment, autonomy, or
nation-hood. Iraqi Kurds also do not share any broad identify with Kurdish groups outside Iraq, and the
Talabani faction seems to be the only separatist group that has shown serious past interest in creating a
greater 'Kurdistan' that involves Turkish and/or Iranian Kurds." (Cordesman November 1998, pp.5-6)
Al-Qilaa Kurds
"This group areis the Kurdish people and their families that fought or supported the Iraqi government
during the 1980s destruction of the Kurdish villages and the incarceration of the inhabitants in the
collective towns. They left (it's not clear if they fled or were expelled) the North upon the establishment of
the Kurdish rule in the North in 1991. To the main population of the Kurds, they are known as the Jash or
the Donkeys. Originally from the Aqra area, they fled to the closest city under Baghdad's control, Mosul,
where they still reside today. Many of them moved into unoccupied military compounds, (in Arabic alQilaa.) Despite having provided such valuable service to the Iraqi authorities in the 1980s, the al-Qilaa
Kurds suffer from the same desperate conditions as other displaced in Iraq. They live in overcrowded
makeshift accommodations, are discriminated against by official regulations, have little education or health
care, and few prospects or hopes for the future. According to Iraqi Red Crescent sources, there are
approximately 8,000 displaced families of the al-Qilaa Kurds in Mosul." (Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02, p32)
The Faili Kurds
"Faili Kurds, most of whom are Shi'a, form a distinctive group of displaced people in Iraq, many of them
twice displaced and now back in their country of origin. Unlike most Iraqi Kurds, until the early 1970s they
lived mainly in central and southern Iraq, many of them in Baghdad. At that time, perhaps 130,000 Failis
were deported to Iran by the government of Iraq on the pretext that they were not Iraqi citizens, though it
fact it was because their loyalty was considered suspect. Most had lived in Iraq for generations, but in
Ottoman times had not registered as citizens in order to avoid conscription. Since the 1970s, most of the
Faili Kurds have lived in Iran. However, since 1981, some have returned to Kurdish-controlled northern
Iraq, where they are not necessarily welcome." (Dammers 1998, p.184)
"Faili is an Arabic term, given to a group of Kurds from a region of the Zagros Mountains straddling the
Iran-Iraq border. Due to the geography of their homeland, the Faili Kurds have family members on both
sides of the border. Contrary to the majority of their Kurdish brethren, they are Shi’a. In the nineteenth and
early twentieth century, many Faili Kurds began migrating westwards to Iraqi cities, primarily Baghdad,
where they took on key commercial, social, and cultural roles. During the 1970s and 80s the regime in
Baghdad expelled large numbers of Faili Kurds. In one instance, in the autumn of 1971, up to 40,000 Failis
were expelled. In April 1980, shortly after Saddam Hussein seized full powers and just before his invasion
of Iran, the 480 wealthiest Baghdadis were summoned to the Chamber of Co mmerce building. One third of
them, found to be Faili Kurds, were swiftly arrested and deported to Iran, with their families following
shortly after. Further deportations continued, and the numbers of Faili Kurd refugees estimated to have
gone to Iran range from 100,000 up to 300,000. It is not clear how many Faili Kurds remain in Iraq, but
according to one account, as of 1997, the expulsions continued." (Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02, pp14-5)
The Yazidis
"The Yazidis are a Kurmanji speaking group and are exclusively Kurdish. Yazidi beliefs incorporate
aspects of several major religions in the region, including Zoroastrianism, Islam, Nestorian Christianity,
12
Judaism and Manichaeism. There are figures of the Yazidi population in Iraq ranging from 30,000 to
120,000 and they live predominately in the Mosul region of Iraq." (UNHCR June 2000, p.16)
"The Constitution does not provide for a Yazidi identity. Many Yazidis consider themselves to be
ethnically Kurdish, although some would define themselves as both religiously and ethnically distinct from
Muslim Kurds. However, the Government, without any historical basis, has defined the Yazidis as Arabs.
There is evidence that the Government has compelled this reidentification to encourage Yazidis to join in
domestic military action against Iraqi Muslim Kurds. Captured government documents included in the 1998
Human Rights Watch report 'Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in its own words', describe
special all-Yazidi military detachments formed during the 1988-89 Anfal campaign to 'pursue and attack'
Muslim Kurds. However, the Government does not hesitate to impose the same repressive measures on
Yazidis as on other groups. For example, 33 members of the Yazidi community of Mosul, arrested in July
1996, still are unaccounted for. (US DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for civil liberties, c.")
The 'Marsh Arabs'
"A crucible of civilization, the marshlands have been home to ancient human communities for more than
five millennia. The area’s inhabitants are commonly known as the Ma’dan or “Marsh Arabs”, whose
population is estimated to range from 350,000 to 500,000. […]Ethnically, the population’s composition has
been heavily influenced by immigrations and intermarriages with the Persians to the east and Arab
Bedouins to the west. The Marsh Arabs are Shi’ite Muslims, and their way of life is largely based on the
traditions of the Arab Bedouin.[…]
The Marsh Arabs have evolved a unique subsistence lifestyle that is firmly rooted in their aquatic
environment. Most of the Ma’dan are semi-nomadic, but some of them are settled in villages. Their
settlements are located on the edges of the marshes, or stand on artificial floating islands that are regularly
reinforced with reeds and mud." (Patrow 2001, pp15-16)
"For thousands of years the salt marshes of southern Iraq have been a unique micro-environment. […] The
marshes lie at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. […] Successive Iraqi governments had
already tampered with the marshes in the way that modern governments often do in developing countries,
regarding the hunter-gatherer subsistence lifestyle of the tribes there as being primitive and unworthy of a
modern state.
But it was with the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 that wholesale disaster set in. By 1982, Iran had
reversed Iraq's original conquest of Iranian lands and the front line surged back across the border into Iraq including the marshlands. The marsh Arabs of the region were driven out as the Iraqi army sent massive
electric charges through the marshes - thousands of invading Iranians were electrocuted like this as they
advanced.
That war ended in 1988 but the devastation continued. After Saddam's second defeat in the Gulf War of
1991, rebels rose up against him in the south of the country. When they were defeated, many of them hid in
the marshes. The government began to drain the marshes systematically in 1992. Three years later, they had
almost finished, creating a desert where the marshland had been. Areas where the water was five foot deep
are now bone dry with cracked mud. Less than 10,000 marsh Arabs remain, their traditional lifestyle
literally drained away. Those who remain barely eke out a living." (Out There News 2000, "Marshes")
The Assyrians and Chaldeans
"The Assyrian Christian minority of about 250,000 people also lives mainly in Iraqi Kurdistan and has been
caught up in the conflict and displacement there, particularly in 1987/8 and 1991." (Dammers 1998, p.181)
"Assyrians and Chaldeans are considered by many to be a distinct ethnic group as well as the descendants
of some of the earliest Christian communities. These communities speak a distinct language (Syriac),
preserve important traditions of Christianity in the east, and have a rich cultural and historical heritage that
they trace back over 2,000 years. Although these groups do not define themselves as Arabs, the
13
Government, without any historical basis, defines Assyrians and Chaldeans as such, evidently to encourage
them to identify with the Sunni-Arab dominated regime." (US DOS 25 February 2000, Section 5)
The Turkomans
"The Turkomans, who are believed to constitute somewhat less than 2 percent of the population, are village
dwellers in the northeast living along the border between the Kurdish and Arab regions. A number of
Turkomans live in the city of Irbil. The Turkomans, who speak a Turkish dialect, have preserved their
language but are no longer tribally organized. Most are Sunnis who were brought in by the Ottomans to
repel tribal raids. These early Turkomans were settled at the entrances of the valleys that gave access to the
Kurdish areas. This historic pacification role has led to strained relations with the Kurds. By 1986 the
Turkomans numbered somewhere around 222,000 and were being rapidly assimilated into the general
population." (Library of Congress 2001, Chapter 2)
The taba`iyya iraniyya
"Some of the returnees from Iran, expelled just after Iraq's invasion of Iran, are a group of people known as
taba`iyya iraniyya, or sometimes, just taba`iyya. According to the scholar Kanan Makiya, after the collapse
of Ottoman rule, the inhabitants of the Iraqi mandate were requested by a census to state their ‘belonging’
(in Arabic taba`iyya) as either Ottoman – uthmaniyya – or Iranian – iraniyya. Many reportedly chose
iraniyya as a means to escape military conscription. These two categories made it through to the modern
state of Iraq, where they now show up on every Iraqi’s citizenship document. In the late 1970s and early
1980s, the regime painted those carrying taba`iyya iraniyya as Iranian fifth columnists, and used the
concept as a legal pretext to summarily deport thousands of families." (Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02, p15)
The 'Bidoon'
"Prior to the Gulf War, the 'Bidoon', most of whom are of Iraqi origin, were stateless residents of Kuwait.
Their name is Arabic for 'without' – that is without nationality. They numbered about 250,000 and most had
been born in Kuwait, or had lived there for a long time. Since the war around half of them have fled from or
been expelled from Kuwait, mostly to Iraq. Though they are refugees, their statelessness, their displacement
and their Iraqi connections mean that their status has much in common with that of other 'internally
displaced' people. Detailed information on their situation in Iraq is, however unavailable." (Dammers 1998,
p.184)
Fighting between Kurdish militia and Iraqi government (1960-1975)
•
•
•
1960-1975: fighting between Kurdish militia and Iraqi government, as well as between militia,
caused the displacement (internally and abroad) of about 600,000 and the forced relocation of
300,000
In 1974, the Iraqi government imposed the Kurdistan Autonomous Region which excluded the oil
wealth of Kirkuk and Khanaqin
Following autonomy decree, beginning of Arabization campaign of Kirkuk region and Kurdish
revolt in 1974
"In the 1960s, Iraq witnessed several changes of government and fluctuating conflicts in which the Barzani
[KDP] and to a lesser extent the Talabani [PUK] militias played a significant role. In 1970, 300,000 people
were reported displaced in Kurdistan, the result of fighting between Kurdish militias and the government,
as well as between the militias themselves. By 1975, when the government defeated Barzani's KDP, as
many as 600,000 were displaced, 250,000 over the border to Iran. The Iraqi government forcibly relocated
perhaps 1400 villages and 300,000 people, mainly to 'strategic hamlets' designed to facilitate government
containment and control. Along the Iranian border depopulation was almost total, with villages bulldozed to
prevent return." (Dammers 1998, p.181)
14
"In 1970, the Ba'ath Party, anxious to secure its precarious hold on power, did offer the Kurds a
considerable measure of self-rule, far greater than that allowed in neighboring Syria, Iran or Turkey. But
the regime defined the Kurdistan Autonomous Region in such a way as deliberately to exclude the vast oil
wealth that lies beneath the fringes of the Kurdish lands. The Autonomous Region, rejected by the Kurds
and imposed unilaterally by Baghdad in 1974, comprised the three northern governorates of Erbil,
Suleimaniyeh and Dohuk. Covering some 14,000square miles -- roughly the combined area of
Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island -- this was only half the territory that the Kurds considered
rightfully theirs. Even so, the Autonomous Region had real economic significance, since it accounted for
fully half the agricultural output of a largely desert country that is sorely deficient in domestic food
production.
In the wake of the autonomy decree, the Ba'ath Party embarked on the "Arabization" of the oil-producing
areas of Kirkuk and Khanaqin and other parts of the north, evicting Kurdish farmers and replacing them
with poor Arab tribesmen from the south. Northern Iraq did not remain at peace for long. In 1974, the longsimmering Kurdish revolt flared up once more under the leadership of the legendary fighter Mullah
Mustafa Barzani, who was supported this time by the governments of Iran, Israel, and the United States.
But the revolt collapsed precipitately in 1975, when Iraq and Iran concluded a border agreement and the
Shah withdrew his support from Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). After the KDP fled into
Iran, tens of thousands of villagers from the Barzani tribe were forcibly removed from their homes and
relocated to barren sites in the desert south of Iraq. Here, without any form of assistance, they had to
rebuild their lives from scratch.
In the mid and late 1970s, the regime again moved against the Kurds, forcibly evacuating at least a quarter
of a million people from Iraq's borders with Iran and Turkey, destroying their villages to create a cordon
sanitaire along these sensitive frontiers. Most of the displaced Kurds were relocated into mujamma'at, crude
new settlements located on the main highways in army -controlled areas of Iraqi Kurdistan. The word
literally means "amalgamations" or "collectivities." In their propaganda, the Iraqis commonly refer to them
as "modern villages"; in this report, they are generally described as "complexes." Until 1987, villagers
relocated to the complexes were generally paid some nominal cash compensation, but were forbidden to
move back to their homes." (HRW 1993, "Introduction")
The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) is led by Masoud Barzani and is dominant in the north of the
country, while the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is led by Jalal Talabani and is dominant in the
northeast. Barzani is the son of the Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani while Talabani was one of his
lieutenants who split.
Iran-Iraq War and the Anfal campaign against the Kurds (1980-1988)
•
•
•
Eight year war allowed Saddam Hussein to consolidate its rule in Iraq
With end of the war in 1988, Saddam Hussein began campaign against Kurdish insurgency
Anfal policy against Iraqi Kurds killed between 50,000 and 200,000 and deporting about 500,000
to new 'collective settlements' and to detention camps
"The present regime in Baghdad came to power through a coup in 1968. The coup gave prominence to a
young officer in the Ba'ath Party intelligence apparatus named Saddam Hussein. Ahma Hassan al-Bakr
served as president and maintained titular power until Saddam deposed him and declared himself president
on July 16, 1979. Just more than a year after seizing uncontested control over Iraq, Saddam declared war on
Iran. While the goals of the war – reclaiming Iraqi territory conceded in 1975 border negotiations, ending
Iranian support for Kurdish separatists in the north, and overthrowing a regime in Tehran that was openly
calling for an Islamic revolution inside Iraq among others – can be debated, the gruesomeness of the war
15
that followed cannot. The war produced about 1.5 million casualties during eight years of hostilities, ending
in a cease-fire that essentially left prewar borders unchanged.
The Iran-Iraq war was the first time since the interwar years that chemical weapons were used in combat.
Probably beginning in 1984, and almost certainly by 1986, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons in the
battlefield against Iranian troops. Such use drew the condemnation of the United Nations in 1986, although
such condemnation was muted by international antipathy toward the regime in Tehran.
The eight-year-long war exhausted both countries, but it allowed Saddam to further consolidate his rule in
Iraq. The constant war footing allowed an already paranoid regime to more ruthlessly root out its opponents
and more loudly proclaim the glories of its leader." When the war wound down, Saddam turned to damping
internal divisions in his country and began a campaign against a Kurdish insurgency in the north. In that
campaign, Saddam again turned to chemical weapons, using a combination of mustard gas and nerve gas
that killed some 5,000 civilians in the town of Halabja in August 1988. As in his war with Iran, Saddam's
use of chemical weapons (this time against civilian targets) failed to raise outrage [at the international
level]." (USIP 17 February 1999, "The Problem")
"After 1980, and the beginning of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, many Iraqi garrisons in Kurdistan were
abandoned or reduced in size, and their troops transferred to the front. In the vacuum that was left, the
Kurdish peshmerga--"those who face death"--once more began to thrive. The KDP, now led by one of
Barzani's sons, Mas'oud, had revived its alliance with Teheran, and in 1983 KDP units aided Iranian troops
in their capture of the border town of Haj Omran. Retribution was swift: in a lightning operation against the
complexes that housed the relocatedBarzanis, Iraqi troops abducted between five and eight thousand males
aged twelve or over. None of them have ever been seen again, and it is believed that after being held
prisoner for several months, they were all killed. In many respects, the 1983 Barzani operation
foreshadowed the techniques that would be used on a much larger scale during the Anfal campaign." (HRW
1993, "Introduction")
"The Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) completed the displacement of much of Iraq's Kurdish population. Towards
the end of the war, following increasing collaboration between Iran and Kurdish guerrilla forces, the Iraqi
regime pursued its genocidal Anfal policy, killing between 50,000 and 200,000, and destroying about 3000
Kurdish villages and hamlets. Their inhabitants – over half a million people – were deported to new
'collective settlements' away from border or mountain areas, or to detention camps in south and west Iraq.
Others fled to Iran. Many of these people have been displaced more than once since then." (Dammers 1998,
p.181)
"Anfal—'the Spoils'--is the name of the eighth sura of the Koran. It is also the name given by the Iraqis to a
series of military actions which lasted from February 23 until September 6, 1988. While it is impossible to
understand the Anfal campaign without reference to the final phase of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Anfal
was not merely a function of that war. Rather, the winding-up of the conflict on Iraq's terms was the
immediate historical circumstance that gave Baghdad the opportunity to bring to a climax its longstanding
efforts to bring the Kurds to heel. For the Iraqi regime's anti-Kurdish drive dated back some fifteen years or
more, well before the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq." (HRW 1993, "Introduction")
To view official Iraqi documents on the Anfal policy, please visit the site of the Iraqi Research and
Documentation Project, launched in June 1993 and sponsored by the Harvard Center for Middle
Eastern Studies (CMES)
[External Link]
For key dates of Iraq's history, please see BBC News Timeline [External Link]
16
The invasion of Kuwait had severe consequence s for Iraq (1990-1992)
•
•
•
Invasion of Kuwait in August 1990
Coalition of allied forces intervened in Kuwait in January 1991
Following cease-fire agreement, under UN SC Resolution 687 Iraq was supposed to destroy
certain types of weapons and to accept international monitoring
•
Northern no-fly zone declared by the U.S., France and Britain in April 1991 to provide safe haven
for Kurds
Southern no-fly zone imposed by U.S., British and French forces in August 1992 in an effort to
protect Shi'ite Iraqis
•
"With Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the perception that Saddam Hussein was a potential
ally against an ideologically expansionist Iran – as well as a potential customer for American grain and
other products – gave way to a new consensus. Under the revis ed thinking, Saddam was seen as threat to
stability in the Persian Gulf and to steady oil supplies from that region. […]
When a coalition of allied forces rolled back the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in January and February 1991,
the UN-imposed cease fire agreement bound Iraq to declare fully to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations the 'locations, amounts, and types' of biological and chemical weapons it possessed, as well as
similar information regarding ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometers. Under the
agreement, Iraq agreed to destroy such weapons under international supervision, and to accept ongoing
international monitoring to ensure that such weapons programs were not revived in the future. Pursuant to
that charge, the United Nations created a 'Special Commission,' or UNSCOM, to carry out on-site
inspections of declared Iraqi facilities as well as any other sites UNSCOM designated.
The agreement, articulated in United Nations Security council Resolution 687, established similar
conditions for whatever nuclear program Iraq might possess, to be monitored by the International Atomic
Energy Agency. Only after Iraq completed its responsibilities to fully disclose its programs to develop
weapons of mass destruction, destroy prohibited materiel under international supervision, and dismantle
any programs to develop such weapons in the future, all to the Security Council's satisfaction, would the
United Nations lift the sanctions it imposed in Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990." (USIP 17
February 1999, "The Problem")
"In April 1991, the United States, France, and Britain unilaterally declared a 19,000-square-mile area of
northern Iraq a safe haven for Kurds and imposed a no-fly zone that prevented Iraqi aircraft from operating
above the 36th parallel. U.S. and British warplanes still patrol the skies of northern Iraq, bombing
frequently since December 1998. France withdrew from the mission in 1996. No United Nations Resolution
supports or calls for a no-fly zone.
A southern no-fly zone was imposed by U.S., British and French forces in August 1992 in an efforts to
protect Shi'ite Iraqis. President Saddam Hussein's forces had crushed a Shi'ite uprising soon after the end of
the Gulf War in February 1991. In 1996, President Clinton extended the zone in response to Iraqi military
intervention in northern Iraq in support of one Kurdish faction against another. The zone now covers the
southern third of Iraq, reaching the 33rd parallel, and touches the outskirts of Baghdad." (AFSC 2000)
Since the Gulf War two Kurdish parties have been controlling northern Iraq (19912000)
•
In 1991 the cease-fire between Iraqi and Allied forces which put an end to the Gulf War was
immediately followed by uprisings in the Kurdish north
17
•
•
•
•
Since 1991 regions in the north and northeast of the country have been under the control of
Kurdish parties
The Iraqi government ended the internal economic blockade against northern Iraq in 1996
The two major Kurdish parties of northern Iraq, KDP and PUK fought intermittently since the
Gulf War until 1998 when they agreed to a Washington-brokered peace agreement
Most of the measures described in the 1998 peace agreement were still not implemented in 2000
"The cease-fire between Iraqi and Allied forces [following the Gulf War] was immediately followed by
uprisings in the Kurdish north and Shi'a south of Iraq. Kurdish guerrillas briefly occupied the whole of Iraqi
Kurdistan, but the reoccupation of most of the region by Iraqi government troops led to as many as two
million people fleeing to Iran, Turkey, and those areas still under Kurdish control. These areas soon
included the 'safe haven', initially patrolled by Allied troops, comprising those parts of Iraqi Kurdistan
adjacent to the Turkish border. Most of the cross-border refugees later returned to areas under Kurdish
(and/or Allied) political control, which expanded greatly following the substantial withdrawal of Iraqi
troops in October and November 1991." (Dammers 1998, p.182)
In April 1991, the UN SCResoultion 688 said that the UN SC:
" 1. Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently
in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the
region;
2. Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to remove the threat to international peace and security in the
region, immediately end this repression and express the hope in the same context that an open dialogue will
take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected;
5.Requests further the Secretary-General to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the
relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi
population." (UN SC 5 April 1991)
"The safe haven zone in northern Iraq, created and maintained by the United States, Britain, and France
since 1991 through Operation Provide Comfort, showed signs of collapse throughout the year [1996]. As
the two sides fought, the governments of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq each appeared ready and willing to
intervene overtly or covertly in an attempt to take advantage of the situation. […]
On August 31 [1996], [Iraqi] government forces entered the city of Erbil, located within the Kurdish safe
haven zone, after being invited in by the KDP, which hoped that an alliance with the government would tip
the balance of power in the north against the PUK. After surrounding Erbil with tanks, Iraqi troops and
government agents entered the town, searching house to house for suspected opponents of President
Saddam Hussein, killing some immediately, arresting others and taking them back to Baghdad. Iraqi troops
reportedly looted and vandalized the areas they entered, completely looting 500 schools, according to
UNICEF, and ransacking hospitals and municipal buildings. […]
The penetration of the safe zone by Iraqi troops and fighting between the Kurdish factions created
widespread hardship and displacement. […] Ironically, in some respects the collapse of the safe zone had
its benefits for many of the other residents of the north. In addition to international sanctions, northern Iraq
had been subjected to an internal blockade from Baghdad. Starting in September [1996], that blockade was
eased, and Kurds from the north were able to engage in trade with government-controlled Iraq." (USCR
1997, pp.151-152)
"In northern Iraq, all central government functions have been performed by local administrators, mainly
Kurds, since the Government withdrew its mi litary forces and civilian administrative personnel from the
area after the 1991 uprising. A regional parliament and local government administrators were elected in
1992. This parliament last met in May 1995. The two major Kurdish parties in de facto control of northern
Iraq, the KDP and the PUK, battled one another from 1994 through 1997. In September 1998, they agreed
18
to unify their separate administrations and to hold new elections in July. The cease-fire held throughout the
year; however, reunification measures were not implemented and no election was held." (US DOS 25
February 2000, Section 3)
"The areas of the North under the control of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) are the
governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, Suleimanyah and a part of the governorate of Kirkuk. As mentioned earlier,
the KRG is an uneasy alliance of the two main Iraqi Kurdish parties. Mas`oud Barzani’s KDP administers
the northwestern half and the Turkish border, while Jalal Talabani’s PUK controls the southeastern half and
most of the Iranian border." (Fawcett & Victor, Oct 02, p7)
"Despite mediation efforts by U.S. government officials, little progress was made towards the
implementation of the provisions of the 1998 Washington Accord. Both sides [KDP and PUK] pledged to
normalize relations but continued to maintain separate administrative, legislative and executive structures
in areas under their control. On October 22, senior officials from the two parties agreed on a series of
measures, including prisoner exchanges, the gradual return of internally displaced people to their homes,
and arrangements for the organization of free movement of people and trade between their respective areas.
Most of these measures were not implemented." (HRW December 2000, "Human Rights Developments")
Improvement of KDP-PUK relations (2001-2002)
•
•
•
•
•
In 2001, both parties agreed to improve coordination but are disagreeing over the unification of
both administrations
Negotiations between Baghdad and Kurdish political parties reopened in 2001 but quickly failed
Improvement of KDP-PUK relations following tensions between Kurdish parties and Islamic
opposition in 2001-2002
Normalization of KDP-PUK relations decided in Oct 02
Largest attack of PUK by Ansar al-Islam in 15 month occurred in Dec 02
In 2001, "The 'reconciliation' between the Kurdish parties administrating the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG) is driven by a review of priorities in anticipation of the possible consequences of the
failure of the ongoing negotiations between Baghdad and the United Nations on the new sanctions system
and in preparation for the expected political changes, according to a commentator from Irbil writing in
London's "Al-Hayat" of 29 May.
The rapprochement and coordination between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has descended to deeper levels than the differences in views over the
distribution of customs revenues, unification of the two administrations, and the reactivation of the KRG
parliament. (RFE/RL 8 June 2001)
"The two enclaves are not equally strong. Talabani controls an estimated 1.2 million of the roughly 3
million Kurds living in the autonomous region. (There are still parts of Kurdistan under Saddam Hussein's
control.) Iran is his main protector. His "state" raises its main revenues from duties on goods smuggled into
and out of Iran and Iraqi-controlled Kurdistan, as well as taxes on the population. Unemployment and
poverty are widespread in Talabani's region, although the economy remains much healthier than that in
government-controlled Iraq.
By contrast, Barzani's region is enjoying the fruits of the burgeoning trade across the Turkish-Iraqi border.
At virtually every time of day, hundreds of trucks laden with goods wait to pass from Turkey to Iraq
through the Ibrahim al-Khalil crossing. On their way back to Turkey, these trucks are loaded with cheap oil
and petroleum products in specially installed tanks. Barzani's customs service reaps tremendous revenues
from the duties both ways. But more important are the booming smuggling networks -- many run by
19
influential personalities -- linking Turkey, Iraq and Syria through Barzani-controlled areas." (al-Khafaji 24
January 2001)
"Current Kurdish moves toward coordination with Baghdad are a result of increased confidence in the
Kurdish establishment and the Kurds' success in establishing a solid defense system that can handle any
conventional attack by Baghdad on Kurdistan. Over the last two years, Kurdish military leaders both
trained a semi-professional military force and exploited the international market to obtain good weapons in
the same way as Iraq, namely, by using the smuggling networks. Thus, the defense network resulting from
these efforts became an actual deterrent to attacks from the Baghdad-controlled areas.
At the same time, the Kurdish leaders are aware that they cannot rely on firm Western stands toward the
Iraq issue. These caused them to turn to Baghdad with specific initiatives. In this context, PUK leader Jalal
Talabani made the teaching of Arabic compulsory at the start of the next school year. and promised not to
use any regional party for developing oil production from wells in his areas.
The major stumbling block remaining between the KDP and PUK is the question of the unification of the
PUK and KDP administrations. Leader of the KDP Mas'ud Barzani said to "Al-Hayah" that "I personally
do not see any problem in the presence of the two administrations at the crucial transitional stage." But
Talabani disagrees." (RFE/RL 8 June 2001)
"President Hussain proposed the reopening of negotiations between the government and Kurdish political
parties on July 15, but in a joint statement on July 27, the KDP and PUK set preconditions: they demanded
an end to mass deportations of Kurds and Turkman, clarification of the fate of detainees in Iraqi
government custody and missing persons, and acceptance by the Iraqi government of federalism as the
basis of future relations between the Kurdish region and Baghdad. The government rejected these demands
in August." (HRW 2002)
Improvement of KDP-PUK relations following tensions between Kurdish parties and Islamic opposition
in 2001-2002
"Tensions are increasing between the secular PUK and militant Kurdish parties following the 2 April
[2002] assassination attempt on PUK Prime Minister Salih and a rumored 18 March attempt on the life of
KDP President Mas'ud Barzani […]. The Islamist parties are based near Tawella, in the mountains along
the Iran-Iraq border. The Iranian government facilitates transport of men and material to the militant
Islamist group, according to the December 2001 'Middle East Intelligence Bulletin.'
The assassination attempt on Salih has furthered reconciliation between the PUK and KDP, according to a
15 April report in the Iraqi Kurdish newspaper "Hawlati." The often-strained relations have warmed
steadily since the appointment of Salih to the PUK premiership in January 2001. According to "Hawlati,"
the KDP and PUK "decided to set up an operations room in order to follow and gather information on
people and terrorist groups who may be active in Kurdistan." Also on 15 April, "Hawlati," reported that the
previous day, "the Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan" (Peshtiwani Islam le Kurdistan), had unilaterally
revoked the cease-fire in place between them and the PUK. Over the past year, the militant Islamist group
has had a steady progression of names including the Islamic Unity Movement, Jund al-Islam, and Ansar-i
Islam." (RFE/RL 26 April 2002)
"The leaders of the two major factions in northern Iraq, KDP leader Mas'ud Barzani and PUK SecretaryGeneral Jalal Talabani, met in Irbil and agreed to press ahead to normalize ties before the first meeting of
the regional parliament this week, AFP reported on 1 October. The two leaders are to meet again on 2
October in Sulaymaniyah, in the PUK-held region.
It will be Barzani's first visit to Sulaymaniyah in several years, and he will be accompanied by a high-level
KDP delegation.
20
During their meetings which precede the reopening of parliament, the two sides agreed that each party
could reopen offices in the other's areas within a week of the reconvening of parliament. They also agreed
to restore property seized in the fighting between the two factions, facilitate the movement of civilians in
the region, and release those still in detention from the civil war between the KDP and PUK.
Plans are still to push for the draft constitution, envisioning a federal Iraq with a Kurdish part mainly
centered around the protected enclave in northern Iraq. No mention was made about Kirkuk, which was
mentioned in the draft posted on the KDP website (see "RFE/RL Iraq Report," 13 September 2002).
After the parliament is revived, a date for new elections is expected in some five months. What the
threatened U.S. military action will have on these plans is unclear." (RFE/RL 4 Oct 02)
For more on the draft constitution, please see RFE/RL 13 Sept 02, Kurds Propose New Iraqi, Kurdish
Constitutions, by David Nissman, [External Link]
"A surprise attack by Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam) forces killed 53 peshmerga of the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan's (PUK) forces near Halabcha, close to the Iranian border, according to an ABC News
report carried by KurdishMedia.com on 11 December. The Ansar al-Islam has been often linked with AlQaeda. The Ansar were attempting to take two heavily fortified PUK fortifications. While they were
initially successful, the PUK later retook the positions.
[…]
This was the largest attack in the 15 months that the Ansar guerrillas had situated themselves along the
border." (RFE/RL 15 Dec 02)
For more information on Islamic groups in northern Iraq, please see Michael Rubin's article, "The Islamist
Threat in Iraqi Kurdistan, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol.3, No.12, December 2001, [See reference
below]
See also Human Rights Watch, 5 Feb 03, Ansar al-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan [Reference below]
Iraqi security forces conducted attacks in southern Iraq and diverted water in the
southern marshes to better access the region (1999-2002)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Causes for displacing the Marsh Arabs include the will to eliminate a population outside of central
governmental control; interest in producing great engineering feat; increase oil production; and
the destruction of a habitat that provides a haven for an armed opposition
Draining of marshes started in 1985
Shi'a revolt against Iraqi regime erupted following the Iraqi defeat in Kuwait
In 1994, the Iraqi government intensified a pacification campaign that it had been directing
toward the marsh population since 1989
Diversion of water from the marshes allowed government forces to penetrate into formerly
inaccessible areas; UNEP reported in 2001 that about 90% of the marshlands had disappeared by
2000
Unrest in Southern Iraq sparked off by the killing of prominent Shi'a cleric in February 1999
Drainage of marshes was largely complete by 1999
Iraqi armed forces conducted deliberate artillery attacks against Shi'a civilians and large-scale
burning operations in the southern marshes in 1999
Iraqi security forces reportedly attacked villages in the marshes of Southern Iraq in 2001
21
"The motives behind the Iraqi regime's brutally callous campaign against the Marsh Arabs include the
following: the desire to eliminate a population outside of central governmental control; an interest in
producing some great engineering feat that is the equivalent of the monumental statues and palaces built to
honor Saddam; the aim to generate economic development and increase oil production; and most
importantly, the destruction of a habitat that provides a haven for an armed opposition. All these motives,
of course, have one underlying objective: to maintain the current regime in power. The regime also guessed
correctly that no one would stop it. In 1992, then Parliamentary Speaker Saadi Mehdi Saleh justified the
action against the Marsh Arabs: "America wiped the Red Indians off the face of the earth and nobody raised
an eyebrow."" (Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02, p32)
"By 1985, visible signs of the draining of the marshes were noted in the area of Qurna, close to the
confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates, where newly discovered oil fields were ripe for exploitation. In the
early 1990s the Iraqi government began an all-out push to finish off the marsh-draining project and, as a
consequence, to finish off the Marsh Arabs.
Several events seem to have precipitated the Iraqi government's decision to take these measures at that
time. The Iraqis had just come out of two wars, the last of which had left the regime of Saddam Hussein
barely holding onto power. One of the clearest threats to his survival were the Shi’a of southern Iraq, who
rose against him in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War. Baghdad, resorting to full military force
(including the use of helicopters permitted under the US-dictated cease-fire conditions) and extraordinary
brutality, succeeded in quashing the rebellion. But the marshes, inaccessible to Iraqi armor, became a haven
for the remaining rebels on the run. Also during the uprising, some groups had attacked the incipient oil
field infrastructure in the West Qurna oil field, attacks which Baghdad blamed on the Marsh Arabs. Finally,
during the early 1990s, very few personnel from international organizations or companies were present to
witness the marsh destruction, due to the war-time evacuation and the imposition of sanctions. This not
only allowed the regime to avoid being seen but also allowed it to requisition, without opposition and by
Presidential decree, foreign company resources, such as bulldozers and other earth-moving equipment,
termed ‘idle assets,’ to accomplish the task. Massive canals, up to a hundred meters wide and hundreds of
kilometers long, were dug, using virtual slave labor and the aforementioned foreign-owned machinery."
(Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02, p30)
"Tensions between the secular, Sunni regime of Saddam Hussein and the Shi'ite populace of southern Iraq
erupted into civil war in early 1991, when the Shi'ite revolted in the wake of the Iraqi defeat in Kuwait. The
revolt was quickly crushed, with heavy casualties, and many displaced Shi'ites and deserters from the Iraqi
army fled into the extensive marshlands between the Tigris and Euphrates river.
The Iraqi government had long viewed the inhabitants of this region, the Marsh Arabs, or Maadan, with
hostility. In 1994, the Iraqi government intensified a pacification campaign that it had been directing
toward the marsh population since 1989, diverting water from the marshes and depriving the Shi'ites of
food and cover. This allowed government forces to penetrate into formerly inaccessible areas." (USCR
1995, p.116)
"Throughout the marsh areas, dykes as high as six meters have been built to cut off flood waters from
replenishing the old marshlands. Between the ancient Tigris and the Euphrates, a manmade river - the
Saddam river - now carries the flood waters down to the Gulf. Marsh Arabs used to live by tending buffalo,
fishing and hunting in the marshes. With no reeds, there is nothing to feed the water buffalo. There are
hardly any fish left in the rivers either. The government claims to be giving land to the Marsh Arabs to
cultivate. There is some farming close to the Euphrates and Tigris but many of those farmers are not Marsh
Arabs but have come from the towns. The government also seems intent on preventing any rebels entering
from Iraq across the water, as they have traditionally been able to do." (Out There News 2000, "Marshes")
According to a UNEP study carried out in 2001, "[…] about 90% of the marshlands had disappeared by
May 2000, with devastating impacts on wildlife and unique human communities that have lived there for
millennia." (UNEP May 2001)
22
"Since the beginning of this year [1999] there have been many clashes between the security forces and
armed Islamist opposition groups in the pre-dominantly Shi'a Muslim Southern Iraq, especially in Basra,
which have reportedly left dozens dead on both sides and have been followed by arbitrary mass arrests and
summary executions. It was not until May that the government acknowledged that unrest had broken out in
Basra in mid-March. It accused Iran of instigating the troubles since one of the biggest opposition groups is
based in Iran. The unrest was sparked off by the killing in suspicious circumstances of Ayatollah
Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, a prominent Shi'a cleric, in February 1999." (AI 24 November 1999,
"Introduction")
"As in previous years, the armed forces conducted deliberate artillery attacks against Shi'a civilians and
large-scale burning operations in the southern marshes [in 1999]. In 1991 and 1992, the Gulf War allies
imposed 'no-fly zones' over northern and southern Iraq respectively. The no-fly zones continued to deter
aerial attacks against the marsh dwellers in southern Iraq and the residents of northern Iraq, limiting the
Government to ground-based assaults." (US DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for human rights, g.")
"The Special Rapporteur received information that armed raids are still being carried out by the Iraqi
security forces against villages in the south of Iraq. Reportedly some of these raids, which are aimed at the
capture of armed guerrillas and army deserters, have resulted in loss of life, damage to property and
searches and arrests without warrant." (CHR 16 January 2001, para. 37)
"Iraqi security forces attacked villages in the marshes of southern Iraq on 15 May resulting in many
casualties, according to reports received by the INC [Iraqi National Congress]" (INC 20 May 2001)
"To accelerate the process, the military and special police made raids on marsh settlements, ostensibly in
pursuit of rebels, criminals and deserters. Iraqi security forces used napalm and other chemical weapons,
shelled and burned villages, assassinated local leaders and other prominent community members, and
abducted heads of families. Other tactics employed by Iraqi authorities included the deliberate
contamination of water supplies, the poisoning of the fishing grounds, commercial blockades, the denial of
aid and the refusal of access to aid agencies.
The tactics of earthworks, drainage, and military action worked hand in hand. As one area was drained,
new embankments would be built, giving the authorities vantage points to begin actions against the next set
of settlements.
By 1999 the drainage of the marshes was largely complete. The only remaining marsh of any size was the
al-Hawizeh marsh that straddles the Iraq-Iran border. This marsh is at least partly intact, as the Iraqis do not
control all the sources of water, (it also provides a measure of security from a neighbor they do not
entirelywater. According to the Iranians, the Iraqi side of the marsh is now under assault. In September
2002 it was alleged that the Iraqis were burning the reeds in a possible attempt to prepare a military assault
on the villages." (Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02, p31)
Difficult relations between the Iraqi regime and the UN following the Gulf War (19912003)
•
•
In Oct 98, Iraq ends all forms of cooperation with the UN Special Commission to Oversee the
Destruction of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (Unscom)
In Nov 02, UN weapons inspectors return to Iraq for the first time since 1998, backed by a tough
UN Security Council resolution which is reluctantly accepted by Baghdad. The resolution
threatens serious consequences if Iraq is in "material breach" of its terms
Ceasefire
23
1991 3 March - Iraq accepts the terms of a ceasefire.
1991 Mid-March/early April - Iraqi forces suppress rebellions in the south and the north of the country.
1991 8 April - A plan for the establishment of a UN safe-haven in northern Iraq, north of latitude 36
degrees north, for the protection of the Kurds, is approved at a European Union meeting in Luxembourg.
On 10 April, the USA orders Iraq to end all military activity in this area.
1992 26 August - A no-fly zone, excluding flights of Iraqi planes, is established in southern Iraq, south of
latitude 32 degrees north.
1993 27 June - US forces launch a cruise missile attack on Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Al-Mansur
district, Baghdad in retaliation for the attempted assassination of US President, George Bush, in Kuwait in
April.
1994 29 May - Saddam Hussein becomes prime minister.
1994 10 November - The Iraqi National Assembly recognizes Kuwait's borders and its independence.
Oil-for-food
1995 14 April - UNSC Resolution 986 allows the partial resumption of Iraq's oil exports to buy food and
medicine ( the "oil-for-food programme"). It is not accepted by Iraq until May 1996 and is not implemented
until December 1996. […]
1995 15 October - Saddam Hussein wins a referendum allowing him to remain president for another 7
years. […]
1996 31 August - In response to a call for aid from the KDP, Iraqi forces launch an offensive into the
northern no-fly zone and capture of Arbil.
1996 3 September - The US extends the northern limit of the southern no-fly zone to latitude 33 degrees
north, just south of Baghdad.
1996 12 December - Saddam Hussein's elder son, Uday, is seriously wounded in an assassination attempt in
Baghdad's Al-Mansur district.
1998 31 October - Iraq ends all forms of cooperation with the UN Special Commission to Oversee the
Destruction of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (Unscom). […]
Operation Desert Fox
1998 16-19 December - After UN staff are evacuated from Baghdad, the USA and UK launch a bombing
campaign, "Operation Desert Fox", to destroy Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
programmes.
1999 4 January - Iraq asks the UN to replace its US and UK staff in Iraq.
1999 19 February - Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, spiritual leader of the Shi'i sect, is
assassinated in Najaf.
1999 17 December - UNSC Resolution 1284 creates the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (Unmovic) to replace Unscom. Iraq rejects the resolution.
2000 1 March - Hans Blix becomes executive chairman of Unmovic.
2000 August - Reopening of Baghdad airport, followed by a stream of international flights organised by
countries and organisations to campaign against sanctions. The flights are labelled humanitarian missions to
comply with UN sanctions.
2000 October - Iraq resumes domestic passenger flights, the first since the 1991 Gulf War. Commercial air
links re-established with Russia, Ireland and Middle East.
2001 - Free-trade zone agreements set up with neighbouring countries. Rail link with Turkey re -opened in
May for first time since 1981.
2001 February - Britain, US carry out bombing raids to try to disable Iraq's air defence network. The
bombings have little international support.
2001 May - Saddam's son Qusay elected to the leadership of the ruling Ba'th Party, fuelling speculation that
he's being groomed to succeed his father.
2002 April - Baghdad suspends oil exports to protest against Israeli incursions into Palestinian territories.
Despite calls by Saddam Hussein, no other Arab countries follow suit. Exports resume after 30 days.
2002 May - UN Security Council agrees to overhaul the sanctions regime, replacing a blanket ban on a
range of goods with "smart" sanctions targeted at military and dual-use equipment.
24
Weapons inspectors return
2002 September - US President George Bush tells sceptical world leaders gathered at a UN General
Assembly session to confront the "grave and gathering danger" of Iraq - or stand aside as the United States
acts. In the same month British Prime Minister Tony Blair publishes a dossier on Iraq's military capability.
2002 November - UN weapons inspectors return to Iraq for the first time since 1998, backed by a tough UN
Security Council resolution which is reluctantly accepted by Baghdad. The resolution threatens serious
consequences if Iraq is in "materia l breach" of its terms.
UNSC 1441 of November 2002, Excerpt: "Holding Iraq in "material breach" of its obligations under
previous resolutions, the Security Council this morning decided to afford it a "final opportunity to comply"
with its disarmament obligations, while setting up an enhanced inspection regime for full and verified
completion of the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991).
By the unanimous adoption of resolution 1441 (2002), the Council instructed the resumed inspections to
begin within 45 days, and also decided it would convene immediately upon the receipt of any reports from
inspection authorities that Iraq was interfering with their activities. It recalled, in that context, that the
Council had repeatedly warned Iraq that it would face "serious consequences" as a result of continued
violations." (UN SC 8 Nov 02)
2003 January - Chief weapons inspector Dr Hans Blix delivers a harsh report to the UN Security Council,
accusing Baghdad of failing to come to a "genuine acceptance" of disarmament." (BBC News 28 Jan 2003)
2003 March – the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC reports that Iraq has accelerated its cooperation but
says inspectors need more time to verify Iraqi compliance.
2003 17 March – following the failure of intensive deliberations among Security Council members on
possible next steps to ensure Iraqi compliance, the UK’s ambassador to the UN says the diplomatic process
on Iraq has ended; UN Secretary General orders the evacuation of arms inspectors from Iraq; President
Bush gives Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave Iraq or face war.
2003 19 March – UN Secretary General addresses UNSC, expressing regret and disappointment at the
imminence of war.
The US-led military campaign on Iraq (March/April 2003)
2003 20 March – missiles hit targets in Baghdad, marking the start of a US-led campaign to topple the Iraqi
regime. In the following days US and British ground troops enter Iraq from the south and numerous targets
are struck in Baghdad and other key cities.
2003 24 March – UN Secretary General calls for “urgent measures” to restore electricity and water in
Basra.
2003 25 March – coalition forces cross the Euphrates at Nasiriya.
2003 28 March – UNSC adopts resolution 1472 adjusting the oil-for-food programme, authorizing the
Secretary General to use limited OFFP funds for the UN Humanitarian Flash Appeal launched the same
day.
2003 1 April – coalition forces are within 45 km of Baghdad.
2003 4 April – power is cut to most of Baghdad.
2003 6 April – coalition forces enter Basra, taking control the next day.
2003 7 April – coalition forces take control of key sites in Baghdad.
2003 9 April – coalition forces sweep into central Baghdad. Widespread looting breaks out.
2003 11 April – coalition forces move to secure Kirkuk oil field.
2003 14 April – the Pentagon says that all major combat operations are probably at an end, following the
fall of Tikrit, Saddam Hussein’s home town.
2003 22 May - the Security Council decided to: lift trade and financial sanctions on Iraq; extend the "oilfor-food" programme for six months; revisit the mandates of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification
25
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at a later
date; request appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General; and review implementation
of those and other matters within 12 months. Adopting resolution 1483 (2003), by a vote of 14 in favour,
with Syria not participating in the voting, and acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the
Council supported the formation by the people of Iraq with the help of the Authority (the occupying Powers
under unified command) and the Special Representative, of an Iraqi interim administration as a transitional
administration run by Iraqis, until an internationally recognized, representative government established by
the people of Iraq assumes the responsibilities of the Authority (UN SC, 22 May 2003)
Iraqi political opposition outside of Iraq remains rife with fracture (Aug 02)
•
•
•
•
INC has served as an umbrella group for the opposition movement
INA is made up of Iraqi exiles and former leaders of the Sunni-dominated military
Constitutional Monarchy Movement seeks to establish "democratic" monarchy
KDP and PUK are Kurdish parties controlling the north of Iraq
•
SCIRI is a Tehran-base Shi'a group
"[H]istory shows that the Iraqi opposition is rife with fracture. The INC, headed by Chalabi, has served as
an umbrella group for the opposition movement. Many U.S. officials, as well as Iraqi opposition leaders
have become leery of the INC following rumors of mismanagement in recent years. In addition, Chalabi
and Iyad Allawi of the INA have had a tense relationship over the years. The INA is made up of Iraqi exiles
and former leaders of the Sunni-dominated military. The INA led the 1996 failed coup attempt against
Saddam Husseyn and is thought to still have strong connections to the Iraqi military and Ba'th Party. Sharif
Ali bin al-Husseyn's Constitutional Monarchy Movement seeks to re-establish democratic (and, it hopes,
monarchial) rule in Iraq. The PUK and KDP have longstanding rivalries, but have worked together in
recent years. They formed a provisional parliament at the beginning of August in an attempt to normalize
the situation in northern Iraq and prepare for regional elections. The two Kurdish groups combined have
approximately 80,000 militiamen. SCIRI is a Tehran-based Shiite group. Its military wing, the Badr Corps,
is made up of former Iraqi officers, soldiers, refugees, and defectors. The group claims to have 10,000
armed men inside Iraq." (RFE/RL 16 Aug 02)
For more information on the relations between the various ethnic and political groups which may shape the
future of Iraq, please see International Crisis Group (ICG), Oct 02, Iraq Backgrounder: What Lies Beneath
[Reference below]
Post-Saddam Hussein authorities
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
US administrator in Iraq Jay Garner
The interim Government of Iraq
US/UK struggle to foster Iraqi leaders
Sunni, Shia, Christians and Kurds to be represented
Local and exiled leaders to take part
US diplomat Paul Bremer to oversee political process and supervise the transition to democracy
Securing Iraq role for UN
Mosul holds landmark vote
26
•
•
USAID helping develop a market economy and creating institutions of economic governance
USAID: Creation of accountability and transformation to a pluralistic democracy
“The United States administrator in Iraq, Jay Garner, has said the core of an interim Iraqi government
should be in place by mid-May. "By the middle of the month, you'll really see a beginning of a nucleus of
an Iraqi government with an Iraqi face on it that is dealing with the coalition," the retired general said. He
said he expected up to nine Iraqis to form an interim leadership group that would be a point of contact for
the Americans. Mr Garner also said that the self-proclaimed mayor of Baghdad, Mohammed Mohsen alZubaidi, who was arrested by US forces, had been released after two days. He was accused of trying to
sabotage coalition efforts to restore basic services to the war-torn capital. The condition for his release was
that he must not resume his activity of establishing authority in Baghdad.”
“The interim administration would consist of returned exiles and local Iraqis, representing Iraq's ethnic and
religious spectrum, Mr Garner said. He cited as likely members: Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan
Democratic Party, Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress, Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan, Iyad Allawi of the Iraqi National Accord, and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, whose elder brother heads
the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq.” (BBC, 5 May 2003)
“The White House has named veteran diplomat and ex-State Department official Paul Bremer as the man
whose task it is to supervise the transition to democracy in Iraq. Mr Bremer will be the top civilian official
in the country, outranking the retired General Jay Garner, who had been appointed Iraq's chief civil
administrator. The 61-year-old former foreign service officer will oversee all political and reconstruction
efforts in Iraq.” (BBC, 7 May 2003)
The different Iraqi factions and their leaders (BBC In Depth):
Local leaders
Shia
Secular groups
Kurds
Old Regime
Daawa
Sciri
Sadr group
Other leaders
Ahmed Chalabi
Iyad Alawi
Adnan Pachachi
Nizar Khazraji
Royalists
Massoud Barzani
Jalal Talabani
Baathist comeback Tribal ties
“The authorities” struggle to foster Iraqi leaders
“The US and British militaries, the "authority" in Iraq according to the wording of a draft resolution being
considered at the UN, are trying to foster a political process to establish an interim government in Iraq. Jay
Garner, who officially leaves his post in mid-June, has pinpointed five Iraqis to form the nucleus of a
provisional Iraqi Government. This body is meant to gather at some point in May. The members so far
announced are three returned exiles and two Kurdish leaders. Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, the
Kurdish leaders, have well established political and military power bases in Kurdish northern Iraq. Also
included is Ahmed Chalabi, the US Pentagon's protege and head of the Iraqi National Congress. Mr Chalabi
has not lived in Iraq for more than three decades and has no discernable constituency there. The two others
named are Ayad Alawi of the Iraqi National Accord, and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, a senior figure in the
Tehran-based Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution. None of these potential government members
proposed by Mr Garner, except for the Kurdish leaders, can be said to represent any of the locally rooted
political or religious groups that have been sprouting up across Iraq. Especially in the majority Shia
community, mosque leaders have taken matters into their own hands - restoring some order, running
hospitals, distributing food, water and medicines. Shia religious leaders all over Iraq have quickly stepped
27
into the vacuum left by the destroyed and disintegrated administration of Saddam Hussein. There also
appears to be a power struggle under way between established community leaders and emerging, more
radical groups. The aim of these and other non-Shia leaders appears to be to establish their power base and
influence on a local level and to make themselves indispensable to whatever comes out of the process in
being run by the US and UK. The problem for the coalition is that there is no national religious or political
leader in Iraq. No national figure was allowed to emerge and last under Saddam Hussein” (BBC, 15 May
2003).
Securing Iraq role for UN
“Blair battles to secure Iraq role for UN in Rumsfeld talks. However, last night it emerged that the US and
Britain are preparing a resolution that would give the UN a role in humanitarian relief but not
peacekeeping, according to a senior official in the Bush administration. The draft resolution would limit the
UN role to helping with refugees and displaced people, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance,
Associated Press reported the official as saying. President Bush said that the UN would play a "vital role"
but after talks yesterday with his British counterpart, Geoff Hoon, and Mr Blair, Mr Rumsfeld gave no
further details. "I suspect there will be, over the coming period, intensive discussions
as to what role the UN may or may not wish to play," Mr Rumsfeld said.
He added: "I hope they do play a role." The issue is bound up with other concerns, including the existing
oil-for-food programme, and huge debts owed by Iraq to Russia and France. Yesterday's talks between Mr
Rumsfeld and the British government concentrated on the future commitment to Iraq of international
troops. "It would be a terrible mistake to think that Iraq is a fully secure, fully pacified environment," Mr
Rumsfeld said. "It is not, it is dangerous."” (The Guardian, 3 May 2003)
Mosul holds landmark vote
“Delegates from different ethnic groups in Iraq's third largest city, Mosul, have elected an interim authority
to run the area until full elections can be held. Some 200 representatives cast their votes for a 24-member
council at a meeting organised by the United States military. It is the first time an election process has been
held in an Iraqi town or city since Saddam Hussein was ousted and the Americans say it could be a model
for the rest of the country. Correspondents say Mosul, which has seen some fierce anti-US protests, remains
volatile. "You have taken a major step forward for Mosul and Iraq," said Major-General David Petraeus,
commanding officer of the 101st Airborne Division, after the election.”
“The council's composition is an attempt to reflect the ethnic make-up of Mosul and surrounding areas.
Although Arabs are in the majority, Mosul has a sizeable Kurdish minority, which includes sub-groups, as
well as Turkmen and Assyrian Christian groups. However, US commanders acknowledged that without a
reliable census there had been a certain amount of guesswork in estimating the size of different
communities, AFP reported. Delegates also chose an Arab mayor, retired army general Ghanim al-Basso,
who pledged to work closely with the US-led troops in the city. "This is the first step on the road to
democracy. I promise I will be a faithful soldier," he said to loud applause from the delegates, meeting
under tight security at the Mosul Social Club. Also chosen were a Kurdish deputy mayor as well as two
assistant mayors from the Turkmen and Assyrian Christian communities. In the past few weeks, there have
been violent anti-American protests in the city. It is only recently that relative calm has returned.
US forces have emphasised this will be an interim government until full elections are held, although this
could take up to two years.” (BBC, 5 May 2003)
USAID helping develop a market economy and creating institutions of economic governance
“(…) With the lifting of U.N. sanctions and the gradual improvements in the oil sector, some revitalization
of legitimate economic activity should follow naturally, along with a reduction of black market activity
which has in the past fueled criminal syndicates. Yet much more must be done to make a solid break with
past practices and put the country on a solid economic and commercial footing. One of the keys to doing
this will be to harness the power of the private sector and give the economy the jump -start it needs to create
jobs and raise incomes for millions of Iraqi citizens. We are about to seek bids for a contract that would
begin this process. We also expect to provide technical assistance under the policy guidance of the Treasury
28
and State Departments to Iraq's Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, and the private banking sector. Within a
year, we hope that the Ministry of Finance will be able to handle government payrolls, Iraqis will begin
tackling some of the tough economic choices that lie ahead, a legal framework will be established that
encourages the private sector, and access to private commercial banks will be widespread.
(…) Many laws and institutions need to be changed or created from scratch: a framework for fiscal and
monetary policies must be put in place and legal and regulatory reforms shaped. Customs and tax policies
must be devised so that the government has revenue from more than just the oil sector and the proper
incentives are given for the private sector. Property rights and the repatriation of profits must be assured,
clear tariff structures created and free trade encouraged. USAID, working with other USG agencies and
appropriate international organizations and partners, will support Iraqi efforts in all of these sectors to
transform Iraq's economy and establish a model for the region and beyond.” (USAID, 4 June 2003)
(…) “Ambassador Bremer's recent decision to remove 30,000 members of the Ba'ath Party from all
positions of responsibility in post-Saddam Iraq was a wise and necessary step. (…) Many of them have
long experience with smuggling, black marketeering, and armed repression. One of the great dangers is that
they will turn, as others have done in Serbia and Russia, to criminal syndicates or armed paramilitary
organizations whose ties to extremist elements could make them very dangerous to both Coalition Forces
and ordinary Iraqis. Some will turn to crime - extortion, murder, and robbery. Others will foment tensions
among contending ethnic and religious groups or hire themselves out as mercenaries and enforcers. Deba'athification also hinges on the success of our larger goals in Iraq: the establishment of a stable society,
with free market economy and an honest, competent democratic government that represents the entire
spectrum of Iraqi citizens.” (USAID, 4 June 2003)
Creation of accountabi lity and transformation to a pluralistic democracy
“Iraq has the second largest proven oil reserves in the world. Oil is country's primary foreign exchange
earner and the major source of government revenues. It can be a source of great wealth and hope for the
Iraqi people, but it can also be a source of great temptation to the unscrupulous. The way oil revenues are
used, therefore, will become an extremely important political and economic question in the country as soon
as a new government is established. How the industry is managed will likely set the pattern for the way the
country is governed economically and politically. The natural resources of the country belong to the Iraqi
people. This puts a huge premium on questions of economic governance. Yet unless the new government is
honest, technically sound, and strongly democratic it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to break with
the corrupt practices of the past.” (USAID, 4 June 2003)
“The three most important tasks the U.S. must accomplish if we are to be successful in Iraq are security,
democracy, and a free market economy. Our first step has been to work with Coalition forces to identify
key local leaders with whom we can work and connect them to opportunities for relief and reconstruction
assistance. This has been an important part of our DART's responsibilities, as well as those of our NGO and
private sector partners. In April, we awarded a contract to Research Triangle Institute (RTI) to work with
local communities in secure areas and respond to their priorities, and help build up local governments so
that they can respond to their constituents and deliver basic services like potable water, schooling, and
health care. Already RTI and its subcontractors have about 20 people in the country, working closely with
the Coalition Provisional Authority, and that number is expected to reach 50 by the end of this month. RTI's
technical experts are setting up neighborhood advisory councils in Baghdad and working with appropriate
local administrators to improve the delivery of essential services. (…) we awarded cooperative agreements
to five U.S. NGOs - Mercy Corps; International Relief and Development, Inc.; Agricultural Cooperative
Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance; Cooperative Housing
Foundation International; and Save the Children Federation, Inc. - as part of our Iraq Community Action
Program. This, too, is specifically designed to promote grass-roots citizen involvement in the affairs of
some 250 communities through Iraq. “ (USAID, 4 June 2003)
29
Post-war transitional authority
•
•
•
Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council
Governing Council preparing constitution and elections
The Bush Administration negotiating with the UN and the SC
“The Iraqi Governing Council was appointed by the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in
July 2003. The council has some significant powers. It can appoint and dismiss ministers and controls the
national budget. It will also oversee the creation of a congress to draft a new Iraqi constitution. National
elections are set to follow a referendum on this constitution. However, the CPA retains real power. It
controls "operational security" and can veto decisions made by the council. Most of those holding council
seats were members of Saddam Hussein's opposition in exile. One of the strongest criticisms of the council
is that it is a collection of outsiders who cannot properly represent the Iraqi people. The council appointed
a cabinet of 25 ministers in early September, after months of wrangling to ensure those selected accurately
represented the ethnic and religious make-up of the country.” (BBC, accessed 10 October 2003)
“Iraq's Governing Council will meet Tuesday [7 October 2003] to examine several recommendations for
the country's new constitution, including one proposal for elections, a member of the US-selected body told
AFP Monday. Mahmoud Othman said the council will examine a report written by the committee charged
with studying the process for drafting a new constitution for war-battered Iraq, which it received last week.
"They have different proposals. One of the proposals is for partial elections, another one is for a general
election and another suggests that some of the members of the constitutional assembly be nominated,"
Othman said.
"We will meet Tuesday to discuss these proposals and we will try to work out a formula," he added.
Earlier, council member Naseer Jaderji also told AFP that the notion of holding elections was "one of the
recommendations" made by the committee, which also suggested that a "census" be held in Iraq. Last
Tuesday the committee handed its recommendations to the council, after canvassing the country for 22 days
during which they met with a cross-section of the Iraqi population, political and religious leaders and
experts.
Council members appear divided over whether to elect or designate the constitutional assembly which will
draft the new supreme law while senior Muslim Shiite leaders have made it clear they want to see elections.
On Friday the head of Iraq's top Shiite political party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq (SCIRI), said the writers of the new constitution must be elected.
"The drafting of a permanent constitution for the country must be done by a panel elected by the Iraqi
people and it must be ratified through a nationwide referendum," Abdel Aziz al-Hakim said. His views
echoed those of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most revered Shiite cleric in Iraq, who issued a decree in June
forbidding the drafting of a constitution by any assembly designated by occupation forces.” (AFP, 6
October 2003)
“The Bush Administration is in negotiations with the United Nations and members of the Security Council
on strengthening the political and military role of the United Nations in Iraq. Refugees International
welcomes the possibility of greater UN involvement in Iraq, while recognizing that this step alone will not
resolve the issues of political legitimacy and security facing the interim authorities in the country. One
challenge that any governing authority will face in Iraq is resolving the status of an estimated 900,000
internally displaced people in the country. The following bulletin by RI's Brenda Oppermann, originally
issued on August 25th, presents a detailed analysis of the consequences of Iraq's internal displacement
problem and makes recommendations as to how to address the situation.” (RI, 4 September 2003)
30
“Coping with displacement is one of the greatest challenges facing the nation of Iraq on its path to
establishing a stable and democratic state. The former state policies of expulsion and repression combined
with the effects of assorted wars and clashes resulted in large-scale displacement. Today, there are
approximately 900,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) throughout the country. Only by recognizing the
many and varied causes of displacement can the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) design and
implement resettlement programs that serve the needs of displaced Iraqis as well as the country overall. The
lack of guidance and coordination by the CPA concerning the issue of displacement is troubling. How this
issue is resolved will be an indication of whether pluralism and democracy in Iraq will take root. The
integrity of the nation depends on finding just solutions for the varied displaced populations and
communities. (…)"(RI, 25 August 2003)
Causes of displacement
Kurdish fighters, threatened Arabs with AK-47s, telling them to leave their houses
within 24 hours (January 2004)
•
•
•
•
•
•
Kurdish fighters, threatened Arabs with AK-47s, telling them to leave their houses within 24
hours
Family members tell you their houses were flattened by bulldozers
"They said where we lived was their land, and that Saddam had sent us,"
"It was government land that was given to us. We have a document to prove it
"It's true that Kurdish political parties in the north put up notices asking Arabs to move out of
their homes"
"I did not attack the people living in my house now, but they left before I came"
"If you ask them, most families living in the former military barracks at Rasheed Camp in Baghdad will tell
you peshmerga, or Kurdish fighters, threatened them with AK-47s, telling them to leave their houses within
24 hours. Sometimes, family members tell you their houses were flattened by bulldozers. Others say their
valuables were looted as they struggled to meet the deadline.
On 8 April 2003, peshmerga came to 36-year-old Bushra Kashem and her neighbours in the High Arabiya
area of Kirkuk near northern Iraq. Jabar said the fighters brought big earthmoving machines, which they
used to start knocking down the walls of houses in the neighbourhood. Everything happened so quickly, the
families had no time to organise themselves or to protest, she said.
"They said where we lived was their land, and that Saddam had sent us," Jabar told IRIN in Baghdad. "We
kept silent because they were armed. We were very scared. We left everything."
As she washed dishes with a hose outside the concrete barrack building on the outskirts of Baghdad, Jabar's
eyes turn red as she tried to keep from crying. "It was government land that was given to us. We have a
document to prove it," Jabar said, going inside to get a simple paper with a map of the neighbourhood and a
signature at the bottom.
An estimated 1,235 people displaced by the peshmerga in northern Iraq now live in various buildings of the
former military barracks, according to figures from the IOM. Another estimated 800 or so live in former
military quarters in the village of Khan Beni Sad to the north. Others live in other temporary
accommodation.
31
"It's true that Kurdish political parties in the north put up notices asking Arabs to move out of their homes,"
Mohammed Ibrahim Jafer, an officer at the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) political party offices,
headed by Jalal Talabani, told IRIN. Talabani just finished a one-month stint as a rotating president of the
US-appointed interim government in Iraq.
Jafer said it was also true that peshmerga sometimes visited Arab neighbourhoods to see if people were
willing to leave. But any fighters who acted "inappropriately" by forcing anyone to move would be
punished, he said, asking for people with complaints to come forward.
Jabar said she was afraid she would be killed if she went to the PUK office in Baghdad or in Kirkuk.
Already, she said she tried to return to Kirkuk and was threatened by people she didn't know standing on
her former street. "Could you live here?" Jabar asked bitterly, gesturing at the mud and the hose she is using
to rinse off her dishes. "I have no place to live now."
The PUK officer, Jafer said he could only sympathise with families like Jabar's up to a point. He said his
family was kicked out of their house in 1975 to make room for Arab families under Saddam Hussein's
"Arabisation" programme. The family fled to Iran to escape political persecution, he explained.
"I feel sad for the Arabs and I can share their suffering," Jafer told IRIN. "But those who came and took my
house, I cannot forgive." In an attempt to show how equitable the Kurd political parties are being, Jafar said
Arab people who lived in the north before 1957 were not bothered by the peshmerga this spring, because
their families are original residents of the region. Saddam Hussein destroyed an estimated 5,000 Kurdish
villages in the north in the 1970s to make room for Arabs he sent to the region, Jafer said.
"I did not attack the people living in my house now, but they left before I came," she explained, in a matterof-fact tone of voice. "We didn't take any money from them when they forced us out, so we won't pay any
money to them now."
It's that attitude that's creating problems for aid groups and rights groups trying to help displaced people.
There's not necessarily proof that one family or another has a greater or lesser claim to a particular house in
Iraq, according to Baptiste Martin, coordinator for IDP projects at the IOM office in central Iraq. In many
cases, an Arab family and a Kurdish family might have equal claims, Martin said.
"We don't want them to hope too much," he told IRIN. "You can have two families that have the same right
to a house. That's why resettlement may also be an issue." An Iraqi claim commission is scheduled to start
in September to sort out property claims, but even for people with documents, arbitration could takes years,
Martin said.
He pointed out that similar disputes in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo and South Africa were still ongoing
and now in Iraq.
For the US military, displaced people are "a real headache," mainly because soldiers don't always
understand the issues involved, and there's not always a neutral third party around to explain it to them,
according to Lt Col Fred Sellers, who works as a liaison in some of the displaced person disputes and is
based near Rasheed Camp.
At the moment, soldiers can evict people from a government building, if the US-led temporary government
needs to use it, he said. If no governmental agency needs the building yet, as appears to be the case with
many military and special police force buildings around the country, displaced people can live there until a
new government decides what to do, Sellers added. US administrators say they will hand over
responsibility for Iraq to a new government at the end of June.
"For example, at the agriculture ministry building in Baghdad, when workers came back to their jobs,
displaced people who had moved in were asked to move to Hillsdale, a set of warehouses set up by the US
32
military to help them," Sellers told IRIN in Baghdad. But when farmers were forced out of a desert area to
make way for a US artillery practice range started asking for compensation with what seemed like
astronomical sums of money, the US military was not so accommodating, he added."(UN OCHA, 6
January 2004).
Causes of displacements in the North (January 2004)
•
•
•
•
•
•
There was the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war when Kurds were expelled to Iran and people fled border
areas
An arabisation campaign and suppression of uprisings forced not only Kurds but Turkmens and
Assyrians out of their homes
At the end of the war with Iran, the Baath regime launched the horrific Anfal campaign that saw
villages burnt and bulldozed
Even the establishment of a Kurdish government following the 1991 uprising did little to stop new
IDPs being created
Internal fighting between the two main Kurdish parties caused displacements
Battles along the Turkish border by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) with Turkish military, all
saw more people forced from their homes
"After 12 years of autonomy it would be easy to think that the north of Iraq, known as Kurdistan by most of
its residents, had fewer problems than the south and centre of the country which continued to endure
Saddam's regime until earlier this year. But the reality is that the three northern governorates of Mosul,
Arbil and Dahuk still have huge problems and needs - none bigger than somehow solving the situation of
between 600,000 and 800,000 IDPs, with the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk being home to the largest
numbers.
The problems have existed for decades, but the last 20 years have seen the worst displacement in the north.
First there was the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war when Kurds were expelled to Iran and people fled border areas as
fighting intensified.
Then came Saddam Hussein's Arabisation campaign and suppression of uprisings forcing not only Kurds
but Turkmens and Assyrians out of their homes. The programme saw Arabs from southern and central Iraq
induced to move north to Kurdish cities. Frequently Kurds were kicked out of their homes to make way for
the new arrivals.
At the end of the war with Iran, Saddam launched the horrific Anfal campaign that saw villages burnt and
bulldozed as punishment for the Kurds' resistance. His authorities relocated hundreds of thousands of
villagers to collective towns that were little better than concentration camps according to inhabitants.
Unable to leave the towns and with no access to arable land, Saddam had destroyed the people's livelihoods
and made them economically dependent on the regime in Baghdad. But even the establishment of a
Kurdish government following the 1991 uprising did little to stop new IDPs being created.
Internal fighting between the two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) as well as battles along the Turkish border by the Kurdish Workers Party
(PKK) with Turkish military, all saw more people forced from their homes." (UN OCHA, 5 January 2004)
33
Palestinian families evicted in Baghdad (November 2003)
•
•
•
Iraq is host country for 80,000 Palestinian refugees and smaller numbers of other nationalities,
mostly in Baghdad
Under Saddam Hussein, the Palestinians were generally well treated
With the fall of Saddam Hussein many Palestinians were evicted from their homes
"Iraq is also a host country for 80,000 Palestinian refugees and smaller numbers of other nationalities,
mostly in Baghdad. Some of the Palestinians have lived in Iraq for decades, although many came to Iraq
after being expelled from Kuwait following the 1991 Gulf War. Under Saddam Hussein, the Palestinians
were generally well treated and, although forbidden to own land or houses, received a rent subsidy. With
the fall of Saddam the subsidy ended and many Palestinians were evicted from their homes. Four hundred
families have taken up residence at a sports stadium where they live in tents and miserable conditions. In
recent interviews with the Arab TV network Al Jazeera, many Palestinians indicated a desire to return to
their homeland -- a wish that is unlikely to be fulfilled barring an Israeli-Palestinian agreement to let them
do so." ( Refugee International, 21 November 2003)
Post-war challenges (2003)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Can Iraq be held together now Saddam is gone?
The Kurdish make-up of Kirkuk and surrounding areas
British troops take control of Basrah
Shia strong-hold in the South
Iraqi displaced: A challenge for democracy
Kirkuk: Ethnic power struggle under US control
Iranians in the south become IDPs
Displaced Palestinian refugees
ESCWA on the challenges of displacement
•
Communal tensions on the rise
“For centuries, Iraq has been part of a volatile region held together by empire. So what will happen when
democracy is imposed? Hardly had the first enthusiasm for the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime broken out
in Baghdad than events in both the north and the south of Iraq – the fall of Kirkuk to Kurdish forces and the
assassination of the Shia Ayatollah al-Khoei in Najaf – seemed to confirm the worst fears of those who had
warned that the collapse of the tyrant would lead to a dismemberment of the country. As ever, it is oil and
past imperial policies that poison the ethnic relations of the region and threaten its unity. The oil wealth of
Iraq is divided north and south between Kurds and Shias, while the power is held by the Sunnis in the
centre. With the dominance of Shias and Kurds in the US-supported opposition, the disgruntled Sunnis, the
former ruling group, cannot be far behind in wanting to battle for a territory for themselves.
Contrary to the promises the Bush team repeatedly gave the Turkish government, the forces of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party have seized Kirkuk, the hub of the Iraqi oil industry in the north. This has
alarmed both the civilian and military leaders of Turkey. They consider it a gross breach of the assurances
34
given to them by Washington. They view the seizure of this city, to be followed shortly by Mosul, by the
KDP – albeit in association with US troops – as the first step toward the creation of a federal Iraq. And they
fear that Kirkuk, a city that has been a bone of contention between ethnic Arabs and Kurds for decades,
would become part of Iraqi Kurdistan. The nightmare scenario for Ankara – as well as for Iran and Syria,
which have their own Kurdish minorities in the areas adjoining Iraqi Kurdistan – would be for the Iraqi
Kurds to declare an independent sovereign state, thus creating a nucleus for a greater Kurdistan in the near
future. Assured of hefty oil revenue from Kirkuk, that state would be an economic powerhouse.”
“Even if the political situation in the post-Saddam Iraq stabilised around a federal set-up, with the country
carved up between Kurdish, Sunni and Shia-majority regions, say the Turkish leaders, this would pose a
mortal threat to the territorial integrity of their republic. Already there are persistent reports of the Kurdish
autonomous movement gathering momentum in south-eastern Turkey and a heightened military presence
there. Thus these three powerful neighbours of Iraq are intent on keeping the autonomy of Iraqi Kurds in
the post-Saddam era to the absolute minimum. If that fails, they fear, it will be a free-for-all.
In the south, where the American and British forces have carved up the region between themselves after
pursuing dissimilar military strategies, a different pattern of military administration is emerging. That does
not augur well for the continued territorial integrity of Iraq.”
“It was only after the SAS stormed the headquarters of the much-hated General Ali Hassan al-Majid in
Basra on 4 April and killed him that British armoured troops were able to punch their way to the city centre
two days later. Since then the military commanders have tried to gain the co-operation of local leaders to
administer the city. By contrast, the Pentagon, controlling Nasiriyah further up the Euphrates from Basra,
has been heavy-handed. It was a fortnight before US forces managed to pacify the town. Now, pursuing the
political agenda of Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice-President Dick Cheney, the Pentagon is
trying to bring into the town the so-called "Free Iraqi Army" of the Iraqi National Congress, led by Ahmed
Chalabi. Though a favourite of the US hawks and the pro-Israeli lobby in Washington, Chalabi is deeply
unpopular among Iraqi exiles and lacks any constituency inside Iraq. His presence in Nasiriyah has already
ignited renewed hostilities.”
“In the Shia holy city of Najaf, American claims to have reached a peace agreement with the religious
authorities were blown apart yesterday by the assassination of Abdul Majid al-Khoei, the US-backed son of
the late leader of the country's Shia majority and a friend of Tony Blair's, who had just returned from exile
in London with US support. No one is yet certain of the cause or the perpetrators of the killing, which was
carried out by a mob in the Ali Mosque, one of the Shias' most sacred places. But it comes on top of the
growing tension between the followers of Grand Ayatollah Mirza Ali Sistani and those of the Tehran-based
Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir Hakim. Sistani issued a fatwa early on in the war calling on all Muslims to
help Iraqis to fight the invading infidel forces, whereas Hakim's Supreme Assembly of Islamic Revolution
in Iraq (SAIRI), based in Iran, had joined the US-supported Iraqi opposition and arrived in Najaf in the
wake of the Anglo-American invasion.”
“In any case, Hakim and Iran's ruling clerics have made it abundantly clear that once the attacking forces
have ousted Saddam Hussein, they must leave the country. This is an unrealistic demand, and will, of
course, go unheeded in Washington. That is likely to lead the followers of Hakim and Sistani in the
predominantly Shia south to join hands against the Anglo-American occupiers of Iraq.
Al-Khoei was widely seen as America's stooge in the area, and may well have paid the price, killed by
either of the rival sects. Certainly his death would seem to have dented Washington's and London's hopes
of an early reconcilement of the various Shia groups behind new democratic structures.
On top of the volatile situation in the south, there is the long-buried issue of relations between the Shia
majority (forming 70 per cent of ethnic Arabs) and the Sunni minority in Iraq. Ever since 1638, when the
Sunni Ottoman Turks captured Mesopotamia, minority Sunnis have been in the driving seat. They have
kept Shias down at best, and persecuted them at worst.”
“Now, with the impending flowering of promised democracy in Iraq, it will be the majority Shias who will
be in the driving seat. Will they then do to the Sunnis what the latter had done to them over centuries? This
35
is the question that the Saudi royals, staunch Sunnis to the bone, must now be asking. There, too, the Shias
dominate the oil provinces but power belongs to Sunnis. Given that Sunni as well as Shia tribes straddle
Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the rulers in Riyadh have a way of influencing events in Iraq.
Senior Saudi officials are notorious for keeping their policies under cover while making a liberal use of the
state's coffers to prosecute them. They had reportedly bribed the Sunni tribal leaders in Iraq to switch sides
during the Anglo-American invasion. It is not clear whether this really happened.
What is crystal clear, though, is that democracy is the last thing the autocratic Saudi royals wish to see take
root in Iraq, fearful that the contagion would spread to their own kingdom and undermine their monopoly
of power. So here we have another element of irredentism in Iraq. For centuries Iraq has been part of a
complex and volatile region held together by empire – first the Arabs, then the Ottomans, and then the
British. It remains to be seen whether an American effort at nation-building can hold it together.” (Dilip
Hiro, D., The Independent, 11 April 2003)
Iraqi Displaced: A test for Democracy
“Beginning in the late 1970s, Saddam's government forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of Kurds,
Iraq's largest minority, destroyed 4,000 of their villages, and sprayed more than 200 of these with chemical
weapons. Most of the nearly 800,000 Kurds displaced in the north cannot return to their homes because of
the widespread destruction of their villages, the planting of landmines and continued occupation of their
lands by Iraqi security forces. To manage such explosive claims, a representative ethnic and religious body
will have to be set up to help the displaced regain their land and property. The returns will have to be
coordinated to prevent a rush on the area, with legal procedures set up to adjudicate property disputes and
oil revenues set aside to compensate those who were expelled or arbitrarily dismissed from the oil industry.
Similarly, the return of thousands of Shiite Arabs, expelled from their homes in Baghdad, Basra and other
areas on political grounds, will have to be addressed. And efforts will have to be made to repair at least part
of the damage done to Iraq's Marsh Arabs. Baghdad brutally destroyed their habitat along the lower Tigris
and Euphrates rivers, forcibly uprooting at least 200,000 people. It coupled massive engineering projects to
drain water from the oil-rich marshes with the shelling and burning of villages, the poisoning of fishing
grounds, and the assassination and abduction of local leaders. Although it would be difficult to recreate the
marshes, consultations should be held with the former inhabitants and a feasibility study done to see
whether at least some of the marshes could be reflooded. For those who cannot return, compensation should
be paid from oil revenues. Even before a change of regime, Iraq's opposition should be pressing the United
Nations to devote more aid to the displaced. The UN Oil for Food Program, the largest humanitarian
assistance program in the world, generates $6 billion a year for civilian goods. Isn't it time for the United
Nations used its leverage to extract a price for the benefits the Iraqi government receives? When the United
Nations kowtows to Baghdad's threats and intimidation, it is the displaced who suffer. UN officials should
protest all new displacement, insist upon unrestricted access to those uprooted, publish data on their
conditions and assure them better shelter and health care. Iraq's internally displaced constitute too large a
group to be ignored. Their problems touch upon the central issues of water, land, oil, minority and majority
rights, ethnicity and religion, citizenship and national allegiance, and systems of justice. If their plight is not
addressed fairly, there will be little prospect for a stable and democratic Iraq. Too little has been said about
them by Iraq's democratic opposition.” (Roberta Cohen, IHT, 28 December 2002)
Kirkuk: Ethnic Power Struggle under U.S. Control
“In cooperation with U.S. occupation forces, two armed Kurdish organizations have moved swiftly in
recent weeks to gain a political hold on Kirkuk, a city in the northern Iraqi oil fields that the groups have
long coveted as a Kurdish economic and cultural center. Since moving into Kirkuk on April 10 behind
fleeing Iraqi soldiers, U.S. forces have struggled to build a viable local administration in a region where
Kurds are the majority among several often hostile ethnic groups. For help, U.S. officers have turned to
eager leaders from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP),
who have administered sectors of a largely autonomous U.S.-protected portion of northern Iraq since
shortly after the 1991 Persian Gulf War.”
36
“The two groups, each with strong militias, have sent in more than 400 police officers and a variety of city
administrators from the Kurdish enclave that begins 25 miles east of this city. This has formalized their
political reach outside that area for the first time. Many of those police officers are former pesh merga
guerrillas, who have spent decades fighting efforts by the government of former president Saddam Hussein
to bring the independence-minded Kurds to heel. US officers have also reached out to local Arabs,
Assyrians and Turkmen, ethnic groups that each make up a significant minority of greater Kirkuk's 1
million residents. But Kurds, with a long history of working with the U.S. military, have emerged with
more influence in the police force and the interim city council. As a result, the council has already been
boycotted by a Turkmen group to protest perceived U.S. favoritism toward Kurds. […] Party officials have
also been buying property from Kirkuk's Arabs, often at inflated prices, in hopes of increasing the number
of Kurdish residents before a US-sponsored mayoral and city council election scheduled this week for this
city 150 miles north of Baghdad. "The only real opposition groups in this region were Kurdish, the only
ones to stand up to the regime," said Mohammed Kamal Salah, the KDP's deputy director in Kirkuk. "The
truth is that this is a Kurdish city, so we have come to represent it." Until now, US forces have tried to keep
the Kurdish parties at arm's length, even ordering the pesh merga out of Kirkuk in the days after the
Hussein government's collapse. Turning to them now marks a shift by U.S. forces that has potentially farreaching implications for stability in a region with restive Kurdish populations scattered across four
countries. While Kurdish party leaders meet in Baghdad to negotiate a role in a federated Iraq, their foot
soldiers have worked on the ground to tip the political balance in their favor. The parties, whose pesh
merga moved alongside U.S. forces throughout the northern campaign, appear to be riding that mutually
useful alliance to greater political power. In endorsing the Kurdish role, however, the United States has
become a player in the ethnic realignment that has swept Iraq since Hussein's fall by trying to create local
institutions that it hopes will endure after U.S. forces withdraw.
During Hussein's three-decade rule, Iraqi forces put down Kurdish rebellions with massacres and poison
gas attacks that killed what human rights groups estimate was more than 100,000 people. After the Gulf
War, U.S. warplanes began protecting a 17,000-square-mile Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq. Now the
Kurds are trying to extend their reach into the two major northern cities outside that enclave: Kirkuk, which
sits above huge oil reserves, and Mosul, an oil center where a similar power struggle between Kurdish,
Arab and other ethnic groupings is playing out under the watch of U.S. forces.”
Turkey, which did not allow U.S. forces to invade from its territory, has warned against allowing Kurdish
groups to assume political or military power in Kirkuk or elsewhere in northern Iraq. Fearing that Kurdish
control of the economically important city could encourage Turkey's separatist Kurds, Turkish officials
threatened to dispatch troops to evict pesh merga militias after they defied U.S. orders not to enter Kirkuk.
The pesh merga withdrew, but the United States has invited their political wing to return. "It's a reward
from the allied forces to allow the Kurds back in here," said Muner Qafi, political director of the Iraqi
Turkmen Front, the largest party representing ethnic Turkmen in Kirkuk. "If the Americans left right now,
this city would be the start of a huge civil conflict, not only here but across the country."
“In recent weeks, U.S. forces have tried to help establish a representative city government and police force.
Because Hussein used settlement of Arabs to alter the demographics of this strategic region, census
information remained secret. No one is sure of the size of each ethnic group, although most agree that the
Kurds represent a majority. And now the numbers are increasing as hundreds of Kurds -- displaced years
ago by Hussein's "Arabization" campaign, which paid Arabs from the south to settle on Kurdish land -have returned to reclaim their property. Many more intend to do so once school lets out in the Kurdish
enclave in July. Violence is already on the rise. On Saturday, witnesses said Arab men from the nearby
town of Hawijah arrived in several trucks and opened fire in town, killing at least five people.
Army Col. William Mayville, commander of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, has called on Kurdish leaders to
condemn the forced evictions that have sent hundreds of Arabs southward. Until Saturday, he had been
mostly successful in preventing deadly ethnic violence and he has asked Kurds to settle property disputes in
neighborhood committees. The Kurdish support, however, could change once the Americans leave.
Mayville set up a city council of 24 members, six from each ethnic group. But rival ethnic leaders say the
Kurdish influence extends beyond its council seats, given to the two major parties and the Kurdistan
37
Communist Party. The two major Kurdish parties, once bitter political, economic and military enemies
within their secessionist movement, have teamed up to consolidate Kurdish political power.
The Iraqi Turkmen Front received all six seats set aside for the ethnic group. But three smaller Turkmen
parties complained, and U.S. forces took five seats away from the front to give to the others. Only the
Turkmen Front, however, operated in Kirkuk during Hussein's rule. The other three Turkmen parties, Qafi
said, were based in the Kurdish enclave and are sympathetic to the Kurdish cause. The Turkmen Front,
once referred to as "brothers" by the same Kurdish leaders who now accuse it of being an extremist group
with subversive ties to Turkey, will protest by refusing to occupy its seat.
The police force, now consisting of at least 500 officers, has also become dominated by Kurds. Although
the precinct commands have been divided evenly, Kurdish officers outnumber those from other groups
because they also make up the plainclothes secret police, according to Kirkuk residents and Kurdish rivals.
The Assyrian Christians could not fill out the full contingent sought by the U.S. Army, so most of their
positions were given to Kurds. Trained in academies, the Kurdish police have been working for years in the
enclave cities of Sulaymaniyah and Irbil. Kurdish officials say all of them are former pesh merga fighters,
including Maohat Asad, whose family was driven from its home in Kirkuk by Arabs 16 years ago.
"I came back and found my family house totally flattened," said Asad, who wears a laminated badge issued
by the 173rd Airborne Brigade. "Anyone we ever had in our house, even visiting family, we had to tell the
Baath Party. They eventually kicked us out. But this will be resolved. Now we're working alongside the
Americans." (Washington Post, 19 May 2003)
Iranians in the south become IDPs
"They sent us away, the people there. They said to us we had to go to our homes in Iran. We would have
been killed," said Saleheh Batah, an Iranian woman who has been living in Iraq with her family for years.
Her family, like most of the 7,000 to 8,000 Iranians who made their homes in three settlements around the
Al-Kut area of Wasit Governorate, had been given 25 acres of land by Saddam Husayn’s regime. They
were paying 2,000 Iraqi dinars (US $1) per acre in rent and 1,000 dinars for water, farmed the land,
integrated with the local communities in Dujaylah, Ali al-Gharbi and Al-Kumayt, and had access to both
health and education.
But two weeks ago they were forced to flee. Hounded off their land by local Iraqis, about 20 Iranian
families moved into abandoned buildings in Basra’s Shatt al-Arab area formerly used as a transit centre by
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). About 500 others fled to
Bazirgan on the Iranian border, where they are "literally sitting in a minefield", the head of UNHCR in
Basra, Mohammed Adar, said. The rest reportedly moved outside the city to the Basra and Maysan
governorates, while a small number stayed, determined to reap their harvests. "They came with guns,
during the day and at night. They were saying: 'This land is ours and we will not let you keep it.’ And
without the land we cannot survive," says Saleheh. None of the Iranians had been killed by the time she
fled, but a local Iraqi who tried to protect them was shot dead, she said.
Hamideh Fakher, who escaped with her 10 children, says she was threatened with all kinds of guns. "They
wanted our land and our animals, worth millions of dinars. We were afraid for our children, so we left.
Suddenly they changed. They said Saddam had brought us here, and that we had to leave since he wasn’t
around to protect us any more." Two local Iraqis were killed in crossfire by the militias, she added.
UNHCR officials have confirmed sightings of masked, armed men during visits to the former settlements,
in areas where there is no policing or protection of any kind. "There is great hostility - we have received
reports of looting, seizures of land, confiscation of property, and of farm produce," Adar said. "The Iranians
had concrete homes and were relatively better off than the locals," he noted. But while the Iranians had
reaped the benefits of having been "welcomed" by the Iraqi regime - having been caught behind the Iraqi
border when the Iran-Iraq war ended - they were also trapped outside their homeland for many years.
[….] UNHCR says the Iranian government must open its borders, and soon. "The best solution for these
people is to return home. Iran should allow them to do so," said Adar, stressing that - especially those stuck
38
in the minefield - were in grave danger. "Coalition forces must also provide security in areas where the
Iranians are settled, so that assistance can be delivered to them," he added. Until assistance does arrive, the
Iranians camped in Basra and elsewhere will have a daily struggle ahead of them. They had not received
their monthly food ration for three months, says Fakher, because they were told it was being given to the
Iraqi army. Now she has only one sack of wheat left. "What has this child done? He’s going to die here. I
need water for him and a doctor, and he has to be inoculated against disease," she says. "Please, we need a
solution urgently." (IRIN, 16 May 2003)
“The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is trying to resolve the issue of up to
1,000 Iranians who left their long-time refugee settlements in eastern Iraq because of security problems and
looting in late April and have since been waiting in makeshift border camps for the green light from Iran to
cross home. "We have asked the Islamic Republic of Iran to permit these anxious refugees to cross
homewards as soon as possible," UNHCR spokesperson Ron Redmond told reporters in Geneva. More than
4,500 of the 23,000 Iranian refugees residing in Iraq had previously been cleared by the Iranian
Government to return home. Some of them are among those waiting at the border. (UN News Service, 20
May 2003)
Displaced Palestinian refugees
“The UN refugee agency announced today that it has sent a convoy of aid to help newly-displaced
Palestinian refugees in Baghdad amid concerns of a backlash against them in post-war Iraq. UNHCR has
also expressed concern about the expulsion of scores of Iranian refugees in southern Iraq.
According to recent reports from the Iraqi capital, some 1,000 Palestinians have been evicted from their
homes since the end of the war. Some of them are camping in disused schools and other abandoned
buildings, as well as on plots of open land in Baghdad.
On Friday, a three-truck UNHCR convoy crossed from Jordan into Iraq with emergency supplies for up to
2,000 people, including 400 tents, 1,200 mattresses and 2,000 blankets as well as stoves, jerry cans and
soap. The convoy is due to arrive in Baghdad later the same day, when the Palestinian Red Crescent will
help distribute the aid materials to the homeless Palestinians.
UNHCR fears that more of the estimated 60-90,000 Palestinian refugees living in Iraq could lose their
homes. The agency noted that other landlords may reclaim property they were forced to rent out for
minuscule sums – sometimes as little as $1 per month – to the Ba'ath government on behalf of the refugees.
Since the fall of the regime, these landlords have stopped receiving their rent.
"We're concerned that what we're hearing about evictions may be the start of a backlash," said UNHCR's
Chief of Mission for Iraq, Daniel Bellamy. "None of this is the Palestinians' fault, but if the perception is
that they were beneficiaries of the former government, then they may suffer as a result."
Many of the Palestinian refugees in Iraq have been there since 1948, or are the descendants of those who
came in the wake of the first Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Others were displaced more recently, for example
from Kuwait following the 1991 Gulf War. Most of the Palestinians in Iraq live in Baghdad, although there
are also small communities located elsewhere in the country who may be facing similar problems.
Unlike Palestinian refugees in the Occupied Territories or in the countries sharing a border with Israel, who
fall under the mandate of UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East), Palestinians in Iraq come under UNHCR's mandate. But until the recent regime change, the
refugee agency's assistance to them was largely limited to legal assistance, including the provision of
documents. The state provided them with material assistance (including housing and food), medical care
and education, under the provisions of Iraq's 1971 National Refugee Act.
This assistance – however basic – may have led to resentment among Iraqi citizens who felt that the
Palestinians were getting more government assistance than they were. Concerned that these refugees may
39
become collateral victims of the regime change, UNHCR's Bellamy said, "This is one reason why we want
to get back in to Baghdad as soon as the security situation allows."
Palestinian refugees are not the only ones targeted. On Wednesday, a UNHCR team in Basra, southern Iraq,
found several Iranian refugee families living in a disused transit centre at the edge of town. The refugees
said they had been expelled from their homes in Dujaila – a refugee settlement near Al Kut, about halfway
between Basra and Baghdad – and that their property and crops had been confiscated. When the team
proceeded to the Iranian border, it found three more Iranian refugee families displaced from Dujaila, trying
to get permission to repatriate.
Small numbers of UNHCR staff have recently returned to Basra, and to Erbil in the north. But there are still
no international UNHCR staff in Baghdad at the moment. The decision about when and how many
UNHCR and other UN agency staff can return there will be made by the UN security agency,
UNSECOORD, based on security assessments in the capital.
Prior to the war, the UN refugee agency was also directly assisting some 12,000 Iranian refugees – mostly
Kurds – in Al Tash camp west of Baghdad, and more than 9,000 Turkish Kurds in Makhmour camp, southeast of Mosul.
UNHCR has repeatedly expressed concern about a group of around 1,000 Iranian refugees from Al Tash
who have been stuck in no man's land at the Jordanian border for more than three weeks, after fleeing from
the camp towards the end of the war.
Staff from the refugee agency and its partner agencies have since visited Al Tash and Makhmour camps,
which appear to be functioning reasonably well. However, UNHCR's Bellamy said the agency was still
anxious to get more international staff back into Iraq to assist the camp communities as well as to deal with
the new problems facing the Palestinians. In addition, the agency wants to proceed with preparations for the
reintegration of Iraqi refugees expected to return to their home country eventually” (UNHCR, 9 May
2003).
ESCWA on the challenges of displacement
“(…) While massive waves of refugees did not result from the conflict, hundreds of thousands of Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) must be dealth with, say international officials and aid workers. Several hundred
thousand Iraqis outside the country may eventually return, and incidents of violence have already taken
place when IDPs seek to return to their original homes, such as in the mixed Kurdish-Arab northern part of
the country.
(…) [S]everal important refugee issues have arisen, usually involving the thousands of internally-displaced
persons (IDPs) in the country and raising concerns about human rights-related issues. According to the UN
International Organization of Migration (www.iom.org), thousands of people fled Iraq's major towns to the
relative safety of the countryside during the conflict; many of these IDPs have since returned to their
homes. In mid-May, IOM -designated NGOs began the long process of registering these people, living in
scattered public buildings or in extended family structures.
The IOM has also begun assessing the difficult conditions faced by thousands of displaced Marsh Arabs,
whose long-standing way of life was disrupted by the former regime. The IOM says that Marsh Arabs face
the difficult choice of whether they should recreate their former life in the marshes or adapt to a new
beginning. On 12 May, the office of the UN humanitarian coordinator for Iraq (www.reliefweb.int) said it
estimated that the stock of internally displaced in Iraq during the last 20 years between 700,000 and 1
million people. Some 600,000-800,000 IDPs are estimated to be located in the predominantly Kurdish
north and 100,000 to 300,000 in the center and south. Relief organizations report that several thousand
persons have returned to the Kirkuk area; they have asked thousands of others who wish to do so to delay
their move until the necessary facilities are in place. To tackle the issue of forced resettlement and
displacement under the former regime, the US-established Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance said on 21 May that it would soon establish a committee to oversee the amicable settlement of
40
property disputes. The office asked Iraqis to not settle conflicts over the ownership of a house, land or
commercial establishment "by your own hand". Occupation forces on the ground have on occasion
responded to pressing questions of returning IDPs. In Kirkuk, US military personnel oversaw, according to
media reports, an agreement to split profits from this year's harvest between Arabs and Kurdish returnees to
lands that they had been forcibly displaced from. Despite the generally better levels of security in northern
towns like Kirkuk, incidents of violence between Arabs and Kurds have taken place over the issue of
returnees.
On 6 May, the IOM said that the first program to go ahead under the USAID-funded Iraq Transition
Initiative (ITI) is rehabilitating a school in Umm Qasr. The project, worth $8 million, was launched three
weeks earlier. The IOM said the project is designed to identify and address priority needs, with Iraqi
participation, with an eye toward encouraging people to return and stabilizing populations. The Umm Qasr
project was agreed upon with local input, the organization said. The project is also supposed to coordinate
with local and national authorities to facilitate work on other areas - reintegrating internally displaced
persons, refugees and former combatants. Other projects under discussion include encouraging the return of
qualified Iraqis and setting up a workable comp ensation scheme for people to claim damages for lost
property and other abuses during the Saddam Hussein regime. In Geneva, the UN secretary-general's
Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng, said the UN should be asked to help with the
issue of internal refugees displaced by the previous regime. He said reconstruction and development funds,
including oil revenues, should be used to help people return or obtain compensation for land and property
lost, but in either case "fairness must be assured for the more than 200,000 Arabs" settled in the Kirkuk area
by the former regime. (…)” (ESCWA, 10 June 2003)
Communal tensions on the rise
“Six months after the fall of Saddam Hussein, tensions and resentments, bottled beneath the surface for
years, have risen to the surface sorely testing relations among Iraq's multiple ethnic groups. Faced with
anarchy and lawlessness, many Iraqis have sought solace in their communal and ethnic identities.
"A tide of religious and ethnic sentiments was reborn by the war. Everyone now calls himself a Kurd or
Arab, Shiite or Sunni and sticks to his side. Everyone feels the tension, the smallest incident could make
things degenerate," said Butros Haddad, a priest at Our Lady of the Rosary in Baghdad. The mood is in
stark contrast to the era of Saddam Hussein when ethnic identities were kept on a tight leash and the
dictator brooked no dissent.
But since the US troops invaded Iraq in late March, old grievances among Iraqi ethnic groups have found a
second life. "We sensed Arabs harboured a dislike toward the Kurds who enjoyed relative autonomy and
experienced less harshly the embargo (over the last decade). The Shiite, traumatised by the repression of
the 1991 rebellion, were against the Sunni. The Sunnis were against the Shiites, whom they considered as
traitors. The war's aftermath has largely brought these divisions to the forefront," a Western diplomat said.
The formation of Iraq's 25-member Governing Council, with a Shiite majority and proportional seating by
ethnic groups has only stoked ethnic divisions.
The balance on the Governing Council, made up of religious and ethnic groups, as well as the continuing
marginalisation of Sunni Arabs, once the dominant group in Iraq, could pave the way for a sectarian
conflict, according to the International Crisis Group think tank. Of the Governing Council, 14 members are
Shiite, five are Kurds and four Sunnis. The proportion is based on Iraq's general population numbers, with
Shiites representing 65 percent of the population, the Sunni Arabs representing roughly 15 percent and the
Kurds another 15 percent.
"The Kurds want to obtain the most autonomy possible, the Shiite want to be recognised officially, the
Sunnis feel dispossessed and rejected," the diplomat said. Although the coalition admits to friction among
the ethnic groups, the US-led coalition believes Iraq's ethnic groups are working out their differences
despite the doomsday scenarios bandied about.
41
"Iraqis have proven they can live together," said coalition spokesman Charles Heatley. The members of the
US-sponsored Governing Council have made official pronouncements against communal violence and have
spoken of Iraqi unity. However on the street, the realities are far more complicated.
After a car bomb in Najaf killed Shiite leader Ayatollah Mohammad Baqer al-Hakim, many Shiites blamed
the Sunni community indirectly for the death, pointing the finger at Sunni fundamentalists and the partisans
of Saddam. For its part, the Sunni Committee of the Ulema has accused the Shiites of seizing Sunni
mosques in Shiite holy cities.
"Emptying Najaf and Karbala of the Sunni presence is very serious and resembles ethnic cleansing and
signals the Balkanisation of Iraq," said Sunni Sheikh Abdel Salam al-Kubaissi. Tensions are also
smoldering in the north between Arabs and Kurds. In the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, Kurds have returned
home, throwing out Arabs who grabbed their property under the old regime's programme of Arabisation.
For its part, the Kurdish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan has flexed its muscles, conducting raids in cities
outside of Kurdistan, such as Mosul, in the name of erasing the Baath party.
Despite avoiding ethnic violence in Kirkuk when Baghdad fell, the situation is still unstable. "It could
explode at any moment," said Lieutenant-Colonel Randy George, deputy US commander in Kirkuk.” (AFP,
7 October 2003)
Turkish, Iraqi and Iranian incursions all caused internal displacement in the north
(1998-2002)
•
•
•
Turkey incursions against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party, based in Turkey) and fighting
between the PKK and the KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party, based in northern Iraq)
On a smaller scale, guerrillas of the KDPI (Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran) have been
bombarded by Iranian troops, generating displacement of both Iranian and Iraqi Kurds
Iraqi incursions into northern Iraq despite no-fly zone reported in 2000 and 2001
"In northern Iraq the causes of internal displacement are complex: they include Turkish military incursions,
PKK activity, internal conflict between Iraqi Kurdish political parties, and deportations of Kurds and
Turcomans from government-controlled areas of Iraq. " (Graham-Brown April 1998, "Conflicts Intersect")
Turkish incursions against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
"Despite increasing hostility for the KDP [Kurdish Democratic Party], guerrillas of the PKK (Kurdistan
Workers' Party), which pursues a separatist guerrilla war in Turkey, have established bases in northern Iraq.
These have been the target of frequent Turkish bombardments and incursions, with major invasions taking
place in October 1992, March 1995, June 1996, May 1997 and September/October 1997. Fighting between
the PKK and KDP has continued intermittently since 1995, and was a significant factor in the displacement
of late 1997." (Dammers 1998, p.183)
"The Turkish army signed an agreement with the KDP in May 1997, reportedly to use its forces as a border
police. The truce of 1998 between the PUK and the KDP further came under strain since several thousand
PKK fighters moved back into Northern Iraq in 1999, after withdrawing from South-Eastern Turkey,
disestablishing the political and military balance in the area. However, there are no reports of renewed
alliance between the PUK and the PKK. A prominent member of the KDP has referred to the PKK as a
terrorist organization who is responsible for the massacre of Kurdish villagers along the border with
Turkey.
42
Turkey continues raids into Iraqi Kurdistan in search of Kurdish rebels and this in turn has led to Iran to
search for Kurdish organizations in Northern Iraq to use as proxies. Iran, Turkey, Syria and the
Government of Iraq are all opposed to the creation of a Kurdish state." (UNHCR June 2000, p.5)
"Further incursions [by Turkey's armed forces into northern Iraq] were carried out in April, May, and
August 2000, resulting in one case in the killing of thirty-eight Iraqi Kurdish civilians." (HRW December
2000, "Human Rights Developments")
"The leader of one of the main Kurdish groups in northern Iraq, Massoud Barzani, has pledged [in October
2000] renewed cooperation with the Turkish government. […] The meeting agreed to continue joint
Turkish and KDP action against the rival Kurdish Workers Party PKK which is fighting a guerrilla
campaign inside Turkey." (BBC News 5 October 2000)
"Turkey launched a major incursion into Iraqi Kurdish on 3 December [2000] in order to back the PUK
against the PKK, according to the 19 December 'Ozgur Politika', a pro-PKK journal. This outlet also
claimed the invasion force involves hundreds of troops as well as heavy weapons and has passed through
the Habur Gate." (RFE/RL 22 December 2000, "Turkish Incursion")
"Two PKK members who fled from northern Iraq claim the PKK is prepared to resume its activities in the
New Year. They say that nearly 4,500 armed PKK members are in camps in northern Iraq, headed by
commanders from Armenia, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. […]
Kurds claim that more than 400 Turkish troops have crossed into Iraq since the beginning of January and
are camped 60 kilometers east of Zakho. They have also reinforced the military base at Bamarni, a former
Iraqi military camp in northern Iraq. Residents of the area say that the Turkish army now has 2,000 troops
and 30 tanks in Bamarni." (RFE/RL 11 January 2002)
Iranian incursions and the KDPI
"A parallel situation, though on a smaller scale, has existed on the Iranian border, with guerrillas of the
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) being bombarded by Iranian troops, generating displacement of
both Iranian and Iraqi Kurds. Iranian conflict with its own Kurdish separatists has not, however, precluded
cooperation between Iran and the PUK, especially when the rival KDP has allied itself with the Iraqi or
Turkish governments. Indeed, the events of 1997 generated common interest between the KDP, Iraq and
Turkey on the one hand and the PKK, PUK and Iran on the other, which proved quite capable of translating
into unlikely alliances on the ground." (Dammers 1998, p.183)
Iraqi troops incursions into Northern Iraq
"Iraqi military forces have entered areas lying north of the 36th parallel, a reliable Kurdish source in Irbil
ha told London's 'Al-Sharq Al-Awsat' on 10 November [2000]. The paper noted that Iraqi forces are
forbidden from entering these regions which have been subject to British and American patrols of the nofly zone for the past nine years. This latest encroachment reportedly took place in a village in the Irbil plain
close to the area which separates the governorate of Ninaweh from the Kurdish regions outside of
Baghdad's control.
The Kurdish source said government forces 'came to the edge of the village where they dug trenches and set
up fortifications. The soldiers began intimidating the people of the village to force them to abandon it.' In
the preceding year, Iraqi forces had crossed the demarcation line at the village of Unwaynah, between Irbil
and Ninawah, and also shelled the villages and areas along the line." (RFE/RL 8 December 2000)
"Iraqi troops were deployed to the northern region on several occasions, apparently with the aim of
launching armed attacks on Kurdish-controlled territory. In mid-June, the government deployed tanks,
armored personnel carriers, artillery and infantry units south of Arbil, coinciding with efforts by the U.K.
and the U.S. to restructure the economic embargo imposed on Iraq and to impose "smart sanctions."
Government troops clashed with PUK forces in the Kifri region on September 9 [2001], and in early
43
October they reportedly entered and occupied the village of Sadawa, south-west of Arbil. The KDP said
that repeated artillery bombardment of some thirty front-line villages by government troops had resulted in
the displacement of their inhabitants." (HRW 2002)
Expulsion of people from their homes as State policy (2002)
•
•
•
Displacement to punish and subdue recalcitrant populations
Displacement as strategy to secure valuable economic resources
Displacement to undermine the growth of political opposition
"In Iraq, the expulsion of people from their homes has long been state policy. Expulsions have been
undertaken to punish and subdue recalcitrant populations. To this end, genocidal acts have taken place
against the Kurds in the 1980s and against the Marsh Arabs in the 1990s. On other occasions, expulsions
have been part of a strategy to secure valuable economic resources, as with the on-going 'Arabization'
campaign against the Turkmen, Kurds, and Assyrians. Expulsions have also been used to undermine the
growth of political opposition as with the Shi’a in the south, or to forestall a fifth column as with the
taba'iyya, those thought to be sympathetic to Iran, at the beginning of the war in 1980. In Iraq, over the last
thirty years, there has never been a time when one group or another was not being expelled from their
homes.
The tactics used to accomplish the expulsions have included the use of overwhelming force, with the fullfledged deployment of infantry, armor and weapons of mass destruction, backed up by village demolition
crews. In cases where the regime wished to retain physical infrastructure and merely change the identity of
the inhabitants, more bureaucratic processes were used and continue to be used, such as regulations
imposing national or religious restrictions on land ownership, employment, access to health and education,
and humanitarian assistance. Carefully planned and executed expulsion operations sometimes occurred
virtually overnight, with large numbers of people on the run, with only the clothes on their backs. Another
method of expulsion, a slower, albeit surer, one which we will examine more closely below, were largescale construction projects that radically altered the environment – the draining of the southern marshes is
the prime example – in order to accomplish military, political, or even economic goals. Indeed, the
expulsion of the Marsh Arabs can be viewed as a form of development-induced displacement – beneath
what used to be marshland lie some of the world’s largest untapped oil fields." (Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02,
p1)
Kurdish in-fighting has caused internal displacement in the North (1998-2002)
•
Displacement of Kurdish families in northern Iraq due to clashes between PUK and Islamic
opposition (2001-2002)
"Since 1994, displacement has most commonly followed conflict between the two main Kurdish parties,
the KDP and the PUK, usually along the border between their respective territories: in and around the city
of Arbil and along a fluctuating front line from Arbil to the Iranian border. People identified with one party
(an identification generally based on clan loyalty rather than ideology) living in territory controlled by the
other feel highly vulnerable and have frequently been displaced." (Dammers 1998, p.182)
Clashes between PUK and Islamic Opposition
"In the afternoon of April 2, 2002, as Mr. Barham Salih, Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional
Government was leaving his home in Souleymanieh, two gunmen in a taxi machine gunned his home.
Although Mr. Barham Salih was not hit, his five body-guards (Amanj Abdul Kadir, Hama Jaza Hama Raza,
44
Shuwan Khidr, Abdullah Ismail Muhammad, Karzan Anwar Ibrahim) and the two assailants were killed.
The people behind the attack have yet to be identified.
Over the last few years, the regions run autonomously by the Kurdish administration in Iraq have been the
victim of terrorist attacks aimed at political party leaders, the local population and expatriates. Several
states or armed groups, backed by these same states, not only threaten the coexistence of multiple political
parties in a democratic experience unique in this region of the world, but also threaten the very existence of
the Kurdish autonomous region.
Several leaders or members of Kurdish political parties, journalists, or members of humanitarian aid
organizations have been victims of these attacks. A few examples are Lucy Schmidt, a German journalist,
Vincent Tollet from Handicap International, François Hariri, member of the central committee of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party - Iraq (KDP) and former governor of Erbil, more than one hundred members of
various political groups of Iranian Kurdistan such as Firouzi Shapour, member of the Kurdistan Democratic
Party – Iran.
In early September 2001, the armed group “Jund al-Islam” (soldiers of Islam), result of the fusion of three
groups – the Islamic group Tawhid, the Force of Soran-2 and the Hamas, and based in the villages of Biara
and Tawela, near the city Halabja on the Iranian border, called for a holy war against the secular Kurdish
parties. This group has never declared a holy war against the Iraqi government. Many members of the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were mutilated and executed throughout the month in the village of
Kheli Hama. A good deal of “Jund al-Islam” fighters, including “Arab Afghans” were imprisoned in
Kurdistan following these acts of violence. Jund al-Islam and other Islamist groups, with suspected links to
Al-Queda, are thought to have regrouped in a new organization known as “ the supporters of Islam” and
they remain a serious threat for the region." (AIJ 9 April 2002)
Iraqi government is displacing Kurds, Assyrian and Turkoman inhabitants from the
cities of Kirkuk and Mosul (1998-2002)
•
•
•
•
Thousands of Kurds as well as Turkmen and Assyrians have been expelled from Kirkuk, because
of their ethnic origin and because of Kirkuk's strategic location as well as its oil fields and are
replaced by Arab families
The majority of the people expelled were accused of having affiliations with opposition parties
Other parts of northern Iraq under government control have seen similar displacements, for
example of Kurds for the predominantly Arab city of Mosul
The "Arabization" campaign gained momentum in 2002
"The strategic city of Kirkuk, which is surrounded by oil fields, has traditionally had a mixed Turkoman,
Kurdish and Arab population. Although long claimed by Kurds as part of Iraqi Kurdistan, it lies outside the
'Kurdistan Autonomous Region' delineated in 1975. Of the cities captures and then lost by Kurdish forces
in the uprising of 1991, only Kirkuk subsequently remained under permanent Iraqi government control.
Most Kurds fled Kirkuk when it was retaken by Iraqi government troops following the Kurdish uprising in
1991; about 140,000 are thought to remain in Kurdish-controlled areas, fearful of returning because of the
persecution and displacement of Kurds remaining in the city. Turkomans (Turkish-speaking Iraqis), who
number up to a million, live mainly in the lowland and urban areas of northern Iraq, but used to be
predominant in Kirkuk. They too have been subject to repression, with many reportedly moving under
pressure to Baghdad, though figures are unavailable. Shi'a Turkomans have been particularly vulnerable.
Arab families from central and southern Iraq have been settled in Kirkuk, part of government efforts to
'Arabize' the city.
45
While Kirkuk has been the most seriously affected, other parts of northern Iraq under government control
have seen similar displacements, for example of Kurds for the predominantly Arab city of Mosul."
(Dammers 1998, p.183)
"A lot of it is about oil. Iraq's northern oil fields are rich, and could produce over a million barrels of oil per
day for the foreseeable future (worth about five billion dollars a year at current oil prices). Many of them lie
within the Kurdish areas. That's why Iraq has made great efforts to settle Arabs from elsewhere in the
country in the oil city of Kirkuk and has never conceded that Kirkuk is part of Kurdish territory." (Out
There News 2000, "Kurds")
"[…] [A]n estimated 100,000 people […] were deported from government-controlled areas, especially from
Kirkuk, Khanaqin and Mosul. They were sent to Northern Iraq for several reasons, yet the majority of them
were accused of having affiliations with the opposition parties in the north or abroad. Being a Kurd or
Turkmen also sufficed as a reason." (UNHCR/ACCORD 14 November 2000, p.57)
"The Iraqi government's ethnic-cleansing campaign in and around Kirkuk is gaining momentum, according
to the 1 June "Brayati." (RFE/RL 7 June 2002)
Iraqi government is displacing Shi'a inhabitants from the Marsh area (1999-2003)
•
•
•
•
•
In the Marsh area, government forces have burned and shelled villages, and built dams to divert
water from the marshes to depopulate the area
Population in the Marsh area had to submit to compulsory resettlement within Iraq, leave the
country, or remain in the drained marshlands, deprived of their water-based means of livelihood
Human Rights Watch believes that many of the acts of the Iraqi government’s systematic
repression of the Marsh Arabs constitute a crime against humanity (2003)
UNEP study: experts predict that unless urgent action is taken to reverse the trend and rehabilitate
the marshlands, the entire wetland system is likely to be lost within three to five years. This will
only be feasible through regional cooperation
IOM assesses needs of displaced Marsh Arabs (23 May 2003)
"The Iraqi government has long been openly hostile to the Marsh Arabs, or Maadan, people living in the
marshlands between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in a triangle-shaped region formed by the cities of
Amarah, Basra, and Nasiriyah. Following the suppression of the 1991 Shi'a uprising in southern Iraq, many
opponents of the Baghdad regime fled to the marshes, and the Iraqi government intensified a pacification
campaign it had been directing toward the Maadan since 1989.
Since 1991, government forces have burned and shelled villages, and built dams to divert water from the
marshes to depopulate the area. Repressive policies in 1999 included diverting water from the marshes and
denying food rations to thousands of people allegedly associated with opposition groups." (USCR 2000,
p.188)
"The construction of dams, forcible migration of communities, the draining of the Marshlands that was
carried out in the 1990s was an extension of earlier trends. However an obsession for security drove the
agenda. By depopulating the Marshlands, by reducing the area to desert, the region was no longer able to
provide a sustainable refuge for dissidents. Saddam Hussein was able to impose his own will on the
refractory people of the Marshlands. The drainage was carried out with no regard to international
obligations concerning water rights or the environment. […] The Marsh Dwellers had limited options. Like
hundreds of thousands of other Iraqis they could submit to compulsory resettlement in an environment not
their own. Or they could leave the country as refugees, as about 200,000 did. Or they could remain in the
46
drained Marshlands, deprived of their inherited water-based means of livelihood." (AMAR 21 May 2001,
p.6)
"Human Rights Watch believes that many of the acts of the Iraqi government’s systematic repression of the
Marsh Arabs constitute a crime against humanity. The crimes were committed as part of a widespread and
systematic attack against the civilian population of the Marsh Arabs during the decade of the 1990s. The
attack involved the multiple commissions of acts in furtherance of state policy. The underlying crimes
include:
· Murder of thousands of unarmed civilians following the abortive March 1991 uprising, through summary
execution and the indiscriminate bombardment and shelling of residential areas in towns and villages in the
vicinity of Basra, al-Nasiriyya, al-‘Amara and across the marshes region;
· Forcible population transfer—coercive expulsion of part of the Marsh Arab population from their native
villages to settlements on dry land on the outskirts of the marshes and along major highways to facilitate
government control over them;
· Arbitrary and prolonged imprisonment of thousands who had been arrested during and in the aftermath of
military bombardment of residential areas in the marshes, including civilians and others suspected of antigovernment activities;
· Torture of Marsh Arab detainees held in government custody, in order to extract information from them,
as punishment, and as a means to spread fear among the local population;
· Enforced disappearances of many of the Marsh Arabs arrested during the 1990s, whose fate and
whereabouts remain unresolved to date;
· Persecution of the Marsh Arabs through the intentional and severe deprivation of their fundamental rights
on the basis of their religious and political identity as a group." (HRW Jan 03, p2)
“Massive drainage works in southern Iraq in the late 1980s and early 1990s, together with the effects of
major upstream damming devastated the wetlands (overall loss of 90%), such that only minor and
fragmented parcels remain today. Satellite images taken in 1973-1976 reveal that the wetlands were then
more or less intact. However, the UNEP study shows that massive loss and degradation had taken place by
2000, with the greatest change occurring between 1991 and 1995. The central and Al Hammar marshlands
had been almost completely destroyed, with 97% and 94% of their respective cover transformed into bare
land and salt crusts. The water-filtering role of the marshland had ceased and the remaining drainage canals
carried polluted irrigation wastewater directly toward the Gulf, with potentially harmful impacts
on local fish resources.”
“The entire Marsh Arab community has suffered huge social and economic upheaval as a result of the
marshlands’ destruction, with about 40,000 people forced to flee to southwest Iran and hundreds of
thousands internally displaced within Iraq. The impact on biodiversity has also been catastrophic. A new
study conducted by UNEP indicates that, of the remnant wetlands surviving in 2000, one-third had
disappeared by 2002. UNEP experts predict that unless urgent action is taken to reverse the trend and
rehabilitate the marshlands, the entire wetland system is likely to be lost within three to five years. This will
only be feasible through regional cooperation.” (UNEP, April 2003)
IOM Assesses Needs of Displaced Marsh Arabs
“IOM will lead a three-day inter-agency mission to assess the needs of displaced Marsh Arabs living in
settlements bordering the Saddam dyke in Missan governorate north of Basrah. The dyke, which runs for
some 400 kms around the marshes, was started in 1991 to forcibly drain the area and punish the inhabitants
for their opposition to the Baathist regime. With the destruction of 90% of the marshes, some half a million
Marsh Arabs were displaced and a 5000-year old culture that had flourished since Sumerian times, was
largely destroyed. An estimated 100,000 of the population became refugees in Iran and the remainder
became internally displaced in Iraq - exchanging their traditional reed houses for impoverished mud hut
settlements bordering the dyke and migrating to Iraq's cities to find work. An initial assessment mission to
Marsh Arab settlements in Missan by the Czech NGO People in Need Foundation (PINF) earlier this week
found an impoverished population with little in terms of food, health care or schools.
47
PINF [….] described a chain of flat roofed mud houses on the western side of the dyke and a drainage canal
on the eastern side. The Baathist regime had reneged on earlier promises to provide irrigation and the marsh
side of the dyke appeared to be an expanse of dry, cracked land. Since the fall of the regime, some villagers
had started to bore holes in the dyke and build irrigation channels to water their fields. Others had started to
use the canal on the western side - which was previously forbidden.
The regime had reportedly withdrawn ration cards from many of the villagers questioned by PINF. Others
had been given half rations for several years. In September, however, the regime provided a full ration,
possibly to garner political support. With their former lifestyle and ecosystem largely destroyed, the Marsh
Arabs now face difficult choices of whether to try to recreate their former lives in the marshes or to
overcome their distrust of outsiders and opt for a new beginning with the help of the international
community.”
“The IOM assessment mission to Missan, which will include representatives of WFP, UN-Habitat and
Ockenden International, IOM's Missan governorate focal point for internally displaced people, is the first of
three similar inter-agency missions to Marsh Arab settlements in Missan, Basrah and Dhi Qar governorates
scheduled over the next two weeks” (IOM, 23 May 2003).
Difficult to assess extent of internal displacement caused by U.S. and British bombing
raids (2000)
•
•
Since the end of 1998 US and UK forces have been carrying out regular strikes on Iraqi targets
inside the no-fly zones
The extent of internal displacement caused by U.S. and British bombing raids could not be
determined
Since the end of December 1998 US and UK forces have been carrying out regular strikes on Iraqi targets
inside the two air exclusion zones in northern and southern Iraq. These zones, north of the 36th parallel and
south of the 33rd parallel, were imposed by allied forces at the end of the Gulf War in 1991 and were
intended to protect Iraq's Kurdish and Shi'a Muslim population. These strikes have reportedly resulted in
the deaths of dozens of civilians and the destruction of civilian property and left many more injured." (AI
24 November 1999, "Background")
"The United States and Britain said the attacks were launched after Baghdad refused to cooperate with the
inspectors, who are charged with ridding Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction." (Reuters 17 December
1998)
"The extent of internal displacement caused by U.S. and British bombing raids could not be determined, but
such raids continued in the skies over southern Iraq throughout 1999. By mid-August, 134 Iraqis had
reportedly been killed by bombing raids. Press reports indicated that this figure includes civilians, such as
11 members of one family who were killed in Jassan, 125 miles southeast of Baghdad on August 17."
(USCR 2000, "Southern Iraq")
48
POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES
Global figures
Estimated 900,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Iraq -based on pre-war figures
(January 2004)
•
•
•
Difficult to establish exact figures due to a lack of staff on the ground because of insecurity
Based on pre-war figures, the largest population of between 600,000 and 800,000 IDPs are living
in the north
An estimated 100,000 live in the south and centre
"With an estimated 900,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Iraq, humanitarian organisations are
putting the emphasis on providing proper shelter in the coming year for homeless people uprooted by the
troubles that have plagued the country not only over the past year but the past few decades.
Of this figure the majority, some 400,000 live in what are called 'collective towns' or purpose built
settlements. Another 300,000 live in homes and the rest are in government or other types of
accommodation.
While there are no current accurate statistics at present, based on pre-war figures, the largest population of
between 600,000 and 800,000 IDPs are living in the north with up to an estimated 100,000 in the south and
centre, many with limited access to basic facilities. Prior to the second Gulf War a UN Habitat survey
found that 40 percent of the displaced had no access to health care and that only some 57,000 people were
living in adequate housing.
With some signs of IDPs returning following the fall of Saddam Hussein, as of the beginning of June 2003,
the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has confirmed up to 40,000 registered IDPs in the south
and central governorates, with other sources suggesting up to 75,000. Aid agencies say that although some
IDPs have returned home it is very difficult to establish exact figures due to a lack of staff on the ground
because of insecurity." (UN OCHA, 5 January 2004)
About 100,000 newly displaced IDPs have been identified (October 2003)
•
•
•
•
•
About 100,000 newly displaced IDPs have been identified, concentrated in Diyala, Ninewa and
Tameem governorates
Major concentration is in Diyala where about 50,000 IDPs have been displaced from Khanakhin
and Kifri
The IDPs have found shelter in abandoned military installations and public buildings
The only big concentration is in Saar military camp (4000 individuals)
The same pattern has been identified in Ninewa, where around 20.000 have been displaced since
the war
"IOM and NGO partners continued to survey displaced communities in the center/south of Iraq. By the end
of September about 100,000 newly displaced IDPs have been identified, concentrated in Diyala, Ninewa
49
and Tameem governorates. These IDPs are mainly Arabs forced to move by the former regime to Kurdish
areas. With the end of the regime, these Arabs were forced to vacate the occupied homes in advance of
Kurdish returns.
The major concentration is in Diyala where about 50,000 IDPs have been displaced from Khanakhin and
Kifri. The IDPs have found shelter in abandoned military installations and public buildings. Most are living
in small groups, while the only big concentration is in Saar military camp (4000 individuals). The same
pattern has been identified in Ninewa, where around 20.000 have been displaced since the war. In
Tameem/Kirkuk, Most displaced are staying with host families, or have returned to their area of origin, and
are reported to have quite good resources and coping strategies in place." (UN OCHA, 10 October 2003).
IDP figures as result of recent conflict (New case-load)
•
•
•
IOM preliminary numbers 2 June 2003: 40,000 IDPs in Southern/Central areas
Other sources report as many as 80,000 new IDPs
Ongoing uncertainty of numbers and needs
IDP figures as result of recent conflict (New case-load)
IOM reported numbers of new IDPs per district by NGO governorate focal points (GFP),
2 June 2003 (Source: IOM):
Governorate
Al Anbar
Ninawa
Al-Ta’meem
Salahadin
Diyala
Baghdad
Babylon
Al-Muthanna
Al-Basrah
Maysan
Wasit
TOTAL NO IDPs:
GFP
LWF
WVI
NRC
CONCERN
DRC
PU
NRC
ACTED
SCUS
Ockenden
MCI
No of IDPs
1,747
3,383
15,600
50
1,922
96
0
0
2,808
12,000
2,350
39,956
Total population
1,271,000
2,521,000
881,000
976,000
1,271,000
6,500,000
1,409,000
570,000
570,000
848,000
939,000
Ongoing uncertainty over number and needs of IDPs
50
“(…) the exact number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) continues to elude aid workers, This week,
however, a clearer picture of the situation in southern and central Iraq shed some light on the scope of the
problem. Chris Petch, the deputy programme manager for IDPs in Iraq for the International Organisation
for Migration said initial reports from 12 of the 92 southern and central districts identified 58,000 IDPs, but
other unconfirmed reports could mean that this number was actually over 80,000. Those IDPs who had
been identified were in real need of assistance, he added. Ongoing uncertainty over the number and needs
of the IDP population have been attributed to ongoing displacement in some places and confusion among
the local population of what constituted an IDP.” (IRIN, 23 May 2003)
Assessing IDPs in the south
“A clearer picture of the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in southern and central Iraq is
emerging as initial data begins to come in. Chris Petch, the deputy programme manager for IDPs in Iraq for
the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), told IRIN that while there were still large areas of the
country to be covered and assessed, it was clear there were many thousands of Iraqis who had shifted from
their homes during the war and had not yet returned. IOM is the lead agency for IDPs in the south and
centre of the country.”
”And while the numbers were not as great as had been predicted or feared before the war, those IDPs who
had been identified were in real need of assistance. Initial reports from 12 of the 92 southern and central
districts had identified 58,000 IDPs, but other unconfirmed reports could mean that this number was
actually over 80,000, Petch said. He said one of the big problems in trying to accurately assess the scale of
the problem was that the situation was very complicated and constantly changing. For example, IOM had
received a report of 50,000 IDPs camped near the Iranian border, but when they investigated, found only
2,000.”
”By contrast, in another case there was a report of up to 50,000 IDPs in one location during the war, but
IOM now knows there were close to 100,000 people there at the time. Petch said it was a very fluid picture,
and security concerns meant that NGOs had been unable to reach into many areas until now to check on the
problem. Numbers could fluctuate every day in an area, with displacement still going on in some places,
but he hoped to obtain a clearer picture of the problem within a month. One of the current problems was
that some areas were not deemed safe to travel to, such as the region around Tikrit, about 150 km northwest
of Baghdad. However he was confident that IOM had access to enough resources to cope with the IDP
situation whatever the final figures turned out to be.”
”It already had a stock non-food items sufficient for 250,000 people, and Petch believed that would be
enough. Once IDPs were found, they would be helped to return to their places of origin, resettle, or
integrate into the new community, and he believed that this process could occur quite quickly once started.
From his experience in other countries, Petch said people generally wanted to return to their homes, and he
suspected this would be the case in Iraq.”
”Peter Nuttall, a team leader for the Irish NGO, GOAL, which is helping with IDP assessments in the
southern governorate of Dhi Qar, told IRIN it had only been in the last two weeks that they had begun
locating IDPs. He said this was in part due to misunderstandings among Iraqis about what constituted an
IDP, but better information was now coming in. For example, GOAL staff had found four families living in
the back of a building, and when locals were asked where they had come from, staff were told they were
just poor people. It transpired, however, that the families had been renting houses which had been
destroyed, thereby turning them into IDPs. Nuttall said GOAL was continuing its work and would have a
clear picture of the overall situation in the area within a few weeks.”
”Another NGO involved in the IDP assessments, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), said it had
completed its assessment in the Al-Anbar Governorate west of Baghdad. Its programme coordinator, John
Damerell, told IRIN the security situation, including an armed attack on two of its vehicles, meant it had
been unable to visit all areas or complete its work. While unable to give definite figures, he said the number
of IDPs remaining in Al-Anbar was not appreciable, although there would still be several thousand. He
51
added that the plight of those found was not deemed to be chronic, and they all intended to go home as soon
as possible. Most IDPs had stayed with families or friends, or been put up by benevolent locals, including
one hotel which had opened its doors to them and accommodated them gratis. Damerell stressed that all the
information LWF had received pointed to the number of IDPs having been much greater when the fighting
was still in progress. However, when looting broke out, many people quickly returned to their homes in
places such as Baghdad to try and protect their possessions, he said” (IRIN, 20 May 2003)
“In order to ascertain the trend for old caseload IDPs who left their homes prior to the conflict to return to
their places of origin, UNOPS launched a survey on 5 May in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. Of the new IDPs
caseload, only 17 persons remain in one site in Dahuk. UNOPS reported that local authorities are assisting
the return of IDPs previously settled in the Arab Singles Camp in Dahuk to their places of origin in
centre/south of Iraq. As of 6 May, 6 persons are still in the camp.” (HCI, 6 May 2003)
“With the continuance of a calm and stable security situation in the three northern governorates people have
been able to return to their daily way of life, as it was pre-conflict. In addition, there is now a free
movement of people between the north and locations in the area, which used be under GOI control, such as
Kirkuk and Khanaqeen. However, there is still less movement between the north and Mosul. NGOs are
conducting humanitarian operations in the governorates of Kirkuk and Mosul and UNOPS-IDP is liaising
and working together with these NGOs in order to be able to support their efforts to provide relief and
assistance to IDP and other vulnerable persons in these areas.
The old caseloads of IDP, who predate the recent conflict, are continuing to return to their places of origin
in the centre and south but this return is going on at a very slow pace. In this regard, UNOPS-IDP is
launching a survey on the trend for the old IDP to return to their places of origin in the centre and south.
Following a two-day training course on how to conduct this assessment and the form to be used, this survey
was launched in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah today. In Erbil the survey started in the public shelters and in
Sulaymaniyah it was completed in 5 randomly selected locations today (5 May 2003). It is expected that the
survey should be concluded in these two governorates over the coming three days. In Dahuk, the project
has engaged in the necessary contact and coordination with the Governor’s office and the Internally
Displaced Persons Liaison Office to obtain their support in carrying out the survey and it is anticipated that
the survey will therefore commence shortly.
Virtually all the caseload of new IDP, who resulted from the recent conflict, have returned to their places of
origin whether they originated from the northern governorates or from the centre and south.” (UNOPS-IDP
SitRep 5 May 2003)
“Danish Refugee council (DRC) registered 649 IDPs in the Saad Military camp in Ba'aquba (Diyala
governorate). The majority (81%) are from within Diyala and the vast majority of families came from
Khanaqin. IOM reports that the total number of verified IDPs in the 15 centre/south governorates stands at
33,757. It is not clear whether these individuals are newly displaced, or part of an older displacement. The
full picture of IDPs with host families will emerge as assessments continue and numbers may reduce
further.” (HCI, 19 May 2003)
“IOM reports that, as no combat had taken place in Hilla during the war, little damage has been
experienced in the town and its infrastructure. Most of the IDPs which were hosted by relatives have now
returned to Baghdad. A few families left their houses, which were damaged during the aerial bombing and
are currently residing in public buildings.” (HCI, 19 May 2003)
“As humanitarian workers begin to gain access to Iraq, IOM is starting to build up a picture of the number
of internally displaced people (IDPs) in the south and center of the country, based on assessment missions
carried out by NGO partners. Reports from the Lutheran World Federation, ACTED, Save the Children, the
Danish Refugee Council, Ockenden International and Mercy Corps have already identified some 58,000
IDPs in just 12 districts partially assessed. To date the NGOs have visited only 40 of 4,082 settlements
identified in the south and center of the country. Of the IDPs they have identified, about half are living in
abandoned public buildings, a quarter are staying with host families and a quarter living rough in tents or in
52
the open. Unconfirmed media and other reports that have already identified a further 82,000 IDPs in
various locations are under investigation. World Vision International, IOM’s partner in the northwestern
governate of Ninewa, is currently investigating media reports of another 10,500 IDPs in public buildings in
Mosul. The task of identifying and assessing the needs of IDP populations throughout Iraq - a country the
size of France - is labour intensive and time consuming, and with the ongoing lack of security, can be
dangerous. The risks were underlined last week when two vehicles belonging to the Lutheran World
Federation (LWF), IOM’s partner NGO in the western Al Anbar governorate, were forced off the main
road and robbed by gunmen 100 km west of Baghdad near Ar Ramdi. LWF staff , who were shocked but
unhurt in the attack, believe that there still may be as many as 30,000 IDPs in Al Anbar. Large numbers of
people fled Iraq’s cities to the Al Anbar towns of Ar Ramdi, Hit, Hadita and An’Nah during the bombing,
but many subsequently returned to Baghdad and other cities. Elsewhere in the country, Premiere Urgence,
IOM’s partner NGO in Baghdad governorate, believes that there may be as many as 35,000 IDPs in and
around the city. The Danish Refugee Council (DRC), IOM’s partner in Diyala, says that there are an
estimated 50,000 IDPs in governorate, which borders Iran. DRC has already assessed their food and other
needs. Ockenden International, IOM’s partner in neighbouring Maysan governorate to the south, has
identified an estimated 12,000 IDPs staying with host families in Al Amrah. Ockenden has already assessed
their non-food needs, which IOM will meet with items donated by the USAID’s Office for Disaster
Assistance (OFDA) and already positioned inside Iraq. Mercy Corps, IOM’s partner in Wassit governorate,
reports some 2,000 IDPs in camps in Badreh. IOM led an assessment mission to Badreh from Iran on April
14th. Save the Children, IOM’s partner in Basrah governorate, where IOM deployed permanent
international staff last weekend, reports about 190 IDPs in public buildings in Umm Qasr and Al Zubair.
IOM, at the request of the UN and under the overall responsibility of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for
Iraq, is coordinating the efforts of NGOs and others in registering IDPs, managing camps, distributing nonfood items, and eventually helping people to return to their homes. Its network of 15 governorate focal
point (GFP) NGOs use a standardized, IOM-designed framework, database and reporting structure to target
assistance at the most vulnerable IDPs. Under the programme, which is supported by USAID’s OFDA,
IOM also provides limited funding to GFP NGOs to support their activities. (IOM 13 May 2003)
About 700,000 to 1 million internally displaced persons in 2001 (2001-2002)
•
•
•
•
Estimated number of internally displaced persons is very difficult to assess because of lack of
reliable sources
A survey by UN Habitat estimated the number of IDPs in northern Iraq at 805,000 in Oct 2000
PUK and KDP officials reported that 119,000 IDPs in the North were expelled from governmentcontrolled to Kurdish controlled areas
USCR estimated the total number of displaced at 700,000 for 2001
UN-Habitat survey (Oct 2000)
"A preliminary survey carried out in northern Iraq by the U.N. Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)
estimated the number of internally displaced persons at 805,000 by the end of October 2000, comprising 23
percent of the population. […]
A major factor in the rising numb er of internally displaced persons was the government's continued
expulsion of Kurds and Turkmen from their homes in Kirkuk, Tuz Khormatu, Khaniqin, and other districts
53
as part of its "Arabization" program. Most were expelled to areas controlled by Kurdish opposition forces
and a smaller number to central and southern Iraq. According to PUK officials, those expelled between
January 1991 and December 2000 and resettled in areas under its control totaled 93,888, while some 25,000
others expelled during the same period were resettled in KDP-controlled areas. Scores more were
reportedly expelled between January and March, particularly from the Tuz Khormatu area. In August and
September, Kurdish opposition sources said the government was intensifying the rate of resettlement of
Arab families in areas from which Kurds and Turkmen had been expelled, including the Lailan, Shwan, and
Qara Hanjir districts of Kirkuk." (HRW Dec 1999)
The UN-Habitat Survey can be obtained from the UN -Habitat office ([email protected])
USCR estimate: 700,000 as of End of 2001
"The estimated 600,000 internally displaced persons in the three northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil,
and Suleymaniyah included not only long-term internally displaced persons and persons displaced by
Kurdish factional infighting, but also more than 100,000 persons, mostly Kurds, Assyrians, and
Turkomans, more recently expelled from central-government-controlled Kirkuk and surrounding districts in
the oil-rich region bordering the Kurdish-controlled north. At least another 100,000 persons were internally
displaced elsewhere in Iraq, mostly in the southeastern marshlands." (USCR 2002)
UNEP estimate of IDPs in Southern Iraq in 2001
According to the UN Environment Program, "Of the 95,000 southern Iraqis who sought refuge in Iran since
the end of the Gulf War in 1991, an estimated 40,000 are Marsh Arabs. The fate of those who stayed inside
Iraq remains poorly documented, but an estimated 200,000-250,000 are considered to be internally
displaced." (Patrow 2001, pp33-34)
USCR reported a great increase of IDPs from 640,000 in 1994 to 1 million in 1995 to
then decrease the following years (1994-2002)
End of Year
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
Conservative estimated number of IDPs
700,000
700,000
900,000
1,000,000
900,000
900,000
1,000,000
640,000
Source
USCR 2002
USCR 2001, p.6
USCR 2000, p.6
USCR 1999, p.6
USCR 1998, p.6
USCR 1997, p.6
USCR 1996, p.112
USCR 1995, pp.115-116
Geographical distribution
UN-Habitat survey reported highest concentration of IDPs in Sulaimaniyah (2001)
"The IDP population of North Iraq assessed by the Site survey on October 2000 comprises 805,505
individuals, or 22.91% of the 3,515,921 inhabitants of the same region (total population figures are based
54
on WFP food ration database). With comparison to North Iraqi population distributed by Governorate (in
this case Darbandikhan population added to Sulaimaniyah) the highest condentration of IDPs occurs in
Sulaimaniyah (48.23%), whereas the lowest is in Duhok Governorate." (UN-Habitat Jan 2001, p5)
Evolution of number of displaced persons in northern Iraq (1994-2002)
•
•
•
Although accurate figures are not available, estimates fluctuated between 600,000 for 1994 to
800,000 for 1999
USCR estimates that the number of persons still displaced in northern Iraq is about 600,000
Current estimates include short and long-term displacement within northern Iraq, but also about
100,000 persons expelled from the government-controlled area to northern Iraq
Northern Iraq (including people displaced from Kirkuk)
End of year Estimated number of IDPs in Northern Iraq
2001
600,000
2000
600,000
1999
800,000
1998
800,000
1997
At least 500,000
1996
At least 666,000
1995
No figure for the North
1994
600,000
Source
USCR 2002
USCR 2001, p.180
USCR 2000, p.185
USCR 1999, p.150
USCR 1998, p.144
USCR 1997, p.152
USCR 1996, p.112
USCR 1995, p.115
1988-1995
"In the 1980's, the Iraqi government launched a punitive campaign known as Anfal, which destroyed up to
4,000 Kurdish villages. In 1988, tens of thousands fled into Iran and Turkey.
Following a failed Kurdish uprising in early 1991, some 1.5 million sought temporary refuge in Iran and
along the Turkish border. By the end of 1991, most Kurdish refugees had returned, but some 700,000
remained displaced within northern Iraq. Many of these had been displaced two or more times, as fighting
continued between Kurdish and Iraqi government forces. […]
During 1992 and 1993, more Kurds were displaced by skirmishing and shelling along the confrontation line
dividing the Kurdish zone from government-controlled Iraq, and government forces expelled many Kurds
into the Kurdish zones. […]
During 1994, about 100,000 previously displaced persons were able to return to their home villages, many
of which had been destroyed during the Anfal, but were being rebuilt with UN and NGO assistance.
However, an estimated 600,000 persons remained displaced within northern Iraq. Of those, about 400,000
were not able to return to their places of origin in government-controlled Iraq or along border areas due to
fears for their safety. The remainder were displaced from one area of northern Iraq to another. For example,
about 100,000 persons in Aqra, Shekan, and surrounding areas – dependent on the government-controlled
energy grid – had to abandon their homes for lack of electricity, water, and sanitation. Others fled areas
subjected to shelling either from Iraqi government forces or from Turkey." (USCR 1995, pp.115-116)
1996
"It was almost impossible to calculate the number of internally displaced people in northern Iraq. Many
people had been displaced multiple times, many also for brief interludes during sporadic fighting. Persons
also fled or continued to be displaced as result of various conflicts and threats, including displacement in
some cases from government-controlled Iraq into the north as well as displacement within the north. During
55
the year, displaced persons fled incursions by Turkish and Iranian military forces. […] Although the
incursion of government forces into Erbil caused additional displacement, the most significant cause of
internal displacement in 1996 was fighting between the KDP and PUK, as well as fighting between the
KDP and the PKK. WFP was targeting assistance to 666,000 persons in the north, although this number
was based on an assessment of need, not displacement per se." (USCR 1997, p.152)
"Kurdish nationalist aspirations have experienced rivalry between the main parties, reaching a peak in
September 1996 when the KDP briefly allied with the Government of Iraq regime to oust the PUK from its
main bases. The crisis of September 1996 caused the largest population displacement since 1991
(approximately 200,000 persons), as the population feared the Iraqi army and its security services as well as
the rivalry between the Kurdish factions. In the North-East, when the PUK announced an imminent Iraqi
attack on Suleymaniya, it contributed to an exodus of 40,000 people towards the Iranian border, while
another 40,000 were displaced in Sueymaniya itself." (UNHCR June 2000, p.3)
"UN figures for those displaced by the fighting in 1996 and the first half of 1997 were: Dohuk governorate
13,281; Arbil governorate 67,283; and Suleimaniyeh governorate 38,453 (total 119,017)." (Dammers 1998,
p.182)
1997
"Factional fighting among the Kurds in the north, particularly in the last three months of the year, and
Turkish incursions into northern Iraq in May and September [1997], internally displaced, at least
temporarily, 30,000 to 100,000 people. Another 500,000 long-term internally displaced people remained in
the three northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil and Suleymaniyah. […]
The UN secretary general reported in 1997 that about half of the 500,000 people displaced in northern Iraq
left their homes before 1991, that 150,000 became displaced between 1991 and 1995, and that 100,000
were displaced in 1996. […]
In 1997, Baghdad intensified its systematic efforts to 'Arabize' the predominantly Kurdish cities of Kirkuk,
Khanaqin, and Douz at the edge of government-controlled Iraq near the Kurdish-controlled zone. To
solidify control of this strategically and economically vital oil-rich region, the government expelled Kurds,
Assyrians, and Turkomans – at times, entire communities – from these cities and surrounding areas. […]
Although it was difficult to find a credible estimate of the number of internal expulsions in 1997, reports
indicated that large numbers were involved." (USCR 1997, pp.143-144)
"A WFP survey conducted in August 1997 reported 1291 people still displaced from the border regions of
northern Iraq affected by the Turkish incursions. In November, a UN security report revised this to '600
families'." (Dammers 1998, p.183)
1998-1999
In 1998 "The Special Rapporteur [of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights
in Iraq] […] cited the more than 150,000 persons of Kurdish origin who had been evicted from the oil-rich
regions, where the policy of 'Arabization' continued. That number did not include the problem of more than
200,000 internally persons in the rest of the country, mainly in the southern regions of Iraq." (UN GA 4
November 1998)
"[T]he following figures were provided in respect of the number of families forced to leave the area: 13,367
families from 1991 to 1993; 112 in 1994; 395 in 1995; 282 in 1996; 710 in 1997; 394 in 1998; 449 in 1999;
and 155 in 2000 (as of 4 June). The total number of individuals who were forced to leave Kirkuk since
1991 reportedly amounts to 94,026. (UN GA 14 August 2000)
USCR mentioned the number of 800,000 internally displaced persons in the north for 1998 and 1999, but
600,000 in 2000 and 2001. (USCR 1999, p.150 & USCR 2000, p.185 & USCR 2001 p.180; USCR 2002)
56
Evolution of the number of displaced in Southern Iraq (1994-2002)
•
•
•
Because of lack of access to the government-controlled part of Iraq, estimates of the number of
internally displaced in the South varied from 40,000 to 1 million between 1994 and 1997
In 1999, USCR adopted the conservative estimate of 100,000 internally displaced persons and
confirmed this estimate for 2000 and 2001
According to Brookings Institution report, there are at least currently 300,000 IDPs in
government-controlled Iraq
Southern Iraq
End of year
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
Estimated number of IDPs in Southern Iraq
100,000
100,000
100,000
No figure for the South
40,000-1,000,000
40,000-1,000,000
40,000-1,000,000
40,000-1,000,000
Source
USCR 2002
USCR 2001, p.180
USCR 2000, p.188
USCR 1999, p.153
USCR 1998, p.145
USCR 1997, p.152
USCR 1996, p.113
USCR 1995, p.116
"The number of persons displaced in the south, including to, from, and within the marshlands, is nearly
impossible to determine with any degree of certainty because the Iraqi regime denies the UN and other
relief agencies access to the area. Estimates of the number of displaced and at risk Maaden (i.e. Marsh
Arabs) range from 40,000 to 1,000,000." (USCR 1995, p.116)
USCR quoted the same estimate (40,000 to 1,000,000) for 1995, 1996 and 1997 (USCR 1996, p.113,
USCR 1997, p.152, USCR 1998, p.145). It renounced to provide any estimate for 1998 because of lack of
access for independent sources to the area. (USCR 1999, p.153). It stated for 1999 and 2000 that
"[a]lthough there are no reliable sources on the number of displaced people in southern Iraq, the U.S.
Committee for Refugees (USCR) conservatively estimates that about 100,000 are internally displaced from
and within the southern region." (USCR 2000, p.188 & 2000 p.180)
According to report by Brookings Institution
"The best estimate on numbers comes from a paper given at the AMAR conference in May 2001. At the
start of the 1990s, prior to the initiation of the large scale marsh-draining program, an estimated original
population of 400,000 Marsh Arabs had dwindled to about 250,000 people still living in the marshes and its
vicinity. The reason for this reduction in numbers was essentially economic migration. Of this remaining
number, 40,000 made it into Iran as refugees, and another estimated 20-40,000 remained in their homes.
This leaves 170,000 to 190,000 people who are either dead or displaced. Although there have been
anecdotal reports of massacres by Iraqi forces, no reliable figures exist.
Numbers for other Shi’i Arabs expelled either because of political activity or for living in the wrong place
are equally hard to determine. While there have been anecdotal accounts of entire villages being destroyed
and hundreds of people expelled, the only firm numbers are the 4,000 families (25,000 people) that the
government itself has admitted to expelling from a Baghdad neighborhood in 1998.
The only figures we have on the al-Qilaa or Jash Kurds come from the Iraqi Red Crescent, which puts the
figure at 8,000 families. Using the UN-Habitat average of 5.7 persons per family, this population is over
45,000. Finally, there are reports of some non-Arabs who, forced out of Kirkuk, have moved south instead
57
of north and into the Kurdish areas. This may be because they are joining family members in the South, or
because they are at odds with authorities in the North, or, perhaps because of some governmental measures
not yet known or understood, or simply because of the vagaries of violence and expulsion.
All told, if one systematically takes the low estimates and the confirmed numbers – 80,000 from the
Iraq/Iran war now living in Basra, 170,000 for the Marsh Arabs in the 1990s, 25,000 for expellees from
Baghdad, 45,000 of the al-Qilaa Kurds, and an unknown number from the Arabization campaign – it is hard
to see how there could be any fewer than 300,000 IDPs in South/Central Iraq." (Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02,
p33)
58
PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT
General
The return of Kurds to their former homes has in turn displaced the Arabs living in
them (November 2003)
•
•
•
In northern Iraq most returnees are Kurds displaced by Saddam Hussein
The return of Kurds to their former homes has in turn displaced the Arabs living in them
About 100,000 displaced Arabs are living in poor conditions in public buildings or in military
camps
•
In southern Iraq, the displaced are primarily Marsh Arabs, forced off their lands by politically
motivated reclamation projects
"Iraq's 800,000 or more displaced persons are in a variety of situations. In northern Iraq most are Kurds
displaced by Saddam Hussein, but many of them have returned to their homes. However, often their homes
have been destroyed or are occupied by other persons, and thus the returnees often live in tents next to their
destroyed houses. Disputes about property ownership are a major factor in preventing many displaced from
returning to their former homes. UNHCR estimates that 70,000 to 100,000 Kurds are vulnerable.
The return of Kurds to their former homes has in turn displaced the Arabs living in them. About 100,000
displaced Arabs are living in poor conditions in public buildings or in military camps. The UN reports that
inadequate water, sanitation, and shelter, and the presence of unexploded bombs are the main problems
they face.
In southern Iraq, the displaced are primarily Marsh Arabs, forced off their lands by politically motivated
reclamation projects in the 1990s. In addition to tens of thousands of Marsh Arabs who are refugees in Iran,
tens of thousands more are displaced in Iraq. USAID has begun a project to restore at least part of the
20,000 square kilometers the marshes previously covered." (Refugee International, 21 November 2003)
Displacements as of the recent war (March/April 2003)
•
•
•
•
Displacements in North as result of pre-war fears
Assessments still ongoing
Kurds returning – new displacements
Diffusing an ethnic bomb
Focus on internal displacement in the north
“Shortly after the start of this year's war in Iraq, Imad Barwari calmly drove his family from their home in
Dahuk to their ancestral village. "We went because we knew Saddam and what he did in the past. We lost
thousands of people, we didn't want to lose more," Barwari said. Imad and fifteen family members gathered
in a 3-room village cottage in the mountains along the border with Turkey to wait out the war. Satellite
television equipment was brought from Dahuk and installed. Nasreen Barwari, Imad's sister, said that their
flight in 2003 was very different to their flight in 1991 when they fled on foot. At that time, she said, she
59
and her three brothers walked for three days ahead of pursuing Iraqi military forces, avoiding the main
roads. A few years later they learnt they had walked over a hill that was mined.”
“During this year's military action, most of Dahuk's 200,000 residents fled to rural areas, according to
Stafford Clarry, Humanitarian Affairs Adviser to the Kurdish authorities in Erbil. About 40 percent of the
populations of the other main cities of Erbil and Sulemaniyah also fled, Clarry said. Unlike 1991, this time
there was credible information available from satellite television channels and from local sources. "This
access to critical information greatly helped families to make more informed decisions on whether to
remain or flee," Clarry said.”
”Most of those recently displaced in the three northern governorates lived in the area and did not flee far
from their homes, according to Clarry. Some went as little as ten kilometers away, others a two-hour drive
into mountainous areas. As the war began in late March, however, a number of Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs) arrived in the region, mainly from Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Mosul, he said.”
”According to the UN's Office for Project Services (UNOPS), which is responsible for coordinating the
humanitarian response to IDPs in northern Iraq, life has returned to normal for most people in Kurdishcontrolled areas and inhabitants can now travel freely to most nearby regions formerly under control of the
Government of Iraq, such as Kirkuk and Khanaqeen. UNOPS said that virtually all of the estimated
300,000 people displaced by the recent conflict had returned to their home areas, "whether they came from
the north itself or areas previously under control of the Government of Iraq."
Last week, the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) said that the harvest in the three northern
governorates of Erbil, Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah would not be disrupted as farmers in these areas had not
been displaced by the fighting. FAO added that the harvest was expected to produce about 500,000 mt of
wheat and barley.
But the return of the estimated one million mainly Kurdish people displaced mainly from Kirkuk and
Mosul by "Arabisation" campaigns during the past decade is thought to be minimal, according to UNOPS.
The scheme cleared housing areas of Kurds in favour of Arabs imported mainly from the centre and south.
UNOPS is currently conducting an assessment to determine the exact number of people involved, whether
people wish to return or not and their key needs. But news reports suggest returning Kurds are reclaiming
property from Arabs - often violently. A five-day assessment of Mosul and surrounding areas by the NGO
World Vision revealed thousands of displaced Arabs living in grim, unsanitary conditions. They had all
been forced to abandon their homes after they were reclaimed by returning Kurds, World Vision said.
On 17 April 2003 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed concern about reports of murder, looting
and forced expulsion of Arabs in Northern Iraq and appealed to all concerned to respect fundamental
human rights principles, including the right to live free from intimidation.
Information officer with the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq (UNOHCI)
Sonia Dumont, speaking from the northern Iraq city of Erbil, said that emergency assistance to remaining
IDPs in the three northern governorates was under control. However the situation in Mosul and Kirkuk was
not as clear as assessments were still going on. She said in the village of Byara near the Iranian border, a
tented camp was being set up to house some of those returning to the area.
The region had been a stronghold of the Islamic group Ansar al-Islam which was routed during heavy
bombing during the recent war. Now villagers were returning to their houses but more than 80 had been
completely destroyed in the bombardment and another 100 were in too precarious a condition to be safe to
live in. Dumont said 450 families had already returned to Byara but more were expected. For those who did
not have houses to return to, UNOPS had erected 110 tents to provide temporary shelter. Some of the
displaced people were returning to the region after as many as eight years while others had only shifted
away during the bombing, Dumont said.
60
Meanwhile in the south of Iraq, work is still going on to assess the level of internal displacement. Hubert
Binon, the head of office in Basra for the United Nations International Organisation for Migration (IOM),
said that it was often difficult to get in touch with IDPs. Some people were living away from their normal
homes but did not consider themselves IDPs as they were staying with family. However IOM was telling
them that it could help if they wanted to go back to their place of origin. Many people had sought refuge in
the countryside due to the fighting and others had shifted because of the collapse of the economy and
business, he said. Three NGOs, ACTED, GOAL and Save the Children, were involved with IDP work in
the region and IOM had set up a base in Basra from Monday” (IRIN, 12 May 2003).
Kurds Return to Northern Iraqi City, Evicting Arabs; Hundreds Being Ousted as Displaced Group
Reclaims Land Taken Over 30 Years
“It's been a decade since Abd Ali Hamid moved to this northern Iraqi city, eager to start a new life. The
Iraqi government had promised him a plot of land in Kirkuk and a loan the equivalent of $ 20,000, an
irresistible offer for a poor Arab fisherman from the south. Hamid built a roomy, two-story home with
mint-green walls and black-speckled tile floors. But with the fall of President Saddam Hussein's
government, Hamid suddenly is homeless. The fisherman left Kirkuk during the recent U.S. bombardment.
When he returned a few days ago, he found his home taken over by Kurds. Now, Hamid's family of 11 is
crowded in with relatives across town, worried that they and other Arabs will be pushed from this city.
"Our children are in school here. All our relatives and colleagues are living here. We don't have people in
the south anymore," protested Hamid, 60, a tall man with charcoal eyes wearing a black-and-white
checkered headdress and flowing gray robe. Added his wife, Jundiya: "If it stays like this, the results could
be very bad. All the Arabs will be kicked out." Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Iraqi Arabs are being
ousted from their homes in and around this ethnically mixed city as Kurds retaliate for decades of
repression by Hussein's government.”
“The newly emboldened Kurds deny this is "ethnic cleansing;" they say they are merely reclaiming lands
seized from them in the past 30 years. The property was often given to Arabs whom the government
resettled here to blunt Kurdish influence. But the evictions are creating a new group of homeless, Iraqis
who in some cases have lived in this area for decades. And the problem could escalate as thousands of
displaced Kurds return from refugee camps in the north. Both the new homeless and human-rights groups
are calling on US troops in charge of the city to stop the forced removals. Soldiers from the Army's 173rd
Airborne Brigade moved into an Arab neighborhood in the southeastern part of the city in recent days to
guard against evictions. But their commander says they are stretched too thin and got started too late to
prevent many of the seizures. "Our biggest fear is that these kinds of incidents are going to raise the
temperature significantly in the city," said Hania Mufti, London director of the Middle East and North
Africa division of Human Rights Watch, who visited Kirkuk last week. "This may, in turn, lead to interethnic violence." The Kurds are an ethnic and linguistic group that inhabits the mostly mountainous area
where the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria converge. They number at least 25 million and had been
promised their own country after World War I.”
“Kurds have claimed to be a majority in this key oil city and its surrounding countryside, but Kirkuk also
has significant numbers of Arabs, Assyrians and Turkmen. Hussein tried to tilt the balance by expelling the
rebellious Kurds and resettling Arabs from the south. Now, the militia-backed Kurdish parties are saying
the Arabs should go home, though not through force. That message, however, hasn't trickled down. Human
Rights Watch estimates 2,000 Arabs were forced to leave four villages south of Kirkuk after the area was
seized April 10 by Kurd ish militia fighters working with the U.S. military. Now, some Kurds are starting
evictions inside this city of 1 million, according to Arab witnesses. Hamid said he, his brother and his
cousin have all had to leave their homes in the Shorja neighborhood in eastern Kirkuk on the orders of
Kurdish neighbors, some of them armed. "They accuse us, 'You belong to Saddam's regime. You have to
leave,' " he said, clicking his black plastic worry beads as he sat cross-legged on the floor of his relative's
house. Hamid's journey has been difficult. He belongs to the country's Shiite Muslim majority, which was
also repressed under Hussein's government. He lost his livelihood in his native Maisan province, near
Basra, when authorities drained the area's lakes and marshes to deny Shiite rebels a hiding place. The
government offered him a chance to start over, he said, with an empty plot of land on the outskirts of
61
Kirkuk and the loan. Forty families from Hamid's tribe accompanied him, getting similar benefits. "I sold
my wife's gold jewelry, and some furniture" to finish the home, said Hamid. He showed a visitor an official
document printed in Arabic. "Look, I have an ownership certificate," he said. But Hamid arrived in Kirkuk
as part of a brutal effort to redraw the city's ethnic map. The government banned non-Arabs from
purchasing property, prohibited businesses from using non-Arab names and even ordered the script on
tombstones replaced with Arabic. Since 1991, according to Human Rights Watch, 120,000 people, mostly
Kurds, were driven from their homes in Kirkuk and the surrounding area.
A senior Kurdish official said a committee would be formed at some point to look into providing
compensation for Arabs who were leaving the city. But, he added, it would be better if they left as soon as
possible, since many Kurds were impatiently waiting to recover their property. "Arabs who came under the
Arabization campaign have to leave. But we exclude the use of force," said Kerkuki, the top local
representative of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.”
“The U.S. military, the ultimate authority here, has so far played a limited role in preventing the evictions.
Col. William Mayville, commander of the 173rd Airborne Brigade here, said he had dispatched a company
of soldiers to an Arab neighborhood in the southeastern part of the city to prevent evictions from occurring.
In a few cases, soldiers had been able to return people to their homes. But, he said, it wasn't clear how
many evictions there have been. "If you listen to the allegations, billions," he said. He appeared surprised
when told of Kerkuki's statement that the Arabs who had been resettled here would have to leave. "We
certainly aren't buying that," said Mayville.He said his troops were stretched so thin that they had not been
able to prevent Kurds from clearing Arabs from villages south of the city. He added that the Kurds involved
were not the militia, but apparently average Kurds claiming to represent the Kurdish parties. "That is the
area we've got to do better," he said.” (Washington Post, 30 April 2003)
U.S. Troops Start Evicting Kurds from Houses They'd Seized from Arabs
“U.S. soldiers carried out the first mass eviction of Kurds on Tuesday from Arab homes that were seized
with the approval of a Kurdish guerrilla faction. Hundreds of Kurds pleaded and argued with troops from
the 101st Airborne Division sent in to clear out a housing complex built for Iraqi military families. But U.S.
troops persuaded around 400 Kurds to leave peacefully. Around 400 more were allowed to stay overnight
until more trucks could arrive to move their belongings, said Col. Joe Anderson, who commanded the
daylong operation involving about 175 soldiers. Several Kurdish families said officials from the Kurdistan
Democratic Party told them to move into the Arabs' houses. More than 8,000 Arabs fled the middle -class
housing complex as KDP guerrillas advanced toward Mosul, and Kurds said they were reclaiming land
seized by Saddam Hussein's regime to "Arabize" the area. "This is Kurdish land and it belongs to the
Kurdish government. It has the right to offer these houses to those of us who sacrificed for Kurdistan
against Saddam. He treated us unjustly, and now the new government is treating us unjustly." The
remaining Kurds are expected to be out of Domiz by today, and the homes' owners should be able to return
from temporary shelters later in the week, Anderson said. Anderson called it a military solution to a
political problem, adding it isn't likely to be repeated in the many northern Iraqi villages where Kurds have
taken over Arab homes to resolve property disputes. Saddam's Baath Party began to seize land and expel
tens of thousands of minority Kurds, Assyrians and Turkmens in the 1970s so that it could resettle Arabs in
an effort to strengthen control over northern Iraq. Kurds who either ordered Arabs to leave villages or took
over Arab homes abandoned during the recent war said they are simply righting the wrongs of the
Arabization policy. “There is no official count of Arabs driven from their homes. But a random check of
more than two weeks, along an arc from south of Kirkuk to areas near the Syrian border, found
communities totaling more than 13,000 Arabs where villagers said Kurds had stolen their houses. There are
no courts to untangle the knot of property claims and counterclaims that is Saddam's legacy, so it landed on
the desk of Capt. Teresa Raymond, airborne soldier and attorney. "Ideally, a legal resolution is the best
idea," said Raymond, 32, of Bowling Green, Ky. "But this is an Iraqi issue, and we want the Iraqi people to
resolve it using the Iraqi legal system."In carrying out the evictions, two of Anderson's most potent
weapons were handwritten notes from KDP leader Massoud Barzani confirming that he had agreed that
Kurds should leave seized property and settle disputes through negotiations." (LA Times, per email, 8 May
2003)
62
Iraq: Diffusing an Ethnic Time Bomb
“The collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime has left coalition forces scrambling to restore order in a nation
suddenly bereft of the instruments of government. In central and southern Iraq, this has meant detaining
looters, securing safe passage for aid trucks, and working to repair damaged utilities. In northern Iraq,
where ethnic tensions are already erupting in violence, the task will be more daunting still and the stakes
extraordinarily high.
Northern Iraq is home to a mixed population of Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians and Arabs. During Saddam's
rule, it was also home to a program of ethnic cleansing referred to as “Arabization,” under which an
estimated 600,000-800,000 Kurds were forced from their homes in Kirkuk, Mosul and the surrounding
countryside. As they fled, Arab Iraqis were offered incentives to settle in their place. Many Kurds have
been waiting years to return to their homes. W ith the fall of Saddam, the opportunity has finally arrived.
With no organized process in place to accept returnees or settle property disputes, however, the two
populations have been left to handle matters themselves. Since the fall of Mosul, at least 40 civilians have
died as a result of ethnic violence, and more than 2,000 Arab Iraqis have fled their homes, either due to
force or fear. With no police or peacekeeping force in place and more than 70,000 heavily armed Kurdish
peshmerga roaming the area, the potential for these pockets of violence to spread is high.
Complicating the situation is a substantial population of Turkmen, whom the Turks consider brothers and
have sworn to protect. Like the Kurds, many Turkmen were also expelled from northern Iraq during
Saddam's reign. With several thousand troops inside the country and another 40,000 amassed on the border,
the Turkish government has made it clear that perceived abuses of the Turkmen population will not be
tolerated. Though reports have not been substantiated, the Turkish press is already claiming that Kurdish
looters are destroying land records in an effort to facilitate the expulsion of Turkmen from the area.
To date, the United States has acknowledged the sensitivity of the area, but has outlined no clear strategy
for easing tensions in volatile northern Iraq. There are few more urgent tasks than for the American forces
to secure this area and establish an orderly and controlling process to handle the return of the displaced. To
this end, the United States should announce that a commission with representative ethnic and religious
makeup will be promptly established to enable Kurds, Turkmen and others to return and regain land and
property lost as a result of forced displacement. As part of this effort, a mechanism for adjudication of
property disputes will have to be created, as well as a task force set up to coordinate returns while also
assuring fairness to the more than 200,000 Arabs brought in under Saddam Hussein's Arabization policy.
The most qualified organization to assist in these tasks is the United Nations. It has long experience in
setting up claims commissions and courts to deal with property disputes and organizing returns of displaced
persons and refugees. The UN has taken on this role in Bosnia and should be called upon as a matter of
urgency to address the situation in Iraq.
The United States does not have weeks or months to deal with this problem. Efforts must be made now,
before passion, fear, and competing claims for the area's substantial oil wealth plunge the region into
violence that would undermine the stability and unity of Iraq and call into question the coalition's victory."
(Refugees International, 17 April 2003)
Assessing IDPs in the south
“A clearer picture of the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in southern and central Iraq is
emerging as initial data begins to come in. Chris Petch, the deputy programme manager for IDPs in Iraq for
the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), told IRIN that while there were still large areas of the
country to be covered and assessed, it was clear there were many thousands of Iraqis who had shifted from
their homes during the war and had not yet returned. IOM is the lead agency for IDPs in the south and
centre of the country.”
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”And while the numbers were not as great as had been predicted or feared before the war, those IDPs who
had been identified were in real need of assistance. Initial reports from 12 of the 92 southern and central
districts had identified 58,000 IDPs, but other unconfirmed reports could mean that this number was
actually over 80,000, Petch said. He said one of the big problems in trying to accurately assess the scale of
the problem was that the situation was very complicated and constantly changing. For example, IOM had
received a report of 50,000 IDPs camped near the Iranian border, but when they investigated, found only
2,000.”
”By contrast, in another case there was a report of up to 50,000 IDPs in one location during the war, but
IOM now knows there were close to 100,000 people there at the time. Petch said it was a very fluid picture,
and security concerns meant that NGOs had been unable to reach into many areas until now to check on the
problem.Numbers could fluctuate every day in an area, with displacement still going on in some places, but
he hoped to obtain a clearer picture of the problem within a month. One of the current problems was that
some areas were not deemed safe to travel to, such as the region around Tikrit, about 150 km northwest of
Baghdad. However he was confident that IOM had access to enough resources to cope with the IDP
situation whatever the final figures turned out to be.”
”It already had a stock non-food items sufficient for 250,000 people, and Petch believed that would be
enough. Once IDPs were found, they would be helped to return to their places of origin, resettle, or
integrate into the new community, and he believed that this process could occur quite quickly once started.
From his experience in other countries, Petch said people generally wanted to return to their homes, and he
suspected this would be the case in Iraq.”
”Peter Nuttall, a team leader for the Irish NGO, GOAL, which is helping with IDP assessments in the
southern governorate of Dhi Qar, told IRIN it had only been in the last two weeks that they had begun
locating IDPs. He said this was in part due to misunderstandings among Iraqis about what constituted an
IDP, but better information was now coming in. For example, GOAL staff had found four families living in
the back of a building, and when locals were asked where they had come from, staff were told they were
just poor people. It transpired, however, that the families had been renting houses which had been
destroyed, thereby turning them into IDPs. Nuttall said GOAL was continuing its work and would have a
clear picture of the overall situation in the area within a few weeks.”
”Another NGO involved in the IDP assessments, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), said it had
completed its assessment in the Al-Anbar Governorate west of Baghdad. Its programme coordinator, John
Damerell, told IRIN the security situation, including an armed attack on two of its vehicles, meant it had
been unable to visit all areas or complete its work. While unable to give definite figures, he said the number
of IDPs remaining in Al-Anbar was not appreciable, although there would still be several thousand. He
added that the plight of those found was not deemed to be chronic, and they all intended to go home as soon
as possible. Most IDPs had stayed with families or friends, or been put up by benevolent locals, including
one hotel which had opened its doors to them and accommodated them gratis. Damerell stressed that all the
information LWF had received pointed to the number of IDPs having been much greater when the fighting
was still in progress. However, when looting broke out, many people quickly returned to their homes in
places such as Baghdad to try and protect their possessions, he said.” (IRIN, 20 May 2003)
”Arab tribal leaders have reportedly responded favorably to a 14 April call by KDP head Barzani for Arabs
and Kurds to live together peacefully, "Brayati" reported on 22 April. According to the daily, the Hamdani
tribe in the Dubz district, as well as leaders from the Al-Afshana, Dibs, Harda'ya, Kubayba, Al-Sabunchi,
and Uzeri tribes have expressed their support for Barzani's call for coexistence. The call came among
widespread reports of violence by Kurds against the Arab inhabitnts of Kirkuk in recent weeks." (RFE/RL,
19 April 2003).
"Meanwhile, "Kurdistani Nuwe" reported on 23 April that PUK head Talabani has held a series of meetings
with the heads and shaykhs of Arab tribes on 21 April. Shaykh Muhammad Shaykhali, and leaders from
Arab tribes including, the Azza, Albumu Faraj, and the Rabi, Bani Tamimi, Janabiyin, Dilemi, Ubed, Jibur,
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and Al-Azzawi tribes met with Talabani. According to the Kurdish daily, the participants thanked the PUK
and the KPF (Kurdistan Peshmerga Force) for their role in protecting the liberated Iraqi citizens and towns.
Talabani also announced that Iraq will set up a commission to resolve disputes between Kurds and Arabs to
resolve issues related to the forced displacement of thousands of citizens under the Hussein regime's
"Arabization" policy. The decision for a commission came following separate meetings on 22 April
between U.S. administrator Jay Garner, Talabani, and Barzani. "There will be a committee later
representing all sides under the guidance of the United States to arrange how people must go back home in
a regular way, not in chaos," Reuters quoted Talabani as telling reporters in Sulaymaniyah on 23 April.
Talabani added that the committee had first been proposed by U.S. envoy Zalmay Khalilzad in Ankara in
March.” (RFE/RL, 26 April 2003)
”Kurds are evicting Iraqi Arabs from their homes in the city of Kirkuk, according to international media
reports. The city boasted a majority-Kurdish population until the Hussein regime began a program of
"Arabization" in the 1980s, displacing some 400,000 Kurds from this oil-rich northern city, according to a
17 April AP report. Describing the recent events as a tinderbox, Human Rights Watch (HRW) on 15 April
called on the authorities to intervene. The statement added that HRW interviewed Arabs who had fled four
villages south of Kirkuk after a local Kurdish official ordered them to vacate their homes within three days.
"Soon thereafter, nearly 2,000 residents from the villages of Al-Muntasir, Khalid, Al-Wahda, and Umar Ibn
Al-Khattab took refuge in tents and homes of fellow tribal members in the village of Sa'd bin Abi Waqqas
and its vicinity." Several of those displaced said they had been forced from their homes at gunpoint, while
their possessions, including cars, tractors, and household goods, were taken away. "They would have killed
us if we hadn't left," an elderly woman said. According to the 15 April HRW statement, an unnamed
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) official in the town of Daqouq said the expulsions were carried out on
the basis of a decision taken by the PUK's political bureau. The official also claimed that U.S. and coalition
forces approved the policy. HRW could not confirm that official's claim. "U.S. troops must stop the
violence. And PUK leaders should take immediate steps to halt any expulsions of Iraqi Arabs from their
homes," Hania Mufti, London director of the Middle East and North Africa division of Human Rights
Watch, said in the statement on the group's website (http://www.hrw.org/). Sayyid Nizzal al-Musevi, an
Arab representative in Kirkuk, told the Istanbul-based daily "Milliyet" on 16 April that the PUK has given
Arabs one week to vacate the city. He criticized PUK leader Jalal Talabani, saying: "Mr. Talabani said, 'We
opened a white page.' Now that page has darkened." Musevi said the Arabs intend to defend themselves in
the city.
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) leader Mas'ud Barzani criticized the incidents in Kirkuk, saying,
"Kurdish citizens have no right to threaten any Arab citizen or attack any Arab village belonging to
indigenous Arab tribes," "The Washington Post" reported on 17 April. Barzani has long stated that he
advocates the return of Kurds to their homes in Kirkuk, but has insisted that it be accomplished in a
nonviolent manner.” (RFE/RL, 26 April 2003.
“Hoshyar Zebari, spokesman for the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), told reporters at a 17 April press
conference in Salah Al-Din that there is no ethnic conflict between Kurds and Arabs in northern Iraq,
KurdSat reported on the same day. Zebari said that Kurdish peshmerga forces entered Mosul at the request
of coalition forces and said they will withdraw soon. Zebari said that Mosul is an Arab city, not Kurdish or
Turkoman. "We favor the establishment of a municipal council in Mosul that would represent the majority
of Arabs, while a municipal council will be established in Kirkuk to include representatives form the
Kurdish, Arab, Turkoman, and Christian communities," he said. Both the KDP and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) have opened offices in Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Mosul, according to Zebari, in an effort to
build relations between Kurds and Arabs in those cities. The Kurds, but particularly the PUK, have come
under fire from local residents and international organizations for reportedly expelling Arabs and
Turkomans from their homes in Kirkuk.” (RFE/RL, 17 April 2003).
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Internal displacement forecasts in case of war (2002-2003)
•
•
•
In Jan 2002, the UN estimated that an additional 900,000 people could be internally displaced in
case of a war
Rumor of the use of WMD might generate panic to instigate large scale flight
Iraqi regime could force people in the South to flee as part of its war strategy
•
Massive displacement to and from Kirkuk and Mossul is expected
"Up to 900,000 people may be displaced in addition to the 900,000-1,000,000 existing IDPs." (UN OCHA
Jan 03, p10)
U.N. agencies predicted in December 2002 that war could displace an additional 1.1 million people inside
Iraq and 900,000 would become refugees outside the country.
To view the UN confidential report mentioning this information, please see: UN 10 Dec 2002, Likely
Humanitarian Scenarios [reference and link below]
"Scenarios for large-scale population displacement:
1) Refugee flow from northern Iraq to neighbor states. Despite the past history (1988 and 1991) and the
publicly and forcefully articulated fears of Turkey and Iran, this is an unlikely scenario. The reasons for this
are the following:
The Kurds are far better organized than in the 1980s or 1991. Administrative structures that can channel
assistance and defuse popular panic exist both at the government and at local levels.
Most Kurdish households, from prime minister to taxi-driver, have several weeks / months worth of food
stocks in the house.
Since 1991, circa 3000 villages have been at least partially rebuilt. They will provide a protective buffer
between the towns and the mountainous borders, with access to food and water. (In 1991 there was nothing
between the towns and the mountains.)
Indications are that a key trigger to large-scale displacement – a prolonged Iraqi military attack -- will be
met with an overwhelming US-led military response.
2) Flight from the northern cities to surrounding areas. As noted above, any large-scale Iraqi military action
against cities such as Erbil, Sulaimaniah, or Dohuk is expected to be met with a prompt coalition response.
Therefore it is only the use of or rumor of the use of WMD that might generate sufficient panic to instigate
large scale flight.
3) New IDPs coming into northern Iraq from the South. This could be any of a number of populations
including non-Arabs expelled from Kirkuk, Mosul or even Baghdad, as well as the general population of
the first two cities. These are likely to be people that are expelled by the Iraqi regime, as part of its strategy
of fighting the war with ‘population bombs.’1 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) may be used to
instigate large-scale displacement.
4) Rapid population movements from and to Mosul and Kirkuk. Upon the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from
the northern cities, which could happen even prior to the outbreak of hostilities, there are likely to be two
types of population movements: Arab populations will flee south, and the former non-Arab residents will
flood home. These movements will happen spontaneously and will be largely uncontrollable." (CHC 23
Dec 02)
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"An attack on Iraq, starting with an air assault against Baghdad and other strategic targets, would generate
huge flows of refugees and a serious nutritional and public health crisis. More than a million people fled
Iraq during and after the 1990– 1991 Gulf crisis, when Saddam Hussein crushed ethnic rebellions that the
United States refused to support. Surrounding countries, the United Nations, and relief agencies are bracing
for flows at least as great this time. There could also be massive internal movement, with people fleeing
cities for the country. Many of the roads that U.S. and allied troops would need to bring troops and
equipment into Iraq could be clogged with people fleeing for their lives.
Most of Iraq’s 24 million people depend on food rations provided under the U.N. Oil for Food Program.
Any break in the food pipeline would create a nutritional crisis, forcing hungry Iraqis to besiege invading
troops for food.
Relief agencies have been working for years in Afghanistan, but there is little infrastructure to deal with a
humanitarian disaster in Iraq. Stockpiling food, assembling supplies and medicine, and building relief
teams will take time and money—mainly from the United States. During and immediately after a conflict,
occupying forces are often the only source of food and medical care.
If Saddam Hussein were to use chemical or biological weapons to blunt an attack, the humanitarian crisis
could be far worse. Thousands of people would be killed or incapacitated, but relief workers—the world’s
first responders to complex emergencies—would find it difficult to provide aid. Humanitarian workers are
completely unprepared to work in the toxic conditions they could encounter in the country." (Bacon Jan 03)
Eviction of Kurds but also of Turkmen and Assyrians from the Kirkuk area (1997-2002)
•
•
•
•
•
•
Since 1997, Iraqi government forced Kurds, as well as a number of Turkmen and Assyrians to
leave the Kirkuk area as part of its policy of "arabization" or "nationalization" of this oil-rich
region
Most of the people expelled from Kirkuk decided to go north, despite government decree that
doing so would cause them to lose their property and food rationing cards
5-6 families are deported every day to northern Iraq
Families perceived to be opposed to the regime, families who have relatives outside Iraq or in
southern Iraq and those who have relatives in detention or executed are said to be the first targeted
in the process of forced displacement
Baath Party members are responsible for ordering the eviction of families viewed as opponents of
the Iraqi regime
Kurdish sources reported acceleration of forced displacement of non-Arabs citizens in 2001 and
2002
"Since mid-1997 thousands of Kurds and a number of other non-Arabs, including Turkmen and Assyrians,
who have lived all their lives in the Kirkuk region, which is about 260 kilometers north of Baghdad, have
been expelled to the Kurdish provinces in the north controlled by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) because of their ethnic origin and because of Kirkuk's strategic
location as well as its oil fields. The authorities have given Kurdish families targeted the choice of either
going to Southern Iraq or to the Kurdish provinces. If the families choose Southern Iraq then they are
allowed to take some of their possessions with them. However, if they choose to go to the north their
properties, as well as their food rationing cards are confiscated by the authorities. The majority of the
families have reportedly chosen to go north. […]"
Once in Northern Iraq some of the families expelled tried to live with relatives. The majority, however,
have been resettled in camps such as the al-Salam camp near Chamchamal and Benislawa camp near Erbil.
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The KDP, PUK and UN agencies have provided them with basic food, tents, blankets and other items.
Their empty properties in the Kirkuk region and in Khanaqeen are given by the authorities to progovernment Arabs brought from other regions in Iraq. Thus far thousands of Arabs from other regions in
Iraq have been resettled in the Kirkuk governorate." (AI 24 November 2000, "Forcible expulsion")
"The policy of the Iraqi government is very systematically implemented in and around Kirkuk. Everyday 56 families are deported to Northern Iraq." (UNHCR/ACCORD 14 November 2000, p.57)
"Kurds and Turkomans who settled in these places after the 1950s are the principal victims of this policy.
Kurdish and Turkoman families are required to move either to the southern part of the country, often to the
city of al-Ramadi, or to the three northern governorates. At the same time, Arabs are reportedly encouraged
to settle in Kirkuk; their proportion is increasing. According to the interviewees, Arabs are given incentives
of money and apartments to settle in Kirkuk. As such, the Government's policy of Arabization, as reported
by the Special Rapporteur [of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq]
in the past, is continuing. [...]
Families who are perceived to be opposed to the regime, families who have relatives outside Iraq or in
southern Iraq and those who have relatives in detention or executed are said to be the first targeted in the
process of forced displacement." (CHR 10 March 1998, "Forced displacement")
"Forced displacement of the Turkomen was reported to have resumed in the last months of 1998,
particularly in the Kirkuk area. The head of the coalition of the Turkoman parties stated that about 5,000
evicted Turkomans were living in 'sub-human conditions in Northern Iraq.'" (UNHCR June 2000, p.12)
In 2000 "The government continued its forced expulsion of Kurds and Turkmen from Kirkuk, Khaniqin,
Makhmour, Sinjar, Tuz Khormatu, and other districts as part of its `Arabization' program.[...] Over 800
people were reportedly expelled between January and June, bringing the total number of those expelled
since 1991 to over 94,000, according to Kurdish opposition sources." (HRW December 2000, "Human
Rights Developments")
In 2001 "Iraqi authorities have forcefully deported five Kurdish families in Tuze Khurmatoo south of
Kirkuk city. Their documents were ceased and their houses were expropriated and given to Arab families.
The families were asked to register as Arabs or face deportation to the areas controlled by the Kurdish
authorities. The deportees who arrived in Kurdistan asked UN to pressure Iraqi government to allow them
back to their land and to halt further deportation activities. The deportees numbered 33 persons, all from the
farm lands near Tuze Khurmatoo." (Kurdistan Observer 26 March 2001)
"Emanuel Khoshaba, an official with the Assyrian Democratic Movement, said that '10 Assyrian families
have been forced to move to...Baghdad since the beginning of the year,' according to 'Zinda' on 12
February. The deportation of these families is part of the arabization campaign spearheaded by the ruling
Iraqi Ba'th Party." (RFE/RL 15 February 2002)
"The Iraqi government's ethnic-cleansing campaign against the country's non-Arab citizens has accelerated,
according to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Kurdish-language daily "Kurdistan Nuwe" on 17 April
[2002]. "Daily, the Iraqi government further intensifies the policy of ethnic cleansing and deportation of
Kurds in the regions under its own control," reported "Kurdistan Nuwe." The article continues, "Whenever
the global problems become more intricate and more threatening, the Iraqi government finds it an
opportune time to further implement its schemes against the Iraqi people in general and the Kurdish people
in particular.[…]
'On 5 January 2002, [Saddam Husseyn's] Presidency Council issued a directive through the Interior
Ministry, to the Kirkuk Governorate in which it called for probing into the causes of death of all the
Kurdish citizens from 1991 to 1996 in Kirkuk, for the purpose of expelling...the families and relatives of
the Kurds who were martyred in the battles for liberating Kirkuk...,' the report said. The battles for
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liberating Kirkuk refer to the brief seizure of Kirkuk by Iraqi Kurdish forces during the abortive March
1991 Kurdish uprising." (RFE/RL 26 April 2002)
For more information on forced displacement from Kirkuk, please see
Zanger, Maggy, April 2002, Refugees in Their Own Country, War Without Borders, Middle East Report
222, Spring 2002, [External Link]
Multiple displacements in northern Iraq (1998-2001)
•
•
In 1998 UN-Habitat estimated that out of 3 million people in northern Iraq, 1 million had been
internally displaced at one time or another
The displaced in the north include victim of the Anfal campaign, people expelled from
government-controlled regions, people displaced by factional Kurdish in-fighting, or people living
close to the border who had to flee foreign incursions and shelling
"Many residents of northern Iraq have been displaced multiple times. In 1998, the UN Center for Human
Settlements (UN-Habitat) estimated that more than 1 million people (out of a population of 3 million) were
internally displaced in the three northern governorates at one time or another. At least 100,000 of the
displaced in the north are people from the government-controlled regions of Kirkuk, Khanaqin, and Sinjar
bordering the north who have been expelled into the north in recent years, including 1999.
Those displaced in northern Iraq also include people previously displaced from government-controlled Iraq;
about half of the displaced were forced out before 1991, many during the 'Anfal' campaign in the late 1980s
when Baghdad forces wiped out about 4,500 Kurdish villages, including virtually all villages near the
borders of Turkey and Iran. The rest of the displaced have been uprooted from one part of northern Iraq to
another by factional Kurdish in-fighting or, for people living in border areas, by incursions or shelling from
outside the Kurdish-controlled region by Turkish, Iranian, or Iraqi government forces." (USCR 2000,
"Northern Iraq")
"At 1999 Sulaimaniyah Conference the following category definition was produced:
Those from Kirkuk (old and new caseload). Khanaqin, Kifri, Makhmour, Sinjar, Tala'far, Mosul and other
areas.
Those displaced as a result of conflict between the two major factions in Iraqi Kurdistan.
People affected by conflict involving the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).[…]
Others in collective towns including widows and children, who would like to return to places of origin if
given the opportunity to do so.
All other citizens of Iraq displaced/expelled for political reasons." (Habitat Jan 2001, p1)
"The composition of the displaced population now includes: (a) those in collective towns who are unable to
return; (b) those who do not wish to return; and (c) those displaced persons who have taken refuge in urban
and semi -urban areas and who, because of their vulnerable position, require water and sewage and other
infrastructure services. […] These two groups [(a) and (c) make up 0.8 million persons." (UN SC 19
November 1998, Sect. IV)
"About 900,000 internal refugees – as much as a third of the region's population – are scattered across Iraqi
Kurdistan. Some of them have been displaced several times in the last twenty years by violence between
the Kurds here and Turkey. Some are unable to return home because the soil is still strewn with landmines.
About 200 people each month are killed or maimed by mines, according to the UN de-miners." (Aquilla
Lawrence Summer 2000)
"The other kind of displacement happened in Northern Iraq after the conflict between the PUK and the
KDP, especially after the KDP gained the control over Arbil City, which had been in the hands of the PUK
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since 1995. A forcible exchange of population took place from Arbil City to Sulaymaniyah City and vice
versa, affecting around 50,000-55,000 people respectively (100,000-110,000 all in all). These people were
sent to the other town just because they were accused of being affiliated with the other party. They lost their
social status and support as well as their property: houses, cars, land." (UNHCR/ACCORD 14 November
2000)
Local officials in Kirkuk area are granted impunity to carry out expulsion process
described in government decree (1998-2000)
•
•
•
•
•
Procedure to follow during the expulsion process includes confiscation of property, of ration cards
and of membership cards to government agencies
One member of each Kurdish family expelled to the northern provinces was often detained and
had to sign note acknowledging to move voluntarily
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in
Iraq observes that the Baath Party and its members are effectively granted impunity in carrying
out forced displacement policy
Measures used by the government to encourage departures and prevent the return of displaced
persons include the mining of the area, the setting-up of military checkpoints and the demolition
of Kurdish sites
Other measures include sealing off entire districts and taking hostage children from families of
minority groups to intimidate their families into leaving their home regions
"The Kirkuk Governorate was renamed 'Al-Ta'mim' which means in arabic 'nationalization'. On 12 January
1998 a decree was issued by the Governorate of al-Ta'mim ordering the expulsion of 1468 families from
the governorate because of its 'very important security status and geographical location'. The decree was
based on directives issued by the office of the President of Iraq. It sets a date, between 15 April 1998 and
15 June 1998, for the deportation of the 1468 families. The decree gives details of the number of families to
be expelled from different neighbourhoods in the Kirkuk governorate. It also includes details of the
procedure to be followed by the security forces, it states:
1. One member of each Kurdish family expelled to the northern provinces should be detained;
2. Confiscation of property belonging to the expelled;
3. Confiscation of ration cards;
4. Confiscation of membership cards to government agencies;
5. Notification of the decree to: the head of security of each district; the Ba'ath party official of each
district, the chief of each village. […]
The expulsion of Kurdish families and other non-Arabs continued throughout 1998 and 1999. The same
procedure described above is followed on each occasion. (AI 24 November 1999, "Forcible expulsion")
"According to several persons interviewed, Baath Party members from the local offices of the Baath Party
in the city of Kirkuk are responsible for implementing the decision to forcibly remove the targeted families.
They are in possession of lists of people living in the neighbourhood under their 'jurisdiction'. These lists
contain information on each household of the neighbourhood. Baath Party members are responsible for
implementation of the decisions. Aside from the various human rights which are violated in the process of
forced displacement (e.g. the rights to privacy, property, movement and personal integrity), the Special
Rapporteur [of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq] observes that
the practice of forced displacement as carried out by the Baath Party is an extralegal use of self-ascribed
authority; to the extent that the ostensible authorities permit the practice to occur, the Baath Party and its
members are effectively granted impunity.
70
According to testimony received, the following is the typical experience of those families subjected to
forced displacement. Once the decision is taken to expel a family, Baath Party members present themselves
at the residence of that particular family and order them to leave the area within 24 to 48 hours. In order to
ensure that the family will effectively move, Baath Party members usually withhold the identification cards
of the members of the family. In some cases a member of the family is put in detention in order to
accelerate the process. Once the family is ready to leave their home, they need to pass by the local police
station and fill in a form stating that they are voluntarily changing their residence. Their identification cards
are only then returned to them and if a member of the family was detained, only then is he or she released.
[…]
Iraqi authorities used to issue a 'displacement order' to families who were required to leave. However, it
was reported that the Government of Iraq stopped this practice when they learned that the document was
being used by asylum seekers outside Iraq as proof of their claims." (CHR 10 March 1998, "Forced
displacement")
"In Kirkuk the regime periodically sealed off entire districts and conducted day-long, house-to-house
searches, evidently as part of its 'Arabization' campaign to harass, and expel ethnic Kurds and Turkomen
from the region. Government officials also take hostage children from families of minority groups to
intimidate their families into leaving their home regions. […] As part of its policy, the authorities
demolished the houses and detained and executed family members of Shi'a who protested government
actions." (US DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for human rights, f.")
"The Government of Iraq has reportedly been using other measures aimed at encouraging departures and
preventing displaced persons from returning. The Government has reportedly declared the area around
Kirkuk, including the oil-fields and production facilities, a military and security zone and has mined the
area to impede transit. The roads into the area have been heavily fortified with military checkpoints. The
regime has also changed the administrative composition of Kirkuk governorate, eliminating four
predominantly Kurdish districts and effectively reducing the Kurdish population to minority status. Most
recently, the Iraqi Government has reportedly evicted the residents of Kirkuk's citadel and begun the
demolition of this ancient Kurdish site, claiming that the envisioned new construction will generate
considerable tourist revenue." (CHR 26 February 1999, para.24-28)
Most Marsh Arabs have been displaced or had to give up their traditional way of living
(1998-2002)
•
•
•
•
•
To escape government repression aimed at Shi'a uprising in 1991, many insurgents fled to the
marsh areas in central and southern Iraq
Government drained the marshes to regain control of the region and most of an estimated 200,000
'Marsh Arabs' (1993 estimate) have been displaced, or have had to abandon their traditional
livelihoods
Iraqi government adopted a compulsory resettlement program for the Marsh Arabs in 1992
The Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights Iraq has received lists of
allegedly destroyed villages and houses, located in the marsh area and in Baghdad
The government has also reportedly forced the Shi'a population from the marshlands to relocate in
the Kirkuk area
"As to where the Marsh Arabs went, little is known. The British NGO AMAR says some 40,000 people
made it into refugee camps in Iran. Some tens of thousands may still be trying to scratch a living out of
whatever remains of the marshes. Some were certainly killed by the Iraqi security forces during the
‘drainage’ operations. But upwards of 100,000 (see numbers section below) must be displaced.
Neighboring urban centers such as an-Nasiriyah and al-Amara are thought to hold some people. Larger
centers like Baghdad and Basra may provide havens as family members had been migrating there for
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decades. Finally, it is thought that some Marsh Arabs may be part of the people being sent north to inhabit
former Kurd and Turkmen properties, under the Arabization campaign, although it is unclear how the
necessary selection process unfolds." (Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02, p31)
"In 1993, Human Rights Watch estimated the rural population of the marshlands to be around 200,000,
which took into account the huge amount of army deserters and political opponents seeking shelter in the
region after 1991. Today, there may be as few as 20,000 of the original inhabitants remaining, the rest
having fled or migrated to Iran and elsewhere, while an estimated minimum of 100,000 have become
internally displaced in Iraq." (HRW Jan 03, p6)
"In April 1992 (as part of the plan to “regroup the marsh villages on dry land” […]), the Iraqi National
Assembly approved a new housing program for the Ma’dan. According to then speaker of the Iraqi
parliament, Sa’di Mahdi Saleh, the government’s intention was to relocate some 3,000-4,000 inhabitants of
the marshes to houses constructed along the highway between Basra and al-Qurna, to “provide them with
electricity, clean water, schools and medical care,” and to “make them good citizens.” Saleh told the media
that the plan approved by parliament “does not specify [whether the families to be relocated] will be given
a choice to move or stay … whether we say it is compulsory or optional is of no significance to them”. The
initiative was widely understood as a means through which the government could force political and
military fugitives out of hiding, enable its program of drainage
of the marshes to proceed without hindrance, and subjugate the local population once and for all.
Moreover, the forced relocation served as a means of depriving the marsh villagers of all sources of
economic livelihood—mirroring precisely what had happened to the Kurds when they were forcibly
relocated to resettlement camps in the 1980s as a prelude to the Anfal campaign.
The parallel between the Kurds and the Ma’dan was not lost on the speaker of the parliament. Referring to
the Kurds, Saleh told the Reuters news agency: 'At the time we evacuated those people and put them in
complexes and provided them with amenities, [but] for political reasons there was a row against us in the
West. Concerning the marsh people the West should help us to move their homes, build schools for them,
improve their health conditions, instead of criticizing. America wiped the Red Indians off the face of the
earth and nobody raised an eyebrow.'
The forced resettlement program in the marshes was accompanied by a counterinsurgency campaign that
included indiscriminate attacks by artillery, helicopter gunships and fixed-wing aircraft on villages. The
attacks were reportedly accompanied by the arrest and execution of civilians, including tribal leaders, the
destruction of property and livestock, and the razing of entire villages. Those targeted included whole
families that had refused to vacate their homes. The waves of arrests were soon followed by reports of
mass summary executions. Among the reports received by Human Rights Watch at the time was one
incident involving the execution of some 2,500 villagers in August 1992. The victims, among them women
and children, were rounded up in the marshes of al-Chibayish (west of al-Qurna) together with
captured fighters of the opposition SCIRI. According to testimony obtained by Human Rights Watch,
including that of a survivor, they were taken to an army camp in northern Iraq, where they were executed
over a period of about two weeks. The UN special rapporteur on Iraq detailed similar reports he had
received." (HRW Jan 03)
“Reports of the destruction of civilian settlements have been received by the Special Rapporteur on an
intermittent basis since 1991. The Special Rapporteur [of the Commission on Human Rights on the
situation of human rights in Iraq] has received lists of allegedly destroyed villages and houses, located in
many parts of the vast marsh area (now mainly drained), as well as in Baghdad.
It was reported that, in late March 1999, Armoured Division Six carried out operations surrounding and
bombarding a number of residential areas of some of the tribes living in the Governorate of Basra. Such
operations reportedly took place in the areas of Al-Ghameigh, Bait Wafi and Bait Sayed Noor.
72
Since the beginning of 1999, the Special Rapporteur has regularly received reports indicating that the
Government of Iraq has been destroying the houses of opponents with bulldozers, operating during the
daytime in full view of the occupants. [...]
The Special Rapporteur has received a list of names of hundreds of people so affected, indicating their
addresses, the date of destruction of their homes and the action taken against the families (arrests,
executions, expulsions etc.).” (UN GA 14 October 1999, para.15-19)
"The practice of the security services to force large numbers of Shi'a inhabitants of the southern marshes to
relocate to major southern cities and to areas along the Iranian border probably is connected to the
destruction of villages. Special Rapporteur van der Stoel described this practice in his February report, and
added that many other persons were transferred to detention centers and prisons in central Iraq, primarily in
Baghdad." (US DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for human rights, g.")
Security forces also have forced Shi'a inhabitants of the southern marshes to relocate to majo r southern
cities and to areas along the Iranian border. […] The Government reportedly also continued to move
forcibly Shi'a populations from the south to the north to replace Kurds, Turkomen, and Assyrians, who had
been expelled forcibly from major cities. (US DOS 5 September 2000, Sect.I)
Other displacements include flight of political opponents and forced relocation of
people who had found refuge in Baghdad (1998-2000)
"Thousands of non-Kurdish opponents of the Saddam Hussein regime have also sought refuge, or a base for
continuing their opposition, in the Kurdish-controlled regions of Iraq, particularly since the Gulf War. The
entry of Iraqi government troops and agents into these regions in 1996 left them particularly vulnerable many were captured or killed, particularly in Arbil. In late 1997, the Iraqi National Congress reported that
around 2000 non-Kurdish political displaced were still sheltering in PUK-controlled regions, mainly in
Suleimaniyeh. Many reportedly had difficulty finding work, and were often regarded with suspicion (as
potential government agents) by the PUK authorities." (Dammers 1998, p.184)
"Thousands of Gulf War refugees who sought haven in Baghdad were relocated forcibly to their home
provinces." (US DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for human rights, d.")
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PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
Physical Security
Kirkuk is the nexus of an ethnic and historical struggle that could endanger Iraq's
delicate social fabric alight (February 2004)
•
•
•
•
Turkmen and Arabs are alarmed by the fact that Kirkuk's police force is now majority Kurd
Many government buildings have Kurdish, not Iraqi, flags atop
"The Turkmen were here first, and we shall return to make it Turkmen again"
Any conversation with Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen in Kirkuk ends up being a numbers game
•
"It's a potentially combustible situation that we can't afford to get wrong,"says US official
"Both Turkmen and Arabs are alarmed by the fact that Kirkuk's police force is now majority Kurd, that
many government buildings have Kurdish, not Iraqi, flags atop them and that plans are afoot to set up local
Kurdish "ministries".
"They think this is all theirs, but in fact the Turkmen were here first, and we shall return to make it
Turkmen again," said Saed Adil, 30, who returned from exile in the north four months ago and is now
living in a tent outside Kirkuk.
Any conversation with Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen in Kirkuk ends up being a numbers game, with each
arguing that they have a majority, or at least a plurality, of the city's population.
In 1921, when the British occupied Iraq, they estimated that Kurds had a large majority in the city. The
1957 census, the last officially conducted national poll, put the figure at 48 percent Kurd, 28 percent Arab
and 21 percent Turkmen.
But in the 45 years since, vast changes have taken place and many suggest that Arabs and Turkmen
probably at some point outnumbered Kurds. Turkmen also say that they founded the city and dominated it
ethnically for centuries.
Either way, Kirkuk is now the nexus of an ethnic and historical struggle that some fear could end up being
the spark that sets Iraq's delicate social fabric alight.
In the remaining months before sovereignty is handed back to Iraqis, and in the period afterwards, as they
shape the constitution that will have to hold the country together, Kirkuk's status is likely to be at the heart
of discussions.
"It's a potentially combustible situation that we can't afford to get wrong," a senior official with the U.S.-led
Coalition Provisional Authority in Kirkuk said recently. (Reuters, 3 February 2004).
Reports of gross human rights violations committed by government, despite
obstacles to assess abuses (1999-2003)
•
•
•
Government does not allow human rights experts outside Baghdad nor in the 3 Northern
governorates
Opposition groups based outside of Iraq relay information on human rights abuses from inside
government-controlled Iraq
Human Rights organizations report gross human rights violations in Iraq, ranging arbitrary arrest
and detention, to torture, extrajudicial and judicial executions after unfair summary trials,
'disappearances', and forcible expulsions on the basis of ethnic origin
74
•
•
Presence of Iraqi government intelligence operatives in autonomous northern Iraq and refusal of
neighboring countries to allow passage to the north of Iraq complicate the task of human rights
organizations
UN Special Rapporteur on the situation in Iraq continued to report human rights violations in
2002
"The Government does not permit the establishment of independent human rights organizations. Citizens
have established several human rights groups abroad and in northern areas not under government control.
Monitors from foreign and international human rights groups are not allowed in the country.
The Government operates an official human rights group that routinely denies allegations of abuses." (US
DOS 25 February 2000, Section 4)
"The government allowed no independent human rights organizations to operate in the governorates under
its control and prevented foreign journalists or diplomats and persons working with humanitarian relief
programs from traveling outside of Baghdad without escort or reporting on human rights abuses.
The Centre for Human Rights, affiliated with the Iraqi Communist Party, relayed information from inside
government-controlled Iraq through its office in Shaqlawa in the autonomous region and its headquarters in
London. Other Iraqi opposition groups such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI), the Iraq National Accord, and the Iraq National Congress also provided information about human
rights abuses by the government in Baghdad. The border between the government-controlled and
autonomous regions remained relatively porous, and many Iraqis reportedly traveled to the north and back
with little hindrance. However, the presence of government intelligence operatives in the north and the
refusal of neighboring countries to allow passage to the north of Iraq made it difficult for international
human rights organizations to investigate abuses or to verify the information provided by opposition
groups." (HRW December 1999, Human Rights Developments")
"The Iraqi government of President Saddam Hussain perpetrated widespread and gross human rights
violations, including arbitrary arrests of suspected political opponents and their relatives, routine torture
and ill-treatment of detainees, summary execution of military personnel and political detainees as part of a
'prison cleansing' campaign, and forced expulsions of Kurds and Turkmen from Kirkuk and other regions."
(HRW 2002, "Human Rights Developments")
In 2001, Amnesty International still reported the execution of hundreds of people, including possible
prisoners of conscience, the arrest of hundreds of suspected political opponents, widespread torture and
forcible expulsions from Kirkuk (AI 2001)
"Victims of torture have included suspected government opponents who range from army, security and
intelligence officers suspected of having contacts with the Iraqi opposition abroad or accused of plotting
against the government, to followers of leading Shi'a Muslim religious personalities. Torture has also been
used against women suspected of having links with Shi'a Islamist groups in the country or simply because
of family links. In many cases relatives of those active in the Iraqi opposition abroad have been tortured or
ill-treated as a way of putting pressure on those opposition leaders to cease their activities." (AI 15 August
2001)
"The Iraqi government continued to commit widespread and gross human rights violations, including the
extensive use of the death penalty and the extrajudicial execution of prisoners, the forced expulsion of
ethnic minorities from government-controlled areas in the oil-rich region of Kirkuk and elsewhere, the
arbitrary arrest of suspected political opponents and members of their families, and the torture and illtreatment of detainees." (HRW 2003)
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"The Iraqi government executed 15 Kurdish oppositionists in Kirkuk last week. They were arrested last
month by the Iraqi security apparatus, according to the Radio of the Iraqi Kurdistan Conservatives, cited by
KurdishMedia.com of 19 November. The victims were buried in a mass grave near a military barrack north
of Kirkuk.
It is also reported that Saddam's security apparatus has increased its activities in recent months. Some 40
percent of Kurdistan (south of the no-fly zone which demarcates the Kurdistan Regional Government
[KRG]) is under Baghdad control. UN Security Council Resolution 688 is supposed to protect the Kurds
and Shi'a population but no steps have been taken by the international community to implement it. Kirkuk
also contains a significant population of Iraqi Turkmen who are equally unprotected." (RFE/RL 23 Nov
2001)
" During the reporting period, the Special Rapporteur continued to receive allegations of human rights
violations committed by the Government of Iraq from various sources. These allegations relate to
extrajudicial killings, torture, cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment and punishment, forced displacement
(the policy of “Arabization”), the lack of fair trial, freedom of expression and association, religious freedom
and other rights. This information has provided some of the background material which the Special
Rapporteur draws on in his discussions with the Government of Iraq." (UN GA 20 Aug 02, para.16)
Post-war security concerns
•
•
•
•
UN and NGOs voice security concerns
WFP reports of looting of warehouses, in hands of militia
NGOs voice concern due to lack of protection mandate for lead agency
Amnesty International voice concern over lack of human rights monitors in Iraq
•
•
Third Country Nationals displaced and stuck in “no-man’s-land”
Human Rights Watch: Civilian deaths higher since war ended
UN and NGOs voice security concerns
“The top United Nations relief official in Iraq voiced concerns over security on Wednesday to the leading
United States civilian official there. "From a UN perspective our immediate concerns are related with
security in the broad sense: law and order, not for us as persons but for the society," Ramiro Lopes da Silva,
UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, told reporters after meeting in Baghdad with Ambassador L. Paul
Bremer, head of the US-run Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). Da Silva's
call followed reports that some NGOs and UN agencies working in the country are having to reassess their
operations after a string of violent attacks. Alykhan Rajani, a spokesman for the international aid agency
CARE, said in the Jordanian capital, Amman, that its staff had been attacked four times in 72 hours this
week.”
“ [...] The situation was so intense that it had forced CARE to review its operations - what it could still do
and whether it could continue operating. It had already stopped using its own vehicles, and staff were
taking local transport to get around the city. He said Baghdad remained insecure with a lot of gunfire, and
the situation was greatly restricting CARE's work. The organisation had 60 staff in Iraq, but Rajani said the
country's huge needs had to be balanced against the safety of these staff. CARE's emergency response team
leader, Anne Morris, said the agency's work was being severely affected by the insecurity, which meant
that it could not properly assess the needs of the Iraqi people. "What does it say about the situation when
criminals can move freely about the city and humanitarian aid workers cannot?" she asked. CARE has
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called on the Coalition to meet its obligation to provide security not only for aid organisations but also for
the Iraqi people in general.”
”The chief spokesman for the World Food Programme (WFP), Trevor Rowe, said in Rome: "The real
number one challenge in Iraq is security. What we are facing is multiple situations where, for example,
warehouses are out of control and in the hands of militias answerable to themselves or to some appointed
authority. They are armed, and that presents a problem with storage, which then presents a problem for
distribution. So that's the number one challenge we face right now in terms of being able to feed the
country. WHO's representative in Iraq, Ghulam Popal, said not only had war severely damaged the health
system but looting, which was still going on, meant that the vital health information system had been lost.
"If you ask me what are the three priorities that we should tackle now under the health sector, my reply will
be, security, security, security."
”Premiere Urgence's press officer, Renaud Douci, said in Baghdad that the security situation there was now
worse than it had been several weeks ago, immediately after the war. He said attackers were organised,
heavily armed and even had flak jackets. NGOs were a target because people knew they had money and
equipment, as well as vehicles. For this reason, Premiere Urgence had removed identity stickers from its
vehicles and imposed a 20:00 curfew on staff. With incidents on the rise, Douci called on US troops in the
city to provide the security that was part of their job.”
”Attacks on NGOs are also continuing on the road between Baghdad and the border with Jordan. Elisabeth
Widmer, a project manager with Operation Mercy in Iraq, was in a vehicle that was attacked near Ramadi,
west of Baghdad, last week. Everywhere else the group had been in Iraq it had felt safe and people were
friendly, but some people would take advantage of the instability and lack of police to try and make money,
Widmer said. Two vehicles belonging to the Lutheran World Federation had also been robbed at gunpoint
in the same area last week. For this reason, NGOs travelling between Baghdad and the Jordanian border
have been advised to move in larger convoys, and take a southern route through Karbala.”
”Major James Brown, a civil military adviser with the Humanitarian Operations Centre - a joint US and
Kuwaiti government initiative - insisted the security situation was continuing to improve. He said the
commander of US troops, Gen. Tommy Franks, had identified security as the number one issue in Iraq, and
the number of forces on security missions was being increased. Much of the improvement in security would
ensue when Iraqis took over law enforcement and municipal councils, and authorities were set up to help
stabilise the situation, Brown said. In the interim, though, it was impossible for troops to be everywhere all
the time." (IRIN, 14 May 2003)
Protection mandate missing for lead agencies in Iraq
“[...] Ms Thomas (ICVA) expressed concern that neither of the two agencies charged by the UN with caring
for IDPs in the country had any protection mandate or experience. "Protection is not something that ... can
be parachuted in," she stressed. "Yet now in Iraq there's an expectation that protection advisers can simply
be dropped onto the ground and that they will solve any protection problems."
Responding, Mr Oshima noted that worst-case scenarios with 2 million displaced Iraqis had not occurred,
and that agencies were largely "starting from scratch" in Iraq. "It is not that the protection side of the IDP
problem is left unaddressed. ... I think the arrangements we have put in place can function, will function,
and all agencies concerned are working together under this collaborative approach." Special protection
measures had been put in place IDPs in Iraq, Mr Oshima insisted, including a working group on protection
that included ICRC and UNHCR. Senior advisers from OHCHR and the IDP Unit were helping the
humanitarian coordinator, he said.” (Global IDP Project, 10 April 2003)
Amnesty International: No human rights monitors to Iraq
“UN Commission on Human Rights fails once again to protect victims of human rights violations. This
year's session coincided with dramatic events in Iraq and Amnesty International has urged the Commission
to support the deployment of human rights monitors as soon as the security situation permits. The draft
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resolution on Iraq has been continuously postponed in efforts to reach a compromise, yet still it fails to
include monitors. The latest draft text is reduced to a few elements compared to previous years. The latest
draft condemns past violations by the Iraq Government, calls on all parties to the current conflict to respect
international law, and extends the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Iraq for a further year. Despite
enormous pressure that the mandate of the Special Rapporteur only focus on past human rights violations,
the latest draft text requests the Special Rapporteur to focus "on newly available material information about
violations of human rights and international law by the government of Iraq over many years." Amnesty
International has argued that the Special Rapporteur's mandate should not be time limited." (AI, 22 April
2003)
Amnesty International urges Bush and Blair to intervene in relation to "disappeared"
“Irene Khan Secretary General of Amnesty International has today written to President George W Bush,
and Prime Minister Tony Blair to seek their intervention in relation to the issue of Iraq's 'disappeared'
people. Amnesty International is concerned that evidence related to past 'disappearances' may be being
destroyed or interfered with and seeks assurances that US and UK forces in Iraq are doing all within their
power to safeguard such evidence.
This appeal comes after Amnesty International researchers visited Basra's bombed Governorate building
following reports indicating the location of a possible secret underground prison. Researchers visited a
series of underground levels underneath the heavily damaged building, a roughly sealed off stairwell
suggested a lower level. Amnesty International's team alerted UK forces about this suspicious finding, but
the organization could not determine if, in fact, there exists a lower level or what its purpose might have
been.
"'Disappearances' are among the gravest of human rights violations. They cause extreme agony for the
victims and for the relatives. The governments of the US and UK are in a position to take urgent steps that
may help alleviate some of the suffering of the relatives of the 'disappeared' in Iraq. The US and UK may
also be in a position to find any of the 'disappeared' who may still be alive.”
"A real commitment to the people of Iraq that such mechanism will be established as a matter of urgency,
will provide a degree of reassurance that they will see the emergence of truth and justice, and that they will
be protected from such grave human rights violations in the future," Amnesty International said.
Amnesty International is also aware of the many reports of relatives of the 'disappeared' and others, who
believe that some of the 'disappeared' may still be alive and may be in underground or secret places of
detention. Amnesty International is not in a position to verify the reliability of such information. However,
in the light of these reports, Us and UK forces should establish and publicise a mechanism to receive
reports of such suspected places of detention. Where such reports appear reliable the US and UK forces
should investigate them, as a matter of urgency, with a view to finding any such detainees. Such
investigations should be carried out in such a way as to preserve evidence and information that may be used
in future impartial and independent investigations and prosecutions.
Amnesty International is calling on the US and UK authorities to cooperate fully with the International
Committee of the Red Cross by ensuring that it has free access to all detention facilities and to all
categories of detainees, and that it can perform fully its mandate relating to missing persons.” (AI, 3 May
2003)
Minefield and cluster bomb target site information must be made available
“Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) calls on the Coalition Forces to immediately release to civilians and
those involved with peacekeeping and reconstruction detailed maps of known mine fields and cluster bomb
drop sites. To date, the large-scale maps released through the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) do
not provide adequate information to assess Iraqi populations at risk or provide security information for
humanitarian aid workers. "The safety of civilians is compromised and the effectiveness of programs
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providing demining, surveying and mine awareness is delayed until detailed maps are circulated," said Dr.
Adam Kushner, a PHR researcher in Iraq and an expert in landmine survivor assistance.
Minefields and unexploded ordinance (UXO) exist throughout Iraq as a result of decades of internal
fighting, the Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 Persian Gulf War - during which the U.S. and the Iraqis used
antipersonnel mines. Though it appears that US and allied troops did not plant landmines during this most
recent conflict, Iraqi forces did lay mines, only adding to the country's major UXO problem. Antipersonnel
landmines, sometimes described as "weapons of mass destruction in slow motion," are banned by the
majority of the world's nations under the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Iran, Iraq, and the United States are not
party to the treaty. Due to their indiscriminate nature, antipersonnel mines and anti-vehicle mines (which
are not banned by the treaty), have devastating effects on civilian populations in more than 80 nations,
including Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Mozambique.
Cluster bombs, munitions containing approximately 200 bomblets each, have a failure rate estimated at 5 to
25%. The Pentagon recently released figures that 1,500 cluster bombs were used during the most recent
conflict; this translates into an estimated 15,000 to 75,000 unexploded bomblets. According to a recent
report by Human Rights Watch, however, these Pentagon figures only include air-dropped cluster
munitions. With the addition of surface-delivered cluster bombs that failed to detonate, the number of
unexploded cluster bomblets now lying in wait may be much higher.
The risk of injury and death from landmines and unexploded cluster bombs and other weapons is well
documented in post-conflict settings. Civilians, US and allied troops, and future peacekeepers and deminers
will all be at serious risk in Iraq. Indeed, many civilians and soldiers have already been injured and killed
by the weapons in recent weeks. For the safety of these populations,
Coalition forces should immediately:
Provide to civilians and reconstruction teams detailed maps of minefields and cluster bomb drop sites.
Together with experienced Mine Action teams from the United Nations, NGOs, and other governments,
continue Mine Action activities including surveys, marking of mine fields, and demining operations.
Identify and provide resources to areas and population centers that will benefit from immediate mine
awareness campaigns. Provide security information for humanitarian aid workers.” (Physicians for Human
Rights, 6 May 2003)
Third Country Nationals (TCN)
Palestinians lose homes for link to Saddam: Refugees of 1948 are forced to seek refuge once again
“Hundreds of Palestinian families who have lived in Iraq for more than half a century are finding
themselves on the streets after being evicted from their homes after the fall of Saddam Hussein. More than
35,000 Palestinians who lived in Iraq since they were displaced from their homeland upon Israel's founding
in 1948 have enjoyed Saddam's protection, often being housed in the homes of Iraqis evicted by authorities
for opposing the government, or in government property. Now that U.S. troops have toppled Saddam, many
Palestinians have found themselves on the streets after some original homeowners returned to claim their
property or when other Iraqis, taking advantage of the legal vacuum following Baghdad's fall last month,
have simply taken over government houses, forcing tenants out. Many Palestinians say they have been
thrown out of their homes in revenge as Iraqis link them to Saddam's ousted regime because of its support
for the Palestinian intifada -- although they say they suffered under his brutal rule as well. A Red Crescent
official at a camp for homeless Palestinians that formerly housed a Palestinian sports club said 241 families
have been driven out of their homes and temporarily resettled throughout Baghdad. A group of Palestinian
women, and a man and four children here said they were all neighbours in a building subsidized by
Saddam's regime -- until three weeks ago when their landlord ordered them to leave.
Despite Saddam's public support for their cause, the Palestinians say they were never allowed to buy
property in their own names, enlist in the army or work in sensitive Iraqi ministries connected with
security. "In the 1990s, things got worse for us because the Iraqi economy was badly impacted by the Gulf
79
War. We could not even buy cars any more," Mr. Abdelrahman said. He said Saddam used the Palestinian
cause "to gain popularity in the Arab world."
Around 2,500 Palestinians settled in Iraq after fleeing or being expelled from their homeland when Israel
was created in 1948, most of them born in what is now the Israeli city of Haifa. The community has grown
to around 35,000. "We were settled in the houses of Iraqi Jews that had gone to live in Israel. Then, in the
early 1970s, we moved to more suitable houses, some paid for by Saddam's Ministry of Social Affairs," Mr.
Abdelrahman said. Ms. Hijazi recalled that her family fled Haifa in 1948 and she was kicked out of Kuwait
in 1990 over Yasser Arafat's support for Saddam's invasion of the emirate. "And now, once again, I am
being dispossessed," she said with a sigh.” (National Post, Canada, 5 May 2003)
“Around 300 Palestinian families are now living in tents at the Haifa Sports Club, a Palestinian sports and
social club that has become a refugee camp. UNHCR, the U.N. refugee agency, has given them tents, and
the Red Cross and Arab charities provide food and water. [...] During Saddam's rule, hundreds of thousands
of people were driven from their lands and houses across the country to make way for other groups. Now,
the dispossessed want their homes back -- causing fresh upheavals. The Palestinians, who enjoyed special
treatment under Saddam, are one of the groups losing out. UNHCR estimates there are 80,000 Palestinian
refugees in Iraq. They arrived in four main waves -- in 1948, 1967, 1973 and 1991." (Reuters, 11 June
2003)
MSF fears for health of 1,000 Iranian Kurds stuck at Jordan-Iraq border
"Medecins Sans Frontieres fears for the well-being of a population forgotten by the world for 23 years and
desperate not to be forgotten," MSF said in a message released in Jordan. "This is a fragile group that
urgently needs attention ... If we are not to see a rapid decline in their mental health, a positive solution
must be found soon," MSF mental health adviser Sue Prosser said in the statement. The Iranian Kurds stuck
in a makeshift camp between Iraq and Jordan come from Al-Tash camp west of Baghdad, which had been
home for 13,000 people who fled upheavals in Iran following the 1979 Islamic revolution. "They fled (AlTash) because they feld threatened by the recent lawlessness (in Iraq) and now they are desperate not to
return," said MSF, which has been providing them with medical care. "Children in no-man's land wear head
scarves with the text 'Save Us' in English and men of the camp hold daily protests in the midday sun,
threatening to hunger strike," the statement said. "MSF doctors note increasing anxiety and fears this can
only get worse as the waiting continues and the searing heat of summer approaches," it added. MSF [...]
urged the United Nations to find long-term solutions for the refugees.” (AFP, 6 May 2003)
“A number of Palestinians and Iraqis who fled the war in Iraq are also stuck at the Jordan-Iraq border. The
UN High Commissioner for Refugees has repeatedly called on the Jordanian authorities in recent weeks to
admit the refugees in a transit camp inside Jordan, where better facilities are available.
Jordan allows on its territory refugees fleeing Iraq who have transit visas or residency in third countries or
those who are assured of repatriation by their governments.” (AFP, 6 May 2003)
Iraq: U.S. and Allies Must Protect Refugees
“The United States and allied forces, as occupying powers in Iraq, have an obligation to protect refugees
living inside the country from threats, physical attacks and forced displacement, Human Rights Watch said
today. A group of more than 1,000 Iranian Kurd, Palestinian, Sudanese, Somali and Syrian refugees have
faced threats and attacks during the past week, according to reports collected by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Despite repeated pleas by UNHCR to admit all 1000 refugees who
fled to the border, Jordan has so far only allowed 150 refugees entry. “
"Most of these refugees fled to Iraq from persecution in their home countries years ago," said Alison
Parker, a refugee protection expert at Human Rights Watch. "Now they are facing new threats in a country
that was once a relatively safe haven."
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“Of particular concern are the more than 400 refugee children at risk because of difficult humanitarian
conditions in the border region. Human Rights Watch said the children and their families should be allowed
to enter the refugee camps in Jordan without delay so that medical relief can be provided.”
“The refugees told UNHCR that groups of armed Iraqis forced them from their homes and threatened that,
if they refused to leave Iraq, the men would be killed and the women raped. Others said that they fled
because of the lack of food and water in the places where they normally reside, including the Bijii and
Balediyat neighborhoods in Baghdad, and the al-Hurriya and al-Tash refugee camps outside of Baghdad.
Human Rights Watch said that the United States and allied forces, as occupying powers, must ensure
security for the local population under their control and authority, including refugees residing in the
country. This includes:
Preventing third parties from attacking or forcibly displacing civilians, especially particularly vulnerable
groups such as the 128,000 refugees living in Iraq. All women, including refugees, should be protected
against any attack, in particular rape.Child refugees must also be afforded appropriate protection and
humanitarian assistance.”
“All civilians inside Iraq must be treated with the same consideration by the occupying powers without any
adverse distinction based, in particular, on national origin, race, religion or political opinion.
Finally, the occupying powers must ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches refugees.
UNHCR's Executive Committee has stated that governments should always admit asylum seekers at least
on a temporary basis and provide them with protection without any discrimination.
"Jordan should allow these refugees to enter, at least on a temporary basis," said Parker. "When conditions
of lawlessness put refugees at grave risk in Iraq, where else can they turn for safety but neighboring
countries?"”
“Jordan has cited concerns that some of the refugees pose security problems. Human Rights Watch
recommended that Jordan put in place measures to screen individuals for security risks, but said that all of
the trapped refugees should be allowed to cross the border and enter the Ruweished camps in Jordan
immediately, at least until their security in Iraq can be assured.” (HRW 23 April 2003)
1000s Life in No-Mans Land, border between Iraq and Jordan
“On the border of Jordan and Iraq there is a strip of No Man's Land. There are currently nearly 1,000
people camped there - they have left Iraq but have not been admitted to Jordan. The camp is basic to say the
least. Dust-clouds swirl around the camp and grit and sand get everywhere. Oxfam is one of several
agencies providing facilities to the makeshift camp for the refugees while their future is decided. Oxfam,
with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, wants to see the people transported to a ready
prepared refugee camp, which lies empty, 60kms up the road, at Ruweished.
Around 275 people have already been allowed to the camp but the other refugees wait. Oxfam has installed
water and sanitation facilities in No Man's Land for up to 1,000 people. Oxfam is scaling up the operation
so it is prepared to help more people if and when they arrive. But water is in short supply. The border is in
the middle of nowhere and there is no other source of water than the tankers that bring it in each day and
then pump it into large water tanks." (Oxfam, 23 April 2003)
"Small numbers of people continue to arrive at Jordan's border with Iraq, where UNHCR and its partner
agencies are now caring for more than 1,000 refugees and other desperate residents of Iraq trying to flee the
country. They are currently stuck in no man's land between the two countries. Late Monday, the Jordanian
government agreed to admit Palestinians with Jordanian spouses or other close family members of
Jordanian nationality. Ninety-four persons were permitted to enter UNHCR's refugee camp at Ruweished
last night. Another group of several dozen Palestinians are expected to be allowed into Jordan later this
morning. These are the first residents of UNHCR's camp at Ruweished, a group of six Iraqis previously
admitted to Jordan three weeks ago were permitted to say in the camp for Third Country Nationals, while
one person was admitted to hospital. Jordanian authorities are apparently requiring the mixed
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Palestinian/Jordanian families to sign waivers indicating that they will return to Iraq once the crisis is over.
We are in talks with the government about this, and the need to keep borders open to all people fleeing Iraq.
Several dozen Iraqi refugees also remain stuck in the no-man's-land separating Jordan and Iraq. Some have
been there for more than a week. The vast majority of the people waiting in no-man's-land are Iranian
Kurds who have fled the Al Tash refugee camp over the last week. Before the war, Al Tash sheltered more
than 12,000 Iranian Kurdish refugees, most of whom have lived at the camp for as long as 20 years. Fiftyeight other Iranians recognized as refugees by several European and North American countries and
Australia also remain in the no-man's-land area. The Iranian Kurdish refugees, as well as many of the Iraqis
and Palestinians waiting at the no-man's-land, said that they fled Iraq due to the chaos and lawlessness that
erupted in their communities as the government of Saddam Hussein collapsed.” (UNHCR, 22 April 2003)
Third-country nationals in border protest
“Iranian third country nationals who say they are being denied entry into Jordanian territory from the noman’s-land between Iraq and Jordan staged protests near the border for the third day running on Monday.
On Sunday morning, about 200 men and male adolescents sitting at the entrance to the camp in no-man'sland were displaying placards, Rick Neal, the public health promotion officer working in the camp with
Oxfam, told IRIN. They said they would continue with their action for a further 10 days.
"The basic message is to impress on the Jordanian government to let them in and process their resettlement
claims," he said, "and that they don't want to be forgotten, as they were when they fled Iran in 1979."
The vast majority of the 1,000 people currently in no-man's-land are Iranian Kurds who fled central Iraq's
Al Tash refugee camp in the last week to escape the chaos and lawlessness that erupted in their
communities as Saddam's government collapsed. Before the war, Al Tash sheltered more than 12,000
Iranian Kurdish refugees, many of whom had lived at the camp for two decades.
The placards on Sunday carried messages such as "Humanitarian organisations come, we need your help"
and "We ask UNHCR to respond to our requests as soon as possible". On Saturday morning about 300
people, including women and children, had staged a similar protest for several hours.
The UNHCR spokesman, Peter Kessler, told IRIN that the group of Iranians were obviously "very
frustrated", which, he said, was "understandable". "We would like to see the occupying forces in Iraq
ensuring security in the Al-Tash camp," he added, noting that there were a further 11,000 Iranian Kurds
who were believed to have remained there. "Obviously if there are people who have fled for their lives,
they should be interviewed and brought to a safe place," he added.
Apart from the Iranian Kurds in no-man's-land, there were 41 other Iranians and about the same number of
Iraqis, said Kessler. The Jordanian authorities had allowed about 540 people, most of them Palestinians
married to Jordanians, cross the border into a nearby camp in Ruwayshid, he said." (IRIN, 28 April 2003)
Stuck in unsuitable camp in 'no man's land'
“Water is a problem, as there is no adequate source near the camp. Instead, water is being trucked in from a
perfectly good - but empty - refugee camp just 50 kms away. An MSF nurse summed up the frustration of
the team working in the camp: "It is difficult to see the hard conditions the people endure, when a perfectly
set up refugee camp is just 50 kilometres away which cost millions of dollars and is now almost empty".
Despite the presence of a three person (doctor and two nurses) MSF medical team working in the no-mansland camp which was increased by a doctor, nurse and a logistician over the weekend, conditions may still
cause the condition of the refugees to deteriorate quickly. MSF is also carrying out mental health
assessments. These people live under great distress, very uncertain about their future. They are desperate to
leave Iraq, as they feel there is no future from them in the country. They have lost all hope after living in
their previous camp for 23 years, where they were completely dependent on assistance. Some of the people
in the camp come from the Al Tash refugee camp, which is located some 150 kilometres west of Baghdad.
The population of this camp is reported to be 13,000. These refugees have told MSF that they have been in
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the camp for over 20 years and they fled after the fall of Saddam Hussein when they were attacked by local
people around the camp. MSF has been unable to visit that camp because security is too uncertain in the
area.” (MSF, 28 April 2003)
Northern Iraq: Civilian Deaths Higher Since War Ended
“The number of civilians killed or wounded since the war ended in northern Iraq is higher than it was
during the conflict, Human Rights Watch said today. Extensive research at five hospitals and morgues in
Kirkuk and Mosul suggests that the high civilian tolls can be attributed to general lawlessness after the
collapse of local authorities; the ready availability of weapons and ammunition; and the vast stores of
ammunition and ammunition components left behind by the Iraqi military, including landmines, rocketpropelled grenades, and other explosives.
Many of the victims have been children who play with explosives or pick up unexploded ordinance (UXO)
as toys and sustain serious injuries as a result. "In some ways, the peace has proved more lethal than the
war," said Hania Mufti, London Director of the Middle East and North Africa division of Human Rights
Watch. At the al-Zahrawri Hospital (formerly al-Jumhuri Hospital) in Mosul, for example, emergency room
records show that three civilians were treated on April 22 after an unidentified person riding a motorbike
tossed a grenade in their direction. Another ten patients were brought in that day after a looting incident in
the Hawi al-Kanisa area of the city. Three of them later died of their gunshot wounds.
The Iraqi authorities stored up huge amounts of ammunition and small arms in homes, schools, and other
sites in residential areas in the run-up to the war. At the al-Bayda' Secondary School for Girls in Kirkuk,
Human Rights Watch researchers on April 13 found one classroom still stacked with dozens of boxes of
ammunition, including rocket-propelled grenades, 82mm and 100mm mortar shells, and 12.7mm machine
gun bullets. The guard at the school told Human Rights Watch that the Iraqi military had brought the
ammunition to the school about five or six days before the start of the war, leaving one sentry in the
classroom, and that students had been obliged to attend their classes in these conditions. Storing
ammunition in a functioning school is a violation of international humanitarian law.
At the al-Razi Hospital (formerly Saddam Hospital) in Mosul, one doctor in the emergency ward told
Human Rights Watch that during the coalition bombing raids, most civilian casualties were the result of
ammunition left behind by the Iraqi army in and around the city. "The [Iraqi] army placed ammunition and
weapons in between houses and among civilians in preparation for the war," the doctor said. "But the
Americans did not attack these civilian areas. When the army withdrew, they left behind bombs, bullets,
and machine guns. People, mostly children, picked these up and they exploded." The doctor said that he
treated about fifteen burn cases every day in the course of an eight-hour shift, often children who were
trying to light loose gunpowder.
Another doctor at al-Razi Hospital in Mosul said on April 21 that he was often treating "tens of cases
daily," mostly wounds sustained from landmines, exploding ammunition or bullets. He also said that Ba'ath
Party loyalists were still present in the hospital and he could not speak freely, out of fear of reprisal attacks.
"They are everywhere and they spy on us even now," he said, "so you can imagine what it was like before."
Injuries from sniper fire and hand grenades are still a major problem in Mosul, where the situation remains
more volatile than in Kirkuk.
Anti-personnel landmines and ammunition are being found in holes dug in the ground in residential areas,
while similar explosive materials were left strewn around the grounds of military bases on the perimeters of
both Mosul and Kirkuk. The bases include the al-Khalid Garrison south of Kirkuk, a Republican Guard
facility; and al-Ghazlani Garrison in Mosul." (HRW, 27 April 2003)
Military training of Iraqi children in preparation of war (Aug 2002)
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"Thousands of Iraqi teenagers are attending training camps this summer to prepare to defend Iraq,
according to a 12 August report by the Associated Press. "Firing pistols and AK-47s while studying Islam
and history, 1,800 boys aged between 13 and 16 are getting three weeks of training at 'Saddam's Cubs
Training Camp' in a southern Baghdad suburb, one of about 30 such camps scattered across the country,"
AP reported. The Iraqi government established "Saddam's Cubs" camps in 1996. Similar training camps
have long been employed by other Middle Eastern regimes, such as Libya. The camps typically mix
weapons training and physical education with a healthy dose of socialization in an effort to elicit loyalty to
the regime." (RFE/RL 16 Aug 2002)
More more information on child soldiers in Iraq, please see CSUCS 7 Nov 02 Child Soldiers 1379
Country Reports: Iraq, pp50-52 [Link below]
Human rights situation in northern Iraq has improved over recent years (2000-2003)
•
•
Since September 2001, deterioration of security climate due to clashes between Islamic groups
and Kurdish political parties
Villagers displaced by Ansar al-Islam complain of harsh Taliban-like restrictions placed on the
population and damage done to local shrines and institutions
"Since 1997 the human rights situation in Iraqi Kurdistan had gradually improved. A cease-fire declared in
1997 brought an end to large-scale abuses by the ruling parties, their militias and security forces. However,
isolated cases of human rights abuses continued to be reported in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1999. These included
arbitrary arrests and political killings. The fate of scores of political prisoners and people who had
'disappeared' in previous years remained unknown." (AI 2000)
"Other bomb blasts in KDP-held territory, including one in Arbil on April 23 and another in Zakho on
October 15, were reportedly attributed to Islamist groups based in the region, notably Harakat al-Tawhid
al-Islami (Islamic Unity Movement, IUM). The IUM, one of three Islamist groups which broke away at
different times from the mainstream Islamic Unity Movement in Kurdistan (IUMK) and in September
merged to form Jund al-Islam (Soldiers of God), was also held responsible by the KDP for the
assassination on February 18 of Francois Hariri, governor of Arbil and member of the KDP's Central
Co mmittee. He was shot dead by unidentified assailants as he drove to work in the city. His bodyguard was
also killed and his driver wounded. The KDP announced in late March that it had identified several IUM
members as being responsible for the assassination, one of whom was apprehended.
Clashes between PUK forces and Jund al-Islam began in September, shortly after the group's leader, Abu
'Ubaidullah al-Shafi'i, declared Jihad (Holy War) against secular and other political parties in Iraqi
Kurdistan deemed to have deviated from the "true path of Islam." After the September 11 attacks in the
U.S., the PUK accused the group of links with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda (The Base) network and said
its members included Arabs of various nationalities who had received military training in Afghanistan. The
PUK also accused the group of imposing an extreme form of Islam in their strongholds of Biyara and
Tawela, including barring women from employment and education, and of preventing the Naqshabandi
Sufis based in the area from practicing their religious rites.
On September 22, Jund al-Islam abducted a doctor, Rebwar Sayyid 'Umar, from his surgery in Halabja and
detained him for twenty days in Biyara near the border with Iran. On September 23, thirty-seven PUK
fighters were killed by Jund al-Islam in the village of Kheli Hama on the Sulaimaniya-Halabja road.
Several died in an ambush, but the majority was reportedly killed after surrender. Photographs of the
victims made available by the PUK showed that some of the prisoners' throats had been slit and some of the
dead had been beheaded or mutilated, including by having their sexual organs severed. During the ensuing
clashes, an estimated one hundred PUK fighters and some forty Jund al-Islam fighters were killed. The
PUK regained control of Halabja and its vicinity by September 26, arresting suspected supporters or
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members of Jund al-Islam, and during October the fighting extended to Sharazur, Hawraman, and
elsewhere. At least thirty-eight Jund al-Islam fighters were reportedly killed in these clashes, while some
twenty-four others were captured or surrendered. Other Kurdish political parties, including the KDP,
offered military assistance to the PUK. On October 11, the PUK declared a ceasefire and on October 25, it
issued a thirty-day amnesty for Jund al-Islam fighters. The amnesty did not cover those responsible for the
assassination of Francois Hariri, or those involved in the killing of the thirty-seven PUK fighters on
September 23. The PUK also said that foreign nationals among them would not be permitted to remain in
Iraqi Kurdistan." (HRW 2002)
"During a mission to Iraqi Kurdistan in September [2002], Human Rights Watch found that the overall
human rights situation in the region had markedly improved relative to previous years. Both the KDP and
PUK administrations promulgated laws and adopted decisions aimed at the protection of fundamental civil
and political rights, including freedom of expression and of association. However, representatives of
several Islamist and Turkman political parties told Human Rights Watch that political activity by their
members and supporters remained curtailed. Perceived sympathizers of Islamist groups, in particular, were
said to be liable to arbitrary arrest and detention without trial." (HRW 20 Feb 03)
"Villagers displaced by the group [Ansar al-Islam] complain of harsh Taliban-like restrictions placed on the
population and damage done to local shrines and institutions." (ICG 7 Feb 03)
Freedom of movement
Unexploded ordnances poses great problems
•
•
•
Many villages are littered with landmines and unexploded ordnance
Poor and landless, returnees are often pushed to the margins of society and the economy
Returnees are likely to be under pressure to use land that may be mined
"Laden with their possessions, the majority of [returning] families walk down to a small cluster of buildings
200 metres from the Iranian checkpoint. Here bureaucratic requirements must be fulfilled in order for them
to obtain continued support within northern Iraq. They are vitally in need of this support because crossing
the border is not the end of their journey. Some villages have been bulldozed or occupied by other families,
and many more are littered with landmines and unexploded ordnance. Most of the refugees cannot return
immediately to their former homes and stay at a camp until arrangements can be made for their relocation.
Refugees and displaced people are particularly vulnerable to the threat of landmines. Poor and landless,
they are often pushed to the margins of society and the economy. Through economic necessity, they are
likely to be under pressure to use land that may be mined. Furthermore, refugees may be unfamiliar with
the appearance of landmines and unexploded ordnance and will lack knowledge of the landmine threat in
local areas." (MAG, 5 February 2004).
“Unexploded ordnance (UXO) in northern Iraq is killing and maiming dozens of people every day. "It is an
absolute emergency," Sean Sutton, the information manager with the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), told
IRIN from As-Sulaymaniyah in northeastern Iraq. "In the short term, this is a horrendous problem,
unequalled anywhere else in the world," he said, "because children are playing with stockpiles of
unexploded ordnance left by Iraqi forces within towns, and on their outskirts, in military and police
buildings and schools." It is believed that following the first days of fighting in the region, the Iraqi army
command structures and control broke down, leading to little or no communication between the soldiers.
They pulled back into towns to prepare for a defensive stand, but then abandoned the fight when no orders
were being received from superiors. Most of them then dissolved into local communities, or fled, leaving
huge stockpiles of arms behind them.
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North of Kirkuk, 11 underground bunkers full of munitions had been abandoned, said Sutton, leading to at
least 30 people being killed. In the last week alone, MAG had shifted close to half a million dangerous
items from around the city, he said. In the first five days following the fall of Kirkuk to coalition forces, a
total of 44 people - mostly children - were killed and the same number injured, he said. In Kifri, southeast
of Kirkuk, 83 had been reported killed last week, he added. In Mosul, two local hospitals visited by Sutton
in the last couple of days reported receiving up to 20 injured patients daily between them - about three
shrapnel glass injuries each from UXO and landmines, and six or seven burn victims each.
In the village of Qadir Karam, between Chamchamal and Kirkuk, a MAG team found a stockpile of
between 500 and 700 antipersonnel mines in a local mosque.
While the short-term emergency focus was shifting the UXO out of harm's way, and clearing specific
routes and areas, the long-term focus would be the "extensive minefields" that had been laid, he said.
Ben Lark, the deputy global landmines coordinator with the United Nations Children's Fund, told IRIN in
the Jordanian capital, Amman, that no reliable and specific information was available on the Iraqi situation,
except for the three semi-autonomous northern governorates of Dahuk, Arbil and As-Sulaymaniyah.
The Iran-Iraq border had been heavily mined during the 1980-88 war, as well as areas in the south during
the 1991 Gulf war, and areas along the borders with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and possibly Syria, he said.
Before 1991, the Iraqi army had also left "vast quantities of ammunition" littered around the country, and
coalition forces had added to this in the northern and southern no-fly zones. "But we've no idea what is
where," he said.
The latest Iraqi war had also left behind a wide range of artillery, rockets, hand grenades, fuses, machine
guns with ammunition still in them, mines and cluster bombs, he said. UNICEF plans to start a mass
awareness campaign by piggybacking on existing networks, including schools, mosques, and community
leaders. "The key issue is to get children off the streets," he said. Lark advised NGOs working in Iraq to
talk to coalition forces and local people in each area they went to, never to travel off-road, to avoid
damaged buildings or partly destroyed vehicles, never to touch anything on the ground, and to assume that
any military equipment was lethal. "A lot of them don't look dangerous, like fuses, but children regularly
lose fingers and are blinded by them," he added. Aneeza Pasha, a community liaison adviser with MAG in
Amman, added that routes needed to be checked every day, as mines were often laid overnight. "It is
essential to get clearance every single day," she said” (IRIN, 25 April 2003).
“On the outskirts of Iraq's main southern city, Basra, children play beside pools of contaminated water,
their toys often being the detritus of the war they have just witnessed. Alongside an abandoned artillery gun
they clamber over are more than 30 unexploded mortar bombs. Not far away, several rocket-propelled
grenades lie barely 20 metres from a house, the children in it seemingly unaware of the danger just outside
its rough mud walls.
Unexploded mines, shells and other ordnance litter southern Iraq in the wake of the war, causing great
concern to agencies trying to protect the population. Johan Sohlberg, the regional mine action adviser for
the Middle East with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), noted that the scale of the
problem in Basra was enormous. "I have clearly been surprised by what I have seen in the south. I have
never seen the magnitude of this many sites and this close together."
Around Basra alone, the veteran of more than 20 of the world's hot spots had seen mortar bombs, artillery
shells, heavy machine-gun ammunition, grenades and mines in abundance in locations where they were a
threat to civilians. Most had simply been abandoned as Iraqi forces fled their positions. At the entrance to
Basra University, numerous antitank mines lie against a wall, just a few metres from the roadway. Sohlberg
said an assessment of the scale of the problem was only just beginning, noting that "if the situation
elsewhere is the way it looks in the south, then it's really bad". He said everywhere he went in the city,
people pointed out where mines and ammunition had been left.” (IRIN, 1 May 2003)
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“As in the 1991 conflict, it can be expected that significant quantities of UXO are present, especially in and
around heavily targeted areas such as Baghdad and Basra. One recent media report detailed the removal of
an unexploded smart bomb from the grounds of Basra’s main hotel. 115 Unless strictly
controled and monitored, the open burning and detonation of UXO could pose risks to the environment and
human health.” (UNEP, Desk Study on the Environment in Iraq, April 2003)
UXOs injure 350 in Kirkuk
“Unexploded ordnance (UXOs), left by Iraqi forces fighting around Iraq's northern city of Kirkuk, was
injuring an average of 25 people per day following the fall of the city to coalition forces on 10 April,
according to an international NGO working on UXO and mine clearance in the region. "Fifty-two people
were killed in the first week but deaths and injuries have reduced significantly as UXOs are identified and
destroyed," Sean Sutton of the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) said from the city of Sulemaniye. There
were about 350 UXO and mine-related injuries in and around Kirkuk since the fighting began but accurate
figures were very difficult to compile, Sutton added. "MAG knows of 47 deaths going unrecorded in
Kirkuk. There is no death registration system, and no morgue where people are taken. They are just
buried," he said. The majority of those injured or killed were children. "Most of the children's injuries are
burns to the hands and face from playing with UXOs," he said. "I have seen a lot of children who have lost
eyes." Many were playing with the guns, ammunition, mortar shells and fuses that they found, with some
even trying to set fire to the UXOs themselves. "They find them and dismantle them, and then throw them
on fires to blow them up," he said. While the injuries were not life-threatening they were "extremely
serious" he said, adding that the hospital in Kirkuk seemed to be coping much better recently with the
arrival of aid supplies to the region. The adult injuries were either from land mines, cluster bombs, from
walking through former military camps or from dismantling UXOS for scrap metal, he said. MAG has
removed 184,500 items of UXO around Kirkuk and the northern city of Mosul since it began work in the
region in mid -April. More than 12,000 mines and booby traps of all kinds have also been cleared from the
region.
MAG was conducting about 10 demolitions every day of every type of UXO, said Sutton, from guns and
ammunition to missile war heads and rocket propelled grenades. The NGO is currently concentrating its
work around Mosul and Kirkuk city, and also clearing booby traps from around Halabjah. So far, twenty
villages had been cleared of the traps - mortar bombs attached to trip wires, which were terrifying local
people, said Sutton. As the number of UXOs declines, the next task will be dealing with the hundreds of
thousands of mines that lie buried across northern Iraq. "MAG will locate and identify the minefields and
start education and awareness programmes with local communities," he added.” (IRIN, 20 May 2003)
87
SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)
General
The Oil-for-Food Programme
•
•
•
•
•
Oil-for-food programme deadline 21 November 2003
SC ends 13 years of UN sanctions
SC extends oil-for-food programme until 3 June 2003
UN warns about humanitarian situation
WFP desperate to restore distribution system
•
•
WHO warns of potential outbreak of diseases, cholera
HCI stresses importance of reactivating systems of providing basic services
Oil-for-Food Programme coming to a close 21 November 2003
“Alternative arrangements are being made in Baghdad to ensure that the UN-administered Oil-for-Food
Programme is terminated on schedule by 21 November 2003. "In view of the reduction of staff in Iraq,
alternative arrangements are being finalised in consultation with the Coalition Provisional Authority [CPA]
and Iraqi authorities for the transfer of programme assets and activities," a spokesperson for the programme
told IRIN on Wednesday. "The programme will close on time and everyone, including the CPA, is working
against the clock to ensure that this happens in the most orderly fashion to ensure the best possible outcome
for the people of Iraq," the spokesperson added.
The Oil-for-Food Programme was established by the Security Council on 14 April 1995 and allowed the
fallen regime of Saddam Hussein to sell oil for food and humanitarian supplies, thereby feeding almost 60
percent of the Iraqi population.Earlier in the week, the UN issued a statement saying that deteriorating
security and "tardy action" by the United States-run CPA could be a major blow to meeting the deadline for
ending the Oil-for-Food Programme.
The statement followed a briefing delivered to the UN Security Council on Monday by Benon V. Sevan,
the Executive Director of the Office of the Iraq Programme, on progress towards the phasing out of the
programme. However, he assured council members that despite chronic insecurity and the temporary
withdrawal of UN international staff from Iraq, the programme would meet its closure deadline of 21
November.
"Most of our assumptions in developing our exit strategies have been constantly overtaken by events over
which we have no control," he said, noting that the programme needed a minimum of 115 international
staff in the northern governorates to meet its objectives for an orderly closure and transfer of assets and
responsibilities to the CPA. He explained that in the absence of the minimum number of required
international staff, the only alternative course of action would be the transfer of assets and responsibility for
the administration of any remaining activity under the CPA "as is", together with the relevant
documentation.
Some 3.4 billion barrels of Iraqi oil valued at about US $65 billion were exported under the programme
between December 1996 and 20 March 2003. Of this amount, 72 per cent of the total was allocated towards
meeting humanitarian needs nationwide after December 2000. The balance went to: Gulf War reparations
88
through a Compensation Fund (25 per cent since December 2000); UN administrative and operational costs
for the programme (2.2 per cent) and costs for the weapons inspection programme (0.8 per cent).
Almost $28 billion worth of humanitarian supplies and equipment were delivered to Iraq under the Oil-forFood Programme between 20 March 1997 and 20 March 2003, including $1.6 billion worth of oil industry
spare parts and equipment. Additional goods and supplies from the programme's $10 billion humanitarian
pipeline are being delivered on a priority basis in consultation with the CPA, Iraqi representatives and UN
agencies and programmes.
The World Food Programme's (WFP) emergency operation is due to end on 31 October, but the agency will
continue to support the Public Distribution System (PDS) until this date, when it is expected that the
Ministry of Trade (MOT) will again run the system. The PDS ensures the availability of all commodities
through a network of outlets selling at fair prices. During this interim period, WFP will work hand in hand
with the MOT to hand over logistics functions, including pipeline management, the coordination of
incoming shipments and renegotiation of Oil-for Food contracts. In the three northern governorates of
Arbil, Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk, WFP is supporting the local authorities in order to integrate the PDS into
the system adopted by the centralised MOT.
In accordance with Security Council Resolution 1483, WFP continues renegotiating oil-for-food contracts
in the food and food handling sectors. As of 26 September, the dedicated Rome -based team had
successfully renegotiated 243 food contracts equivalent to 2 million mt of food aid valued at some €789
million. Simultaneously, a WFP team based in the Danish capital, Copenhagen, is working together with
the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), on renegotiating transport and food-handling
contracts. To date, 160 priority contracts have been approved for contract renegotiation, and suppliers have
been contacted. Once these suppliers confirm their acceptance, contracts go through the renegotiation
process.” (IRIN, 2 October 2003)
Security Council ends 13 years of UN sanctions on Iraq (22 May 2003)
“The United Nations Security Council ended 13 years of UN sanctions on Iraq with immediate effect
Thursday and gave the US-led forces there broad control of its economy and political future. The 14-0 vote
was a diplomatic victory for the United States and Britain, which won endorsement of far more authority
than is conceded to an occupying power by the 1949 Geneva Conventions. But, in an unexpected move,
Syria denied them a triumph of consensus by boycotting the vote, taken almost three-quarters of an hour
late in the presence of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.
Less than 10 weeks ago, the military allies could persuade only two of the 13 other council members to
back a proposal to disarm Iraq by force. On Thursday, the council asked them to help form an Iraqi-led
interim administration "until an internationally recognized, representative government is established by the
Iraqi people." In adopting Resolution 1483, it set up a new Development Fund for Iraq under the central
bank and said the country's oil revenues will be deposited in it and disbursed at the direction of the
occupying powers.
The Fund will be used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for economic reconstruction and
for repairing Iraq's infrastructure, the resolution said. It will also finance "the continued disarmament of
Iraq, the costs of Iraqi civilian administration and other purposes benefitting the people of Iraq." The
resolution asked Annan to appoint a special representative for Iraq, to contribute to setting up the interim
authority and to take part in an advisory board auditing the Development Fund.
[….] Despite widespread skepticism about the existence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, the
resolution tacitly acknowledged that US and British forces had replaced the UN arms inspectors by
encouraging them to "keep the council informed of their activities in this regard." The resolution extends
the UN's oil-for-food programme in Iraq for six months to ensure the delivery of priority civilian goods. Set
up in December 1996 to cushion Iraqi citizens from the impact of the crippling trade embargo and financial
restrictions on their country, the programme has since swollen into a 10-billion-dollar-a-year business.
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Russia, in particular, has a large number of contracts to supply Iraq with trucks and oil industry spare parts.
Many of these deals would have collapsed had the programme been phased out in four months, as
originally proposed. Under the resolution, one billion dollars in unallocated oil-for-food money will be
transferred immediately to the Development Fund, the rest following after various UN expenses have been
met. The resolution cut from 25 percent to five percent the proportion of Iraq's oil income which goes to the
UN Compensation Fund for damages resulting from the invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
In order to reassure Iraq's major creditors, which include Russia and Kuwait, the resolution envisages a
rescheduling of Iraq's debt -- estimated at up to 400 billion dollars -- through the Paris Club. At the same
time, it effectively establishes a moratorium on the debt by declaring Iraq's oil revenues immune from legal
proceedings until December 31, 2007.
It orders all countries to immediately freeze any funds or other assets belonging to the regime or family of
Saddam Hussein and deposit them in the Fund, except assets which have already been frozen and are the
subject of legal action in domestic courts." (AFP, 22 May 2003)
Security Council extends 'oil-for-food' programme until 3 June, unanimously adopting resolution 1476
(2003)
“The Security Council … extended the "oil-for-food" programme for Iraq, as adjusted by its resolution
1472 (2003) and which was to expire on 12 May, until 3 June. It did so by unanimously adopting resolution
1476 (2003), through which the Council decided that the provisions contained in paragraph 4 of resolution
1472 (2003) would remain in force until that date and might be subject to further renewal. Under paragraph
4 of resolution 1472 (2003), the Council gave Secretary-General Kofi Annan more authority to administer
the programme by authorizing him, among other things, to establish alternative locations, both inside and
outside Iraq, for the delivery of humanitarian supplies and equipment; to proceed with approved contracts
after a review to determine the relative priorities of the need for adequate medicine, health supplies,
foodstuffs and other materials; to negotiate and agree on necessary adjustments in approved contracts; and
to negotiate and execute new contracts for essential medical items.” (UN SC, 24 April 2003)
“Resolution 1476 (2003) of 24 April has given the Programme until 3 June to identify priority items
identified as food, medicines, health supplies and water and sanitation supplies, for shipping to Iraq. Most
of these supplies are in the food electricity and health sectors and are already in transit to Iraq.
The Office of the Iraq Programme and UN agencies and programmes are continuing to identify the most
easily accessible priority items in the pipeline and negotiate with suppliers to speed the shipment of
supplies under already approved contracts. The UN agencies and programmes actively involved in the
review of the Oil-for-Food pipeline are: FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, WFP.” (UNOIP, 6 May 2003)
“As the Security Council voted unanimously in favour of the Resolution, the UN launched a Flash Appeal
for $2.2 billion (including $1.3 billion for WFP) for commodities and supplies for Iraq for six months from
April to September … WFP is also getting ready to provide for Iraqis who may no longer have access to
their monthly rations, such as IDPs, refugees and, particularly, vulnerable groups such as the elderly and
handicapped. A special programme will focus on helping malnourished children, pregnant and nursing
women as well as the residents of hospitals and orphanages.” (WFP, 28 March 2003)
“In a press conference in Baghdad on May 4, the HCI stressed the importance of reactivating systems that
were in place to provide basic services to the population, warning that social indicators characterised a
situation of extreme fragility. He added that disaster had so far been avoided as a result the crucial inputs of
the oil for food programme (OFFP).” (HCI, 6 May 2003)
UN warns about humanitarian situation
“The United Nations in the capital, Baghdad, has warned that the humanitarian situation in Iraq is still
precarious and could deteriorate if assistance were to dry up. (…) Even before the war, one million children
under five years of age suffered from chronic malnutrition. Factors such as this showed the extreme
fragility of the country in terms of its humanitarian situation. Carel de Rooy, the representative in Iraq for
the UN children’s fund UNICEF, said people mistakenly believed the war was over and so, therefore, were
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the people’s needs. "There is this whole sense of safety - ‘oh, everything is fine, there’s no problem’. And if
we don’t move rapidly we can see the situation deteriorating very quickly, because we know how tenuous
the situation was before the war started. The situation now is worse, so we are very close to a humanitarian
crisis of great dimensions if we don’t move rapidly enough."
”The UN has just begun bringing international staff back to Baghdad, and the situation confronting them is
dire. Many people still have no clean drinking water, diarrhoea is rife, hospitals are under pressure, some
medicines are running low, electricity is limited, sewage disposal systems are struggling to keep up with
demand, fuel is scarce, most people have not been paid or have lost their jobs, and inflation is rising
rapidly.”
”The World Food Programme’s (WFP) representative in Iraq, Torben Due, said his agency had launched its
biggest programme ever to bring food into the country. "The economy has gone down, food prices in the
market have gone up. For that reason it is very critical to get in the food in time now, because otherwise
there will be a crisis.”One pressing need was to cover a shortfall of 200,000 mt of cooking oil and pulses,
which WFP did not have. "These are very important commodities as they provide the protein and the fats in
the diet. It’s critical to get these commodities, to get the full food basket for the population," Due said.
Before the war, 60 percent of Iraqis depended entirely on food rations, and WFP was desperately trying to
restore this distribution system. Due estimated that food stocks held by most households would suffice for
only two to three weeks, which was why it was vital to resurrect the system quickly. "Our preliminary
discussions with the senior officia ls of the ministry of trade indicate that the structure is in place," he said.
"The 45,000 food agents that were doing the food distribution to the population are still there and ready to
startworking."
”The World Health Organisation’s (WHO) representative in Iraq, Ghulam Popal, said WHO faced a huge
challenge preventing outbreaks of disease and controlling any such outbreak if it occurred. "Now that water
is not clean and the sanitation is bad and public health programmes have completely broken down, I’m
afraid that the potential for having a cholera outbreak is very high," he said.” (IRIN, 6 May 2003)
WFP: Hope for a good harvest, yet dependence on food import (2003)
•
•
•
FAO: IDPs and refugees hardest hit by starvation (2003)
Even in good harvest years, Iraq has always relied on substantial cereal imports
Livestock, however, remained stable (2003)
“In the largest food aid operation in the history of the World Food Programme (WFP), just under 1.9
million mt of food has been delivered to Iraq since the start of April from neighbouring Turkey, Jordan,
Kuwait, Syria and Iran. Food agency officials in Jordan have so far managed to transport the highest
tonnage to the volatile nation, sending in about 512,645 mt of food aid to needy Iraqis.
(…)
"The WFP operation aims to feed the entire Iraqi population until October 2003. However, food items
renegotiated from Oil for Food contracts will be delivered into Iraq till mid 2004," WFP spokeswoman
Antonia Paradela, told IRIN from the Iraqi capital, Baghdad. "The Iraqi Ministry of Trade will be in charge
of the whole process of importing food for the rations as it was doing before the war," she added. With
more than 1,100 WFP staff working for the Iraq emergency and a budget of US $1.5 million, WFP wants to
bring 2.2 million mt of food into Iraq by the end of October. This is equivalent to the total amount of food
WFP distributed worldwide last year. (…) Some 485,774 mt of food had been dispatched from Turkey to
Iraq as of 15 September. This makes up 26 percent of the tonnage delivered to Iraq from the five
neighbouring countries. A further 39 mt of dried skimmed milk is to be delivered before the end of
October. The total cost of the commodities channelled through Turkey, including logistics, is some US
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$360 million. "The food sent from Turkey was distributed in the northern cities of Mosul, Dahuk,
Sulaymaniyah and Tikrit," Togbe-Olory explained.
(…)
The agency registered an increase in shootings in July, looting of storage facilities and attacks on trucks
bringing food into southern Iraq. Security at storage facilities was also a major source of concern. Most of
the warehouses and silos belong to the Iraqi Ministry of Trade (MOT), supported by WFP in the monthly
distribution of 27 million food rations.
(…)
While food will still be provided to the vulnerable, many Iraqis are doing their best to work towards selfsufficiency and are looking forward to a good harvest.
The UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) reported that the harvest in the northern governorates
of Arbil, Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah are expected to produce between 30 and 35 per cent of this year's total
estimated grain crop. Most farmers were not displaced from their fields during the war and are in a good
position to begin harvesting. The situation in the centre and the south of Iraq is less clear, according to
FAO. "A successful harvest would help alleviate food shortages by producing more than 500,000 mt of
wheat and barley, enough to fill at least 20,000 truckloads that would otherwise have to be imported," the
FAO said in a recent statement. "It also would improve access to food and could help stimulate the rural
economy."
However, the bulk of Iraq's cereal requirement would have to continue to be met through imports, including
substantial amounts of food aid. Even in good harvest years, Iraq has always relied on substantial cereal
imports as its output, particularly in major producing areas of central and southern Iraq, has suffered from
limited investment, shortage of inputs and deteriorating irrigation infrastructure.” (IRIN, 19 September
2003)
“Millions of Iraqis will remain dependant on food aid for some time, despite a better harvest and the lifting
of sanctions, a report released by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and the World Food
Programme (WFP) said. "While starvation has been averted, chronic malnutrition persists among several
million vulnerable people, including some 100,000 refugees and around 200,000 displaced people,"
information officer for the FAO, Erwin Northoff, told IRIN from Rome on Wednesday.
Both agencies stated that there would be a need to continue food assistance for the short to medium term, as
the agricultural sector needed "considerable time for rehabilitation". Nearly half of the Iraqi population of
26.3 million were estimated to be poor and in need of assistance, with 60 percent unemployed and directly
dependant on food rations financed by the Oil-for- Food Programme. "Any significant disruption of the
public distribution system would have a severe negative impact on food access," the report warned. "The
situation of mothers and children in central and southern Iraq is of particular concern," Northoff
maintained, noting, however, that acute malnutrition had nearly been eliminated in the northern
governorates.
However, there was some hope in reviving the sector with 4.12 million mt of cereal crop production
expected for this year, 22 percent higher than was originally estimated. "Production increased mainly due to
favourable rains in the north, increased irrigation and timely distribution of agricultural inputs in the main
producing areas," he explained. Meanwhile, the farming community in Iraq continues to face an uphill
struggle as the joint report stressed that the capacity to produce fertiliser nationally had been drastically
reduced with two factories not able to produce, when some 600,000 mt of fertilisers would be needed for
next year's cereal crops.
With cereal imports for 2003/2004 estimated at 3.44 million mt, both agencies urged that any additional
food aid required should be procured locally to support the farming industry. Livestock, however, remained
stable, as it had benefited from good pastures in the north along with the availability of grain.
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According to WFP, estimates of those needing supplementary food for 2004 - malnourished children,
family members and pregnant women - stands at 3.5 million people, at a cost of US $51 million.” (IRIN, 24
September 2003)
A war will bring additional hardship to current IDPs and new ones (2003)
•
•
•
Population in the North should have better access to food than in the Centre/South if a war occurs
A war situation, which may also involve the destruction of transportation facilities, ports, bridges
and warehouses would likely lead to rapidly increasing food prices in the markets
Most urban Iraqi are dependent on government rations and would be unlikely to cope with food
shortages without immediate and massive emergency assistance
"A war will bring new hardship to existing civilian and displaced populations within Iraq; produce new
refugee outflows to neighboring countries; strain the resources of and possibly prompt a backlash within
neighboring countries against Iraqi refugees; and place new demands on donor states to provide increased
assistance inside Iraq and to Iraq’s neighbors, as well as to open their own doors to a significantly larger
number of Iraqi refugees.
In the event of war in Iraq, a mostly urban civilian population already dependent on centralized food, water,
and sanitation distribution systems, will be at risk from the disruption of those systems. Depending on the
evolution of a potential conflict, internal displacement and refugee flight are likely to result from a
humanitarian crisis as well as from the direct effects of war, ethnic or other conflict, or human rights abuse.
Should the United States go to war with Iraq and establish military control and authority over Iraqi
territory, it will have responsibilities under international law to meet the humanitarian needs of the
inhabitants, including people displaced by the fighting. Human Rights Watch is particularly concerned that
Iraqi civilians be protected from forced displacement inconsistent with international humanitarian law, but
be allowed to flee voluntarily to safety should conditions so dictate. An occupying power must ensure the
security of the civilian population or allow civilians to voluntarily move out of harm’s way, both within and
outside the state’s borders.
Human Rights Watch fears that Iraqis who attempt to seek greater safety across international borders may
be prevented from doing so. Turkey has announced plans in the event of war to establish camps for Iraqis
inside Iraq. If such “safe areas” are created, Turkey or any other government in control will have the burden
of ensuring that such camps are secure and must make arrangements to provide all necessary humanitarian
assistance. Past international experience has shown that “safe areas” often do not remain safe. If “safe
areas” become insecure, or whenever individuals arrive at borders seeking protection, Turkey and all other
neighboring states will be obliged to allow Iraqi refugees to enter, at least on a temporary basis, and the
international community will have an obligation to help such host governments cope with the refugee
influx. […]
In the north, a good harvest in 2002 has allowed most Iraqis (particularly Kurds, Assyrians, and Turkmen)
to build up a reserve of food sufficient to last them from three weeks to three months should war occur in
2003. Families in the northern zone also receive their rations from the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP)
in accordance with the Oil for Food program (which allows the Iraqi government to trade oil for food and
other commodities).
In the central and southern regions of Iraq, where the population is made up of Shi’a Muslims, Sunni
Muslims, and Turkmen, the potential for humanitarian crisis is much more acute. There are few NGOs
operating and they will have difficulty responding if the current governmental food distribution is disrupted
for any reason. Nearly twenty million people in these regions receive rations on a monthly basis from the
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government. Possibly tens of thousands of people who are critically dependent on rations will be facing
serious food shortages from the very first day a potential conflict interrupts government distributions in
central and southern Iraq. Over the last two months, the Iraqi government has provided the populace with
double rations in anticipation of war. However, information from inside Iraq indicates that these rations
will, at best, suffice for a brief time.
There are also reports that poorer Iraqis have sold their rations to raise capital for important other needs,
including medicine and the cost of possible flight from their cities." (HRW, Feb 02, pp2-4)
"UNICEF estimates that over 18 million people out of an estimated population of 26 million are food
insecure in Iraq and “even a short-term interruption in basic services that would follow a conflict in Iraq”
would have very negative effects on their lives […].
A war situation, which may also involve the destruction of transportation facilities, ports, bridges and
warehouses would likely lead to rapidly increasing food prices in the markets. That situation, coupled with
the fact that most of the urban Iraqi population are dependent on government rations and would be unlikely
to cope with food shortages without immediate and massive emergency assistance, means that war would
most certainly have a massive negative impact on the civilian population." (IST 30 Jan 03, p8)
See also International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 8 October 2002, A New Refugee Crisis in
Iraq? Uncertain Risks, Inadequate Preparation, [External Link]
Internally displaced persons' living conditions in northern Iraq are lower than the ones
of the rest of the population in the North (2001-2002)
"The initial report of the [UN Habitat] survey of internally displaced persons has been finalized, and work
is about to begin on a second stage, consisting of more in-depth interviews. The preliminary findings are
that, while conditions vary considerably, about 40 per cent of internally displaced persons live in
settlements with standards of water and electricity supplies, sanitation, drainage and road access that are
below average for the area. Most internally displaced persons have, on the other hand, acceptable access to
the food basket, education and, in most cases, health care." (UN SC 2 March 2001, para. 135)
"On December 4 [2000], the executive director of the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) told the
Security Council he was "greatly concerned with the increasing number of internally displaced persons,
'whose living conditions in some cases were 'abominable.'" (HRW 2002)
The Iraq Foundation reported that the displaced have been stripped of their possessions and papers, and
have no access to shelter, food or work "The deportation of Kurds and Turkoman from areas under
government control, and particularly from the Kirkuk governorate, has left over 100,000 people from
northern areas homeless and destitute. The deportees have been stripped of their possession and papers, and
have no access to shelter, food or work. The Kurdish regional administrations in Erbil and Suleimaniya are
having difficulty sheltering and feeding such large numbers of people. The situation of those deported to
areas under government control, such as Al-Anbar, are in even worse shape, as they are still under
government surveillance and victims of both deprivation and persecution." (The Iraq Foundation 26
January 2001)
According to UN-Habitat survey in January 2001, "There is only 47.85% of the sites [ie collective towns,
self-built houses and tent camps] that are provided with the entire range of needed facilities, that can be
considered as the minimum standard. 32.43% are lacking in one, 12.39% in two, etc. 1212 individuals live
in sites with no services at all. These sites are mainly concentrated in Duhok and Erbil regions, on the
contrary in Sulaimaniyah and Darbandikhan areas IDP sites are provided with better services.[…]
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Finally the levels of settlement services (water, electricity, sanitation, drainage and road) range from 1 to 10
(where 10 is given the highest possible level of services available in an IDP settlement). Some 38.8% of
IDP population is located in settlements, whose index is less than 6. The worst settlement conditions occur
in Erbil area." (UN-Habitat Jan 2002, p6)
Health & Nutrition
Struggle to restore basic services in post-war Iraq
•
•
•
•
•
Struggle to restore basic services
UN warns about humanitarian situation
War is over, but the battle to protect Iraq’s children is far from won
FAO: One-third of cereal crop intact
Assessments of the Marsh lands
“More than a month after war's end, hundreds of thousands of Baghdad residents are still struggling to
survive without basic services. Electricity remains intermittent, clean drinking water is unavailable to large
numbers of people, and authorities are barely coping with sewage disposal. Muthanna said during the war,
many transmission lines from power stations to the city had been destroyed. Of 245 high tension lines only
15 were working now, he said. While damage caused to the local network could be repaired, generating
enough power and getting it to Baghdad remained a problem. He estimated it would still be several weeks
before the system could be restored to anything like normal. Another concern was that his staff had not
been paid, and had no idea when they would receive any wages. "We have not even received a promise we are just working for loyalty to our country and citizens. I feel very upset about the situation. We are not
used to not having power."
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) says electricity generation has not improved over the
past 10 days, with only 2,200 MW being generated nationwide out of the 10,000 MW needed. It said this
raised a serious threat to public health, since it limited the production of safe water, and the risk would
increase with the advent of summer. Meanwhile, sewage-disposal systems are still struggling to cope with
the demand from the capital's 5 million people, with 13,000 gallons of untreated waste water and sewage
being dumped into the Tigris river every minute.
At the Al-Mansur District sewage treatment plant, staff are only barely managing to keep operating. Their
foreman, Mahdi Abd al-Rasul, said two of the station's four motors and two of its floating pumps were out
of action. "If one of the remaining motors breaks down, we will have big problems." What was needed was
money and material for repairs and an engineer to help, he added. Because there was no electricity, the
station was relying on its two diesel generators, but already one of these had broken down because of
having had to run for 16 hours a day. Moreover, Mahdi said, the station was facing difficulties in obtaining
sufficient fuel for the generators. He was also worried about the threat of looters, who, until now, had been
kept away with the help of local residents.
Looting is also hindering attempts to repair the city's water distribution system. Diya Abud, the engineer
responsible for the maintenance of the Baghdad Water Authority network, said looters had stolen large
quantities of supplies, and it was still difficult and dangerous to reach the warehouse because of armed
thieves. He said it was fortunate that none of the 2,000 km of major water pipes in the city had been
damaged during the war, but many of the smaller ones had been hit. In Khadamiya District, 200,000 people
had gone without water for two days after a rocket hit a pipe.
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But a continuing problem was the lack of electricity. Only about 10 percent to 20 percent of water stations
were getting electricity, and even at those that did, the supply was intermittent. […] Adding to the problem
was that fuel for generators and for work vehicles was in short supply. He warned that as temperatures rose
throughout the summer, the problems of water shortages would also increase. Even before the war and the
damage it caused, there was a shortage of 1 million cubic metres of water per day in Baghdad during
summer, he said.
To complicate matters even further, workers had received no pay for the last two months. "We have had
lots of times like this before, but it's surely very sad," Dhia said, adding that the only help received had
been from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC). The ICRC spokeswoman in Baghdad, Nada Doumani, said the city's structures had collapsed and
there was little organisation. She called on the coalition to pay the outstanding salaries as a confidencebuilding measure, pointing out that the damage caused by the war had only worsened an infrastructure that
had been neglected for years. "It's not like a normal city where you repair something and it's better. Things
here run on the verge of breaking down," she said.
[…] The UNICEF health and nutrition officer, Dr Wisam Al-Timini, said hundreds of thousands of tonnes
of raw sewage were being pumped into the Tigris and Euphrates rivers every day because many of the
1,000 treatment plants across Iraq were inoperative due to looters having stripped them. Supplies of waterpurification chemicals had also been stolen or destroyed. UNICEF is trucking more than 2 million litres of
clean water into Iraq each day, and importing supplies of chlorine gas and tablets for water treatment."
(IRIN, 14 May 2003)
UN warns about humanitarian situation
“The United Nations in the capital, Baghdad, has warned that the humanitarian situation in Iraq is still
precarious and could deteriorate if assistance were to dry up. (…) Even before the war, one million children
under five years of age suffered from chronic malnutrition. Factors such as this showed the extreme
fragility of the country in terms of its humanitarian situation. Carel de Rooy, the representative in Iraq for
the UN children’s fund UNICEF, said people mistakenly believed the war was over and so, therefore, were
the people’s needs. "There is this whole sense of safety - ‘oh, everything is fine, there’s no problem’. And if
we don’t move rapidly we can see the situation deteriorating very quickly, because we know how tenuous
the situation was before the war started. The situation now is worse, so we are very close to a humanitarian
crisis of great dimensions if we don’t move rapidly enough."
”The UN has just begun bringing international staff back to Baghdad, and the situation confronting them is
dire. Many people still have no clean drinking water, diarrhoea is rife, hospitals are under pressure, some
medicines are running low, electricity is limited, sewage disposal systems are struggling to keep up with
demand, fuel is scarce, most people have not been paid or have lost their jobs, and inflation is rising
rapidly.”
”The World Food Programme’s (WFP) representative in Iraq, Torben Due, said his agency had launched its
biggest programme ever to bring food into the country. "The economy has gone down, food prices in the
market have gone up. For that reason it is very critical to get in the food in time now, because otherwise
there will be a crisis.”One pressing need was to cover a shortfall of 200,000 mt of cooking oil and pulses,
which WFP did not have. "These are very important commodities as they provide the protein and the fats in
the diet. It’s critical to get these commodities, to get the full food basket for the population," Due said.
Before the war, 60 percent of Iraqis depended entirely on food rations, and WFP was desperately trying to
restore this distribution system. Due estimated that food stocks held by most households would suffice for
only two to three weeks, which was why it was vital to resurrect the system quickly. "Our preliminary
discussions with the senior officials of the ministry of trade indicate that the structure is in place," he said.
"The 45,000 food agents that were doing the food distribution to the population are still there and ready to
startworking."
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”The World Health Organisation’s (WHO) representative in Iraq, Ghulam Popal, said WHO faced a huge
challenge preventing outbreaks of dis ease and controlling any such outbreak if it occurred. "Now that water
is not clean and the sanitation is bad and public health programmes have completely broken down, I’m
afraid that the potential for having a cholera outbreak is very high," he said.” (IRIN, 6 May 2003)
War is over, but the battle to protect Iraq’s children is far from won
“Iraqi children still face grave threats to their survival, health and general well-being, despite the end of the
war and the rapid process of change underway in the country, UNICEF warned today. UNICEF said that
unless immediate national priority is put on protecting children from these threats, thousands of Iraqi
youngsters will die unnecessarily – and hundreds of thousands more will be injured, fall prey to disease,
suffer from abuse and exploitation, or fall behind in school.”
“Recurrent insecurity across the country, preventing humanitarian aid from consistently reaching every
community where it is needed and which leads to looting that further hurts relief and recovery efforts.
Significant degradation of the national water system, resulting in ongoing and widespread health hazards
that hit children hardest. Outbreaks of diarrhoea, cholera, and other killer diseases have been reported
across the country. Unknown numbers of unexploded munitions lying in and around Iraqi neighbourhoods,
with daily reports of injuries and deaths among children. Enormous stress on health centres and hospitals,
including an insufficient flow of needed medical supplies to many locations and inadequate care for the
injured and sick. Insufficient emphasis on opening schools, leaving children on the streets where they are
exposed to hazards, and leaving their parents overburdened and worried. Ongoing malnutrition, with food
supplies not yet stabilized and more than a quarter of all children under age five already malnourished”
“UNICEF said its own key priorities are supporting the recovery of basic health and water services, and
immediately opening classrooms. It is also working to re-establish care for severely malnourished children.
UNICEF noted that nearly half of Iraq’s population are children. “Bellamy said that putting children first in
national recovery efforts rallies a population and leads to greater stability and political consensus. She said
experience in Afghanistan, Angola and other countries in crisis makes clear that focusing on children’s
needs has a galvanizing and inspirational effect on populations that are hurting from years of struggle and
conflict.”
“UNICEF has already delivered hundreds of pre-packed “School-In-A-Box” kits into Iraq to help local
communities organize education efforts quickly. Since the end of the war, UNICEF has supplied medicine
and supplies for hundreds of thousands of people; delivered water equipment and worked to repair vital
water facilities; tankered millions of litres of fresh water into the country; supported the opening of
classrooms with school-in-a-box kits; and supplied high-protein biscuits and other life-saving nutritional
items to children mo st in need.” (UNICEF, 2 May 2003)
One-third of cereal crop intact
“At least one-third of Iraq's cereal crop, upon which the country's staple of wheat bread heavily depends,
appears to have emerged unscathed from the war, a UN Food and Agriculture Organis aton spokesman,
Barry Came, told IRIN on Monday. Farmers in the three northern governorates of Erbil, Dahuk and
Sulaymaniyah were not displaced from their homes during the fighting, which meant that they could begin
to harvest over the next few weeks, and expect to produce about 500,000 mt of wheat and barley, Came
said.
In the other 15 governorates the situation was less clear, however, especially in the breadbasket area south
of Baghdad between the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, he noted. Farmers in this region, which normally
produced a third of the country's crop, had been displaced by fighting. "This could mean a loss of 1.2
million tonnes of grain, which will otherwise have to be imported," Came said. "The other problem is that if
they lose this year's harvest, there will be a lack of seeds for next year."
97
Unlike the northern governorates which have had adequate rainfall, crops in the south are heavily
dependent on irrigation, which in turn depends on electricity - unavailable in many areas since the war - to
run pumping networks. Crops of vegetables have also been affected by lack of irrigation, leading to a 100
percent rise in prices in the north. This is because most vegetables available in the north are currently
coming in from Iran, whereas usually they would be supplied by southern markets, hence the price
increase.
"The Iraqi system is heavily dependent on mechanisation," said Came, noting that the average age of
tractors in the country was now 24 years, while combine harvesters averaged about 20 years. "War and
sanctions have slowly degraded the system," he said. Even before sanctions, semiarid Iraq was only able to
produce about one-third of its total cereal needs, due to lack of cultivable land.
The office of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq (UNOHCI) reported on Monday that basic
commodity prices in the country had shot up by between 20 and 50 percent since March 2003. Meanwhile,
the exchange rate for the US dollar had also dropped from 4,500 Iraqi dinars before the war to a current rate
of 1,170." (IRIN, 29 April 2003)
“On 25 and 26 May 2003, an interagency assessment mission visited the Marsh Arabs in the Nahr Al-Lez
region. The overall situation has been described as very difficult as this population has been subjected to
prolonged displacement. The area suffers from a severe water shortage, and available water is of poor
quality. There is also a total absence of medical staff in the area. Only one unfurnished and unequipped
school (with one teacher) is open. Given the prolonged displacement of this population, and the lack of
development suffered by the region, the mission recommended urgent intervention. On 25-26 May, IOM
visited a concentration of Marsh Arab IDPs stretched out in adjacent settlements along several dozen km of
irrigation dyke. Local estimates were unreliable, but Ockenden's estimate of 12,000 appears to be
reasonable. Local tribal leaders estimate that between one quarter and one third of families do not have
ration cards, because these were only issued to families whose Heads of Household had signed up for
military service or were over 45 years of age. The main need for these people is potable water and WFP
food delivery. WHO and Assisting Marsh Arabs and Refugees Foundation (AMAR) are conducting
medical assessments among the Marsh Arabs, many of whom have little or no access to proper medical
care. With the support of WHO, AMAR is also conducting a demographic survey of the population,
attempting to establish the incidence of communicable and endemic diseases, vaccination requirements,
fertility, mortality, morbidity, infant mortality, water and sanitation infrastructure.” (HCI, 2 June 2003)
Difficult to assess adequacy of health services for IDPs in northern Iraq (2002)
"The adequacy of health services for the displaced people is difficult to judge. UN-Habitat mentions in
their survey that 12,000 displaced families, about eight percent of the total, have no access to health centers
(It is not clear from where Habitat got this number). In the survey, access to health centers, primary,
secondary, and intermediate schools, a market place, and public transportation are combined to form a "site
service index." Nearly half of all people had access to all of these services, 80 percent access to five of the
six and only 7 percent had access to fewer than four of these services. However as there is no breakdown as
to which services were lacking, the information is of less use than it might have been." (Fawcett & Tanner,
Oct 02, p21)
Close to one million children are chronically malnourished in Iraq (2002-2003)
•
•
Acute and general malnutrition are now less than half the levels of 1996, while chronic
malnutrition has fallen by nearly 30% during the same period
While results are encouraging, Iraqi children are by no means in a stable or appropriate nutritional
state
98
"Following the 1991 Gulf War and twelve years of sanctions, Iraqi families do not yet possess food
security. Agricultural production has been hampered by economic sanctions, while imports under the Oilfor-Food Program have increased household dependency on government distributed food rations. Many
families’ food intake remains nutritionally poor, with inadequate caloric, protein and micronutrient value.
Entitlement and access to food has been hindered by the fact that the majority of Iraqi families are now
very poor. Most have long since exhausted household financial resources, and are now living day-to-day
under conditions of extreme poverty.
Importantly, existing social, economic, and nutritional data indicate that Iraqi children are now more
vulnerable to malnutrition then they were before the 1991 Gulf War." (IST 30 Jan 03, p6)
(in IST 30 Jan 02, p12)
"[P]reliminary figures from a UNICEF-supported survey carried out in February 2002 show that acute and
general malnutrition are now less than half the levels of 1996, while chronic malnutrition has fallen by
nearly 30% during the same period. This decline should be seen in the context of the overall humanitarian
programme in Iraq, including the UNICEF-supported Targeted Nutrition Programme (TNP). Despite gains,
the present level of child malnutrition remains high compared to 1991 levels, which were already elevated
after one year of sanctions." (UNICEF 21 Nov 2002, "Overview")
"UNICEF attributes the improvements to:
· The continuing expenditure by Iraq of the majority of oil-for-food money on food
· The UN lifting of a cap on oil sales
· The success of nutrition screening in Community Child Care Units
· Two good years of rainfall and bumper crops" (UNICEF 21 Nov 02, "Malnutrition")
"The decline in malnutrition rates over the past five years is due to multiple factors, including an increase in
the caloric content of the government ration; gradually decreasing rates of diarrheal disease; modest
improvements to the health sector; implementation of the Targeted Nutrition Program (supplementary and
therapeutic feeding); breastfeeding promotion, and improved immunization coverage (according to
UNICEF).
While these results are encouraging, and there is no question that some improvement in nutritional status
has taken place, Iraqi children are by no means in a stable or appropriate nutritional state. One quarter of
Iraqi children under-five years of age (close to one million children) are chronically malnourished." (IST 30
Jan 02, pp12-13)
99
"Surveys carried out by UNICEF during 2001 show that almost one-third of children in the south and
centre of Iraq suffer from chronic malnutrition. Other issues of concern in the health sector include low
exclusive breast feeding rates, high bottle feeding rates, and high prevalence of anaemia among women,
high incidence of low birth weight contribute to Iraq’s very high child mortality rates - 131 per 1000 live
births in the south and centre of Iraq (1999) - a rate comparable to that of Pakistan or Haiti. Diarrhoea
leading to death from dehydration and acute respiratory infection (ARI), together account for 70 per cent of
child deaths." (UNICEF 29 May 2002, 1)
"Moreover, many diseases which are locally endemic, such as maleria, cholera, visceral leishmaniasis,
intestinal parasitic infestations and hepatitis have been reported to be re-emerging." (UNICEF Feb 02)
UNICEF survey found that child mortality increased in government-controlled Iraq
while decreasing slightly in northern Iraq (1999)
•
•
•
In government-controlled Iraq infant mortality increased from 47 to 108 deaths per 1000 live
births, while child mortality (under five years of age) increased from 56 to 131 deaths per 1,000
live births between the 1984-89 and 1994-1999 periods
In autonomous northern Iraq, infant mortality decreased from 64 to 59 deaths per 1000 live births,
while child mortality decreased from 80 to 72 deaths per 1,000 live births between the same
periods
The presence of humanitarian organizations in the north as well as the policies of the Iraq
government are elements to explain discrepancy between north and south
"UNICEF, comparing the 1984-89 and 1994-99 periods in the government-controlled center and south of
the country, found that infant mortality had increased from 47 to 108 deaths per 1000 live births, while
child mortality (under five years of age) had increased from 56 to 131 deaths per 1,000 live births-a rapid
and sustained increase in infant and child mortality rates that was virtually unprecedented. UNICEF
reported, by contrast, declining mortality rates in the northern autonomous governorates." (HRW December
1999, "Human Rights Developments")
Survey in the 15 southern governorates
(UNICEF 27 August 1999, “Survey in the 15 southern governorates," p.9)
100
(UNICEF 27 August 1999, "3 autonomous northern governorates, p.9)
How to explain discrepancy between North and South?
"The UN has reported that, despite Iraqi claims of infant malnutrition, the government of Iraq has ordered
only a fraction of the nutrition supplies for vulnerable children and pregnant and nursing mothers
recommended by the UN and for which money has been set aside under the oil-for-food program. Only
$1.7 million of $25 million set aside for nutritional supplements has been spent by Iraq. In the past eighteen
months, Iraq has ordered no nutritional supplements. The United Nations has reported that $200 million
worth of medicines and medical supplies sit undistributed in Iraqi warehouses." (US DOS 13 September
1999, "Iraqi Obstruction")
"Although food availability has increased since 1997 following SCR 986, nutritional problems continue to
exist. Reasons for this include prolonged reliance of the population on a nutritionally inadequate and
unvaried diet, the inability of the agricultural sector to make up this shortfall, particularly in view of the
current drought, the dilapidation of the economy, underemployment and low incomes, poor quality of
essential service delivery, unhealthy lifestyles and practices, and infection and disease." (FAO September
2000, p.36)
"In the north of the country, where the Oil-for-Food Programme is implemented by the UN-Inter-Agency
Humanitarian Programme on behalf of the Government of Iraq with the participation of FAO and WFP,
there have been 'significant improvements in the nutritional situation.' Acute malnutrition has almost been
eliminated and infant and child mortality rates have fallen, largely because the region is more self-sufficient
in food and receives far greater assistance per person. Additionally, focus here is given to targeted nutrition
programmes, food production, growth promotion and the early detection of malnutrition among children
under five." (FAO 13 September 2000)
"In short, nutrition and health care were declining in government-controlled Iraq, but improving in the
northern autonomous zone. The presence of international humanitarian organizations in the north
accounted, in part, for the better health of the Kurdish population there. Even so, UNICEF noted that
'chronic malnutrition has remained at about 24 percent over the past six months [in the north], which is
comparatively high for the region'." (USCR 2000)
For a broader discussion on disparities in Northern Iraq and Government-controlled Iraq, please see
[Internal link], "UNICEF and other UN officials highlight reasons for North-South economic
disparities (2000)"
Spread of infectious disease due to lack of drinking water and adequate sewage
systems in government-controlled Iraq (1999-2003)
101
•
•
•
•
UNICEF reported in 2002 continued lack of essential public services, poor water supplies and
resulting diarrhoeal infections
Over half of the rural population did not have adequate access to clean drinking water according
to UNICEF/government survey conducted in 1997 which had led to the rapid spread of infectious
diseases, such as cholera
Hospitals and health centers have been without repairs since 1991
Internally displaced persons camps in southern Iraq have open sewage, which has an important
potential for disease
"The Gulf War and twelve years of economic sanctions have had a devastating effect on Iraq’s health
infrastructure, resulting in a significant decline in the health and well being of Iraqi children […]. Death
rates of children under five have more than doubled over the past decade, with 70 percent of deaths
attributed to diarrheal disease and respiratory tract infections [according to UNICEF]. Marginal gains in
health services under the Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP) are having a limited impact on child morbidity and
mortality in south/central Iraq due in part to persistent deficiencies in the water and sanitation sectors. In
addition, inefficiencies and delays in the procurement of essential medicines and medical equipment under
the OFFP are resulting in frequent shortages and reduced capacity within hospitals and health clinics. While
there have been improvements in immunization coverage and malnutrition rates in the past several years,
overall Iraqi children are much more vulnerable to starvation, death and disease than they were in 1990."
(IST 30 Jan 03, p11)
"Essential public services have continued to suffer from a lack of maintenance and resulting in decreasing
capacity and efficiency, and rapidly increasing demand through population growth. (Some 16 million in
1990 compared to 22 million in 2000). Poor water supplies both in terms of quality and quantity and
inadequate sanitation services contribute to frequent and repeated diarrhoeal infections. Environmental
pollution further compounds the problem. Additionally, 500,000MT of raw sewerage is discharged directly
into fresh water each day; 300,000MT of this discharged into rivers in Baghdad. Access to safe water in
rural areas has dropped to just 41%. Per capita share of safe clean water has also decreased from 330 to 218
litres per day in Baghdad, while in rural areas, the capita share to those who have access dropped from 91
to less than 18 litres per day. It is therefore not surprising that each Iraqi child under 5 years of age suffers
an average of 14 diarrhoeal episodes per year - a five-fold increase from pre -1990 figures." (UNICEF 29
May 2002)
"Another major threat to the health of the population is the quality of the drinking water. The Gulf war
severely damaged Iraq's infrastructure, interrupting the power supply and consequently the operation of
pumping and treatment facilities. Since then, money and spare parts have not been available to repair
sewage works and purification plants, which are often working at reduced capacity, or not at all. This has
led to an overall deterioration in the quality and quantity of drinking water and the rapid spread of
infectious diseases, such as cholera.
A UNICEF/government of Iraq survey in 1997 on the availability of water and sewage systems reported
that more than half of the rural population did not have adequate access to clean drinking water, while for
sewage disposal some 30% of the total population, predominantly in rural areas, were without adequate
services. Much of the waste is discharged directly into rivers and streams, so that much of the water
supplied is contaminated or below acceptable standards.
The low availability of power, averaging 50% in rural areas, frequent cuts and unstable supply place an
additional strain on the installed electrical equipment. This, added to the fact that the chemicals used to
purify the water contain around 30 times more impurities than before the embargo, leads to premature
deterioration of the equipment, which subsequently requires more maintenance. […]
102
For the first time in decades, diarrhoea has reappeared as the major killer of children. The highly
specialized Iraqi doctors are now faced with third-world health problems – malnutrition, diphtheria, cholera
– which they were not trained to handle." (ICRC 14 March 2000, II)
"According to the report [of the humanitarian panel established on 30 January 1999 by the UN Security
Council], hospitals and health centers have remained without repairs and maintenance since 1991 and the
'functional capacity of the health care system has degraded further by shortages of water and power supply,
lack of transportation and the collapse of the telecommunications system." (AI 24 November 1999,
"Background")
"In areas where the Iraqi government had not installed or not improved functioning water and sewage
treatment facilities in the past, the current sanctions-era impoverishment has prevented current
improvements. Thus the 1980s-built internally displaced persons camps, primarily in the south of Iraq, have
running streams of raw sewage between housing blocs, and pond-size pools of untreated standing sewage
water with enormous potential for disease." (AFSC 21 March 2000 "Humanitarian Effect of Economic
Sanctions")
In the South, government limited access to food, medicine, drinking water and
transportation for Shi'a Arabs (1999-2000)
•
•
•
Iraqi government burned hundreds of square miles and drained the marshes in the south,
supposedly to increase agricultural production
Thousands of persons were denied rations supposed to be supplied under the U.N. oil-for-food
program and had limited access to food, medicine, drinking water and transportation.
As a result the humanitarian condition of Shi'a in the south continued to suffer despite the
expansion of the oil-for-food program
The military also continued its water-diversion and other projects in the south. Observers gave little
credence to the Government's claim that the drainage is part of a land reclamation plan to increase the
acreage of arable land and spur agricultural production. Hundreds of square miles have been burned in
military operations. The U.N. Special Rapporteur has noted the serious detrimental impact that draining the
marshes has had on the culture of the Shi'a marsh Arabs. The SCIRI [Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq] claims to have captured government documents that detail the destructive intent of the
water-diversion program and its connection to 'strategic security operations,' economic blockade, and
'withdrawal of food supply agencies.'
In addition the regime's diversion of supplies in the south limited the Shi'a population's access to food,
medicine, drinking water, and transportation. According to the U.N. Special Rapporteur and opposition
sources, thousands of persons in Nasiriyah and Basra provinces were denied rations that should have been
supplied under the U.N. oil-for-food program. In these provinces and in Amarah province, access to food
allegedly is used to reward regime supporters and silence opponents. Shi'a groups report that, due to this
policy, the humanitarian condition of Shi'a in the south continued to suffer despite a significant expansion
of the oil-for-food program." (US DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for human rights, g.")
WFP survey in Centre/South shows one-in-five unable to meet basic needs
•
•
The Center/South contains numerous areas with high chronic poverty rates
Districts with the highest rates are located towards the east and include some of the Marsh Arab
lands
103
•
Public Distribution System is considered the safety net for the majority of the Marsh Arab
population
“WFP Chronic Poverty assessment in the Centre and South of Iraq showed that over one-infive
Center/South households were unable to meet their basic needs even after taking into account assistance
provided through the PDS. The Center/South contains numerous areas with high chronic poverty rates. Two
clusters of such districts are located towards the east of the country and border Iran. The first cluster lies
east of Baghdad. A second cluster, located in the southeast corner of the country, includes all of Basrah
governorate and most of southern Missan. Basrah governorate is particularly noteworthy in that all of its
districts are classified as having either high, or very high chronic poverty rates. Districts with the highest
rates are located towards the east and include some of the Marsh Arab lands in Al Madiana and Al Qurnah
in addition to Shatt Al Arab, Abu Al Khasib, and Al Faw. Subsequently, rapid need assessment was
conducted targeting vulnerable areas of Marsh Arab Lands/ villages in Thi-Qar, Basra, and Missan
Governorates
It was evident that the Public Distribution System is considered the safety net for the majority of the Marsh
Arab population. There also have been noted cases of families/individuals who are without ration cards.
The common reason for that was lack of military service, non-formal marriage practice or being outside the
country for an extended period of time. There is a high level of unemployment among the population.
Farming and to a lesser extent fishing and raising animals are the main source income. Farming is mainly
wheat and grain.
With the declined market price of wheat (35-40,000) farmers were not able to compensate their initial costs.
Additionally, prices of livestock in the market have decreased tremendously post war while animal feed in
increasing. Marsh Arabs expressed their concern with respect to the spread of diseases amongst the
livestock, i.e. black fever, and triple fever.” (UN OCHI, 30 June 2003)
Shelter
Kurds returning to destroyed homes (December 2003)
•
•
•
•
The Baath authorities burnt and bulldozed houses, shot animals and destroyed fields in northern
village
Saddam wanted to punish the Kurds for their resistance and make them reliant on the state by
shifting them to collective villages that have been likened to concentration camps
On 18 September building began on the 32 concrete houses
If the people see the village is rebuilding and there is a future, then they will come back
"In Kurdish, Ekmala means "one house". But in the northern Iraqi village bearing that name there will soon
be 32 new houses for a community that has suffered badly over the last 15 years.
"I am so proud and thankful. And I am so happy to have this help come from across the world," the village
mukhtar (chief elder), Ahmad Khalid, told IRIN from his home about an hour's drive northeast of Dahuk.
The help has come from the Danish NGO Mission East, which, with funding from the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), has almost completed building the new houses in the
Kurdish region.
104
But life has not always been so good for Ahmad and the village his ancestors came to over 200 years ago.
In 1988, when the Iraqi ruler, Saddam Hussein, launched the destructive Anfal campaign against the Kurds,
Ekmala suffered the same fate as thousands of other villages in the north.
Iraqi troops burnt and bulldozed the houses, shot the animals and destroyed the fields that the 80 families
relied upon. Saddam wanted to punish the Kurds for their resistance and make them reliant on the state by
shifting them to collective villages that have been likened to concentration camps.
After the suspected gassing of a neighbouring village, Ekmala's residents attempted to flee, but were caught
by Saddam's troops.
Seventy-two men and boys were taken away and have never been seen again. The remaining residents were
relocated, and it was not until 1992 after the Kurdish uprising and establishment of a safe area in the north
that they were able to return to Ekmala. Ahmad said nothing had been left, the orchards, houses and
vineyards having been destroyed.
The Swedish-based NGO Qandil helped rebuild some of the houses as people filtered back, but in time, the
children grew up and had families of their own, leading to overcrowding. According to UN studies,
Saddam wanted to punish the Kurds for their resistance and make them reliant on the state by shifting them
to collective villages that have been likened to concentration camps. and the people had no funds to build
more houses.
In August last year, Mission East met villagers and area officials to offer help. And on 18 September
building began on the 32 concrete houses. If winter holds off, the first houses could be finished within a
month.
Hasan Sulayman, 37, is one of the residents set to move in to a new house. With two children, he has been
forced to live with his parents until now in an overcrowded home. He said life would be so much better
with a new house, but they had paid a high price in the past.
"If I start to tell you about the suffering, you would not believe it," he told IRIN in Ekmala. His wife,
Sowsan, was so excited about the new house she could talk of little else, Hasan said.
But while she was keen to shift into their new home, he was happy to wait and make sure everything was
right. The houses have been designed according to the needs of the families set to occupy them, and all
have toilets and bathrooms, concrete roofs and kitchens.
Ahmad said 63 families had returned to Ekmala and he hoped others would shift back from larger centres
such as Dahuk where they had been living until now, many without a source of income. "If the people see
the village is rebuilding and there is a future, then they will come back."
While farming was not easy in Ekmala there was land where people could grow tomatoes, apples, grapes
and peaches and graze stock, Ahmad said. "We are poor, but when we see foreign people coming to talk to
us, we feel like we are human beings again."
Brandon Pustejovsky, Mission East's country representative, told IRIN in Dahuk that the bulk of the money
for the project, about US $132,000, had come from UNHCR.
As well as the new houses, the NGO had given each family a pregnant ewe to try and increase the village's
flock, and was building a fence around the primary school. Pustejovsky also hoped the new houses would
encourage more villagers to return to Ekmala, based on the fact that 80 percent of Internally Displaced
People (IDPs) in Dahuk had said suitable housing was a prerequisite for them to move from the cities.
105
Other imp ortant factors in getting IDPs to return were health and water facilities, schools, roads and a
means of earning a living, Pustejovsky said. "I just wish we could provide this comprehensive solution to
more villages."
After the completion of this project Mission East hopes to continue reconstruction work in a number of
villages in Iraq's north.
Pustejovsky said he was happy with the progress made in building the houses at Ekmala, but the real
pleasure would come later. "When I talk to them afterwards and see how they are doing and they say this is
what they were needing and when I hear people wanting to return to Ekmala, then I'll get a buzz - that will
be worth it."
But back in Ekmala, Ahmad Khalid is already looking forward to a celebration and feast when the first
families move into the houses. "Now we have forgotten the misfortunes of the past and are just
concentrating on today and looking forward to the future. The most important thing is that we live in
peace."(UN OCHA, 11 December 2003)
Hundreds of evicted families in Baghdad are bracing for the freezing winter (October
2003)
•
•
•
Large families crowd small spaces with no furniture, where men, women and children sit, eat and
sleep on thin, ragged mats
The misery has just started for many homeless families after the fall of the Saddam Hussein
regime sent rent prices sky-rocketing
Iraq's winter season may be short, but temperatures can reach freezing point at night or in the
early hours of the morning as the population rises for work.
"Hundreds of fami lies who lost their homes to post-war rent hikes are bracing for the freezing winter
season, haunted by the fear of another expulsion from their dilapidated shacks along Baghdad's notoriously
violent airport road.
"I was thrown out of my apartment after the war. The owners wanted to increase the rent and I do not have
money," said Um Shawki, 57, who hails from the modest al-Karkh neighborhood in Baghdad.
With no place to go, she found refuge in a rundown house under construction along the airport road, known
by US soldiers as the "highway of death" for the repeated anti-coalition guerrilla attacks.
"The only place I could find, were these pillars of an unfinished house. With the help of some other
homeless people, I was able to put corrugated iron as a rooftop to make the place liveable," she said,
leaning on a wooden cane and sitting on her shaded porch.
Large families crowd small spaces with no furniture, where men, women and children sit, eat and sleep on
thin, ragged mats.
Openings in the wall that serve as windows are covered with old, multicolored sheets, as holes in the roof
are traversed by beams of sunlight that criss-cross the room. When the rains come, water will soak the
living area.
106
The misery has just started for Um Shawki and many homeless families who faced a similar ordeal after the
April 9 fall of the Saddam Hussein regime sent rent prices sky-rocketing.
"Every day, we receive visitors with documents claiming that they own the land we are living on. They
threaten us with expulsion," said Jassim Hassan, a 45-year-old construction employee and a father of six
girls and a boy.
Hassan, who earns 5,000 Iraqi dinars (three dollars) a day, is adamant: "We have been expelled once. Now
they can only do it over my dead body."
The year's first bone-chilling wind that swept the capital in the past few days brought further gloom to the
homeless families.
"Yesterday it was freezing during the night. We huddled together and used blankets, but it did not help a
lot," said Hussein Ali, 48, while fixing a corrugated iron roof on his small room.
"We were practically sleeping in the open and it is very cold," he added.
Iraq's winter season may be short, but temperatures can reach freezing point at night or in the early hours of
the morning as the population rises for work.
The cold is not the only enemy for Ali, Um Shawki and Jassim, who frequently find themselves caught in
the line of fire.
"We are always afraid of stray bullets. Two days ago we stayed awake counting rockets flying over our
heads," recalls Jassim.
Iraqi civilians are frequently victims of the vicious circle of violence.
"We are very lucky. There is an Arab proverb that says: 'Who is not killed by the sword will die by another
means,'" said Um Shawkat.
"But we are lucky," she added bitterly: "We have three ways to die: from the cold, the bullets or
expulsion."(AFP, 31 October 2003)
UN-Habitat assists in providing shelter for IDPs in northern Iraq
•
•
UN-HABITAT assists in providing shelter in the North (April 2003)
UN-HABITAT surveys housing needs
“As the lead agency in the United Nations system for the shelter sector and in particular, for urban
reconstruction and rehabilitation, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) has
continued emergency assistance to new internally displaced people, IDPs, in northern Iraq. UN-HABITAT
is coordinating the planning and implementation of shelter sector activities in post-conflict Iraq within the
policy framework and under the overall guidance of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq.
This work includes immediate assistance to IDPs in terms of selection and preparation of sites, planning,
installation and repair of basic services, condition monitoring and damage assessment of critical housing
and infrastructure, and their repair and rehabilitation.”
107
“UN-HABITAT is finalizing preparations to provide assistance to IDP camps in the three northern
governorates, namely Delizian, Ashkawtwan and Jenarook Camps in Erbil and Tanahi Camp in Dahuk, as
well as Basian, Sordash, Maydan and Hajyawa camps in Suliemanyah catering for close to 6000 families.
UN-HABITAT has also made available a range of construction materials and heavy machinery and is
happy to note that the necessary co-operative and management arrangements are in place and running
smoothly. This work covers site preparation and layout, building of access and internal roads, building of
temporary structures such as health centres, stores, and staff administration buildings, construction of water
and sanitation facilities in coordination with the United Nations Children's Fund. Additional tents have also
been offered by the Government of Norway.”
"If called upon by the United Nations Security Council, UN-HABITAT is ready to extend further support
to emergency assessment of housing and services, provide emergency housing, water and sewage
treatment, undertake immediate measures for solid waste management in affected urban areas", said Mrs.
Anna Tibaijuka, the Executive Director of UN-HABITAT. "We have considerable experience from other
post-conflict zones, in rehabilitating local institutions and authorities, building capacity of local
professionals and self-help groups of men and women."
This work can be undertaken in three stages, essentially rapid humanitarian needs assessment for the shelter
sector against the background of short-, medium- and long-term needs. Hopefully, this will be followed by
stepping up the agency's presence in all areas of Iraq with the existing over 600 national and international
experts; partnerships will also be established with other experts from external institutions on a global basis.
Specialized multi-disciplinary expert teams will be formed to address IDPs, emergency assessment and
repair, capacity building, and medium- to long-term strategic planning for sustainable urban reconstruction.
(UN-HABITAT, 15 April 2003)
“United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) has opened a new office in Basra in order to
begin the urgent task of certifying the state of war damaged housing stock. This survey is being undertaken
as part of UN-Habitat's Emergency Relief Response and will also be conducted in Baghdad, Mosul and
other urban areas. The team in Basra consists, at present, of one international expert and 54 national
engineers, architects , and database managers. UN-Habitat has also examined the state of sewage disposal
and solid waste management in Habania, a low-income district in Basra with a population of 300,000.
According to initial findings the situation is desperate due to years of neglect and additional war damage.
UN-Habitatwill liase with United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) for the purpose of emergency repairs
once the ongoing assessment reporting is finalized.
The officers in Basra are being supported by UN-Habitat's offices in Amman, Jordan and Larnaca, Cyprus.
UN-Habitat will soon re-open its offices in Baghdad and UN-Habitat's international experts are now
returning to the three northern Iraqi governorates of Erbil, Dahuk and Suleimaniyah, where UN-Habitathas
been working on Settlements Rehabilitation Programme for internally displaced persons and most
vulnerable groups, under the "oil-for-food" programme, since 1997.
In 1997, the Secretary General called upon UN-Habitatto implement the settlement rehabilitation
component of the oil-for-food programme. As of 31 December 2002, the Settlements Rehabilitation
Programme had served 191,000 beneficiaries directly, and has delivered: 19,051 houses, 685 schools, 127
health centres; 99 agriculture and veterinary centres, 48 other social and civic buildings, 2,800 kilometres
of roads and bridges, and 853 kilometres of sewage and water systems. The Programme has further created
150,000 much-needed jobs in the private sector by engaging and training local contractors.” (UNHABITAT, 6 May 2003)
Houses destroyed by fighting and shelling
108
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•
•
•
When residents returned the remote village of Biyara they found that most of their houses had
been destroyed
Returned displaced live in sagging tents
The 100 most needy families had been selected for new houses
Needs in Biyara far in excess of resources
"It is midday and the welcome sun bathes Avin Abdullah's home in the remote village of Biyara. The icy
mud has just begun to melt as the temperature creeps above zero. For Avin, the next few hours are the only
time she will not feel cold.
That is because for her and seven other members of her family, home is a sagging tent on a hillside just
outside Biyara, where nearly 60 families are trying to survive.
"Our life is not good," Avin told IRIN in Biyara. "When there is a little bit of rain it comes inside the tent.
So what do you think it's like when it rains heavily?"
In 2001, Biyara was taken over by the hardline Islamic group Ansar al-Islam. Many residents fled the
northeastern mountain village, which lies near the border with Iran border, only returning after US-led
forces had pounded the Ansar fighters out of their stronghold. When the residents returned, they found that
most of their houses had been destroyed by the Ansar or the Coalition shelling.
More than 100 houses were rebuilt by the NGO Dutch Consortium, but with so many more people coming
to Biyara, a tented camp was set up for another 150 families on the steep hillside near the village centre.
Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) together with the Kurdish NGO Civilisation Development Organisation
(CDO) have obtained funding to build another 100 houses, but with winter having begun, construction has
stalled.
Meanwhile, about 100 families who had been living in the tents moved in with relatives or friends to escape
the worst of the weather, but the rest are still in tents covered with nylon tarpaulins.
Avin said her family had missed out on the 100 new houses and had no idea when they might be able to
shift from the tent they had been in since April. At 15, she had to give up school because of the fighting and
now wonders if she has any future. "I'm sorry, but I'm totally without hope. When it's so cold that you
shiver all night and can't get to sleep how can you think about the next day?"
Shirwan Muhammad Majid, CDO's monitor in Biyara, told IRIN that the families living in the tents were
internally displaced persons (IDPs) who had been forced to leave their villages either during the Iran-Iraq
war or by the Ansar. Many had already been very poor and economically vulnerable before coming here,
Shirwan told IRIN. "They absolutely have to live here - there is nowhere else for them," he said.
The 100 most needy families had been selected for the new houses, but CDO's resources were limited and
more help was needed. "We are yelling and screaming to the NGOs to please come and give us some
money to give these other people a home," Shirwan said. In the short term, CDO was helping the families
with kerosene and heaters, but the IDPs still lacked many basics such as warm clothing, he added. [...]
NPA's programme manager for rural rehabilitation, Soran Sa'ed, told IRIN in the northeastern governorate
of Sulaymaniyah that needs in Biyara were far in excess of the NGOs' resources. NPA was not only trying
to meet immediate needs such as housing but also to create a broader development strategy to enable the
village to surmount its current crisis.
However, it was more difficult to obtain funds for longer-term work and donor agencies were often focused
on the very visible and more widely documented situation of Iraqis in the south and centre of the country,
he said."
109
Aid agencies warn of delay in return due to chronic housing shortage (July 2003)
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Thousands of people left their homes and moved to recently emptied public buildings following
the war (July 2003)
The groups are a mixture of populations - both displaced and urban poor
Less than a third of squatters would qualify as IDPs
Before any aid is distributed to the IDPs, they need to be separated from the other squatters
The displaced and squatters who are not in key installations are unlikely to be moved by Coalition
forces in the near future
“The war that brought an end to Saddam Hussein’s regime has also led to a huge social upheaval
throughout Iraq. Thousands of people left their homes and moved to recently emptied public buildings.
Some were evicted by the original owners of their houses, others had their residences destroyed in the war,
or their rents sharply increased. Aid agenices say they now face a major headache distinguishing genuinely
displaced people from the thousands of urban poor.
The displaced, who were forced to leave their homes, include tens of thousands of Arabs who were
resettled in northern areas and who have either been evicted by returning Kurds, or left in anticipation of
their arrival. Alongside them are the urban poor, who have moved into the now empty prisons, military
bases and former government institutions for economic reasons - particularly after landlords took advantage
of the end of rent controls to demand more money.
Aid workers say many people took the opportunity of the fall of the regime to move to public places to
avoid rent and live in better areas. The problem is that the groups are a mixture of populations - both
displaced and urban poor.
Premiere Urgence, which is the focal point in Baghdad for internally displaced people (IDPs), is being
funded by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) to help the displaced in the capital. It
recently surveyed 20,000 people living in public buildings in the city and found that less than a third of
them would qualify as IDPs. The agency said that before any aid is distributed to the IDPs, they need to be
separated from the other squatters. The problem was clearly illustrated during a visit to a housing complex
in Baghdad that used to comprise apartments for Saddam Hussein’s Special Guard. The spacious
apartments are now home to 37 families who moved in after the war. The four families IRIN met there had
all left their original homes because of rent increases, rather than being forced out.
(…)
The displaced and squatters who are not in key installations are unlikely to be moved by Coalition forces in
the near future. However, some are in buildings which could serve a useful purpose. A large group of
displaced and poor people have taken over a former showpiece orphanage, known as the Iraqi Family
Village. The NGO Life wants to see it emptied as quickly as possible and restored to its former use.
(…)
Before the war, more than 600 orphans lived in the Family Village, with more than 300 teachers and
support staff. There was a well-equipped school, a lavish mosque, sports facilities and a health centre.
When the war started, the staff sent the children away - some went to stay with relatives, but others have
ended up on the streets. The Family Village was comprehensively looted after the war, and then squatters
moved in. It was not possible to speak to them as they are aggressive to outsiders, presumably fearing
eviction, and are said to be armed. The only residents who approached IRIN were three children who
confided that the Family Village was much better than their old homes.
110
"It’s a complicated issue - and it’s one that the Coalition authorities will have to resolve," said Robb. "But
we need to get the children back in here." The Coalition forces have been moving some IDPs and squatters
out of buildings that they need, such as prisons and police stations.
"We have to make sure that if the people are moved, they have somewhere to go to," said Chris Petch of
IOM from Baghdad. "And one of the main problems in Iraq is the chronic housing shortage which is not
going to be fixed overnight."” (IRIN, 15 July 2003)
Displaced Marsh Arabs in the city in need of assistance (June 2003)
•
•
Nearly 300,000 Marsh Arabs were killed or forced to leave their homes
As the displaced marsh-dwellers arrived in Baghdad, Saddam issued a law forbidding them to buy
lands
“Kassra and Attashis - "Broken and Thirsty" in Arabic - lies on the very edge of Baghdad and at first sight
looks like one of the many sprawling garbage dumps that disfigure the Iraqi capital. It is a forlorn, sunbaked wasteland of crumbling mud huts surrounded by piles of scrap metal and bright green lakes of raw
sewage. (…) Kassra and Attashis is the furthest extremity of the sprawling Shia suburb that the old regime
called Saddam City, but that was renamed Sadr City after Saddam's fall, in memory of a much-loved Shia
religious leader assassinated by the regime. Many of the people living here were displaced from the
marshes of southern Iraq after Saddam drained them to punish Shia in the region for supporting a popular
uprising against him in 1991.
Nearly 300,000 Marsh Arabs were killed or forced to leave the area, home to a unique culture and complex
ecosystem between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers that lasted for thousands of years. Many others
disappeared. The marshes today are a salt-encrusted desert inhabited by barely 20,000 people. Human
rights groups have called the attack on the region and its people genocide, and have said it should form part
of a war crimes dossier if Saddam is ever captured and brought to justice.
As the displaced marsh-dwellers arrived in Baghdad, Saddam issued a law forbidding them to buy lands,
thereby making it impossible for them to live off the land. Some turned to crime. Others - a minority - work
as shepherds, selling milk and cheese. A few live on the charity of friends and neighbours. There are almost
no men in this desolate place. Most households are headed by widows who lost their husbands either in the
war against Iran or in the war in the marshes. Few children go to school: they have to contribute to their
family's income - either by hawking simple items, begging or searching the rubbish, from dawn until dusk,
in hope of finding something valuable to sell.
As American forces completed their conquest of Baghdad in April, members of the Fedayeen of Saddam
militia attacked Kassra and Attashis for no apparent reason. Hessna Ghata's husband died from a bullet
wound in the one-room hut where he lived with his 10 children - six girls and four boys. The children saw
him die. "We don't know why they came here," Hessna said. "We are poor people. We cause no harm."
Hessna's neighbour, whose little girl almost lost a foot from an infected rat bite, shrugged. "Saddam hated
the Shia," she said. Since Saddam Hussein was toppled, and bad government was replaced by no
government, the inhabitants of Kassra and Attashis have been visited only once - by a team from the
humanitarian office of the Iraqi National Congress, a political coalition formerly based in London, led by
Tamara Daghestani. Daghestani's frustration at the occupying forces' slowness in responding to the need in
Baghdad - and not just in extreme cases like that of Kassra and Attashis - was obvious. "People are
beginning to get really angry," she said. "There is no security and almost no electricity. Saddam is winning
the PR battle without having to lift a finger."” (IWPR, 25 June 2003)
111
UNHCR assisting internally displaced Iraqi Kurds (2003)
•
•
•
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•
UNHCR has dispatched tents, blankets, kitchen sets, stoves and lanterns
UNHCR program to rehabilitate villages in Makhmour district in the Erbil governorate
The agency is concentrating assistance efforts in areas where there are no major problems
In Dohuk, UNHCR has assessed conditions in 26 of 36 villages devastated during the 1990s
conflict
In most of the villages, UNHCR has found that returns could not take place because of property
disputes
”The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has mobilized assistance for internally displaced
Iraqi Kurds who have gone back spontaneously to their original villages in the Dohuk area under a multiagency program to stabilize returnee communities.
UNHCR has dispatched tents, blankets, kitchen sets, stoves and lanterns to 230 people in 32 families at
Galikhodeda village, and similar relief aid packages are being arranged for 200 returnees in 28 families at
Hinjirok village. Shelter materials will soon be distributed in the two villages, and other UN agencies and
NGOs are clearing land mines in peripheral areas and laying out plans to dig wells and bring in electricity.
Almost all of the houses at Galikhodeda and Hinjirok villages in Shekhan district were destroyed during the
inter-Kurdish factional fighting in the mid-1990s that uprooted around 180,000 people in the Dohuk
governorate. They are among an estimated 800,000 internally displaced people, or IDPs, forced from their
homes in decades of conflicts and ethnic cleansing campaigns in northern Iraq.
Last month, UNHCR began the program to rehabilitate villages in Makhmour district in the Erbil
governorate, where spontaneous returns have taken place. After handing out tents and emergency relief to
three villages in Makhmour, UNHCR is now providing shelter materials - cement, window and door frames
- to these villages so the returnees could build houses. "We are concentrating our assistance efforts in areas
where there are no major problems," said Pierre Francois Pirlot, UNHCR's coordinator for northern Iraq.
"There are areas where returns could provoke tensions, such as the Kirkuk region. There, we are urging
displaced people who are from that area to remain where they are as outstanding property disputes have not
been resolved."
During a visit to northern Iraq last month, High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers said the international
community must find a way forward to facilitate the return of displaced people, saying that failure to do so
could spark renewed tensions. In Dohuk, UNHCR has assessed conditions in 26 of 36 villages devastated
during the 1990s conflict. In most of the villages, UNHCR has found that returns could not take place
because of property disputes, the absence of basic infrastructure and the presence of unexploded ordnance.
Most of the IDPs in the region and elsewhere are living in appalling conditions in mud huts in collective
settlements.
In addition to its work for internally displaced Iraqis, UNHCR is also laying the groundwork for the
eventual repatriation of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees currently outside the country. The first
UNHCR-organised convoy of refugees returning to Iraq since the fall of the government of Saddam
Hussein arrived in southern Iraq on Wednesday morning from Rafha camp in Saudi Arabia.” (UNHCR, 30
July 2003)
Deterioration of shelter conditions for the internally displaced in northern Iraq (20002002)
112
•
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•
According UN Habitat 2001, in the 805,505 people accounted for in the UN-Habitat survey, the
majority, 446,000 people, live in 'collective towns'
Thousands of people expelled from Kirkuk live in tent or abandoned military facilities (2002)
Internally displaced persons in northern Iraq live in tents or in open, unheated public buildings
Head of UN Programs in Iraq concerned about the increasing number of internally displaced and
the lack of housing possibilities for the new comers
"Of the 805,505 people accounted for in the UN-Habitat survey, the majority, 446,000 people, live in
‘collective towns.’ These are purpose-built settlements that the regime constructed in the lowlands during
the 1970s and 1980s to accommodate and control the people expelled from the 4,000 or so villages it had
destroyed. Many of these settlements are in an advanced state of decay, and many have insufficient
infrastructure. Others, however, are on the outskirts of cities and towns and have started to blend into them;
the displaced population in these settlements has come to rely on the services and infrastructure of the
existing urban centers.
Another 301,000 people live in homes and apartments both in villages and cities. As of October 2000, this
left about 57,000 people living in barracks or other buildings not constructed for permanent family
accommodation. Of this 57,000 people, 6,366 were living in tents.
The international aid community has assisted approximately 35,000 people with their shelter needs. In
order to provide everyone with decent housing, UN-Habitat estimated that 26,290 new housing units
needed to be built. Nearly 10,000 of these would be for the aforementioned 57,000 people living in tents
and inadequate buildings. The other housing units would be built to relieve overcrowding of displaced
persons in the collective towns, villages and cities.[…]
Of the 6,366 living in tents, the majority, 4,069, were returnees from Iran, 1,950 were victims of
Arabization, and 347 had fled or been expelled from their homes as a result of Kurdish infighting.
Nevertheless they have attracted considerable local and international media attention. New expellees from
the Center/South are directed to these tent camps, run by the KRG, as their first place of refuge and by
some accounts remain there for up to two years.
It is not clear why people must live in tented camps for such extended periods of time.[…]
The reasons why these people are spending inordinate amounts of time in what are ostensibly reception
camps may be:
Foot-dragging or incompetence within the UN agencies, as suggested in USG Sevan's report;
The governing authorities of the KRG are trying to maintain visible and demonstrable examples of the
expulsions resulting from the government of Iraq's Arabization campaign.
Two-thirdsAccording to the Habitat survey, two-thirds of the people are returnees from Iran, and their
original home is in other areas of Iraq. They have no local affinitysupport network to draw upon, and no
aid agency takes them on.
Over the past six months living conditions in most of these camps have improved. Sanitation and water
supply show marked improvement. Electrification projects are in process, and education and health care
plans are underway. All of this is due to the activities of the recently established IDP unit in UNOPS."
(Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 2002, pp19-21)
"According to Kurdish sources, "Thousands of Kurdish and some Turkoman Iraqis expelled from Kirkuk,
Khanaqin, and Sinjar live in tent cities near Chamchamal, or in temporary housing in Kifri and Kalar, as
well as in abandoned Iraqi military facilities in Irbil and Sulaymaniyah." (RFE/RL 26 April 2002)
113
"Shelter and infrastructure conditions in rural and urban settlements of northern Iraq have deteriorated to
critical levels in the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis. This situation has been compounded by problems arising
from previous population movements in the north and the return of families to rural villages; the increase of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in recent months; the sheltering of large numbers of IDPs in inadequate
buildings without a minimum of services and facilities; the continuous deterioration of urban and semi urban areas due to lack of supplies for essential operation and maintenance; and the inability of families
settled or returning to rural centres to support themselves.
As a result, there is a clear need to undertake humanitarian rehabilitation activities which enable the
sustainability of resettled centres, focusing on access roads, essential infrastructure to support productive
activities, water supply and sanitation and the construction of community facilities such as health centres
and schools. The experience gained in the implementation of previous programmes also points to the need
for a greater emphasis on establishing community-based methods for project implementation.
The population increase and limited land available in rural areas also restricts the number of people that can
return to rural villages in the medium-term. This creates a humanitarian need for maintaining selected basic
services and infrastructure in certain collective towns to serve those families that do not have resettlement
alternatives as well as to accommodate new IDPs. A case by case approach is applied to define the
humanitarian rehabilitation actions to be carried out in these settlements.
Cities and towns in the northern Governorates are home to near 2 million people. Approximately 1.1
million people inhabit the three capital cities, Suleimaniyeh (480,000), Erbil (440,000) and Dohouk
(190,000). Urban settlements with previously satisfactory coverage of infrastructure and services have
witnessed a dramatic decline in their quality and coverage in recent years.
The situation of IDPs is of great concern in northern Iraq. Most of them, including widows and children,
live under precarious conditions in public buildings and provisional shelter." (UNCHS December 2000)
"Just a few miles outside Sulaymaniyya […] [i]n makeshift tents, with open pits for waste disposal,
displaced Kurdish families, or fractions of families, survive on UN rations. This particular camp is called
New Kirkuk, because people thrown out of Kirkuk by the Iraqi army arrive by the dozens almost every
day." (Aquilla Lawrence Summer 2000)
"In a briefing to the Security Council last Monday, Benon Sevan, who directs all of the United Nations
programs in Iraq that are not related to weapons, said he was 'greatly concerned with the increasing
numbers of internally displaced person.' He said conditions at refugee centers were 'abominable.' […]
At refugee camp at Kani Shaitan, east of Kirkuk in Kurdish territory, 1,375 people, 994 of them children,
have been crowded into a settlement built for 550 people. People continue to arrive at the camp, officials
say, sometimes in groups that appear to have been driven out of government-controlled regions en masse.
'Unfortunately, the number of families at the Kani Shaitan camp appear to be increasing,' Mr. Sevan said.
Arrivals are getting ahead of efforts to build homes for newcomers. At another nearby camp, Chamchamal,
plans to build nearly 500 houses in time for the harsh winter of mountainous northern Iraq have been held
up by a dearth of materials. In other settlements the United Nations has been putting up tents and supplying
them with heaters. The latest report of the United Nations program under which Iraq exports unlimited
quantities of oil to buy civilian goods says the presence of so many refugees is taxing the ability of the
United Nations housing agency, Habitat. Housing experts are looking for ways to encourage local builders
to provide labor and material for crash programs." (Crossette 11 December 2000)
114
ACCESS TO EDUCATION
General
Schools reopen despite security concerns
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Schools reopen in the south despite secutity concerns
Reconstruction of schools started
UNICEF distributes "school-in-a-box"-kits
“On Sunday, in the country's second-largest city, Basra, children started trickling back to the schools they
had abandoned in mid-March as war loomed. At Al-Fajr al-Jadid Primary School in central Basra, 20 pupils
returned; from a school roll of 600, this may seem barely worth recording, except for the fact that it
represents the start of a long process of rebuilding the country’s education system, which has been in a state
of decline for over a decade. The school’s 25 teachers hope that as word spreads that the school is open
again, more children will feel comfortable about returning. Even if not much teaching takes place, the
teachers want to begin restoring the children’s trust inasmuch as the Iraqi army used many schools as bases
during the war. One of the teachers, Thaka Muhammad Bakr, said that in Basra the war had badly
frightened the children, and many now cried on hearing any noise. "Their education has been disturbed.
The children have forgotten what they were taught, and we will have to revise what they had before," she
said.
While schools in northern Iraq reopened more than a week ago, the south has struggled to restore even
basic institutions. With no government to organise education or pay teachers, and many schools hit by
looting, bored children have been left to their own devices on the streets of Basra and other cities and
towns. The Save the Children’s spokeswoman for southern Iraq, Nicole Amoroso, said from Kuwait City
that even if schools could not formally reopen, it was important to organise areas where children could
gather. For some children it was the second war they had experienced, and there would be considerable
trauma for them to overcome. Moreover, such matters as landmine awareness training would have to be
attended to, Amoroso said.
While many schools in the south will reopen, damage to buildings and difficulties over getting teachers to
return are two reasons why some schools may be unable to do so before the official school year ends in
June. This raises the danger of the country's education system remaining crippled for even longer. Even
before the war, the United Nations Children’s Fund estimated that Iraq was short of 5,000 primary schools,
and 8,000 existing ones were in desperate need of repair. Because of overcrowding, many children attended
school for only two to three hours a day instead of six, and more than 25 percent of children did not go to
school at all." (IRIN, 21 April 2003)
“After a closure of six weeks, one of the first primary schools in Baghdad to reopen its doors after the war
welcomed back its pupils on Tuesday. About 30 of the school's 1,300 pupils turned up on the first day, but
the school's principal Sa'diyah Sa'd said numbers would increase quickly as the word spread.
Fears about the continuing insecurity in the city and difficulties getting to school were reasons why not
everyone would return to school for some time. The school had buses, but could not operate them because
there was no fuel. Many of the school’s rooms had broken windows caused by bomb blasts nearby, and it
still had no electricity, she said. Moreover, all 52 teachers were working without pay and had no idea when
they might get their wages, Sa'diyah said. "We are just doing this for the good of the children. It’s our
115
loyalty to our children and to help our country." She went on to say that in an effort to catch up the lessons
lost during the war, they would concentrate on academic subjects rather than activities like sports during
the month before the end of the school year. Parents would also be encouraged to give extra lessons to their
children at home.”
“Hayfah Baha, said she was still frightened to send her 12-year-old daughter to school, because there was
unexploded ordnance in the streets, shooting at night and looting still going on. "Now I can’t even leave my
daughter standing at the front of the house," she said. At nearby Adhamiya Secondary School for girls, its
principal, Salwa Ahmad al-Sharbati, agreed that security was a major concern for everyone. "Nobody feels
safe about bringing their children to school," she said; what was needed was a police car with two officers
at the school entrance, but there were no longer any police in Baghdad. On Tuesday, staff and students
were busy cleaning the school from damage caused when bombs exploded at a nearby palace of Saddam
Husayn's, and Salwa said she would open the 700-pupil school on Wednesday. "It has been an
extraordinary situation, and I feel upset, but we hope to get things back to normal. Especially at this age, if
the youths have no school, it has a big effect on their future - it is very bad."
“Earlier in the year, expecting war to break out, she had doubled lessons, and would now try to do the same
again so that pupils could catch up. Eighteen-year-old Ansama Hazim was one of the students helping to
clear away a thick layer of dirt, accumulated rubbish and broken glass from the classrooms.
Even though the war was over, she did not feel safe, but was so keen to return to school that she made her
brother accompany her. She was particularly worried she would not be able to sit the end-of-year exams, in
which case the whole academic year would be lost. The same fears are being expressed at universities
where students are also set to return to class. At Baghdad University’s Al-Kindi College of Medicine,
lecturers are planning to resume lectures and clinical work on Saturday, although practical lessons in
laboratories could be a month away. But one lecturer, Prof Ali, said staff would do everything they could to
enable students to complete the academic year even if it meant extending classes into holiday time.
He was particularly worried about how the war had affected students psychologically, also noting that
many of them might have difficulty getting back to Baghdad from their homes across the country. "Frankly,
this is not an easy situation we have faced. We are a repressed people. Teaching staff and doctors hope that
things will get better for us, but it’s a vague future." Staff had received no communication from education
ministry officials, so had had to make their own decisions about reopening. Ali was pessimistic about how
quickly things could return to normal, given that the university still had no electricity or sufficient water.”
(IRIN, 30 April 2003)
“UNESCO is assisting with the production of 5 million science and mathematics textbooks, available to
primary and secondary Iraqi students for the forthcoming school year, starting September 2003. UNESCO
is accomplishing this in cooperation with, and with support from, the US Agency for International
Development (USAID). OCPA has announced that over 30% of schools are now open. Attendance is now
90% in many locations, compared to 40% only a week ago. College and university students are also
completing their first full week of classes. The MoE Coordinator presented an education sector report to the
humanitarian community on 26 May. The countrywide average of enrolment is now 60%, and end of the
year exams are scheduled to begin 21 June. Teacher and MoE staff salaries will be paid shortly. Shortly, a
USAID contractor will complement activities for 2 million secondary students, plus another 4 million by
the beginning of the next school year. During the summer, UNICEF and Betchel will conduct repairs on
2000 schools. Another 6,000 school buildings will be targeted within one year. Creative Associate Inc. will
deliver furniture, equipment and supplies through local suppliers. A UNICEF/MoE programme for girl's
education will be piloted in Basrah. USAID, UNESCO and UNICEF are assisting in the Iraqi-led revision
of textbooks, to be used in the next school year. Consultation with MoE for the revision of curricula and
provision of teacher training is ongoing. UNICEF has so far distributed 250 School in a Box Kits (SIBKs)
to schools. This has benefited 20,000 students and 500 teachers.
116
UNESCO held meetings with Ministry of Education (MOE) counterparts on 25-27 May. Among those
issues discussed were the timetable for forthcoming examinations at all levels of education; concerns over
the examination copybook, especially with regard to changed specifications; the review and printing of new
text books for the sciences; changes to, and coordination of, the national curriculum; teacher training and
pay; MOE outstanding procurement contracts; MOE equipment requirements; and school rehabilitation.”
(HCI, 2 June 2003)
A quarter of Iraqi children are no longer attending school (May 2002)
"The Government of Iraq now acknowledges that at least 23 per cent of all school-aged children (6-15
years of age) are no longer attending school; many are working to supplement family incomes. Schools are
not being maintained and repaired, and experience severe shortages of basic school supplies, classroom
furniture, textbooks and teaching aids. Lack of adequate investment in teacher training, and in teaching and
learning materials has seriously affected the overall quality of education. Teachers' salaries are grossly
inadequate. This grim situation has prompted an increasing number of qualified teachers to leave the sector
in search of better-paid jobs. This has also been reflected in school entry rates: only 66.8 per cent of male
and 66.6 per cent of female students at the age of six were enrolled in 2000 against 88 per cent and 87 per
cent respectively in 1991." (UNICEF 29 May 2002)
117
ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Self-reliance
Rubbish dump gives IDPs economic means (January 2004)
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•
Every day a green garbage truck usually shows up with trash from a US civilian and military
compound
For IDP children, the dump has meant they can contribute to feeding themselves and their families
Rubbish haulers estimated they bring 10 trucks per day
"Every day around 1 p.m. it's like the Muslim festival of Eid and the Christian festival of Christmas rolled
into one big present for the children who live next to the main Baghdad city dump in the district of Taji.
That's when a green garbage truck usually shows up with trash from a US civilian and military compound
known as the "green zone" in downtown Baghdad.
The truck disgorges colourful, American magazines and unopened food packets; stale, half-eaten cans of
Pringles and worn-out tennis shoes - a sharp contrast to the meagre orange peels and plastic bottles that
make up most Iraqi trash.
"I look for sweets and pictures in magazines," Delal Hanlar, a 10-year-old told IRIN as she scavenged from
the lucrative piles of black plastic trash bags, an embroidered black headscarf covering her hair. "My family
sell the magazines," she added. For these IDP children, the dump has meant they can contribute to feeding
themselves and their families.
Teenager Ahmed Mohammed hands a grimy but unopened chocolate energy bar to his brother Haidar, who
gleefully rips open the shiny, gold wrapper with his teeth. It's Mohammed's job along with the other
children from families who live near the dump to poke through the bags to find valuable things to sell.
But many of the children play with the new garbage, finding some edible cheese spread and vegetable
crackers from a US military meal-ready-to-eat (MRE) package, and orange crackers with peanut butter that
turns to crumbs when the plastic package is opened.
In thrifty Iraq, trash has always been sold to shepherds who use the vegetable parings and stale bread to
feed their goats, sheep and cows. The new loads go for up to 15 times the price, however, about US $15
paid directly to the driver.
"Shepherds trust in God to keep the animals from eating anything that's not good for them, including the
numerous plastic bags," Jema Zair Hassan, who owns an assortment of animals that eats the rubbish, told
IRIN.
"This is very rich as food for animals, that's the most important thing," Hassan said, explaining why he pays
for the load being dumped in front of cows and sheep being tended by his children and neighbours. "But
sometimes we find other things like shoes and electrical cords that we can sell," he added.
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Before US-led troops rolled into Iraq in April, the rubbish pickers used to look for garbage trucks from the
wealthy neighbourhoods of Mansour and Jermuk. Those trash bags are all but forgotten now.
"For these IDP children, the dump has meant they can contribute to feeding themselves and their families.
," rubbish hauler, Raid Hekmat, told IRIN. "Even the Iraqi Army had much less."
Rubbish haulers estimated they bring 10 trucks per day, each carrying one and a half mt, to the dump. Once
the children have gone through the rubbish piles, families set them on fire, sending up a toxic stench.
Smouldering trash piles are less likely to spread disease, and rodents won't move into them, Hassan said."
(UN OCHA, 13 January 2004)
North sets reconstruction example ( January 2004)
•
•
•
•
The experience and resources of Iraq's north can help reconstruct the rest of the country
Since 1992 the three Kurdish northern governorates have effectively governed themselves and
started to rebuild independancy
Although the north is still plagued with some problems such as shelter for IDPs, efforts to assist
them have greatly benefited the economy of the region
Wrong to import such things as tents from overseas when they could be made in the north
"The experience and resources of Iraq's north can help reconstruct the rest of the country according to
NGOs and authorities in the region. Since 1992 the three Kurdish northern governorates have effectively
governed themselves and started to rebuild independancy from the rest of Iraq after years of repression and
destruction.
Those lessons should now be exploited, according to Robert Pianka, field office manager in the north of
Iraq for the US-based NGO Mercy Corps. Based in the northern city of Khanaqin, Pianka said that Iraq's
situation should not be judged by the troubled areas of Baghdad, Tikrit and Fallujah. "Our reality is nobody
else's reality. The ability of the north to help the rest of the country is obvious to anyone that's here," he told
IRIN in Sulaymaniyah.
While Khanaqin is mainly Kurdish it was below the green line that separated the north from the Baghdadbased Iraqi regime but despite this it was being quickly rehabilitated due to its proximity to the north.
Being free of Saddam Hussein for more than a decade and relatively peaceful for the last six years had
meant the opportunity for many reconstruction projects in the north, the majority under the auspices of the
UN with Oil-for-Food Programme money.
Although the north is still plagued with some problems such as shelter for IDPs, these efforts had greatly
benefited the economy of the region. "It's just a great, secure, prosperous place that we can procure things
for the rest of the country," Pianka said.
He explained that it was crazy to import such things as tents from overseas when they could be made in the
north."This is not rocket science and it's obvious if you're sitting in the north. If you are sitting in Samara or
Tikrit it's not so obvious." Pianka said the north had about seven years' head start on the rest of the country
and this could be seen in things such as businesses and billboards.
"Things that happen when people have time to get down to work and you can project that into the south."
He believed the largest problem facing the country was poverty, brought on by Saddam Hussein and
international embargos, and said more than half the population could be considered poor or very poor.( UN
OCHA, 7 January 2004)
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SCF-Survey: 60% of the population of Northern Iraq is poor, and 20 percent are totally
reliant on the WFP food rations (2002)
"20% live in extreme poverty, defined as under $150 per household per annum
20% of the total population of Northern Iraq is living in extreme poverty, bordering on destitution, with
incomes of US $120 to $200 per household per annum (phpa). Most of the very poor live in the households
of widows, the disabled and the elderly, living in towns and collectives. They are entirely reliant on the
WFP food ration and have virtually no other access to income, with the exception of casual labour and
internal gifts from their respective communities.
40% live in poverty, defined as under $300 phpa.
In addition to the 20% in extreme poverty, 40% of the total population of Northern Iraq is living in poverty.
There is a slight increase in income of US $250 to $300 phpa. Income is generated from agricultural
production, agricultural and casual labour, regular low-paid employment and access to small amounts of
often rented land (1 to 4 donums).
Many middle income groups have incomes under $400 phpa, and may be at risk
There is a further 25% of the urban population which was defined as having medium wealth. Significant
income is gained through regular employment as civil servants, teachers, drivers, etc. A large amount of
income is gained through taking loans and using past savings. For the 36% of villagers in this medium
group, the main income sources come from crop and livestock production. However a proportion
of the middle groups are also at risk (half the communities visited had average incomes of less than $400
phpa.) […]
Most households are extremely vulnerable to external shocks, including
unplanned changes in the sanctions system
The poorest population makes up 60% of the total population of Northern Iraq. It is extremely vulnerable to
external ‘shocks’. These shocks include droughts, price increases, external or internal conflict, and natural
disasters. They also include any unplanned changes to the ration system created by UN Security Council
Resolution 986. They have little (if any) capacity to expand to other coping strategies and economic
activities." (SCF 2002, pp39-40)
Arabs requested that they be provided with 50% of the harvest as part of a sharing
agreement with returning Kurds (August 2003)
•
Returned Kurdish IDPs have been told by local authorities to refrain from planting the fields this
autumn
•
If fields lie fallow and food assistance is discontinued, it is likely that a food crisis will occur in
the near future
"Lands in the north that were confiscated by the government as part of the Arabization process represent
the breadbasket of the country. The process of Kurds reclaiming their previous lands began just before the
harvesting season. Departing Arabs requested that they be provided with 50% of the harvest as part of a
sharing agreement with returning Kurds. Bureaucratic delays and political wrangling prevented this plan
from being carried out.
Newly returned Kurdish IDPs have been told by local authorities to refrain from planting the fields this
autumn because of unresolved property issues. The provisional government has not yet determined who
rightfully owns the land. As a result, returnees will not replant out of fear that they will not reap the
benefits of their labor. This fear is fully justified considering the history of IDPs in general and the recent
treatment of Arab farmers.
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The decision of returnees to refrain from planting fields may have serious repercussions. As mentioned,
lands in northern Iraq produce a preponderance of the country’s food. In addition, the Oil-for-Food
Program (that currently provides food to 60% of Iraqis) is scheduled to end in November 2003. If fields lie
fallow and food assistance is discontinued, it is likely that a food crisis will occur in the near future." (RI,
25 August 2003).
The Marsh Arabs divided between their old and new lives
•
•
•
•
For close to a decade, thousands of Marsh Arabs- or Ma'dan - have lived in dusty roadside
villages
It is only since they were forced out of the marshes that they have come into contact with the
outside world and its progress
'In the marshes we knew nothing about schools and hospitals'
'Now we want to be civilised'
“(…) Shanawah is a tribal chief of about 1,000 dispossessed and demoralised Marsh Arabs - an Iraqi tribe,
who, until Saddam Hussein intervened, lived simple lives cut off from the outside world.
But now, with Saddam gone and calls both locally and internationally for the recovery of the marshlands,
Shanawah's village - and dozens more like it - is struggling to choose between the lives they now lead and
the lives they were forced to abandon.
For close to a decade, thousands of Marsh Arabs- or Ma'dan - have lived in dusty roadside villages, earning
a living from land instead of water, from wheat instead of fish, and despite the hardships it entails, there is
much that they like about their new way of life. For it is only since they were forced out of the marshes that
they have come into contact with the outside world and its progress.
"Life in the marshes was good and we were happy to live there, but when we were in the marshes we knew
nothing about schools and hospitals. Now we want to be civilised," said Shanawah. Many of the Ma'dan are
too young to remember much of the life they once had. Most Marsh Arabs first felt the sting of Saddam in
1991 when the people of southern Iraq dared to rebel against him following his defeat in the first Gulf War.
As members of Iraq's long-oppressed Shi'ah majority, many of the Ma'dan were already committed
opponents of the former Iraqi government, and when army deserters and rebels sought shelter in the
marshes, Saddam began a dual policy of forced expulsion and the systematic draining of the marshes using
a network of diversionary dams and canals.
(…)
Eighty percent of the marshlands has been converted into open farmland or remains fallow. Much of the
ecosystem has been badly damaged and landmines still pose a constant danger to the few who still live
there. Moreover, when the Iraqi army collapsed and fled their camps in the aftermath of Saddam's final
defeat, they left yet more munitions on the marshes' borders. The village of Al-Turabah, where some 200
families now live, is just such a place. An oily film spreads across the water's surface and, according to 36year-old Faysal Na'im, the fish in it rarely grow bigger than a finger where before they used to grow to "the
length of my arm".
Faisal remembers marsh life well - the fishing trips with his father, the water buffalo cavorting in the water,
the neatly built Mudheef, or meeting halls, where men would gather to discuss the business of the day.
But much has changed since they were forcibly evacuated from the marshes and Faisal speaks for many
Ma'dan when he says that he would rather continue living outside of the marshes with the benefits that
come with exposure to the outside world than return to the isolated marsh lives they lived before.
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Indeed, Faisal is not sure what to make of the growing number of fields that have been re-flooded since the
regime's collapse. Both by design and lack of maintenance water is seeping through damns and sluice gates
and returning to the fields that until recently grew wheat and barley.
"We do not want the marshes to come back," said Faisal. "Where will we grow our crops if there is only
water? Now we are farmers not fishermen." But across the border in Iran where the British NGO AMAR
(Assisting Marsh Arabs and Refugees) has been assisting the 60,000 odd refugees for more than a decade,
the Marsh Arabs there, says AMAR, are desperate for the marshes to be re-flooded. Like their displaced
counterparts in Iraq they too have been exposed to the services and benefits of a modern way of life, but
unlike their brothers in Iraq they have not been denied them. "What the Marsh Arabs in Iran are telling us
they want is to return to the marshes but to take these benefits and services with them," said Dr. Peter
Clark, AMARs Chief Executive Officer.
But for their brothers in Iraq, the trauma they had experienced at the hands of Saddam Hussein and many of
the adjustments that they have been forced to make means that they have lost their way culturally. As one
middle aged Ma'dan put it, "we used to live like fishes but now we have forgotten how to swim."
“Whether the traditional marshland environment and society can ever be recreated is the subject of some
debate. In the meantime, the most Marsh Arabs continue to endure the privations suffered by all vulnerable
peoples within this desperately poor country. Today few Marsh Arabs (perhaps only 10,000) are living in
their traditional marshlands, less than 10% of which can now sustain their traditional way of life. Estimates
of the number of internally displaced Marsh Arabs range from 100,000 to 200,000 and up to 100,000 are
believed to have left the country as refugees, of which 40,000 are currently in Iran and have been known to
cross back and forth over the border. Following the 2003 conflict, which largely by-passed the marsh area,
the Marsh Arabs have received a great deal of attention from the media and the international community.
This attention has rightly brought their plight to the world’s attention. However, such focus if
uncoordinated, can negatively impact communities by driving humanitarian actors into interventions that
substitute good practice for visibility.
An additional concern for the humanitarian assistance community is registration of Marsh Arabs.
Registration of the Marsh Arab community as IDPs and in general terms needs to be clarified among the
concerned agencies. General registration may create an artificial divide between communities and also raise
expectations that will be difficult to meet. It must also be recalled that the marshlands contain considerable
oil reserves and there may be some political sensitivities regarding full land rights. In this respect, a
compensation mechanism and/or alternative settlement areas that offer returnees real options for a durable
return may have to be considered.
This report highlights immediate humanitarian needs as reported by Marsh Arab communities. Whether
these needs are unique to Marsh Arabs is doubtful. More likely, depending on livelihood patterns, needs
between vulnerable groups are similar. That is a matter for continuing assessments with wider objectives.
Assessment teams have heard from Marsh Arab communities, Iraqi government administrators and the
international humanitarian community. The consistent message is that special assistance should not be
focused on Marsh Arab communities. The needs and aspirations of the communities assessed are shared
by other communities. As some of these communities have managed to integrate into the society, targeting
the Marsh Arabs as an independent group will not be practically feasible nor is it in a humanitarian context
recommended. Artificial divides in targeting will encourage hostilities between the Marsh Arabs,
surrounding host communities and other sizeable vulnerable groups who in essence have similar needs.”
(UNOCHI, 30 June 2003)
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Revitalizing Agriculture should be a priority for employment and to reduce
dependence
•
•
Revitalizing agriculture to reduce dependence on aid and imports
Unemployment hits hard
“One reconstruction priority in Iraq should to revitalize Iraqi agriculture to reduce dependence on food aid
and food imports and to increase farmers incomes. Observers predict that many Iraqis will exhaust their
food reserves in May. Immediate shipments of large quantities of food aid to Iraq are necessary to prevent
serious hardship and increased malnutrition. The United Nations has appealed for $1.3 billion in
contributions to provide food to Iraq during the next six months. The 26 million people of Iraq, thus, will
become the beneficiaries of the largest food aid program in the world.”
“The immediate reason for Iraq's large food aid needs is the disruption of food imports and the UNmanaged oil-for-food program caused by the war in Iraq. Sixty percent of Iraq's people depend on the oilfor-food program for all their food. Whether food distribution under the oil-for-food program can be
resumed depends on establishing basic security inside the country and on the UN Security Council
resolving legal and procedural issues as to if and how the program should continue now that the Iraqi
government has been replaced by an occupying force led by the United States. While some food aid will be
necessary, requirements will be gradually reduced as the economic situation normalizes. Barring obstacles
imposed by the Security Council, Iraq should be able to import food and pay for it with the money it has in
oil-for-food escrow accounts -- reportedly more than US$10 billion -- and with receipts from petroleum
exports.”
The necessity for Iraq to import huge quantities of food reflects the sad state of Iraqi agriculture after two
decades of neglect. Grain production during the upcoming May/June harvest will be about 1.7 million
metric tons -- less than one-half the grain production in 1990. This decline in production was caused by the
deterioration in agricultural infrastructure and shortages of inputs such as seeds and fertilizer.
The oil-for-food program, begun in 1995, has had a deleterious impact on agriculture. Under the oil-forfood program, cash was scarce and food was distributed by the government -- under UN supervision -- to
virtually everyone in the country. Although the UN cites increases in production of poultry, meat, and eggs
under the oil-for-food program, Iraqis have told Refugees International that the import and distribution of
food under the program damaged the internal market for locally produced agricultural products. Iraq will
continue to be a food-importing country, but it seems feasible to reduce imports by increasing agricultural
production if inputs such as seeds and fertilizer can be provided, infrastructure improved, and farmers have
a market for their products. Ensuring a market for Iraqi-produced agricultural products is the trickiest part
of this equation beacause cash-poor Iraqis are now dependent upon free or subsidized food provided
through food aid and the oil-for-food program. Over a period of time, as Iraq's economy improves and
agriculture production increases, the public distribution system for food, created under the oil-for-food
program, can be eliminated, although it may be necessary to continue free or subsidized distribution of food
to the most vulnerable members of Iraqi society.”
“It is often said that Iraq is an urbanized country, but the contribution of agriculture to the economy and
employment should not be ignored. In this petroleum-rich country, agriculture contributes six to eight
percent of the economy and about 25 percent of the population is employed in agriculture. Agricultural
revitalization, because of its potential for positive results impacting a large number of Iraqis, deserves a
high priority in the reconstruction effort for Iraq. Thus far, however, agriculture seems to have received
short shrift by the U.S. government agencies charged with helping reconstruct Iraq. The U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) has issued eight Requests for Proposals (RFPs) this year for work in
Iraq and has signed several contracts for capital construction, seaport and airport administration, education,
public health, local governance, and logistical and personnel support. But USAID has yet to issue an RFP
for agriculture.”
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“The next planting season for grain in Iraq is October and November. Time is short and there is a clear
need to begin work now with the goal of stimulating a large increase in Iraqi agriculture production during
the next year.” (RI, 23 April 2003)
Reviving the food distribution system
"We need our salaries," says Ali Qasim Hasan, a cashier working with the Ministry of Trade (MT) in the
Muthanna Governorate of southern Iraq. "I am here to ask the United Nations to help."They say Coalition
forces promised them US $20 each per month, but payment keeps being postponed, making them feel
increasingly frustrated. "We can't survive like this, they're asking themselves why they come to work at
all," says Ali Qasim. "They are selling clothes, cars, anything, because they need food, what can they do? A
friend of mine sold his watch for 20,000 Iraqi dinars [US $10] to buy a bag of rice."
”Keeping the food distribution system running, which has been designed and managed by local MT staff in
Iraq's 15 central and southern governorates for the last 12 years, is one of the key challenges facing the
country.Not least, because it is central to keeping a lid on people's increasing frustrations with almost total
unemployment, no salaries, no government and poor security. "Keeping the public distribution system
[PDS] going in Iraq's post-conflict phase is essential to stabilising the country," Tarek Elguindi, the
programme coordinator for Iraq with the World Food Programme (WFP), told IRIN. "It is too unstable to
stop giving out food." WFP plans to manage the PDS until the end of September - offering support with
transport and logistics - and then to scale down significantly, while a new government takes over.”
”But to keep the ball rolling and ensure that 60 percent of Iraqis get the heavily subsidised food rations
(250 dinars per ration) that they have depended on for so long, a number of postwar problems need to be
urgently solved. Locating the thousands of food and flour agents who distribute the food from their homes,
placing armed guards at warehouses to keep stocks safe from looters, repairing warehouses and mills
damaged in the war or looted afterwards, locating and updating records of recipients that were not burned
or lost, and reinstating computers in looted warehouses to keep records are just some of the everyday
headaches. Moreover, people are hungry and need to receive the food rations, and more, as soon as
possible. (…) In theory, people in Muthanna have been given supplies, except for milk and rice, to last
them up until September. But most of these have long been sold. "Most have sold the extra rations they got
before the war because everything's become so expensive - they didn't act economically with the food,"
says Khuld Karam, a team coordinator with WFP.”
”So locals are keen to see the system up and running as soon as possible, and have asked WFP to have full
rations in place for 1 June. Partial distributions have been made over the last couple of weeks as a stop-gap
measure, but the high cost of fuel means many food agents cannot afford to keep travelling to the
warehouses to collect it. In Muthanna, some of the 600 food agents have to travel up to 180 km each way to
bring the food back to their homes, where they distribute it to their neighbours. Higher fuel prices will
affect the fairness of the system by tempting food agents to ask people for more than the standard 250
dinars per ration - already difficult to find for some - or to steal food to compensate.”
“Even more worrying in the long-term is whether a new Iraqi government will have the time and money to
import enough food before the end of September. Hamid Kamil, an MT warehouse manager in AsSamawah, said he had heard of no plans to import food. "Nobody has informed us of anything. There have
been no directives from Baghdad," he said. "I don't think any steps have been taken - there's no minister or
ministry, there's no order." With no authority in place, looted banks, empty reserves, and disgruntled MT
workers, the challenges ahead cannot be underestimated. The only certainty is that the task of feeding 27
million Iraqis in a country that does not produce enough to feed itself will not go away.” (IRIN, 14 May
2003)
Unemployment hits hard
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“With the regime toppled, all government employees have now lost their jobs, and even if people like
teachers went back to work there would be nobody to pay them. Many workplaces were damaged in the
fighting or cannot open for lack of electricity and water. While some shops are beginning to reopen, most
stay shut, their owners scared of further looting. The end result is that very few people in Iraq's second
biggest city now have jobs, a situation likely to be one of the greatest challenges facing any new authority
trying to rebuild the country. With no government in place, and limited aid arriving in Basra, most families
are facing a future replete with fear and uncertainty.” (IRIN, 25 April 2003)
In search of sustainable livelihoods for the Marsh Arabs
“Prior to the forced displacement of the Marsh Arabs in 1991, the main livelihood activities engaging
populations were fishing, agriculture, livestock herding (especially water buffalo), hunting and handicraft
making. Wheat, barley, rice and vegetables were grown for household consumption. The significance of the
water based economic activity of the Marsh dwellers reaches far beyond their homeland, as it was the
subsistence for over one million residents of the region. Remnants of destroyed houses, schools and clinics
in the original wetland settlements were noted, supporting the notion that services were much more
accessible in the past.
The forced displacement caused a severe drop in the living standard for the majority of the marsh
populations. With the continuous population movement livelihood patterns shifted. Communities that are
currently settled in proximity to the marshes, seasonal agriculture as well as some livestock rearing were
adopted. Fishing for communities close to water bodies is also practised in a small scale. Most Marsh Arabs
who have moved in closer to urban areas are engaged in a wide range of activities including casual labour
in cities. Unemployment was sited as a major concern for most of the communities visited.
Accordingly, income levels were drastically reduced, as was access to health, education, water and
electricity. The situation of women across the Marsh population merits special mention. Most women/girls
engage in running the households (which is normally extended family structures), house building,
collection of water and working in the farmlands. Women noted that life was much harder for them now
than in the marshes, and expressed a desperate need for access to clean water and health facilities. Literacy
rates appear to have deteriorated as most of the women interviewed were not able to read or write.
Absence of surfaced main, arterial and feeder roads was noted as a major hindrance to economic activities
and access to services. Large areas were reported impassable during the wet season November to April due
to the loosely compacted earth roads. The border with Iran where Marsh Arab concentrations are currently
living is infested with land mines and UXOs.
(…)
General observations from the one-day visit to the Al Hawezieh marsh in the Al Salem district of Missian
and previous visits to the Central Marsh confirm the agricultural imbalance and unsustainability of current
livelihoods of the Marsh Arabs. Displaced farmers who once depended on buffalo meat and milk, fish,
wildfowl, the sale of reed products and seasonal rice, are now part time arable farmers with most of the
men out of work and dependant on food aid. The most interesting observation was the age difference view
of the future with the older generation (40+) wishing to return the known life of the marshes and its stable
food security compared with the younger people (17-30) who know a different life and wish to have
improved services found outside of the marsh.
In the assessment area the situation is difficult in many respects. Crop production and income generation of
farmers has suffered significant drawbacks. Salinity of the soil and poor quality of the irrigation water is the
main problem affecting crop yields. It also affects drinking water for the population and their livestock. As
125
a result, milk yield and buffalo meat growth rates are reduced and further, taste and flavor are affected.
Finally, it reduces the amount of fodder and reed grazing for buffaloes and sheep. This water problem is
worsened by the deterioration and deficient functioning of irrigation infrastructures and pumping stations
and general fuel shortages. Of the three main pumping stations visited, all are out of order. The water
availability problem is worsened by the increase in dam construction in the Tigris watershed which has
reduced the overall water flow.
Fields were also affected by frequent movement of the Iraqi Army in the region, UXO and weaponry left in
the fields and connecting roads. The region never had priority support from the previous regime and the
embargo on agricultural and veterinary inputs worsened the situation. At present with the disruption of
government services, the farmers main difficulties are: lack of support in agricultural inputs such as
fertilizers and pesticide and a lack of veterinary support and vaccination. The farmers also mentioned the
poor quality of seed for wheat and barley, and the lack of communication concerning the procurement of
the 2003 cereal production. Further, farmers reported they made more income from the traditional marsh
livelihood activities including: meat and milk production (buffaloes), wild birds hunting, rice cultivation on
receding water and some wheat and sorghum cultivation.” (UN OCHI, 30 June 2003)
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DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP
General
Iraqi government is destroying evidence that Kurdish families were expelled from
Kirkuk (August 2001)
"[…] in August 2001, the Ministry of the Interior sent a document to the Department of Statistics
demanding that during the expulsion of any family from Kirkuk, false names and numbers should be
written on the documents that are usually issued for them by the governorate office to the checkpoints, and
that the documents should not be registered in their records.
[The Sulaymaniyah Kurdish newspaper] 'Kurdistani Nuwe' believes that the intention behind these
measures is to destroy any evidence that the Iraqi government has expelled Kurdish families from Kirkuk in
case of accountability by official sides, particularly the United Nations. In this way, Iraq could easily deny
the allegation." (RFE/RL 14 September 2001)
Ethnic minority members forced to choose between signing a form correcting their
nationality or being expelled (2000-2002)
•
Many Kurds and Turkoman families in Mosul and Kirkuk expelled to northern Iraq for failing to
sign form
•
In Sept 2001 the Iraqi government passed Resolution No. 199 giving all non-Arab Iraqis over 18
the right to change their ethnic identity to that of Arab
"In 1999, Baghdad continued its systematic efforts to 'Arabize' the predominantly Kurdish districts of
Kirkuk, Khanaqin, and Sinjar at the edge of government-controlled Iraq near the Kurdish-controlled zone.
To solidify control of this strategically and economically vital oil-rich region, the government expelled
Kurds, Assyrians, and Turkomans—at times, entire communities—from these cities and surrounding areas.
At the same time, the government offered financial and housing incentives to Sunni Arabs to persuade them
to move to Kirkuk and other cities targeted for Arabization. New Arab settlements were constructed on
expropriated Kurdish land holdings.
In 1999, Baghdad gave a name to its Arabization program: 'nationality correction.' The government began
requiring ethnic minority civil servants to sign a form correcting their nationality. Persons refusing to sign
the forms —for example, a Kurd refusing to 'correct' his nationality and list himself as an Arab rather than a
Kurd—would be subject to expulsion to northern Iraq or the no-fly zone in the south. During the year,
Kurds and Turkoman families in Mosul and Kirkuk were reportedly expelled to northern Iraq for failure to
sign the forms. Although the Arabization campaign was not publicized, sources in northern Iraq reported
that more than 2,000 people were expelled to the northern region between January and November." (USCR
2000)
"On the 6th September 2001, in an unprecedented move, the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council –
which ranks higher than the so-called Iraqi Parliament – passed Resolution No. 199 giving all non-Arab
Iraqis over 18 the right to change their ethnic identity to that of Arab. Such a decision is contrary to all the
principles of human rights and is politically motivated. Its purpose is to compel all non-Arabs in Iraq to
127
adopt an Arab ethnic identity. This law legalizes the regime’s policy of ethnic cleansing directed against all
Kurds, Turkmans and Assyro-Chaldeans.
For decades, the Iraqi regime has continued to deport tens of thousands of Kurdish families from that part
of Kurdistan still under its control to either the Kurdish controlled area of Kurdistan or to southern Iraq and
has confiscated their properties and belongings, including their identity cards. The choice facing these
people was deportation or the enforced change of ethnic identity. This law, which legalizes such acts, is in
direct violation even of the Iraqi Provisional Constitution of 1970, Article 19/A of which states that all
Iraqis are equal, regardless of ethnic language, religion or social class.
Furthermore, Article 5/B of that Constitution states that the people of Iraq is composed of two main ethnic
groups, Arabs and Kurds, and recognizes the rights of the Kurds and other minorities. This decision of the
Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council effectively divides the population according to ethnicity. It favours
one group over the other and gives a higher status to Arabs.
It should also be remembered that this Resolution is in direct contravention of Article 18 of the
International Charter of Civil and Political Rights adopted by the UN in February 1966. Just as everyone
has the right to their place in a family line, so every person has an inalienable right to his claim of ethnic
identity, but Resolution No.199 makes no distinction between ethnic identity and nationality." (KTRS 27
Jan 2002)
For more information on the "Arabization policy", please see
[Internal link], "Eviction of Kurds but also of Turkmen and Assyrians from the Kirkuk area (1997-2001) "
128
ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE
General
Kurds displaced to northern Iraq are less and less welcome by tribe members and
local authorities (2000)
•
•
•
Sharing the tribe, the culture, the past, the displaced were welcome in the beginning
As numbers continually rose, people coming from government-controlled areas were not very
much tolerated by both the locals and the authorities
Due to the hard living conditions of the displaced, splitting of families is quite common
"The displacement had of course serious effects not only on the individuals , but also on social relations.
Those who left Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah and Arbil found themselves in new places and in a new atmosphere.
People residing in those places were confronted with a challenge for accommodation, food and jobs. While
their future had not been secure before, they suddenly found a new neighbours that maybe they never
would have liked to have. Sharing the tribe, the culture, the past, these people were welcome in the
beginning. However, as numbers continually rose, people coming from the government-controlled areas
around Kirkuk to Arbil were not very much tolerated by both the locals and the authorities. The locals
started to keep distance from the newcomers. The IDP situation is more or less at the limit. The KDP
immediately took measures, requiring the IDPs to abide by given conditions, if they wanted to stay.
Therefore the Arabs as well as those Kurds and Turkmen who were obliged to leave government-controlled
areas preferred to go to Sulaymaniyah where they could find better social conditions. Displacement is
defecting individuals very much since they are losing all or most of their social connections. This, however,
does not imply the total destruction of the tribal or ethnic identity in their families. In the KDP-controlled
area the IDPs are mainly living in residential centers provided by the Kurdish authorities. The conditions
there force them to find jobs of whatever kind. Unlike in the past, the splitting of families is quite
common." (UNHCR/ACCORD 14 November 2000, p.58)
129
PROPERTY ISSUES
General
IDPs paying to squat in government buildings (December 2003)
•
•
•
•
An NGO wants to repair the former military camp's infrastructure to enable its residents to have
electricity, running water, sewage disposal facilities and a small school,
"If we rehabilitate the camp and give them one year for free, it will increase the problem"
"We may make them pay US $30 to $40 in rent right now. They could afford to pay something,"
Many of the families in the camp said they had paid $500 or more for their homes for the right to
squat in government buildings
•
"A man from southern Iraq, 39-year-old Irhaf Nahhas, now living in a former elite military headquarters
says he does not fear followers of former President Saddam Hussein.
He goes on to tell, however, that after Saddam's special fida'iyin troops destroyed his traditional reed house
after his son was caught trying to avoid military service, his family had nowhere to live. Nahhas comes
from the marshlands around the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in southern Iraq, which were
deliberately drained by the Saddam regime for political reasons.
When Saddam's government was toppled in May, Nahhas moved his family to the former Republican
Guard headquarters just outside the capital, Baghdad. "If we have no house, there's no way to live in
Maysan [Governorate]," said Nahhas, a former fisherman. "There was no opportunity there."
He and his neighbours were now getting help from the aid group Premiere Urgence under an expanded
definition of what it means to be an internally displaced person (IDP), said Baptiste Martin, coordinator of
the French NGO's IDP project. Martin said his agency also assisted poor and vulnerable people, operating
at 270 locations in and around Baghdad.
About 10,400 people now living in Baghdad are IDPs, according to Martin, due to the recent war, for
human rights/ethnicity-related reasons, or because something happened to their houses before the war.
Première Urgence wants to repair the former military camp's infrastructure to enable its residents to have
electricity, running water, sewage disposal facilities and a small school, Iraq. But there may be hitches. "If
we rehabilitate the camp and give them one year for free, it will increase the problem," Martin told IRIN.
"We may make them pay US $30 to $40 in rent right now. They could afford to pay something," he added.
In fact, many of the families in the camp said they had paid $500 or more for their homes - basically for the
right to squat in government buildings. Most agreed that the buildings they occupied did not belong to
them, but none of them was willing to move out unless some future government officials forced them to do
so.
"Our future here is unclear, but the situation in our former city was worse, with people killing each other
for revenge, for water, for land," Layla Hathal, the wife of the sheikh who is the group's informal leader,
130
told IRIN. "If the government asks us to leave, we have to. Otherwise, I'll stay here," she said. (UN OCHA,
9 December 2003)
Confusion over IDPs ingovernment buildings (December 2003)
•
•
•
•
•
•
Thieves are still dismantling the buildings comprising the Rashid camp of the former Iraqi army
in Baghdad
Nearby live Iraqi internally displaced persons (IDPs) forced out of their homes in other parts of
the country
IDPs who steal government infrastructure must be treated as thieves
No-one should be evicted until another site is available for them
No-one seemed to have the authority able to decide on whether the IDPs would be able to stay or
have to leave
"They took everything from me, even my national identity card," Mukhi said. "Why shouldn't I
live here?"
"Two thieves are carrying off a bundle of long, metal supporting rods they have removed from a building
whose flat concrete roof consequently collapsed. More than seven months after US-led forces entered Iraq,
thieves are still dismantling the buildings comprising the Rashid camp of the former Iraqi army in Baghdad,
stripping them of anything of value, down to any underground pipes they can dig up.
Nearby live Iraqi internally displaced persons (IDPs) forced out of their homes in other parts of the country.
The places they live in now are most often fenced off with metal sheets, some with clothes flapping on
washing lines.
The chaotic nature of his surroundings does not seem unusual to 22-year-old Ali Munshi, displaced from
his home in the south by Saddam Hussein loyalists, who had taken it over together with everything he
owned. "Our land was taken, so we need some way to feed ourselves now," Ali told IRIN as he stood guard
over a house at the camp he and his family had occupied.
Newly appointed government ministers condemn the practice. IDPs who steal government infrastructure
must be treated as thieves, say the housing, of urban affairs and displacement, foreign and interior
ministers.
"They're saying 97 percent of the people living in Rashid are looters, so kick them out," Baptiste Martin,
the head of the IDP programme for the French NGO Premiere Urgence, told IRIN in Baghdad. "There's a 9
August Coalition Provisional Authority/United Nations agreement for eviction, however, that says no-one
should be evicted until another site is available for them," he noted.
No-one seemed to have the authority able to decide on whether the IDPs would be able to stay or have to
leave, said Amir Sabah al-Sa'idi, a self-appointed sheikh, or leader, at the camp. When there appeared to be
no-one in charge, people behaved badly, he observed. "We have contacted all the humanitarian offices.
They say they don't know the future," al-Sa'idi told IRIN, with his two children by his side. "We need our
voices to be heard by the public."
On the other side of the highway, in another sector of the Rashid camp, are 200 Arab families who moved
into it from Khanaqin in the north in May after being evicted from their homes by Kurds, who said that
131
prior to 1975 they had lived in the houses the Arabs were occupying. In the sector now occupied by the
Arabs from Khaniqin, many buildings seem to be intact, but it is hard to tell if this is attributable to the
influence of the group's leaders or because people respected what appear to have been houses formerly
tenanted by Iraqi army officers.
"I agree that some Iraqi people are taking these things, but we are protecting the buildings because we need
a place to live," Abd al-Salam Mukhi, a former tribal leader in Khanaqin, told IRIN. "We are good men.
We would never accept such bad things." But Mukhi also said that inasmuch as the Kurds had seized all his
private property - even the livestock - he had few qualms over using the property of the former Iraqi
military. "They took everything from me, even my national identity card," Mukhi said. "Why shouldn't I
live here?"
The UN or a new Iraqi government should find housing for people evicted from their homes, said Yusuf
Farhan Sathi, a 53-year-old former resident of Khanaqin. He said he was very angry at first when the Kurds
had told him to move out. At the time, many people in Baghdad had heard that the Iraqi army was vacating
its bases, so his group had not been too worried back in May about where its members would live in the
future. But now things seemed to be deteriorating, Sathi said. "This is not the right place for us," he said.
"How can we live here? We feel hopeless."
Because there had been so much theft at the Rashid Camp, Premiere Urgence had plans to call on the
families living there to move to another former military camp, which could be better protected from looters
by the people who lived there, Martin said.
"We registered 410 boys in Rashid Camp - most of them were looting. We'll try to do a psychological
assessment on the camp to see how we can change their ideas," he added." (UN OCHA, 16 December
2003)
Inadequacy of Iraq's land management and property title systems (October 2003)
•
•
•
Housing for returnees and the internally displaced a critical short-term need
This situation is being exacerbated by the coalition which has begun evicting families who have
sought shelter in public buildings
A broad-ranging restitution and property reform process is an urgent necessity
•
Important that a property restitution process is in place prior to reintegration of returnees
"The United Nations/World Bank needs assessment highlights housing as a critical issue and the
inadequacy of Iraq's land management and property title systems. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have
been forcefully displaced from their homes during the past thirty years. In northern Iraq, the Ba'ath party
pursued an aggressive policy of "Arabization," forcefully expelling hundreds of thousands of Kurds,
Turkoman, and Assyrians from their homes and replacing them with Arab residents. In the south, the
government destroyed the marsh area and forced the Marsh Arab population to seek refuge in Iran. During
the Iraq-Iran war, large numbers of Shi`as and Feyli Kurds were stripped of their Iraqi nationality and
expelled to Iran. Many of the victims of these policies are beginning to return to their homes, particularly in
northern Iraq.
The needs assessment correctly highlights housing for returnees and the internally displaced as a critical
short-term need. This situation is being exacerbated by the coalition which has begun evicting families who
132
have sought shelter in public buildings around Iraq, but has not provided alternative housing for these
families. The donor community should prioritize the provision of adequate shelter to families in need.
The donor community should also support the establishment of a post-conflict property dispute mechanism
to provide fair and efficient settlement procedures a top priority. A broad-ranging restitution and property
reform process is an urgent necessity for Iraq in order to avoid inter-ethnic violence. Victims of forced
displacement-a crime against humanity-have a right to reclaim their former property, but this right must be
balanced against the rights and humanitarian needs of the secondary occupants, many of whom have lived
in expropriated homes for decades.
The many victims of forced displacement are deeply impoverished, and will require significant
reintegration assistance to return to their former homes. However, it is important that a property restitution
process is in place prior to reintegration of returnees, as property claims should be settled before the
reconstruction process can begin. Many victims of the Arabization policies who are housed in camps in the
three northern governates (Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaimaniya). The donor community should step up
assistance to the victims of Arabization now housed in the northern governates, in order to assure that
desperate displaced families will not seek to return prior to the establishment of fair and efficient property
dispute mechanisms. " (HRW, 22 October 2003)
Kurds own the land, Arabs own the houses (September 2003)
•
•
•
Both sides feel cheated
Explosive issue of historic Kurdish lands taken over by Arabs
No decision has been reached regarding Kurdish rights to old property
“On the walls of the mosque, an avenging hand has scrawled: "We will be back to claim our rights." In the
northern village of Hifa, Kurds own the land, Arabs own the houses, and both sides feel cheated. The
inhabitants of Hifa, 30 kilometres (19 miles) north of Kirkuk, are anxiously waiting for the interim
authorities in Baghdad to resolve the explosive issue of historic Kurdish lands taken over by Arabs. The
Arabs arrived and settled in Hifa in 1975 in what were then empty fields. "We are in all our rights," says
Ali Riad, a 30 year-old farmer.
"We have contracts bearing our names. Kurds received compensation... We have built homes, cultivated the
fields for 30 years. Now they come back to reclaim their lands and half the crop without having made any
effort." Iraq's former Baathist regime drove out tens of thousands of Kurds from the Kirkuk region by
buying their lands and homes for small sums of money and installing in their place Arabs from the centre
and south of the country in an effort to change the ethnic makeup of the area in favour of Arabs.
Many Kurdish homes were destroyed in the process. After the fall of Kirku k on April 10, thousands of
Kurds came back in search of their old property, in many cases taking over homes left empty by fleeing
Arabs during the US-led war to oust Saddam Hussein's regime, and in other cases using force or threats to
kick out Arab inhabitants.
"We asked them (Kurds) not to come back," while no decision has been reached regarding Kurdish rights to
old property, says Lieutenant Colonel Randy George, deputy commander of the 173rd Airborne Division.
He said the actual number of Kurds returning to the Kirkuk region was "significantly" less than initial
expectations.
133
But Kurds and Arabs are getting impatient. "All refugees are coming back. If they find Arabs in their
homes, they expel them, it's comprehensive," said Jalal Jawar, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
representative in Kirkuk. There was an exchange of fire in Hifa last week [22 September 2003] when 50 or
so Kurds occupied an Arab field claiming it was their old land. Coalition authorities, members of the
municipal council and tribes tried to calm the situation. But Arab families feel defenceless. "We are afraid
that the village will be attacked, afraid to work in the fields. A solution must be found fast. We are either
declared landowners, or given compensation. In this case we will take our money, our furniture and return
to our homes," said Majid Abdel Hussein, a 53-year-old Hifa resident.
On the other side, about 250 Kurdish families, whose homes were destroyed under the previous regime,
have been camping for the last five months at Kirkuk's sports stadium. "We were expelled to Suleimaniyah.
We came back in May, our house was destroyed, now we live like dogs," said Abdel Khalek Ahmed Sherif,
46, who lives with a family of 13 in the stadium's bleachers as they wait for authorities to provide them
with housing.
Police last week arrested 15 Kurds who built homes on public land after returning to Kirkuk, from which
they were displaced by the ousted regime. The Kurdish mayor of Kirkuk Abdel Rahman Mustafa called
Friday on the interim Governing Council to take a decision very fast to allow the return of Kurds to Kirkuk
"in a fair manner that would not undermine the unity" of the multi-ethnic city.
Tensions have been on the rise in the multi-ethnic province of 800,000 to 850,000 inhabitants, who include
Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen and Assyrian Christians, since the fall of Saddam's regime in April.” (AFP, 29
September 2003)
Property disputes in post-war Iraq
•
•
•
Houses built by Kurds on land that they once owned were destroyed by Iraqi forces
In their place, Arabs built new homes.
What sort of compensation should be provided to Arabs who legally purchased the property of
Kurds forced to move?
•
•
•
Coalition setting up body to settle increasing property disputes in Iraq
US advances Bosnian solution to ethnic cleansing in Iraq
Recommendations from HRW on property disputes and the guiding principles (March 2003)
"One of the most complex effects of displacement in Iraq is the issue of settling property claims. Whatever
the reason for displacement, it resulted in the widespread involuntary abandonment of property that was,
ultimately, confiscated by others. Houses built by Kurds on land that they once owned, for example, were
destroyed by Iraqi forces. In their place, Arabs built new homes. Who, then, is the rightful owner of the
“new” house? While it is justified for Kurds to return to their former homelands to reclaim what is
rightfully theirs, what sort of remuneration should be provided to Arab farmers who built homes and
farmed these lands at the behest of the former regime? What sort of compensation should be provided to
Arabs who legally purchased the property of Kurds forced to move? These are just a few of the issues that
need to be resolved before people can resettle and begin new lives with the assurance that their efforts will
be recognized as both legal and just."(RI, 25 August 2003)
Coalition setting up body to settle increasing property disputes in Iraq
”The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) for post-war Iraq said Wednesday it
was in the process of establishing a committee to oversee the amicable settlement of property disputes. "A
committee will be established in the coming weeks to help Iraqis settle property disputes amicably,"
134
according to an ORHA statement read on the radio. "If you have a conflict with someone over the
ownership of a house, land or commercial establishment, do not settle this difference by your own hand,"
urged, set up by the US-led coalition."Keep documents relating to the disputed property and await
instructions on the date and place of the committee's meetings. While waiting, try to find shelter with
family or friends." Property disputes have increased since the coalition's ouster of Saddam Hussein's regime
on 9 April 2003.” (AFP, 21 May 2003)
“On May 19, Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) personnel visited villages in southern Arbil
governorate. The team met with local villagers, newly arrived returnees, and U.S. military officials
responsible for Coalition operations in the region. Water appears to be a concern, although in the villages
visited there were hand-dug wells that could be easily cleaned to provide potable water. The water table in
these villages was between 15 and 20 meters deep. Ethnic tensions are escalating in villages near the old
green line. In the village of Shamamak, DART members met with Arabs who reported that on May 17, a
local Kurdish commander had come with four armed men and told them they must leave the village. The
Arabs fear that without Coalition intervention in the next few days, they will have to relocate to Mosul. The
DART reported the incident to the U.S. military personnel, who indicated that this sort of incident was
becoming increasingly common. According to the DART, land tenure issues appear to be heating up with
little noticeable action to systematically address the problem. The issues are complex but not difficult if the
local leaders are involved with determining land ownership. Land rights may be more difficult. It appears
that Saddam Hussein’s regime and the Kurdistan-Democratic Party (KDP) have taken land to be given to
their followers.” (USAID, 21 May 2003)
US advances Bosnian solution to ethnic cleansing in Iraq
“Jay Garner, the retired general overseeing Iraq's post-war reconstruction, held out the promise yesterday of
a Bosnia-style commission to resolve disputes between Arabs, Kurds and Turkomans displaced in northern
Iraq during Saddam Hussein's regime. He said that a commission to "arbitrate what is just and fair" would
help to reverse "years of ethnic cleansing" of Kurds and other minorities around the cities of Kirkuk and
Mosul. But details of the proposed commission remain vague.
“He said the Iraqi version would be set up "within weeks or months", and could operate alongside an
independent body to monitor its work. The issue of land and property reclamation is one of the most
delicate facing a new Iraqi administration. Human Rights Watch says that as many as 120,000 Kurds were
displaced under a programme of "Arabisation". Kurds have long dreamed of being able to reclaim their
property. And since the collapse of the government in Baghdad some Arab families in the north say they
have been forced out - some at gunpoint - by Kurds seeking to reverse years of forced expulsions. Gen
Garner, who is on a two-day visit to the Kurdish-controlled north, said that the commission would comprise
representatives of all Iraq's communities. "It is vital that we do not accept the results of ethnic cleansing,"
he said.
“Jalal Talabani, whose Patriotic Union of Kurdistan was accused of driving Arabs from their homes, said
that the return of displaced people in the north was an "absolute right", but that it must be done "in a regular
way, not in chaos". He repeated the Kurds' commitment to avoiding reprisals against Arabs. "No one
should take anything by force," he said. Mr Talabani and Massoud Barzani, head of the other Kurdish
faction, the Kurdistan Democratic party, have set up committees to deal with the issue of returning property
looted by Kurds from Arab homes in the first few days after the fall of Baghdad.” (The Guardian, 24 April
2003)
Recommendations from HRW on the guiding principles (March 2003)
To the Government of Iraq
“[...]
• Set up a planning forum with representatives of governmental, nongovernmental and intergovernmental
organizations with relevant expertise, as well as representatives of displaced Iraqis to develop a program to
ensure that the internally displaced can return to their homes insafety and dignity and can resume their
livelihoods and/or access publicly available assistance. All return programs should be consistent with the
135
U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and respect the rights of displaced Iraqis, and effectively
publicize its provisions to all Iraqis.
To the PUK and KDP authorities
[…]
• Cooperate fully with a return program established in accordance with the U.N. Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement and with the family reunification, place of origin, and
property claims dispute resolution mechanism.
To the United States and its allies, should they become occupying powers
[…]
• Assist with the design and implementation of a fair, safe, and sustainable program of return in
accordance with humanitarian and human rights law, including the U.N. Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement.
• Assist with the design and implementation of an impartial and efficient mechanism for
promoting family reunification and resolving place of origin, and property claims disputes in
accordance with standards of international human rights and humanitarian law.” (HRW, March 2003)
Ethnic Kurds who changed their identity to Arab received plots of land in certain areas
only (September 2001)
"In the beginning of August 2001 the Ba'th Party sent a document to branches within the Baghdadcontrolled north demanding that Kurdish members of the Ba'th Party at the rank of 'party comrade' and who
have changed their identity into Arab are included by the measures of the allocations of plots of land and
party donations, but they should receive plots of land in the center or southern cities, but these should be
outside the cities of Kirkuk, Mosul, Diyala, Tikrit and Baghdad.
However, all Kurdish Ba'th Party members who left the region controlled by the Kurdistan Regional
Government after 1992, and who have changed their identities to Arab are deprived of all privileges, like
allocation of rent and financial aid. "Kurdistani Nuwe" thinks this is because of their participation in the
1991 uprising. They are blamed for staying in Kurdistan after the uprising." (RFE/RL 14 Sept 2001)
Kurdish party denounces Iraqi authorities' new decree on land compensation in
Kirkuk (2001)
According to the PUK [Patriotic Union of Kurdistan]: "The official newspaper of the Iraqi Governorate of
Taameem [new name of Kirkuk province, which means "Nationalization"] published a new decree (AL
TAAMEEM, June 25, 2001 edition) […]: 'It has been decreed that all jurisdiction has been withdrawn from
the courts relating to litigation cases seeking compensation for agricultural lands covered by the
Development Plan in the Governorate of Taameem, including lands covered by the security of the
Ministries of Defense and Oil. This decree makes null and void all claims of compensation for the relevant
lands. It further voids all judicial decisions pertaining to those cases and cancels all the consequent
remedies provided by the verdicts.'
A legal expert confirmed to Kurdistan Newsline that the purpose of this decree is to deprive the Kurdish
farmers from their lands which have been in their heritage for hundreds of years and preventing them from
even leasing them for cultivation. Thus, the regime is confiscating Kurdish lands without compensation and
distributes them free to Arabs, transplanted from South and Middle Iraq." (Kurdistan Newsline 26 June
2001)
136
Kurds are forced to sell homes to Arabs in Kirkuk (1999-2002)
•
•
•
•
Kurds are prevented from constructing, renovating, registering or inheriting property in Kirkuk
(1999-2000)
The Iraqi government will provide new housing and employment to more than 300,000 Arab
residents resettled in Kirkuk (1999)
Kurdish sources reported in 2002 that the Iraqi government has decided to allocate vast areas of
land to Arabs exclusively and to auction government property in Kirkuk to ethnic Arabs only
Kurdish sources also reported in 2002 that Arab families got piece of land for each dead member
of family transported to Kirkuk
"Kurds [in Kirkuk] are reportedly not permitted to sell their homes to anyone other than Arabs. New
construction or renovation of Kurdish property is said to be forbidden and Kurds are prevented from
registering or inheriting properties. At the same time, Arab settlement is favoured. The Revolution
Command Council has mandated that the State must provide new housing and employment to more than
300,000 Arab residents resettled in Kirkuk. In the past several months, at least seven new Arab settlements
have been built in Kurdish areas on properties confiscated mainly from ethnic Kurds. The new settlements
are given Arab names and local merchants are instructed to give their companies Arab names. Finally, the
governorate's administrative offices are being moved to the Arabized side of the city, as are the
headquarters of major professional and political organizations." (CHR 26 February 1999, para.26)
"Sulaymaniyah's 'Kurdistani Nuwe' on 30 November [2000] reported that Baghdad's Arabization program
has intensified via the distribution of land to 80 Iraqi Arabs who will thus displace the local Turkmen and
Kurdish population. The paper cited a report in the 27 November 'Sawt al-Ta'mim,' a newspaper which is
under the control of the Iraqi government.
Lieutenant-General Sabah Nuri Alwan, the governor of Kirkuk (Al-Ta'mim), distributed the land deeds to
'those whose incomes are limited.' At the celebration accompanying the deed distribution, the recipients
'expressed their love and admiration to the leader, 'the Mujahid, Saddam Husseyn.'" (RFE/RL 15 December
2000, "Arabization in Kirkuk")
According to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Kurdish-language daily "Kurdistan Nuwe", "the Iraqi
government had recently begun construction of 200 houses to be reserved for Arab families transported
from southern Iraq.[…]
Since the beginning of this year, "Kurdistan Nuwe" reported, the Iraqi government has "decided to allocate
vast areas of land" to Arabs exclusively. This land includes plots in between the Zewiya and Azadi districts,
around the football stadium in Azadi, and between the Iskan and Karama districts. Land behind the Pepsi
Cola plant in Rahim Awa is now allocated only "to the Arab [Ba'th] party comrades." Numerous Arab
families have been relocated to the surrounding villages of Hafta Chashma, Omara Gada, and Qara Ways,
the report said. The Regional Secretariat of the Ba'th Party has further ordered that ethnic Kurds may not
purchase contracts for shops and businesses.
There are also reports in the Kurdistan Democratic Party's (KDP) press concerning the Iraqi government's
continuing ethnic-cleansing campaign. The 19 April issue of the KDP Arabic-language daily "Khabat"
reported: "Within the framework of the continuing Arabization policies implemented by the central [Iraqi]
authorities in Kirkuk...the authorities decided to auction some of the government-owned houses in Kirkuk.
Instructions allow only Arabs to buy these houses, preventing the indigenous Kurdish, Turkoman, and
Assyrian inhabitants from doing so." The article continued, "Observers say that the city's Kurdish,
Turkoman and Assyrian inhabitants are considered second-class citizens and are deprived of any legal or
constitutional rights." (RFE/RL 26 April 2002)
137
"Citing an article in the KDP daily "Brayati," kurdishmedia.com reported on 2 April from Irbil that the
Iraqi government has stepped up its "Arabization" campaign in Kirkuk, displacing increasing numbers of
Kurdish, Turkoman, and Assyrian Iraqis, and confiscating their property. The measures include asking
Arab settlers to move their dead relatives from the place where they came from, to Kirkuk. "The
government has ordered each family of Arab settlers to move at least one of their dead relatives from the
graveyards of their original place to a graveyard in Kirkuk," according to the "Brayati" report.
The report continues: "Each family gets a piece of land, as a present from the president, per each dead
relative moved to Kirkuk. The Iraqi government has taken this extraordinary course because its policy of
ethnic cleansing doesn't work as it [is] supposed to.... As most Arab settlers leave to their original place
after a while. It has been reported that many Arab settlers have sent apologies to people, who
[were]cleansed from Kirkuk, for being forced to settle on their properties and offered to share the revenues
of these properties with them." (RFE/RL 12 April 2002)
Iraqi Government's financial compensation to people displaced in the late 1980's
denounced by Kurdish official (1999)
"In a letter to the President of the UN Security Council, Dr. Barham Salih, Director of PUK's Bureau for
International Relations, called on the international community to intercede with the Government of Iraq to
end its ethnic cleansing campaign against the Kurdish inhabitants of Kirkuk, Khanaqin and other districts of
Iraqi Kurdistan.
The letter cited a recent announcement by the Iraqi Go vernor of Kirkuk which was published in the ruling
Ba'ath Party's daily newspaper, al-Thawara, in its issue number 9833 on August 25, 1999, calling on
deportees from 89 villages and districts to meet with GOI authorities to receive 'financial compensation' for
their confiscated land. The villages were destroyed by the GOI in the late 1980s and their inhabitants,
overwhelmingly Kurdish, were forcibly deported and their land distributed to Arab settlers brought from
southern and central Iraq.
Dr. Salih said 'the Iraqi announcement is an effort to finalize the dispossession of the Kurdish landowners
by giving a semblance of legal authority to the Arabization campaign which is aimed at changing the
demographic characteristics of these districts of Iraqi Kurdistan." (Kurdistan Newsline 13 September 1999,
"PUK Urges U.N. to End Iraq's Ethnic Cleansing Campaign")
138
PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT
General
Wealthy and astute political leaders spurring Kurdish return movements (February
2004)
•
•
•
•
Only days after Saddam's government was overthrown last April, Kurdish families began moving
south towards Kirukuk
Turkmen have also begun returning in numbers to Kirkuk
Around the periphery of the city there are now tented encampments of Turkmen and Kurds
desperate to return
Some are losing patience, but most expect that they will soon find a home in Kirkuk or nearby
" Only days after Saddam's government was overthrown last April, Kurdish families began leaving their
exile in the far north of Iraq and moving south towards Kirkuk, spurred on in part by their wealthy and
astute political leaders.
The goal was to reassume influence in and around the city, which lies south of the northern no-fly zone
enforced by the United States and Britain after the first Gulf war, meaning that during 12 years of
sanctions, Saddam still held sway.
Turkmen, less well-off and well-prepared than their Kurdish rivals, moved more slowly, but in recent
months have also begun returning in numbers. At the same time, many Arabs who were moved into the
region have fled, fearing retribution.
Around the periphery of the city there are now tented encampments of Turkmen and Kurds desperate to
return. They have been waiting for months, and some are losing patience, but most expect that they will
soon find a home in Kirkuk or nearby.
"It hurts me to see my people living like this in the mud and dirt," said Ashraf Shaukat, 65, the nominal
chief of some 650 Kurdish families living in tents on a rocky patch of earth near a football stadium on
Kirkuk's southern outskirts.
"But we are willing to wait, and soon we will have a home where we have always wanted a home, and life
can begin again."
Shaukat and others are quick to emphasise that they have no problem with Arabs and no interest in driving
them from the city or fighting with Turkmen for dominance, but recent history suggests not everyone is
keeping such calm counsel.
In December, days of demonstrations by Arabs and Turkmen opposed to the increased Kurdish presence in
Kirkuk led to the death of at least 10 protesters. In late January, a senior Turkmen official was assassinated
in unexplained circumstances." (Reuters, 3 February 2004).
Problems of reconstructing war-ravaged Iraqi society (February 2004)
•
•
•
In the village of Dugardkan there are 42 new concrete houses being built, power lines running to
them, water connected and a new community hall
In a village less than a kilometre away there is no gravelled road, no power, water or new houses just a few mud huts
The difference between the settlements is vast, graphic and difficult to explain
139
•
•
•
There are two Arab families in Dugardkan, showcasing the ability of the two cultures and ethnic
groups to live together
Dugardkan was a prosperous village before it was destroyed
The only assistance the neighbouring village has received in the last eight months is two visits
from a water tanker
"On the road leading south from the northern Iraqi governorate of Arbil the problems of reconstructing warravaged Iraqi society are distilled on one stretch of highway.
South of the line, that until this year divided self-governing Iraqi Kurdistan from the regime of Saddam
Hussein, this region was badly hit by the Anfal campaign of the 1980s.
More than 4,500 villages in the Kurdish north of the country were destroyed and those living in them
forced to leave. But since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government this year, thousands of people have
returned to the land they once occupied hoping to rebuild the lives they left 15 or more years ago.
The area near Mahmour town, an hour's drive south of Arbil, is one such village that is slowly being
repopulated. On one side of the road you will find a colourful sign pointing to Dugardkan, a village rising
from the earth again, 42 new concrete houses being built, power lines running to them, water connected and
even a new community hall.
But across the road, less than a kilometre away, lies the village of Sirma. There is no sign, no gravelled
road, no power, water or new houses - just a few mud huts constructed by some of the villagers who have
returned to try and live on their land again.
The difference between the settlements is vast, graphic and difficult to explain. It shows both the scale of
the problem faced in reconstructing villages in northern Iraq but also the difficulty of doing this equitably.
Dugardkan is something of a model of reconstruction. Funded by the office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Swedish-based NGO Qandil provided the materials for people
to build their own houses and most will move in after winter. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
built the community hall and named it after an American soldier who died nearby.
Though predominately Kurdish, there are two Arab families in Dugardkan, showcasing the ability of the
two cultures and ethnic groups to live together, following Saddam Hussein's Arabisation plan. It aimed to
change the demography of the areas where Iraq's vast oil wealth lies by forcing ethnic groups out to be
replaced by Arabs, mainly from the south.
Abdul Aziz Hajaj Yusef is the head of one of those Arab families. He told IRIN in Dugardkan that Saddam
Hussein’s forces kicked him out of the village in 1987, along with the Kurds. It was the second time his
house had been destroyed after a similar attack in 1963. So he moved in with relatives in a nearby village
and stayed there for 16 years.
Now he was anxiously waiting to finish constructing his house so he can finally move back. With much
enmity between Kurds and Arabs in the region, he is thankful to his neighbours who have helped him so
much. 'I don’t make any difference between Arabs and Kurds. We have been living together for a long
time. We can live together without any problems in the future.' He is also thankful to Qandil and those who
chose Dugardkan to be reconstructed.
'We are very lucky and I think Dugardkan will be better than before. But we still need many things that we
don’t have money for. I want a mosque to pray in because I am a Muslim. I have children and they need a
school. We get sick so we need a hospital.'
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His Kurdish neighbour, Azad Gaffur Ismael, told IRIN that Dugardkan was a prosperous village before it
was destroyed. 'In 1987 we had everything and we were very rich. We even had electricity then.' For the
past 16 years he has lived in a camp for internally displaced people (IDPs) near Arbil, surviving on food
handouts. Now he wanted to shift back to his land and grow wheat and other crops.
Across the road in Sirma, Mahmood Khadir Rashid shares that wish. But that is all the two men have in
common right now. For Mahmood, home is a pitiful one-room mud shelter he built when he came back to
Sirma after the war in April.
Wet patches inside the walls show where the house leaks during rain. Its mud floor offers no insulation
from the bitter winter and for this reason seven of his nine children are still living in nearby Mahmour
town. There is no power and no kerosene for heaters. 'Winter is not at the gate, it is already inside the gate,'
Mahmood told IRIN.
Before the village was destroyed in 1987, about 37 families lived in Sirma. Eleven have returned so far and
the remainder want to, but have no money to build houses.
They used to be connected to a water supply, but now they drink muddy water from a bad well. The only
assistance they have received in the last eight months is two visits from a water tanker. 'We haven’t had any
help - not a single seed,' Mahmood said, hoping to replant his fields, as he had no job, like many other
villagers.' (IRIN, 11 February 2004)."
Thousands of internally displaced persons have tried to move back to their original
homes (December 2003)
•
•
Some IDPs are now living in tents pitched next to their destroyed houses
Others have managed to move back into their former homes, in some cases causing tension and
further displacement
•
Since early summer, UNHCR has been assisting internally displaced persons to return to villages
where there are no disputes about the ownership of property
People have moved when and where they can, many inhabiting abandoned buildings and
warehouses
•
"Over the summer and autumn a large proportion of Iraq's hundreds of thousands of internally displaced
persons have tried to move back to their original homes. Some are now living in tents pitched next to their
destroyed houses, while others have managed to move back into their former homes, in some cases causing
tension and further displacement. Since early summer, UNHCR has been assisting internally displaced
persons to return to villages where there are no disputes about the ownership of property. Assistance to
internally displaced persons and monitoring of their needs, as well as of internal population movements,
has also been provided by the International Organization for Migration and a number of non-governmental
organizations that are concentrating their activities in priority governorates." (UN SC, 5 December 2003)
"A number of displaced people are either relocating or moving back to their home villages in northern Iraq
- despite the fact that many of those villages have been damaged or totally destroyed. Around 800,000
people are estimated to have been displaced in the north, mostly as a result of the previous regime's policy
of expelling Kurds and other minorities (i.e. Turkmens, etc.) from their homes and replacing them with
others from central and southern Iraq. People have moved when and where they can, many inhabiting
abandoned buildings and warehouses." (UNHCR, 22 October 2003)
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HRW and UNHCR on the right of return for IDPs in Iraq
•
•
HRW: The right of forcibly displaced persons to return
UNHCR: preliminary repatriation plan for Iraq
The Right of Forcibly Displaced Persons to Return to their Homes
“International law not only specifies the forced and arbitrary transfer of populations as a crime against
humanity, but also provides for a remedy for the persons victimized by these forced transfers. Persons
forcibly transferred from their homes in violation of international standards are entitled to return to their
home areas and property, a right known as the “right to return.” Most international human rights
instruments recognize the right to return to one’s country. There is no specific provision in international
covenants affirming the right of internally displaced persons to return to their places of origin. However,
this right, or at least the obligation of states not to impede the return of people to their places of origin, is
implied. For example, article 12 of the ICCPR recognizes the right to enter one’s own country. Article 12
also recognizes the right to choose freely one’s own place of residence, which incorporates the right to
return to one’s home area. In some cases, the right to return to one’s former place of residence is also
supported by the right to family reunification and to protection for the family. Recognizing these various
rights, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has reaffirmed “the right of
all refugees ...and internally displaced persons to return to their homes and places of habitual residence in
their country and/or place of origin, should they so wish.” Numerous resolutions of the U.N. General
Assembly and of the Security Council as well as several international peace agreements also recognize the
right to return to one’s home and/or property.119 The right to an effective re medy, contained in ICCPR
article 2(3), requires that Iraqis should be able, in principle, to repossess their homes after being deprived of
them under the “Arabization” policy.
The Commission on Human Rights has often recognized the need for property restitution as an effective
remedy for forced displacement. When displaced persons are unable to return to their homes because their
property has been destroyed or claims against a current occupant are unsuccessful, they are entitled to
compensation. The right to an effective remedy, contained in ICCPR article 2(3), suggests that there should
be a right to financial compensation when a displaced person cannot repossess her property.
While the ethnic Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrians displaced by the “Arabization” policies have a right to
return to their homes in the Kirkuk region and receive compensation for their losses, it is important that this
right is implemented in a manner that does not cause additional human rights abuses. The Iraqi government
has brought ethnic Arab populations—some also against their will, others with financial incentives—to
Kirkuk to advance its “Arabization” drive, and many of those ethnic Arabs now live in the former homes of
displaced persons. The right to repossess private property must be balanced against any rights these
secondary occupiers may have in domestic or international law, using impartial and efficient procedural
safeguards.
In many conflicts, the collapse of an abusive administration is often followed by a security vacuum in
which the former victims of abusive policies may wreak revenge on perceived government supporters.
Programs aimed at returning displaced populations and re-creating multi-ethnic communities in the Balkans
after years of forced displacement have faced severe obstacles.” (HRW, March 2003)
UNHCR preliminary repatriation and reintegration plan for Iraq
“During the period leading up to the recent military intervention in Iraq, UNHCR undertook a review of the
various humanitarian scenarios which could result from such intervention. Contingency plans and
preparedness measures focused on providing protection and relief to a potential refugee outflow. UNHCR
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also began planning for the possibility of a new state of affairs in Iraq that would be conducive to the
voluntary repatriation of Iraqi refugees already residing abroad.”
“The purpose of this Repatriation and Reintegration Plan is to set out the basic planning parameters for a
large-scale return of Iraqi refugees from neighbouring countries and from countries outside the immediate
region. It assumes a relatively rapid stabilisation of the security situation in Iraq thereby enabling refugees
to return to their homes in conditions of safety and dignity. If the prevailing instability in Iraq continues for
an extended period of time, the implementation of the present Repatriation and Reintegration Plan may be
limited to locations where conditions are believed to be conducive to sustainable return, and where the
operating environment is considered to be safe under UN standards. Under such circumstances, the present
Plan will be revised accordingly.”
“To date, there has been no large-scale outflow of refugees as a result of the recent military intervention in
Iraq. The present Plan therefore focuses on the pre-war caseload of Iraqi refugees, asylum-seekers and
persons in refugee-like situations. However, it does not exclude the possibility that the prevailing instability
or new developments might cause new displacements, which will require a further review of the plan.”
“The Plan does not address the needs of IDPs, as decisions on institutional arrangements for this group in
the return context are still being finalized. UNHCR has emphasized, however, that since many refugees and
IDPs originate from the same areas, were forced out of their homes for similar reasons, and are likely to
face similar problems upon return, it may be difficult - if not impossible - to separate the protection and
assistance needs of returning refugees from those of returning IDPs. UNHCR has informed the Secretary
General, the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq that it stands ready
to take the lead with respect to protection for both returning refugees and returning IDPs, if called upon to
do so. This Plan will be further adapted as and when new policy decisions are taken with regard to
UNHCR's involvement with IDPs in the context of return.” (UNHCR, 30 April 2003)
HRW recommendations on return of IDPs
IDP Recommendations by HRW (March 2003)
“ …… there is an urgent need for the international community to prepare for humanitarian crises …. when
internally displaced persons seek to return to the homes from which they were forcibly expelled by the Iraqi
government. In the absence of a mechanism for the gradual return of the internally displaced, the likelihood
of inter-ethnic violence erupting as individual families seek to re-establish claims to property and assets is
very high. It is equally crucial that the international community provide both financial assistance and
expertise for the administration of a mechanism allowing for the orderly return of internally displaced
persons. It should also take all measures possible to ensure that Iraqi officials implicated in the perpetration
of the policy of forced transfer of ethnic minorities defined as a crime against humanity under international
law beheld accountable and brought to justice.” (Human Rights Watch Vol. 15, No. 3(E) March 2003)
To the Government of Iraq
• Respect the right to freedom of movement of all Iraqi citizens, including their freedom to choose and to
remain in their place of residence and the right of all Iraqis to family unity.
• Cease immediately the forced expulsion of ethnic minorities, namely Kurds, Turkomans, and Assyrians,
from their homes in Kirkuk and other areas where the policy of “Arabization” has been implemented.
• Cease immediately the resettlement of Arab families from southern Iraq in the homes seized from those
expelled.
• Cease the coercive use of RCC Decree 199 of September 6, 2001, which “allowed” non-Arab Iraqis aged
eighteen or over to change their official ethnic identity by applying to register as Arabs. Cease use of the
“nationality correction” form to coerce members of ethnic minorities to register themselves officially as
Arabs.
143
• Cease all coercive policies associated with the forced expulsion of ethnic minorities, including the seizure
of property, businesses and other assets; forced recruitment into the Ba`th Party and paramilitary forces or
as informers; the intimidation and harassment of families with relatives living in Kurdish-controlled areas;
and the compulsory adoption of Arab names for persons and places. Lift all legal restrictions on the
ownership and registration of property in their own right by ethnic minorities.
• Preserve all records in the possession of the government establishing the ethnicity and place of origin of
displaced Iraqis, including duplicates of nationality correction forms, confiscated expulsion orders, and
ration cards.
• Take immediate steps to provide a public and accessible register of all Kurds, Turkomans, and Assyrians
forcibly expelled from their homes and of Arab families resettled from southern Iraq, as well as of all
seized or confiscated real property. Make available all documentation necessary for the full, speedy and fair
resolution of all claims regarding the return of housing and other real property and provide a public family
tracing and reunification registry and service.
• Investigate and prosecute officials implicated in the policy of forced transfer of ethnic minorities, defined
in international law as a crime against humanity, in accordance with principles of due process and the rights
of the accused established under international law.
• Establish a specialist agency dedicated to implementing the safe and dignified return of internally
displaced Iraqis.
• Set up a planning forum with representatives of governmental, nongovernmental and intergovernmental
organizations with relevant expertise, as well as representatives of displaced Iraqis to develop a program to
ensure that the internally displaced can return to their homes in safety and dignity and can resume their
livelihoods and/or access publicly available assistance. All return programs should be consistent with the
U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and respect the rights of displaced Iraqis, and effectively
publicize its provisions to all Iraqis.
• Set up a planning forum with representatives of governmental judicial, nongovernmental, and
intergovernmental organizations with relevant expertise, as well as representatives of displaced Iraqis, to
develop an impartial and efficient mechanism for family reunification and to resolve place of origin and
property claims disputes in accordance with standards of international human rights and humanitarian law.
Ensure that the family reunification, place of origin, and property claims dispute resolution mechanism
respects the human rights of all parties involved, including the rights of unaccompanied minors to family
unification, the property and place of origin rights of displaced persons, and the property and place of
origin rights of resettled persons. Ensure that the property claims dispute resolution mechanism includes
procedures for several remedies including inter alia: property restitution, or should restitution prove
impossible, financial compensation.
To the PUK and KDP authorities
• Continue to compile records establishing the ethnicity and place of origin for displaced persons within
areas under PUK or KDP control.
• Preserve all records currently in the possession of the PUK or KDP establishing the ethnicity and place of
origin of displaced Iraqis, including duplicates of nationality correction forms, confiscated expulsion
orders, and ration cards.
• Provide a public and accessible family tracing and reunification registry and service.
• Cooperate fully with a return program established in accordance with the U.N. Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement and with the family reunification, place of origin, and property claims dispute
resolution mechanism.
To the international community, including donor governments and intergovernmental organizations
with an interest in displacement, including the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
• Urge the government of Iraq to immediately stop forced expulsions of ethnic minorities, and lift all legal
restrictions on the owners hip and registration of property in their own right by ethnic minorities.
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• Assure the government of Iraq of their willingness to contribute their expertise and experience to assist
with protection and assistance for displaced Iraqis.
• Assist with the establishment of a mechanism of orderly return of displaced Iraqis to their homes. Offer
technical and financial assistance to the government of Iraq, the PUK, and the KDP authorities in compiling
ethnicity, place of origin, and property claims registers and in providing a public family tracing and
reunification registry and service.
• Take all measures possible to ensure that officials implicated in the policy of forced transfer of ethnic
minorities.defined in international law as a crime against humanity.be held accountable and brought to
justice.
To the United States and its allies, should they become occupying powers
• Respect the freedom of movement rights of all Iraqi citizens, including their freedom to choose a place of
residence, and to move to a place of safety either inside or outside of Iraq.
• Protect all Iraqis from arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy, family and home.
• Ensure that all humanitarian agencies have free and unimpeded access to assist internally displaced Iraqis.
• Take all possible measures to prevent attacks of retaliation or reprisal against persons now residing in
disputed areas in and around Kirkuk. Preserve all records establishing the ethnicity and place of origin of
displaced Iraqis, including duplicates of nationality correction forms, confiscated expulsion orders, and
ration cards.
• Promote the establishment of a public register of all Kurds, Turkomans, and Assyrians forcibly expelled
from their homes, and a similar register for Arab families resettled fromsouthern Iraq.
• Promote the establishment of a public register of all seized or confiscated real property, and make
available all documentation necessary for the full, speedy, and fair resolution of all claims regarding the
return of housing and other real property.
• Establish a public family tracing and reunification registry and service.
• Assist with the design and implementation of a fair, safe, and sustainable program of return in accordance
with humanitarian and human rights law, including the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
• Assist with the design and implementation of an impartial and efficient mechanism for promoting family
reunification and resolving place of origin, and property claims disputes in accordance with standards of
international human rights and humanitarian law” (HRW, March 2003).
Refugees International on the challenge of IDP return for the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA)
•
•
Return of Kurds to their homes of origin to reclaim their land has been largely non-violent
Investments are now being lost as Arabs who were resettled on Kurdish areas leave and return to
their original homes
“ Today, there are approximately 900,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) throughout the country. Only
by recognizing the many and varied causes of displacement can the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
design and implement resettlement programs that serve the needs of displaced Iraqis as well as the country
overall. The lack of guidance and coordination by the CPA concerning the issue of displacement is
troubling. How this issue is resolved will be an indication of whether pluralism and democracy in Iraq will
take root. The integrity of the nation depends on finding just solutions for the varied displaced populations
and commu nities.
(…)
While the horrific policy of Arabization destroyed families, property, and livelihoods while displacing
hundreds of thousands of people, reversing this process, by returning those initially displaced to their
original homes, will result in many of the same consequences.
Although the return of Kurds to their homes of origin to reclaim their land has been largely non-violent,
several deaths have resulted from this process. The more significant issue, however, is the loss of
145
investments made by Arabs who were resettled on Kurdish property. In several instances, Arabs formally
purchased lands from departing Kurds. Even those who were provided with these confiscated lands free of
charge by the former regime built new homes and improved agricultural land over the many years that they
inhabited these lands. These investments are now being lost as Arabs leave these resettled areas and return
to their original homes. Moreover, in many cases, Arabs returning to their villages of origin face the
problem of insufficient farmland to support their families and a lack of capital with which to rebuild their
lives.
[...]
Former Prisoners and Their Families Falling between the Cracks
Iraqis imprisoned for political and military crimes as well as their families (including widows and their
children) who have suffered displacement as a result of their imprisonment are not currently recognized as
IDPs by the government. This cause of displacement is very real, yet because it falls outside of the
commonly recognized reasons for displacement, it has received little attention. The UN is currently
addressing the needs of this population, but the CPA or the emerging Iraqi government must grant official
recognition of their plight. Only official recognition will ensure that this displaced population receives the
same assistance as those displaced by the Anfal, Arabization, or other well-recognized causes of
displacement. (RI, 25 August 2003)
Northern Iraq
IDP situation by far the biggest problem the Governing Council is facing (January
2004)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Those who left their homes before or during the fighting that toppled Saddam Hussein's regime
returned relatively quickly
The war did not precipitate the hope for many Kurdish IDPs that they could at last return to their
homes
There were no resources allocated to rebuild their lives
Thousands of returned families are living in tents or in mud hovels
Hundreds of villages still need reconstruction and assistance
Nearly 200,000 IDPs in the north living in the collective towns they had been shifted to by
Saddam's regime
Need for long term solutions not just emergency help to provide food and shelter for families
" Ironically, the war this year that toppled Saddam Hussein's regime did not result in the huge new numbers
of IDPs that were feared. Those who did leave their homes before or during the fighting returned relatively
quickly. But what the war did precipitate was a hope for thousands of mainly Kurdish IDPs that they could
at last return to their villages, towns and cities and rebuild their homes and lives.
And in doing so it clearly showed the scale of the problem. For so many people returning home, there were
no resources to rebuild their lives. Therefore as the first snows of winter hit the region, thousands of
families are living in tents or in mud hovels.
Manija Mohammed Sayeed has been an IDP for 16 years, displaced three times and is still no closer to
returning to her home let alone finding a house to live in.
146
Squatting outside the mud shelter she lives in at the former international sports stadium in the northern Iraq
city of Kirkuk, she said having hope is hard, especially when the memories of recent years hurt so much.
In 1988 she was evicted from her village of Qaitool south of Kirkuk as part of Saddam Hussein's Anfal
campaign that destroyed 4,500 villages in the Kurdish north of the country. The rest of her family and
villagers disappeared and were killed.
Eventually she got a job near Tikrit but was imprisoned and evicted from there to a collective village near
Kirkuk set up by Saddam's authorities. Life here was miserable and as soon as the Iraqi regime collapsed in
April, she shifted back to Kirkuk, ending up living in the sports stadium with over 1,000 other IDPs.
While the Kurdistan Regional Government, United Nations and NGOs have reconstructed many villages,
the problem is still vast as Brandon Pustejovsky of US NGO Mission East told IRIN in the northern
governorate of Arbil, it was not just a matter of building houses for those returning to their homes.
Rather, an entire package was needed which included schools, health facilities, water and sanitation and a
means to make a living for the residents.
In the village of Ekmala an hour's drive from the northern city of Dahuk, Mission East has built 32 homes
for residents whose village was destroyed in the Anfal campaign. But it is just one village among hundreds
that still need reconstruction and help. "I just wish we could provide that comprehensive a solution to more
villages," Pustejovsky said.
Fakher Maraan, the Kurdistan Regional Government's Deputy Minister of Reconstruction and
Development, told IRIN in Arbil that the IDP situation was by far the biggest problem his government
faced.
Nearly 200,000 IDPs in the north were still living in the collective towns they had been shifted to by
Saddam's regime. In Arbil governorate and nearby Kirkuk alone there were more than 45,000 IDP families.
Maraan estimated another 1,500 villages needed to be rebuilt across the north of Iraq to accommodate
them.
But he also stressed the need for long term solutions not just emergency help to provide food and shelter for
families. While a simple house could cost about US $4,000, when costs of water, sewage, power, roads,
health centres and schools were added in, the price per residence in a reconstructed village could rise to US
$12,000 or US $15,000 in remote regions.
While the north had many skills and resources, it needed help from abroad because the problem was so
vast, he said. However, he worried that the international community considered the north of Iraq was
comparatively well off after years of self-government.
"But I have a very bad message for them - they don't understand." He said the UN administered Oil-forFood Programme had given people hope that they could return to their place of origin, but many were
finding there was no help despite the new freedoms.
On the outskirts of Arbil, thousands of people still live in the collective town of Binaslawa. Ali Hamid was
kicked out of his village of Khalid Barziani in 1988 by Saddam's forces and moved to Binaslawa. Formerly
a farmer, he was forced to sell second hand clothes to survive.
Fifteen years later he is still there, now with a small store selling cigarettes and sweets. He has visited his
village but everything remains destroyed. At present he lives hand to mouth and has no way of paying to
rebuild his old life. So he waits in Binaslawa for someone to provide him with somewhere to live and a way
to make a living.
147
"I would love to go back to my village to live and I still hope to be able to - until I die I hope to go back. It
is my land and the land of my father and grandfather." One of 80,000 IDPs living in Binaslawa, he is
luckier than many. Thousands have no income and live in tents or mud shacks. They rely totally on the
monthly food distributions under the Oil-for-Food Programme now being administered by the new Iraqi
ruling authority backed by the US Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).
Robert Pianka of US NGO Mercy Corps told IRIN in Khanaqin near Arbil that there was almost an infinite
variety of IDPs, from people whose villages had been destroyed during the Anfal campaign to those whose
paperwork had not been in order way back in the 1960s.
He said a related issue was the natural urbanisation process with people migrating from rural areas to towns
and others moving from towns to cities. In this respect he said much of the IDP problem would not be
solved by providing rural land to people but apartments and jobs in urban areas.
Often there was not enough land in villages for expanded families and people wanted access to better
schools and other kinds of employment. "People are moving from their villages to Khanaqin and from
Khanaqin to Baghdad and they should be able to if they want to come and have a mo re prosperous life."
He said Khanaqin was an example of an area with a mixed Arab and Kurdish population where relations
between the two groups had traditionally been good. The Arabisation process had "messed around with
this" and the return of IDPs was a way to re-establish what was a natural buffer zone between the Kurdish
north and Arab south.
However, further to the north the spectre of continuing IDP problems raised its head recently. At a protest
of several thousand people in Kirkuk, marchers called for Arabs who had shifted to the city during the
Arabisation process to leave and go home.
In a country that has seen so many forced from their homes and so much suffering because of this, it
appears the sad story of displacement may be set to continue unless large amounts of international
reconstruction aid are forthcomming." (UN OCHA, 5 January 2004)
1,000 returned Kurds sheltering in stadium in Kirkuk (January 2004)
•
•
•
Thousands of Kurdish families were forcibly moved from the area and replaced by Arabs
In a stadium that used to be the scene of happiness and triumph there is no cheering now
Promises of help and housing but so far nothing has materialised
"Sometimes Rebwar Mohammed Ibrahim wonders when life is going to get better. In his 25 years he has
been evicted from his home, imprisoned, tortured and seen his brother killed.
Now he is sheltering in a former sports stadium in the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk, one of more than 1,000
internally displaced people (IDPs) who have nowhere else to live.
"I just want to live like everyone else - in a house," he told IRIN in Kirkuk. He used to live in a house in
Kirkuk when he was a boy but in 1995 three of his brothers were arrested and the family was told they
would only be freed when the family and its possessions were on the edge of town ready to leave.
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As part of Saddam Hussein's Arabisation process, thousands of Kurdish families were forcibly moved from
the area and replaced by Arabs from the south and centre of the country.
After some time Rebwar sneaked back to Kirkuk, got married and in 2000 had a daughter. The following
year he was arrested and imprisoned. For the next seven months he was tortured, hung by his wrists, given
electric shock treatment and had all his toenails pulled out.
When he was released he became a Kurdish peshmerga fighter and amoung the first group of soldiers with
US forces to enter Kirkuk in April this year.
His joy at being back in his homeland still endures, but is tempered by the conditions he now finds himself
in. Having no house to go back to, he was one of seven families who set up home in the former
international sports stadium in Kirkuk where he once watched Iraq play Saudi Arabia at football.
In the eight months since then, he has been joined by 340 other families who have built crude mud shelters
outside the stadium and around its running track.
Chickens squat on the pole vault run-up in the shade of clothes drying and a child defecates in the long
jump pit. The IDPs have started ripping up the concrete seating to use as a floor in their shelters so they
don't have to sleep on the mud. Bits of the rubber track have been pulled up to provide paths over boggy
areas.
Pipes pour raw waste from the shacks onto the paths while sacks and blankets are all some families have
for walls. Rebwan, who is the elected representative of the stadium IDPs, said there have been promises of
help and housing but so far nothing has materialised.
"We came with the hope that the Coalition and other nations would give us the opportunity to build houses
quickly. We didn't think it would take so long," he exclaimed.
Some NGOs had donated supplies, but with new families arriving every day the problems were still huge.
In a stadium that used to be the scene of happiness and triumph there is no cheering now. "We want
liberation and freedom which will eventually mean this place becomes a place of healthy life and sports
again not a place of disease and sickness."
While his living situation depresses him, Rebwan said he would still rather be in his home city than exiled
as he was before. "Now I can see my child playing on Kirkuk land. My greatest hope was and still is to see
my child free - but in my own house. Of course I still have hope. Paying the sacrifice of our souls and blood
will bring something good."(UN OCHA, 19 January 2004)
Fear of ethnic cleansing in Kirkuk as Arabs are displaced
•
•
•
US: Commission to be set up to deal with displaced Kurds
The displaced in Kirkuk
Displaced reclaim land taken over 30 years
US advances Bosnian solution to ethnic cleansing in Iraq
“Jay Garner, the retired general overseeing Iraq's post-war reconstruction, held out the promise yesterday of
a Bosnia-style commission to resolve disputes between Arabs, Kurds and Turkomans displaced in northern
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Iraq during Saddam Hussein's regime. He said that a commission to "arbitrate what is just and fair" would
help to reverse "years of ethnic cleansing" of Kurds and other minorities around the cities of Kirkuk and
Mosul. But details of the proposed commission remain vague.
“He said the Iraqi version would be set up "within weeks or months", and could operate alongside an
independent body to monitor its work. The issue of land and property reclamation is one of the most
delicate facing a new Iraqi administration. Human Rights Watch says that as many as 120,000 Kurds were
displaced under a programme of "Arabisation". Kurds have long dreamed of being able to reclaim their
property. And since the collapse of the government in Baghdad some Arab families in the north say they
have been forced out - some at gunpoint - by Kurds seeking to reverse years of forced expulsions. Gen
Garner, who is on a two-day visit to the Kurdish-controlled north, said that the commission would comprise
representatives of all Iraq's communities. "It is vital that we do not accept the results of ethnic cleansing,"
he said.
“Jalal Talabani, whose Patriotic Union of Kurdistan was accused of driving Arabs from their homes, said
that the return of displaced people in the north was an "absolute right", but that it must be done "in a regular
way, not in chaos". He repeated the Kurds' commitment to avoiding reprisals against Arabs. "No one
should take anything by force," he said. Mr Talabani and Massoud Barzani, head of the other Kurdish
faction, the Kurdistan Democratic party, have set up committees to deal with the issue of returning property
looted by Kurds from Arab homes in the first few days after the fall of Baghdad.” (The Guardian, 24 April
2003)
Commission to be set up to deal with displaced Kurds
“A commission will be set up to resolve disputes between Arabs and Kurds displaced from their homes
under Saddam Hussein's regime. Kurdish leaders who met Jay Garner, the retired US general overseeing
the rebuilding of Iraq, reassured him that there would be no reprisals against Arabs who had taken over the
properties of Kurds expelled by Saddam's regime. Many Kurds want their properties back and others want
revenge for the violence against their people. Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan,
said: "There will be a committee later representing all sides, under the guidance of the United States, to
arrange how people must go back home in a regular way, not in chaos. We had made a commitment.
Yesterday we assured, we repeated it."
General Garner had met Mr Talabani in Sulaimaniya and flew yesterday morning to Arbil, where Massoud
Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, told him "I suppose we can make all Iraq like
Kurdistan." Saddam Hussein's regime expelled up to 120 000 Kurds from Kurdish cities under a campaign
of Arabisation of south Kurdistan.” (Kurdish Media, 24 April 2003)
Kurds move to lay claim to oil-rich Kirkuk Arabs, Turkmen being displaced in grab for power Kirkuk, Iraq
"This oil-rich city in northern Iraq always figured to be one of the great prizes of the war, and Kurdish
political parties are aggressively moving to take control of it -- lock, stock and oil barrel. The Kurds,
strongly opposed by rival groups of Arabs and Turkmen, have taken the largest physical hold of Kirkuk.
Hundreds of Kurdish police officers have been imported from the neighboring ethnic enclave of Iraqi
Kurdistan, and squads of Kurdish soldiers man the 24-hour checkpoints on every road leading into the city.
Kurdish leaders also are using the phrase "our Jerusalem" to refer to Kirkuk, a budding boomtown of
600,000 that is poised to generate billions of dollars in oil revenue. The city is not officially a part of
Kurdistan, and until three weeks ago it remained firmly under Saddam Hussein's control.
Officials from the dominant and well-armed Kurdish groups – the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan – have occupied numerous government buildings in Kirkuk, along with the
telecom offices, the TV station, military and police installations, and most of the former Baath Party
offices. At each bank in town, two armed guards stand watch: one from the KDP, the other from the PUK.
Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen all claim to be the majority population in Kirkuk, although reliable population
statistics do not exist. The last census here was done in 1957. Ethnic and political violence continues to
flare, and although U.S. forces here have been reinforced in recent days, they remain outnumbered and
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overmatched. Gunbattles, arson, extortion and looting are daily occurrences, and some of Kirkuk's most
valuable oil installations are being left unguarded.
"Nobody is watching the Zambur (oil and gas) company," said a Kurdish police sergeant, Ibrahim Hamza
Aziz. "We saw some men looting it the other day, but the Americans weren't around. And since the
Americans don't allow us to carry guns, we couldn't do anything. Zambur is a huge facility, and you could
blow up the whole place with a single cigarette butt." Such is the cynicism about U.S. efforts here that Aziz
and other Kurdish police say they believe Kirkuk's oil facilities are unguarded on purpose.
"All the oil equipment and machinery is Russian-made," he said. "Maybe the Americans want someone to
blow it all up so they can rebuild it and replace everything with American equipment." Kurds, meanwhile,
are also moving to influence the cultural and social life of Kirkuk through a covert but aggressive campaign
of flooding the city with Kurdish teachers, doctors, engineers and lawyers. Scores of Kurdish professors
have been bused to the University of Kirkuk from the University of Salahaddin, in the Kurdish capital of
Irbil. Salahaddin's president told the professors that it was their ethnic duty to apply for any postings in
Kirkuk that are held by Arab instructors. In Kirkuk's shops and markets, Kurdish money is being accepted
for the first time (along with U.S. dollars and the Iraqi dinars bearing Hussein's portrait). The PUKcontrolled Channel 8 shows Kurdish music videos in the evenings, and the self-appointed minister of
education, a Kurd, has been issuing decrees written in Kurdish, a language that few people here can read. A
new word has even entered the political vocabulary here -- takirid, which in Arabic means Kurdification.
"This word is an entirely new coinage," said Khalis Choperli, an official with the Iraqi Turkmen Front, an
umbrella group for a number of Turkmen political factions. "This concept of Kurdification started
immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein." The Turkmen also lay claim to Kirkuk -- they are dominant
in the center of the city -- and the baby-blue flags of the Turkmen Front can be seen fluttering above their
political offices in many neighborhoods. Iraq's estimated 1.4 million Turkmen are culturally and
linguistically related to the Turks, who have pledged to militarily protect them against possible reprisals by
Kurds and Arabs. Men allegedly with the Turkish special forces were recently caught trying to smuggle
weapons and ammunition into northern Iraq. Part of their cargo reportedly included flags and banners from
the Iraqi Turkmen Front.
“The Arab population in the Kirkuk region began to increase dramatically in the 1980s as Hussein began
his program of "Arabization," moving in Arabs from central and southern Iraq with guarantees of free land,
free houses and cheap agricultural loans. At the same time, at a nearly genocidal rate, Hussein was gassing,
killing and displacing hundreds of thousands of Kurds and Turkmen. The dreaded and violent fallout from
Arabization is being felt throughout northern Iraq, as Kurdish families are expelling Arab families from the
houses, farms and villages where the Arabs have lived for a decade or more.
The Kurds are reclaiming these places as their ancestral homes, along with the vacated homes of military
and political officers from the old regime. In the absence of any viable law, order or documentation, these
"negotiations" over houses are often conducted at the business end of a Kalashnikov rifle. One Arab family
in the Nasar section of Kirkuk, an extended family with 11 children, had its well-appointed home seized
overnight by a Kurdish military officer. The family appealed to Kurdish police and security officials in the
city, but they only shrugged. In several villages around Kirkuk, angry Arabs evicted from their houses have
packed their belongings and then set fire to the dwellings. Better that, they reasoned, than let the returning
Kurds have them.” (Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 4 May 2003)
Return Movements
300 Kurdish families spontaneously return to their village in Erbil
“UNHCR visited the destroyed site of Kandar, one of 231 villages in the Makhmur district that, according
to the local authorities, had been completely destroyed during the 'arabisation campaign' in 1987/88. The
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village was built 100 years ago, and had 70 families at the time of its destruction. UNHCR met with the
returned families who are living in make shift tents without electricity and running water. Pending
permanent solutions for people returning home, UNHCR is looking into possibilities of providing tents and
non-food items to returnees. A recent UNOPS survey found 300 Kurdish families had spontaneously
returned to their villages from Erbil.” (HCI, 6 May 2003)
"Returns of displaced people to their homes are a common feature of life in the North. A majority of the
people living in the North have been displaced at some point over the past 30 years, many more than once.
Returns are on-going from the population displaced during the 1980s, by the Anfal camp aign and the 1991
uprising. All the returns, however, are to homes and lands that are under the control of the KRG. Kurdistan
Regional Government. For this population, the impediments to return are not of a security nature, aside
from landmine pollution. Failure to return is more of an economic and social nature." (Fawcett & Tanner,
Oct 02, p23)
Kurdish parties start to implement agreement of the return of internally displaced
within northern Iraq (2001-2002)
•
•
•
•
Kurdish parties agreed in 1998 and again in 1999 to return people expelled from their home in
northern Iraq but with no tangible result
As of July 2001, following a new agreement between the Kurdish parties, over 120 displaced
families had gone back home
In Oct 2001, close to 600 families displaced within northern Iraq returned home
According to USCR, some 1,300 families returned home between June and October 2001
"The KDP and PUK reiterated [in 1999] their September 1998 agreement to begin returning to their rightful
homes the many thousands of persons that each had expelled as a result of intra-Kurdish fighting in the
three northern provinces; however, no effort to implement the agreement was begun during the year. (US
DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for civil liberties, c.")
"According to the agreement of the Higher Peace Committee between Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), yesterday 40 families from Arbil went back to Suleymania and 35
families from Suleymania went back to Arbil. More will follow soon.
Both parties have signed an agreement in Arbil, South Kurdistan capital, on 16th of this month, regarding
the return of the displaced people between Arbil and Suleymania because of the exceptional
circumstances."
The first returnees are those who do not have the problem of housing and property. They were all received
at both sides by the concerned authorities and taken to their places wit respect and dignity. […]
Task forces have been established to ensure the returnees settle smoothly. (KurdishMedia.com 25 June
2001)
"Tomorrow on 8th of this month [July 2001], more displaced people are going back to their homes on their
free choice. 52 families are coming back from Suleymania to Arbil and 55 families are going back from
Arbil to Suleymania and its surroundings." (KurdishMedia.com 7 July 2001)
"Before similar number of displaced families returned home on both sides at the same time. But now,
because of the strengthening of the peace, the Higher Coordinating Committee has decided to let this to
take its natural course and neither side has to allocate a date to return any groups of displaced families. This
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is why yesterday for the first time the biggest number of families (279 of them) came back from
Suleymania to Arbil. (200) more families will return home from Arbil to Suleymania this week.
Out of the 279 displaced families came back from Suleymania, 223 of them went to Arbil, 39 of them went
to Shaqlawa, Soran, Harir and the surroundings and 6 families went to Akry and Dihoke. 118 Of these
families in Arbil went back straight to their houses. In Suleymania and its surroundings, 83 houses of the
displaced family have already been vacated to be given back to their owners this week.
According to a source from Joint Committee of displaced families, all farmlands, on both sides, have been
freed for their owners and all returned families have gone back to their farm. The few, left, will soon
receive back their property and farms." (KurdishMedia.com 21 Oct 2001)
"The PUK and KDP also began implementation of an October 1999 agreement that called for the return of
displaced people within northern Iraq to their places of origin; between June and October [2001], some
1,300 families reportedly returned to their homes in Erbil, Dohuk, and Suleymaniyah." (USCR 2002)
Obstacles to return
Focus on Kirkuk displaced
"It's taken us a long time to get here, but we can start again. We've had to do it many times before. At least
we are home now," says 68-year-old Aziz Khurshid. For Aziz and his family, home is an abandoned Iraqi
military building on the outskirts of the northern city of Kirkuk. "It's not exactly home, but it is close
enough to where our village used to be," he told IRIN. Forced to flee his village, some two kilometres south
of Kirkuk city, the Khurshid family have been on the move for almost 17 years. Aziz recalls that fateful day
in December 1986 when in the early hours of the morning he rushed to bundle his wife and two children
onto a tractor and fled for his life.
"People were saying that our village would be next, but I didn't want to believe them. Then, one morning,
we heard the shelling in the nearby village. I told my wife to pack a few things, mainly food and clothes,
and we decided to leave. Since then I have never looked back," he said. In a move to subdue the mainly
Kurdish-populated part of Iraq once and for all, the Ba'thist regime destroyed some 4,000 Kurdish villages
between 1980 and 1988. Human rights groups estimated that up to a million people, mainly Kurds, but also
Turkomans and Assyrians, were displaced as a result.
Along with tens of thousands of others, Aziz and his family were forced into "collective towns", far from
their farms and economic support. Rights groups often highlighted the sub-standard living conditions in
these purpose-built towns. Observers say the intention of the regime was to make the fiercely independent
rural Kurds dependent on the Iraqi authorities for food, water and social services. "The conditions at Bin
Aslawah [10 km east of Arbil] were terrible. There were too many people there and not enough water. Our
children were getting sick all the time. So we moved to another collective town, hoping conditions would
be better. But it was worse," Aziz said.
Barely making ends meet, the Khurshid family has since lived in three collective towns across northern
Iraq. That was until two months ago when news spread across Iraq that the decades of Ba'thist rule had
finally ended. "At first I couldn't believe it, and now I still don't fully believe Saddam has gone. Not until I
see him either arrested or in the ground will I be at peace. But when we heard the news that the Americans
had taken over, we thought we should come back to Kirkuk. We had nothing in the collective town, and
now we still have nothing here, but we feel more safe because it is our home," Aziz said.
Unlike several other public buildings occupied by returnees, the Khurshid family has water. Through a
series of complicated electrical hot-wiring, they also have a steady supply of electricity. Their biggest
concern is their dwindling stock of food. "There is very little left of the food that we managed to store. With
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no money, we are sure to have problems very soon. I am too old to work now and my daughters cannot find
even tailoring work. What will happen when there is nothing left?" he told IRIN.
For 37-year-old Reza'iyeh Husayn and her husband, who live in another abandoned building further down
the road, the homecoming to Kirkuk has been wrought with difficulties and painful memories. "When we
left in 1991, we had a house, but now we don't have any papers to show that it belonged to us. Without
papers, we cannot prove anything. My husband has no job. We can only depend on the food ration, and we
haven't received that for the last two months," she told IRIN.
In 1991, in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, the Iraqi government used the Republican Guard and
other units that survived the war to quell an ensuing rebellion by the Kurds in the north. Recalling the terror
used against them three years earlier, it is estimated that close to two million people fled for the Turkish
and Iranian borders.
For Kurds like Reza'iyeh and her husband who decided to stay in their homes, life became unbearable as
the regime stepped up its 'Arabisation' policy. Villages, neighbourhoods, and at times individuals were
expelled through a subtle mix of targeted violence and bureaucratic repression. In order to weaken the
'undesired' communities, the regime promulgated administrative rules prohibiting non-Arabs from
purchasing property, renewing licences for economic activities, or attending school. "It was too much for
us. My husband could not find work anywhere. We were constantly watched without knowing why. My
brothers were arrested many times, and up until today we don't know what happened to some of the men
from the area," she told IRIN. But while their departure from Kirkuk became inevitable given the continued
harassment from Iraqi authorities, the tragedy that was set to befall them continues to haunt them today.
"That place was not fit for humans to live in, but we had no choice. I regret I ever went to live there," she
said. "We're glad to be back, but I cannot help but blame Saddam and his soldiers from forcing us from our
homes. Maybe if we had stayed, my baby would still be alive today."
According to the United Nations, some 15,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are at present in Kirkuk
city, the majority of whom are old caseload Kurds [those who predate the recent war], and who are now
returning from the three northern governorates [of Dahuk, Arbil and Sulaymaniyah], as well as from the
western governorate of Anbar and its main city, Al-Ramadi. However, the situation is fluid as people are
returning to their areas of origin daily. A recent inter-agency assessment of 150 families who had settled in
Kirkuk stadium found that most of the group had arrived from Tikrit, but originated from Kirkuk.
The assessment showed that while some of these families did have relatives in the city, they were unable to
accommodate returning IDPs. Moreover, whereas some of the families had owned property in the city, it
had either been destroyed or was occupied by squatters.
Although the findings of the 29 May inter-agency assessment to Kirkuk, which focused particularly on the
humanitarian needs of IDPs have not yet been released, preliminary results show that many of the recent
returnees have adequate food supplies and, according to the World Food Programme, have "some cash
which they use to buy additional food in the market".
The current challenge, however, for humanitarian agencies is the development of a coherent strategy to
address the myriad of problems facing returnees. "It is important that along with the local authorities that a
policy is put in place so that humanitarian assistance may be delivered in a manner that benefits both the
host community and those who are returning. This would go towards diluting some of the tensions between
different groups in the future," one UN official told IRIN. "The international community has to make sure
that people are returning to conditions that are conducive to them continuing productive lives," he added.”
(IRIN, 2 June 2003)
Kurds Return to Northern Iraqi City, Evicting Arabs; Hundreds Being Ousted as Displaced Group
Reclaims Land Taken Over 30 Ye ars
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“It's been a decade since Abd Ali Hamid moved to this northern Iraqi city, eager to start a new life. The
Iraqi government had promised him a plot of land in Kirkuk and a loan the equivalent of $ 20,000, an
irresistible offer for a poor Arab fisherman from the south. Hamid built a roomy, two-story home with
mint-green walls and black-speckled tile floors. But with the fall of President Saddam Hussein's
government, Hamid suddenly is homeless. The fisherman left Kirkuk during the recent US bombardment.
When he returned a few days ago, he found his home taken over by Kurds. Now, Hamid's family of 11 is
crowded in with relatives across town, worried that they and other Arabs will be pushed from this city.
"Our children are in school here. All our relatives and colleagues are living here. We don't have people in
the south anymore," protested Hamid, 60, a tall man with charcoal eyes wearing a black-and-white
checkered headdress and flowing gray robe. Added his wife, Jundiya: "If it stays like this, the results could
be very bad. All the Arabs will be kicked out."
Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Iraqi Arabs are being ousted from their homes in and around this
ethnically mixed city as Kurds retaliate for decades of repression by Hussein's government. The newly
emboldened Kurds deny this is "ethnic cleansing;" they say they are merely reclaiming lands seized from
them in the past 30 years. The property was often given to Arabs whom the government resettled here to
blunt Kurdish influence.
But the evictions are creating a new group of homeless, Iraqis who in some cases have lived in this area for
decades. And the problem could escalate as thousands of displaced Kurds return from refugee camps in
the north. Both the new homeless and human-rights groups are calling on US troops in charge of the city to
stop the forced removals. Soldiers from the Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade moved into an Arab
neighborhood in the southeastern part of the city in recent days to guard against evictions. But their
commander says they are stretched too thin and got started too late to prevent many of the seizures. "Our
biggest fear is that these kinds of incidents are going to raise the temperature significantly in the city," said
Hania Mufti, London director of the Middle East and North Africa division of Human Rights Watch, who
visited Kirkuk last week. "This may, in turn, lead to inter-ethnic violence."
The Kurds are an ethnic and linguistic group that inhabits the mostly mountainous area where the borders
of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria converge. They number at least 25 million and had been promised their own
country after World War I. Kurds have claimed to be a majority in this key oil city and its surrounding
countryside, but Kirkuk also has significant numbers of Arabs, Assyrians and Turkmen. Hussein tried to tilt
the balance by expelling the rebellious Kurds and resettling Arabs from the south. Now, the militia-backed
Kurdish parties are saying the Arabs should go home, though not through force.
That message, however, hasn't trickled down. Human Rights Watch estimates 2,000 Arabs were forced to
leave four villages south of Kirkuk after the area was seized April 10 by Kurdish militia fighters working
with the US military. Now, some Kurds are starting evictions inside this city of 1 million, according to
Arab witnesses. Hamid said he, his brother and his cousin have all had to leave their homes in the Shorja
neighborhood in eastern Kirkuk on the orders of Kurdish neighbors, some of them armed. "They accuse us,
'You belong to
Saddam's regime. You have to leave,' " he said, clicking his black plastic worry beads as he sat cross-legged
on the floor of his relative's house. Hamid's journey has been difficult. He belongs to the country's Shiite
Muslim majority, which was also repressed under Hussein's government. He lost his livelihood in his native
Maisan province, near Basra, when authorities drained the area's lakes and marshes to deny Shiite rebels a
hiding place.
The government offered him a chance to start over, he said, with an empty plot of land on the outskirts of
Kirkuk and the loan. Forty families from Hamid's tribe accompanied him, getting similar benefits. "I sold
my wife's gold jewelry, and some furniture" to finish the home, said Hamid. He showed a visitor an official
document printed in Arabic. "Look, I have an ownership certificate," he said. But Hamid arrived in Kirkuk
as part of a brutal effort to redraw the city's ethnic map. The government banned non-Arabs from
purchasing property, prohibited businesses from using non-Arab names and even ordered the script on
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tombstones replaced with Arabic. Since 1991, according to Human Rights Watch, 120,000 people, mostly
Kurds, were driven from their homes in Kirkuk and the surrounding area.
Among them was Nasrin Jafar. The young mother said her family was forced out of the city in 1991, after a
Kurdish uprising. Their home was blown up, one of 2,000 destroyed in the Shorja neighborhood, according
to Kurdish officials. The family eventually returned but had to bribe Baath Party members, she said. With
the US-led invasion, Jafar now has new freedoms, new hopes and, at last, a house. Hamid's.
"I fully believe I am entitled to have this house, because we suffered so much under the Baath Party," said
Jafar, 23, in a long green velour robe, her 5-year-old daughter in her lap and neighbors sitting around her.
Above them, on the mint-green walls of the living room, were posters of the two main Kurdish leaders,
Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani. Jafar and her husband were renting a room in a nearby house when
Hamid's family left during the recent war. When the regime fell, they moved in. "This house does not
belong to them. It belongs to the government," insisted Jafar's husband, Ali Jalal, 24. Hamid's wife and
children tried to return to the house after the war. But the neighbors screamed that they were not welcome.
"They wanted to come back," said Jalal. "But all the neighbors say, 'We don't want anything to do with
these people. We do not want them here. In the past, they behaved badly.'" In particular, the couple said,
Hamid and his family were active members of Hussein's Baath P arty who informed security agencies that
neighborhood people were linked to the Kurdish guerrillas. A neighbor sitting in the living room, Serbast
Yunus, 17, said Hamid had accused his brother of robbery and ties to Kurdish rebels, resulting in his
spending a night in jail and having to pay a large bribe to Baath Party officials. Asked whether he had been
a Baath Party member, Hamid said no. But he added, "If you didn't join, you couldn't get a government job.
You would be hated. That's why most people had to join. I am the only person who did not." Hamid said he
would be willing to return to southern Iraq if he and his tribe had guarantees they could get housing and
jobs.
Kemal Kerkuki, a senior Kurdish official here, said a committee would be formed at some point to look
into providing compensation for Arabs who were leaving the city. But, he added, it would be better if they
left as soon as possible, since many Kurds were impatiently waiting to recover their property. "Arabs who
came under the Arabization campaign have to leave. But we exclude the use of force," said Kerkuki, the top
local representative of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The US military, the ultimate authority here, has so
far played a limited role in preventing the evictions. Col. William Mayville, commander of the 173rd
Airborne Brigade here, said he had dispatched a company of soldiers to an Arab neighborhood in the
southeastern part of the city to prevent evictions from occurring. In a few cases, soldiers had been able to
return people to their homes.
But, he said, it wasn't clear how many evictions there have been. "If you listen to the allegations, billions,"
he said. He said his troops were stretched so thin that they had not been able to prevent Kurds from clearing
Arabs from villages south of the city. He added that the Kurds involved were not the militia, but apparently
average Kurds claiming to represent the Kurdish parties. "That is the area we've got to do better," he said."
(RW, 25 April 2003)
Arab IDPs in Kirkuk region: "We are Iraqis, but now we have no place to go"
•
•
Arabs were permitted by the Baath Authorities to move into houses previously occupied by others
After the regime fell, those people asked for their houses back
“(…) Most in the group were rewarded with plots of land and houses in Kirkuk and Khanaqin in northern
Iraq for fighting in the eight year Iran/Iraq war. But when the Saddam Hussein regime fell after US-led
coalition troops entered Iraq, people living in those cities told them to leave. Under Saddam Hussein’s
“Arabisation” programme to get more of his supporters into parts of the country where he was not liked,
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many of the Arabs were permitted to move into houses previously occupied by others. After the regime fell,
those people asked for their houses back.
Thousands of people were moved around in Iraq in the last 35 years as part of the programme. In a complex
dance, many have now been thrown out of their homes into various temporary quarters around the country.
“I’m like a refugee in my own country,” 56-year-old Halil Naismotlik, a tribal leader sitting on the carpet,
told IRIN. (…) More than 100 families live at a former Iraqi military base, worrying about what to do next.
(…)
“Kurdish (residents of northern cities) people gave us just a few days to leave,” Salem Majid, told IRIN.
“We are Iraqis, but now we have no place to go,” he added. US troops recently came to see the group,
Major David Vacchi, a US military spokesman at a nearby base in a former military hospital, told IRIN.
They believe the families should move back to Nasiriyah, a city in the south where most have relatives. No
international aid agencies have offered help, although some have come to visit, tribal leaders said. Officials
from the newly formed ministry of justice offered them electricity and water, but did not say what the
people should do to prepare themselves for winter, according to Sheik Akram Juad.
(…)
People used to being taken care of by Saddam Hussein have difficulty comprehending the position they
now find themselves in. One man said he accepted that he was told to leave his house in the north, since he
said he knew the house he lived in used to belong to someone else. But he also believed he and his
colleagues had done nothing wrong. “The US Army should take care of us,” Sabar Dombas, told IRIN.
“We sacrificed ourselves in the war with Iran. If the United States and Islamic countries accept that there
are refugees in this place, they should also accept us,” he maintained.” (IRIN, 30 September 2003)
In northern Iraq landmines prevent return (1998-2002)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Population of Northern Iraq has one of the more extensive landmine/unexploded ordnance
problems in the world
Northern Iraq was heavily mined during the Iran-Iraq war to protect the country from invasion
The UN Office for Project Services said that many IDPs cannot return home because villages
remain infested with mines
Additional landmines were laid during the Kurdish uprising
According to the UN Secretary General, landmines impede displaced persons from returning to
their homes in northern Iraq but clearing these minefields would take between 35 and 75 years
Return movements were however observed in 2000
The Iraqi government has also mined the area around Kirkuk to prevent return of displaced
families
"The population of the three northern governorates of Iraq faces one of the more extensive
landmine/unexploded ordnance (UXO) problems in the world. Even though the exact number of mines is
unknown, the national survey conducted by UNOPS up to September 2001 has identified 3,400 mined
areas covering some 900 square kilometers of land required for reconstruction, resettlement, agricultural
purposes and the rehabilitation of basic services such as electricity and water, affecting approximately
1100 communities.
In addition to medical and social consequences resulting from mine accidents and casualties, mines and
unexploded ordnance have had a significant impact on socio-economic factors. Many displaced people
now wish to return to their villages of origin and resume their normal life, farming their land, but entire
villages are still infested with mines making it unsafe. In addition, the mine problem is having long-term
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negative repercussions on economic development making reconstruction of road networks, power lines and
waterways more protracted, dangerous and costly.
Lastly, mines impede the mobility of teachers,
technicians, doctors and healthcare workers, undermining the rehabilitation process. Even where mines do
not prevent food and medical aid from reaching people in need, they make already difficult operations even
more hazardous, and the associated security measures increase the cost of humanitarian relief." (UNOPS
2002)
"Northern Iraq (Kurdistan) is severely mine-affected. The region was heavily mined during the 1980-1988
Iran-Iraq war as the conflict waged throughout the region. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraqi military resources
were concentrated in the south, and the northern borders were mined to protect the country from invasion.
During the post-war Kurdish uprising, additional landmines were laid in the northern region.
[…] The UN estimates that there are more than 10 million landmines and a large quantity of UXO
[Unexploded Ordnance] in Iraqi Kurdistan. Of these landmines, 8 million are estimated to be antipersonnel
and 2 million antitank. […] Some minefields were mapped, but the army has since destroyed those records.
[…] Landmines and UXO are concentrated in the northern Kurdish region, southern Iraq, and the area
along the Iran and Kuwait borders, and are commonly found near water sources and in rural farmland.
Mining was not restricted to borders; mines are known to be located throughout the northern region in such
areas as Penjwin. In addition, the region near Basra in the southeast is heavily mined.
[…] Following the Gulf War, IDPs and refugees returned to the Kurdish region and settled in the
mountainous, heavily mined area. Landmines continue to be the primary obstacle to economic productivity;
their clearance and the restoration of the land are essential to the long-term economic self-sufficiency of the
region. The presence of landmines has allowed only 50 percent of agricultural land to be cultivated in the
region, and in the governorate of Sulaimania alone only 40 percent of the land is usable. Simple chores
such as herding animals and collecting firewood have become life -endangering activities. […]
The Iraqi government has no known program for demining. The demining activities that have been
conducted in Iraq have been in the autonomous Kurdish region in the north." (U.S. DOS 1998)
"Landmines continued to make northern Iraq dangerous and impeded displaced persons from returning to
their homes." (USCR 1999, p.152)
"The greatest concentration of mines in northern Iraq is located along the Iran-Iraq border, specifically in
the districts of Penjwin, Sharbazher, and Qaladiza. A recently completed Landmine Impact Survey
confirmed that all twenty-five districts in the three provinces (governorates) comprising northern Iraq are
mine-affected, and 3,444 distinct areas suspected of mine and/or UXO contamination affect over 148,000
families (more than one in five) living in 1,096 mine-affected communities." (HRW Dec 02)
"Studies indicate that there are approximately 210 million square metres of minefields, disregarding
minefields that continue to be added and new discoveries. These include 4.5 million square metres of
minefields in Dohuk, 55.7 million square metres in Erbil and 149 square metres in Sulaymaniya. It is
estimated that it will take between 35 and 75 years to clear those minefields. (UN SC 19 November 1998,
Sect. IV)
However, in 2000: "It was […] clear […] that return movement within northern Iraq was occurring, and
that some of the 4,500 Kurdish villages destroyed by Baghdad forces during the 'Anfal' campaign of the
late 1980s were being rebuilt and reoccupied." (USCR 2001, p.180)
"Those expelled [from Kirkuk] are not permitted to return. The Special Rapporteur reported that citizens
who provide employment, food or shelter to returning or newly arriving Kurds are subject to arrest. In order
to encourage departure and prevent displaced persons from returning, the Government reportedly has mined
the area around Kirkuk, and has declared it a military and security zone. Roads into the area are fortified
with military checkpoints. " (US DOS 25 February 2000, "Respect for civil liberties, c.")
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Government-controlled Iraq
U.S.-led forces are trying to keep Kurds from coming back too quickly (February 2004)
•
•
•
•
If all Kurds come back to Kirkuk at the same time, the city simply can't cope in terms of providing
services
Saddam brought Arabs to Kirkuk, sometimes given homes of displaced Kurds to "Arabize" the
city
Many Kurds want the Arabs who came during Saddam's rule to return to where they came from
Kurdish Regonal Government accused of encouraging the Kurds' return to increase their numbers
in time for a possible referendum on the future of the city
"U.S.-led forces are trying to keep Kurds who lost their homes in Saddam's campaign of ethnic cleansing
from coming back too quickly, hoping to avert humanitarian and political problems.
Kirkuk, which sits on some of the world's largest oil reserves, is considered a difficult case in the political
tangle of the new Iraq. Its inhabitants are made up of Kurds, Turkomen, Arabs and Christians. Rivalry
among the three Muslim ethnic groups has led to bloodshed in recent months.
Saddam brought Arabs to Kirkuk, sometimes given homes of displaced Kurds to 'Arabize' the city. Many
Kurds want the Arabs who came during Saddam's rule to return to where they came from, something the
Coalition Provisional Authority opposes.
Some Turkomen leaders accuse the two dominant Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the
Kurdistan Democratic Party, of encouraging the Kurds' return to increase their numbers in time for a
possible referendum on the future of the city or strengthen their bargaining position in the future.
The Kurdish parties say they are not encouraging returns, just providing humanitarian assistance when
needed.
The U.S.-led coalition asked the PUK to stop supplying tents to the returnees to discourage them from
coming back.
'If all come back at the same time, the city simply can't cope in terms of providing services, said Paul
Harvey, a Briton, who heads the coalition office in Kirkuk.
But Zanganeh, whose husband was taken away by Saddam's security agents, cannot understand why she is
not welcome.
'For so many years Saddam denied us from living in this city,' said Piroz, 36. 'We've been homeless for too
long.
She, her three sons, her mother, two sisters, four nieces and two nephews left their previous camp — in
Chamchamal, 24 miles to the east — on April 14, a day after Kirkuk fell to the U.S. Army, and moved into
a tent on the edge of the city.
Zanganeh's son, Amin, 20, fears that promises that eventually they will be allowed to settle in the city may
fall through. 'The sooner we return and have a foothold here the better because this way we are more
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assured that we will stay and won't be uprooted. This is my home. This tent is erected on my land, the land
of my ancestors,' he said.
Kurdish officials accuse coalition officials of lacking sympathy.
'It is their right to return the moment they desire to do so,' said Hassib Rozbayani, a Kurd and Kirkuk's
deputy mayor.
Harvey said the return — especially of those whose property was confiscated and handed to Arabs — could
take more than a year.
The Iraqi Governing Council in Baghdad has ordered the creation of a claims commission in each of the
country's 18 governorates to address property disputes, due to start work by the end of the month.
'But it will take time to process those claims," said Harvey. "There's no instant fix."'
Complicating matters, some confiscated homes have been sold and resold multiple times.
'You will have somebody in their property today who bought it in good faith and to tell them that they have
to move out is a problem,' Harvey said.
The absence of international aid agencies, including the United Nations , has also slowed resettlement.
Relief organizations withdrew from Iraq last year following a series of suicide bombings at U.N. and
international Red cross headquarters.
The few agencies who are here are trying to provide the 60 sites where returnees are staying with
electricity, clean water and sanitation.
The home of Rabiya Abdullah Amin, 73, has been fixed up in the village of Qarahanjir, about 30 miles
northwest of Kirkuk. But she can't occupy the property until 800 more houses scheduled to be repaired are
done — so everyone can move in at once.
She and other families are squatting nearby to make sure they don't lose their homes again.
'I am afraid someone would come and occupy it again and never give it back,' said Amin. 'As soon as they
give the key, I will take my old man and move into our house." (AP, 10 February 2004).
Difficult return post-war Iraq (April 2003)
•
•
Fayli Kurds face difficult return
Marsh Arabs contemplate return to lost paradise
Fayli Kurds face difficult return
“According to David McDowall, a specialist on Middle East affairs with a particular interest in minorities,
and author of a book entitled "A Modern History of the Kurds", the Fayli Kurds, resident in Iraq since the
Ottoman empire, have had a tenuous relationship with the Iraqi government. In fact, as a matter of policy,
the state had long argued that, given their religious beliefs, they were actually Iranians. At least 50,0000
Fayli Kurds were expelled in the late 1970s and, by 1987, at least another 50,000 had crossed the border to
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Iran. By the end of August 1988, probably another 100,000 or so crossed, bringing the total to something in
the order of 250,000, McDowell said in his book. As part of the state's campaign, property belonging to
Fayli Kurds was confiscated and they were stripped of their Iraqi citizenship. But it was the 1980-88 war
between Iraq and Iran that Saddam seized as the perfect excuse to send what remained of them to Iran.”
"I was 12 years old when the headmaster at my school told me that I had to be a Ba'thist [Saddam Hussein's
Ba'th party], because he knew that my father belonged to another party [the Shi'ah religious Da'wah party].
I didn't know what he meant, but I said 'no', and only two days after this took place, all my family was sent
to Iran," Safa told IRIN, refusing to give his full name as he had only returned from Iran 10 days earlier.
Most of the Fayli Kurds were merchants who owned many offices and shops. They even founded the
Baghdad Chamber of Commerce during the 1960s, but now remain reluctant to return unless all their rights,
wealth and property are restored.The houses and other buildings belonging to the Faylis were either turned
into offices for the police, security or intelligence services, or given to people who had worked for them. In
some ways, the families of Abd a-Rahim and Safa could be considered lucky. Safa said that during the antiFayli campaign, many male members of families aged between 18 and 35 were picked up by the authorities
and imprisoned, many of them never to be heard from again. He believed that about 12,000 such young
men simply disappeared.”
”Today, the situation resulting from that campaign constitutes a major obstacle to the group's return. "The
question is who owns the documents that prove that they are the true owners of the property," Zaynab
Murad of the Cultural Association of Fayli Kurds said. "A lot of the people that were exiled to Iran stayed
there, but a few fled to Europe." According to Zaynab, at the time of the campaign, most of the Fayli
merchants and traders were summoned to an emergency meeting and told to bring all their documents.
When they complied, they were arrested and their documents confiscated before being sent to the border
without their families. "We had 10 to 15 cases where the new owners of the houses welcomed the idea of
giving the properties back, but in many other cases, the residents were not helpful," she said, noting that her
association now had legal consultants awaiting a new government to enable them to take the cases to court.
But "only a few Faylis will ever return to the country that they once used to call home", she predicted.”
(IRIN, 21 May 2003)
Marsh Arabs ambivalent about returning to their lost paradise
”Resting by the green river bank at Qurna, which was reputed to be the Garden of Eden, Qassim Khalaf
voiced his sorrow at the paradise lost, the land of the marsh Arabs. "The marshes were a source of fish,
reeds and birds," he said wistfully, adding: "There are no marshes left. The water has dried up." The
riverside at Qurna is one of the few green and fertile places left in this part of southern Iraq. Elsewhere, the
marshes have been reduced to parched earth, the result of environmental vandalism on a grand scale by
Saddam Hussein designed to quell the rebellious marsh Arabs. He destroyed a 5,000-year-old way of life,
killing or displacing most of the population of the marshes. Mr Khalaf, 35, a schoolteacher, described the
destruction as vengeance by Saddam Hussien, a Sunni, for the Shia uprising against him after the 1991 Gulf
war. "Saddam destroyed the marshes because we are Shia Muslim," he said. Like many other residents of
Qurna, he predicts that, with Saddam gone, most of the displaced marsh Arabs will agitate to return. That
will present the next Iraqi government with a dilemma. Iraqi experts say the challenge of returning water to
the marshes is immense. Salah Bader, 32, a water engineer who lives in Qurna, is sceptical, but reluctantly
admitted: "It is possible to put the water back: to close the barriers and let the water flow again. It would
not be easy, but it could be done. It would be costly."
Standing by Adam's Tree at Qurna, supposedly where Adam gave in to Eve's temptation, Mr Bader said
that one of the biggest problems lay outside Iraq's borders. Turkey has dammed the Tigris, and it was taking
so much water that the flow was not as strong as it used to be, he said. Even if Saddam's drainage system
was reversed, there might not be enough water in the Tigris to flood the marshes again. Turkey's dam
programme is internationally controversial, but the chance of a diplomatic with Ankara on water at this
point looks remote. The land of the marsh Arabs covered more than 15,000 sq km (6,000 sq miles) around
Qurna, where Iraq's two main rivers, the Euphrates and the Tigris, join, stretching from Basra in the south
to Nassiriya in the west and Amara in the north. Its inhabitants had a unique lifestyle, living on floating
161
islands made from reeds and in cathedral-like houses, also built from reeds. They were self-sustaining,
living mainly on fish and birds. In a habitat which provided good cover, they sustained a long guerrilla
campaign against Saddam, who took his revenge by digging a third river in 1991 to drain the marshes. The
last of the big marshes disappeared in 1994.
Human Rights Watch, in a report published in January, said the population had fallen from 250,000 to
40,000. Thousands had been killed, an estimated 40,000 fled as refugees to camp s in Iran, and 100,000
were displaced to elsewhere in Iraq. Many can be found living in hovels by the roadsides of southern Iraq.
At Dera, south of Qurna, there is a string of such homes, a few made from brick, but most from mud. One
of the residents, Katem Muhsen, 23, a former army officer, was among the last to leave the marshes. He
lived in Hammar, one of the two bigger marshes, until 1997, when he moved to Dera. "In Saddam's time all
our rights were lost and he closed our marshes. Everything died. We are the lowest form of life in Iraq," he
said. Signalling problems ahead for the next Iraqi government, Mr Muhsen said that many of the marsh
Arabs wanted to return to their old lives. "If the water returns to the marshes, they would like to go. But not
as it is." But it may be too late to recreate the old ways. Some of the marsh Arabs, like Mr Muhsen himself,
have got used to a more modern existence and think even the squalor of Dera is preferable to the old ways.
He will not return to the marshes. "I have got used to living here," he said. "We can reach the city and it is
better, and we have roads and that is easier. "Here we have livestock. Some will go back and others will
stay."” (The Guardian, 26 April 2003)
Marsh Arabs destroy Saddam's dykes to revive ancient way of life
“The destitute Marsh Arabs of southern Iraq are destroying dykes built under Saddam Hussein's regime in a
bid to revive the parched ancient marshlands which provided their traditional way of life. The unruly Shiite
tribes, who made their living among the towering reeds and marshes, found themselves a target of Saddam
by the 1980s. A series of dykes was ordered built, the marshes were drained and the reeds torched -- killing
off a way of life unique in the Middle East, the Madan civilisation. "It's the Madan themselves who have
destroyed several dykes with mechanical shovels since the regime fell," said Corrado Generelli, a water and
environment specialist with the International Committee of the Red Cross.
As a result, the water levels are rising again. Generelli explained that at the same time as they dykes were
breeched, the marshes also began to receive unusual amounts of water from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.
Dams in far northern Iraq which are normally filled with melting snow water for the summer were
abandoned during the US-led war that toppled Saddam. The water flowed down the rivers to the Gulf.
"An enormous quantity of water flowed to the Persian-Arab Gulf and some of it came to irrigate the
marshes," the water expert said, warning, "The summer reserves have been lost." Generelli expects the
level of the Euphrates to fall again in the coming months but that the marshes will still be irrigated by the
river. "The Euphrates flows naturally through the marshes," he said.
The Baath regime hardened its attitude towards the Marsh Arabs when opposition militants found refuge
among the reeds after an abortive Shiite uprising in the south followed the 1991 Gulf War. An ecological
and human disaster developed as the water ran increasingly dry and salty, in a scorched region where
rainfall is rare. Turkey's construction of two major dams on the Tigris and Euphrates in the 1990s -- despite
Iraqi hostility -- did nothing to relieve the plight of the marsh dwellers. Many fishermen moved to the cities
to work as labourers, others found refuge in surrounding villages and towns, eking out a miserable living.
An Iraqi water expert said he feared serious water shortages this year in Iraq unless an agreement could be
struck with Turkey. Baghdad was negotiating before the war in a bid to persuade Ankara to allow more
water to head south, in exchange for oil, the expert said. Generelli said the Marsh Arabs "will come back to
the marshes whatever: they have been dreaming only of that for years. "However the water will have to
reach a certain level for them to settle in again ... once there is enough water the reeds will grow again
quickly. They only need a few centimetres." Amin Awad, mission head for the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees, said he expected the Madan to gradually return to their traditional ways and once again build
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reed homes on stilts to fish, hunt and breed buffalo. "It will take six months or a year before there is enough
water for fish eggs to hatch," Awad said.” (AFP, 19 May 2003)
Forced return of families originally from the Provinces and living in Baghdad (1999)
•
•
•
Residents of the Kurdish provinces in the north and Shiite Muslims provinces of the south sought
refuge in Baghdad after the 1991 Gulf War
Iraqi government forced 4,000 families to return to their province of origin in 1999
Opposition sources said that most of the people expelled were opponents to the regime
"More than 4,000 families from northern and southern Iraq who sought refuge in Baghdad after the 1991
Gulf War have been expelled to their provinces, Interior Minister Mohammed Zamam Abdel Razzak said.
'The interior ministry decided to move the families who poured into Baghdad since 1991 and took them
back to their provinces of origin,' he was quoted by the weekly Al-Iilam as saying. Since the end of the
Gulf War in 1991, 'thousands of families have left the northern and southern provinces, affecting the
economic and social situation in Baghdad,' he told the Iraqi parliament.
'The interior ministry has set up a committee to criss-cross Baghdad to make a list of the families and sent
them back to their original provinces,' he said. So far, the authorities have expelled 4,099 families from
Baghdad, he said, without providing the total number of people moved.
Baghdad has a population of about five million. Residents of the Kurdish provinces in the north and Shiite
Muslim provinces of the south flooded into Baghdad after the war because of instability in those regions."
(AFP 27 November 1999)
"Opposition sources , however, contended that most of the expelled families were Kurds and Shi'a, many
from the Al-Thawra neighborhood, the scene of an anti-regime riot in February. They said that the
expulsions were aimed at preventing political unrest in the capital. They noted that persons displaced from
President Hussein's hometown of Tikrit were not included in the expulsion order." (USCR 2000)
Return of Shi'a displaced could contribute to improve Shi'a and Sunni relations in Iraq
(2002)
•
Return for Marsh Arabs may prove difficult due to the destruction of their natural habitat
"As a group, this is the smallest number of all the categories of displaced people in Iraq. Yet, in terms of
political impact, the return of Shi’i displaced to their homes would be disproportionately large. The
expulsions were an attempt to undermine Shi’i political opposition. This has fed into the history of modern
relations between Shi’a and Sunni in Iraq, where the latter smaller group has ruled the former larger one. A
publicized return of people to their homes and an acknowledgement of the injustice they suffered would not
only defuse a grievance between the communities but would contribute to an atmosphere conducive to
peaceful political action." (Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02, pp41-42)
Return for Marsh Arabs may prove difficult due to the destruction of their natural habitat
"Although it would be difficult to recreate the marshes, consultations should be held with the former
inhabitants and a feasibility study done to see whether at least some of the marshes could be reflooded. For
those who cannot return, compensation should be paid from oil revenues." (Cohen & Fawcett, 28 Dec 02)
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Obstacles to return
•
Even if there is a new regime allowing return, return will be complicated by the deliberate
destruction of documentation, as well as the potential Kurdish-Turkmen rivalry over Kirkuk
"When return to Kirkuk becomes possible, the length of time over which expulsions have occurred – some
three decades and counting – will give rise to a set of painful, possibly intractable, complications over who
should return where. Disputes over property rights – over land, over buildings – will be complicated by the
deliberate destruction of deeds, cadasters and other documentation. Added tensions will stem from the use
of economic assets, access to oil field employment and infrastructure management.
A specific concern is the potential Kurdish-Turkmen rivalry for political and economic control of Kirkuk.
As noted above, in 1957, the date of the last reliable national census in Iraq, the Turkmen were a plurality
of the population in Kirkuk City and the Kurds a plurality in the governorate as a whole. Aside from a
politically manipulated riot in 1959 (it was in fact a Ba`thi-Communist clash Samir Al-Khalil (K. Makiya),
Republic of Fear, pp. 237-238.), there does not seem to be any historical evidence of Kurdish-Turkmen
violent conflict in the history of Kirkuk. Talabany, The Arabization of the Kirkuk Region, p. 114.
Nevertheless, despite their having suffered similar repression and displacement by a common enemy, the
regime of Saddam Hussein, the Kurds and Turkmen have, over the past decade, found little common
ground in building governing structures in the North." (Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02, p24)
"Kirkuk looms large for US strategic planners because Kurds like the Karems claim the city - and its wealth
- as their historical heritage. But Turkey warns that any attempt by Iraqi Kurds to seize control of Kirkuk as they did briefly during a 1991 uprising - will spark a Turkish military reaction.
Turkey announced last week that it has boosted its military strength inside northern Iraq to 12,000 troops,
with armor. It is concerned that any increase of Kurdish sovereignty in northern Iraq will prompt unrest
among Turkish Kurds.
But it's the determination of Kurdish families - some 100,000 ethnic Kurds and Turkmen were expelled
from Kirkuk during the past three decades - that is expected to present a key challenge to any American
occupation of Iraq.
"In the night I can't sleep, because I worry about my children," says mother Hamdiya Abdulrahman Karem,
standing outside her tent home just inside the border of the Kurdish-controlled territory of northern Iraq.
Kirkuk is the likely fulcrum of US military plans for deployment in northern Iraq. The area is one of two
leading Iraqi oil sites with more than 10 billion barrels of proven reserves, analysts say. But competing
claims to the city by Kurds, Turkmen, and Turkey - complicated further by decades of enforced
demographic change by Iraqi governments - promise to entangle US forces." (Peterson 13 Jan 03)
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HUMANITARIAN ACCESS
General
Further attacks anticipated especially in Northern Iraq (February 2004)
•
•
Humanitarian worker do not feel safe in Erbil anymore
UN-mission and elections in the summer 2004 will not result in the easing of tensions
" For security reasons, Malteser Germany will move its project coordinator from Erbil in Northern Iraq
back to Germany the coming weekend. 'Indeed, I don't feel safe in Erbil anymore', says Carsten Stork,
project coordinator of Malteser Germany after the heavy terror attacks of last Sunday. Stork: 'The
dimension of violence and the way people deliberately put up with the killing of civilians, the growing
encroachments even here in the north, the planned sending of an UN-mission and elections next summer
will not result in the easing of tensions.'
Malteser Germany is obliged to suspend its relief projects in Northern Iraq and to bring Stork back to
Germany. 'We have to anticipate further attacks especially in Northern Iraq. Our staff is not safe in Erbil at
the moment" (MH, 5 February 2004).
UN withdrawn the last of its 20 foreign staff in Baghdad (November 2003)
•
•
•
•
•
About 40 international employees still remained in northern Iraq
The move by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to pull out staff was prompted by suicide
bombings against the International Committee of the Red Cross office and Iraqi police stations
At least 34 people died, 12 of them from the Red Cross, and 200 were wounded
The attack against the Red Cross was the bloodiest on an international organization since a truck
bomb devastated UN headquarters in Baghdad on Aug. 19, killing 22 people
Annan had come under heavy pressure from senior officials as well as the UN staff union to pull
everyone out
"The United Nations announced on Thursday it had withdrawn the last of its 20 foreign staff in Baghdad
but about 40 international employees still remained in northern Iraq.
"As of today, all UN international staff have been temporarily relocated out of Baghdad," UN spokesman
Farhan Haq said.
The group has gone to Larnaca, Cyprus, where they will begin talks next week with UN security officials
about whether or when they would return to the Iraqi capital.
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The move by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to pull out staff was prompted by last week's suicide
bombings against the International Committee of the Red Cross office and four Iraqi police stations in
Baghdad. At least 34 people died, 12 of them from the Red Cross, and 200 were wounded.
The attack against the Red Cross was the bloodiest on an international organization since a truck bomb
devastated UN headquarters in Baghdad on Aug. 19, killing 22 people.
The bombings have shocked the foreign aid community and stirred concerns about whether U.S.-led
coalition forces could bring order to the country. Medecins Sans Frontieres, or Doctors Without Borders,
has also withdrawn its staff.
The Aug. 19 attack against UN headquarters resulted in a sharp reduction of UN foreign staff, estimated at
350 to 550 in Baghdad. On Tuesday, Annan put on leave two senior security officials while the bombing
continues to be investigated.
Annan had come under heavy pressure from senior officials as well as the UN staff union, representing
some 5,000 employees around the world, to pull everyone out.
But he has had to balance safety concerns with the need to keep a UN presence at a time when countries are
pressing for the world body to play a political role in Iraq. An Oct. 15 Security Council resolution gave the
United Nations a role in the country's transition, although not a central one." (Reuters, 6 November 2003)
Anybody trying to better the situation in Iraq is liable to be attacked (October 2003)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Rise in the number of incidents since May 2003
By September 2003, the number of incidents stabilized on a rate of 20-30 per day
Demonstrations can turn violent with little effort
The reported presence of foreign fighters suggests that the number of suicide bombers' attacks
could increase
UN and NGOs scaling down operations
Car bombing of the Jordanian embassy on 7 August killed at least 11 people
Suicide bomb attack on the UN headquarters killed at least 23 people and wounded more than 100
on 19 August 2003
Most activities are carried out by local Iraqi staff
"The security statistics reveal a linear rise in the number of incidents since May 2003. By beginning mid
September, the number of incidents -- mostly involving the use of IEDs, RPGs, mortars and small arms -stabilized on a rate of 20-30 per day. In most cases attackers target Coalition Forces (CF) and police
stations, although most recently the number of Iraqi and international civilian targets has increased. Flyers
threatening individuals working with the UN, or collaborating with the CPA and the Coalition forces have
been found in a number of occasions.
Demonstrations -- called to protest against the non-payment of salaries, the demobilization of the army, or
called by religious leaders, or to support the former regime, etc. -- continue to occur, countrywide. While in
most cases these demonstrations have been peaceful, they could turn violent with little effort. The reported
166
presence of foreign fighters and agitators - linked to groups that aim at destabilizing further the country - to
hire unemployed moderates to take action they might not otherwise contemplate is to be considered.
Continuous efforts of the CF led to the discovery of ammunition and arms caches, indicating that the means
to conduct attacks remain readily available. The reported presence of foreign fighters suggests that the
number of suicide bombers' attacks could also increase." (UN OCHA, 10 October 2003)
“MSF is staying. Marc Joolens, the charity's Iraqi operations coordinator, said: 'We decided not to leave
because we still see humanitarian and medical needs in Baghdad. We provide primary care services, with
up to 2500 consultations per week.' He admitted, though, that safety was as bad as during the war.
Four major non-governmental organisations are scaling down their operations in Iraq amid security
concerns after the bombings of the UN headquarters and the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad. The
International Committee of the Red Cross, Oxfam, Save the Children, and Merlin have withdrawn their
international staff from Baghdad. 'The decision to temporarily withdraw our international staff from Iraq
comes from a general insecurity since the end of the war,' said Brendan Cox, a spokesman for Oxfam.
A car bombing of the Jordanian embassy on 7 August killed at least 11 people, and on 19 August a suicide
bomb attack on the UN headquarters killed at least 23 people and wounded more than 100. Recently a
series of grenade and bomb attacks have been directed at foreign journalists and aid workers. Brendan
Paddy, a spokesman for Save the Children, said: 'There is a clear pattern of events - the bombings showing that humanitarian workers are not being treated as impartial.' Commenting on the impact of the
withdrawal of the charity, he said: 'We are concerned about the spread of communicable disease, diarrhoea,
and cholera and that the situation is deteriorating and not getting better. The level of assistance in Baghdad
is decreasing at a time when the Iraqi people need all we have to offer and more.'
Both agencies are demanding that the US and UK governments take action. Mr Cox said, 'We are calling
for the coalition and the UN to take urgent action to stabilise the situation so aid agencies can do their
work.' Mr Paddy added: 'Ultimately the occupying powers are responsible for the health of Iraqi people,
and they must create a safe space for independent agencies.' Merlin, a UK based medical relief agency, has
relocated its international staff to Amman in Jordan. Gerson Brandao, head of Merlin's mission in Iraq,
spoke from Jordan: 'Merlin is now keeping a low profile in Iraq. Most of our activities are carried out by
local Iraqi staff.' He expressed concern for his colleagues in Baghdad: 'They are also being harassed by the
US military at checkpoints. Sometimes it's quite aggressive. For them we are the enemies.'
The International Committee of the Red Cross has been reducing staff numbers since late July, when a staff
member was murdered outside Baghdad. However, some aid agencies, such as the Catholic Agency for
Overseas Development (CAFOD), Unicef, and Care, are staying. Bjarne Jorgensen, CAFOD's emergency
coordinator in Baghdad, spoke of the health situation in Iraq: 'If they [the aid agencies] stop their activities
it has an impact on public health. The quality of the health service is affected by the general situation.' He
cites security, especially for medical staff, and clean water supplies as the biggest health concerns.
Médecins Sans Frontières is also staying. Marc Joolens, the charity's Iraqi operations coordinator, said: 'We
decided not to leave because we still see humanitarian and medical needs in Baghdad. We provide primary
care services, with up to 2500 consultations per week.' He admitted, though, that safety was as bad as
during the war.” (MSF, 5 September 2003)
“A United Nations assessment team will arrive in Iraq this week to assess the safety of remaining staff
there, the officer in charge of the UN's Iraq mission, Kevin Kennedy, announced over the weekend.
(…)
'We’re very concerned about the security situation here,' Kennedy asserted. 'I think they’re targeting
everybody. Anybody trying to better the situation in Iraq is liable to be attacked'. Most international staff
working for the UN are in the Jordanian capital, Amman at the moment and many administrative staff have
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also been moved to Cyprus, following instructions from the UN-Secretary General Kofi Annan to scale
back. Some are travelling in and out of the country on a daily basis. However, around 1,000 local staff
remain maintaining programme activity in essential areas.
[...]
Meanwhile, many NGOs have scaled back their operations and even pulled out following security
concerns, while others are continuing. For example, Intersos, an Italian NGO, is continuing to distribute
food and fix up health centres, said Magda Bellu, the group’s head of mission. It also is working with the
United Nation's Children's Fund (UNICEF) on 'child friendly space' programmes.
However, there are some problems due to lack of international staff. 'Our repatriation programme to bring
Iraq refugees in Iran back home is on hold at the moment because workers at the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, or UNHCR, office in Baghdad, are currently in Jordan,' Bellu told IRIN. 'We
were expecting 11,000 refugees from Iran (so) the re-allocation of international staff is slowing down the
work,' Bellu explained. 'Legal, voluntary returns will be supported by UNHCR, which should deal with the
Iranian government and the authorities.'
The US based, CARE International NGO, which specialises in food distribution, is also continuing work in
the country. The group is keeping a low profile, but it’s 'business as usual,' an aid worker from the NGO
told IRIN. Medicines Sans Frontiers, (MSF) a medical aid group, along with Mercy Corps are also doing
their best to continue. 'We work with them on a daily basis,' Veronique Taveau, a spokeswoman for the
United Nations in Iraq told IRIN. 'We help them and they help us,' she added.” (IRIN, 7 October 2003)
“IOM is reviewing its Iraq programme and the staffing of its Iraq offices following Tuesday’s truck bomb
attack on the UN’s headquarters in Baghdad. IOM’s offices are a 15-minute drive from the UN offices and
no current IOM staff were hurt in the blast. The review, which is likely to result in a temporary reduction in
staffing levels, is based on the premise that humanitarian workers may now be viewed by terrorists in Iraq
as legitimate “soft” targets. (…)
(IOM, 21 August 2003)
Bomb attacks against buildings used by UN personnel and by NGOs in Arbil end 2001
(2002)
"There were at least eight bomb attacks in Arbil in other cities between November 2000 and October 2001.
Some targeted buildings used by U.N. personnel and by local and international nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). In August, the KDP said it had arrested two men in separate incidents whose
vehicles were apparently carrying explosives, and that they had confessed to working for Iraqi intelligence.
Among them was a Tunisian national employed by the U.N. who was caught on July 19 while returning
from Baghdad with explosives in his vehicle. He was released on July 31 and handed over to Tun Myat,
U.N. humanitarian coordinator for Iraq, during his visit to Iraqi Kurdistan." (HRW 2002)
The Iraqi government severely restricts access to international NGOs and to the UN
(2000-2002)
•
•
Access to IDPs easier in the North under Kurdish administration than in the Center/South
Only seven international NGOs have permission to operate in government-controlled Iraq
•
Government reportedly harassed and intimidated relief workers and U.N. personnel throughout
the country
U.N. Special Rapporteur has been repeatedly denied to visit Iraq since 1992
In June 2000, two staff members of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
were shot dead in Baghdad and seven others wounded
•
•
168
•
•
Baghdad refused to issue over 270 visas to experts for the 'oil-for-food' program and the program
to remove land mines in the Kurdish north in 2001
Iraqi government continued campaign of intimidation against UN and NGO personel as of end
2001
"As the three governorates of the North, Erbil, Dohuk and Suleimanyah, are not under the control of the
Iraqi government, access to the displaced population is easier than in the Center/South. UN agencies,
NGOs, foreign government representatives, even an Under-Secretary-General of the UN, have visited the
camps or the collective communities housing many of the displaced. For the NGOs and foreign
representatives such as delegations from the UK and US, the visits take place without the permission of the
government in Baghdad. For UN officials including Under-Secretary-General Benon Sevan, it is part of
their duties under the Oil-for-Food program, hence they travel to the North with the permission of the Iraqi
government. However, UN human rights officials, as earlier noted, such as the Special Rapporteur on the
Situation of Human Rights in Iraq or the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced
Persons, have not visited the North. Their terms of reference allow them to visit countries only at the
invitation of the government. In this case, the government in Baghdad has unsurprisingly never ‘invited’
them to visit the North. The principle of state sovereignty is carefully adhered to by UN officials, despite
the relative logistical ease of getting to northern Iraq via Turkey, Syria, or Iran.
In 1992, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, former Dutch diplomat Max
Van der Stoel, made his only visit to Iraq but was refused access to the North. He did, however, see enough
to write a highly critical report on the human rights situation in the country as a whole. He was never
invited back. His successor Andreas Mavrommatis was invited early in 2002, although he also did not
travel north. It is hoped that, should he be granted a second visit, he would be allowed into the KRG area."
(Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02, pp17-18)
"In the Center and South, the main obstruction to international observers assessing the status of displaced
people is simply that the party responsible for the violence and the displacement, the Iraqi government, has
no interest in having its deeds exposed. The government uses several tactics to prevent access by
international observers to the displaced people." (Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02, p34)
"President Hussein obstructed humanitarian agencies from assisting the civilian population in governmentcontrolled areas. For example, only seven international non governmental organizations (NGOs) had
permission to operate in Iraq: CARE, Enfants du Monde, the IFRC, the Middle East Council of Churches,
Ponte per Baghdad, Première Urgence, and Voice in the Wilderness." (USCR 2000)
"The Government harassed and intimidated relief workers and U.N. personnel throughout the country,
maintained a threat to arrest or kill relief workers in the north, and staged protests against U.N. offices in
the capital.
As in previous years the Government did not allow the U.N. Special Rapporteur to visit Iraq, nor did it
respond to his requests for information. The Government continued to defy various calls from U.N. bodies
to allow the Special Rapporteur to visit the southern marshes and other regions." (US DOS 25 February
2000, Section 4)
"It remains the responsibility of the UN to deal with concerns about the situation in Iraq; but, from 1992,
the Iraqi authorities denied entry to Max van der Stoel, who served as Special Rapporteur of the UNCHR
until November 1999, and failed to answer any of his communications. His successor, Andreas
Mavrommatis, who took up his duties in January 2000, still awaits a response to his request for permission
to visit Iraq." (Foreign & Commonwealth Office November 2000, p.2)
169
"The UN agencies working in Iraq do so under extraordinarily difficult, daunting, circumstances. Their
work and living conditions are tightly constrained, and they face enormous obstacles from a number of
sources." (AFSC 21 March 2000, "Problems facing UN agencies' work)
"One June 28 [2000], two staff members of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
were shot dead in Baghdad and seven others wounded, reportedly y an Iraqi identified by the authorities as
Fowad Hussain Haidar. He said he had carried out the attack in protest at the U.N.-imposed embargo."
(HRW December 2000, "Human Rights Developments")
"The government of President Saddam Hussein is slowing crucial aid work in Iraq by refusing to issue
visas to international experts, United Nations officials said today.
Experts assigned to Iraq under the 'oil for food' program to work on electricity projects and the removal of
land mines in the Kurdish north have been singled out, officials say. More than 270 visa requests have been
rejected or have gone unanswered." (Crossette 1 May 2001 in New York Times)
"The [Iraqi] Government has continued a campaign of intimidation directed at U.N. and nongovernmental
organization (NGO) relief workers. In February [2001] the Foreign Minister threatened to break off official
ties to U.N. workers supervising Oil-for-Food Program distribution in northern Iraq, and to revoke their
visas and deport them. In September the Government expelled six U.N. humanitarian relief workers
without providing any explanation." (US DOS 4 March 2002, Sect.1.g)
170
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
National response
Authorities wrangle over whose responsibility it is to care for Internally Displaced
people (January 2004)
•
•
•
•
•
In dozens of villages that need to be rebuilt throughout Mahmour there are arguments over who
should be giving them aid
According to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Mahmour falls south of the Green Line
and therefore is the responsibility of Mosul or Ninewa governorate
But the Kurdish Regional Government based in Arbil argues the area was historically within its
boundaries and the people are Kurds so it wants to help
Caught in between is the United Nations
Unclear what role the UN will have in the future in this region
"Homeless people in northern Iraq are falling between the cracks as authorities wrangle over whose
responsibility it is to care for them. The Mahmour area an hours drive south of Mosul and Arbil falls within
the traditional borders of the Arbil governorate controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
However, Mahmour fell south of the "green line" that divided Saddam Hussein's regime from that of the
KRG after 1991. Until this year's war, Kurdish people removed from these areas by Saddam Hussein were
unable to return to their villages. But now they are and thousands of people want to re-establish themselves
on their traditional land and make a living from it once again.
In dozens of villages that need to be rebuilt throughout Mahmour there are arguments over who should be
giving them aid. According to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Mahmour falls south of the
Green Line and therefore is the responsibility of Mosul or Ninewa governorate.
But the KRG based in Arbil argues the area was historically within its boundaries and the people are Kurds
so it wants to help.
Caught in between is the United Nations, which previously funded many reconstruction projects, but has
now largely withdrawn from the region because of security concerns. On top of this, it is unclear what role
it will have in the future in this region and contracts it was planning with NGOs for rebuilding villages have
been put on hold.
Fakher Maraan, KRG's Deputy Minister of Reconstruction and Development, told IRIN in Arbil that the
villages had been part of Saddam Hussein's Arabisation programme which encouraged Arabs from the
south and centre of the country to shift north and displace Kurds.
Those returning after this year's war had been promised they would receive help to rebuild their villages but
everything now appeared to be frozen.
The KRG had been extending its administration south of the former green line to help but has been stopped,
Maraan claimed, because the CPA argued it was not KRG's territory. "And now they are in a bad condition.
They have no houses or drinking water or schools and health conditions are bad."
171
He said the green line was a false border set up by Saddam Hussein and therefore had no legal standing. "I
really don't care about the green line. If I have to go there I will go. This is six months of delaying and a
gap and nobody is doing anything. It is like the Berlin Wall that is now broken down," he lamented.
He said the UN had money earmarked for projects in Mahmour but was not working in the area at present.
"If the United Nations can not come here because of the security situation then it is my duty to go there. I
don't care who stops me. We're going to go there and help the Kurdish people."(UN OCHA, 29 January
2004).
The private sector will solve housing crisis for displaced (December 2003)
•
•
•
•
The Governing Council has no plan to solve the crisis of people who have been forced out of their
houses, but the private sector will contribute
Construction companies from Egypt, Syria and the United Arab Emirates will build 3,500 units of
housing
New housing will be built in the suburbs outside of Baghdad
Foreign banks will lend money to finance the houses
"Baker Jabor, a civil engineer and Iraq's new housing and construction minister, expects to disburse more
than US $533 million in the coming months for various infrastructure projects around the country,
including several large road-building projects.
Under former President Saddam Hussein, the housing and construction ministry's primary function was to
build the more than 70 lavish palaces and government buildings around Iraq. In an interview with IRIN in
the capital, Baghdad, he said internally displaced people were high on the list of his priorities.
QUESTION: I understand you will build new housing for people displaced from their homes?
ANSWER: We talked to United Nations-Habitat officials now in Amman concerning housing. There are
experts from the ministries of planning and public works working on it as well. We expect construction
companies from Egypt, Syria and the United Arab Emirates to build 3,500 units of housing in Najaf,
Maysan Governorate, Basra, Diwaniyah and Hillah. We actually have no plan to solve the crisis of people
who have been forced out of their houses, but the private sector will contribute. Those new buildings will
solve the housing crisis.
Q: Where will the housing be located and how much will it cost?
A: We want to put houses by the highways since the streets of Baghdad are so crowded. New housing will
be built in the suburbs outside of Baghdad. We're looking at sites at the former military Rashid camp and
the former military airport. There should be more clinics, police stations and schools in these areas. We
have a very ambitious plan to use these areas for housing, or they could also have parks for children, public
gardens or football stadiums.
Q: How will families pay for the new housing?
A: We are asking foreign banks to help us. They are capable of lending money, so people can buy
apartments like those found in other countries. I have been living for 20 years abroad, so I know what a
distinguished building should look like. Here in Baghdad, you will see modern buildings go up.
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Q: What other construction projects are you doing?
A: After meeting with officials in Iran, we decided to build a 'pilgrim's highway' between Iran and Iraq,
which will be supported by foreign companies. We may also get money from the Madrid donors'
conference for the highway. Religious pilgrims will also pay a transit tax when they use the highway. We
also agreed with foreign companies in Turkey to build an express-way from north to south, which would be
very useful to move goods [on].
Q: Are you working with the Coalition Provisional Authority on these contracts or with the US military, or
both?
A: Many countries attending the Madrid conference in October pledged $33 million to us as a gift. By
February, you will start to see the flow of this money. This is expected to be money for in-kind materials or
machinery.
Q: Do you expect to get money from the US Congress for your projects?
A: The re-formed Ministry of Planning will control the $18.6 billion [approved by Congress for Iraq's
reconstruction]. We expect to get $500 million for road and bridge projects, but there is nothing in the
budget for housing. We asked for it, but they didn't give it to us, because they are thinking to solve the issue
through the private sector.
Q: Did you find any leftover construction project money from Saddam Hussein's time?
A: The former government had too much money in other Arab countries. Much of it is in Lebanon, some of
it in private banks. We're afraid the private sector is using this money, so we have to track it down. There
are also hundreds of millions in the names of Uday and Qusay [Saddam's sons, who were killed by US
troops]. It's not under the name of the Iraqi government, so it's hard for us to find.
Q: What happened to that money?
A: This money legally belongs to the Iraqi government, so there's no doubt the minister of finance will pay
a visit to Lebanon and other countries to find out what is happening to it. There are some companies that
Uday Hussein invested in. Every country in the world needs to take this issue up, because it's for the
rebuilding of our country.
Q: What is your top priority for the future?
A: We have a great amount of money in neighbouring countries, and we are negotiating to get it back. This
will help Iraq to breathe again, to stand alongside its neighbours as a sovereign country.
Q: You recently met with other ministers in countries around the region. What did you find out?
A: We went to Tehran, Damascus and Amman. It was the first official visit by new leaders in Iraq to those
countries. We met with ministers of foreign affairs of those countries and discussed continuing protocol
between Iraq and its neighbours. In Iran, we also met the minister of housing and construction. In Turkey,
we talked to the ministers of housing, trade and industry. This is very important because it's a legal
acknowledgement that they recognise the [US-appointed Iraqi] Governing Council." (UN OCHA, 24
December 2003)
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Slowly returning water to the marshlands (November 2003)
•
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•
•
•
•
The marshlands are located between the Tigris and Euphrates and near the Iran border
The former regime of Saddam Hussein spent years successfully turning Iraq's vast wetlands into a
desert
Now, with Hussein gone, Iraqi and coalition engineers are slowly returning water to the
marshlands
Hundreds of thousands of people who once lived there have their first hopes of returning home
The gradual return to life for the wetlands began with an accident
Iraqi state irrigation engineers returning to work under the coalition have helped the revival
further
"The former regime of Saddam Hussein spent years successfully turning Iraq's vast wetlands into a desert
in an ecological war designed to root out armed Shia opposition to his rule. Now, with Hussein gone, Iraqi
and coalition engineers are slowly returning water to the marshlands and hundreds of thousands of people
who once lived there have their first hopes of returning home. RFE/RL reports on the gradual revival of
Iraq's wetlands in the first part of a two -part series.
Prague, 6 November 2003 (RFE/RL) -- The drying up of Iraq's vast wetlands, which once spread over some
20,000 square kilometers, was deliberate. But their gradual return to life as Saddam Hussein was toppled
early this year began with an accident.
During the pas t decade, Hussein's regime spent millions of dollars to build dams and canals to halt the flow
of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers into the marshes. To remove their dense reed thickets as hiding places for
rebel groups, army engineers also built dikes to divide the wetlands into stagnant ponds. As the water
evaporated, 90 percent of the marshes turned into a dry, salt-encrusted wasteland.
Baroness Emma Nicholson, a British member of the European Parliament, is the organizer of a charitable
foundation, Assis ting Marsh Arabs and Refugees (AMAR), that helps the hundreds of thousands of Marsh
Arabs who had to flee their land. She estimates that by the time coalition forces toppled Hussein's regime in
April, only some 85,000 people remained in the marshes out of a population that once numbered up to halfa-million.
But now things are changing, beginning with what Nicholson called some "inadvertent" help to the
marshlands from the Iraqi Army as it fled advancing British forces this spring. "Trying to stop the Brit ish
troops from entering [Al-Basrah], [an effort] in which [the Iraqi Army] signally failed, they blew up a road,
failing to recognize that it was one of the dams across the water that they themselves had built in 1991 on
the instructions of Saddam Hussein," she said. "The blowing up of that dam had a magnificent reaction and
25 square kilometers of drained marshlands was quickly reflooded."
She said that the reflooding of the marshes near Al-Basrah inspired some of the marsh people still living
near their old homes to destroy other dams and dikes themselves. As they did, they started what many hope
will now be the gradual revival of an ecosystem which previously provided a bounty of fish, sugar cane,
papyrus reeds, and livestock. The marshlands -- mostly located between the Tigris and Euphrates and near
the Iran border -- were once rich enough not only to support the Marsh Arabs in a way of life almost
unchanged since the time of the Sumerians but also to supply fish and other food to Iraq's cities.
Iraqi state irrigation engineers returning to work under the coalition have helped the revival further by
opening the gates of one dam on the Euphrates and smashing some of the bulwarks that previously diverted
174
much of that river's water into Hussein's Mother of All Battles Canal. The canal was deliberately built to
send the river on a 260-kilometer detour around the wetlands and dump its water into the Persian Gulf. Iran
has also helped by opening a dam on its side of the border to assist in reflooding the marshes near its
territory.
Yet if some local areas of the marshlands are now coming back to life, far more work remains to be done
before the region can even begin to recover the lush vegetation and bird life which once made it the largest
wetlands in the Middle East." (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 6 November 2003)
USAID on reconstruction and rehabilitation, and the role of CPA
•
•
•
•
USAID support four objective- none of which can be pursued in isolation
-Security
-Essential services
-Economy
•
-Governance
“On July 27 USAID Mission Director Lewis Lucke officially announced the formation of USAID's Mission
to Iraq at the USAID office in Baghdad. Currently, the USAID Mission is working closely with the people
of Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the United Nations, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and private sector partners involved with relief and reconstruction efforts. United States
Government offices, including USAID's Asia and Near-East Bureau, Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI),
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Food for Peace (FFP), the U.S. Department of Defense, and
the U.S. Department of State support the USAID Mission in Iraq which is carrying out programming and
activities in education, health care, food security, infrastructure, local government, and water and
sanitation.
Selected IDP items, FY 2003:
“Implementing Partner: IOM, IDP programs, countrywide, amount: $5,000,000
Implementing Partner: SCF/US, IDP Support, Al Basrah (countrywide: $6,000,000)” (USAID, 1 October
2003)
“USAID provides vital reconstruction and rehabilitation assistance to Iraq. USAID is investing resources in
planning, staffing, managing, implementing, and evaluating reconstruction and rehabilitation programs to
advance the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) strategic plan for Iraq and improve the wellbeing of the
Iraqi people. We support the CPA strategic plan for Iraq. The CPA strategy has four objectives, none of
which can be pursued in isolation and all of which lead to the return home of U.S. troops and a transition to
national governance of Iraq by Iraqis sooner rather than later:
•
security, which determines the speed with which we can advance reconstruction and build up
institutions of good governance;
•
essential services, which are a major priority for the people of Iraq;
•
the economy, which requires considerable assistance before the country can realize its potential for
economic growth; and
•
governance, which requires a rapid development of institutions and values to support democratic
government.
175
Our USAID mission in Iraq reports to Ambassador Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority and,
through him, to the emerging Iraqi government and the Iraqi people.
(…)
Before combat started, USAID was involved in planning efforts to respond to potential humanitarian needs
in Iraq, and an inter-agency Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), the largest in U.S. history, had
pre-positioned humanitarian commodities in the region for up to 1,000,000 internally displaced people.
This DART team entered Iraq on March 27, before the cessation of combat and before the fall of Baghdad.
USAID obligated hundreds of millions of dollars in food and other humanitarian assistance before the war
had ended. On May 2, one day after the President declared the end of major combat operations, USAID
began directing assistance to the most immediate post-conflict needs in Iraq. Our DART team provided
urgent assistance to displaced people and linked the humanitarian community and Coalition Forces,
facilitating their delivery of food, medicines and clean drinking water. The DART team included an Abuse
Prevention Unit deployed to protect vulnerable Iraqis and to help the CPA preserve evidence such as mass
grave sites of past abuse by Saddam's regime.
USAID undertook rapid assessments of Iraqi needs and immediately began programming resources.
USAID programmed over $400 million through UN agencies to ensure that the food distribution system
was restarted and people did not go hungry, including many displaced people who had not been receiving
food rations. The transition was so smooth that the media paid little attention to it. Our field mission in Iraq
is delivering reconstruction, rehabilitation, and humanitarian relief assistance through approximately 45
grants and contracts to American non-profit organizations and firms. While our $680 million contract with
Bechtel captures the media spotlight, it certainly does not define our engagement with the Iraqi people. We
have tapped into the innovation and expertise of a number of American firms. (…) USAID works to ensure
that U.S. assistance benefits the average Iraqi citizen and encourages cooperation among ethnic and
religious groups on Iraqi society. (USAID, 30 September 2003)
Occupying powers responsibilities and response
•
US Assistance
•
•
•
USAID: Stabilizing the population
US advances Bosnian solution to ethnic cleansing in Iraq
Commission to be set up to deal with displaced Kurds
US Assistance
“Initial U.S. assistance expenditures have been aimed at preparations for the delivery of humanitarian aid.
The United States has allocated $154 million for Iraq’s humanitarian relief, food distribution, and
reconstruction. Of that amount, $35 million has been spent to date on contingency planning, including
$17.3 million on pre-positioning of commodities. The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
(PRM) at the State Department has spent $15.6 million, and $22 million has been allocated to the
Emergency Refugee and Migration Account (ERMA). In addition, last week, the United States pledged to
release 610,000 tonnes of food. On March 20, President Bush issued an executive order confiscating nondiplomatic Iraqi assets held in the United States. Of the total assets seized, an estimated $1.6 billion are
expected to be available for reconstruction purposes.” (US: Report for Congress, April 2003)
USAID Testimony, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate
“USAID is providing both emergency and reconstruction assistance for Iraq. (…) approaching these tasks,
unprecedented in size and scope, with six broad objectives in mind. They are to:
• show the Iraqi people an improvement in their standard of living and public services;
• stabilize the population - reduce ethnic and religious tensions, repatriate refugees, resettle internally
displaced people, and resolve property claim disputes created under Saddam;
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• develop a market economy - produce new jobs and encourage investment and agricultural and economic
growth; create the institutions of economic governance which will form the foundation of the new Iraqi
economy and the fiscal structure of the national government;
• support the de-Ba'athification of Iraqi society -- eliminate the palpable sense of fear that was a feature
Saddam's rule; and create a genuine civil society that can control the abuses of the state, stabilize social
order, and help reconstruction take place;
• create accountability and control systems to prevent oil revenues from being diverted by future Iraqi
governments and ensure future revenues are used for public good; and
• ensure a peaceful transition to a pluralistic democracy representative of the ethnic and religious make-up
of the society.
“ […] Many elements of the U.S. Government were involved in this unprecedented effort -- but there are
three units of USAID in particular that I would like to focus on today: the Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA), Food for Peace (FFP), and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). (…) USAID
assembled the largest Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) - outside of a few search and rescue
missions - in history. The DART included more than 60 people - doctors, public health professionals, water
and sanitation experts, food distribution and agricultural specialists, logisticians, security officers and
specialists in refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and abuse prevention. In the months prior to the
war, OFDA began preparing for a possible humanitarian emergency by stockpiling emergency relief
supplies, including water tanks, hygiene kits, health kits, plastic sheeting and blankets. OFDA also
provided funding to the World Food Program (WFP), UNICEF, and NGOs to set up logistics operations,
offices and relief stockpiles. Because of this, our NGO partners were in a position to respond quickly to
urgent humanitarian needs and are now making repairs to water and sanitation facilities in Ar Rutbah,
Basra, and Erbil. OFDA grants are also supporting urgent health care assistance: CARE is working in
Baghdad; Save the Children in Mosul; the International Medical Corps in Basra, al Nasariyah, and Wasit;
and World Vision in Ar Rutbah. OFDA has also purchased medical kits, each containing enough supplies
for 10,000 people for three months. In late May, the DART provided 33 of these kits to our NGOs partners
for distribution in several cities in Iraq.
Timely USAID grants from the Office of Food for Peace helped prepare WFP to undertake the largest
mobilization operation they have ever carried out. The first country-wide distribution of food in Iraq is
already under way. Much of it comes from a $200 million FFP grant to WFP which made it possible to
purchase food in Jordan, Syria, and Turkey for immediate consumption. In just the month of May, for
example, more than 360,000 metric tons (MTs) have arrived in Iraq from neighboring countries. All of this
is in addition to the 245,000 MTs of U.S.-produced food that is already in the region or en route.
As a result of these careful preparations - and the fact that the Iraqis received increased rations prior to the
fighting -- there has been no food crisis in Iraq. We anticipate continuing U.S. food shipments through
October and perhaps longer, if needed. The long-term solution, however, is the creation of a functioning
market system. In the meantime, our food specialists on the DART have been working with DoD, WFP and
the Ministry of Trade on issues like finding the 9,000 trucks needed to haul the 480,000 MTs of food that
we expect to arrive in Iraq every month, assuring security along the corridors from Kuwait, Jordan, Syria,
Turkey, and Iran, and preparing enough silos, warehouses and equipment to support these vital supplies.
The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) specializes in small, "quick impact" programs. OTI's flexibility
and quick turn-around times have proved invaluable in many situations. OTI grants are currently helping
the Town Council in Umm Qasr, Iraq's principal deep water port, get up and running and funding sports
activities for young people there. One of the lessons we have learned from our work in other failed and
failing societies is the need to keep young people, especially young men, off the streets, in school and in
healthy activities such as sports. Unless they are occupied, young men are often a source of disruption, for
they can be easily lured into looting or organized crime and violence.
OTI has also provided grants to keep the electric generators at the Mosul Dam running, so that the 1.7
million people who depend on it have electricity. Other OTI projects currently underway include efforts to
repair a school in Umm Qasr; shore up the Mosul Dam; put 16,000 people to work cleaning up garbage and
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debris in al Thawra; and supplying water testing equipment, refurbishing the fire station, and supplying
new furniture and instructional materials to primary school in Kirkuk. In addition, OTI has begun work on
repairing ministries and public buildings and supplying them with computers, copiers, communications
equipment, supplies and furniture, so that they can resume their normal functions. One of the advantages of
this approach is that it allows us to work directly with Iraqi citizens and civil servants on practical everyday matters. Already we have started programs with the Iraqi Ministries of Justice, Irrigation and Finance,
as well as the Central Bank, and we are looking at the possibility of doing more. Indeed, we have received
proposals for 30 ministries and commissions for just such services.
Other OTI projects envision repairing the Courthouse in al Hillah; building concrete platforms for three
radio and television broadcast towers; assessing the needs of fire department throughout the country; and
designing more public works projects such as in al Thawra (ex-Saddam City).” (USAID, 4 June 2003)
Health, Education, and Agriculture
“Initial evaluations of the health sector show that services have been disrupted and equipment, medicine,
and supplies have been looted from some hospitals and warehouses. While there have been no major
outbreaks of communicable diseases, the potential for such outbreaks remains a source of concern.
USAID's goal in this sector is to meet urgent health needs as well as normalizing health services rapidly. To
this effect, we have worked through UNICEF to supply 22.3 million doses of vaccines to prevent measles,
pediatric tuberculosis, hepatitis B, diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus and polio. This is enough to treat
4.2 million children under the age of 5 as well as 700,000 pregnant women.
We have also established a surveillance system with WHO, UNICEF, and Abt Associates to monitor
cholera, worked with the Iraqi Director of Public Health on a diarrhea survey, established a database for
tracking and coordinating international medical donations, and helped prepare public service
announcements about sanitation and breastfeeding. In addition, we have made grants to CARE, Save the
Children, the International Medical Corps, and World Vision for emergency health projects in Baghdad,
Mosul, Basra, al Nasariyah, Maysan, Wasit, and Ar Rutbah, respectively. Our grant to Abt will enable them
to address other medical needs, such as pharmaceuticals and equipment and coordinating donations of
medical supplies. Abt will also work with the Iraqi Ministry of Health to improve their administration of
medical services throughout the country.” (USAID, 4 June 2003)
“In the education sector, we have launched a "back to school" campaign with UNICEF and delivered 1,500
school kits that helped 120,000 students in Baghdad return to their classrooms in May. Through a contract
with Creative Associates, we have inventoried all 700 schools in Basra with the Ministry of Education,
begun making grants to refurbish a number of schools there, and finalized plans to distribute 8,000 school
and student kits for Basra schools when the new school year starts in September. The next step is to do the
same in Dhi Qar Governate. We are also funding UNESCO to print and distribute 5 million math and
science texts on time for the beginning of the school year, and we are in the process of soliciting proposals
to link U.S. colleges and universities with Iraqi institutions of higher learning on various health, education,
agro-industry, engineering, and other projects. A USAID technical advisor is also working with the
Ministry of Education on ways to deliver sufficient equipment, material, supplies for the new school year.”
(USAID, 4 June 2003)
Stabilize the Population: refugees, IDPs and abuse prevention
“[…] Stabilizing the ethnic and religious tensions within the country, resettling IDPs, and ultimately
helping resolve some of the complex property disputes created during Saddam's 24 years of corrupt and
abusive rule are important goals. Our first step began with the DART, which, for the first time ever,
included specialized abuse prevention officers. Our Agency has years of experience in post-conflict
situations. A priority for the DART was to identify key contacts with the U.S. armed forces, civil affairs
units, the International Committees of the Red Cross, NGOs, the media, and local leaders and brief them on
the kinds of lawlessness and human rights abuse that occur in the immediate aftermath of a conflict so that
suitable responses could be fashioned. As part of this effort, each of our abuse prevention officers
distributed USAID's Field Guide to Preventing, Mitigating and Responding to Human Rights Abuse, which
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was designed for just such situations. (…) Abuse prevention officers are also monitoring the situation of
IDPs in northern cities like Kirkuk, Dohuk, Zamar, and Domiz, where upwards of 100,000 Kurdish families
were driven from their homes as part of Saddam's Arabization campaign. Many of these Kurdish families
are now returning to their homes - or trying to - and this makes for a potentially destabilizing situation. Our
role, for the mo ment, is to try and sort out the dynamics of these conflicting property claims, so that
ultimately, they can be resolved by legal means, somewhat like they were in Eastern Europe after the fall of
the Berlin Wall.
Elsewhere our abuse prevention officers are working with several NGOs to identify and train local groups
in human rights monitoring and grave site protection. Another early USAID grant supports the International
Organization on Migration (IOM), which is providing relief supplies for up to 500,000 IDPs in central and
southern Iraq and coordinating the distribution of supplies for another two million Iraqis in the same region.
As you know, after the first Gulf War, Saddam deliberately targeted the Marsh Arabs, or Madan people, for
destruction. Tens of thousands were killed, land and water mines were sown throughout the region, and
some 200,000 people were driven from their homes. The systematic draining of these marshes reduced
them to a tiny fraction of their former size, destroyed a way of life that had survived for millennia, and
caused an environmental catastrophe of unprecedented size and cope. This month, we hope to send a team
of hydrologists, environmental specialists and economists to the region to study what might be done to
begin restoring some part of this region and how to include the Marsh Arabs in the process.” (USAID, 4
June 2003)
US advances Bosnian solution to ethnic cleansing in Iraq
“Jay Garner, the retired general overseeing Iraq's post-war reconstruction, held out the promise yesterday of
a Bosnia-style commission to resolve disputes between Arabs, Kurds and Turkomans displaced in northern
Iraq during Saddam Hussein's regime. He said that a commission to "arbitrate what is just and fair" would
help to reverse "years of ethnic cleansing" of Kurds and other minorities around the cities of Kirkuk and
Mosul. But details of the proposed commission remain vague.
“He said the Iraqi version would be set up "within weeks or months", and could operate alongside an
independent body to monitor its work. The issue of land and property reclamation is one of the most
delicate facing a new Iraqi administration. Human Rights Watch says that as many as 120,000 Kurds were
displaced under a programme of "Arabisation". Kurds have long dreamed of being able to reclaim their
property. And since the collapse of the government in Baghdad some Arab families in the north say they
have been forced out - some at gunpoint - by Kurds seeking to reverse years of forced expulsions. Gen
Garner, who is on a two-day visit to the Kurdish-controlled north, said that the commission would comprise
representatives of all Iraq's communities. "It is vital that we do not accept the results of ethnic cleansing,"
he said.
“Jalal Talabani, whose Patriotic Union of Kurdistan was accused of driving Arabs from their homes, said
that the return of displaced people in the north was an "absolute right", but that it must be done "in a regular
way, not in chaos". He repeated the Kurds' commitment to avoiding reprisals against Arabs. "No one
should take anything by force," he said. Mr Talabani and Massoud Barzani, head of the other Kurdish
faction, the Kurdistan Democratic party, have set up committees to deal with the issue of returning property
looted by Kurds from Arab homes in the first few days after the fall of Baghdad.” (The Guardian, 24 April
2003)
Commission to be set up to deal with displaced Kurds
“A commission will be set up to resolve disputes between Arabs and Kurds displaced from their homes
under Saddam Hussein's regime. Kurdish leaders who met Jay Garner, the retired US general overseeing
the rebuilding of Iraq, reassured him that there would be no reprisals against Arabs who had taken over the
properties of Kurds expelled by Saddam's regime. Many Kurds want their properties back and others want
revenge for the violence against their people. Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan,
said: "There will be a committee later representing all sides, under the guidance of the United States, to
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arrange how people must go back home in a regular way, not in chaos. We had made a commitment.
Yesterday we assured, we repeated it."
General Garner had met Mr Talabani in Sulaimaniya and flew yesterday morning to Arbil, where Massoud
Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, told him "I suppose we can make all Iraq like
Kurdistan." Saddam Hussein's regime expelled up to 120 000 Kurds from Kurdish cities under a campaign
of Arabisation of south Kurdistan.” (Kurdish Media, 24 April 2003)
Iraq is a state party to several international human rights agreements (2000)
Iraq is not a state party to the following international human rights instruments:
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(UNHCR June 2000, pp.8-9)
Government denies policy of forced displacement from Kirkuk and the southern
marshes despite local and international accusations (1998-2002)
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Amnesty International wrote to the Iraqi Government to denounce the grave violation of the rights
to freedom of conscience, freedom from discrimination and the right to physical and mental
integrity of the people displaced from Kirkuk
Academic conference in northern Iraq sent memorandum to UN SG urging the international
community to intervene to stop Arabization of Kirkuk area
An Assyrian coalition denounced in May 2001 the steps taken by Baghdad to change the
population demographics, as well as the destruction of historical buildings
The Association Against Ethnic Cleasing in Kirkuk announced its foundation in July 2001
Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected allegations of forced displacement of non-Arabs around
Kirkuk as baseless accusations
Iraqi Minister of Interior said to the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Iraq in 2002 that
activities in Kirkuk were sanctions imposed on people who did not cultivate their land
Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that only routine activities to track criminals and deserters
are conducted in the southern marshes
"Amnesty International wrote to the Iraqi Government on 30 March 1998 expressing serious concern about
the forcible mass expulsions of Kurdish and other non-Arab families on the basis of their ethnic origin. The
organization stated that the action taken by the Iraqi authorities is considered a grave violation of the rights
to freedom of conscience, freedom from discrimination and the right to physical and mental integrity.
Amnesty International urged the government to halt the expulsions and to allow all those families already
expelled to return to their homes in the Kirkuk area. The organization also made its concerns public in a
statement issued on 29 April 1998 [...]
As of August 1999 no response from the Iraqi Government on these forcible expulsions had been received
by Amnesty International." (AI 24 November 2000, "Forcible expulsion")
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"An April 2001 academic conference in Irbil issued a memorandum that has now been sent to UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The memorandum urged the international community to intervene to block
the further arabization of the Kirkuk area and also to end the ethnic cleansing of that region. It asks that the
UN force Baghdad to reveal the fate of thousands of Kurds and others who have been detained and then
disappeared. And it calls for an expansion of the safe haven to include Kirkuk." (RFE/RL 8 June 2001)
"The 23rd Assyrian Universal Alliance World Congress expressed its concerns about Iraqi oppression of
the Assyrians in Bet Nahrain, 'Zinda' reported on 29 May. The congress declaration condemns 'steps being
implemented by the Iraqi government to change the population demographics on the Nineveh Plain,' as well
as the destruction of historical buildings and archeological sites. And it denounced 'the implementation of a
policy in Kirkuk, Mosul, Ein Sifneh and elsewhere to prevent Assyrians, Kurds and Turkmen[s] from
buying land for the construction of homes unless they are willing to change their legal (census) nationality
designation to Arab.' (RFE/RL 8 June 2001)
For the entire declaration of the 23rd Congress of the Assyrian Universal Alliance, please see [External
Link]
"[…] [T]he Association Against Ethnic Cleansing in Kirkuk has announced its foundation and declared that
the ethnic-cleansing policy of the Irai government in Kirkuk and other areas under its control aims to
eradicate Kurdish identity in these areas; it maintains that this policy represents a danger to Iraqi unity."
(RFE/RL 21 July 2001)
According to the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Fabrications made by (Stoel [i.e. former Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Iraq, Max van der
Stoel]) about violations against the Kurds in Al- Ta’mim province (Kirkuk) and coercive displacement and
resettlement campaigns are merely untrue and baseless allegations. We [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]
confirm that no such cases had existed, that citizens in those areas are leading their normal life and
practicing their daily works and duties, and that their rights are guaranteed under the Constitution and
effective laws. (Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001)
According to the Iraqi Minister of Interior: " the Special Rapporteur [on the situation of human rights in
Iraq] pointed out that several allegations received recently claimed that non-Arabs were being forcibly
expelled from their land in the north, especially in the Kirkuk area. The Minister [of Interior] pointed out
that what was currently going on in the north was related to initiatives aimed at maximizing the agricultural
output of one of the most fertile regions of Iraq. The Minister explained that a specific policy was currently
in place which would require landowners to cultivate their land. If this was not done, certain restrictions
could be imposed. While it was acknowledged that this issue was too complex to be covered in depth
during the meeting, upon the request of the Special Rapporteur the Minister undertook to work with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prepare an explanatory note on the issue. This would then allow the Special
Rapporteur to study the question in depth and to formulate additional questions, recommendations, etc."
(CHR 15 March 2002, para.39)
According to the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Iraq is accused of committing grave violations of
human rights in the marshes area, launching arbitrary bombing against villages there and coercively
displacing their residents.
In this respect we [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] would like to highlight the fact that the government
authorities there undertake their routine activities in tracing criminals and deserters who in most cases
resort to the marshes area to hide there taking advantage of the area’s geographical nature in order to evade
legal persecution for the crimes they have committed." (Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001)
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Regional government in northern Iraq works with the UN to implement programs in
favor of the displaced and other vulnerable groups (2001-2003)
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Mine awareness campaign and coordination with the United Nations for de-mining activities
(2001)
Reconstruction of houses for internally displaced from Kirkuk and other vulnerable people (2001)
Construction of housing units in Irbil and Dahuk governorates (2002)
Regional government openly applies political criteria towards the level of assistance it provides to
the IDP population (2002)
Regional government complain of lack of UN help to prepare for war fall out (Jan 03)
"The KRG, in both its Erbil (KDP) and Sulaimaniah (PUK) incarnations, openly applies political criteria
towards the level of assistance it provides to the IDP population. It attempts to provide for the
‘humanitarian needs’ of people who have been expelled, often under violent circumstances from their
homes, while not encouraging these people to resettle on a permanent basis. The Kurdish authorities
adamantly insist that all displaced people should return to their original homes. While the incentive for this
approach is based on a desire for justice there is also a political agenda: if the displaced do not return to
Kirkuk and the surrounding areas, there will be a demographic shift towards the non-Kurdish populations
of Turkmen, Arabs, and Assyrians. The PUK and the KDP see this as not only rewarding the Iraqi
authorities for their Arabization program, but undermining any future claims of the Kurds to the Kirkuk
region." (Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02, pp23-24)
"One of the largest projects ot be undertaken by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is the
reconstruction of the region to repair the damage done under the successive Iraqi regimes. During the past
two to three decades, more that 4,000 villages were destroyed and the inhabitants forced to move from their
traditional lands and homes. Wars and internal conflicts have added to the problem of displaced people
living in the region too. The Iraqi policy of Arabization continues to fuel the problem of people displaced
from their homes and lands with many of them choosing to move to Iraqi Kurdistan. The KRG commits
funds towards the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the area along with funds allocated under the SCR986 Oil-for-Food Program.
As part of the KRG goal to reconstruct the region, the Ministry of Reconstruction and Development has
begun work on a project to construct 400 houses for families of the martyrs, Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) – many from Kirkuk, and returnees from Iran." (Kurdistan News May 2001)
"The Ministry of Reconstruction and Development (MORAD) in Irbil has released its 2001 data for
projects both completed and currently under implementation. According to the figures acquired from
MORAD Minister Nasreen Sideek Mustafa, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) spent $68.5
million in 2001 for reconstruction in the Irbil and Dahuk governorates (the KRG in Sulaymaniyah
separately handles projects in the Sulaymaniyah and "New Kirkuk" Governorate).
In the Irbil and Dahuk governorates, MORAD completed 1,833 housing units, with an additional 3,463
under construction. UN Security Council Resolution 986 "Oil-for-food" income funded the completion of
36 educational projects (including schools, dormitories, and teacher's guest houses), with another 140 under
construction. During the first eight phases of the UN oil-for-food program, MORAD built a total of 351
village schools and 91 staff houses. The KRG also built or has under construction more than 1,000
kilometers of new roads in the two governorates, as well as five bridges. All nine new veterinary clinics to
support local husbandry have been completed.
Providing access to water remains a major MORAD concern in the Irbil and Dahuk governorates,
especially after a three-year drought. MORAD trucked water into 193 villages at a cost of nearly $218,000.
In addition, MORAD drilled 43 new wells, and upgraded 857 water systems." (RFE/RL 12 April 2002)
183
"The head of the Mine Coordination Office of the Kurdistan Regional Government recently set out the
extent of the continuing danger of mines in Iraqi Kurdistan. In an interview with "Iraqi Kurdistan
Dispatch," a web-based news service, Siraj Barzani estimated that 12-15 million mines had been laid in
Iraqi Kurdistan. There were around 3,500 known minefields. More than 3,600 people had been killed by
mines since 1991 and more than 6,000 had been injured by blasts that often left them maimed or
handicapped. Each month there are between 10 and 20 civilian casualties on average. There are 25 different
types of mines that have been identified, the most common being a fragmentation type and a blast type,
both intended for an antipersonnel role.
Barzani said mines were laid in Kurdistan during four different periods. The first was during the 1970s
when the Iraqi army was trying to curb a Kurdish uprising in pursuit of self-rule. The second was during the
1980-88 Iran-Iraq war when both sides heavily mined the border areas. The third period was prior to the
Gulf War when the Iraqi army laid barrier minefields along the border with Turkey to prevent an allied
invasion from the north. The fourth period was during fighting between rival Kurdish groups between 1994
and 1997, when Kurds laid minefields to protect themselves from their rivals. He noted that mine-laying
during this period was much less extensive.
Two organizations are at work clearing mines. The Mine Advisory Group (MAG), an international
nongovernmental organization, has been working since 1993. Also, the United Nations Office for Project
Services (UNOPS) has been at work since 1998. Together they have destroyed nearly 100,000 mines and
nearly 150,000 pieces of other unexploded ordinance. The area cleared of mines is over 14 million square
meters.
The main reason for such slow progress, Barzani explained, is the absence of minefield maps. The UN has
asked Baghdad for such maps but has not received any cooperation. Another difficulty is that the
minefields are often parts of larger battlefields so there is a huge amount of metal fragments, which
confuses the mine-detecting equipment. In these circumstances the whole area has to be dug out by hand.
This is extremely slow. Specially trained dogs and mechanical flails are also used.
The Mine Coordination Office is part of the Ministry of Humanitarian Aid and Cooperation in the
Kurdistan Regional Government. The office supervises and monitors the work of all local and international
NGOs as well as UN agencies. Barzani said the emphasis was now on developing local capacities. "When
local assets are promoted, project implementation tends indeed to be more cost-effective and sustainable,"
he was quoted as saying." (RFE/RL 26 July 02)
"Kurdish parties running a Western-protected enclave in northern Iraq have initiated limited contingency
plans to cope with possible Iraqi reprisals in the event of a US war on Baghdad but complain that the
international community is doing precious little to help them.[…]
We have repeatedly approached the United Nations" about helping the region prepare for the fallout of war,
'but we got no response,' said Hoshyar Siwaili, undersecretary at the KDP's ministry of humanitarian aid
and cooperation.
Lack of resources prevents the Kurdish parties from implementing large-scale contingency plans in their
region, which has been off limits to the central government since the 1991 Gulf War, he said." (AFP 2 Jan
03)
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Creation of Joint Committee on Displaced Persons by Kurdish authorities following
1998 accord (2002)
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According to some NGOs, return of internally displaced in the North is very politicized
"In the September 1998 Washington accord, the two governing parties of the Kurdish Regional
Government, the PUK and the KDP, committed to stop battling and to begin the process of forming a
unified governing structure for the North. A Higher Coordinating Committee (HCC) was set up with prime
ministers from the two parties as chairs to begin the process of implementation.[…]
One of the subcommittees formed was the Joint Committee on Displaced Persons. According to the accord
a timeline for the return of displaced people was to be presented within one month of the signing of the
agreement. It was not until June 2001, after numerous pledges, promises and ‘constructive’ meetings that
the first 70 families returned (out of a total of some 100,000 people). In July 2001, one month later, another
120 families, evenly split between the two sides, returned. More recently, the numbers have been picking
up. According to the PUK, there have been nine groups of returnees, which include 1,256 families (7387
people) returning to KDP-held areas and 721 families (3323 people) returning to PUK areas, for a total of
10,710 people.
The sessions of the KRG joint-parliament held in early October 2002, and the statements of the two leaders
Mas`oud Barzani and Jalal Talabani regarding renewed commitment to implementing the Washington
accord are likely to further increase returns.
The system works as follows: First, each party presents to the joint subcommittee a list of potential
returnees with supporting documentation as to home ownership. Second, the committee meets and goes
over the names and agrees on a number to return to each side. Third, the receiving party is responsible for
seeing that the returnees’ homes or apartments are vacant and habitable.
One NGO, Peace Winds Japan, has recognized the value and risks inherent in assisting this group of
displaced people to return home. Rather than avoiding the risk, it claims,
NGOs can facilitate [the] peace process by strategic application/allocation of humanitarian or development
assistance projects in view of conflict dynamics in a given region . . . PWJ is now seriously considering
implementing projects which would facilitate the exchange of the IDP families in both KDP-held and PUKheld territories.
This is in stark contrast to the view of another major NGO operating in the North which told us, 'The reason
we do not get involved in IDP issues is that it is very political, and the danger of being politicized is too
great.'" (Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02, pp27-28)
Kurdistan Regional Government officials criticized slow pace of UN aid programs
(2002)
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Many Iraqi Kurds reportedly complain that the UN does not respond to their needs
"Many KRG officials, however, are not satisfied with the "slow pace" of UN aid programs. PUK Deputy
Prime Minis ter Adnan Mufti met with a delegation of the United Nations Development Program and
criticized it for the slow pace of its operations, according to the 19 April issue of "Al-Ittihad," the Arabiclanguage daily newspaper of the PUK. According to "Al-Ittihad," Mufti "called on the UN to play its role in
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dealing with failures and shortcomings in the electricity sector and consolidating cooperation and
coordination with the institutions of the Kurdistan Regional Government." Mufti also requested the UN
speed up organization of teacher-training courses, and "to respond to the needs of the health and agriculture
sectors." (Some Iraqi Kurdish hospital officials interviewed in spring 2001 said that the UN often takes up
to 18 months to deliver approved equipment. If that equipment is faulty, then another 18 months can be
wasted waiting for replacement parts.)
Many Iraqi Kurds complain that the UN does not respond to their needs and concerns; they say that many
Arab national UN employees, such as those from Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, and Sudan are especially
unresponsive. According to a 27 March 2001 United Press International report, Husseyn pressured UN
agencies to "do his bidding in northern Iraq." The article pointed to one example where Rima al-Azar, a
Lebanese UNICEF child protection officer in Irbil, unilaterally severed UNICEF's contracts with NGOs
operating in Iraqi Kurdistan, apparently without any authorization from her superiors or UN offices in
Geneva and New York. There have been other problems with the UN. According to farmers and officials of
the University of Sulaymani College of Agriculture, a pesticide supplied to farmers by the UN wiped out
nearly the entire chickpea crop in spring 2001, leaving several farmers who had sought UN agricultural
advice destitute." (RFE/RL 26 April 2002)
Selected UN activities
UN seeking ways to assist internally displaced persons in non-contentious areas in
the North (January 2004)
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UN carries out assistance through their national staff and Iraqi contractors
Activities include cross-border deliveries, rehabilitation projects and capacity-building
Coordination of the current United Nations activities is being undertaken by the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI)
The United Nations will continue to support the ration system, which remains an essential lifeline
for a majority of the Iraqi population
The United Nations is prepared to expand activities when security conditions make further
assistance possible
"United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan today apprised representatives of the Coalition Provisional
Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council of the United Nations' active and ongoing engagement in
humanitarian and rehabilitation activities in Iraq.
Within the limitations imposed by the security situation, United Nations agencies and programmes are
continuing to carry out a wide range of assistance through their national staff and Iraqi contractors, with the
support of several hundred international staff in the region. These activities include cross-border deliveries,
rehabilitation projects and capacity-building.
Coordination of the current United Nations activities is being undertaken by the United Nations Assistance
Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), which has established several offices in the region. Last month, SecretaryGeneral Annan named Ross Mountain, United Nations Assistant Emergency Relief Coordinator, as his
Special Representative ad interim.
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United Nations agencies are bringing in potable water; delivering medical supplies; providing fertilizer and
seeds; dredging ports and helping rehabilitate health centres and water treatment plants, pumping stations
and power supply systems.
The United Nations is also engaged in capacity-building, training and other forms of support to Iraqi
authorities. This ranges from training in procurement and logistics to Ministry of Trade staff, to providing a
start-up package to the new Ministry of Displacement and Migration. The United Nations is also providing
emergency health kits and public-health data for the Ministry of Health and providing financial assistance
to Iraqi authorities for life-saving activities for children.
The United Nations will continue to support the ration system, which remains an essential lifeline for a
majority of the Iraqi population, with about 2.3 million tonnes of food to be delivered by mid-2004. United
Nations agencies are also providing nutritional support including high-energy biscuits for primary schools,
kindergartens and social centres.
The United Nations has also been assisting the voluntary return of refugees from Saudi Arabia and Iran, as
well as providing protection and assistance to refugees inside Iraq. It is also developing ways to facilitate
the return and reintegration of internally displaced persons in non-contentious areas in the North.
The United Nations is prepared to expand these activities when security conditions make further assistance
possible and has drawn up plans for further humanitarian and reconstruction activities for 2004 and beyond
in areas such as education, health, food security, governance, poverty reduction, housing and
infrastructure." (UN OCHA, 19 Januaray 2004)
UN/World Bank addresses post-war reconstruction needs (October 2003)
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A Joint Iraq Needs Assessment was initiated in Iraq soon after major combat ended
The purpose of the assessment is to inform the Donor Conference in Madrid on October 23-24,
2003
The assessment covers fourteen priority sectors and three cross-cutting themes
Overall stock of reconstruction needs over the period 2004-2007 in the fourteen priority sectors,
on the order of US$36
Constraints to reconstruction are often not due to a lack of funds, but rather to difficulties in
developing and implementing time-bound investment programs according to established
international procedures
Beyond 2004, it is expected that more of the investments could be covered by Iraqi government
oil and tax revenues or private sector financing
“The Core Group on Iraq -- the United Arab Emirates, the United States, the European Union and Japan –
in cooperation with the UN, World Bank and IMF has discussed a Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, which was
initiated in Iraq soon after major combat ended. The Assessment was undertaken by the United Nations
Development Group (UNDG) and the World Bank Group with assistance from the IMF. The purpose of the
assessment is to inform the Donor Conference in Madrid on October 23-24, 2003. This conference will
seek funding from the donor community to address priority reconstruction and rehabilitation needs,
focusing on both urgent and medium-term needs for supporting sustainable development. The assessment
covers fourteen priority sectors and three cross-cutting themes,[as agreed among the international
community at the Technical Reconstruction Meeting in New York on June 24, 2003. In addition to Iraqi
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expertise, the work benefited from significant inputs from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA),
several NGOs and a number of experts from the European Union, the European Commission, Japan, and
Australia.
(…)
Iraq’s overall reconstruction needs today are vast and are a result of nearly 20 years of neglect and
degradation of the country’s infrastructure, environment and social services. Public resources were diverted
to support the military and the ruling regime’s power; poor economic and policy decisions took a toll; and
conflict and international sanctions all combined to erode the standard of living for ordinary Iraqis.
Development priorities must include (i) strengthening institutions of sovereign, transparent and good
government; (ii) restoring critical infrastructure and core human services destroyed and degraded by years
of misrule and conflict; and (iii) supporting an economic and social transition that provides both growth and
social protection.
The assessment estimates the overall stock of reconstruction needs over the period 2004-2007 in the
fourteen priority sectors, to be on the order of US$36 billion. In addition, the CPA has separately
estimated that there are some $20 billion needed in critical sectors not covered by the World Bank/UN
assessment, including security and oil. While the figures in the assessment reflect the best estimates of the
likely needs for the immediate and medium-term, the actual disbursement – that is, the expenditure – of
funds is mu ch harder to predict, because it depends on the security situation, the capacity of Iraqi
institutions to plan and implement projects, and the state of infrastructure and energy services. Experience
by the Bank in other post-conflict countries shows that constraints to reconstruction are often not due to a
lack of funds, but rather to difficulties in developing and implementing time-bound investment programs
according to established international procedures. Given the massive size and scope of the reconstruction
needs in Iraq, it can be expected that initial disbursement rates will be low while local capacity is built, but
will increase rapidly over time as institutions are developed and experience is gained.
In addition, the assessment notes that not all of the identified needs may require external financing. Already
in 2004, about $1 billion of these needs are covered by ongoing contracts under the UN oil-for-food
program. Beyond 2004, it is expected that more of the investments could be covered by Iraqi government
oil and tax revenues or private sector financing, diminishing the need for external donor support. This is
based on the assumption that, in a stable environment, oil productivity and output will increase with the
investment that takes place, general economic recovery will result in increasing direct and indirect tax
revenues, and an improved investment climate will result in significant financing from both domestic and
international private investors. Finally, the assessment notes that it is currently not possible to predict
offsetting expenditures on principal and interest payments on Iraq’s very sizeable external debt.” (WB, 2
October 2003)
Shelter and basic services to 120,000 Internally Displaced Persons (August 2003)
•
•
•
•
In Northern Iraq, UN HABITAT has provided shelter and basic services to 120,000 Internally
Displaced Persons and Vulnerable Groups
The USD 600 million SRP has been implemented through Local Authorities and over 800 local
contractors
In South and Central Iraq UN-HABITAT conduc ted the Housing Sector Observation Programme
"The Iraq Reconstruction Plan for Shelter and Urban Development offers a preliminary strategy for
improving the conditions of people living and working in the 290 urban areas of Iraq. The Plan provides
information on the present status of shelter and urban development and makes recommendations for policy
reform, capacity building, small-scale projects, information systems, and further assessments. Also
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included by way of annex, are a series of immediate projects that interested Member States and
international development co-operation agencies may consider supporting.
The Plan draws upon the seven-year experience of UN-HABITAT in Iraq and rapid assessments
undertaken after the recent conflict. Under the Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP), UN-HABITAT has
implemented three separate initiatives. In Northern Iraq the agency has executed the Settlements
Rehabilitation Programme (SRP), the third largest humanitarian OFFP component, providing shelter and
basic services to 120,000 Internally Displaced Persons and Vulnerable Groups. The USD 600 million SRP
has been implemented through Local Authorities and over 800 local contractors with the added advantage
of building local capacity and generating employment to over 80,000 people. In South and Central Iraq
UN-HABITAT conducted the Housing Sector Observation Programme monitoring the importation of
building materials, and implemented in Baghdad the Neighbourhood Rehabilitation Project, a set of smallscale infrastructure projects applying principles of community management and partnership.
Subsequent to the adoption of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1483, UN-HABITAT together
with Iraqi nationals assessed war damages nation-wide. The agency had earlier also developed a Three-year
Plan for shelter and service improvements in Northern Iraq, and assessed the construction sector in Iraq.
The Iraq Reconstruction Plan reflects past experience and rapid assessment, and situates these within the
context of the twin mandates of UN-HABITAT: “adequate shelter for all” and “sustainable urban
development.” The Plan also builds on the agency’s work in post-conflict situations in Kosovo,
Afghanistan and East Timor, and technical co-operation pursued by the agency for three decades in 75
countries.
The following strategy, in line with SCR 1483, supports Iraqi institutions (national and local) and the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). UN-HABITAT will make available expert practitioners to assist the
Iraqi government and CPA in the achievement of the above objectives, under the co-ordination and in
collaboration with the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, the Resident Coordinator, and the UN Country Team. Further support will be provided by the UN-HABITAT
Representative in Iraq, a seasoned team of both international and local staff members, and expertise within
UN-HABITAT headquarters.
Estimated funding for the entire programme is USD 20-30 million annually over 5 years, with sufficient
de/mobilisation time built in to this period. This document offers a dynamic approach to the changing
situation on the ground today. UN-HABITAT will ensure its continued updating and adaptation to the
emerging needs of the Iraqi people."(UN-HABITAT, 31 August 2003)
The UN Humanitarian Response - The Flash Appeal revised
•
•
•
Updated UN Flash Appeal (May 2003)
UN to fill gaps in humanitarian response
Lack of security serious hindrance to relief efforts in Iraq
UPDATE: UN Flash Appeal on the Iraq Crisis (May 2003)
“The situation in Iraq remains extremely worrying to the international humanitarian community. The
prevailing insecurity affects all facets of life of Iraqi civilians. Organised looting and robbery have become
daily features that affect virtually all sectors of public and social life and have left a majority of essential
services and institutions severely damaged and disrupted. Weapons are widely available. Insecurity in the
largest cities has significantly held back humanitarian, recovery and rehabilitation activities as well as the
necessary proper assessments of the situation. Violence and lawlessness continues to endanger civilians,
particularly women and girls. Women have been largely confined to their homes while girls have not been
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attending school. While the Coalition is making efforts to address security, there are urgent humanitarian
needs.
There are signs that the interruption of access to clean water and to health services is leading to a
deterioration of the health situation, particularly of children. A UNICEF rapid nutrition assessment
conducted in Baghdad, although a small sample, revealed acute malnutrition levels at 7.7%, nearly the
double of those found in February 2002. Similar trends in malnutrition can be expected in other urban
centres. Diahorrea cases have jumped significantly and cholera, although endemic, and at the usual level at
this time of the year, is a continuing concern. Immunisation programmes have been interrupted. The
breakdown of disease surveillance systems means that cases of disease are likely to well exceed those
reported. UXO is a critical problem across the country, with the overwhelming majority of casualties
inflicted on children. Injuries reported since the end of the war suggest a significant worsening in the
situation, particularly around Kirkuk and Mosul. Inter-ethnic tensions have been rising in Kirkuk,
particularly after the return of large numbers of those displaced through the previous government policies
and has overstretched housing stock and basic services. There is now the prospect of significant returns
including by Iraqi refugees in the months ahead. A second key constraint to note in re-establishing basic
services has been payment of salaries. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) began payments to civil
servants on 25 May.
By late April, significant amounts of food, medical, and other supplies had been propositioned in the
region. This high level of preparedness hasassisted greatly in ensuring timely response, particularly in the
health sector, where the cholera outbreak in the South was contained by the speedy delivery of key medical
and water quality supplies and by the establishment of an inter-agency task force. Iraq is also now well
positioned for the recommencement of the public food distribution, scheduled for 1 June 2003, with around
360,000 MTs of food dispatched into Iraq by 26 May 2003. Agencies working in water and sanitation have
faced enormous challenges, but have pressed on with rolling programmes of rapid assessment and repairs to
keep systems functioning. Tankering water into the South has proven critical to keeping at bay a major
water and health catastrophe. Coordination mechanisms in key sectors have allowed to re-engage quickly
with local authorities and line agencies, to ensure pressing needs are met – not only in terms of supplies,
but also in kick-starting key systems, e.g., for surveillance and monitoring of health, quality control of
water and medical supplies, emergency repairs to water and sewage installations, and to electricity supply
facilities, the latter being pivotal to establishing water and health services.
The Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq has been inter-acting with representatives of the CPA, particularly
the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), in order to ensure a well-coordinated
humanitarian response. In Baghdad, and through the five Area Coordination offices1, mechanisms for
coordination of assistance are now in place and constructive dialogue on key humanitarian issues has been
established with coalition officials. Following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1483 on 22 May
2003, discussions are underway between the UN and the CPA to ensure clarity of roles and responsibilities
regarding humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. By late May, around 380 international UN staff had
been deployed to Iraq. Four of the five UN Area Coordination teams are now in situ, in the North (Erbil),
Centre (Mosul), Baghdad and Upper South (Basrah) . The Lower South team has been conducting daily
missions pending the identification of suitable office premises in Hillah.” (UN-OCHA, May 2003)
A revision of the Flash Appeal for Iraq
“In order to rapidly mobilise resources from the donor community to respond to a potential humanitarian
crisis in Iraq, the UN launched its ‘Flash Appeal: For the Humanitarian Requirements of the Iraq Crisis’ in
late March 2003 for a period of six months (April through September 2003). Given the uncertainty of
events regarding the possible evolution of the conflict and disruptive effects it would have on the people of
Iraq, preliminary estimates based on a ‘medium impact scenario’ indicated that a figure of approximately
US$ 2,218 billion would be required to allow an adequate humanitarian response. To date, the UN has
received a positive response from the donor community with current contributions and firm pledges
amounting to some US$ 981.5 million or 44.2%2 of the initial amount requested. Security Council
Resolution 1472 (28 March 2003), making “temporary and technical adjustments” to the Oil-for-Food
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Programme (OFFP) to allow UN agencies to identify contracts pertaining to priority humanitarian
commodities, has been extended through 3 June 2003 (SC Res 1476, 24 April 2003).
“As at 27 May 2003, the UN agencies and programmes have identified goods in 444 contracts worth US$
1,155 million as shippable by 3 June 2003. Most of the goods are in food (US$ 515 million), electricity
(US$ 261 million), agriculture (US$ 182 million) and health (US$ 127 million) sectors. Further contracts
with a balance of undelivered goods worth some US$ 330 million are still being considered by the UN for
possible shipment by 3 June 20033. Given that the UN does not wish to request from the donors resources
that are already provided by the OFFP, work is continuing with UN agencies to establish which of the
resources within these contracts should be matched against requirements outlined in the Flash Appeal.
The latest Security Council Resolution 1483 has also requested the Secretary-General to continue the
exercise of his responsibilities under Security Council Resolutions 1472 and 1476 for a period of six
months and terminate within this time period the operations of the Programme. Continued support will be
required to meet humanitarian needs in Iraq in the post-conflict period. The United Nations is now in the
process of revising the current Flash Appeal. The “Revised Humanitarian Appeal for Iraq” will be launched
in New York on 24 June 2003. The revision will be substantial. It will revisit planning assumptions, which
were not borne out: sizeable internal and external population movements, considerable destruction of
infrastructure, and restriction of access to affected population and a severe disruption of the OFFP. It will
take into account OFFP resources made available to UN agencies for activities included in the Flash Appeal
as well as developments which have affected the humanitarian situation, particularly the unexpected scale
and severity of the looting and the continuing level of insecurity. The Revised Appeal will draw heavily on
data gathered through sector coordination groups (UN, ICRC and NGOs) thereby ensuring the best fact
based approach available at this point. Ongoing insecurity will, however, severely hamper the ability of the
UN to undertake extensive and detailed needs assessments as desired.” (UN-OCHA, May 2003)
UN to fill gaps in humanitarian response
“Top United Nations staff have returned to Baghdad promising to plug gaps in the response to the country’s
humanitarian needs. The UN’s humanitarian coordinator for Iraq, Ramiro Lopes da Silva, arrived in the
Iraqi capital on Friday afternoon together with agency heads of the World Health Organisation (WHO), the
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN Development Programme
(UNDP). UN international staff withdrew from Iraq on 18 March, leaving 3,400 local staff members to
carry on working where possible. While 90 international staff have returned to three of the northern
governorates, this is the first move back to the central part of the country, and comes in spite of the security
situation being uncertain. On Saturday, at his first public engagement since arriving, da Silva said plans
were already in place to accommodate 55 more UN staff in its Baghdad headquarters to help with the
groundwork. He said that in returning to the capital, the UN had always had to weigh needs against the risk
to staff, and the initial team would cover areas where the UN had an immediate obligation to respond to the
humanitarian situation.
In the end, he said, it was concluded that a "more active interpretation" of Geneva Convention guidelines
on its return should be made. "I think we have to have to take a more pragmatic approach to life," he said,
adding that it had been a question of whether or not the UN should step aside and let systems collapse when
it had knowledge, expertise and contacts that could be valuable in re-establishing these systems. "Our role
is to assist the Iraqi people. Our guide is that Iraqi people are at the centre of everything. We need to move
forward and that’s what we are doing," da Silva said. The UN's return to Baghdad had also involved
political considerations inasmuch as it had not sanctioned the war in Iraq, he observed.
Da Silva said it was clear that the body in charge of governing Iraq at present was the coalition’s Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) headed by US Gen (retd) Jay Garner. To this end,
the UN would not seek to replace ORHA but to collaborate with it. "Our duty is to fill gaps not to duplicate
efforts," he said, pointing out that UN agencies had been in Iraq since the 1960s, and had a vast amount of
experience and knowledge.
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Da Silva said that the situation in Iraq was not like in Kosovo or Afghanistan where "parallel to the
humanitarain assistance the UN had a broad mandate and it was easier to establish the framework of the
relationship." He added that it was not a humanitarian disaster like the ones covered in the Horn of Africa
where people had died of starvation. "But it is a humanitarian disaster in the sense that the basic services
collapsed or are in risk of collapsing if we don't put them back into shape rather quickly. We think we can
bring support to that effort," da Silva said.
WFP’s representative in Iraq, Torben Due, said reactivating the food-rationing system, on which 60 percent
of Iraqis had been fully dependent, was crucial. The agency had launched its biggest programme ever to
bring food into the country, and needed to revive the distribution systems used before the war. The WHO
representative, Ghulam Popal, said some of the major problems needing to be addressed were the lack of
clean water, damaged health facilities, patient records and public health programmes. Unless dealt with,
these matters would lead to more disease and death, he stressed. Moreover, the UN had to ensure that
sufficient drugs were available and provide financial support to critical medical facilities such as hospitals
until the Iraqi authorities could resume making decisions.
Carel de Rooy, UNICEF’s representative in Iraq, said it was vital to assess needs in areas such as water,
sanitation, nutrition, child protection and health. It was also crucial to get children back to school. Doing so
would get them off the streets, which were still dangerous, being littered with huge numbers of mines and
items of unexploded ordnance. UNICEF would also be working with the education ministry to develop the
country’s curriculum, but de Rooy stressed that its content must be decided by Iraqis.
Francois Dubois, UNDP's resident representative in Iraq, said that his agency had been entrusted with
rehabilitation of the electricity sector which had been damaged both during the first Gulf war and in the
most recent conflict. He said that UNDP was assessing the extent of the damage and would work closely
with its Iraqi counterparts, the civilian population and non-governmental organisations in its
implementation of this programme.” (IRIN, 4 May 2003)
Flash Appeal for the humanitarian requirements of the Iraq crisis - Six-month response (28 March
2003)
”[…] Potentially, people may be forced to leave their homes and communities and become internally
displaced, or they may flee to neighbouring countries, creating a refugee crisis with far-reaching effects on
the region. It is evident that the international community must act immediately to prepare for all
eventualities and to provide assistance if a humanitarian disaster is to be averted. As in any conflict, the
primary responsibility for the protection and welfare of the civilian population rests with the warring
parties. Further, in any territory under foreign occupation, it is the occupying power that has the
responsibility to ensure the provision of food and medical supplies to the civilian population. Without
detracting from these obligations, the United Nations will provide humanitarian assistance to affected and
vulnerable populations, whether inside Iraq, or in the neighbouring countries. […] The UN expects that all
parties concerned will ensure a secure environment for the delivery of assistance and provide free and
unfettered access to populations in need in accordance with International Humanitarian Law. The UN also
calls on neighbouring states to recognize the right of refugees to seek asylum.
Notwithstanding the efforts of the United Nations to support the peaceful implementation of Resolution
1441, the UN system has been engaged in contingency planning for humanitarian action in the event of
war. Emergency preparedness appeals were launched in December 2002 and January 2003 for a total of US
$123.5 million. With US $58.6 million contributed and pledged against these appeals, and drawing on
available emergency reserves, the United Nations has pre-positioned some essential relief supplies in Iraq
and the region. […] With the start of war, however, the UN's preliminary estimates are that US$
2,218,417,415 will be required to assist the Iraqi people over the six-month period, until the end of
September 2003. […] The UN must secure immediate pledges of funds and resources from the donor
community to allow for an effective response with emergency, life -saving assistance. Should relief supplies
or funds be made available through the OFFP, overall Flash Appeal requirements requested from the
donors will be adjusted accordingly.
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This Flash Appeal has two key components: food and non-food needs. Food needs would be a vital element
in our overall response given the overwhelming reliance of the Iraqi population on rations distributed under
the OFFP. […] The second component of the appeal addresses the requirements of the non-food sector,
including assistance for potential refugees, internally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups both
inside Iraq and in the neighbouring countries. The agencies involved will focus on activities relating to the
provision of potable water to the general population, health and nutrition assistance to children, pregnant
women, lactating mothers, the elderly and infirm and for the provision of shelter, education, protection, demining operations and emergency infrastructure repair. The exact magnitude of the requirements of these
activities will depend on the evolving situation and will be adjusted accordingly. […] The United Nations,
therefore, calls on donors ot contribute to the estimated requirements of US $901,642,741 for this
component.
[…] The UN works closely with the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement and international NGOs, and
would not be able to achieve its goal of bringing humanitarian aid to Iraqi people without this cooperation.
Donors are strongly urged to also support these humanitarian operations, especially given the work of the
ICRC during armed conflicts, and the ability of the NGOs to respond to humanitarian needs. The IFRC and
ICRC have already launched their own, separate appeals related to the Iraq crisis.” (OCHA, 28 March
2003)
Donations in-kind for the Iraq Crisis: Guidance to Donors May 2003
“The 'Flash Appeal for the Humanitarian Requirements of the Iraq Crisis' launched in late March sought
$US 2.2 billion to respond to immediate and anticipated humanitarian needs in Iraq. Donors have
responded generously with financial support to our Appeal. There are, however, significant unmet needs for
which we are seeking funds. These needs are outlined in the Flash Appeal. The UN emphasizes the
importance of donors providing financial resources, rather than in-kind assistance, for its emergency
efforts, and discourages in most cases contributions in-kind. We need to maintain the capacity to respond
flexibly and appropriately to needs as the situation evolves. In the past, in-kind contributions have included
unneeded items, or items which are not easily integrated into a large scale operation. As well, the UN has
limited capacity in Iraq to handle shipments, and the costs associated with shipment, warehousing and
distribution of in-kind contributions are high - and often exceed the value of the donated items.
The health sector has to date attracted a range of very significant donations -- of field hospitals and staff,
and supplies - from many different quarters. Iraq has some large and sophisticated hospitals. Most kept
functioning through the war, but some were brought to a halt by looting. Now, in many hospitals, the main
problems are security, water, restoring sanitation services, power and mid level and administrative
personnel. There is not a shortage of doctors. There are some specific shortages of medicines and
equipment, but this varies from hospital to hospital. The health system in Iraq has shown remarkable
resilience during the current crisis. The first priority is to assist Iraqi health professionals to get the health
system up and running again. International health partners in Iraq agree that the best option right now,
including to hospitals, is assistance which helps the existing structures to operate as fully as it can under the
circumstances. A strong, sustainable health system in Iraqi requires a focused effort to build local capacity
in areas identified by Iraqi professionals thems elves. In other sectors, the UN has requested support in-kind,
or is able to accept it. The most obvious example of this is food aid. The World Food Programme has
requested food for Iraq, or cash to buy food.
In all cases where an in-kind donation is planned, donors are urged to approach the relevant UN agency to
discuss the needs in Iraq, and the ability of the donor to meet the profile of needs appropriately. Where an
in-kind contribution is accepted by a UN agency, the donor will also be asked to make financial
arrangements for the transport, clearance, handling, storage, management and distribution costs related to
items. Full details of associated costs will be provided to donors on request. For each sector of
humanitarian response in Iraq, an agency has been designated as sectoral coordinator.” (HCI, 14 May 2003)
Lack of security serious hindrance to relief efforts in Iraq
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”While a major humanitarian crisis had been averted so far in Iraq, the civilian population -- and children in
particular -- remained at risk if the security situation did not improve substantially soon, Deputy SecretaryGeneral Louise Fréchette told the Security Council this morning, as it met on the humanitarian situation in
that country. In a prior meeting this morning, the Council adopted resolution 1483 (2003), which, among
other things, provided for a Special Representative of the Secretary-General whose responsibilities would
include coordination of humanitarian aid. Opening the meeting, during which the Council was briefed by
top United Nations officials, Ms. Fréchette said the Organization's ability to respond rapidly and effectively
from the outset of the crisis had been greatly enhanced by inter-agency coordination, which had resulted in
joint planning and an integrated plan, with substantial quantities of humanitarian supplies having been prepositioned inside Iraq and neighbouring countries.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), stated Administrator Mark Malloch Brown, had
moved quickly with efforts to provide electricity, facilitating the operation of water supply stations, sewage
treatment plants and hospitals. Together with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the UNDP was also preparing needs assessment operations for reconstruction and recovery planning.
The Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP), James T. Morris, said the WFP so far had
delivered over 200,000 metric tons of food and was now gearing up for the largest humanitarian operation
it had ever attempted. He was confident that serious hunger among the Iraqi people could be avoided.
Today, there was no food crisis in Iraq, he stated. Iraq was a nation of tremendous wealth and resources,
and with the restoration of a functioning economy, it would eventually be able to move away from heavily
subsidized food rations. [...] The World Health Organization (WHO), said the priority now was to rapidly
re-establish medical and public health-care services for Iraqis. In much of the country, the precarious
security situation hampered efforts to re-start public services. Echoing the concern of many, he said, "the
absolute lack of cash to meet the running costs of services and to enable critical personnel to receive
remuneration, is undermining the capacity of all institutions to offer essential services". He estimated that
the total cost of jump starting the health-care system and sustaining it for six months to be between $20
million and $30 million per month.
A top priority for the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), said Nils Kastberg, Director, Office of
Emergency Programmes, was to get all children back in school as soon as possible. Another was basic
health for children and women. In response to soaring rates of diarrhoea among Iraqi children, UNICEF
was rebuilding basic immunization services and improving sewage and waste disposal to eliminate
contaminants in water. It was also advocating the removal of breast milk substitutes from food donation
packages, since they were mixed with contaminated water.
[…] ICRC had, so far, visited more than 7,000 prisoners of war and civilian internees, and was continuing
efforts to gain access to others. Its priorities included visits to all those who had been deprived of their
liberty; the protection of the sick and wounded, children and internally displaced persons; emergency repair
and rehabilitation of infrastructure; the provision of emergency medical services and equipment; the
provision of food to vulnerable populations; and landmine-related operations.
Statement by Deputy Secretary-General
[…] Noting that the humanitarian situation in Iraq remained very serious, she said the breakdown of
essential services and law and order had resulted in a range of urgent needs. While a major humanitarian
crisis had been averted so far, the civilian population -- and children, in particular -- remained at risk,
particularly if the security situation did not improve substantially in the near future. Emphasizing that
reactivating essential public services was the overarching priority of virtually all United Nations assistance
efforts, she said that those included health services, electricity and water supply, as well as the public food
distribution system. One major constraint on public service providers had been the inability to pay salaries
and other running costs. The general lack of law and order had had a wide variety of humanitarian
consequences, including the devastation of ministries, water treatment plants, hospitals and warehouses.
Many facilities had been repaired or restocked, only to be looted again a few days later. Security concerns
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also included unexploded ordnance, which threatened civilians and impeded transport and the resumption
of normal agricultural activities. […]
[…] The threat of violence had also resulted in population movements, such as the displacement of Iraqi
Arabs from several areas. The Humanitarian Coordinator was leading an effort by United Nations agencies,
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations to draw up a
protection framework for internally displaced persons, returning refugees and other civilians at risk. […] To
date, more than $700 million had been received in response to the United Nations flash appeal. As
implementation of Security Council resolution 1472 (2003) continued, the Office of the Iraq Programme
and United Nations agencies had confirmed that nearly $1 billion in priority humanitarian needs could be
shipped by 3 June. […]
Briefing by Agency Heads
[…] UNDP's teams were deployed in Baghdad, Basra and the three northern governorates, and staff were
now being deployed to Mosul and Kirkuk. […] UNDP had moved quickly in response to the immediate
humanitarian needs of the war-affected Iraqi people by providing a secure and stable electricity supply,
facilitating the operation of water-supply stations, sewage-treatment plants, hospitals and other medical
facilities to resume operations. […] The Programme was also involved in mine-action operations.
Regarding reconstruction and recovery planning, he said that the UNDP, with the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), had been discussing how to mount needs assessment operations in the
field. They were also preparing a major assessment of the current household living standards of Iraqis
throughout the country.
[…] WFP had delivered over 200,000 metric tons of food -- some 3,800 truckloads -- using five different
corridors through Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Iran and Kuwait. In addition, a shipment of WFP rice had been
moved through the port of Umm Qasr. […] "Our objective is to ensure 480,000 metric tons of food a month
are available to feed all 27 million Iraqis through the existing public food distribution system for five
months", he said. By that time, the agency felt that an Iraqi authority would be able to take over the
operation. Throughout the operation, the WFP would distribute 2.5 million tons of food, 48,000 truckloads,
at a cost of some $1.85 billion. WFP staff had been working hard to renegotiate food contracts under the
provisions of Council resolutions 1472 and 1476. […] The Council that the WFP had identified some $947
million worth of food items from the Programme. Full distribution to the entire population of Iraq were
scheduled to begin on 1 June. Advanced rations provided by the Government before the conflict supplied
families with two months of provisions, and with the restoration of the public distribution system, the WFP
was confident serious hunger among the Iraqi people could be avoided. Today, there was no food crisis in
Iraq. […] Other pressing issues included the payment of salaries for Ministry of Trade staff implementing
the public distribution system, as well as the provision of water, fuel and electricity supplies to mills in Iraq
so they could produce wheat flour. Another concern was the protection of Iraq's cereal harvest, estimated
this year at some 1.7 million tons of wheat and barley. The harvest began last week and continues through
June. […] With the restoration of a functioning economy, it would eventually be able to transition away
from heavily subsidized food rations towards a market food economy. In doing so, it would be critical to
maintain a safety net for the vulnerable populations of Iraq, especially young children in areas where high
malnutrition rates had been noted.
WHO : […] In much of the country, the precarious security situation hampered efforts to restart public
services, including electricity, water, sanitation, medical and health. But even in places considered
reasonably secure, the prevailing power vacuum meant that government workers had no idea what was
expected of them, who was issuing their instructions or even whether there was a likelihood that they would
or could remain employed. […] Of particular concern was the continuing deterioration of public health
systems […]. That trend not only made it difficult for pregnant mothers and people with chronic illnesses to
access desperately needed medical care; it also exacerbated the potential for disease outbreaks and limited
the capacity to detect them. Since the war, in most of Iraq's governorates health services were operating at
20 per cent pre-war capacity. Further, overall public health was declining -- immunization rates had fallen
because routine vaccination programmes had been disrupted in the last six weeks. Systems for disease
detection were not functioning and laboratory services had collapsed. While cholera could generally be
expected at this time of year, the WHO was concerned by the increase in diarrhoeal diseases, particularly
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among children. Malaria and leishmaniasis needed to be kept under control, he said, and added that in a
country that had been polio-free for the past three years, two new possible cases had been reported and
were being investigated. […] The new authorities in Iraq must react to the deepening health crisis with
interventions: restarting existing health services for a limited period now would mitigate the crisis and
enable new authorities to judge how well they functioned. Substantive health-care initiatives could be
implemented in a phased and systematic manner. […] the WHO, in the meantime, would propose to
coordinate a country-wide initiative aimed at jump -starting health-care systems, within the context of the
gradual winding-down of emergency humanitarian, longer-term health sector reform, and the new
authority's rehabilitation and reconstruction plans. Where security permitted, the WHO was positioned to
coordinate the restarting of, among other things, basic health care in hospitals, capacity to monitor public
health and respond to threats, and systems for procuring warehousing and distribution of essential
medicines. The WHO estimated the total cost of jump - starting the health-care system and sustaining it for
six months to be between $20 million and $30 million per mo nth.
[…] UNICEF had placed the highest priority on the need for law and order throughout Iraq. After all, the
ability of United Nations staff to reach the neediest children was still being impeded by a culture of
lawlessness and fear. […] UNICEF's commitment to deliver learning supplies to all 3.5 million primary
school-aged children by September. […] UNICEF was rebuilding the cold chain for basic immunization
services and improving sewage and waste disposal to eliminate contaminants in water. It was also boosting
monitoring and treatment services for children affected by contaminated water.
The ICRC had so far visited more than 7,000 prisoners of war and civilian internees, and was continuing
its efforts to gain access to others. […] ICRC had had no access to major cities between Basra and
Baghdad, including Najaf, Karbala and Nassiriya, […] its priorities would include visits to all those who
had been deprived of their liberty; the protection of the sick and wounded, children and internally displaced
persons; emergency repair and rehabilitation of infrastructure; the provision of emergency medical services
and equipment; the provision of food to vulnerable populations; and landmine-related operations. […]
expressed concern over the effects of unexploded ordnance and the easy access to weapons and
ammunition throughout the country.
[…] The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was providing micro grants to
strengthen the capacity of local and community institutions. It was also working to provide communication
links among ministries. […] Emergency cash payments had been made to civil servants outside of
Baghdad. There was economic activity resuming in different ways, both cash and barter. On human rights,
USAID's abuse and prevention unit was tracking acts of retribution, had located mass graves, and
coordinated with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to promote tolerance and
respect for the rule of law. [….] Demining missions and projects to restore power and supply equipment for
necessary power repairs were among the projects under way. […]
KENZO OSHIMA,Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator,
said his recent visit to Iraq had confirmed his concerns about security, the lack of law and order, and the
payment of salaries. He warned that, if not addressed, the declining humanitarian situation could lead to a
serious crisis. He was looking into revising the flash appeal, in light of the new situation on the ground and
the resolution that had been adopted this morning. After conducting needs assessment for the widest
possible area, he would be able to launch that revision towards the end of June.
With regard to establishing a working relationship with the Iraqi people, he confirmed that there was a
considerable depth of human resources in the country. The strong institutional base had been disrupted but
could be deployed again quickly if salaries were paid. He noted that senior ministerial officials in Iraq had
expressed their desire to be consulted and involved in the priority setting and planning exercises, and he
stressed that their wishes should be respected as much as possible […].” (UN SC, 22 May 2003)
UNHCR chooses 4 villages for initial return showcase (September 2003)
•
•
After the collapse of the government in Baghdad, some IDPs began trickling back to their original
villages
UNHCR began identifying areas where returns are possible and less problematic
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•
UNHCR brought cement and concrete blocks for the villagers to start building their houses
“ The villagers of Dengawa were among some 800,000 internally displaced people, or IDPs, who had been
caught in various conflicts and waves of expulsions carried out by the previous government against ethnic
minorities – mainly Kurds, but also against Turkmen, Assyrians and to some extent Arabs.
After the collapse of the government in Baghdad, some IDPs began trickling back to their original villages.
In many areas, there were problems – lack of basic infrastructure and shelters, complicated and potentially
explosive property disputes and, in some regions, the presence of unexploded ordnance.
Soon after re-establishing its presence in Iraq, UNHCR began identifying areas where returns are possible
and less problematic. The agency subsequently selected initially four villages where returns have taken
place and decided to make them a showcase for what it plans to do to help in the return of IDPs in
collaboration with local authorities, the CPA, other UN agencies and relief organisations.
Dengawa is one of those pilot villages. In June, UNHCR handed out tents, blankets, kitchen sets, plastic
sheeting, hurricane lanterns, stoves and jerry cans. Earlier in August, it brought cement and concrete blocks
for the villagers to start building their houses (…).” (UNHCR, 3 September 2003)
UNHCR and IDPs (July 2003)
•
•
•
High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers brings attention to the IDPs of Northern Iraq
Primary responsibility lies with the Provisional Authority says Lubbers
UNHCR mobilizes assistance for IDP returnees in Northern Iraq
“High Commissioner Ruudd Lubbers' second day in northern Iraq Friday focused on the issue of hundreds
of thousands of people, mostly ethnic Kurds, forcibly displaced from the southern portion of Northern Iraq
during Saddam Hussein's rule. In the north-eastern city of Sulaymaniyah - one of the main administrative
centres of Iraq's Kurdish - controlled north, the High Commissioner met with senior officials of the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) - the dominant political force in the area and one of the two main
Kurdish political parties in Iraq.
On Thursday, in the city of Erbil, the High Commissioner held similar discussions with leading officials of
the other main Kurdish party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), including the deputy head of the
local government, Sami Abdul Rahman. On Friday, as he emerged from the meeting with the head of the
local government in Sulaymaniyah, Barham Salih, Lubbers said the major challenge now was to reverse
Saddam Hussein's policy, under which hundreds of thousands of Kurds were expelled from their homes and
ethnic Arabs were settled in traditionally Kurdish areas, most notably the oil-rich Kirkuk region. The High
Commissioner said a way had to be found to enable the Kurds to return to their original homes in Kirkuk.
He described the reversal of Saddam Hussein's policy as a "priority," but he also stressed that fair solutions
were needed for the Arab families in Kirkuk who were also adversely affected by the policy.
The High Commissioner offered UNHCR's help in dealing with the problem, but he emphasized that the
primary responsibility lies with the new authorities in Iraq, and particularly the Provisional Authority.
Lubbers describedpraised the liberation of Kirkuk last April as "exemplary" but warned that the success
could turn to disillusionment and renewed conflict, unless quick action is taken to help both ethnic groups
in a fair and equitable way. Also on Friday, Lubbers traveled to the settlement at Raparin, near
Sulaymaniyah, located on the premises of a former printing plant. There, , where he met with ethnic
Kurdish families expelled from Kirkuk 16 years ago. Many of them told him that they wanted to go back
but expressed concerns about housing and security. (…)” (UNHCR, 18 July 2003)
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“The UN refugee agency is stepping up efforts to help refugees and internally displaced Iraqis in post-war
Iraq. These range from finding alternative housing for hundreds of displaced Palestinians in Baghdad, to
registering undocumented Syrian refugees, and providing relief aid for Iraqi Kurds returning in the north.
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in April this year, more than 800 Palestinian families have been
evicted from their homes in Baghdad. At least another 200 families have been given notice to vacate their
flats, such that by the end of June, the number of displaced refugees could rise to 1,000 Palestinian families.
UNHCR has built temporary tents for these displaced Palestinians and is negotiating with the Coalition
Provisional Authority to allow the Palestinians to move to vacant government buildings as soon as possible.
Another group of refugees of concern to UNHCR are some 140 Syrian families who had left their country
for Baghdad in the late 1960s and early '70s for political reasons. They had enjoyed protection under
Saddam's regime but are now left to their own devices - some have been evicted, while many do not have
identity papers.
The UN refugee agency has started registering them to provide them with proper documentation and to find
out what they would like to do. Many said they would like to go back to Syria, but some prefer to be
resettled to third countries or naturalised in Iraq. On Monday, UNHCR staff visited yet another group of
refugees - Iranians in Al Tash camp, some 180 km west of Baghdad - and heard reports about a string of
violent incidents including shooting, looting and attacks by the local population over the past few weeks.
UNHCR is appealing to the Coalition Provisional Authority to ensure security at the camp.
Meanwhile in northern Iraq, the refugee agency on Tuesday distributed relief aid in two Iraqi Kurd villages
under a programme to help stabilise communities whose residents had been forced from their homes by the
previous government. At Bengawa and Talamater villages in Erbil's southern district of Makhmour,
UNHCR handed out tents, kitchen sets, plastic sheeting, stoves, jerry cans, lanterns and blankets to 479
Iraqi Kurds in 64 families who had reoccupied their property.
These people had been forced from their homes in the mid-1980s as a result of the Saddam regime's
"Arabisation policy" and had lived in appalling conditions in collective centres in Erbil and other cities.
Since the end of the recent war, they have begun to return spontaneously to their original villages. Some of
these Iraqi Kurds had been refugees in Iran and had come back to Iraq, but their repatriation was disrupted
by the previous government. The return to Bengawa and Talamater came after the Coalition Provisional
Authority and local officials helped resolve property disputes in the two villages, negotiating an
arrangement with the Arab settlers for a 50-50 sharing of this year's harvest of wheat and barley. However,
property claims remain unresolved in many areas in northern Iraq.
Fearing new tensions over attempts to repossess property, UNHCR is working with the authorities to
arrange for the peaceful resolution of these problems in a fair and equitable manner and to assist the
displaced in their current locations. "We know that the people who were uprooted from their homes have
suffered enough, but we are appealing for a little more patience," said Pierre-François Pirlot, UNHCR's
regional coordinator for northern Iraq.
"Many areas where the internally displaced people and the refugees come from lack the basic infrastructure
to make returns durable," said Pirlot. He added that the presence of land mines and unexploded ordnance is
another major concern. Since the end of the war, the UN refugee agency has been expanding its presence in
Iraq to deal with the return of more than 500,000 refugees and displaced Iraqis. The number includes
around 200,000 Iraqi refugees in Iran.” (UNHCR, 24 June 2003)
”The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has mobilized assistance for internally displaced
Iraqi Kurds who have gone back spontaneously to their original villages in the Dohuk area under a multiagency program to stabilize returnee communities.
UNHCR has dispatched tents, blankets, kitchen sets, stoves and lanterns to 230 people in 32 families at
Galikhodeda village, and similar relief aid packages are being arranged for 200 returnees in 28 families at
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Hinjirok village. Shelter materials will soon be distributed in the two villages, and other UN agencies and
NGOs are clearing land mines in peripheral areas and laying out plans to dig wells and bring in electricity.
Almost all of the houses at Galikhodeda and Hinjirok villages in Shekhan district were destroyed during the
inter-Kurdish factional fighting in the mid-1990s that uprooted around 180,000 people in the Dohuk
governorate. They are among an estimated 800,000 internally displaced people, or IDPs, forced from their
homes in decades of conflicts and ethnic cleansing campaigns in northern Iraq.
Last month, UNHCR began the progra m to rehabilitate villages in Makhmour district in the Erbil
governorate, where spontaneous returns have taken place. After handing out tents and emergency relief to
three villages in Makhmour, UNHCR is now providing shelter materials - cement, window and door frames
- to these villages so the returnees could build houses. "We are concentrating our assistance efforts in areas
where there are no major problems," said Pierre Francois Pirlot, UNHCR's coordinator for northern Iraq.
"There are areas where returns could provoke tensions, such as the Kirkuk region. There, we are urging
displaced people who are from that area to remain where they are as outstanding property disputes have not
been resolved."
During a visit to northern Iraq last month, High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers said the international
community must find a way forward to facilitate the return of displaced people, saying that failure to do so
could spark renewed tensions. In Dohuk, UNHCR has assessed conditions in 26 of 36 villages devastated
during the 1990s conflict. In most of the villages, UNHCR has found that returns could not take place
because of property disputes, the absence of basic infrastructure and the presence of unexploded ordnance.
Most of the IDPs in the region and elsewhere are living in appalling conditions in mud huts in collective
settlements.
In addition to its work for internally displaced Iraqis, UNHCR is also laying the groundwork for the
eventual repatriation of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees currently outside the country. The first
UNHCR-organised convoy of refugees returning to Iraq since the fall of the government of Saddam
Hussein arrived in southern Iraq on Wednesday morning from Rafha camp in Saudi Arabia.” (UNHCR, 30
July 2003)
UNDP to finance the building of homes for returnees
•
•
UNDP has allocated 400 million dollars to fund the return of people displaced from the northern
Iraqi oil city of Kirkuk
The program will be financed by the World Bank
“The UN Development Program (UNDP) has allocated 400 million dollars to fund the return of people
displaced from the northern Iraqi oil city of Kirkuk by the ousted regime, a Kurdish newspaper said
Monday. Khabat, published in this Kurdish city to the north of Kirkuk, quoted Haseb Ruzhbayani, an
assistant to Kirkuk's governor for resettlement and compensation affairs, as saying the aid was announced
by a UNDP delegation which recently visited Kirkuk. Kurds long accused Saddam Hussein's deposed
regime of settling Arabs from central and southern Iraq in and around Kirkuk in order to change the
demographic character of the multi-ethnic province, whose 800,000 to 850,000 inhabitants include
Turkmen and Assyrian Christians in addition to Arabs and Kurds.
Arab colonization around Kirkuk, 255 kilometers (160 miles) north of Baghdad, started in 1974, one year
after the Kurds rejected as insufficient a unilateral proclamation from Baghdad granting them limited selfrule. The ouster of Saddam's mainly Arab and Sunni Muslim regime by US-led forces in April opened the
way for tens of thousands of Kurds to lay claim to lands in Kirkuk, and in some cases evict Arabs who had
settled in their villages.
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Ruzhbayani said a UNDP delegation was expected in Kirkuk later Monday to discuss the modalities of the
return of the displaced. The program, to be financed by the World Bank, will feature building homes to the
returnees who have lost their former residences and giving them cash aid, he said.” (AFP, 18 August 2003)
UNICEF prepares to respond to immediate and basic needs of children and women in
Iraq, including IDPs (Jan 03)
"In light of a possible humanitarian crisis in Iraq, UNICEF is focussing its efforts mainly on preparedness
activities to respond to the immediate and basic needs of children and women in Iraq and the neighbouring
countries. UNICEF's planned interventions focus on reducing and mitigating the impact of a conflict on
health and nutrition status, ensuring access to potable water and sanitation facilities, and ensuring learning
opportunities by children as well as their care and protection. Within Iraq, UNICEF is the lead agency for
water and sanitation and co-lead agency for food focusing on therapeutic feeding and nutrition surveys.
UNICEF will actively participate in other areas such as health, education, protection, transport, logistics
and communication, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and asylum seekers. Whether inside or outside
Iraq, UNICEF is ensuring that its humanitarian response is co-ordinated with the response of respective
governments, sister UN agencies, Red Cross/Crescent Societies and international NGOs. […]
Emergency Programme Objectives
The following are the emergency programme objectives during the first month of a crisis for Iraq. In all
cases, UNICEF will work in areas that are accessible to its staff (national and international):
Health
To ensure a proper assessment of the health conditions of the affected population is carried out on time,
especially of children and women.
To prevent outbreaks of measles in IDP settlements and contiguous areas through vaccination of children
between 6 months and 16 years of age.
To ensure the availability of emergency drugs and ORS for PHC facilities, IDPs and targeted areas.
To ensure the safe delivery services for women in PHC facilities, IDPs and targeted areas.
To ensure the availability of relevant IEC material concerning health, especially care and management of
childhood illnesses.
Nutrition
To ensure a proper assessment of the nutritional conditions of the affected population is carried out on time,
especially of IDP children.
To carry out nutritional monitoring and surveillance of the population and especially vulnerable groups.
To ensure continued rehabilitation of acute malnourished children in CCCUs, hospitals and IDP areas.
To ensure the availability of relevant IEC material concerning nutrition, especially breastfeeding.
Water and Sanitation
To carry out a proper assessment of the water and sanitation conditions of the affected population.
To ensure the availability of potable water and sanitation services to most affected areas.
To ensure that the affected/displaced populations in urban areas have access to minimal potable water
service through the use of water purification tablets and limited water tankering (especially to IDP areas
and health facilities).
To ensure that IDPs - with particular emphasis on women and children - have access to facilities, supplies
and information that contribute to their hygienic status and protects them from water borne diseases.
To ensure the availability of relevant information and communication material (IEC) concerning safe water
and hygiene, especially related to water purification and prevention of water-borne diseases.
To co-ordinate all UN and NGO assistance in the area of Water and Sanitation.
Child Protection
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Carry out a rapid assessment of the conditions of institutionalised children, as well as IDP children with
special protection needs (unaccompanied children, children with disabilities and traumatised children).
Ensure that institutionalised children with special protection needs have access to shelter, food and
clothing, especially institutionalised and IDP children.
Ensure special care, protection and physical and psychosocial support for IDP children with special needs
Ensure special care, protection and psychosocial support of unaccompanied children, and their reunification
with their families
Ensure the development of safe spaces for children and youth in IDP areas.
Reduce the risk of injuries and death as a result of landmines and/or unexploded ordnance (UXOs) and
cluster bombs.
Education
To conduct a rapid assessment of the education sector and psycho-social situation of children, especially in
IDP areas
To ensure the resumption of educational and recreational services in IDP and other affected areas for
children and adolescents, through the provision of basic educational supplies and teaching materials."
(UNICEF 14 Jan 03)
WFP stock food for 900,000 Iraqis in case of conflict (Jan 03)
"The UN World Food Programme (WFP) is stocking up food in countries neighbouring Iraq to feed some
900,000 Iraqis for a three-month period in case of a war against Baghdad, a senior WFP spokesman said
Wednesday.
'We are close to the completion of pre-positioning food for some 900,000 people for three months in the
surrounding countries,' the chief of the Rome-based WFP Public Affairs Service, Trevor Rowe, told AFP in
Amman.
Rowe stressed, however, that this was merely a contingency plan and that the amount of food was "elastic"
and would increase as needed.
"We are not predicting a war on Iraq but we have to be prepared,' he said." (AFP 29 Jan 03)
Oil-for-food program established to alleviate humanitarian needs of Iraqi population
(1996-2002)
•
•
•
Oil-for-food program was set-up in 1996 as a temporary measure while the sanctions were in
place
In May 2002, UN SC members agreed to revise the sanction regime to ease its humanitarian
impact
Oil-for-food program was extented for 6 months in December 2002
"In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991, the United Nations sent a mission to Iraq which
reported the makings of 'an imminent catastrophe if minimum life supporting needs are not rapidly met.'
The Security Council responded by offering Iraq, in August 1991, an opportunity to sell oil to meet its
people’s basic needs while the sanctions, imposed in August 1990, remained in place. That offer was not
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accepted and over the following five years there was widespread suffering with food shortages, an absence
of essential medicines and a general deterioration in essential social services.
In 1996 the Government of Iraq and the United Nations Secretariat reached agreement on a Memorandum
of Understanding, setting out the details of implementing Security Council resolution 986 (1995) which had
been adopted 13 months earlier. Resolution 986 (1995) set the terms of reference for the oil-for-food
programme.
'Oil-for-food is a unique programme, established by the Council as a temporary measure to provide for the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, which is being implemented within the context of a sanctions
regime with all its attendant political, psychological and commercial dimensions, until the fulfillment by
Iraq of the relevant resolutions, including notably resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991.' (The
Supplementary Report of the Secretary-General of 1 February 1998 - S/1998/90)" (UN Office of the Iraq
Programme 2001)
"Under the program, the country also is permitted, under U.N. control, to import food, medicine, supplies
for water, sanitation, electricity, agricultural, and education projects, and spare parts for the oil sector." (UN
DOS 4 March 2002)
May 2002: UN SC members agreed to revise sanction regime to ease humanitarian impact
To see UN SC Resolution 1409 of 14 May 2002 modifying the sanction regime, please see [External Link]
"The key element in the new arrangements is the Goods Review List provided for in paragraph 2 of UNSC
Resolution 1382, passed in November 2001. Items specified on this list, defined as for military or dual use,
are to be separated from humanitarian goods. Russia's agreement to accept this list, after protracted
negotiations, cleared the way for implementation of the new "smarter" sanctions. The US sweetened the pot
for Russia by removing holds on over $200 million of Russian contracts with Iraq in late March. By the
rules of the 661 Committee which presently scrutinizes orders for humanitarian goods, all Security Council
members are allowed to query and hold up such orders. About 90 percent of the $5 billion worth of
contracts currently on hold are being blocked by the US and Great Britain.
The new proposals are expected to end this system of 661 Committee scrutiny of humanitarian goods.
Under the new system, contracts containing goods on the Goods Review List will be reviewed by the UN
Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) -- which administers oil for food. This office would then send the
contracts to the UN Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), which head up efforts to prevent Iraq from obtaining banned weapons. In turn,
these offices can refer contracts considered objectionable to the 661 Committee for rejection or passage.
A proposal to tighten up on regional smuggling -- key to earlier drafts of the "smart sanctions" resolution -has been dropped. Neighboring states, including Syria, which is currently a Security Council member, are
unlikely to give up their expanded commercial contacts with Baghdad and resisted any attempts to restrict
this trade. The State Department estimates that Iraq reaps $2.5 billion a year from smuggling oil outside the
oil for food program.
The imposition of "smarter" sanctions has arguably come as too little, too late. As the Iraqi regime is welladapted to sanctions, both in terms of political control and its regional and international networks of trade,
clandestine contacts and money laundering, the new measures are unlikely to exact a significant tax on
regime coffers." (Graham-Brown 14 May 2002, in MERIP)
In December 2002, the UN SC extended the 'oil-for-food' programme for 180 days (UN SC 4 Dec 02)
For a chronology of crises between Iraq and UN over arms inspections between 1991 and 1998, see AFP
12 Nov 1998 [Internet]
202
To access the home page of the United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme Oil-for-Food: [Internet]
Little focus on the internally displaced from the United Nations (Oct 02)
•
•
UN-Habitat Survey 2001 is one of the few comprehensive information on IDPs in Iraq generated
by the UN
According to a report by Brookings Institution, UN agencies, the UN Office of the Humanitarian
Coordinator for Iraq, and the UN Office for the Iraqi Program have become intimidated by the
Iraqi government
"As the spokesperson for the UN Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) said, 'The UN under this program does
not deal with IDPs. We are only in Iraq to observe the distribution of supplies. The government of Iraq is
directly responsible for programs for IDPs and I don't believe they have any programs for IDPs. Only in the
three northern governorates do we have specific projects because we are operational.' In response to a query
on assistance to the displaced in Iraq, the World Food Program (WFP), a key observer of the distribution
the OIP spokesperson referred to, commented: 'As for the south, the characteristic lack of information as to
their plight does not allow us to assess the real complexity of the issue.'
It is, however, harder to understand why information on the displaced in the northern governorates, beyond
Baghdad’s control, has also been so limited for so long. This may still be due in part to Baghdad, as any
UN agency capable of gathering information is dependent on the Iraqis for access to the North. There may
also be reluctance within the rival Kurdish authorities to identify the displaced populations, since these
authorities also have had a hand in creating and prolonging some of the displacement. Third, within the UN
agencies operational in Iraq, there is no focal point on displaced persons, no advocate who has made the
IDP cause a primary concern.
Within the United Nations, the primary source of information on the internally displaced in Iraq is the UN
Special Rapporteur for the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq. Holders of this mandate, however, in the two
trips to Iraq they have made over the past decade, have not been allowed by the Iraqi authorities to study
the situation of the displaced first hand. In light of this experience, it is not surprising that the
Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Dis placed Persons, appointed in 1992, has not
sought to visit Iraq; nor has he been invited to visit.
Reports from UN humanitarian agencies, the OIP, and the Secretary-General provide very little information
regarding displaced persons. For the North, reference to the displaced is always in the context of their
shelter needs and the programs to address them. An exception is the UN-Habitat survey published in
January 2001. […]
Privately, we heard of the reasons for this code of silence. UN agencies, the UN Office of the Humanitarian
Coordinator for Iraq (UNOCHI), and the OIP have become intimidated by the Iraqi government. Rank-andfile UN officials in Iraq have seen colleagues expelled or their contracts terminated because their visas were
not renewed. Senior UN officials have not been known to stand up for them. At the same time, in the
North, UN agencies reportedly have engaged in ‘turf wars,’ competing with each other for the sizable funds
that Oil-for-Food makes available. A culture of subservience in the government-held areas and reported turf
wars in the North have combined to undermine humanitarian goals. It is no surprise that, as a result, the
weakest members of Iraqi society, the internally displaced, have fallen through the cracks." (Fawcett &
Tanner, Oct 02, pp3-4)
2001 UN-Habitat IDP Site and Family Survey
"The objective of this survey is certainly that of accounting for the IDP population according to […] the
definition according to which IDPs are all those people that have been displaced in any time against their
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will. The survey aims also to satisfy some more specific policy information needs that will help
international community to develop policies for humanitarian aid. These needs are:
Assessing the magnitude of the IDP phenomenon with reference to the size and location of IDP settlements.
Producing evidence on problems that affect this population and to ascertain vulnerability gradients and
differentials existing among them.
Acknowledging their different biographies and their different needs and expectations, particularly with
respect to on-going resettlement programs.
Making decision makers aware of the groups that are receiving support from humanitarian programs and
the groups that are lacking assistance." (UN-Habitat January 2001, p2)
In the North, UN assistance to IDPs has been spotty according to report by Brookings
Institution (2002)
"In the North, where the UN agencies implement the programs, albeit having to deal with pervasive and
continual Iraqi government obstruction, assistance to the displaced has been spotty.
Food – On the one hand, distribution is to the whole population and a special program has been set up for
those newly displaced until they receive verification of residency and can again access normal monthly
rations. On the other hand, general distribution is impeding local food production. Moreover, the UN
success in the North contrasts with the availability of food to displaced persons in the Center/South where
there have been problems with registration.
Health - According to the UN Habitat survey, tens of thousands of the displaced have no access to regular
health care. The relevant UN agency, the World Health Organization, appears to have no targeted programs
for the displaced. Of the $2 billion worth of health sector materials delivered to Iraq under the Oil-for-Food
program, for which WHO is either the direct implementer or the UN designated observer, none has been
allocated to the long-suffering victims of the chemical weapons attacks, many of whom are displaced.
Shelter - The conditions in the reception camps have improved recently due to the IDP Unit created in
UNOPS. Nonetheless, individual families continue to be housed in tents for months or years. Although,
there is a continual flow of expelled people from Center/South to North, the UN-Habitat settlements are
slow to build and are expensive and culturally inappropriate. They physically and economically isolate the
IDP population, furthering its dependency on UN handouts and the political control of the authorities.
Physical Infrastructure - The infrastructure of the North has shown some dramatic improvements since
the advent of the KRG, and much of this has been due to the Oil-for-Food program. The displaced
population has shared in the general improvement in roads and will share in the general improvements in
electricity supply once the projects are completed. However, the infrastructure of the ‘collective towns,’
inhabited solely by IDPs, has received little attention from UN agencies.
Social Infrastructure - There is little understanding of the nature of the problems specific to IDP families
with special needs and no programs tailored for them." (Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02, p44)
Sanctions raise serious concern at international level despite "Oil-for-food" Program
(1999-2002)
•
The Center for Strategic and International Studies reports that Iraq's GNP had already dropped
before the Gulf War due to the Iran-Iraq War and low oil prices
•
NGOs denounce the high human price paid by the Iraqi population because of the embargo
204
•
•
For ICRC, the 'Oil-for-Food programme' has had some positive effects, but has neither halted the
collapse of the health system, nor improved the economic situation of the population
Several NGOs doubt that the revised sanction regime of May 2002 will improve the humanitarian
situation of the Iraqi population
According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the embargo is not the cause of
Iraq's current economic decline
"Saddam has […] tried to blame most of Iraq's current economic decline on UN sanctions, but Iraq's GNP
dropped much further as a result of the Iran-Iraq War and lower oil prices before the Gulf War began. The
World Bank estimates that Iraq's GDP dropped by an annual average rate of 6.8% during 1980-1990, the
worst economic performance of any of the more than 200 countries it surveys. Iraq also exhausted virtually
all of its national reserves and went deep into debt. Estimates of Iraq's total foreign debt in 1990, including
interest, range from $80 billion to $109 billion.
The increases in Iraq's population interacted throughout this period with the decline in its economy to cut
Iraq's per capita income. Iraq's population increased from 13.2 million in 1980 to 18,4 million in 1990 - an
increase o 38%. Its GNP shrank by well over 65% during the same period. US and World Bank estimates
indicate that Iraq's GNP per capita dropped by well over 50% from the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War to
[the] time [when] Iraq invaded Kuwait.
Any estimates of the trends since the Gulf War must be far more speculative, but CIA, EIA, and World
Bank estimates indicate that Iraq's population increased by another 16% between 1990 and 1997, while its
GNP shrank by at least another 55%. If one examines the impact of nearly two decades of continuous war,
austerity, and sanctions, the Iraqi population rose by more than 50% during 1980-1996, while the GNP
shrank by well over 80." (Cordesman November 1998, p.8)
According to other sources, sanctions have an dire impact on the humanitarian situation
"The sanctions have, according to many international experts, journalists and UN agencies, including the
World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO), crippled Iraq's economic infrastructure and have resulted in the
breakdown of the socio-cultural fabric of the society, acute poverty, malnutrition, wide-spread corruption
and crime, and the reported deaths of over half a million children under the age of five." (AI 24 November
1999, "Background")
'The Oil-for-Food programme' "has done much to alleviate the plight of the civilian population, especially
as regards food and medicines. Malnutrition rates have stabilized since the programme began to be
implemented in 1997. However, it has not halted the collapse of the health system and the deterioration of
water supplies, which together pose one of the gravest threats to the health and well-being of the civilian
population.
Resolution 986 also allows certain equipment to reach Iraq, for example pumps for water treatment. This
does not, however, solve all the problems. The equipment needs to be properly installed and backed up by
more general maintenance work on existing equipment and structures. The government often does not have
the resources to pay for contractors to install it. This has thus become one of the major tasks for
humanitarian organizations in Iraq." (ICRC 14 March 2000, III)
"The overall humanitarian situation in Iraq remained dire despite the expanded 'oil-for-food' program'. In
his March 10 [2000] report to the Security Council on the operation of the program, U.N. SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan noted that 'an excessive number of holds' continued to impede the relief program.
These included holds on contracts in the water and sanitation and electric power sectors, which he stated
were a major factor impeding progress in the area of public health. In his most recent report of September 8
to the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted some improvements in this area, but said that
'infrastructural degradation' of the water and sanitation sector was being exacerbated by "the absence of key
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complementary items currently on hold and adequate maintenance, spare parts and staffing.' As regards the
electricity sector, the report stated that the 'entire electricity grid is in a precarious state and is in imminent
danger of collapsing altogether.' The overall provision of health care and services was said to be in 'steep
decline.' This assessment was supported by the findings of U.N. and other humanitarian agencies." (HRW
December 2000, "Human Rights Developments")
"[The] embargo, unprecedented in its comprehensiveness and now well into its tenth year, has taken an
enormous toll on Iraqi lives and had a ruinous impact on Iraqi society. […]The balance sheet of several
years of sanctions against Iraq reveals a minimum of political dividends as against a high human price paid
primarily by women and children. The food rationing system provides less than 60 percent of the required
daily calorie intake, the water and sanitation systems are in a state of collapse, and there is a critical
shortage of life-saving drugs. […]
The devastating impact of the sanctions is largely a consequence of their unprecedentedly comprehensive
scope and duration, coupled with the fact that their imposition followed the military campaign to compel
Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. This campaign, conducted under the authority conferred by Resolution 678
(1990), included air attacks that crippled most of Iraq's electrical power system. Because of the centrality of
the country's electric power grid to water and sewage treatment, the health care system, agricultural
irrigation, and other vital civilian areas, these attacks have had grave civilian consequences. The embargo,
in turn, has severely impeded the repair and reconstruction of these sectors that together function as a life
support system for most of Iraqi society. More than nine years after the war, it is less and less possible to
resort to the make-shift repairs and cannibalization of parts that for a number of years enabled the country
to keep in operation some of its pre-war stock of generators, transformers, water pumps, and similar sorts of
equipment.
This physical breakdown has been accompanied by the devastation of the country's human resource
infrastructure. Real incomes and purchasing power of the great majority of Iraqis plummeted, leading many
salaried professionals and skilled workers to emigrate or to shift to casual unskilled labor. This systematic
'de-skilling' of the population has been aggravated by the severe intellectual isolation stemming from the
extension of the embargo to cover professional and scientific journals and books as well as travel outside
the country to professional conferences and the like. The damage to the country's physical and human
infrastructure and the acutely distressed income levels of most of the population have seriously
compromised the beneficial impact of a program limited to commodities alone." (HRW 5 January 2000)
"As in war, it is civilians who are the prime victims of sanctions. Salaries are as low as US$2 a month;
there is around 50% unemployment. People have had to sell their belongings in order to survive -- first their
cars, then household appliances, even their books and furniture. Regular school attendance by children
under 15 has fallen drastically since 1990 for 'school does not give us money in order to live'. And in the
schools themselves, pupils often have to squat on the floor for want of chairs and desks. Water pipes have
not been repaired, and there are huge pools of stagnating water in the school yard." (ICRC 14 March 2000,
I)
Several NGOs doubt that the revised sanction regime will improve the humanitarian situation of the
Iraqi population
"CAFOD, the Catholic Aid Agency, says the new economic sanctions on Iraq reflect little more than
cosmetic changes and will do little to help the plight of the ordinary people.
The new UN resolution on economic sanctions focuses on streamlining procedures rather than on radical
change while the number of projects on hold continues to escalate dramatically." (CAFOD 16 May 2002)
"The Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq (CASI) today expressed its disappointment at the failure of UN
Security Council Resolution 1409 to address the humanitarian crisis in Iraq sufficiently. The resolution,
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which implements a revised Goods Review List of 'dual-use' items with effect from 30 May 2002, indicates
the cementing of the US-UK policy of 'smart sanctions' on Iraq.
The resolution is likely to have little effect on Iraq's humanitarian situation." (CASI 15 May 2002)
UNICEF and other organizations highlight reasons for North-South economic
disparities (2000-2002)
•
•
•
•
•
The Oil-for-food program in the South is administered by the Iraqi regime, while in the North it is
under UN responsibility
87% population living in the Center/South have access effectively only to about 53% of the oil for
food money
In the North, the program includes a cash component, through which oil for food money can be
used to pay local labor or to purchase local goods, which is not the case in the Center/South
The North benefits from other elements as well: many international NGOs are present in the
North; the North is the traditional agricultural center of Iraq
According to a SCF UK study in 2002 on Kurdish livelihoods in northern Iraq, sanctions have
almost totally impoverished the population of northern Iraq despite oil-for-food program
"At the political level, the largely Kurdish North functions under the Western protection, and the food,
health, and economic life of the three governorates are managed by local Iraqi Kurdish officials under the
control of the UN. In the Center/South the Iraqi government maintains sovereign control of food rationing,
health infrastructure, the economy, etc., although it remains under close and constant supervision by the
UN. Economically, the North is far more productive: it is the traditional agricultural center of the country,
its border with Turkey is thoroughly porous for both legal and clandestine trade, it has sufficient indigenous
water supplies, officials are permitted to purchase local food and other commodities, and it has access to a
cash component out of its oil for food funds that can be used to hire local workers or buy local materials for
reconstruction. It currently receives a higher per capita amount of money from the oil for food program.
The UNICEF director spent some time explaining to the staff delegation [of the American Friends Service
Committee] the ques tion of disparity in health and other social indicators between the North and
South/Center of Iraq. This has been a consistent issue in U.S. and other policy debates, with the assertion
made that 'the' reason for the discrepancy is the fact that the UN controls distribution in the North, and the
Iraqi regime in the South/Center.
Dr. Rao Singh [UNICEF Director] made clear that the issue arises from a complex set of factors, not any
single issue, and is certainly not only because the UN is responsible in North and Iraq in Center-South.
There are many reasons:
1) There is a significant per capita disparity in oil for food money available for education, infrastructure,
etc. in favor of the North. This is because the 13% component of the oil for food funds reserved for the
North is taken off the top; the Center/South's share is not 87%, but is only what is left over after deducting
the required 30% off the top guaranteed to the Kuwait reparations fund, and the amount deducted to cover
costs of the UN operation. The result is the 87% population living in the Center/South have access only to
about 53% of the oil for food money.
2) In the North, the program includes a cash component, through which oil for food money can be used to
pay local labor or to purchase local goods (food or supplies). In the Center/South, no oil for food money
can be used for local purchases or labor, creating additional problems in transport, installation, and use of
imported goods. Therefore in the North that cash component allows a much more efficient use of money.
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3) Human resources are a serious problem in the Center/South. There are many highly trained professionals
left there still working, but they work for government wages which now average $10/month.
Other UN officials provided additional insight to the complexity of the disparity. Non-governmental
humanitarian organizations with large-scale financial and political support from Western governments,
began working in the North immediately after the Gulf war in 1991; there are now more than 30 agencies
working there. In the Center/South, partly because of Iraqi government restrictions and other difficulties,
most NGOs began working only after 1996, and there are only 11 there now, mostly with much smallerscale resources. Additionally, the North was the traditional agricultural center of Iraq; almost half (48%) of
Iraq's arable land is in the North, populated by only 13% of the people, and locally produced food is far
more abundant. The availability of fresh water is also far higher, and the North's longstanding traditional
agricultural methods were far less vulnerable to coalition bombing during Desert Storm than was the newer
high-tech, industrialized electricity-dependent agricultural systems in the Center/South.
There are certainly related problems having to do with the role of the Iraqi regime. It seems clear that the
government has access to some amount of money (generally thought to be between $300 and $400 million)
obtained from smuggled oil sales. That money is generally not being used for civilian assistance, although
the palace-building projects provide WPA-style construction work for Iraqis, using local cement, local
labor, and payment in local currency. However, it is likely that it is not a sufficient amount of money to be
able to play a major role in the broader sanctions-driven impoverishment." (AFSC 21 March 2000,
"Humanitarian effect of economic sanctions")
"The Save the Children UK study [on Kurdish livelihoods in northern Iraq] concludes that sanctions and
the Oil for Food program have almost totally impoverished the population of Northern Iraq -- raising
dependency levels to internationally unprecedented levels - and that the Government of Iraq is a major
beneficiary of the Oil for Food program, as it manages food distribution. The organisation warned,
however, that any scaling back of the Oil for Food program currently associated with sanctions could "send
Kurds living in Northern Iraq over the edge into a humanitarian catastrophe." (SCF-UK 4 Feb 2002)
Habitat (UNCHS) provides shelter, infrastructure and services activities to internally
displaced persons (1999-2002)
•
•
•
•
United Nations Humanitarian Coordination for Iraq is the ad hoc agency coordinating
implementation of Security Council Resolution 986
Habitat (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements) assists in implementing settlement
rehabilitation component of Oil-for-Food Program
Program gives particular attention to the needs of internally displaced persons and those most
affected by the breakdown of services
According to Habitat, rebahilitation activities in the south of the country started in 2000 but were
slow due to sanctions (2002)
"UNOHCI (United Nations Humanitarian Coordination for Iraq) is the ad hoc agency coordinating
implementation of Security Council Resolution 986. All the UN agencies, apart from UNHCR, are
involved in supervising implementation of the oil-for-food programme in their specific fields through
small-scale but regular programmes." (ICRC 11 June 2001, Sect.1)
"UNCHS (Habitat) was called upon to assist in the implementation of the Settlements Rehabilitation
component of the 'oil for food' agreement between the Government of Iraq and the United Nations. The
agreement allows for attention to be paid to the urgent humanitarian needs of the population affected by the
conflict in the Gulf. Other UN agencies are implementing complementary activities under the programme
in other sectors such as food, health, energy and de-mining.
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The programme gives particular attention to the needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and those
most affected by the breakdown of services, numbering over half a million people. The overall works on
urban and rural services benefit either directly or indirectly the three million people living in the Northern
Governorates. The programme provides integrated packages of infrastructure and services to achieve four
main goals: the resettlement and consolidation of rural villages; the attention to growth centres and towns;
the rehabilitation of infrastructure in urban areas; and, the attention to Internally Displaced Persons. The
programme is implemented in close collaboration with the local authorities and the active participation of
communities and the private sector in all stages from planning to actual execution of work […]
Each of the programme components consists of 'packages' of shelter, infrastructure and services activities
aiming at giving and integrated humanitarian response to the needs of IDPs and rural and urban
communities. The selection of the 'package' of activities to be implemented in each community is carried
out with the participation of the beneficiaries and in consultation with other external support agencies
implementing complementary activities.
The activities included in each package in consultation with the affected communities and local authorities
might include:
i. Rural access roads and ancillary works
ii. Water supply and sanitation
iii. Essential infrastructure (irrigation channels and others)
iv. Buildings for schools and health centres
v. Organisation and capacity building for rehabilitation and operation
vi. Shelter with community participation
Organisation and capacity building activities are an integral part of the community rehabilitation process in
order to ensure its sustainability." (UNCHS December 2000)
"The United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) continued to construct shelters and associated
facilities in the three northern governorates. […]
So far, about 8,000 new houses have been constructed since the start of the programme. The number of
additional houses planned to be built across all three governorates is estimated at about 26,000. These
figures are too low in comparison with the high estimated number of internally displaced persons in the
area. In that regard, the results of the Habitat surveys will be used in devising, through improved planning
and coordination in cooperation with all concerned, an accelerated resettlement strategy that addresses
more precisely the particular needs of the various categories of beneficiaries within viable communities.
The strengthening of local sustainability, the availability of building materials and the maximization of
local construction industry ouput are also factors in this programme. […]
A total of 150 families, previously living in most deplorable conditions at a temporary camp at Kani
Shaitan in the governorate of Sulaymaniyah, have since December been moved to new houses constructed
by Habitat in nearby Chamchamal. Habitat is planning to construct additional houses in Chamchamal for
priority allocation to the approximately 50 families remaining in Kani Shaitan. Local authorities have
demolished the camp and are planning to close off the area completely once the remaining eligible families
have been housed in Chamchamal town." (UN SC 2 March 2001, para. 135-137)
The case of Dal da Ghan, village of Northern Iraq
"During the Iraqi Anfal campaign about 4000 villages like this one [Dal da Ghan, northern Iraq] were
forcibly depopulated, burned to the ground and dynamited by government troops. In some cases soldiers
burned down the trees, and relocated the inhabitants to camps away from the borders with Iran and Turkey.
You can still see the ruins of village after village along the highways. Dan da Ghan itself was destroyed in
1987.
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The reconstruction of Dal da Ghan is part of a virtual UN welfare state in northern Iraq. Over the last few
years the UN Habitat program scouted out villagers who were willing to return. The program spent about
US $24,000 to provide the village with materiel to build houses, schools, roads and water facilities."
(Aquila Lawrence, Summer 2000)
Construction activities in the south of Iraq
"Par suite des sanctions imposées par les Nations Unies sur l'Iraq, beaucoup d'activités de construction ont
été suspendues. Malgré de grands efforts de réhabilitation, les réseaux de traitement des eaux et
d'approvisionnement en eau et les systèmes d'élimination des eaux usées ont été réduits à moins de la
moitié de leur capacité. L'effet de la dislocation des services sur les populations urbaines qui se concentrent
dans certains quartiers de Bagdad deviennent catastrophiques. Les conditions de vie se sont détériorées et
les risques de maladies se sont accrus. Il faut des processus novateurs pour améliorer les conditions de vie
dans les quartiers, s'appuyant sur la participation des communautés, en partenariat étroit avec les autorités
locales. […]
Le projet consiste en un schéma pilote de réhabilitation communautaire qui est mis en œuvre dans deux
communautés choisies de Bagdad, Shu'lla et Habibia." (UN-Habitat 2002)
WFP distributes food to the internally displaced in northern Iraq and observes
adequacy of rations in government-controlled area (2000-2002)
•
•
WFP distributes food to all 3.5 million inhabitants of Northern Iraq, including to IDPs
Some new IDPs said they lacked a ration card and could therefore not access the food distribution
system
•
According to an SCF survey in 2002, 60 percent of the population in Northern Iraq is dependent
on the WFP food ratio
WFP also runs special income generation projects targeting internally displaced persons
•
"WFP distributes food to all 3.5 million inhabitants of Northern Iraq. The IDPs are included in this
distribution. WFP has two programs to benefit the displaced: supplemental feeding for all malnourished
people and a one-time food distribution to the victims of Arabization upon their arrival in the North."
(Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02, p21)
"In the areas under the control of the two Kurdish authorities (PUK and KDP), the UN's World Food
Program (WFP) is responsible for food distribution. The system has worked reasonably well though
persistent complaints have been heard about newly displaced persons lacking their ration card not being
able to access the distribution and second that the quality of food distributed is often poor.[…]
In the areas under the control of the Iraqi government, the distribution of the food rations is done by the
Ministry of Trade of the Iraqi government. The UN is limited to an observation role." (CHC 15 Nov 02)
According to an SCF survey in 2002, "60 percent of the population in Northern Iraq is dependent on the
World Food Program (WFP) food ration with insufficient alternatives if the food ration is withdrawn or if
the Oil for Food programme is stopped." (SCF 17 Dec 02)
To view SCF survey from February 2002, please see reference below.
"The WFP operation in Iraq includes both participation in the general food distribution to the Iraqi
population under Security council resolution (SCR) 986 and a Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
(PRRO) [Iraq 6085.00] targeted to malnourished children, their families, patients in hospitals and residents
in social institutions. Under SCR 986, also known as the 'oil for food' agreement, WFP is responsible for
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observing the equity, efficiency, and adequacy of the ration throughout Iraq, and for conducting distribution
of commodities to 3.1 million people [including displaced persons] in the three northern autonomous
governorates." (WFP 2000)
"While WFP assisted IDPs under different EMOPs in the aftermath of Gulf war, IDPs are no longer a WFP
category of beneficiaries under SCR 986 and the general food distribution scheme as, according to the
MOU between the UN and the GOI, every person residing in Iraq is entitled to food ration regardless of
status [...]
[The] food need [of the internally displaced persons] is fully met through the WFP safety food basket net .
Hence we can say that WFP feeds all 800,000 IDPs in Northern Iraq . IDPs major needs , mostly unmet, are
houses, water, sanitation, drainage system, electricity etc.
WFP considers IDPs among the most vulnerable of all the beneficiaries. Hence, in addition to general food
distribution to all IDPs, all WFP household food security/income generation interventions (about $ 6
million) started in 1999 are targeted to IDPs, particularly Female Headed Households. This include small
ruminant projects, backyard poultry projects and gardening projects . These interventions enable
households to supplement the general food ration ( eggs , meat , vegetable etc..) and generate some income
to meet other needs." (WFP February 2001)
UN Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator will be focal point on IDPs (2003)
"In Iraq, the Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq is headed by WFP official, Ramiro Lopes da
Silva who took over from another WFP official, Tun Myat, in July 2002." (Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02, p7)
The Humanitarian Coordinator has been designated as IDP focal point.
UN Human Rights bodies condemn forced displacement from Kirkuk and other human
rights violations in Iraq (2000-2002)
•
•
•
•
Government challenged the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to
provide evidence of allegation of forcible expulsion
UN Commission on Human Rights urged government to stop practice of forced deportation and
relocation (April 2000 and April 2001)
Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights on Iraq is gathering evidence of
forced displacement from Kirkuk
UN Special Rapporteur finally allowed in Iraq in Feb 2002; last visit of Special Rapporteur was in
1992
"The practice of forcible expulsions of thousands of families on the basis of their ethnic origin violates
Iraq's obligation under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD), to which it acceded in 1970. Article 2(1a) of CERD states that 'Each State Party
undertakes to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination against person, groups of persons or
institutions and to ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national and local, shall act in
conformity with this legislation'. In its 14th periodic report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination in February 1999 Iraq denied that it had expelled non-Arab families. It stated that 'The
Government of Iraq categorically refutes the allegation that it has forcibly expelled non-Arab ethnic groups
and requests the Committee to provide it with the factual evidence substantiating that allegation.' [
CERD/C/320/Add. 3 - Periodic Report of Iraq, page 9.]." (AI 24 November 2000, "Forcible expulsion")
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"The Special Rapporteur [of the UN Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in
Iraq] asked those alleging [that non-Arab resident of the Kirkuk area are driven from their homes by the
Government] to supply him with a list of the families who left the Kirkuk area, containing names,
addresses, circumstances and date of departure from Kirkuk, copy or mention of any legal documents
invoked or served on them, and information on circumstances connected with their relocation, as well as
information as to who moved into their abandoned residences." (UN GA 14 August 2000, para.51)
"A significant breakthrough was achieved in the context of the relations with the Government of Iraq when
the Government, in January 2002, announced that it would accept a visit to Iraq by the Special Rapporteur,
who eventually undertook a mission to the country from 11 to 15 February 2002. […]
The Special Rapporteur appreciates this positive response from the Government to his repeated requests for
a visit. He sees this initial mission as an exploratory one, the main purpose of which was to set the stage
for future cooperation. Owing to the short notice prior to the mission, as well as the short duration of the
visit, the Special Rapporteur decided that only a limited number of pre-selected human rights issues could
be raised.
The Special Rapporteur is pleased that contacts with the Government were established and that mechanisms
and procedures for communications with the Government regarding allegations of violations of human
rights were put in place during the mission. The success of the dialogue will depend on the continued
cooperation of the Government. The ultimate measure of success will be the successful implementation of
recommendations submitted by the Special Rapporteur.[…]
[…] the Special Rapporteur continued to receive from various sources a number of written allegations of
human rights violations. Allegations of violations committed by the Government covered a very broad
range of issues, including arbitrary and extrajudicial execution, cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment and
punishment, restrictions on religious and political freedom, forced displacement of ethnic minorities and
“arabization”, and forced military recruitment. The Special Rapporteur plans to investigate these
allegations further in the context of the new mechanisms and procedures established with the Government
of Iraq in this regard." (CHR 15 March 2002, Introduction)
Following his visit to Iraq, the Special Rapporteur noted: "Although there has been progress in establishing
a dialogue with the Government, the Special Rapporteur regrets to reiterate that this dialogue has remained
at a far too general level." (UN GA 20 Aug 02, para.24)
"Special rapporteurs are independent experts who report to the annual sessions of the UN Human Rights
Commission, which established the mandate for a rapporteur on Iraq in 1991.
Since then, the Iraqi government has accepted only one visit, which was conducted by the former special
rapporteur Max van der Stoel in 1992." (AFP 12 Feb 2002)
[The Commission on Human Rights] "calls upon the Government of Iraq [t]o respect the rights of all ethnic
and religious groups and to cease immediately its continued repressive practices, including the practice of
forced deportation and relocation, against the Iraqi Kurds, Assyrians and Turkmen, in particular their
deportation from the regions of Kirkuk and Khanaquin, and against the population of the southern marsh
areas, where drainage projects have provoked environmental destruction and a deterioration of the situation
of the civilian population, and to ensure the personal integrity and freedoms of all citizens, including the
Shia population." (CHR 18 April 2000 & 18 April 2001)
The UN General Assembly "Notes with dismay that there has been no improvement in the situation of
human rights in the country;
Strongly condemns:
(a) The systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human
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rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in all-pervasive
repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror;
(b) The suppression of freedom of thought, expression, information,
association, assembly and movement, through fear of arrest, imprisonment,
execution, expulsion, house demolition and other sanctions." (UN GA 27 Feb 2002)
UNOPS and several NGOs conduct mine clearing programs in northern Iraq (20002002)
•
•
UNOPS has an emergency de-mining program with teams in the three northern governorates
UNOPS launched the night phase of the mine action project in northern Iraq in 2002
"Landmines in the north, mostly planted by the Government before 1991, continued to kill and maim
civilians. Many of the mines were laid during the Iran-Iraq War; however, the army failed to clear them
before it abandoned the area. The mines appear to have been planted haphazardly in civilian areas.
Landmines are also a problem along the Iraq-Iran border throughout central and southern Iraq. There is no
information on civilian casualties or the efforts, if any, to clear old mine fields in areas under the central
Government's control. According to reports by the U.N. Office of Project Serv ices, the Mines Advisory
Group, and Norwegian Peoples Aid, over 3,000 persons have been killed in the three northern governates
since the 1991 uprising. The Special Rapporteur repeatedly has reminded the Government of its obligation
under the Land Mines Protocol to protect civilians from the effects of mines. Various nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) continued efforts to remove land mines from the area and increase awareness of the
mine problem among local residents. In December 1998, the Government declared that mine-clearing
activity was subversive and ordered NGO workers performing such activity to leave Iraq. On April 26, a
New Zealander working for the U.N. mine-clearing program in the north was shot and killed by an
unknown assailant who first asked for water and then fired three times at close range." (US DOS 25
February 2000, "Respect for human rights, g.")
"UNOPS is the UN organization which is officially dealing with mines in the autonomous governorates of
Erbil, Dubouk and Sulaimanyah. UNOPS, under UNDP, has established an emergency de-mining
programme with one team of expatriate de-miners stationed in each governorate. The expatriate teams are
training local teams in de-mining techniques and have already started clearing identified fields." (IFRC 5
December 2000, Sect.3)
"UNOPS has been asked by the UN Office of the Iraq Programme to launch the ninth phase of a mine
action project in northern Iraq.[…]
The project will help create a safer environment for farmers and others who depend on the land for their
livelihoods in three northern governorates of the country and complete the implementation of a
comprehensive network of services for victims.
Statistics show that as of the end of August 2001, approximately 27,000 families in 165 communities have
so far benefited from UNOPS-implemented mine-clearance activities. As a result of UNOPS' work, more
than 400,000 kilogrammes of crops were produced in 2001 on cleared land, 34,700 livestock can now graze
safely, 3,300 people have improved water supplies, and 400,000 people near Sulaimaniya have access to
electricity.
According to a UNOPS survey of almost 4,500 communities in the region, about 1,100 of them, mostly in
rural areas, have been affected by the explosive devices. Mines hamper economic development because
they prevent the reconstruction of road networks and power lines, restrict the movement of teachers,
technicians and doctors, and the transport of food and medical aid." (UNOPS 29 Jan 2002)
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Selected NGO & Donor Response
Iraq needs $36 billion for reconstruction 2004-2007
•
•
•
Reconstruction needs today are vast and are a result of years of neglect and degradation of the
country's infrastructure, environment and social services
About $1 billion of these needs are covered by ongoing contracts under the UN Oil-for-Food
programme
The Madrid conference, scheduled for 23 to 24 October 2003, will seek funding from the donor
community to address priority reconstruction and rehabilitation needs
“Iraq needs some $36 billion for reconstruction for the years 2004 to 2007, according to the findings of
United Nations missions to be presented at the Iraqi Donor Conference in Madrid later this month. The
missions were undertaken by the UN Development Group and the World Bank Group with assistance from
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) soon after major combat ended in Iraq and are in addition to the $20
billion the United States-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has said are needed in critical sectors,
including security and oil. According to the missions' findings, Iraq's overall reconstruction needs today are
vast and are a result of years of neglect and degradation of the country's infrastructure, environment and
social services. The assessment notes that not all of the identified needs may require external financing.
Already in 2004, about $1 billion of these needs are covered by ongoing contracts under the UN Oil-forFood programme, through which the sanctions-bound regime of Saddam Hussein was allowed to sell oil for
humanitarian supplies. The Madrid conference, scheduled for 23 to 24 October, will seek funding from the
donor community to address priority reconstruction and rehabilitation needs, focusing on both urgent and
medium-term requirements for supporting sustainable development. In other news, the UN Special
Rapporteur on human rights in Iraq, Andreas Mavrommatis, has delayed a scheduled trip to the country
because of the terrorist attack on UN headquarters there on 19 August. The Rapporteur is to submit a report
to the General Assembly focusing on newly available information about violations of human rights and
humanitarian law by Saddam Hussein's government over many years.” (UN, 3 October 2003)
Schools for Marsh Arabs (December 2003)
•
•
•
Four schools in Al Mijar Al Kabir province are currently undergoing a complete rehabilitation
Schools will provide needed education for four communities of Marsh Arabs
More than twenty schools and two university compound reconstructions have been completed or
are undergoing rehabilitation
"People In Need Foundation, the Czech Republic based NGO, is focusing on the Marsh lands again. After
completion of three water treatment units that provide clean water for over 20,000 people, PINF has taken
on a new project in the education sector.
Four schools in Al Mijar Al Kabir province are currently undergoing a complete rehabilitation. Funded by
IOM/IDP, these schools will provide needed education for four communities of Marsh Arabs. In the Missan
province, the majority of the ex-inhabitants of the central Al Qurna marsh have been displaced along the
Southern and Western dams of the Al-Iz river, the so-called "Mother of Battles river". The river is an
artificial dyke designed to divert water from the marshes.
Together with this project, a similar one is being run in the health sector. PINF sees this as a logical next
step of its activities in the education sector in Missan and Basrah. More than twenty schools and two
214
university compound reconstructions have been completed or are undergoing rehabilitation by PINF.
Projects are generously funded by the IOM and the Czech Government." (PINF, December 2003)
European Commission pledges support for reconstruction efforts (October 2003)
•
•
•
•
•
•
€200 million should be made available from the Community budget for reconstruction
Three factors that will be key to the success of the reconstruction effort:
-Improvement in the security situation
-Involvement of Iraq's neighbours, notably Turkey, Jordan, Syria, the Gulf Co-operation Council
States (GCC) and Iran
-A clear commitment to the establishment of a sovereign Iraqi government
Priorities would include support in areas such as institutional and capacity-building, creating a
social safety net, health, water and sanitation, education and employment
“The European Commission today [1 October 2003] adopted a Communication setting out proposals for the
European Union's position at the Madrid Conference on Reconstruction in Iraq. The Communication
suggests that Europe should offer a consolidated pledge at Madrid, bringing together the contribution of the
Community and individual contributions from the Member States. It is proposed that €200 million should
be made available from the Community budget for reconstruction in Iraq in the initial period up to the end
of 2004. €100 million in humanitarian assistance from the Community budget is already being deployed in
Iraq. The Communication outlines a common approach, stressing that success will depend on three factors:
security, transfer of power to the Iraqi people, and a multilateral framework for reconstruction including the
creation of a multi-donor trust fund. It notes the importance of involving Iraq's neighbours in the
reconstruction process from the start.
Chris Patten, Commissioner for External Relations, said "Whatever the depth of division in the
international community over the war, we all have a stake in a stable, open, democratic Iraq. In Madrid,
Europe will play its part in the international effort to lay the first foundations for bringing about a better life
for the Iraqis under their own representative government. The worrying security situation should not hold
us back from planning for Iraq's political and physical reconstruction. The more international legitimacy we
can bring to this project the more likely it is to succeed".
(…)
The Madrid Conference will aim to reach a consensus on the framework and priorities for international
efforts to boost the reconstruction process and seek financial commitments until the end of 2004. The
Communication sets out three factors that will be key to the success of the reconstruction effort:
An improvement in the security situation
A clear commitment to the establishment of a sovereign Iraqi government
The creation of a transparent and operational multilateral framework for reconstruction
Success will also depend on the involvement of Iraq's neighbours, notably Turkey, Jordan, Syria, the Gulf
Co-operation Council States (GCC) and Iran.
(…)
Priorities for Community assistance would include support in areas such as institutional and capacitybuilding, creating a social safety net, health, water and sanitation, education, employment, as well as the
strengthening of civil society and the protection and promotion of human rights and democracy. Assistance
would be channelled via the United Nations bodies and NGOs and, once established, a Multi-Donor Trust
Fund for Iraq imp lemented by the World Bank and the United Nations. This Trust Fund would operate
separately from, but in co-operation with, the funds managed by the Coalition Provisional Authority.
215
The European Commission today also adopted the necessary budgetary proposal to mobilise €200 million
for the period up to the end of 2004. In the remaining months of 2003 €40 million would be found within
the existing External Relations budget. This is on top of the €100 million in humanitarian aid that ECHO is
implementing in 2003. (…)” (EC, 1 October 2003)
ICRC, IFRC and NGOs are planning assistance to answer the needs of IDPs and other
civilians in case of a conflict in Iraq (2002)
According to Refugees International: "The U.S. government, the U.N. and relief organisations are all
working to find ways to minimise the impact of conflict on civilians.
However, they have been working on parallel, but separate, tracks that don't allow for adequate
coordination. The reasons for this are clear.
The United States doesn't want to reveal details of its war plans. The U.N. is reluctant to look like it is in
league with the United States in planning for a war that Secretary-General Kofi Annan says he hopes can be
avoided.
NGOs don't want to get too close to the military, out of fear that they will appear to be humanitarian agents
of the attacking forces.
Fortunately, the parallel planning processes are beginning to merge; there is increasing dialogue between
among NGOs and the U.N. and increasing contact between NGOs and the U.S. government, although
contacts with the military remain very limited." (Bacon 13 Dec 02)
ICRC
"The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) […] has been building stocks of medicine,
sanitation equipment and blankets inside Iraq, where it has some 30 international staff, and in neighbouring
states." (Reuters 13 Jan 03)
IFRC
"With the increasing threat of war, the Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS) is speeding up preparations for
responding to a possible humanitarian crisis in the country, said its president Dr. Hisham Salman AlSadoon yesterday in Baghdad.
Within weeks, emergency relief items will be available for up to 100,000 people across the country, thanks
to ongoing joint efforts by the IRCS and the International Federation, he announced.
These will include tents, blankets, heaters, kerosene lamps, stove and cooking sets as well as first aid
mobile kits and jerry cans for carrying water. Dr. Al-Sadoon insisted that, in case of a major humanitarian
crisis, "the primary role of the Red Crescent would be to meet the urgent needs of the population during the
first 10 days."" (IFRC 27 Sept 02)
Joint NGO Emergency Prearedness Initiative (JNEPI)
"Mercy Corps and international partner agencies have formed the Joint NGO Emergency Preparedness
Initiative (JNEPI) to coordinate planning and preparedness activities for a possible humanitarian crisis in
Iraq. Based in Amman, Jordan, the consortium is funded by the participating agencies and the US Agency
for International Development.
The JNEPI project was initiated by International Medical Corps, International Rescue Committee, Mercy
Corps, Save the Children/US, and World Vision to serve as a clearinghouse for information gathered by the
agencies through their assessments and experiences in the region." (Mercy Corps 7 Feb 03)
216
International Blue Crescent Relief and Development Foundation (IBC) (based in Istambul)
"We have agreed with the Turkish Red Crescent to deliver the food, blankets and other emergency relief
material to Northern Iraq through their trucks.After the delivery to specific centers in Iraq the staff of our
local partners will distribute the material to the beneficiaries. We have preferred this way because during
the war roads of transport will be closed to all NGO's except TRC. We are free to select the beneficiaries
and not obliged to deliver the material only to TRC camps." (IBC 30 Nov 02)
ICRC & IFRC provide asssistance to the internally displaced population in northern
Iraq (2000-2002)
•
•
•
In northern Iraq, ICRC focuses on providing basic infrastructure to the displaced (water &
sanitation)
In 2000, ICRC provided non-food items to 400 displaced families in southern Iraq
In 2001, IFRC distributed to IDPs in northern Iraq items most needed during cold winter months
such as blankets, kerosene heaters, etc.
ICRC
In 2000, the "ICRC remained concerned about the humanitarian implications of the sanctions on Iraq. To
alleviate the plight of the civilian population, it continued to focus its activities on needs not covered by the
oil-for-food programme." (ICRC 6 July 2001)
"The ICRC's goal in northern Iraq is that internally displaced persons and rural communities in particular
should have access to water and benefit from sanitary conditions in accordance with WHO standards. The
focus is therefore on basic infrastructure such as water-supply systems and sewage-evacuation networks
requiring either maintenance work or emergency repairs. An important criterion for new projects in 2001
will be, apart from the humanitarian needs, that for some reason they cannot be carried out under the oilfor-food programme." (ICRC 11 June 2001)
"In northern Iraq, the water situation improved in a camp for 5,000 displaced persons in arbil following
work by ICRC engineers to extend the internal network and increase the number of water distribution
points. […]
In Iraq thousands of people have been driven from their homes, in particular in northern Iraq where,
according to the authorities, fighting between rival Kurdish factions has displaced some 120,000 people.
Many of the displaced are living in tents, open spaces, or unheated public buildings. In northern Iraq, the
ICRC continued to carry out individual surveys of displaced families, and pursued its cooperation with the
Iraqi Red Crescent for the distribution of non-food items.
In 2000 the ICRC carried out a survey, in cooperation with the Iraqi Red Crescent and local authorities, of
the internally displaced population in southern Iraq. A group of 400 families (2,334 people) was identified
as the most vulnerable and received an ad hoc supply of non-food items). (ICRC 6 July 2001)
"The ICRC's main office is in Baghdad, and there are three offices in northern Iraq (in Arbil, Dohuk, and
Sulaymaniyah). It is thus the ICRC's largest operation in the Middle East." (ICRC 14 March 2000, IV)
"An important development in 2000 was the reopening of an office in the southern city of Basra." (ICRC 6
July 2001)
IFRC
217
In its annual report for 2001, IFRC said that:
"Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees have settled in the northern governorates and live in
precarious conditions in abandoned complexes, tents, schools or other unoccupied buildings. The
vulnerable families needed blankets, heaters, plastic sheeting, kerosene lamps, tents, cooking sets, jerrycans
and water tanks.
Goal [of Disaster Response]
To alleviate the suffering of the most vulnerable refugees, IDPs and returnee population in the three
northern governorates. The total number of beneficiaries was more than 6,500 families in the Duhouk, Erbil
and Suleimaniah governorates. Distributions included the items most needed during cold winter months
such as blankets, kerosene heaters, etc." (IFRC 28 May 2002)
Donors' and international NGOs' activities aim to complement Oil-for-Food Program
(1999-2003)
•
•
EU is the largest donor of humanitarian aid to Iraq and focuses on the center and south of Iraq
CARE & Première Urgence both have projects to house internally displaced persons
EU
ECHO's current criterion for establishing priorities is to provide actions that are comp lementary to the oilfor-humanitarian goods program in favour of the most vulnerable, concentrating on topical sectors where it
would remain useful and cost-effective. In particular, compensation for the lack of 'cash assistance' in the
centre and south ( pop. Mio 19, Baghdad Mio 4) where humanitarian needs are greater than in the north of
the country (pop. Mio 3). A 8,6 million Plan of Action for Iraq for the year 2000 was approved by the
Commission on 19 April 2000. […]
The Plan of Action activities are implemented through various NGOs and UN agencies namely: Care-UK,
Première Urgence (France), Enfants du Monde - Droits de l'Homme (France), Médecins du monde
(France), Netherlands Red Cross, UNICEF and UNHCS (UN Centre for Human Settlements, Habitat)."
(EU 19 February 2001)
"The E.U. remained the largest donor of humanitarian aid to Iraq, with 8.6 million euros allocated for the
year through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)." (HRW December 2000 "The Role
of the International Community")
CARE
"Apart from the United nations and Red Cross, CARE is the only international NGO that has a significant
and active presence in Iraq. CARE International has been working in Iraq since the beginning of the
humanitarian crisis in 1991, meeting the basic humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. Projects have been
funded by various donors including the Government of the UK, Norway, the Netherlands, USA, Australia,
South Africa, the European Union in addition to UNICEF, UN WFP, UNHCR and UNDHA." (CARE 16
December 1998)
"CARE has been actively engaged in various sectors, but most extensively in the areas of water, sanitation,
education and health." (CARE Australia 2001)
"CARE International began working in Iraq in 1991 following the Gulf War. Since that time, CARE is the
only international non-governmental organization to maintain a continuous program in the center and south
of the country. Since 1995, CARE's programs have focused on water and sanitation, health and children,
providing supplementary food and milk to 97 pediatric hospitals. In the past 12 years, CARE's programs
have provided humanitarian assistance to more than seven million people -- approximately one-third of the
population of Iraq." (CARE 31 Jan 2003)
218
Première Urgence
"The situation of [the] displaced populations is particularly precarious since they are not covered by any
governmental programmes. Thousands of families live in great difficulty in unhealthy shelters; unused
barracks, temporary dwellings made of earth or branches, abandoned schools,…
In 1999, Première Urgence started the rehabilitation of community centers to house these displaced
populations. Our objective is not only to provide them with better living conditions, but also to encourage
their integration into the economic and social fabric." (Première Urgence 2000)
NGOs lead relief efforts - Governorate focal points for IDPs
IRAQ - NGOs Lead Relief Efforts
“As the war in Iraq ends, the urgent need for a coordinated international relief effort to mitigate the impact
on the vulnerable civilian population is growing daily. NGOs, whose assistance to internally displaced
persons (IDPs) in the south and centre of the country is being coordinated by IOM, are leading the initial
international response. IOM's role, at the request of the UN and under the overall responsibility of the UN
Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, is to coordinate the efforts of NGOs and others in registering IDPs,
managing camps, distributing non-food items, and eventually helping people to return to their homes.
In order to achieve this, IOM invited leading international NGOs to act as IDP focal points in each of the
15 governorates in the centre and south of Iraq. The network of governorate focal point (GFP) NGOs listed
below will work closely with four IOM area offices, and have agreed to use a standardized, IOM-designed
framework, database and reporting structure to target assistance at the most vulnerable IDPs. Under the
programme, which is supported by USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, IOM can also provide
funding to GFP NGOs to support their activities. It has already agreed a grant to the Norwegian Refugee
Council.
Under UNSECOORD rules, IOM international staff operating from Kuwait, Jordan and Iran are not yet
permitted to overnight in Iraq. But three other members of the GFP network - Premiere Urgence in
Baghdad, Save the Children in Basrah and International Rescue Committee in Kerbala - have already set up
operations in their respective areas.
Each member of the network will work closely with other international and local NGOs working in the
same area. In Baghdad, for example, Premiere Urgence is already coordinating with Islamic Relief, Un
Ponte Per, Life for Relief and Development, Intersos and Médecins Sans Frontières.
While the number of Iraqis internally displaced by the war appears to be far lower than originally feared,
IOM has already identified IDPs in Um Qasr in the south, Badreh in Wasit governorate near the Iranian
border, and Baqubah in Diyala governorate north of Baghdad. There have also been reports of other, post
conflict population displacements in Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk” (IOM, 25 April 2003)
IOM Governorate Focal Points for IDPs
Governorate
Centre
Nineweh
Ta’meen
Salah Ad Din
Baghdad
Anbar
Diyala
Baghdad
Upper South
Focal Point
World Vision International
Norwegian Refugee Council
Concern Worldwide
Lutheran World Federation/Norwegian Church Aid
Danish Refugee Council
Premiere Urgence
219
Najaf
Al Oadussiyah
Wasit
Babil
Kerbala
South
Basrah
Missan
Muthanna
Dhi Qar
Save the Children (US/UK)
Mercy Corps International
Mercy Corps International
Norwegian Refugee Council
International Rescue Committee
Save the Children (US/UK)
Ockenden International
ACTED
GOAL
World Vision plans aid to destitute Iraqis
”World Vision will seek to assist thousands of displaced persons living in dire conditions following postwar population upheavals in northern Iraq. Following a five day assessment mission in Mosul, and
surrounding areas, World Vision senior relief administrator Doris Knochel and commodities officer Mitsu
Ikeda discovered displaced families living in grim, unsanitary conditions. Among them the World Vision
staff found about 550 displaced sleeping in the guard quarters of the former presidential palace in Mosul.
"All they had were some blankets on the concrete floor. They lacked clothes, food, hygiene and a number
of children were sick," Dr Knochel said. "These people have nothing. Something must be done very soon."
The displaced were all Arabs, forced to abandon their homes after they were re-claimed by returning
Kurds.”
“The Kurds were expelled from the same houses, in some cases more than 20 years ago, under a policy of
former president Saddam Hussein. The policy cleared housing areas of Kurds in favour of Arabs struggling
to buy their first homes. In addition to the palace grounds, Dr Knochel and Mr Ikeda found other displaced
living in abandoned buildings and on wasteland in tents made from sacks. In some cases they had no access
to clean water or toilets. "Mothers are very concerned about the health of their children, especially as it just
gets hotter and hotter," Dr Knoechel said. Despite the appalling conditions, Dr Knoechel said all the
displaced she spoke to acknowledged they had no right to remain where they were. "I found it really
encouraging. People acknowledge local rights and customs and these over-rule temporary impositions by a
dictatorship," she said. Dr Knoechel said World Vision was in a good position to assist the displaced with
essential supplies of tents, jerry-cans, hygiene kits, plastic sheeting and water purification tablets, already
pre-positioned across the border in Al Hasakah, Syria. "What we have is exactly what they need," she said.
World Vision will this week begin plans to mo ve the supplies into Iraq and then distribute them.”
“While conducting food needs assessments, the World Food Programme estimated there could be up to
150,000 displaced in Niniveh. In addition to those returning houses to Kurds, other displaced people have
fled Kurdish areas to start a fresh life in the governorate. A majority of displaced have found
accommodation with family members, placing a strain on a vulnerable populace. World Vision's
assessment mission identified several other areas where the agency may offer practical assistance in the
governorate. They included repairing looted and damaged schools, repairing looted workshops for the
disabled, establishing feeding programmes in kindergartens and providing medicines to hospitals
desperately short of supplies. World Vision will also look into reports of malnourished children.”
(World Vision, 6 May 2003) see http://www.wvi.org/home.shtml
220
Alliance Internationale pour la Justice (AIJ) organized a Conference on Iraqi refugees
and IDPs (July 2002)
Agenda related to Internal Displacement:
"The displacement of Kurds, Turkmens, Assyrians and Shias, by Françoise Brié, International Alliance for
Justice
The situation of displaced persons in Kurdistan, by Nasreen M. Sideek Barwari, Minister of the Kurdish
Regional Government
The Displacement of Kurds and others in the Kirkuk Region, by Dr. Nouri Talabany, Kiruk Trust for
Research and Studies (United Kingdom)"
(AIJ 4 July 2002)
References to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
Known references to the Guiding Principles (as of January 03)
•
•
•
•
Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation
Other References to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages
Training on the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation
None
Other References to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
None
Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages
The GP are available in Arabic.
Documents:
GP in Arabic [Internet]
Training on the Guiding Principles
Workshop on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
Amman, 10-12 November 2003 for humanitarian workers in charge of programmes for Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Iraq
221
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
CERD
CIA
ECHO
EIA
EU
FAO
GNP
HROI
ICRC
IDP
IFRC
INC
KDP
KDPI
OIP
PKK
PRRO
PUK
SCIRI
SCR
Sfr.
UNCHR
UN-Habitat or UNCHS
UNDP
UNICEF
UNMOVIC
UNSCOM
USCR
UXO
WFP
WHO
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
Central Intelligence Agency
European Community Humanitarian Office
Energy Information Administration
European Union
United nations Food and Agriculture Organization
Gross National Product
Human Rights Organization in Iraq
International Committee of the Red Cross
Internally Displaced Person
International Federation of the Red Cross
Iraqi National Congress
Kurdish Democratic Party
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran
United Nations of the Iraq Program
Kurdistan Workers' Party
Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
Security Council Resolution
Swiss Francs
United Nations Commission on Human Rights
United Nations Center for Human Settlements
United Nations Development Program
United Nations Children's Fund
United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission
United Nations Special Commission
U.S. Committee for Refugees
Unexploded Ordnance
World Food Program
World Health Organization
222
LIST OF SOURCES USED
(alphabetical order)
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 18 August 2003, UNDP allocating 400 million dollars to
return displaced to Kirkuk
Internet
:
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/9155DA6072FF73DEC1256D870045A48D
,
accessed 3 October 2003
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 19 May 2003, Marsh Arabs destroy Saddam's dykes to
revive ancient way of life
Internet
:
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/a6df338ba863
e16dc1256d2b004c06f6?OpenDocument , accessed 24 May 2003
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 2 January 2003, Iraqi Kurds complain of lack of UN help
to prepare for war fallout
Internet
:
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/e5eed66262
a502d7c1256ca2005c2f33?OpenDocument , accessed 24 February 2003
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 21 May 2003, Coalition setting up body to settle
increasing property disputes in Iraq
Internet
:
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/079ca8af5125
3b9bc1256d2d0050addf?OpenDocumentaccessed 24 May 2003
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 22 May 2003, SC ends 13 years of UN sanctions on Iraq
Internet
:
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/8c32eb7b471c
804ec1256d2e0051a050?OpenDocumentaccessed 29 May 2003
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 27 November 1999, Iraqi refugee families in Baghdad
taken back to provinces
Internet
:
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/80b41d1f61
496691c1256838003bc924?OpenDocument , accessed 30 January 2001
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 29 January 2003, WFP stocks food for 900,000 Iraqis
ahead of possible conflict
Internet
:
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/4ceb048d5d
a446dbc1256cbd0055312f?OpenDocument , accessed 24 February 2003
223
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 29 September 2003, Arab homes on Kurdish lands fuel
ethnic rivalries in northern Iraq
Internet
:
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/ca5efa39858
e491dc1256db0003c5d3f?OpenDocument , accessed 3 October 2003
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 31 October 2003, Post-war Baghdad homeless brace for
chilly winter
Internet
:
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/aabf06571ef
57b53c1256dd0003cd76d?OpenDocument , accessed 20 January 2004
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 6 October 2003, Iraqi Governing Council to meet
Tuesday on constitution
Internet
:
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/82fbde836e
bdf4a4c1256db70042ef4b?OpenDocument , accessed 12 October 2003
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 7 October 2003, Communal tensions high in Iraq after
Baghdad fell
Internet
:
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/cd98a8dcef4b
7c33c1256db8004bbbcf?OpenDocument , accessed 8 October 2003
al-Khafaji, Isam, 24 January 2001, Almost Unnoticed Interventions and Rivalries in
Iraqi Kurdistan
Internet : http://www.merip.org/pins/pin44.html , accessed 24 July 2001
Aljazeera, 18 January 2004, Kirkuk: Harbinger of Iraq's future
Internet
:
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/EF7F7036-B436-4079-B8846286097E544D.htm , accessed 6 February 2004
Aljazeera, 2 January 2004, Ethnic violence threatens northern Iraq
Internet
:
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/F923E4BB-8045-44FC-9A85FBA2AB1BC896.htm , accessed 6 February 2004
Aljazeera, 5 February 2004, Iraq: Still in the dark
Internet
:
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/3B59D75D-EF48-4805-85974A8819EFF585.htm , accessed 5 February 2004
Alliance Internationale pour la Justice (AIJ), 20 December 2002, Irak : épuration
ethnique continue et silencieuse
Internet : http://www.a- i-j.org/pdf/irak3501fin.pdf , accessed 18 February 2004
Alliance Internationale pour la Justice (AIJ), 4 July 2002, International Conference on
Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
224
AMAR International Charitable Foundation, 21 May 2001, Iraqi Marshlands:
Prospects (Draft)
Internet : http://www.amarappeal.com/documents/Draft_Report.pdf , accessed 24 July
2001
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), 2000, Sectarian Diversity - the Kurds
and the Shi'ites
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), 21 March 2000, Congressional staffers'
Iraq trip report
Internet
:
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d741a9852568ab007b606d?OpenDocument , accessed 30 January 2001
Amnesty International (AI), 15 August 2002, Iraq: Systematic torture of political
prisoners
Internet
:
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/MDE1400801.pdf , accessed 5 June 2001
Amnesty International (AI), 2000, Annual Report 2000, Iraq
Internet
:
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0552932?OpenDocument , accessed 30 January 2001
Amnesty International (AI), 2001, Report 2001: Iraq
Internet
http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2001.nsf/webmepcountries/IRAQ?OpenDocument
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:
,
Amnesty International (AI), 22 April 2003, Iraq: People come first - Protect human
rights during the current unrest - 10-point appeal
Internet : http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE140932003 , accessed 15 May
2003
Amnesty International (AI), 24 November 1999, Victims of systematic repression
Internet : http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/MDE140101999 , accessed 30
January 2001
Amnesty International (AI), 3 May 2003, Amnesty International urges Bush and Blair
to intervene in relation to "disappeared"
Internet : http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE141082003 , accessed 3 May
2003
Associated Press, 10 February 2004, Kurdish Refugees Seek Return to Iraq
225
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:
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aq_kurds_return_2&printer=1 , accessed 12 February 2004
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