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N° SPECIAL 2007/01
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DOCTRINE
# SPECIAL
2007/01
general military review
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS AND FORCES
MULTINATIONAL
OPERATIONS AND FORCES
C.D.E.F
Forces Employment
Doctrine Center
DOCTRINE
FRENCH
COMMANDERS
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Table of contents
SPECIAL ISSUE MN COMMAND
Directeur de la publication :
Général (2s) Jean-Marie Veyrat
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS AND FORCES COMMAND
Rédactrice en chef :
Lieutenant Marie-Noëlle Bayard
Tél. : 01 44 42 35 91
PERSUASION AND TRUST
LESSONS LEARNT FROM MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
Capitaine Grégoire de Montmorillon
(Rédacteur en chef par intérim)
Tél. : 01 44 42 47 57 ou 01 44 42 35 91
- Multilateral interoperability program tactical C2IS,
interoperability requirement (version 3.1 dated March
14, 2005).
p. 3
AND FORCES COMMAND
CONSTANTS AND PROMINENT FEATURES
- SIC 603 / volume 1: Manual for the employment of
operational information systems - operational system
of information (2002 issue).
p. 4
AN HISTORICAL BASIS
Relecture des traductions :
Colonel (ER) Philippe Jolly
Maquette : Christine Villey
Tél. : 01 44 42 59 86
Création : amarena
Crédits photos :
ECPAD (1ère de couverture)
CCH Jean-Jacques Chatard
SIRPA Terre (4e de couverture)
Diffusion : Etablissement
de Diffusion, d’Impression
et d’Archives du Commissariat
de l’Armée de Terre de Saint-Etienne
Impression : Point d’impression
de l’Armée de Terre
de Saint-Maixent-l’Ecole
Tirage : 2 000 exemplaires
Dépôt légal : à parution
ISSN : 1293-2671 - Tous droits
de reproduction réservés.
Revue trimestrielle
Conformément à la loi
«informatique et libertés» n° 78-17
du 6 janvier 1978,
le fichier des abonnés à
DOCTRINE a fait l’objet d’une
déclaration auprès de la CNIL,
enregistrée sous le n° 732939.
Le droit d’accès et de rectification
s’effectue auprès du CDEF.
Centre de Doctrine
d’Emploi des Forces BP 53 - 00445 ARMEES.
Fax : 01 44 42 52 17 ou 821 753 52 17
Web : www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr
Mel : [email protected]
A Short Chronological Survey
p. 6
The Allied Armies on the Oriental Front and the Learning of Multinationality (1915 -1918)
p. 8
- SIC 603 / volume 2: Manual for the employment of
operational information systems - contribution of an
operational system of information in the operational
decision-making process (2002 issue).
p. 11
Command Organization
French General Officers in Multinational Forces or Operations
The Imaginary Account of Ferdinand Foch, Maréchal de France, Field Marshal
of Great Britain and Poland, the First Allied Commander and the Man of the 1918 Victory
Level 1 HQ
- TTA 956: Structures of operational command for forces
in operation (pending drafting).
ACCOUNT OF FRENCH GENERAL OFFICERS WHO COMMANDED A MULTINATIONAL
FORCE OR OPERATION
General (Ret) COT, Former Commander of the UNPROFOR
from July 1st 1993 to March 15th 1994
p. 14
Lieutenant General (Ret) SOUBIROU, Former Commanding General
of the RRF Multinational Brigade in Bosnia from July to October 1995
p. 22
- Circular 2350 dealing with national procedures for
administrative and logistic support of a land force in an
overseas operation (July 23, 2005).
- Manual for organizing and running a level 2 HQ (July
2004 issue, version 5).
- SIC 603 / volume 4: Manual for employment of
operational information systems - information system
of a division (provisional release 2003).
- SIC 903 : Manual for employment of divisional
information systems (2001 issue).
Level 3 HQ
- Manual for organizing and running a level 3 HQ
(2001 issue).
- SIC 603 / volume 3: Manual for employment of
operational information systems - information system
of a brigade (2002 issue).
- SIC 904: Manual for employment of CIS in a generic
combined arms brigade (2005 issue).
- LCC HQ handbook (July 1999).
- SIC 902: Manual for employment of level 1 CIS
(2002 issue).
General (Ret) RIDEAU, Former Commanding Officer of the Multinational
Division South East (MNDSE) in Bosnia from December 1995 to May 1996
p. 30
General (Ret) (UK) JACKSON, Former Commander of NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)
from June to october 1999
p. 36
Lieutenant General de KERMABON, Former Commanding General
of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) from September 1st 2004 to September 1st 2005
p. 42
Major General MARAL, Former Commander of the European Union Operation
in Macedonia (CONCORDIA), from March 31st to December 15th 2003
p. 48
Major General NEVEUX, Former Commanding General of Operation “ARTEMIS”
in the Democratic Republic of Congo from June to September 2003
p. 54
Lieutenant General PY, Former Commanding General of the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) from August 2004 to February 2005
p. 62
Vice Admiral (Ret) MAZARS, Former Commander, Task Force 150 (TF 150)
p. 68
SOME DOCTRINAL DOCUMENTS ABOUT COMMAND
OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
p. 74
This Doctrine's special issue has been achieved by the CDEF/DREX (Forces
Employment Doctrine Center/Research & Lessons Learned Division), and especially
Col Billières head of the AAR section for the accounts by general officers, Lt Col Goya
from the lessons learned branch, Lt Col Cario, Cpt Vitry and Ltn (Res) Lasconjarias
from the research section for the other documents.
SIRPA TERRE
Traductions :
Colonel (CR) Robert Travaillot
LCL (CR) Jean-Claude Laloire
LCL (CR) Daniel Sillon
LCL (CR) Jacques de Vasselot
LCL (CR) Alain Pérignon
LCL (CR) Donatien Lebastard
Level 2 HQ
FÉVRIER 2007
75
DOCTRINE NUMÉRO SPÉCIAL
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SPECIAL ISSUE MN COMMAND
Multinational Operations
and Forces Command
Persuasion and Trust
or a period of time, History seemed to have
put aside the French general officers from
multinational operational command
performance. It brought them back. And in
numbers. From this renewal, from this
increasingly growing experience, it has
appeared to be beneficial to draw their most
prominent features and their constants so that
they can help those who will have in the future
to assume such responsibilities and those who
will have to assist them, their staff officers.
C•D•E•F F
Beginning in 1992, French general officers
assumed command of multinational forces
that deployed to this Balkan Europe from where
the Great War storm started. These troops wear
the UN blue helmet and operate at
the same rhythm as this organization which
aims at only one objective: maintain a peace
that nevertheless does not yet exist. But this
peace seems to have a price that number of
contributing countries seem not ready to pay.
However, dramatic events pressure induce
the multinational forces to shift from a less and
less possible peace keeping process to a peace
enforcement that only a powerful military force
and a determined political commitment seem
able to promote. The United Nations are relayed
by NATO. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, IFOR replaces
UNPROFOR, then, in 1999, NATO intervenes
again in Kosovo with KFOR. French general
officers are part of it. They are also in command
of European forces that the Union has
committed in Macedonia and in Congo in 2003.
First commanders of allied forces in a war torn
Europe on the Eastern and Western fronts in
the beginning of the twentieth century, French
general officers thus resume assuming
multinational commands in operations, from
which the 1940 defeat, the withdrawal from
NATO and tens of years of Cold War had kept
them away.
Many decades later, they recover the
experience of the Sarrail, Guillaumat, Franchey
d’Esperey and Foch who, beginning in 1915, had
to face the difficulties of commanding allied
armies. Like them, they realise that inside a
coalition, the command of armies very different
from one another cannot be performed through
the only simple process working in their own
army. A fair execution of orders diversely
understood and interpreted cannot be
guaranteed. With Maréchal1 Juin, who was
commander in chief of the allied land forces in
Central-Europe in 1951, they may have
sometimes proclaimed: “You don’t know what it
is to work with a coalition army”.
Through the reflections of eight of them, this
special issue of Doctrine is dedicated to those
commanding generals. Our armed forces have
to take advantage of the lessons learnt they
draw from the different commands they
assumed, the difficulties they had to face, the
convictions they share with us, at a time in the
history when multinational operations become
the normal framework of the military
commitments. It seemed wise to join the
contribution of an allied officer, General
Jackson, the former British Army Chief of Staff,
who was twice in command of NATO forces, in
Bosnia and then in Kosovo.
Like Maréchal Foch, everybody can appropriate
the idea that, in such circumstances, nothing
can be obtained from the allied forces we have
under our command “otherwise than through
persuasion, and in a perfectly maintained
climate of trust”.
Brigadier General Vincent DESPORTES
Commander, Forces Employment
Doctrine Center
1 General of the Army in US Army.
FEBRUARY 2007
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Lessons Learnt
from Multinational Operations
and Forces Command
Constants and Prominent Features
R
eading the reflections this issue of Doctrine
consists in, allows to perceive the pattern of
the multinational forces operational commands
assumed by French general officers. The following short
sum up aims at outlining their constants and prominent
features.
THE APPOINTMENT, THE PARTICIPATION
IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE AND ITS DEPLOYMENT
The decisive point remains the emergency of the
operational situation. In most cases, the operation or
force commanders consider that their advices have been
sought and that they have been able to prepare
themselves, some of them a long time in advance when
it was for a relief. Nevertheless all point out that it
demands a firm willingness from their own to find the
information they need and obtain appointments with
the high military and civilian authorities. When France is
the “framework nation”, this building up seems to be a
little easier. However, the political choices of each one
of the concerned nation remain the basic issues for the
volume of the force, the date and the location of the
deployment.
THE CHAIN OF COMMAND
It is always complex although it is theoretically clearly
formalized, as it is the case within NATO.
The commander would sometimes be tempted to bypass some part of the chain - some do it - but always for
operational effectiveness reasons. A multinational force
commander is always quartered between an always
present national command and the operational
authority he depends of on the theater. He is the only
one managing these sometimes contradictory
imperatives.
DOCTRINE SPECIAL ISSUE
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FEBRUARY 2007
FORCES AND WEAKNESSES OF MULTINATIONALITY
As a whole, multinationality is considered a necessary
evil. An important force cannot be only national
anymore; and the participation, even reduced, of some
countries cannot be ruled out. This gives to these
countries a political existence at international level and,
sometimes provides the force some added value in
scarce specific capabilities (helicopters, aircrafts,
medical support...).
But multinationality finds its limits: on the tactical plan,
as soon as the operation rises to some intensity, it
cannot go down lower than the brigade level, and it
seems fundamental to keep the battalions homogenous.
Some people raise the threshold at the upper level in
case of war operations. The national restrictions, the
“caveats”, are real “poison” for the military leader who
can have them changed only with a lot of difficulties.
The ROEs of a multinational force are generally levelled
at the lowest common capability - generally speaking,
the legitimate defense; but they seldom survive
the first serious clash.
INTELLIGENCE
There is unanimity in this domain. Within a multinational
force, information is shared, not intelligence. Each nation
operates its National Intelligence Cell (NIC) who works for
his countrymen. The same phenomenon appears at the
upper level between the NATO intelligence and the EU
intelligence when these two organizations co-exist on
the same theater (Bosnia, Macedonia). Even among the
French, the issue remains complex. A military leader often
finds it very difficult to federate the actions conducted by
the Gendarmerie, the CIMIC guys, the Directorate, Military
Intelligence (“DRM”), the Brigades S2s and sometimes
the Special Operations Forces Command.
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SPECIAL ISSUE MN COMMAND
INTEROPERABILITY
The difficulties in this domain must not be overestimated: interoperability is a way of being more
efficient, not an objective per se. The operational
function most concerned is the CIS’. Most of operation
or force commanders have solved their problems very
rapidly, especially by sending liaison officers to
the adjacent units and HQs.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
Great progress have been made in this domain and
everybody recognizes that the support of a
multinational force works smoothly. There is a simple
reason: people share in common what they can do
easily (fuel, air transport...) and the remaining rests
in the national support responsibility (maintenance,
medical support, soldiers specific military supplies). In
this respect French logistics have often been mentioned
for their outstanding performances and flexibility.
The result is some redundancy that some people grieve
over, but it is the price to pay for the force to be fully
operational.
The level of knowledge in English language improves
every year. Yet the requested level is higher in NATO
than elsewhere.
THE POLITICO-MILITARY ROLE OF THE COMMANDER
Undoubtedly, each one admits that the commander has
both a military and a political role to play. But the
general officers differ in the importance they give to
each role compared to the other. Some insist upon their
role as a military leader, others on their political one.
Indeed it will always be so, because it is a question of
circumstances. However the political aspect increases
when on the considered theater, the level shifts from
tactical to operational.
OFFICIERS EDUCATION
The inserted French officers have not to be ashamed of
the duty they perform within an allied staff. Being hard
working and keen to apprehend the situations, they
may be favourably compared to other nations members.
FEBRUARY 2007
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AN HISTORICAL BASIS
French General Officers
in Multinational Forces or Operations
A Short Chronological Survey
S
ince conflicts in the Balkans have burst out in 1991,
many French general officers commanded multinational
forces committed on the European territory but also on
other overseas territories; among them, we have to mention
Afghanistan and some African countries in particular.
Indeed, in the past, several former commanders also had
had allied forces under their command, in particular during
WWI.
The purpose of this special issue consists in drawing
lessons learned by some of these general officers from
their command and control action.
World War I:
- From October 1915 to November 1918: General SARRAIL,
GUILLAUMAT and FRANCHET d’ESPEREY, who successively
commanded the allied forces on the Oriental front.
- On April 14th, 1918: General, then General of the Army
FOCH, supreme allied commander of the allied forces in
France, then also in Italy.
Cold War (NATO):
- 1951: General JUIN, who commanded the North Atlantic
Organization’s allied land forces in Central Europe.
- 1953-1954: the authority of General of the Army JUIN is
extended to Air forces and Naval forces. He became the
1st French CINCENT (Commander-in-Chief in Central Europe)
before General Valluy, Challe, Jacquot and Crépin, who was
the last one in 1966.
First Gulf War, Kuwait - Iraq - UNO:
- 1990: General ROQUEJEOFFRE, who commanded operation
DAGUET in Kuwait.
- From September 22nd, 1990 to January 16th, 1991: General
MOUSCARDES, who commanded the French forces during
operation Desert Shield.
- From January 17th, 1991 to February 08th, 1991: General
MOUSCARDES, who commanded the French forces during
operation Desert Storm (DAGUET Division).
- From February 08th, 1991 to February 28th, 1991: General
JANVIER, who commanded the French forces during
operation Desert Storm (alongside with the 2nd brigade,
82nd (US) airborne division and the 15th US
artillery brigade under his operational
control).
Cambodia - UNO:
From November 1991 to March 1992:
General LORIDON, who commanded
operation UNAMIC (United Nations
Advanced Mission in Cambodia).
Bosnia - UNO:
ECPAD
From 1992 to 1996, the commanders of
the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) were as follows:
- From September 1992 to June 30th, 1993:
General MORILLON.
- From July 1st, 1993 to March 15th, 1994:
General COT.
- From March 16, 1994 to February 1995:
General de LAPRESLE.
- From March 1st, 1995 to January 1996:
General JANVIER.
- June 1995: General SOUBIROU, who
commanded the Rapid Reaction Force
(RRF)’s multinational brigade.
DOCTRINE SPECIAL ISSUE
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SPECIAL ISSUE MN COMMAND
Bosnia - NATO:
From 1996 to 2003, the deputy commanders of the
Stabilization Force (SFOR) were as follows:
- From November 1996 to April 1997: General WAYMEL.
- From April 197 to May 1998: General MANSUY.
- From April 1998 to April 1999: General ELIE.
- From May 1999 to June 2000: General de MONCHY.
- From June 2000 to June 2001: General DUBURG.
- From June 2001 to June 2002: General de GOESBRIAND.
- From June 2002 to June 2003: General MEYER.
From 1995 to 2002, the commanders of the Multinational
Division - South-East (MND-SE) were as follows:
- From December 1995 to May 1996: General RIDEAU.
- From May 1996 to December 1996: General de LAMBERT.
- From December 1996 to July 1997: General LE CHATELIER.
- From July 1997 to March 1998: General DELANGHE.
- From March 1998 to March 1999: General LANG.
- From May 1999 to June 2000: General MEILLE.
- From June 2000 to June 2001: General AMARGER.
- From June 2001 to June 2002: General SOMMAIRE.
From 2002 to 2005, the commanders of the Multinational
Brigade - South-East (MNB -SE) were:
- From November 2002 to March 2003: General OBERTO.
- From November 2004 to October 2005: General CHEREAU.
Rwanda - UNO:
From June 1994 to August 1994, the commander of
operation TURQUOISE: General LAFOURCADE.
Kosovo - NATO:
From November 1998 to March 1999, the French Senior
Officer commanding the Verification Standards division of
the Kosovo Verification Mission - KVM: General AVENEL.
From 1999 to 2006, the commanders of the Kosovo Force
(KFOR) and of it major units were:
Commanding the Kosovo Force
- (From June 1999 to October 1999: British general JACKSON.
Omitted).
- From October 2001 to October 2002: General VALENTIN.
- From September 1st, 2004 to September 1st, 2005:
General de KERMABON.
KFOR deputy commander:
- February 2006: General SOMMAIRE.
Commanders of the multinational Brigade - North:
- From January 2002 to April 2002: General DAMAY.
- From May 2002 to August 2002: General de KERMABON.
- From September 2002 to December 2002:
General BIDARD.
- From January 2003 to April 2003: General KLEIN.
- From May 2003 to August 2003: General BERTUCCHI.
- From September 2003 to December 2003: General RATEL.
- From January 2004 to April 2004: General MICHEL.
- From May 2004 to August 2004: General LAFONTAINE.
- From August 2004 to February 2005:
General LECHEVALLIER.
- From February 2005 to June 2005: General HOUBRON.
Macedonia - European Union:
Commanding operation CONCORDIA:
- From March, 2003 to September, 2003: General MARAL.
Lebanon - UNO:
Commanding the UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL):
- From February 2004: General PELLEGRINI.
Afghanistan - NATO:
Commanding the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF):
- From August, 2004 to February 2005: General PY.
Afghanistan - Coalition set up by the United States Operation Enduring Freedom:
Commanding Task Force 150:
- From September 2003 to January 2004:
Rear admiral MAZARS.
- From August 2005 to December 2005:
Rear admiral MAZARS.
Democratic republic of Congo - European Union:
Commanding operation ARTEMIS:
- From June 2003 to September 2003: General NEVEUX.
In such a special issue, it was not possible to give the floor to all the French general officers who have been
in command of multinational forces. It's Doctrine's hope, that it covers to the best the wide diversity and the
large riches of numerous experiences; it is clear that it is keen to print any contradiction or complementary
discussions that would be provided.
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DOCTRINE SPECIAL ISSUE
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AN HISTORICAL BASIS
The Allied Armies on the Oriental Front
and the Learning of Multinationality
(1915 -1918)
opinion, can only fail due to the weakness of committed
assets. On their side, the French want to help Serbia but
without committing more than three divisions that lack
sufficient logistics.
I
mprovised creation aimed at giving assistance to Serbia
and protecting Greece, the small expeditionary corps
disembarking at Salonika at the end of 1915 had
become, in 1918, an army group of 650,000 men coming
from seven different nations: the allied armies on the
Oriental front (AAO). This is one of the first modern
examples of a multinational force, placing the various
commanders in chief, all French, confronted to issues
never faced before.
The result is a limited penetration in Southern Serbia
that however costs 5,000 men before withdrawing at
the Salonika harbor, organized as an entrenched camp
or more exactly in two allied camps located side by side.
Layouts are not even coordinated, the five British divisions
being organized into lines whilst the French have strong
points spread in the depth.
Attention is given to the Balkans as soon as the end of
1914, when an alternative to the tactical halt due to the
trenches on the French front is to be envisaged. Several
landing plans at Salonika are rapidly presented. They all
come up against Greek reluctances and the hostility of
Joffre who only swears by the “breakthrough” on the main
front. The British landing plan in the Dardanelles thus
prevails but leads to a new dead end.
In October 1915, the going to war of Bulgaria and a
powerful German-Austrian offensive in Serbia speed up
the events. An expedition is mounted in emergency under
the command of general Sarrail, imposed by the
government to Joffre who has just fired him. As a condition
Sarrail wants the committed force to have the rank of
army and wants it not to be placed under British
command. The war minister
agrees and manages to
impose him to the Allies
at the head of the
expeditionary corps.
DOCTRINE SPECIAL ISSUE
Général SARRAIL
Straight away, the action of
general Sarrail is hampered
by strategic considerations.
The British essentially
envisage the defense
of Greece and the capture
of the Straits. They are
very reluctant as far as an
offensive engagement
towards the Danube River is
considered, which, in their
The paralysis of will, a common disease of coalitions
(General Pellé, the Adjutant general of the GHQ)
8
FEBRUARY 2007
From 1916 on, a phoney war begins in which, facing
300,000 Bulgarians, no large operation can take place
insofar as the British under general Milne reject any
adventure. In fact, they only very nominally acknowledge
the authority of a Sarrail they do not like. The Greek rear
is very unstable, permanently hesitating on the side to
choose. Moreover, the French army in Orient is not
the priority of the French high command deeply involved
with the battles of Verdun and in the Somme. As far as
the efforts of the other allies are concerned, they are
symbolic with Italy and then Russia sending one division
each in the summer of 1916.
Therefore, the only possibility of having a sufficient forces
ratio comes from the remainders of the Serb forces,
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SPECIAL ISSUE MN COMMAND
evacuated and rebuilt together with the assistance of
the French on the island of Corfu. The 130,000 Serb
soldiers join the AAO in May 1916 and this reinforcement
enables to envisage an offensive for the coming August.
This latter one closes with confuse encounters and no
significant results, with the exception of the capture of
Monastir on November 19. Romania, which has just
rejoined the allied side, cannot be helped in face of
the German offensive.
immediately. The same occurs with Prince Alexander of
Serbia and the Italian general Mombelli, even if this latter
one alternatively plays on the words of his Commando
supremo and of the commander of the AAO to preserve
his autonomy. Although only commanding one division
and therefore normally under the orders of the French
army, Mombelli is above all considered as a national
representative and the military crosses are generously
allocated to the Italians.
Relations between the Allies have then reached their
lowest level and general Sarrail discovers that
authoritarianism might not be the best quality to conduct
a coalition. Relations with the British remain cold.
The general commanding the Russian forces complains
to his hierarchy about the re-supplying and employment
conditions of his units. Sarrail also receives the order from
Paris to make more room to the Italians in the press
releases and decoration presentations. The Serbs are
the only ones to accept without restriction the orders
of the French general but their morale declines along
with their internal political struggles.
The second axis of effort pertains to the transformation of
the AAO staff into a true inter-allied staff and no longer a
French staff that also deals with the Allies. Reinforcements
in officers enable to build true army corps staffs for
the French force and to consequently relieve the AAO staff.
Within this latter one, increased by 50% in terms of
officers, the J2 is trying to develop the cooperation
in the field of intelligence. However and logically, the very
heart of the cooperation is in the J3, which remains
predominantly French but in which British, Serb and Greek
cells are created to serve as liaison and coordination
bodies. A liaison officer is also attached to the Italian
corps of Albania. Three general officers or higher are
appointed to coordinate the action of artillery, engineers
and anti-aircraft artillery.
This lack of cooperation and the Greek uncertainty
paralyze the action of the allies and the morale shows
the effects of these. According to a German statement,
in 1917 Salonika is “the greatest allied internment camp”
ravaged by malaria and rumbling.
General Guillaumat or the understanding
of multinational command
Général GUILLAUMAT
After standing out at the head of the 2nd Army in France,
general Guillaumat is called to command the AAO in
December 1917. Straight away, he understands their
specificities: “Such a command is difficult to organize,
even more difficult to exercise.
However precise the constitution
conventions may be, the one who
has the responsibility cannot
pretend to obtain eagerness from
the generals reporting to him.
He has to take into account their
national temperament, their
military and political traditions.
From their side, his orders will
always be of a lower value than
the directives they continue to
receive from their governments
of which he is not often aware”.
Therefore, for him it will not be the case of creating a
centralized command but of establishing his authority
over an autonomous group of armies that operates
efficiently thanks to an adapted staff.
First, general Guillaumat will personally act in order to
renew connections between the Allies by multiplying visits
and attentions. He treats General Milne with great
consideration and relations with the British improve
Another axis of effort pertains to common training on
methods and procedures. Several inter-allied centers
are created such as the artillery study center or the gas
protection school. Initially reluctant, the Italians and
the British, who have their own organization, eventually
participate actively. In June 1918, the first information
course for generals and senior officers takes place. During
more than a week, 24 officers from the various armies
attend conferences dealing with the analysis of past
operations and with the various policies pertaining to
the employment of weapons and materials. The course
ends with a common exercise.
Although the relations between the commanders are now
good again, the possibilities of the different contingents
vary in accordance with the national policies. The British
take away two divisions out of six for the benefit of
the Middle-East. The Italians are rather more interested
in the occupation of Albania where they have committed
an army corps, than in Macedonia. More worrying,
the Russian division is subject to the repercussions of
the disintegration of its national army and the changes
in regime. The division has to be relieved and disarmed.
Most of its men are assigned in battalions of workers
whilst the hardest elements are sent to North Africa.
This weakening as well as the persistence of the bad Serb
morale are partly compensated by the build up of the
Greek army, which is now committed against the Central
Powers, and reinforcements coming from France.
This reorganization task, to which should be added a
complete restructure of re-supplying and living conditions,
enables to increase the AAO to 650,000 men in front of
400,000 Bulgarians. However, this superiority does not
really materialize itself in terms of combat units
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(276 battalions against 251) due to the importance of
support units within the AAO but the Bulgarian morale is
weak, as shown by the limited operations that are
mounted to prepare the breakthrough offensive and
harden the Greek army.
The triumph of the allied armies on the Oriental front
On September 15, 1918, after an
unprecedented large artillery
preparation on this theater, two
French divisions and one Serb
division achieve one of the sole
allied breakthroughs of the entire
war. This breakthrough is
immediately exploited by three
multinational taskforces, on
the West with the French Orient
army encompassing 8 divisions
including one Greek and one
Italian, on the East with one
French-Greek taskforce of two
divisions and in the center with
six Serb divisions reinforced by two French divisions.
Success exceeds all expectations and less than two
weeks after the beginning of the offensive Bulgaria
capitulates.
CARTE du FRONT d’ORIENT
General FRANCHET d’ESPEREY
It is up to general Franchet d’Esperey, Guillaumat’s
successor in June 1918, to give the enemy the coup
de grace.
After having in vain envisaged a maneuver on the aisles
in cooperation with the very reluctant Italian corps
of Albania, Franchet d’Esperey decides to reach
the breakthrough in the center.
Facing the new
opened strategic
perspectives the
national polities
vary. The British
Prime Minister
Lloyd George orders
to Milne, who has
not moved from
Greece, to free
himself from
the authority of
Franchet d’Esperey
and march towards
Constantinople.
Reluctantly,
the French
government
reinforces with
one division this offensive which begins on October 1st, in
liaison with
the operations in the Middle-East. On their side,
the Italians do not want to hear anything else than
the occupation of Albania while the Greeks reassemble
in Thrace.
On their way to Vienna, the allied armies from
the Oriental front shrink away all the more so as to fight
against bolshevism in Romania, some French units are
taken to form a Danube army under command of
general Berthelot.
The experience of the AAO, true laboratory of
the multinational action, in an area which will see others,
has in this way shown the constraints of common action
but also of its potentialities. No Allied army could have
allocated by itself the 650,000 men
of the AAO, each
of them being deeply involved with
the defense of its “gravity center”.
It is solely the placing in common
of forces that has enabled to
constitute an army which, once
national egoisms are put aside,
was able to reach considerable
results by playing upon
the qualities of the ones or
the others. Therefore, by beating
the weakened allies of Germany,
the September 1918 offensive has
largely contributed to the victory
of all.
Main source: Gérard Fassy,
Le commandement français en Orient
(The French command on the Oriental front
(October 1915-November 1918),
Economica, 2003
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The Imaginary Account
1
of Ferdinand Foch, Maréchal de France2,
Field Marshal of Great Britain and Poland,
the First Allied Commander and the Man
of the 1918 Victory
raduated from Polytechnique and an artillery officer,
G
he commanded the 28th Artillery Battalion,
Maréchal Ferdinand Foch (1851-1929) by Jean Patricot
the French War College from 1907 to 1911, the 13th ID
(Infantry Division), the 8th Army Corps, and then
the 20th Army Corps in Nancy. During the Great War, he
successively commanded the 20th Army Corps in August
1914, during the Battle of Lorraine, the IXth Army from
September 1914 to early 1915 during the Battle of
the Marne, in Flanders, in Artois, the Northern Army
group from the moment when it was set up early in 1915
until December 1916, in particular during the Battle of the Somme. He assumed
the duties of Chief of the General Staff from May 1917, and he became responsible
for co-operation with Allied forces; he was tasked to “co-ordinate their operations on
the western front” on March 26th, 1918. Appointed as “Commanding General of the Allied
Forces in France” on April 15th, then in Italy in May, he succeeded in gaining victory.
He was the first Supreme Allied Commander of most of the forces whose countries
were to become NATO members.
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“In my command before the war, my efforts were only aimed at
further enlightening and reasoning amongst the officers’ corps
this magnificent fieriness, source of all energies and from there of all hopes. It was pointless to push this further. But it was
the case of making it cautious in front of the difficulty of the
task, against haste or the lack of a general vision in armed
actions. Happy are the commanders only having to guide so
burning wills” 3
At the end of this conference Clemenceau looking at me
cries out in admiration - “You have it, you have your
command!”. I retorted him - “Nice command !” I am
confirmed in this allied command on April 15th.
How do you conceive this command ?
The creation of an allied unified command is for me the key
towards final victory.
Sir, under what circumstances did you come at the head
of allied armies?
Let’s come back to the end of 1917. While I am the chief of
the general staff, we analyze together, with General Pétain the then commander-in-chief of the French armies - and
General Robertson, my British colleague, the risks of a
Russian defection. The Brest-Litovsk negotiations between
Germany and bolchevik Russia, the Rumanian capitulation
and then the Caporetto disaster, prove that we were right
and lead us to create a “Superior war council”,
encompassing the French, British and Italian prime
ministers together with the military representatives,
(the executive council), in charge of coordinating the
military action on the Western front and of monitoring
the general conduct of the war. It is a first step towards
unity of command.
But nothing is settled yet when at the beginning of 1918,
Germany demonstrates signs of a significant offensive
overall the Western front. I then propose to create a general
inter-allied reserve, which could be employed, in case of
imminent danger, to act upon the most threatened point.
This was approved on February 2nd 1918; the War Superior
Council approves the constitution of this reserve and
appoints the executive committee - at the head of which
I am nominated - to determine its force and composition, to
plan for its stationing and to decide upon its employment.
But the difficulties aroused by the British cabinet and the
Clemenceau’s4 volte-face smashed down this first attempt.
On March 21st 1918, over a front of more than 70 km, the
German army launches an offensive that should put an end
to the war. More than fifty enemy divisions go into attack.
In some sectors the front is broken and no one is able to fill
in the breech. On March 24th, I request the French Prime
Minister to create without delay a “war leading body”
able to issue the necessary directives for the conduct of
all operations and to ensure their execution. On March 26th,
an inter-allied conference meets at Doullens, under
the presidency of Poincaré5, gathering Clemenceau,
Loucheur6, Pétain, lord Milner7, general Wilson8 and Douglas
Haig9. In order to solve the crisis, lord Milner, taking
Clemenceau aside, and pretty confident of
the support of the other participants, offers to give me
the coordination of the allied armies action over
the Western front.
DOCTRINE SPECIAL ISSUE
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In a first step, it was the case of slowing down and
jeopardizing the German offensive. As early as March 26 in the
evening, I call all hands in order to re-establish liaisons
between the French and British armies, even if this entails
having to personally dispatch to the various commanders or
to their headquarters or command posts, the order not to
further draw back and to fill in the gap by throwing all the
reserves into the battle. I also get the support of the American
troops. Although they had not participated in the Doullens
conference, the United States, through the voice of their
representative, General Blyss, gives its full and entire support.
During the first days of April the German offensive runs out.
But towards the end of May, after a short break, Ludendorff
resumes his offensive. However, the allied committed reserves
stop this assault on the River Marne. Everywhere the Germans
are hold in check.
Rapidly, my coordination role proves to be insufficient and
turns into a leading role, capable of creating action, of
managing and animating it. I am then given the command-inchief of the allied armies in France, which enables me to
decide upon the strategic employment of the allied forces, in
order to distribute offensive and defensive missions amongst
them. But my scope of activities cannot be summed up to the
simple conduct of operations. I am also concerned with the
requirements and even with the organization of each army. A
simple example of this if you don’t mind. During April 1918,
the English armies had encountered losses of 300,000 men
and 14,000 officers. This means that nine of their divisions are
dismantled. By insisting, I obtain from the British Cabinet the
re-building of those forces. But in order to avoid the overall
number decrease of our reserves, General Pershing and
myself decide together that the United States would
essentially send us infantrymen and machine gunners.
Washington agrees and between April and early July, over
370,000 American soldiers land on the French soil. We then
have to train, equip and employ them, a task which does not
fall under the operations domain but needless to say essential
within a coalition!
What are the consequences of this unified command?
I’d like to ask you to refer to the memorandum I drafted on
July 24th 1918, in which I detail the conditions for victory. I see,
in the successive failures of the German offensives, an
opportunity to strike a decisive blow against Ludendorff. For
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this purpose, I order the Allies to resume initiative thanks to
incessant attacks with utmost energy. Offensive alone leads to
victory in the battle and to regain the morale influence. In a
first stage, we did not have the superiority in terms of number
of combatants but, due to the quantity of divisions the
Germans were compelled to commit, we had the superiority in
terms of reserves. And due to the great number of exhausted
divisions the Germans had to relieve on the
battlefront, we also had the superiority in
numbers of fresh reserves. On top of this
morale superiority, we also had an
unquestionable material superiority in
terms of guns, ammunitions, aircraft
and assault tanks.
From this moment, the Allied
armies manage, in the course of
the battle, to regain initiative of
operations. Their force enables
them to preserve it and the
warfare principles command
them to do so. In a first step,
only limited objectives
operations are envisaged and
these then ensure the
necessary freedom of strategic
action. Without searching a
definite decision, these
offensives, thanks to a series of
actions to be taken, are aiming
at useful results for the further
development of operations and
for the economical life of the
country. But to speak frankly, I did
not expect these plans to be so
rapidly successful. Our goals
anticipated that 1919 would be
the decisive year of the war.
can only be obtained thanks to frank and as clear as possible
communications as well as to the will for emulation of
national self-esteems.
- Last, the title of commander-in-chief is not a protection
against critics, divergences and reluctances. A narrow
minded command retains and divides efforts. There should
exist a confidence which unifies and reinforces them
towards a same objective, victory. All means are
useful, from the moment they reach their goal
rapidly. The issue remains to know when
and how to employ available assets.
Sir, would you have some
additional pieces of advice
on how to “run” a
coalition?
A posteriori, what are your thoughts about this
unified command?
Yes, just one last one. Large
conferences leading to
endless discussions with
poor useful results should be
avoided as much as
possible. I only had two with
all the commanders-in-chief
on July 24th 1918 to present
the summer offensive
program and on October 25th
to define the military
conditions
of the Armistice.
On the other hand, frequent
meetings should be organized with
your immediate collaborators. I had
over sixty of them with General Pétain,
as many or more with Field Marshal Haig
or General Pershing, i.e.
one every four or five days...
Last, let me tell you that “I have had much less
admiration towards Napoleon since I commanded a
coalition”.
A lot can be said about the notion of “unified command”.
The word is magic, but reality is much more complex.
I can see three main points.
- We should not think that command, in the military sense of
the word, can be exercised vis-à-vis armies very different
the ones from the others thanks to simple processes that are
employed in one’s own army. Without the support and
re-iterated appeals to governments, nothing warrants
the execution of orders that are differently understood and
interpreted.
- The upper level direction of this unified command can only
be in search of a single result, i.e. to lead and grow within a
coordinated effort the spirits and the forces that surround
each flag. Agreement must be searched at any cost, and this
1 Imaginary interview of Maréchal Foch, written by the Research section of the
Research & Lessons Learned Division , based on text extracts of the following
publications: The two battles of the Marne River, September 5-11 1914 and
July 15-18 1918 by Maréchal Joffre, the former imperial Kronprinz,
Maréchal Foch and General Ludendorff, Paris, Payot, 1929 (cf texte français),
p. 100-135 Maréchal Foch, Memoirs for the history of the 1914-1918 war,
second volume, Paris, Plon, 1931.
2 General of the Army in the US Army.
3 Maréchal Foch, Memoirs for the history of the 1914-1918 war,
Paris, Plon, 1931.
4 French Prime Minister and War Minister.
5 President of the French Republic.
6 Armament Minister in Clemenceau’s government.
7 British War Minister.
8 British Imperial Chief of Staff.
9 Commander-in-chief of the British forces in France.
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As a Reminder...
The United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) in Former Yugoslavia
T
he explosion of Yugoslavia, the beginning of which
dates back to the death of Tito in 1980, really takes
place during the year 1991. Croatia and Slovenia
unilaterally proclaim their independence on June 25th, 1991.
The first war in Yugoslavia opposes Slovenia to
the federal army, therefore Serbia, from June 27 through
July 17th, 1991. This conflict spreads into Croatia with
the beginning of armed confrontations between Serbs
and Croatians starting from August of the same year.
On December 23rd, 1991 Germany unilaterally recognizes
the independence of Croatia and Slovenia, catching on
the wrong side the rather neutral position of the
international community which stated as a postulate
the preservation of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.
The European Community tries to bring solutions to the
conflict. We can just observe a succession of ceasefires that
are systematically broken by the various parties. It is only
on February 21st, 1992 that the United Nations Organization
Security Council approves the creation of an interposition
force after agreement of the various parties involved in the
conflict. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
will begin its deployment in Croatia on February 21st, 92.
The conflict spreads into Bosnia from March 3rd, 1992, date
of the proclamation of independence of Bosnia by its
Parliament. Following the trip of François Mitterrand at
Sarajevo on June 29th, 1992, the Security Council decides to
extend the mandate of the UNPROFOR to Bosnia. The first
battalion of French militaries lands at the Sarajevo airport
in July 1992.
From this date, the French will ensure a constant presence
of an outstanding performance in Bosnia. In a certain way,
the intervention in the Balkans is a change in the French
intervention tradition abroad. The theater is no longer
located in Africa but in Europe, with first consequences
pertaining to the adaptation of the forces to the climate,
the relief, but above all to a different population from
the one the French soldier was accustomed to.
Therefore, the intervention context is not one of a postcolonial nature as it was the case in Africa. It is also not a
cold war configuration, during which the Western armies
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were ready to face the Soviet armies. On the contrary,
the conflict in the Balkans may be characterized by the
absence of a clearly designated or constant enemy and a
lack of a clearly recognized front line. With the captures or
re-captures by one or the other parties, the front line will be
called to change as well as the aggressor. The permanent
element of this fact during the first phase of the conflict,
the “UN phase” is that the blue helmets will be precisely
placed between the two parties in a solely humanitarian
configuration and will often play the role of the designated
enemy by proxy for the parties in presence. Therefore,
the blue helmets will be an obstacle for the revenge spirit
that hangs over the conflict.
Generally speaking, the UNPROFOR mission is to act in
order to gather all the peace and security conditions.
The United Nations force must ensure that the areas on
which it is deployed remain de-militarized, assist and escort
if need be the UN humanitarian organizations, especially
the United Nations High Committee for the refugees
(resolution 776), and secure the Sarajevo airport in order to
dispatch humanitarian aid. Following the enlargement of
the UNPROFOR responsibilities from 1993, it must protect
the population of the five security areas created by
the United Nations Security Council (resolution 844) that
are besieged by the Serb forces. From July 1993, the UN
sends 1,000 additional blue helmets to Mount Igman in
order to loosen the Serb stranglehold around Sarajevo.
However, the peace keeping personified by the UNPROFOR
found its limits in Bosnia and was not able to prevent mass
massacres such as the one of Srebrenica in 1995.
From August 1995, NATO comes into play in order to loosen,
thanks to air strikes, the stranglehold that suffocates
Sarajevo. This new crisis configuration opens the way on
the Dayton ceasefire agreements and on the creation
by NATO, on October 11th, 1995, of the Implementation
Force (IFOR), aimed at taking over from the UNPROFOR.
France paid a heavy tribute in the operations on the theater
of the Balkans where eighty four militaries lost their lives
from 1992 to 2004.
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The Account
of General (Ret) Jean COT
Former Commander of the UNPROFOR1
from July 1st 1993 to March 15th 1994
raduated from the French
G
Military Academy, Saint-Cyr,
and an Infantry officer, he
commanded the 110th Infantry
Battalion from 1977 to 1979 and
the 15th ID (Infantry Division)
from 1986 to 1988. He was
the Commanding General,
1st French Army from 1990, and he
ECPAD
assumed command of UNPROFOR
in Zagreb between July 1993
and March 1994.
He has been retired since
July 1994.
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Sir, when did you command the UNPROFOR?
In which command structure were you integrated?
I commanded the UNPROFOR on the overall Former
Yugoslavia theater from July 1st 1993 through
March 15th 1994.
I normally had a one year contract but my mission was
shortened. In fact, having tried during six months, from
July through December 1993, to make the internal
running of the United Nations evolve, by acting on the
New York side as well as on the part of my direct chief,
the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General
on the field, I realized it was rigorously impossible to
change anything. On the other hand, I realized that
the political and military leaders of the Former
Yugoslavia were consistently humiliating and
instrumentalizing the military force I commanded while
red carpets were displayed under their feet at Geneva
and elsewhere. Last, my requirement of obtaining a
delegation from the Secretary General for the decision
of employing air-to-ground fires hurried his decision
of asking the French government for my recall.
This mission was the largest ever conducted by the UN.
Under the responsibility of the Special Representative,
it had four components: the UNPROFOR, the civilian
affairs, the administrative affairs and the HCR2. My
difficulties were not only coming from New York, but
also from the inside of the mission. With hindsight,
I have the feeling I have spent more than 50% of my
energy trying to settle internal issues. Consequently
and to my great regret, I only had less than 50% left for
what should have been the essential, i.e. what was
going on on the field.
Within which framework did you exercise
your command?
I’d like to remind that war started in Croatia in June
1991, but the first UN elements only arrived there in
April 1992. This date also marks the beginning of
the war in BosniaHerzegovina. Upon my
arrival, the UN was in
a state of considerable
extension; within six
months we went from 15 to
40,000 men. I commanded
all the UN forces in
the Former Yugoslavia.
The hierarchical
organization was rather
asymmetrical as I had four
subordinates in Croatia,
where the mission
had started (roughly
15,000 men), one in
Macedonia where there
was a UN force
encompassing Northern
Europeans and Americans
and a unique command for
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
I recall that the first French
battalion arrived at the
Sarajevo airport in June
1992 following Mr.
Mitterrand’s visit. Bosnia
very rapidly became the
main theater.
As the SRSG3 only rarely came to Zagreb, he had
appointed a general officer, a Norwegian like him, as his
deputy and who was supposed to be my chief; and
that was unacceptable. Therefore, I requested, without
success, to become officially the direct deputy of
the SRSG on the ground, i.e. to have authority over
the three other branches (civilian and administrative
affairs, HCR). I refused to participate in any meetings
presided by the SRSG deputy.
When one has the operational responsibility of
40,000 men, one cannot accept to be placed in such a
command structure. Finally one can say that my
determination and my relief, which is its consequence,
contributed to improve things later on, as my French
successors let me understand.
Command organization - Chart template (UNPROFOR)
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How was your staff organized?
The Norwegian general, another one, who was there
before me, had no staff. Just leaving the command of
the 1st (FR) Army, I knew what and operational command
was. Therefore, I built a staff whose chief was British,
and somewhat respected the ratio of number of officers,
their level and rank, in relation with the volume of
forces on the ground, but still giving the main roles
to officers on whom I could count, such as my Canadian
operations division head for example.
For this staff, I had adopted a particular running
manner. On the one hand, there were situation meetings
in which the UN civilian representatives participated,
during which I made certain decisions. On the other
hand, the “restricted committees” during which,
together with my chief of staff and four or five direct
subordinates, I gave the broad directions, such as for
example the review of the rules of engagement we will
maybe speak about later.
What type of force did you command?
The UN force in the Former Yugoslavia amounted to
roughly 40,000 men coming from around 40 countries.
It was the most heterogeneous military assembling that
could be conceived, in terms of equipment, training or
of motivation. There were battalions that were arriving
practically without any assets and were therefore
useless, at times they were even dangerous due to their
rather usual involvement in the black market. There
were long-going peace keeping professionals, check
points and observation posts great specialists whose
governments carefully see that they would not do
anything else. Last, there were, luckily, a few
contingents that could perform everything and firstly
obey orders and react in face of events. This is not with
such a bric-a-brac that one can build an army worthy of
the name. For a given mission, war or peace, and under
given circumstances, troops must have assets, training,
and will. If one of those criteria is missing, the troop is
useless.
setting up forward air controllers, and then by
organizing exercises with simulated fires in Croatia
and in Bosnia. Therefore, after six months I had
implemented a system of air-to-ground fires that could
have worked, at least with the battalions that had a
minimum capability for close air support.
Simultaneously with this interoperability effort on
the ground and during the first six months, I came up
against the refusal of the UN Secretary General
M. Boutros-Ghali, to give me the delegation for deciding
the employment of the NATO air force in direct and
urgent support of the UNPROFOR. Thanks to the
exercises carried out under all possible configurations
and despite the improvements brought to the loop
necessary for obtaining the approval of the UN
Secretary General before a strike, a minimum delay of
six hours between my close air support request and its
validation by the UN was necessary. Under these
conditions, a company facing difficulties during the
escorting of a convoy for example could not expect
anything from such a “differed” support.
We have already touched on the rules of
engagement. What was your action in this area?
Their overall review has been one of my main tasks.
I had enough of hearing my subordinates, down to
battalion commanders, telling me they could not return
fire when they were themselves under fire, because
their government asked them to avoid placing
themselves in a situation where they would have to do
it. This was unacceptable. I consider that the
commander of a UN force worthy of the name must set
the rules of engagement of his assets alone. Therefore,
I strongly ordered all my subordinates that it was
imperative to return fire immediately against any direct
attack with assets in proportion to the encountered
attack. Not only do we have the right but the duty to
return fire in case of attack. I can tell you I had to go on
the ground to demand the execution of given orders.
Sir, what is your opinion about interoperability?
Could you let us share your difficulties in relation
with multinationality?
First, I’d like to speak about the employment of the
NATO aircraft. Before I took command, the UN had
decided, thanks to several resolutions, that NATO could
commit air assets in order to support the UNPROFOR.
As my predecessor had refused this support, I organized
it together with the AFSOUTH commander in Naples as
soon as I took command in July 1993.
This was extremely complicated to set up as amongst
the roughly forty battalions placed under my orders,
only four or five of them had ever heard about close air
support. I was quite directly involved with this, firstly by
The interaction between the directives or the constraints
coming from the various governments and the mission
has been an issue difficult to manage for me. Within
nine months, I believe I met all the defense ministers
and a certain number of prime ministers from the forty
countries represented within the force, without
mentioning the chiefs of staff. They all more or less
explicitly told me that they had placed men at my
disposal but that I was not to send them back coffins.
The UN has two sorts of contingents, the first one can
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be asked anything and the second, representing
the majority of contingents, which demonstrates great
pusillanimity. This second category may be divided into
two sub-categories. The first one, the more important of
the two, encompasses contingents with no operational
capability, no training, no motivation and underequipped including in individual protection means. The
second sub-category encompasses very well equipped
and rather correctly trained contingents, but which do
not want to go beyond the limits set out by their
government. Two examples illustrate this.
First, in September 1993, in the Medak pocket, a UN
march battalion took back from the Croatians, on my
order a piece of land of ten kilometers wide over fifteen
kilometers deep. As I had no reserve, I constituted one
with this march battalion in which I wanted to initially
include a mechanized Danish company. The sector
commander, to whom this company belonged, refused
to execute my order as his government had not given its
agreement. Therefore, I called in a French company
coming from Bosnia.
ECPAD
The second example, much more serious, occurred in
December 1993 at Srebrenica. I decided to relieve
200 Canadians that had been implanted for six months
in an enclave as large as a French small department by a
Nordic battalion arriving on the territory and composed
DOCTRINE SPECIAL ISSUE
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of units from four various nationalities including a
Danish tank company. Twice, in front of General
Briquemont, and then in front of me, the battalion
commander refused to rejoin Srebrenica, admitting in
tears, that his government forbade him to do that.
This matter was the subject of half a dozen of reports on
my part to the UN Secretary General, asking him to act
vis-à-vis the concerned governments as such a situation
was absolutely unacceptable. In the answers, I was
asked to demonstrate political sense and more
flexibility. Of course, I could have been more diplomatic
and understanding. But, I imposed this behavior on
myself considering that if there should be more
flexibility, it was not up to the military commander,
placed in the situation I was, to provide for it. Others
had to make the governments understand that they
could not continue in such erring ways.
Maybe the military, as he is trained today, could have a
tendency towards being too diplomatic. In much more
complicated and serious situations, Leclerc or Delattre
demonstrated diplomacy as much as they could but
there exist countless examples showing they have also
been of an inflexible determination towards their
American superiors. Rigorousness is necessary in
extreme cases and I was not far from being sometimes
in this case.
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Sir, have you been involved in the definition
of the mission of this multinational force ?
out this condition, which, retrospectively, was maybe
a mistake.
On June 25th, 1993, the French Joint Staff operations
deputy asked me whether I would accept to take
command of the UNPROFOR on July 1st, while this had
never been envisaged. I immediately agreed. Since
the outbreak of the war in the summer of 1991, I had
been monitoring the Yugoslavian file upon delegation
of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and I was
responsible for the setting up of our units, for
the monitoring and for the lessons learnt process
originating from the roughly 6,000 French on
the theater.
I draw a lesson from that: peace keeping and peace
enforcement do exist. In a peace enforcement mission,
I understand the need for a diplomatic action but the
first thing to achieve is to impose peace. This is the role
of the military commander who cannot be placed under
the orders of a civilian chief occupied to get prepared
for the moment when, once peace is imposed on
the ground, it will become possible to compel
belligerents to negotiate. It was a mistake to negotiate
openly and frenetically before peace had been enforced.
To answer your question, the military commander that I
was never had a precise mission, nor even a “personal
and secret instruction” from the UN Secretary General,
setting out the effects that were to be obtained on
the ground in order to support the political and
humanitarian goals. The SRSG pretended that the UN
resolutions were sufficient to enable me to carry
out my job.
Consequently I had a good awareness of this theater
and if I had been a cautious infantryman I would have
set only one condition to the Chief of Staff: there cannot
be a civilian chief with a military subordinate when
war rages; I will only go there if I am heading the UN
mission. I took over this command without setting
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How would you conceive the organization
of the UN Secretary General?
As far as intelligence was concerned,
what was the available organization?
For a long time, I have been fighting for
the reconstruction of the UN secretary and especially
the peace keeping operations department. This very
name is hypocrite. Why should we call it the “peace
keeping operation department” and not simply the “UN
operations department”, as it is also responsible for
peace enforcement operations? Why are diplomats
heading the peace operations departments instead of
militaries?
Firstly, the UN does not deal with intelligence, there
are no classified documents and therefore, I had no
assets, being a stateless general, to monitor what
the various factions were doing on the ground.
This is the principle. But as it is difficult to achieve
something without intelligence, I had some French
special forces elements located in most cases within
the various battalions, that provided me with
intelligence. The British were much better than us, in
the sense they had infiltrated intelligence agents
within the civilian affairs, administration and
humanitarian structures. A great number of truck drivers
of the HCR were British intelligence agents. But only a
very small part of their intelligence came to me.
And, in addition, I had a military assistant dedicated to
my relation with Paris and especially with the French
Directorate, Military Intelligence (DRM), for dealing
with intelligence.
Is it not possible to admit that there could be a military
at the head of the operations department, which would
be articulated in a military organization chart manner,
including civilians? Would it not be possible for a four
stars general (NATO) to be the first deputy of
the Secretary General, when there are over 80,000 UN
blue helmets on the ground?
Simply because the UN administration cannot drop
the philosophy according to which the worst thing
would be to militarize the UN. I am not demanding the
militarization of the UN. I just request the operations
department at least to be named as such and its chief to
be a military, who would be able to draft “personal and
secret instructions” for each of the force commanders
on the ground, signed off by the Secretary General.
In other words, and by paraphrasing Clemenceau’s jest,
I believe that peace is a far too important matter to
leave it up to the sole civilians.
How was the UNPROFOR support organized?
For me support was rather simple in the sense that
most of the support was of the responsibility of
the contingents. It was impossible to have a centralized
system to support such a diversified range of materials.
Finally, only catering, water and POL supplies and
terrain organization assets were centralized,
the procurement contracts being made by the UN.
Theoretically, medical support was also centralized but
in fact, nations capable of doing so, provided assets in
terms of physicians and surgical wards. Therefore, I had
no big problems on this side. One nation, Great Britain
not to name it, had even set up an ambulance company
which, very certainly, never carried a casualty as in
reality it was an electronic warfare listening company.
And, on top of that, I had the French support battalion
which mainly ensured POL and food transports for
the benefit of the whole force.
Support difficulties were not connected to its
organization but to the extreme difficulties pertaining
to the dispatching of the re-supplying and humanitarian
convoys.
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Was the training of French officers adapted
to the running of your staff?
Globally, there was a lack which is now greatly
filled in: all officers, including myself, did not speak
the Shakespeare’s English. But what I appreciate
with officers and the French in general, are their
adaptation abilities, their sharpness, which are not
only coming from their training, and also their
capability to tackle the essential issue. In fact,
the enormous flow of information allowed by
the technical collecting capabilities must be more
than ever mastered by a sharp synthesis mind,
enhanced by experience on the ground. Our officers are
concerned with their adaptation to all situations;
they are militaries but also humanitarians, diplomats,
within a staff as well as on the ground. The French
officer or soldier is fully committed, even in “weird”
missions. I believe it must be in his genes. I think he
would feel miserable if he was fenced too much.
However, I’d like to insist on one point which might
be apparently very paradoxical; it’s the dedication
of French officers to the interest of all, to that of
the UNPROFOR, which I particularly liked within
my staff at Zagreb. I believe that we can be proud
of this state of mind, contrarily to that of many other
contingents.
To sum up and thanks to this particular experience,
I can confirm that our staff training is good and that it
should not be too much changed by allowing more
room to “general education” at the detriment of staff
techniques and the art of warfare ... and the art
of peace.
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Beyond all the evoked topics, what are
the main lessons learnt that you can draw
from your mission?
What would be your recommendations
to a general officer appointed to command
a multinational force?
The first lesson: UN must not be broken; it is
undoubtedly the only remaining hope to avoid that
“might” not always remains “right” in the world.
Whatever its defaults might be, starting with its lack of
operational capability, the UN will go where it’s
required, subject to the vote of the Security Council,
whilst national forces will only go there if interests are
jeopardized and NATO only if the interests of the United
States are involved.
I do not have the pretentiousness of giving specific
advice to generals that are fifteen years younger than
I am as circumstances have changed within fifteen
years. I could however formulate two recommendations.
Secondly, one must obtain the full support of one’s own
government, not only for immediate support reasons,
but vis-à-vis the UN and NATO. I must say that was
the case forme.
1 United nations Protection Force.
2 High Commissioner for Refugees.
3 The UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for the Former
Yugoslavia.
4 Rapid reaction force.
ECPAD
Second lesson: no military action can be envisaged
without operational reserve. In my OPORDs, I imposed
to each sector to have one reserve company, which
could have a secondary mission but which was the
reserve of the sector and that I could take to form a
march battalion, as long as the governments agreed.
I wanted to constitute a global reserve, such as an
intervention brigade, at the level of the UNPROFOR.
For various reasons I could not do it and this probably
explains a lot of things. This notion of reserve has finally
been demonstrated by the commitment of the RRF4.
There is also one corollary lesson for which I fought,
if the UN had the political will to have its own rapid
intervention force, for example a 5,000 men brigade
able to project a forward echelon within 48 hours and
the rest within a week, we would have avoided
numerous dramas such as Vukovar or Srebrenica. Just
imagine this force exists, who would, within the Security
Council, dare to forbid it to be sent to the Darfur in
order to avoid those massacres we put up with?
First, these international missions will remain, despite
achieved progress, always difficult to conduct as leading
a NATO or UN orchestra is always more difficult than
playing in solo. Maybe, the best way to succeed is not
to always try to smooth all angles on the pretext that
the soldier should be as diplomatic as the diplomat.
Sometimes, one must demonstrate one’s firmness,
especially towards the non-military players who have a
great tendency to involve themselves in the execution
of the mission on the ground.
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As a Reminder...
Rapid Reaction Force (RRF)
in Bosnia
O
ut of concerns for a series of UN soldiers killed in
action and improper UNPROFOR responses to that
security issue, France advocates for creating a
multinational Rapid Reaction Force. French proposal
is discussed in the Defense Secretaries Conference
organized, 3rd of July 1995, on demand from the EU
and Atlantic Alliance member-states.
Creation of the RRF is officially endorsed upon the
publication of UNSCR-998, 15th of June 1995. RRF is
assigned the following missions: “secure emergencysupport responses to UN forces isolated or exposed
to risks, help UNPROFOR re-deploy and contribute in
sustainable freedom of movement across the AOO”
(Reference: letter from the Secretary General to
the Security Council dated 9 June, 1995).
In that scope, RRF stands for an UNPROFOR-integrated
and supporting instrument. Though responding to
the UN chain of command, this tool is deliberately
placed OPCON to the UN military commander in theater 1,
and away from the UN civilian authority2.
As demanded by the French authorities, RRF personnel
can operate under national uniforms and crests. No
“blue helmets”, no white-painted vehicles, only the UN
flag. RRF is visibly and purposely equipped for serious
combat-encounters. This way, France means to
demonstrate that UNPROFOR is going to take on
the strong line -likely use of force- though not shifting
to peace-enforcement operations.
A 4,500 coalition-force resourced from France,
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, RRF is
composed of three brigades, two deployed in theater
and one kept on short notice to move in France. The USA
and Germany provide airlift, medical and logistics
support to them. In the RRF body deployed, there is one
MNB3 enrolling 2,000 men, most of them French, under
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the command of Brigadier General Soubirou. This
brigade is essentially composed of Foreign Legion
elements from the 6th Light Armored Division.
Initial missions assigned to the RRF are quite
demanding, namely: protect UN soldiers, restore
accessibility to Sarajevo and return Serbs’ heavyweapons to all collection points previously monitored
by the UN in the region. Starting in July, 1995, the force
re-deploys exclusively on Mount Igman and gets heavier
weaponry/equipment (artillery, heavy mortars, main
battle-tanks and helicopters). As soon as the month
of August, Serbs dare gunning at UNPROFOR positions
repeatedly, thus exposing their artillery to an immediate
and effective retaliation from the RRF. Short after this
episode, RRF missions gets revised as to merely include
UN troops protection and reopening routes across
Mount Igman.
Ultimately, NATO steps in the scene by September, 1995
and the RRF is assigned a newer role in a newer
operation: Deliberate Force. The RRF gets ordered in
demolition-fires in Support of NATO strikes directed to
the Serbs positions surrounding Sarajevo. Note from
Gen Bachelet (Commander, UNPROFOR Sector of
Sarajevo): “NATO was applying strategic air-strikes
whilst RRF ARTY complementing on them at tactical
level”.
NATO strikes stop being required NLT 14 September,
1995, out of the Serbs decision to withdraw 300 heavy
weapons from around Sarajevo. The city gets accessible
again and UNPROFOR can resume its mission, reopen
the routes and resupply the city. Serbs’ defeat is total.
1 Noticeably, Gen Janvier.
2 UNSG Boutros-Ghali and his “High Rep” M. Akashi.
3 Multinational brigade.
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The Account of Lieutenant
General (Ret) André SOUBIROU,
Former Commanding General
of the RRF1 Multinational Brigade
in Bosnia from July to October 1995
raduated from the French Military
G
Academy, Saint-Cyr, and an Infantry
officer, he commanded the 2nd Foreign
Legion Infantry Battalion between 1988
and 1990. Within the UNPROFOR
framework, he commanded the Sarajevo
sector from October 1993 to September
1994, the Multinational Brigade of the UN
Rapid Reaction Force from June 1995
to December 1995, before assuming
command of the JANUS brigade within
the Multinational Division South-East
(MND - SE) until February 1996. Between
2000 and 2003, he was in command of the
French Army’s Doctrine and Higher
Military Education Command.
He has been retired since September
ECPAD
2003.
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Sir could you first tell us about the national
and international context at the time you
have been appointed ?
Let me first go back one year. From October 1993 to
September 1994, I was the commander of the Sarajevo
sector, commanding the “Blue Helmets” deployed in and
around the Bosnian capital. Following one year of an
In May 1995, there was a general context of aggravation of
the tensions between the warring factions involved in the
Former Yugoslavia conflict. Then several hundreds of blue
helmets were taken hostage in Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH)
following NATO air strikes against the vicinity of Pale,
the capital of the Bosnian Serbs. This action had been
authorized by the British Lieutenant General Rupert Smith,
COMUNPROFOR in BiH, who had such authority inside BiH.
In France, Mr. Jacques Chirac who had just been elected
President of the Republic decided to get hold of the issue.
In the United States, the Clinton administration was reticent
to engage land forces in the Balkans, except in Macedonia.
Among the thirty nations contributing to the UNPROFOR,
DOCTRINE SPECIAL ISSUE
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enthralling professional and human experience which
permitted a relief symbolized by the loosening of
the Bosnian Serbs’ guns encirclement around Sarajevo and
the reopening of the tramways line, I was expecting to be
assigned to a position where I could remain in contact with
this crisis. Unexpectedly I was designated to become
the territorial deputy commander of the Marseille territorial
military district - another mystery of human resources
management.
France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands were
among the largest contributors and above all, they were
engaged in the most exposed areas: the Gorazde enclave for
the British, that of Srebrenica for the Dutch, Sarajevo and
the Zepa pocket being under French responsibility.
At the beginning of June, the principle of the creation of a
UN reserve force was adopted. On June 3rd, on a French
initiative, the NATO Ministers of Defense met and three
countries (France, Great Britain and the Netherlands)
decided to arm a rapid reaction force (RRF); Germany
participated as well with the deployment of a field hospital
in Croatia. The concept was to provide COMUNPROFOR with
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a rapid land reaction force capable of deterring aggressions
against Blue Helmets and to regain initiative, since air
deterrence had proved to be unsuccessful in a situation
where parties were so much overlapping.
The RRF was not supposed to
have its own commander ; it was
to be entrusted to the UNPROFOR
commander, at that time it was
French General Bernard Janvier
with a team in charge of planning
the RRF’s actions.
On June 7th 1995, I was designated
to assume command of
the multinational brigade (MNB),
one of the RRF components. As a
matter of fact the MNB was to be
the only unit to be engaged, and
this has been the cause for a
confusion between MNB and RRF.
What was that force’s
composition and have you
participated in its creation ?
RRF was activated and deployed
simultaneously during the
Summer of 1995.
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In addition to the MNB that
deployed immediately and
onto which I’ll come back
later, other units were
created: in July, a
multinational planning cell
for COMUNPROFOR at
Zagreb, a staff for the BiH
Commander at Kisseljak, and
in August a British Airmobile
Brigade (24th AMB) based
at Ploce, that brigade re
deployed back two months
later without having been
engaged.
In France, a heavy brigade
was built up, that included
Leclerc MBTs and 155mm
AUF1 guns. An artillery group
comprising 8 AUF1 (GA 8
AUF1) from this unit was
deployed and integrated to
the MNB in August.
MNB’s French component was also created on the run as it
was deployed. It consisted of a very comprehensive battalion
task force tailored out of the 6th Light Armored Brigade, and
placed under the control of the 2nd REI2 HQ; it included three
infantry companies, an AMX10RC (Light Wheeled Armored
Tank) company, an engineer company, a reconnaissance
and combat support company (with scout and anti tank
capabilities; one and then a second mortar platoon, at the end
of May during the hostages crisis); plus a strong airmobile
detachment including Light helicopters, AT helicopters and
SA330 UHs within the framework of the BALBUZARD
operation, operating from the French navy ships.
MNB included important logistics assets which provided it
with significant autonomy. It also included intelligence and
communication means that were usually found at operational
level.
The British had envisaged to provide the MNB with units that
were already deployed in the theater: a mechanized infantry
battalion task force (Warriors with 30 mm guns), two artillery
batteries (105mm light guns), an engineer company, plus
logistics and communication means. These units that had
been taken out of the UNPROFOR British contingent were
placed lately under MNB’s OPCON.
The Dutch arrived at the beginning of August with a mortar
platoon from the Royal Marines
The multinational staff, with a strength of about one hundred
officers and NCOs, was composed of French (50%), British
(45%), and Dutch (5%). The chief of staff was a British
paratrooper. Staff support was ensured by a Command and
Support Battalion built out of the 17th Command and Support
Regiment (French Rapid Reaction Corps).
DOCTRINE SPECIAL ISSUE
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That HQ included a French Air Coordination Centre in charge
of coordinating air support with the NATO CAOC and, if
required, with Naval Air force embarked on the carrier
on the Adriatic Sea.
All these assets provided the MNB with operational
capabilities that were to become very useful when needed but
at that time they were disturbing UNPROFOR “territorial”
operating procedures .
I had not been much consulted for the building up of the force.
The French Armed Forces Joint staff and the Rapid Reaction
Corps had well planned that phase.
I however made three wishes that had different results.
The first was to include AUF1 guns into the brigade in order to
get an increased range and firepower that would have kept
the Serbs under control. That was not accepted under
the pretext that air support would be enough and that the UN
would be reluctant to see these over aggressive weapons
being deployed. The aggravation of the events in July will
sweep these arguments away. But the time that was wasted
placed us in a difficult position at crucial moments.
The second and third wishes were related to the choice I made
for three officers belonging to my direct environment. I wished
I had had the possibility to choose a deputy whom I knew well
and who was assigned to the French Rapid Reaction Corps HQ,
that HQ refused abruptly.
The Joint Staff was more understanding when it assigned to
me as Military Assistants two of its staff officers I had required,
Lieutenant Colonels Trinquand and Stoltz who proved to be
very talented and tireless collaborators in spite of an intense
pressure.
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How did your entry into the theatre and deployment go?
This proved to be difficult because, although the creation of
the force had been well organized, the preparation of the entry
as well as the deployment itself were improvised; improvised
as far as relation with the host nations as well as with
the UNPROFOR were concerned. These events lasted about
two months, from the end of June to the end of August.
As a matter of fact, it seemed that nobody, except the French
authorities among which the President of the Republic who
whished to break away from his predecessor’s politics
especially towards the Bosnian Serbs, wanted a foreign
force to appear on the theatre.
UN civilian and military representatives, although conscious
of the seriousness of the crisis, remained however convinced
that a reserve constituted out of one or two “blue helmet
battalions” would be enough to prevent a new hostage crisis.
The intervention of a force of a different nature (camouflage
painted, and having different rules of engagement) even under
UNPROFOR command, disrupted a game to which they were
accustomed. This was particularly true for the British and
Dutch senior commanders in BiH. This explains why I had it
very difficult to obtain that General Rupert Smith placed under
my OPCON the British units that were earmarked to the MNB.
It took a formal order by General Janvier, UNPROFOR
commander, to impose that decision.
Regarding the three warring parties, the arrival of the force
disrupted even more the game they were used to play.
Croatia, took pretext that it had not been notified of the arrival
of the forces to prohibit the passage of the convoys on its
territory, outside of Ploce harbor. There were at least two
reasons to that attitude: one, to obtain better compensations
for the new service that was being rendered, but above all, a
fear to see that force getting involved in the affair, a force that
initially - early August - deployed to the vicinity of the
envisaged offensive area, to reconquer the Serbian Republic
of Krajina. From this originated constant harassments and
obstructions by Croatia and even more by the authorities
and forces of the Herzeg Bosnian Croats.
One could have expected that the Muslim Bosnians would
have been more welcoming because there was little chance
that the disembarked force would have harmed them. In fact
they feared that the new force could have been intended to
extract the blue helmets whose departure would have meant
being abandoned by the international community.
And last, as for the Serbs, you figure it well, they were not
expecting anything good out of this deployment of soldiers
with “green” helmets.
More or less, that force disturbed everybody on the theater.
It was thus necessary to overcome all these resistances to
have my concept of operations accepted, to position MNB’s
main part on Mount Igman in order to control the theater
center of gravity - Sarajevo and suburbs - and even Pale if the
AUF1 were to be projected.
This vision was not shared by the British and the Dutch who
were more worried by the fate of their battalions locked in
Gorazde and Srebrenica. Due to the lack of heavy helicopters,
the MNB was not able to operate everywhere simultaneously.
Paradoxically, this idea worried also the blue helmets of
the Sarajevo sector who did not deviate from the UN peace
keeping logic and feared that these movements could involve
Serb reprisals on their positions. This attitude could be
compared to the Stockholm syndrome one.
Several times it has been necessary to use the force to force
our way on the ground and close to the ground. The obstacles
to freedom of circulation emanating from the Croats and
Bosniac Muslims concerned only the forces in green, i.e.
the lately disembarked French forces, under the sarcastic
glance of the blue helmets, who felt that their perception of
the disturbing role of the force was confirmed.
In July, the degradation of the situation gradually modified the
perception of our role, and gave credit to our engagement and
entailed the expected GA 8 AUF1 reinforcement. On July 3rd,
MNB’s HQ and French contribution were deployed on
Tomislavgrad plateau, an area controlled by the Bosno-Croats.
The helicopter battalion was based at Ploce harbor.
In the evening of July 14th, the French minister of Defense and
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces who were visiting the
MNB were made aware that a logistic convoy had just been
severely attacked by the Serbs on the Igman trail. They then
decided to deploy the GA8 reinforcement.
On July 21st another logistic convoy felt under a severe attack
when entering the Sarajevo basin which caused numerous
casualties, in particular two French captains killed. We then got
a green light for our onward movement towards Mount Igman.
On July 22nd we were deployed there with 50% of our combat
power in spite of the obstructions conducted by the Bosnian
Muslims who were still convinced that these movements were
to prepare the extraction of the Blue Helmets.
During the end of July and until the end of August, the Igman
deployment had to be permanently adapted due to the arrival
of new reinforcements: Dutch heavy mortars platoon, British
units put under MNB’s OPCON, jolty arrival of the AUF1
by a mountain track following their immobilization at
the Croatia-BiH border.
From Mount Igman, several well targeted reactions were
conducted to the benefit of the Sarajevo sector to respond to
Serbian provocations or to allow a regrouping of the Blue
Helmets lay out.
The HQ’s activities concentrated on the planning of operations
aimed at breaking the encirclement of Sarajevo; indeed the
city was only accessible by a very dangerous mountain track,
beaten by Serb fires and on which several UNPROFOR soldiers
and American diplomats died or have been seriously wounded
in accidents and by Serbs fires.
But, above all, the HQ built up on Mount Igman a Fire support
co-ordination center (FSCC) in charge of preparing fire
missions against all the military objectives that were reachable
by land based fire support means. The FSCC included an air
cell in charge of coordinating aerial fire support and to manage
the brigade very dense network of TACPs.
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This very meticulous work proved to be fruitful when, following
a new firing of a Serbian shell at the Markale Market (28
August), the airland operation DELIBERATE FORCE was
launched during the night of 29 to 30th August3, conducted
by NATO Air Forces over the entire territory controlled
by the Bosnian Serbs and in cooperation with the MNB
in and around Sarajevo.
Mount Igman, while continuing the Sarajevo “opening up”
operations, among which the clearing up of check-point “sierra
1” on the road to Kisseljak. After the transfer of authority
towards the IFOR MND SE, on 20th December,
the MNB’s
French contingent reached the Mostar area and reopened the
Ortijes airport where the SFOR French contingent is still
stationed.
Finally, the airland strikes that occurred between August 30
and mid-September brought to its end the Bosnian Serbs’
resistance. They opened the way to negotiation, to the Dayton
agreement which led to the signature of the Paris treaty.
According to my information from the Serb side, it was that
combination of the air strikes destructive effects with the
paralysis of all the military movements around Sarajevo due to
the permanent ground-to-ground fires, which led them to
negotiation towards the exit of the crisis.
In such a difficult context and with such a tight
timeline, how did you manage to turn your brigade
into an operational tool?
Let’s first talk briefly about the chain of command.
Early July, the brigade that had been put at COMUNPROFOR’s
disposal, was placed under the UNPROFOR’s BiH Command,
on that sub theater that was obviously the most probable for
its employment. My direct boss was thus Lieutenant general
(UK) Ruppert Smith, commanding UNPROFOR in BiH. He was
subordinated to COMUNPROFOR, General (FR) Bernard Janvier
who however kept a very close look over our activities.
But I also had daily relations with the French Armed Forces Joint
Staff. Almost everyday I talked on the phone to that staff’s
ACOS OPS. This is one of the main characteristics of the current
multinational operations. The commander, whatever might be
his nationality, keeps close relations with his national
authorities and receives guidance from them.
During July, the HQ has been able to work intensely, to forge
ahead its cohesion by overcoming resistances, and especially
by federating energies around a clear objective: effort on
Sarajevo, key point to the situation. The HQ’s British and Dutch
officers rapidly joined this point of view and became the best
advocates of this idea towards their national authorities and
the UNPROFOR chain of command.
How did you experience multinationality within
the brigade? Had you any problem linked
to interoperability?
The MNB was composed of about 50 % French, 45 % British
and 5 % Dutch. Within the Headquarters, I had decided that
everyone should address orally the others using the other’s
language, which means that a British or a Dutch had to talk to
a French in French, and reciprocally the French were to address
their allied comrades in English. That idea had come to my
mind by observing our Belgian friends who use that means in
their spoken relations between French speaking and Dutch
speaking people.
All UNPROFOR written products were in English.
Within the battalions that were nationally homogeneous
the question did not arise, but the principle of addressing a
person in the language of that person became widely used
during training events and operations that gathered several
allied units, contributing thus to reinforce cohesion.
Similarly the battalions, the British ones - in “white”, since they
were not yet placed under OPCON - and the French ones, in
“green” were able to train on the Tomislavgrad plateau, an area
similar to the Larzac training area. Maneuvers and fire trainings
were conducted in a very operational type of environment
which was a very rare opportunity in the BiH at that time.
Cohesion was rapidly achieved since the objective had clearly
been designated and recognized. The British units, soldiers,
NCOs, officers and battalion commander who were training
with the French eventually convinced their authorities of the
MNB’s credibility. It was a fusion that started form the bottom.
Lastly, the 5th RHC4’s “green” helicopters, in order to conquer
their freedom of movement indispensable for conducting
reconnaissance and operational missions, had to defy daily all
the flight interdictions imposed by all parties.
We did not have to face any major logistical problems even if
the living conditions at Tomislavgrad as well as on the Mount
Igman were very rustic. The English noticed that, for quite a
long period of time, the British army had not had to spend 90
consecutive days “in the trenches”.
Since we had no clue about the end of our mandate we had to
start to reflect on the questions of the winterization of the
force. The force had to spend a month and half in the snow on
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DOCTRINE SPECIAL ISSUE
Thanks to that experience, I am absolutely convinced
of the relevance of the “lead nation” concept for that type
of multinational operations. The commander, the staff and CIS
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means constitute the basis of such a concept. All the rest can
be negotiated but whatever might happen, the brigade level
must remain the lower threshold. I’m not convinced by
the concept of implementing multinationality within a
battalion; this is sometimes done but only for demonstration
purpose during a stabilization phase; but the reversibility of
certain situations may cause grave misunderstandings should
the situation worsens.
In any case, it is crucial to constantly look for benefiting from
multinationality experiments lessons learnt, in particular when
the number of nations is limited, which was the case of
the MNB, far from the UNPROFOR “patchwork”.
For what regards interoperability, it was necessary to have
redundant CIS means, in order to meet the data transmissions
needs at operational level. But at tactical level, there was no
problem. To liaise with my direct superior, Lieutenant General
Ruppert Smith, I used the British communication systems,
which reinforced the mutual confidence even though
the number of networks had thus to be multiplied.
I would like to insist again on one point that was for us a great
success: the coordination between air and ground based fire
support. Very early we created a FSCC5 within which were
working representatives of each of the artillery units and an air
force liaison officer. Planning had to be particularly rigorous
especially after August 30th, when the first air strikes were
conducted.
On this day, during the first DELIBERATE FORCE artillery fire
against a Serb battery in the outskirts of Sarajevo, the three
nations fired at the same objective: the French with their heavy
mortars and their AUF1, the British with their 105 mm and the
Dutch with their mortars. I had justified this decision in the
name of the cohesion and solidarity of the contributing
nations, in addition it involved all the actors from the start.
The complementary efficiency of ground-to-ground and air-toground fire support means proved to be perfect. The groundto-ground slots granted to us by the CAOC - in charge of the air
operations - increased significantly, since our fires proved to
be accurate and effective and the weather degradation made
impossible certain types of air actions.
The AUF1 range enabled us to strike targets up to the vicinity
of Pale. The capital of the Bosnian Serbs was thus under
the permanent threat of our ground fire support.
Contrary to what has been often asserted, in that type of
engagements, it is the nature of the target that makes its value
- strategic or tactical - and not its location in the depth.
The necessary complementary effects between air and ground
based fire support and the relevance of the air land operations
have been once more demonstrated during this operation.
In the light of all that experience, which advice
or recommendation would you articulate?
In peace keeping, peace reinforcing or peace making
operations, one must permanently maintain a favorable forces
ratio. There is always a place left for negotiation but it can only
turn favorably for the one who is in a position of force, which
does not mean that the other has to be humiliated.
When I commanded the sector of Sarajevo, and I was meeting
with the belligerents, I endeavored to display force by having
NATO combat aircraft to fly over the meeting location at low
altitude, which represented a modest palliative to our lack of
means and to the weakness of the international community’s
resolve.
The preparation of the mission, in particular the politicomilitary part is essential and in that domain I must admit that
the personal relations that I had been able to establish in
advance with the UN representatives, the French Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces, and the UNPROFOR commander, largely
facilitated this operation. Confidence, mutual comprehension
based on shared experiences make it possible to distinguish
the very “spirit” of the mission in order to become able to free
oneself from the weight of its “letter”.
Another piece of advice comes to my mind: the development
of an initial cohesion and a permanent concern for its
maintenance. “Ad unum omnes”, all for one, such was
the “motto”, retained for the brigade. This motto was quickly
implemented and maintained at all levels. The brigade “esprit
de corps” came from the jointly overcome difficulties and
the federating enthusiasm generated by a clear definition of
the objective to be reached.
And last, I do believe that it is important to keep in mind
the three principles promoted by Marshall Foch and to which
I’ll add a few comments:
• Economy of forces, but also mastering of the force.
• Concentration of the efforts, i.e. choosing the right center
of gravity. For me, the center of gravity was the greater
Sarajevo (i.e. Sarajevo itself and its immediate
surroundings). Having few heavy transportation means
available (helicopters in particular), we were not able to
make efforts every where in Bosnia. The key was thus
Sarajevo.
• Freedom of action: yes, including mental freedom of action,
i.e. the possibility to take initiatives.
As a conclusion, I’d say that the support from the UNPROFOR
commander within the UN sphere, the resoluteness of the
French authorities in the management of the crisis, and the
determination of all actors in the field have been decisive for
the success of that mission.
1 Rapid Reaction Force.
2 Regiment étranger d’infanterie (French Foreign Legion 2nd Infantry Regiment).
3 The 24 hours delay allowed the Gorazde British battalion to withdraw from
the pocket through Serbia.
4 5e Régiment d’hélicoptères de combat (Combat Helicopters Regiment).
5 Fire support co-ordination center.
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ACCOUNT OF FRENCH GENERAL OFFICERS WHO
COMMANDED A MULTINATIONAL FORCE OR OPERATION
As a Reminder...
The Multinational Division
South-East (MND-SE) in Bosnia
F
ollowing the November 21st 1995 Dayton
agreements, supported by the United Nations
through UN Security Council Resolution 1031 dated
December 15th 1995, the UN forces (UNPROFOR)
withdraw from the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory to be
replaced by NATO forces, namely the Implementation
Force (IFOR) in the frame of operation Joint Endeavour,
that would be succeeded by the Stabilisation Force
(SFOR) beginning on December 20th 1996, in the frame
of Operation Joint Guard. France takes part in all these
operations. (The French contingent in IFOR is named
Salamander and amounts to 7,500 soldiers).
IFOR’s primary objective is to enforce the cessation
of hostilities between the belligerents: monitor
the marking of the lines of cease fire and of separation,
control the withdrawal of the warring factions forces
on each side of the line of separation, control the return
of some pieces of territory, look after the regrouping
of heavy weapons and military units in the prescribed
locations, demobilize the other units.
IFOR’s Land Component, under the orders of the ARRC
Commander, includes three large multinational
divisions: one under US command (Northern sector,
Tuzla), another under British command (South-Western
sector, Banja Luka) and the third under French command
(Southern sector, Sarajevo-Mostar). The MNDSE is
composed, in addition to the 2,500 French soldiers,
of one Spanish brigade, one Italian brigade,
the Moroccan, Egyptian, Ukrainian battalions... Taking
advantage of a partial redeployment of the French forces
being part of the UNPROFOR already in theater,
DOCTRINE SPECIAL ISSUE
30 FEBRUARY 2007
the MNDSE could rapidly be organized. To be noticed,
the French participation in the Rapid Reaction Force
(RRF) constituted the ALPHA brigade in Mostar.
SFOR’s men strength (35,000) is then reduced by a half
compared to the IFOR’s. The civilian aspect takes
the lead over the military one. SFOR main missions are
as follow: deter any attempt to resume fighting, protect
the force and ensure its freedom of movement, control
and enforce the military segments of the Dayton peace
Agreements, provide a secure environment to
the international and national civilian organizations, be
prepared to intervene on the theater in case of incident.
As an example, the MNDSE supported the organization
of the elections in September 1996 and September 1998.
In 1995, France provides for more than 6,900 soldiers.
By the end of 2002, the multinational divisions are
being reorganized into multinational brigades. SFOR
goes on with its re-deployment and its men strength is
being reduced to 8,000 men. The brigades are replaced
by Task Forces of about 500 soldiers. SFOR disappears
on December 2nd 2004, being replaced by the European
Union operation ALTHEA.
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The Account of Lieutenant
General (Ret) Robert RIDEAU,
Former Commanding Officer
of the Multinational Division South East (MNDSE)
in Bosnia from December 1995 to May 1996
G
raduated from the French Military
Academy, Saint-Cyr, and an Infantry
officer, he commanded the 13th Demibrigade de Légion étrangère (Foreign
Legion half-brigade). As the commanding
General, 6th Light Armored Division from
1995, he assumed command of
the Multinational Division South-East
(MND - SE) within the IFOR between
November 1995 and May 1996.
ECPAD
He has been retired since August 2000.
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ACCOUNT OF FRENCH GENERAL OFFICERS WHO
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Sir, can you tell us in which context
did you receive your mission?
I have been in command of the Multinational Division South
East (MNDSE) or Salamander Division in Bosnia
Herzegovina from December 19th 1995, date of the transfer
of authority between UNPROFOR and IFOR (Implementation
Force), to May 14th 1996.
Two honour marching squads were waiting for me at
my arrival: one with green berets (French Foreign Legion
2th Paratroop Battalion) and the other one with blue berets
(6th French Marine Infantry Battalion), we were effectively
in the transition phase.
IFOR itself was operating under a UNO mandate - resolution
1031 from the UN security council dated 16 December 1995 over the whole Bosnia Herzegovina. IFOR initial mandate
was due to last one year.
The 6 (FR) Light Armored Division that I commanded then
was the second echelon (heavy) of the Rapid Reaction
Brigade (RRB) commanded by Brigadier General Soubirou.
So I was well aware of the negotiations initiated following
the NATO air strikes against Sarajevo late in August and
concluded by the signature of the Dayton agreements on
November 21st.
The ACE Rapid Reaction Corps was selected to exert IFOR
Land command. In the field the disposition encompassed
three multinational divisions commanded to the North by
an American general, to the South West by a British general
and finally the MNDSE commanded by a French general.
The expected end state was to enforce a long lasting cease
fire between the two entities, Croatian-Bosnian Federation
and Bosnia Serbian Republic. Therefore, the goal of the
division, similar to the other divisions, has been first to pull
the former belligerents apart and to force both of them to
withdraw beyond the inter-entity borderline and then to
begin “demobilizing” them.
The mission given to the MNDSE is as follows :“in
accordance with a decision of the French government and in
the framework of the mandate given by the UNO to NATO,
to take part in restoring peace in Bosnia Herzegovina, inside
an action area centered on Sarajevo and Mostar, by using
force if need be. To that effect, be ready to command a
multinational division under NATO operational control
including two French brigades and two foreign brigades
while performing the national support of our own forces.
Have you been involved in the process of composing
your division, its preparation and its deployment?
I may surprise you but I can only note that this involvement
was very late and resulted only from my personal insistence.
The reasons for what we can consider as abnormal
regarding the operational efficiency can be largely
explained, but not only, by the eminently political context in
which the force engagement was included.
Some chronological marks to illustrate this aspect:
- September 29th 1995: NATO begins preparing a peace multinational force
- October 12th: Decision to send a NATO force in Bosnia in
the days following the signature of a peace agreement,
- November 1st: Beginning of the peace negotiations in Dayton,
- November 21st: Signature of a global peace agreement about
Bosnia in Dayton;
- November 24th: I am officially selected and therefore allowed
to officially deal with the Joint Planning Staff (EMIA) and to
take part in the planning works some of which being largely
drafted and this since mid September.
The diplomatic context only partially explains these delays.
Indeed, France’s participation, at a very significant level, in
an operation placed under NATO aegis could not have been
possible, according to me, without a diplomatic gesture
towards NATO. This explains why during
numerous weeks the French representatives in
the different NATO planning bodies were more
active observers than accepted actors. This
also explains why, despite having been prewarned for months, my official selection was
so late.
ECPAD
On the other hand, the inter-allied general
planning was painful, the Joint planning staff
at Creil constituting a screen between the
ARRC and my staff.; it was also the case for
the French-French logistical planning with
many actors (Armed forces Joint Staff, Joint
planning staff, Army Staff, Rapid Action Force,
3rd Army Corps) and without any assigned real
leader. The MNDSE final composition was
therefore decided rather late.
Taking into account the emergency but also
because it was taking over UNPROFOR, IFOR
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SPECIAL ISSUE MN COMMAND
was set up as a coalition (or as a UNO force) i.e. by
requesting troop contributing nations from NATO as well as
non NATO. Then, “everybody being welcome” it has been
like in a Spanish hotel and each contributing nation came
with forces the volume and composition of which was
according to its own appreciation. Some examples : an
excess in heavy armored vehicles difficult to use as regards
the geography of the country, the excess in artillery or even
the excess in Medical Service units. Another drawback: the
research of national objectives sometimes very different
from the general goal. In this matter France is no exception
and often places the local French commanding officer in a
tricky position. A single example: Paris wanted that my CP
be in Mostar but my center of gravity was in Sarajevo. After
living for some days with two half CPs (a farcical situation) I
finally decided to regroup everybody in Sarajevo waiting for
the possibility to settle down definitively in Mostar in late
February.
Nevertheless it cannot be denied that in this context
of inter-ethnic rivalries the engagement of such or such
contingent selected according to religious or historical
criteria can facilitate the performance of the mission
(for example placing the Spanish brigade in the Catholic
Croatian part of Bosnia).
Finally, the MNDSE had the following composition:
- an HQ and Division base (2,000 men),
- two French brigades in Sarajevo and Mostar (4,000 men),
- one Spanish brigade (3,000 men),
- one Italian brigade (3,500 men) including a Portuguese
battalion,
- Egyptian, Jordanian and Ukrainian units
(around 2,500 men),
- A Moroccan task force (1,200 men).
MDNSE Structure
Sir, can you tell us some words about interoperability
and by extension about your relations with your
superiors and subordinates?
Salamander highlighted that interoperability, too often
presented as a must to conduct a multinational operation,
was indeed and really justified only in the CIS domain. It
was the case for the ARRC which had its own signal
battalion. The command and information system it deployed
for this operation has probably been one of the most
complicated in the history of the recent crises. Not less than
1 200 signalmen and technicians from the signal battalion
succeeded to make compatible between them the twenty
nets of the deployed forces, to link this tactical network to
the existing local networks to rely on the satellite network
and so permit real time command.
The situation has been similar within the division. Right at
the start of the mission, it rapidly appeared that the
deployed system was quickly overloaded. It had been
studied for a structure with two independent brigades, it
was not adapted for commanding a NATO type division with
four brigades, with a strong hierarchy and a reinforced staff.
Therefore I requested and obtained against a light strength
increase the deployment of the RITA system. It enabled me
to have at my disposal a coherent, robust, protected and
interoperable communication system to ensure the links on
the theater from my CP in Mostar with the ARRC, the French
Military representative, the four brigades, the French
battalions and other elements such as the Air detachment.
Thanks to its new satellite range the RITA system also made
it possible to connect the theater with the national high
command. Associated to the SIC/F it permitted to
significantly improve the command system within
the MNDSE.
To summarize, in a multinational context
the only interoperability worth looking for
is that of the command means.
As regards the relations between
the different hierarchic levels when we
make an assessment we need to admit
that they have been excellent. This has
been caused by several factors: the
mission was clear, all in execution,
the military from the deployed force were
not involved in a political aspect of
the solution to the crisis, most of
the contingents tacitly agreed to deny or
even to oppose the unavoidable attempts
to interfere by the national commands in
the performance of the operations
(creation of a true esprit de corps within
IFOR Land command, under the ARRC
command).
In a very practical way the contact
between the different hierarchic echelons
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MNDSE HQ STRUCTURE
was established through the daily conference calls with
the ARRC and the division. This working method very
fashionable among the Anglo-Saxons permits to command
very efficiently by voice, to create links and to avoid
the endless meetings which, in the field, cause hours of car
riding or helicopter flying.
To sum up: esprit de corps, minds focussed towards
the sole execution of a mission with a military aspect,
denial of the national interferences.
Do you consider that the support whether national
or NATO enabled you to permanently keep your
operational capability?
Most of the French units constituting the division were
already engaged on the theater in the framework of
the UNO and therefore attached to an existing logistic
system; it was decided to keep it as such i.e. “national” with
some modifications concerning mainly its geographical
position. The ARRC and IFOR had therefore only a minor role
to play, limited only to the transits in the COMZFORWARD.
The “national” support concept facilitated the mission of
the logisticians. The advantages of that method deserve to
be stressed: simplicity, flexibility, efficiency and certainty
not to have to manage a complex system that would have
had few chances to satisfy all the parties.
On the contrary the Medical service could have been an
exception to the chosen principle. In a commendable
DOCTRINE SPECIAL ISSUE
34 FEBRUARY 2007
concern to ensure a maximum support in this particularly
sensitive domain no contributing nation was sparing on
the volume and the quality of the deployed means. Thus an
obvious redundancy and an evident underemployment of
the French as well as foreign medical units. Putting
the means in common would have permitted important
economies of scale without decreasing the value of
the medical support.
One word about intelligence. Everything went well with
the ARRC on the tactical point of view and with the
gendarmes for the investigations. The relations with
the French Directorate, Military Intelligence (DRM) were
more touchy because its representatives in the field tended
to report to Paris rather than to their employing authority.
Are the French officers educated to work
in international staffs ?
At that time, few officers had the experience of serving in
NATO staffs but a lot of them had made an experience with
multinational staffs during operations under the aegis of
the UNO or the Gulf war. If it is true that the NATO
procedures were not always perfectly mastered it has been
only a matter of weeks to cope with that. In crisis situation
and under the pressure of events learning is fast. The main
obstacle to a perfect insertion (integration?) was a poor
knowledge of the English language (since that time this gap
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has been filled). On the contrary it appeared possible to
impose French as a second official language
by the judicious selection of French speaking foreign
officers for the integrated posts in the staffs placed
under the authority of France and by the attachment of
bilingual liaison teams to the brigade staffs. This policy
conducted with the utmost flexibility notably thanks to
the conference calls proved very efficient and gave a very
specific style to the MNDSE though well accepted
by the ARRC and the strictly English speaking adjacent
divisions. So it seems judicious to increase our efforts to
open still more widely our advanced military education
to the officers of the European nations to increase
the potential resource of those who might tomorrow be
inserted in our staffs.
Is the commander of a multinational force
a military commander, a politico-military
representative or both at the same time?
I assert without any hesitation that the commanding
officer of a multinational force is a military commander
and only a military commander even if I disappoint all
those who think that, since they meet in their functions
a lot of diplomatic and political representatives, it is
enough to give them a politico-military dimension.
Indeed the multinational engagements are always or
almost always placed under the aegis of an international
organisation which is the sole holder of the political
power (UNO, NATO, EU). It gives a mandate on the theater
to a special representative (always a civilian) to watch
the proper execution of the resolution resulting in
the deployment of the force. More to that we need to keep
in mind that the military component of the mission,
for as important and visible it be, is only one among
many others (reconstruction, elections, human rights,
refugees, etc.). The military leader must of course have a
political view of his mission but he must keep his place
when he is associated to the political decision making.
Every time it has been different the consequences have
always been to the detriment of the military leader.
Always in this report I stressed the necessity to innovate
regarding the operation of our HQs. At division level
because of the complexity of the political-military situation
and the originality of the mission, we had to differentiate
very clearly the plans, the conduct, the contacts with the
factions. This led to create a very strong study-planning cell
(6 high level senior officers coming from very different
horizons) to study the problems under all their aspects
and to draft concepts and guidelines. Once validated, these
concepts were transformed into orders by the Ops Center
alone in charge of the conduct
In this respect the creation of the Force HQs very well fills
the need of a strong HQ.
What advices would you give a future multinational
force commander?
- To chose (or have assigned) the hard core of his future
team which must as much as possible be distinct from
the one that will set up and project the force. This team
will more especially be in charge of the general and
operational planning and of the necessary contacts to be
taken during the setting up.
- To meet (depending on the case) with the special
representative of the international organization under
which aegis the force will operate or with the higher level
military authority.
- To obtain from the national command a general planning
guideline in order to begin in due time and hour the
planning at his level of responsibility.
- To obtain the clearance for a direct contact with the
commanders of the foreign forces composing the
multinational force in order to obtain, as much as possible
a general coherence of the projected means.
- To obtain the assignment of a political advisor to enlighten
the future military decisions.
- To have the rules of engagement studied by the operation
legal advisor.
Beyond the previous topics what are
the main lessons you learned from your mission?
In my end of mission report I was wishing France to set up
a projection HQ similar to the ARRC that had impressed us
all. I think I wrote then that the ARRC had a true HQ culture:
perfect mastering of the procedures, concern for team
work, political view of the problems, permanent anticipation
of the situation, adaptation and evolution of the structures
depending on the needs. So I can only be delighted
with the decision to provide our Army with a rapid
reaction HQ, the CRR-FR on the ARRC model.
- To ban any cross attachments between different units and
nationalities. Their support as well as their command are
then uselessly complicated and the whole efficiency is
decreased. A multinational force must not be assimilated
to a pleasant “jamboree”.
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As a Reminder...
The Multinational Force in Kosovo
(Kosovo Force - KFOR)
province of Serbia, one of the States of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo is historically
A
considered by the Serbs as the birth place of their
nation. Up till 1999 it was inhabited by a population
of Albanian origin essentially. Year 1999 saw the end
of a policy of ethnic hate implemented by Slobodan
Milosevic, president of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. Therefore, in 1999 Kosovo encountered
a serious humanitarian crisis. The military and
paramilitary Serbian forces are opposed to the Kosovo
Liberation Army (UCK) composed by populations
of Albanian origin. We see massive movements of
population (one million of refugees). Facing the failure
of the Rambouillet negotiations, and in front of the
threat of a genocide of the populations of Albanian
origin by the Serbs, NATO launches on March 24th, 1999
the air operation Allied Force. Facing the demonstrated
determination of NATO, the power at Belgrade gives
in and accepts the entry of a multinational force
in the province.
On its side on June 10th, 1999, the United Nations
Security Council passes resolution 1244 which
authorizes the creation of the Kosovo Force (KFOR).
The KFOR, a force under UN mandate and under
the responsibility of NATO, enters Kosovo
on June 12th, 1999.
The mission given by the United Nations to the KFOR
is threefold. First, the KFOR must establish and
preserve a security environment in Kosovo and this
includes public order. Then, it must monitor, check
and if necessary impose the abidance to the military
technical agreements (MTA) signed on June 9th, 1999
which marked the end of the conflict between
the Serbian forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army.
Last, the KFOR constitutes a support force to the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which
is the civilian part of the United Nations action
in the province.
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At the beginning, the KFOR has over 20,000 men.
It will reach a maximum of 50,000 men. It is composed
of about 35 nations that are NATO members or not,
including Russia. On its side, France proposes a
participation of 7,000 men.
The KFOR, whose command post is located at Pristina,
is now organized into 4 multinational brigades that are
all placed under the authority of the KFOR commander,
General Jackson (UK), who commands the ARRC.
The Multinational Brigade East is commanded
by the United States, the South-Western brigade
by Germany, the Central brigade by Finland and
the North-Eastern brigade, main contact area between
the Serbian populations and the Albanian origin
populations, by France. At the North of the province,
this area placed under French responsibility, is the one
which faces the most tensions due to the proximity
of the antagonist populations.
The mission of the KFOR is still not completed and one
can punctually see an upsurge of ethnic tensions in
the province. In any case, the international community
cannot envisage a withdrawal of the troops of
the KFOR from Kosovo before having solved
the sensitive issue of the future status of Kosovo.
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The Account of British General (Ret)
Mike JACKSON
Former Commander of NATO Kosovo Force
(KFOR) from June to october 1999
raduated from the British Military Academy,
G
Sandhurst, and an intelligence officer, he was
Battalion Commander, 1st battalion, Parachute
Regiment, from 1984 to 1986; he assumed the
duties of Commanding General, 39th Infantry
Brigade from 1989 to 1992 and 3rd (UK) Division
from 1994 to 1996. Between 1995 and 1996, he
commanded the UNPROFOR units in BosniaHerzegovina, then the SFOR’s Multinational
Division South-West (MND - SW). He commanded
the Directorate General Development and Doctrine
(DGD&D) from 1996 to 1997; then he assumed
the duties of Commanding General, ACE Rapid
Reaction Corps (ARRC) from 1997, with which he
moved to Macedonia before becoming Commanding
General, KFOR, from June 1999 to October 1999.
He commanded the UK Land Force between 2000
and 2003, and he assumed the appointment of
Army Chief of the General Staff from 2003 to 2006.
ECPAD
He left the Army in 2006.
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ACCOUNT OF FRENCH GENERAL OFFICERS WHO
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On two occasions, firstly with the IFOR on 1st
December 1995 with a 7 month deployment in
Bosnia upon transfer of authority from UN to
NATO; I then commanded the 3d UK Division
which formed up the multi national division
South West. That represented my first practical
experience of multinationality as a general; the
main contingents comprised the Canadians, the
Dutch, the Czechoslovakians completed by a
number of smaller contingents. The second
occasion was by mid 1999 till mid October as
commanding general of (NATO) KFOR (COMARRC
from early 1997 to the end of 1999). It was
extremely interesting to shift from peacetime to
an operational one; KFOR was comprised of five
main contingents: the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, Italy and the US plus a number of other
nationalities.
ECPAD
When did you command a multinational
operation?
What was the general context of your command
responsibilities?
I left the command on the eight of October 99 but
the aspects that led to the crisis are certainly more
interesting. Kosovo came on the international scene
in May 98. While a potential NATO deployment was not
excluded, it became clear that LCC was to be the ARRC
(the only available and experienced HRF HQ at this time)
which planned and watched the unfolding situation with
interest. The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission was
deployed in October and NATO simultaneously established
the Extraction Force in Kumanovo with brigadier FR Valentin
(this force was multinational with contingents from Italy,
United Kingdom, Germany under NATO Command).
When the future clarified, some nations decided to put
some forces in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
on a unilateral basis under national command. SHAPE
decided to deploy HQ ARRC in a coordinating role (land
allocation) which was a messy start with no unified
command and tasks largely administrative! Things became
clearer by mid March with the ongoing deployment and
the final visit of Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade to which
Milosevic opposed his refusal.
The commencement of military action took place on
the 24th of March 99. Even then there was reluctance to
establish a robust command structure, including in the UK
(with caveats) where there was concern over the fact that
we were very small to take land action: 5,000 men, 30 MBTs,
twenty 105 Arty compared to the power of the VJ (they might
try an adventure in Macedonia). We went through a strange
period: the air campaign was underway and simultaneously
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we faced a very severe refugee crisis deliberately triggered
by Milosevic to destabilise Macedonia and NATO as well.
That was a critical moment for the Macedonian government
which could not cope with hundreds of thousands of
refugees in two weeks. To neutralise what was perceived as
a threat, KFOR had to take the first action at once.
What was the objective related to the final end state?
It’s a very good question! The end state had several
different versions. Firstly, why did NATO went in there was
guilt over the failure of EU to take action in Bosnia
(spectre of the siege of Sarajevo); some even argued that
it was only when the US arrived that the European took
action (AFSOUTH was providing the air power). There was
a sense that we could not stand by and watch ethnic
cleansing. Secondly, for a lot of people the end state was
the prevention of mass killing, but amazingly with no UN
security resolution to authorise any military action.
The Rambouillet Accord set out an international force in
Kosovo and only an interim end state. A three month
period of time went on and some countries became
nervous. It was an affair of months and having begun this
military action, it was unthinkable that NATO say we are
going home: it would have been a defeat. Therefore,
if the air campaign was not enough to force Milosevic’s
compliance, we might have had to force entry on the
ground. At last, as time went on “Serbs out, NATO in,
refugees back” became the endstate; but of course it
could not be an end state (it had to be a political one)
and the real one was indeed to settle the long term
constitutional future of Kosovo.
What was your mission?
The mission I published was that KFOR is to: firstly to
establish a secure environment, secondly to monitor
and verify and if necessary enforce compliance with
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the conditions of the military technical agreement, thirdly
to provide assistance to the UN Mission in Kosovo. It was
most clearly defined in the UN Council Security Resolution
n° 1244 (10 June 1999) and the responsibilities/mission of
KFOR included:
- Deterring renewed hostilities,
- maintaining and enforcing a cease fire,
- demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army,
- Establishing a secure environment,
- ensuring public safety,
Well it was interesting, because in peace time, the ARRC is
a Corps HQ commanding a number of manoeuvre divisions
and Corps troops, but KFOR was not exactly a corps in size,
shape and role. The ARRC provided a HQ with a very wide
breadth of functions; for example, we transformed our fire
support branch into a - key/essential - faction liaison branch
and it became “oil in the machine”.
We found ourselves commanding in reality five brigades;
it was all right, but they may need more directions than
divisional HQs and I think that the brigades adapted their
own behaviour; KFOR had five points of contact, plus
Macedonia as rear echelon, plus Thessaloniki for the RSOI.
The Russians were soon integrated into two of the five
- upporting and coordinating with the work of
the international civil presence (namely the UNMIK).
To summarize, KFOR was doing a lot of things in the civil
area, initially acting in a civilian vacuum, attempting to
keep a minimum civil action going until UNMIK would
take it over; worth to be noticed, the NATO order to
fulfil the mission finally arrived in Pristina 40 days after
our deployment!
How was the chain of command organised?
brigades. There was no UN Security council resolution
because it was clear that they were going to veto for three
reasons; firstly, there was the slave orthodox connection.
Secondly, Russia had a sense of being treated in a
condescending way by the West. And thirdly,
Mr. Chernomyrdin was among the gentlemen who brought
Milosevic on concessions. We thus had been led to believe
and we finally expected that there would be a Russian
contingent in KFOR in a way or another. What was
surprising was how and when they decided to move from
Bosnia; it was a political move, and the message was:
“we are an actor on this world stage and you must respect
Russia”; it was very easily handled in a sensible way
(not exactly the way SACEUR expected), which led to a
rapid integration in the force (the fact that the Commander
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had some knowledge in Russian certainly helped to ease
the problems).
What were the means at your disposal?
We had five subordinate brigade HQs, a force which
eventually grew up to 55,000 when compared to entry with
only 15,000. We were glad we didn’t have to embark upon
a force entry. We would have won but we would have taken
a lot of casualties...
Implication of the commander in the definition
of the mission of the multinational force?
He certainly has a role because part of the difficulty of any
coalition is that you get commanded by committees. And so
even if sometimes the NATO drafts did not appear so clear
(“oh, they will kill me in SHAPE!”), the UN Security Council
Resolution 1244 was our bible;
it was clear, well drafted, providing
the appropriate amount of forces and
assets to fulfil the mission. However,
one has to keep in mind that to mount a
multinational operation and to deploy
the contingents, a given commander relies on
nations to generate forces and provide
contributions.
caveats are made, but he cannot change them. He can do
that with the help of senior visitors, through his own capital
but at last Nations remain sovereign and above all it is
Politics! But caveats are unhelpful, militarily absurd and the
degree to which national governments tend to do things
varies from one government to another (one has to keep in
mind this image of the “long screw driver”: shall we give a
half turn or a quarter turn?).
It is modern multinational soldiering and the solution is to
work with it and to integrate the caveats as tactical
constraints; the commander has just to try to improve when
he can, but not to get angry about it or frustrated because it
is a waste of energy.
Interoperability: reality or constraint?
It’s both... Interoperability is the real world, it can be a
limitation (at least for some of us!) but it depends what you
mean: one (national) brigade in a division, is particularly
adapted especially on CIS side (certainly not at the level of a
company or a section). If you are not war fighting, it is
then possible to go further down: a British battalion can
then be TACON or OPCON to a French Brigade or viceversa for example. War fighting creates
difficulty and interoperability in this
case should not go below national
brigade.
Advantages
and constraints
of national
specificities for
the execution of the mission?
It is a difficult and most sensitive
question ... but it is reality! All nations
when offering forces will place caveats on
their employment. It should not be so,
because to achieve the maximum capability
the commander must have completely free
hands. But the degree to which national
capitals will supervise in detail the activities
of the forces and then national contingents is a fact of life.
The commander can influence the degree to which such
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Going back to Kosovo
entry plan, the 1st echelon
in Presevo valley was
the French battalion but with no artillery; we had one
battery and to devise a system whereby a British gun
battery would support a French Battalion in conventional
war fighting was an interesting exercise... it was a real
challenge. It can be done but it is not something usual
and we need to be careful and don’t go further down than
actually required since going further down creates
military friction!
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Command relationship with higher levels
and with subordinate units?
As COMKFOR I was fortunate with the five brigade
commanders I worked with; we knew each other well
(the waiting time in Macedonia offered study periods,
weekly conferences, visits). I certainly enjoyed these men
and I hope they would say the same of me; so at this level
life was simple.
At the higher level, SHAPE plan placed KFOR under
regional command which was then AFSOUTH in Naples;
thus CINCSOUTH was in theory the military superior.
But - and I make no judgment - SHAPE and SACEUR dealt
directly with the force and AFSOUTH was bypassed a lot
of times which was confusing if not humiliating for him
(either you are the regional command or you are not);
it could have been done directly from SHAPE but the air
operation was run in Vicenza, so the situation was not
ideal (I think it is in the public domain Jackson & Clark
did not see eye to eye very well). The role of DSACEUR Ruppert Smith, with his knowledge of the Balkans
and his background as successful commander - was
extremely helpful for COMKFOR and it was also helpful
to see a non-American to whom to speak. I also found
conversations with various heads of armies encouraging.
Adaptation of Logistics and support organisation?
The ARRC was an Expeditionary HQ; but there was little
multinational logistics even if there was some kind
of sharing with the NSE concept. For KFOR there was no
great substance in this theme.
Is the commander of a multinational operation either a
truly military leader, or a Political Military leader or both
at the same time?
The question either/or is wrong ... The commander
of a multinational force MUST be a military commander
to have credibility with senior military leadership of
contributing nations; as he puts them at risk, they need
some confidence and the commander must be competent.
But in such a multinational environment, a commander
can not function unless he has political understanding
of the situation; he has to understand that his military
action is to achieve a political objective (create some
sorts of conditions) and thus he must look at how he uses
the military force, the aim being to achieve the political
end state. General Jackson was not double hated as
commanding British forces and it sent the right
message/signal that the multinational force commander
was truly acting in the benefit of the force.
absence of the rule of law; general Jackson saw in some way
a very close parallel between KFOR and UNMIK appointed
and elected by the UN to embody the civil international
authority in Kosovo. This represented
the lawful government of Kosovo and therefore the military
force should regard it as the elected government of a
country. For General Jackson, Bernard Kouchner was
the civil power to whom he was responsible for
the security and military activities. This was a proper
message to send to Kosovars: in a democracy, military is
subject to the civil power (As a matter of fact, general
Jackson always saluted Mr. Kouchner with a nuance of
respect - and kind humour as well - as “le roi”).
Beyond those themes, what main and key lessons
did you draw from your mission?
A lot! But above all a key one: how difficult it is to make a
coalition work even along an organisation like NATO which
has mechanisms. It is still very difficult and moreover KFOR
mission was not an article V with survival issues ...
What would be your recommendations
to a general who has just been appointed
to command a multinational force/operation?
• Keep upon some sense of humour.
• Understand what makes the various national contingents
... and their peculiarities/specificities.
• Try to be opened and establish trust and confidence
among and with the subordinate commanders.
• Get along in some other languages; this provides insight
in the culture of the subordinate contingents.
• Keep a bottle of whisky with you (i.e. don’t hesitate to go
beyond the uniform: the more the command team gets to
know each other informally, the better it is).
• If you can help one of your subordinate commanders do
so, he will appreciate ... Even when he tells you the sad
tale of the screw driver!
Relations with the UNMIK. One of the reasons we were for
such a long time in the Balkans was that there was an
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The Account of Lieutenant
General Yves de KERMABON,
Former Commanding General
of the Kosovo Force (KFOR)
from September 1st 2004 to September 1st 2005
raduated from the French Military Academy,
G
Saint-Cyr, and an Armor officer, he commanded
the first Régiment étranger de cavalerie (Foreign
Legion Armored Cavalry Battalion) from 1991 to
1993 and the French Battalion in Cambodia during
this period. As the Commanding General, Land Force
HQ 4 (EMF 4) from 2002, he assumed the duties
of Deputy Commander, KFOR, between March 2003
and September 2003, before commanding this
Multinational Force between September 2004
and September 2005.
Currently, he has been assuming the duties
of Commanding General, French Rapid Reaction
Corps (CRR-RF) since October 1st, 2005.
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Sir, you were in command of the KFOR from September
1st 2004 to September 1st 2005. Have you had an
opportunity to prepare yourself for this command?
Yes and under good conditions. I was able to select
and prepare my command and control team, and to
prepare myself for the mission and this for 2 reasons:
I had already carried out two missions in Kosovo, so I
had a good knowledge of the terrain and the players,
and above all I had been appointed a long time in
advance.
When I came back in 2003, after having served for six
months within the COMKFOR as the deputy commander,
and after commanding the North-East Brigade in 2002,
I knew that I had fair chances to be appointed as
the future COMKFOR; I was designated in February 2004!
This is an invaluable advantage as I have had all
the time to think about what I wanted to do. In this
respect, I was able to benefit from the “Key leader
training”1 in Kosovo to give the first outlines to my
command and control team. I met my future chief in
Naples as well as the SACEUR in Mons. I also had
discussions with all the key military and political
executives in the Ministry of Defense, foreign affairs as
well as in the Armed Forces Joint Staff, the Army Staff,
the Directorate, Military Intelligence (DRM),
the Directorate, Strategic Policy (DAS)..., able to give
me top level information. In this kind of operation,
the inter-ministry aspect is very important. I was
received in other foreign bodies and last I met the future
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General
(who took office a fortnight before me) during one of his
trips to Paris. Therefore, I consider that I have had
the optimum conditions.
Within which framework did you exercise
these responsibilities?
The KFOR, a NATO multinational force, commanded
by General Jackson who at that time headed the “ACE
Rapid Reaction Corps” (ARRC), entered in Kosovo in June
1999. This force of 50,000 men acted alongside
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK) within the framework of resolution 1244
of the United Nations.
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At that time, the mission of the force was essentially to
compel the Serb forces to leave Kosovo. This was the
first mission assigned to the KFOR, which had
verification structures (Joint Implementation
Commission, JIC) and held regular meetings with the
Serb officers, and this at all levels (battalion, brigade,
KFOR). Then the mission changed in the sense that the
purpose became to ensure a “safe and secure”
environment, i.e. to maintain security and stability in
Kosovo.
Sir, what did your mission consist in?
Whilst continuing to warrant a “safe and secure”
environment, the purpose was to achieve the conditions
necessary to prepare for the future of the province but
also to prepare for the reduction of the force and to
some extent the end of the crisis. Initially amounting
to 50,000 men, the strength of the KFOR went down to
30,000 under the orders of General Valentin and then
to 17,000 upon my arrival. The March 2004 incidents
demonstrated to the international community that
nothing was settled. Therefore, I firstly worked in order
to increase the efficiency and reactivity of the force
whilst continuing to develop the “Unfixing Strategy”,
which consisted in transferring a certain number of nonmilitary missions to the police. This allows for the local
institutions to take over more responsibilities as well as
for the KFOR to reorganize. The next step will be
“deterrence presence”, a concept which consists in
having a minimum deterring force whilst being able to
react rapidly by relying upon tactical, operational and
strategic reserves.
Is the commander involved in the definition
of the mission of the multinational force?
I had an important role in the evolution of the force as
the objective was to make it more flexible and more
reactive. Instead of 4 brigades territorially anchored,
the force will be organized into 5 lighter Tasks forces
and able to act over the entire Kosovo.
What about the advantages and constraints
of the national specificities for the execution
of the mission?
A multinational commander must place himself above
national interests. However and independently from being
the REPFRANCE, as COMKFOR, I regularly reported about
the situation to the French Armed Forces Chief of Staff.
Within NATO, even if the French troops have a specific
place, they are fully recognized. As far as employment
restrictions (caveats) are concerned, we made significant
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progress thanks to the action of my predecessor
supported by the SACEUR, General Jones. Those that
still existed upon my arrival on crowd control and
the employment of non-lethal means were practically
cancelled. Thus, the KFOR became a much more flexible,
reactive and homogeneous force than it was two years
before.
Despite its advantages, a multinational force has certain
inertia in terms of logistics and intelligence. The SACEUR
wanted to multi-nationalize in order to reinforce
the reaction capability of the KFOR. It is extremely difficult.
I’ve tried to do it by creating a multinational intelligence
committee and by also integrating the police in it.
The committee gathered all the players likely to bring
intelligence including the National Intelligence Cells (NIC).
Smooth running of this committee was difficult
at the beginning. But the fact of insisting on
the specificities that each of us should preserve to operate
in his area of competence and on the fact that we are all
united around the same mission and that there is a
minimum of things to put in common in order to fulfill it, is
an idea which sinks in well. Without obtaining full support,
we succeed in having persons working together. This is a
permanent paradox between the NATO will of achieving
more and the sovereignty of nations.
As far as logistics is concerned, as the nations pay for
the support of their soldiers, it is difficult to multinationalize or mutualize a certain number of assets.
Can it be said that the force commander must “manage multinationality” in order to obtain
the best out of it?
One must find a minimum of common denominators in
which everybody will recognize themselves and simplify
the mission by finding a motto, I had chosen “restore
confidence”, around which everybody has to gather and
identify themselves. From this standpoint, it is possible
to compare the multinational commander to
the conductor of an orchestra that must play the same
music sheet with different instruments whose strong
and weak points he must know in order to use
the appropriate instrument at the right time. On should
know that some units will fulfill better certain missions
as they are trained better for them and as that is more
in connection with their national culture, and take these
divergences into account to obtain the best
complementary effects. Commanding 35 different
nations is an immense treasure. It is possible to obtain
a lot from each nation when it works in accordance with
its own culture, competence and history. One must also
be aware of the limits as anything cannot be asked to
anyone. One must play on those two scales to obtain
the achievement of the mission assigned to you. This is
where all the art and the manner of commanding a
multinational force lie.
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Were the rules of engagement precise
enough or have they been adapted in the course
of the mission?
In March 2004 some young officers and NCOs were
facing, with a few dozen soldiers, demonstrating crowds
with rules of engagement based on self-defense and this
doesn’t mean much when faced to women and children.
From the beginning, this has been my main concern.
Thus, the legal advisors (LEGAD) have searched for a
common minimum legal basis that was common to all
nations. From there we have built a concept and defined
rules of engagements in order to avoid for young officers
and NCOs to be faced with unmanageable situations.
ECPAD
Our concept started from the principle that one cannot
be everywhere all the time and defend all
the inhabitants and sensitive locations in Kosovo.
Therefore, we have determined the most sensitive areas
and locations at the level of the COMKFOR and of each
brigade commander, and then those upon which efforts
had to be made by placing the assets to defend them.
In this way, we elaborated the “red box” and “blue box”
concepts.
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This military defense layout enabled to employ
weapons, as the mission was to defend the sensitive
“red box” point. Around it was located the “blue box”,
an area in which we placed all available military and
police assets, to dissuade the demonstrators or rioters
of reaching the “red box”. When this defense was
activated, the areas were marked on the ground. As
the rioters entered the “blue box” assets were
hardened, crowd control, non-lethal assets, smoke, tear
gases, plastic bullets, so that those who would reach
the “red box” wouldn’t reach it accidentally, but
animated with an obvious will of attacking the sensitive
point. Our soldiers were therefore placed in a very clear
situation, they could fulfill the mission they had
received.
The implementation of this concept was preceded and
accompanied with a very educative information
campaign. Then we carried out common trainings,
military forces and police forces together, shows to
the population and to different political local and
province executives so that everybody could see
the assets that we had put in place to fulfill the mission.
This has had a significant deterring effect.
Interoperability: is it a reality or a constraint?
Interoperability is rather an objective to achieve.
At the level of a staff this involves specific training in
numerous fields including procedures and English
language. In addition, the lessons learned, acquired
during operations, enable each of us to improve.
What is true for staffs is more difficult at unit level
essentially for material and logistical reasons. In fact,
for units, the nations implement various principles
taking into account financial constraints and national
responsibilities. However, as most of the present
engagements are carried out within a multinational
framework, one must work in this direction and look
together for common solutions, especially as far as
general support is concerned.
Improvement margins towards interoperability do exist.
As far as communications and command and control
information are concerned, significant improvements
have been made. This is certainly less the case for
armament, ammunitions and vehicles.
Are French officers trained to serve within
multinational staffs?
At the beginning of our commitment at Sarajevo with
the United Nations, we had a poor awareness of those
structures and procedures and few officers spoke
English well. I discovered all this on my way between my
first operation in Cambodia and the entry of the 6th Light
Armored Brigade in Bosnia with the ARRC. Today, a
certain number of officers are practically “immersed” in
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these structures. They have a sufficiently fair level of
English to feel immediately at ease. They prepare
themselves for staff or military assistant positions, and,
when the time comes, they will be able to take over
responsibilities at multinational level.
We can be proud of our officers that are in multinational
staffs. They are more and more recognized on the NATO
“market place”. Coming from far behind, we have now
reached a most satisfactory situation.
Was the general support organization adapted?
Within a pure French environment, there is no problem.
Within the international one, they were none either from
the moment that each stayed in their area. Difficulties
appeared with the implementation of the “cross
boundaries operations” aiming at exchanging units
between brigades in order to become more reactive and
prepare for the future. In fact, we had to find technical
agreements so that units from a given nation could be
supported by another nation. Constraining restrictions
came rapidly into light as, when a country accepts to pay
expensive costs to send a unit within a multinational
force and supports it in terms of logistics, it reluctantly
accepts further financial costs due to an exchange of
area. Some contributing nations considered they had to
pay twice when they had to change sectors. This has
been one of the great difficulties of interoperability in
that field.
The commander of a multinational force: military
commander or political-military executive?
The COMKFOR is a political-military chief. The military
part is neither the most constraining nor the most
difficult one. I had assigned the responsibilities for
operations to my deputy; I had focused on contacts with
the local and international players. The COMKFOR is one
of the key persons in Kosovo as he is responsible for
general security and represents NATO. Our aim is to
provide the Kosovo people with the environment
necessary to prepare for their future. For this purpose,
I needed to have permanent contacts with
the population and the various responsible persons;
I needed to be aware of the situation, to win their trust
and to carry out a convincing education work by
convincing the ones and the others to take up their
responsibilities in order to build Kosovo for their
children.
Authorities in Brussels were rapidly aware of this key
role and allowed me an entire freedom of action in terms
of communications with the media and local
representatives. However, they have shown much more
reluctance when I told them that the theater
commanders also needed political guidelines if not
political directives.
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What lessons do you draw from your mission?
An extraordinary enrichment, at military, human and
political levels, even if and undoubtedly above all,
because it has not always been easy and that during
a whole year, the rhythm was very high.
Besides this personal enrichment, I still believe that
we must integrate ourselves within those multinational
operations, take into account the political-military role
of theater commanders, guide them and draw the
appropriate lessons in terms of training and education.
The training I had and the experiences I had had during
previous operations led me to be under the best
conditions to exercise this command. Our institution
must take this into account to build the “profile of
officers” to whom it will become possible to give such
commands.
historic, human, sociologic, political, economical and
religious fields in order to understand at best the local
and international players. Then, one must build a team
and do everything from the start to create great
confidence, a great team spirit and transparency in this
command. One must gather everybody around a simple
idea, trust, especially within a multinational framework,
and then be aware of one’s strengths and weaknesses
in order to be able of using the appropriate person at
the right time. A sole man achieves nothing.
1 This training period of one week gives a specific preparation to executives due
to serve with the KFOR.
What recommendations would you give
to a general officer who has just been appointed
to command a multinational force?
ECPAD
From the first day, you must be ready to take over your
responsibilities. Therefore, one must beforehand have
thought it over, prepared oneself and built one’s concept
of operation. One must be aware of the geographic,
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As a Reminder...
The First Operation of the European
Union in Macedonia
(CONCORDIA)
Since 2001, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM) has been going through acute ethnic tensions.
It is agitated by Albanian radicals, supporting a “large
Albania” and wishing to regroup in one single country
Kosovo, Albania and the North of Macedonia. This
embryo of crisis is in some ways the last convulsion of
the explosion of the Balkans that began in 1992. These
Albanian radicals are regrouped in the National Army of
the Albanians from Macedonia, they carry out guerilla
operations in the North of the country against the
governmental forces that are supported by NATO and
the European Union which both fear an extension of
the conflict. Six months of conflicts end up, under
the pressure of the European Union, with the signature
of the Ohrid agreements on August 13th, 2001. In order
to implement those agreements, especially thanks to
the disarming of the Albanian militias, NATO deploys
from August 22nd, 2001 onwards, a force of 3,500 men
(operation ESSENTIAL HARVEST, then AMBER FOX and
lastly ALLIED HARMONY). The French forces participating
to this deployment are regrouped in operation MINERVE.
Within the context of the American operation in Iraq,
the North Atlantic Council decides on March 17th, 2003
to put an end to the mandate of its force in Macedonia
on March 31st. Therefore and on this date, NATO transfers
the responsibility of the operation in Macedonia to
the European Union, which then takes the name of
operation CONCORDIA (March 31st - December 15th, 2003).
The French participation to CONCORDIA takes the name
of operation ALTAÏR, which succeeds to operation
MINERVE.
For the first time with CONCORDIA, the European Union
conducts an operation within the framework of
the Petersberg operations (military participation within
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the framework of humanitarian missions or evacuation of
citizens, of peacekeeping missions or of combat missions
for crisis management, including peace restoring
operations). CONCORDIA is situated at the low level
of the Petersberg operations as at the beginning of
the operation, relative peace was restored in the North
of Macedonia, even if the insecurity atmosphere remains,
notably fed by the numerous mafia groups that are active
in the area as well as by still persisting ethnic rivalries.
CONCORDIA is characterized by three types of missions:
collection of information, demonstration of a deterring
military presence and support to the international
community observers.
CONCORDIA roughly has 400 men, including 175 French
soldiers, coming from 26 nations including 14 that are
not members of the European Union. As France is
the lead nation, the operation is commanded by
the French general MARAL, from SKOPJE, between March
31st and September 30th, 2003. Then from this date on,
command is ensured by the EUROFOR.
Considering the stabilization of the situation in
the North of the country, the European Union decides to
replace the military force by a European police force from
December 15th, 2003 onwards, named operation
PROXIMA (200 policemen and “gendarmes” including
40 French personnel).
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The Account of Major
General Pierre MARAL,
Former Commander of the European Union
Operation in Macedonia (CONCORDIA), from
March 31st through December 15th 2003
raduated from the French Military
G
Academy, Saint-Cyr, and an Engineer
officer, he commanded the 6th Engineer
Battalion from 1992 to 1994, during a period
when he also assumed the duties of Chief
Engineer in the Sarajevo sector between
January 1994 and July 1994. As the
Commanding General, French Land Force HQ 1
between April 2003 and July 2004, he
commanded the European Union’s operation
CONCORDIA in Macedonia from March 2003
to December 2003.
He has been Deputy Commanding
General, Army Region – South-West (RTSO),
ECPAD
since August 1, 2004.
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Sir, could you describe for us the power build-up, and
then the deployment of the Force CONCORDIA?
In order to correctly understand the political-military context
of this build-up, it must be reminded that the main aim of this
operation was to validate the operating of the very new
European institutions as well as the so called “Berlin+”
agreements that had just been signed after lengthy and
difficult negotiations.
Therefore, I believe you can well imagine the political pressure
that was exercised so that the European Security and Defense
Policy (ESDP) could find at last a concrete application on
the ground and so that the new tools allowed for it could get
over their teething troubles. Rather paradoxically, we had to be
fast although the situation on the ground did not require such
a degree of urgency. In fact, the Ohrid agreements, signed in
September 2001, put an end to the hostilities in the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM), and the NATO
operation Allied Harmony whose CP was at Skopje, supported
the on going peace process.
On January 27 2003, the common EU action in the FYRM was
decided and at the end of March the CONCORDIA force,
the EUFOR was operational.
the arrival of multinationals. This principle was well accepted
during the force generation conference that was held at
Brussels. For the story and to confirm the validity of this
option, the chief of staff, an Italian colonel, only rejoined his
post a month after the beginning of the operation.
The operational planning, the power build up of the force and
the deployment of an advanced CP as soon as March 1st 2003
were carried out nominally. I must here point out the excellent
synergy between the different players, in the army staff but
also in the Land Command as well as in the Operations
Command and Preparation Center and even At Brussels and at
Mons. In a first step, the advanced CP was co-localized with
the NHQS (NATO Headquarters at Skopje). Aiming at enabling
the EUFHQ2 to become operational as soon as possible after
the signature of the political decision, it fulfilled its role
perfectly well. But if the power build up was carried out so
fast, it is first thanks to the planning and reactive capabilities
of a tool such as the Force HQ1 that I commanded at that time,
and also thanks to the French national support (the French
National Support Elements) that was present within the KFOR,
which established the welcoming structures for the force
(shelters, data processing, CIS liaisons) within a few weeks.
It is also France which ensured the financing
of this new force awaiting that NATO and
the EU set up the appropriate budget and
logistical procedures, and this took
lengthy months.
Were you able to choose
your immediate subordinates?
Confronted to the reluctances of its allies (Europeans but also
NATO members), France volunteered to become the lead
nation. As such, it took command of the force I was
nominated1 for, and ensured the essential operational
functions such as the CIS and a great part of support.
The allocation of positions within the Force HQ was tricky.
Rapidly I had decided to keep for France certain key positions
in order to be able to operate straight away while waiting for
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Obviously, the appointment of one’s
subordinates and the urgency of the
situation are generally antinomical.
A general appointed COMFOR can select
his immediate environment: deputy,
cabinet. It is touchier as far as the
selection of the Legal Advisor (LEGAD) or
of the Police Advisor (POLAD) is concerned
as there are very few candidates.
My LEGAD had difficulties to adapt
himself; he had no knowledge of the EU
or of NATO and spoke poor English.
The POLAD, given by the Delegation of
Strategic Affairs was quite outstanding.
Even if the multinational factor in a staff
often leads to cumbersomeness and lack
of efficiency, it is unavoidable to give more
legitimacy to the action, and one is sometimes
happily surprised by the complementarity of talents. Thus, to
reinforce my “European” attachment, I had multi-nationalized
my cabinet and I had obtained a British head of cabinet and a
Slovenian AdC who proved to be particularly efficient.
Whatever happens, it is the responsibility of the commander
to tailor his entourage in accordance with everyone’s
competences.
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agreements. Therefore, we had to
permanently assess the security
picture over the theater and
dissuade and even control all
the troublemakers able to resume
the crisis thanks to incidents,
provocations or dissemination of
malevolent rumors. Thus, with this
first EU military operation, I could
implement the doctrine and concepts
dealing with global crisis
management on which I had had
the opportunity to work a lot within
the framework of my former
activities in the Land Command
and in the Joint Staff. In particular,
I had the opportunity to experiment
“information operations” and “low
costs CIMIC actions”, which for me
are two major elements in these end
of crisis missions.
In a few words, can you tell us what your mission
consisted in?
My mission consisted in providing a military component
to the EU Special Representative who was responsible for
the coordination of the actions of the international
community for the implementation of the Ohrid
The force had a strength of roughly 450 men. This small
number is in fact representative of the deterring forces
adapted to end of crises. I had a robust HQ, able to
command several battalions placed in reinforcement
should the situation worsen, but also with significant
CIS and INT assets, in accordance with the well known
C4ISR. We never ignored the reversible nature of our
mission.
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On the other hand, there were heavy and light liaison
monitoring teams (LMT) on the ground. The heavy teams were
there to protect a minima the light ones. The courses of action
were somewhat similar to those of the Special forces, even if
no special forces - in the French sense of the term - were
committed in the FYRM. The missions of these LMTs were to
collect intelligence but also to dialog, negotiate for the very
purpose of avoiding, or at least anticipating a resuming of
violent actions between the belligerents.
I was confronted with two specific difficulties.
The first one pertained to the communications assets at
tactical level. The LMTs communicated with the CP using
Internet or cell phones, as the force did not have efficient and
secure signals assets. In vain, I pointed out at length this
deficiency, which considerably weakened the conveying of
intelligence and consequently led to a dangerous gap between
the CP and the teams on the ground in terms of security
assessments.
ECPAD
The second one dealt with the differences, at the very
operational value level, between the LMTs coming from
various nations. To make this clear, some teams given by
certain nations were only playing walk-on parts; their
personnel did not have the military culture or the know-hows
indispensable for their mission. Beyond their inefficiency, this
lack of professionalism of some teams sometimes led to
mistakes in the relations with the environment or the parties
involved in the crisis, which could have had serious
consequences.
Were the relations between NATO and the EU complex?
Yes, and complex is the appropriate word, which also entails
that they were not insurmountable.
According to the EU doctrine, the chain of command included
the OHQ located within the SHAPE and the EUFHQ located at
SKOPJE.
All the difficulty pertained to the fact that NATO had decided
to locate at Naples a coordination element (EUCE), taking into
account its theater organization of the Balkans theater and
the importance of the permanent staffs in the Alliance.
Therefore, there was an obvious gap between the
cumbersomeness of the NATO command structure that was
supposed to support us and the simplicity of the EU command
chain needed stricto sensu for operation CONCORDIA.
The EUSR (EU Special Representative), with whom I daily
worked and with all transparency, had a direct and permanent
line opened with the team of Doctor Solana at Brussels.
Therefore, I used his channel to work with the EU bodies at
Brussels, including the EUHQ, which enabled to rapidly
deal with what usually took one or two months through the
NATO channel to be dealt with.
On the ground, it is in the support and intelligence fields
that this complexity of the NATO-EU relations was
highlighted.
As far as the logistical support is concerned, there were
three players: France, NATO and the EU.
Nothing to say on the French support, our logisticians were
reactive, available and competent. As Macedonia was the
rear base of the KFOR, we benefited from the NATO
support after having gone through initial reluctances.
Finally our budget was given to us by Europe. First
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European operation of this nature, CONCORDIA was a test for
the procedures in this domain, with a late but all in all real
success.
As far as INTEL is concerned, always a touchy issue,
the collaboration with NATO was laborious at least at
the beginning and my good relations with the Spanish General
who commanded the NHQS enabled to overcome obstacles.
Clearly speaking, as NATO considered that Macedonia was in
its area of interest, it wanted the EU to provide all its
intelligence. But the reverse was not true, both for NATO
technical security reasons (non-NATO nations participated in
operation CONCORDIA) and for more irrational reasons
(mistrust of certain NATO personnel vis-à-vis the EU).
Fortunately, the NIC (National Intelligence Cells) and especially
the FRENIC (French NIC) compensated this lack of reverse
intelligence that was essential for our understanding of
the situation on the theater.
Chain of command in Macedonia
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What were your relations with the local authorities?
Immediately it obviously appeared to me that the quality of
these relations with all the local players was key for
the success of operation CONCORDIA. One must remember
that as early as 2001 Europe had invested in the FYRM in
the person of Mr. Solana. My principal interface was the EUSR
(EU Special Representative), Mr. Alexis Brouhns (Belgian),
successor of Mrs. Léotard and Leroy. From the first day we
started to think on the conditions for success and for the end
of the crisis as we had reached the limits of the military action.
Therefore, we had to convince the Macedonian authorities to
think in terms of security and no longer in terms of military
operations. The Macedonian militaries had to go back to their
barracks and a true ministry of interior, with its police, its
customs services, etc... had to be re-created.
Therefore, we had regular meetings with the politicians of
the FYRM government, other ones with the ambassadors of
the EU countries present at Skopje and each month we made
together an analysis of the security situation. I must also say
that I received a determining support from the French
ambassador at Skopje, from the French Intelligence Agency
(DGSE) and to a lesser extent from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, which is always difficult to convince!
How did you manage the disengagement of the force?
From the start, I had felt that the hardest would be to gather all
the conditions enabling to close down the operation. In fact, it
was obvious that the security situation needed more important
measures pertaining to the inside security, justice and
the running of the administration. But everybody got used to
the presence of military forces, firstly of NATO and then of
the EU, and mistrusted any evolution. Therefore, it became
compulsory to convince all parties, including Brussels, of the
necessity of entering another phase, which required the setting
up of a police force able to promote the indispensable reforms.
Here again, the key to success was the close cooperation that I
had established with the EUSP and all local authorities.
As early as August 2005, the J5 of the staff was able to begin
the planning of the disengagement of CONCORDIA. Paris
wanted the withdrawal to take place as soon as possible and I
had to argue vigorously in order not to speed up things. In
fact, during the fall the FYRM was carrying out a census of its
population as well as a recovery of weapons, both operations
being sensitive for obvious tension reasons between the
ethnic groups. On the other hand, a follow-on to CONCORDIA
had to be found. In December we handed the place over to
the force PROXIMA, composed of policemen and “gendarmes”
(notably French).
As all generals coming back from operations, I was debriefed
by my employment authorities. I had a warm welcome at Mons
from the side of Admiral Feist (German), commander of
operation CONCORDIA, as well as at Brussels in the COPS, at
the military committee and at the EUHQ. The visit of the EU
military committee on the field had largely contributed to
convince them that the mission had to be ended.
My debriefing in France was touchier and I realized that Paris
had had difficulties in apprehending the reality of EU/NATO
relations in the FYRM as well as our concerns with Naples. A
few kind souls took this opportunity to denigrate the results
and methods of CONCORDIA. Still remains the fact that this
operation is a rare example of a successful end of crisis.
What are the main lessons learnt that can be drawn
from this operation and what advice would you give to
a future COMFOR?
Operation CONCORDIA was undoubtedly a success both for
Europe and France. For the first time, Europe demonstrated
that it could and knew how to conduct end of crises
operations and that it mastered all the political, military,
security, economic, institutional and administrative
components. However, dysfunctions and internal struggles
within the EU institutions at Brussels should not be brought
down to the field.
NATO is only a military alliance whose administrative running
becomes heavier and heavier. A projected CP must be able, if
need be, to manage both tactical and operational levels and
the chain of command must remain simple and easy to read.
On its side, France validated the concept of Force HQ, a staff
able to arm a FHQ under emergency for the benefit of the EU. I
also note that the full cooperation on the ground between the
military commander (COMEUFOR) and his political counterpart
(EUSR) is fundamental.
Last, one should not hastily generalize when conducting a
multinational operation. What was true at Skopje might not be
necessarily true in Africa or in the Middle-East. This is notably
the case as far as support is concerned.
The physical presence of the commander close to the players,
whoever they might be, remains essential. This requires a
personal investment of every minute. Indisputably, one
identifies oneself to one’s mission.
I’d like to close with the importance of communication without
which one’s action rapidly becomes sterile, and more generally
with the information operations that are the main weapons
systems of end of crises operations. We started this operation
with a low profile as we didn’t have the assurance to
counterweigh NATO straight away. But as soon as the high
local authorities understood that I was a European military
commander contributing to the overall coherence of the action
carried out by the EU, then it became possible to communicate
in all directions, towards the belligerents in their mountains as
well as in the capital or on the banks of Lake Ohrid. And it
worked out!
1 The previous functions of Major General Maral within the Joint Staff and his
knowledge of the European wheels in Brussels led the Joint Chief of Staff to
appoint him as COMEUFOR (Commander of the European Force) for this
operation.
2 European Force Headquarters.
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As a Reminder...
ARTEMIS
The European Union Operation
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
n response to Spring, 2003’s clashes-spillover between
ethnical groups in Bunia, an Ituri Province’s city NorthEast of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the
UN Security Council calls a multinational force upon
assistance to the United Nations Mission in DR Congo1
(UNSCR-1484 dated 30 May, 2003).
I
Consistently, an enabling operation named MAMBA
starts under French auspices, 4th of June 2003, according
to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces initial orders
[quote] “Support MONUC’s activities in Bunia-city and
take hold of the airport. Provide support to UN troops
where required. Protect any populations obviously under
threat/attack in the AOO that will be next assigned to the
multinational force [unquote]. Though the assigned AOR2
keeps strictly limited to “Bunia Airport, Bunia-city and its
close vicinity area”, ROEs3 clearly address “a combatready task-force that can fight for and impose a military
solution if necessary”.
Between the 7th and the 12th of June, French core elements
get deployed in their forward base of operation at Bunia,
whilst support units heading to Entebbe in Uganda.
12th of June, the European Union Council decides on
mounting/leading Operation ARTEMIS in concordance
with UNSCR-1484. At this stage, French initial
commitment takes on the dimension of an EU-led, UNmandated operation. France therefore shifts to the role of
framework nation for Operation ARTEMIS, placed under
MG Neveux’s command. His supporting HQ -and
European OHQ- gets accommodated in the CPCO4
established boulevard
St Germain in Paris, 6,500
km away from theater.
ARTEMIS actually fits in the “Petersberg missions
Catalog” addressing EU-led, humanitarian-oriented
categories of military commitment. Namely: evacuation
of citizens at risk; peace-keeping; also combat-missions
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related to crisis-management and peace-enforcement
issues. With reference to past Operation CONCORDIA in
Macedonia, this the second time that the EU happens to
take on leadership for expeditionary forces operating
beyond the own territory.
Poorly explored, the theater is however posing a real
challenge to the force because of its encaged and
mountainous complexion. In addition, the local
APOD/infrastructure cannot match strategic-lift
conditions, thus heavy cargoes must be re-routed to
Entebbe Airport, in Uganda; finally they are facing
“bad-identified” groups of rebels.
General Thonier is commanding this 2,000 soldiers force,
out of whom 1,785 are French. As soon as early July,
2003, the force is already handling 5 points of access to
Bunia City and starts extending its authority down-town
into districts. The 11th of July, “Malia camp” is subject to
reprisals from hostile groups, thus driving the Cdr in
considering a wider area of operation for the force. CAS
missions ordered at this occasion give even more credit
to the Force’s determination in protecting the population.
In sum, Operation ARTEMIS clearly demonstrates that EU
member-states can successfully run a military expedition,
6,500 km away from home and on their own. This
operation should therefore stand for an EU political and
military accomplishment.
Forces committed to Operation ARTEMIS have left
the theater on the 6th of September 2003.
1 Referred to as the MONUC.
2 Area of Responsibility.
3 Rules of Engagement.
4. Joint Operations Planning and Command & Control Center
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The Account of Major
General Bruno NEVEUX,
Former Commanding General of Operation
“ARTEMIS” in the Democratic Republic
of Congo from June to September 2003
raduated from the French Military
G
Academy, Saint-Cyr, and an Infantry
officer, he commanded the French
Detachment within UNIFIL from 1988 to 1989,
then the 6th Mountain Infantry Battalion
between 1992 and 1994. As the Joint Force
and Training HQ’s (EMIA - FE) Commander
in Creil from August 2003 to June 2006, he
commanded the European Union’s operation
ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of
Congo from June 2003 to September 2003.
Currently, he has been assuming the duties
of Government’s defense advisor.
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Sir, when were you in command of Operation ARTEMIS?
I’ve been officially appointed on the 5th of June 2003, upon a decision from the European Union that was formalized in a
document called “Joint action”, whilst Brigadier General Thonier receiving the charge of Force Commander at
the same time. I’ve been commanding this operation during four months, until mid-September 2003.
In which context have you been carrying on such responsibilities?
Just remember April to May sequence of events.
Harsh combats were opposing rival militias and ethnic groups in Bunia, a city of the Ituri province, North-East
of the DRC. The Uruguayan Battalion sent there by the MONUC1 couldn’t really prevent violence from escalating in
lootings and slaughters of civilians. Upon request from the UNSG2, EU member-states have accepted the principle of
committing troops to a crisis-control mission3 under a UN mandate in support of MONUC operations in the Ituri
province. Time-space framework was very precise: four months in Bunia City and vicinity. This is actually how
Operation ARTEMIS got started.
What about your mission?
Well, the mission is all written in the UN mandate (UNSCR 1484, 30th of May 2003). This was much a matter of
humanitarian-emergency for the force and a “need more time” type of concern for the UN. Namely: stop violence in Bunia
and restore secure conditions in the region, until the UN gets really mission-capable. With reference to Chapter VII, this
was clearly a security-related, coercion-style of temporary mission. Kind of “bridging operation” fairly similar to our
previous participation in Timor. The challenge lied with shifting from an intolerable to a durably improved and
dispassionate situation that could pave the way to a replacement force.
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Could you describe the chain of command
for this operation?
The UE came to such military commitment on its own
for the very first time. I mean without NATO support. Hence
the chain of command looked like a novelty in that sense.
Though I was officially responding to M. Solana,
the Secretary General and ESDP4 High Representative, my
“Boss” and direct contact was in fact Finnish Gen
Hägglunds, who was chairing the European Union military
committee (EUMC) at that time. At the top, M. Solana was
acting through political and military channels. Namely
the Political and Security committee (PSC) on the one
hand, and the EUMC on the other hand. The Operation
Headquarters (OHQ) proper was standing in Paris. I also
happened to deal with a series of authorities. Most
important of them were the Director, EU Military Staff
(EUMS); a division of the foreign relations general
directorate (#8) ,which is in charge of the security and
defense board issues, and did cater for my political advisor.
And which “tool” did you get for that mission?
Basically a joint, consistent, deterrence-capable
and multinational force; though the main body of it
was French actually. At its peak state of activation,
the force was amounting to 2,000 men, including
the joint, forward support base (JFSB) settled at
Entebbe in Uganda. Amongst all national contributions,
I’d like to mention Swedish Special forces;
the UK detachment of engineers, set at work in the sole
APOD available in country; also medical support and
INFO-OPS teams -the so-called “Radio ARTEMIS”- both
resourced from Belgium. On the Air Component side,
France has deployed cargo, CAS and reconnaissance
aircrafts; and also one “Atlantic” from its Navy.
Then Canada, Brazil and the UK came beefing-up
our tactical airlift capability. At last, two helicopters
Oryx from South Africa happened to take part
in the operation.
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Sir, have you been personally involved in the force
generation process?
Remember. The humanitarian-emergency situation we
were facing demanded a quick response. Thus France
stepped in the scene first, as the lead nation for
Operation MAMBA, with lead elements already landed in
Bunia, 6th of June. When the EU took over the direction of
Operation ARTEMIS by the 12th of June, France shifted to
the role of framework nation. Remarkably, the EU gave
its decision-making process a real kick in order to get
command-ready as fast as possible. My proper deputy
has been chairing the force generation conference (FGC),
organized in Paris, where he could collect SOR5-based
offers from those nations volunteering for a contribution
in the operation planned. Being the major TCN6, France
kept running the whole activation/preparation process
for the mission.
Also worth a quote, staff functions in a national OHQ
(CPCO7 in France) are a matter of routine, but generating
a European OHQ directly connected to Brussels was a
true “first shot”. Standards of procedures (SOP) needed
to be invented “on the way”, though largely informed
from previous studies addressed in the ECAP8, especially
on the command structures. Nevertheless, this HQ got
activated and mission-capable by the 10th of June
morning, short after the manning conference. A hell of a
challenge met, I’d dare say!
How to reconciliate national specifics with that
European context?
ECPAD
There was a serious risk of interference between the EU
chain of command I was answerable to, and a prominent
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commitment from the French authorities. This is why I’ve
assigned my deputy the role of liaison-party with the
CPCO, just as a REPFRANCE could have been appointed
to a multinational HQ. Given the prominent role France
had played, its designs couldn’t be much contested. All
in all, I’m much inclined awarding the merit of success to
the talents and skills of our soldiers, as well as to
the deep insight and clever leadership displayed
by Gen Thonier.
This said, ARTEMIS happened to be an EU operation
because all member-states wanted to show their resolve
in tackling with a potentially hazardous operation,
and in accepting whichever issue might come out
of their collective decisions. A failure would have hence
compromised all of them, including non-contributing
nations. The European touch also materialized
in the practice of some EU-available, non-military
instruments. I mean policy-making, diplomacy and
economy. Regular commitment from Mr Solana and his
mediations in many capitals; constant support from
various EU agencies; also key-contributions from
the European Commission are clearly attesting that
stance.
Do you feel you’ve got full access
to the information required for your mission?
I’d say yes, though there was a touchy subject still
pending. I mean information sharing. The EU situation
assessment center (SITCEN) used to issue analyses and
estimate-reports on demand. Both works proved
interesting and pertinent. Conversely, this wasn’t that
easy to persuade member-states they’d better release
national Intel reports,
of political-military or
strategic interest, that
could help confirm
or correct our proper
perception and put
some light on what the
protagonists involved
were “cooking”. Indeed
we got the picture
of most whereabouts
related to the Ituri area.
But everybody,
especially the Force
Commander, needed
more visibility on
the 1,800 Km distant city
of Kinshasa9 and some
neighbor-countries part
to the conflict. You
know, Understanding
goes with Intelligence,
all time.
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Clear rules of engagement (ROEs) established
from the start?
Affirmative! France had established them for its own
contingent and the EU did the same for the European
Force (EUFOR). Then CPCO and OHQ staffs have been
working on harmonization with the EUMS, based on an
EU catalog of ROEs. Finally, the military and the political
committees have approved ROEs as a part integral
and annexed to the OPLAN. They perfectly matched
the spirit and the letter of the mission. Quite “robust
ROEs”, this is how we’d word that now I guess, and great
help for a force set into action. In return, some harder
legal aspects have been subject to discussions.
Such studies did have an impact on time for getting
directions in theater. For example, military solutions
to dealing with “infant-soldiers” were likely to upset
the sensitivity to children in most countries. Another
recurring problem lied with the right to arrest and jail
potentially dangerous individuals or suspected
crime-perpetrators. What should be done in a country
where the whole administrative, police and judicial
structure was blown up if the force is not really
mandated for chasing and imprisoning hostiles
and criminals?
Sir, how have you been “living” that multinational
environment?
Oh perfectly, and this for two reasons. On the one hand,
multinational cooperation is now a current standard;
we are used and well-prepared to that. On the other
hand, I’ve got some experience in that domain in
exercises and/or in operations. So, in spite of the
“pioneering” nature of this particular mission,
multinational aspects weren’t a surprise to me. I’d even
indulge quoting definite advantages in the situation.
Probably the most important point worth noticing is
that international legitimacy goes and grows with the
number of states participating in an operation. A single
nation committed, even where justified, can’t get such
undisputable endorsement if not simply contested and
criticized. Think of it: who is granted support from
twenty nations can definitively voice a convincing
message and no doubt his speech will be heard
“loud and clear”.
The OHQ proper was incorporating 40% of non-French
contributions. Diversity made it richer in a way.
This said, there’d be no sense veiling the complexity
of a multi-party decision-making process. I mean
the consensus required at each important step; also
“finicky negotiated” transfers of authority and caveats
possibly impinging on their execution. Well, let’s say
there was no much clash to fear for Operation ARTEMIS
because the force was relatively coherent.
Interoperability. Is that a fact or a constraint?
Probably both ways. This is a fact, as far as we are all
drilled to common, well-known SOPs. Also, English is the
standard working language practiced in the OHQ. Yet,
this is a constraint if you look at our information and
communication systems. ARTEMIS was a rather low footprint expedition where one framework nation was
supposed to arm the whole chain of command, but we
have deployed four of those systems, all different and,
by the way, not really “interoperable”.
What about your relationship with higher
and lower HQs/Authorities?
Current contacts with the many EU authorities and
agencies involved have been excellent always. I couldn’t
mention one single attempt of interference or “micromanagement” from their side and I must praise them for
the freedom of action I’ve been granted. I knew I could
rely on steady support from them all, especially from
the EUMS and its German director, General Schuwirth.
Considering that each commander should play his
assigned role fully, we similarly refrained from
interfering in the task-force’s sphere of duty. This was an
easily-made decision based on total trust in its missioncapability. I must say our trust proved well-placed and
the troops have appreciated.
In parallel, we needed to get and keep in touch with
the UN, more precisely its Peace-Keeping Department10;
also with Bangladesh, the lead-nation called upon
additional forces for the MONUC. We got only 3 months
for proactively staffing a plan and securing Bangladeshi
troops’ deployment in the AOO before the term of our
mandate. This wasn’t that easy because the MONUC
was also to respect a very tight agenda for getting
a new mandate, additional forces and more troopscontributors. Nevertheless, everything went fine and
timely. A new UNSCR was published; the OHQ could
send mission-teams to New York, Dacca and Kinshasa
and; as expected and desired, the MONUC could take
over on the 1st of September 2003.
Would you define the Commander of such an Operation
as a military or a political-military authority?
Both ways again but, as far as the Ops Cdr is to support
a political project, political-military concerns are
governing operational issues. I was clearly placed at
the door of EU policy and strategy deciders. Many
briefing-reports I’ve presented to the PSC11 and
the EUMC would confirm that.
Same statement applies to the force commander. His
role clearly extends beyond purely military matters and
his operational-level sphere of duty addresses political
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issues most of the time. Force commander, Brigadier
General Thonier was directly in contact with DRC and
Uganda state-authorities; UN and UE representatives;
also European ambassadors.
Sir, what about the logistics aspect
of the operation?
This has been a huge challenge to project heavily
equipped forces some 6,000 km away from home.
The main problem was to charter the large number
of transport aircrafts required for the strategic airlift.
Heavy cargo planes were landing at Entebbe, whilst
tactical airlifters (TAL) commuting between the APOD
and Bunia. The European airlift coordination cell (EACC)
was set into action for this occasion and did a great job
at best employing TAL resources from a variety of
nations.
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Are French officers educated and trained
for servicing in a multinational HQ?
Yes they are, EMIA12 resourced officers in particular. They
have been forming the core-staff and proved perfectly fit
to the job. But your question makes sense. There is no
place for scratch teams in a multiservice, multinational
working environment. This can’t be a matter of bringing
smart individuals together for a mission. Integration
must be prepared and, in some cases, rely on support
from peace-established joint staffs set on regular and
multinational-oriented training.
Staff officers appointed to a multinational HQ are got
to work in English and be familiar with its SOPs.
Hence, special training is key to interoperability
and mutual understanding where various cultures
and approaches coexist. I do believe our officers are
aware of and perfectly prepared to that.
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Which main lessons learned the Operation Commander
would point out?
posed to them and, as required, mobilize the military
tools that will insure success in the AOO15. Provided
that the appropriate consensus is met, they can as
well enforce deliberate crisis-end strategies.
Seems to me that ARTEMIS is still perceived as a rather
symbol-charged operation because it has introduced
some twists in the ESDP at various degrees. You know
autonomy in terms of command structures; the EU Rapid
Reaction Force and “BG 1,500”13; security-related
commitment to Africa. Having now in mind EU concerns
for RECAMP14 issues, cooperation with the UN, and other
similar programs, I’d put the stress on two points that
are more political than military.
b/ With regard to its global approach to crisismanagement and quite mature military and nonmilitary instruments at hand, the EU stands for a
prime winning card fit to spectrum of crises we are
facing nowadays.
a/ When all EU state-members cohere to a common
objective, they know how to speed up their decisionmaking process, respond quickly to the challenge
In conclusion, which recommendations would you
issue to commanding generals possibly assigned
similar missions?
This’d be very pompous from my
side! No I can only testify I had to
make for a singular context and a
world I wasn’t aware of. Seems to me
that humility could be the best
attitude in such cases. I mean there
is no much option but hunting for
and accepting pieces of advice and
assistance from all and any. My word
would rather be: “Don’t even
contemplate that History keeps a
trace of your deeds if any”.
CCH Jean-jacques CHARARD/SIRPA TERRE
1 Mission des Nations unies au Congo.
Translation = UN Mission in Congo.
2 United Nations Secretary General.
3 Note from the translator. Actually a securing
mission.
4 European Security and Defense Policy.
5 Statement of Requirements.
6 Troops Contributing Nation.
7 Centre de planification et de conduite des
opérations. Joint Operations Planning and
Command & Control Center
8 European capability action plan.
9 Capital of the DRC.
10 Namely: Département des opérations de
maintien de paix (DOMP) in French.
11 Policy and Security Committee. Comité
politique et de sécurité (COPS) in French.
12 État-major interarmées (de planification).
= Joint Planning Staff.
13 Referred to as the “EU Battle-Group”
comprising 1,500 men. Possible US
equivalents could be “EU Battalion TF”
or EU, Combined Arms Task-force.
14 French acronym for “Reinforcement
of African, Peace-Keeping Capacities”.
15 Area of operation.
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As a Reminder...
The International Security
Assistance Force (FIAS)
1
in Afghanistan
I
n reaction to “9/11 attacks” 1, the United States
decided to launch Operation Enduring Freedom with
their allies. Intent was to disband the “Taliban’s
Regime” and, more generally, eliminate terrorists groups
operating in and from Afghanistan. France’s
participation was named operation HERACLES. In
December 2001, after the fall of the Taliban’s regime,
an international conference took place in Bonn with
the participation of the Afghan Transitional Authority,
representing the new kernel-government. It was decided
to set up the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) which role is to assist the Afghan government.
The ISAF is not a “UN Force” proper. It is a coalitionforce deployed under the UN Security Council’s authority
in support of Resolutions 1386 - 1413 - 1444 and 1510.
ISAF is primarily to assist Afghanistan and the IC in
establishing sustainable security conditions within its
assigned AOO 2. It has to act so that the Afghan
government authority be restored all over the country.
Then conditions should be met for free elections to be
organized and the country rebuilt.
For this purpose, the force was ordered to patrol within
and around Kabul. In October 2003, the UNSC decided
to extend such activities all over the country (Reference:
UNSCR 1510). Nowadays, ISAF is regularly patrolling
nine provinces of the North and West of Afghanistan.
It is organized into four components: ISAF HQ in Kabul;
the Kabul’s MNB3, the unit which runs its Airport and
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) supporting
“nation-building” efforts.
ISAF actively cooperates with the local population;
non-governmental organizations; the UN Mission of
Assistance to Afghanistan and the US forces committed
to operation Enduring Freedom.
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From its origin, ISAF command has been successively
resting with the United Kingdom and Turkey then, once
supported by NATO in February 2003, Germany and
the Netherlands. Currently, the responsibility for running
ISAF operations was subsumed under NATO, 11th of
August 2003. This is the first time that this organization
gets committed so far-away from its traditional AOR
in terms of command-responsibility, coordination and
operational planning. ISAF is now amounting to
9,000 troops from 35 NATO and non-NATO nations.
France has started beefing-up its participation
by Summer, 2006. The 1,100 strong, French
expeditionary troops deployed in Afghanistan keep
running two operations at the same time.
- PAMIR. An ISAF-supporting, monitoring-oriented
mission, PAMIR develops in the plain of Chamali
and some districts of Kabul-city.
- EPIDOTE. An education/training program directed to
Afghan Officers (integrated into Operation HERACLES).
Then EUROCORPS Commander, French Lieutenant
General PY has been heading the ISAF from August 2004
to February 2005.
1 Note. Terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are often referred to as “9/11”
attacks (pronounced nine eleven).
2 Area of Operation.
3 Multinational Brigade.
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The Account of Lieutenant
General Jean-Louis PY,
Former Commanding General of the International
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF)
from August 2004 to February 2005
raduated from the French Military
G
Academy, Saint-Cyr, and an Infantry
officer, he commanded the 16th Mechanized
Infantry Battalion from 1992 to 1994.
He assumed the duties of Commanding
General, European Corps (EUROCORPS)
from September 2003, and he commanded
the ISAF (International Security Assistance
Force) in Afghanistan from August 2004 to
February 2005.
He has been Commanding General, French
CFAT
Land Action Force, since October 1st, 2005.
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Sir, you were in command of the ISAF from
August 9th 2004 to February 13th 2005. Within which
framework did you comply with this mission?
ISAF is a NATO mission based on a United Nations resolution,
conducted in parallel with the US forces mission “Enduring
Freedom”. Its aim is to assist the Afghan government in
restoring a secure environment necessary for the country’s
reconstruction. I took over command at a time when the new
disposition was finalized in order to extend this command to
Kabul and to the nine provinces of the North.
Sir, what did your mission consist in?
First, I have to mention that operation Enduring Freedom
consists in fighting international terrorism while, in its mission
as specified by the Security Council resolution, ISAF had to
restore security in Kabul to allow the government to act legally,
and deploy in each of the nine provinces Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in charge of providing security in
the province and initiating the rebuilding. Locally the PRT’s
mission was twofold: the first one, to be performed by the
military component of the PRT, dealt with security issues in
liaison with the police, the Afghan National Army (ANA) and
ANA representatives; the other, tasked to the civilian
component, was to assist the local authority in restarting
the economy.
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How was the chain of command organized?
SACEUR1 acted as the Operation Commander.
The operational command was exercised by the Brunssum’s
Joint Force Command. I was the tactical commander on
the theater. It’s in fact the regular NATO’s scheme of
operations.
Nevertheless and forcedly, since there is no operational
command deployed on the theater, the tactical commander
had to position himself at the operational level: he must
at the same time liaise with the local government and be
integrated into the coordination system of all the operations
conducted on the territory. In Afghanistan, the force
operational commander (JFB) came on the theater every
two months in order to keep contact with the local leaders.
How was your CP organized?
Its composition was based on the deployment of a HRF2.
The European Corps, an LCC3 HQ, was reinforced by
augmentees including operational level specialists. As an
example, I had a POLAD who was a Spanish ambassador,
a PSYOPS Command and a TAOC4 in charge of air operations
coordination in the area.
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SPEWas your CP able to prepare itself?
The European Corps has been tasked on in January 2004 in
order to be deployed in August. From then, we were able to
conduct a complete preparation session of our staff that was
attended by a maximum of personnel. We could train
nominally on concrete and real situations at the Stavanger
Joint Warfare Center. At the home station, we had an
operations center and an intelligence cell monitoring the
information provided by the G2. Finally, we had outside
experts coming to give us lectures.
Six months advance notice to prepare and train at staff level is
a considerable added value.
There has been a change in the structures between our
Canadian predecessors and us. But some data are not
negotiable and one has just to adapt. For instance I expected
to keep a command structure similar to the European Corps
one: I would have had my DCOM, my Chief of staff, my ACOS
OPS and my ACOS Logistics. After numerous discussions,
NATO assigned another DCOM and a general officer in charge
of the PRTs.
As for the Forces generation conferences, the participation
was at the level of the nations providing troops in the
European Corps (Eurocorps).
What do you think about meeting your needs
as information is concerned?
Upon my arrival, the Battalion Commander remained the
REPFRANCE5. The FRENIC6 was inserted inside the ISAF CP, but
being primarily national intelligence oriented, I cannot say that
this cell cooperated extensively. Like everybody I met number
of problems in the integration of multinational intelligence.
Through persuasion, we succeeded in obtaining more and
more national pieces of intelligence during the commander’s
briefing organized within the ISAF HQ. I received also a
valuable support from the French ambassador. But the issue of
the intelligence fusion and assessment remains unsolved.
Could you tell us something about the national employment restrictions which were most remarkable for you?
Each of the 38 nations had a national representative inside my staff.
But it was quite impossible to have the complete inventory of their
employment restrictions. It was a real problem because we would
have encountered difficulties if we had had to commit in force. For
example, one nation presented so many restrictions for the employment of its helicopters that it was very difficult to employ them. For
others, the deployed forces were not available for employment when
and how we intended to do.
I faced also another problem caused by a nation that employed
700 personnel in support of the 150 who were under ISAF
ADC Olivier Dubois/SIRPA Terre
Have you taken part in the different force generation
conferences?
OPCON. Another example: some nations were reluctant to
abandon the strict orders of wearing the bullet-proof jacket
because of insurances issues with their soldiers being not
covered if not wearing it; or for financial reasons linked to extra
money for wearing the jacket. Some nations also wanted to
avoid any internal problem to the nation with its parliament.
Here does the notion of being at risk take all its value.
In NATO, before ordering something you need to know well in
advance whether the nation which provides the unit will
accept or not to perform what you are to ask it.
Interoperability: reality or constraint?
The forces rotation on the theater generates a real difficulty:
everything dealing with forces deployment and common
financing is the responsibility of the NATO Command Structure
and in no case applies to the NATO Force Structure. Thus upon
its arrival, the Eurocorps staff took over the CIS net settled by
NATO for liaisons with the higher level of command. For the
subordinate levels, each nation in charge of a level brought its
own system that was not necessarily interoperable with
the NATO’s one. When a relief occurs, to shift from one system
to another is very constraining. Sometimes the shift work
happens to be done twice. Thus in Kabul, our predecessors
have withdrawn their system that they were not able to sell
to NATO. So my mandate had to establish its own system at
the tactical level. Upon each replacement, there are financial
issues to solve for the transfer of installations and equipments
passing from one nation to the following one. This is how we
experience it on the theater.
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What was the nature of your relations with
your subordinate commanders?
Sir, what do you think about the French officers
in multinational staff?
My subordinates were on the one hand the Kabul Brigade
manned by the Franco-German Brigade (“BFA”), on the other
hand the PRTs provided by Germany and the Netherlands in
the five North Eastern provinces, and by the United Kingdom in
the four Northern provinces. This amounted to some 7,000
men and rose up to 10,000 during the elections.
With the Kabul Brigade, there was no problem because
the BFA was well aware of the system and was under
Eurocorps OPCOM since peacetime. With the PRTs it took
more time to determine the work procedures especially when
dealing with intelligence collection: when I arrived the PRTs
have just begun to operate and even if an emergency report
system did exist, it was necessary to establish a precise and
detailed reporting system as well as emergency reinforcement
plans. It’s what I did first, so that the PRTs remain under my
control. One can also notice that in these remote provinces,
the national influence remains of the utmost importance
for the PRTs.
They have a very good level as reflection and tackling
problems are concerned; they really master the staff work and
the employment of multinational CISs, always difficult to
manage. However, their level in English language is sometimes
borderline. In a multinational staff the level of the ISAF’s, one
must be able to conduct a briefing in English, to present one’s
ideas, develop hypothesis and to answer questions in front of
a commanding officer. It is not always easy to participate
smartly in high level meetings with people who may be almost
un-understandable because they speak their native language
and use very formal words to avoid being too clearly
understood.
We made considerable progress since our officers succeed in
managing all situations, but we have still to improve our skills
in English language.
Besides, the participation in an overseas operation of student
officers due to attend our Field Grade Staff Course (“CSEM”),
as part of a multinational staff, would give them a NATO
culture that they will need in the future.
Was the organization of service support convenient
for the force you were in command?
We had no extensive integrated multinational support,
and this was the source of many difficulties. On the one
side the ISAF HQ was directly supported by the NATO
Command Structure, with some margin of initiative for
contacting; on the other side forces were nationally
supported, without real coordination. The nations
providing small contingents had them supported by
another nation’s chain of support through bilateral
agreements.
The problem is the same inside the NRF 7 where NATO
strives with difficulty to set up the Joint Logistic Support
Group. The problem often arises from national standards
for support which are not compatible. It is true that
the concept of lead nation for the fuel can be retained, but
similarly it’s impossible for medical support, each nation
enforcing its own standards of treatment which are seldom
equivalent.
I experienced the 3,000 men reinforcement deployment
for the presidential elections. We realized that
the logistical support disposition to deploy was huge if it
was to remain national. Besides some nations had planned
to deploy their earmarked strategic reserve kept in home
station in the frame of the rapid reaction. If it had been
necessary to deploy it in emergency, we would have met
a real problem because the force and its associated
logistics had to be airlifted. A study conducted about
the potential projection of an American battalion stationed
in Europe resulted in the need of so many rotations
of C 17 that the nation in charge of the study refused to
conduct a projection rehearsal to the theater even with
only the battalion CP and one company.
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Is the commander of a multinational force a military
leader or a politico-military authority?
I have absolutely been a politico-military commander. I had
delegated the conduct of tactical operations to my German
deputy for operations who was my DCOM at the Eurocorps.
Thus I spent 80% of my time dealing with politico-military
problems. The remaining 20% were used to capture the
perception of the overall situation, to go on the field where
I had still a politico-military role through my negotiations with
the war-lords. Somehow I was the relay of the quite isolated
central power.
In my staff, some thirty persons allowed me to play such a role
that is not evident for lack of preparation. I met the President
every three weeks, some of his ministers every week,
the international community, the ambassadors at least
the most important and the United Nations Secretary General
Representative also once a week. It was the condition for
the operation to develop in coherence with the local and
international situations.
Nevertheless every day I dealt with tactical problem with my
Deputy for operations in order to make decisions at my level,
knowing that he would be in charge of all the conduct.
Does such an organization apply on another theater?
I think that it can apply to many kinds of operations, notably
the KFOR, but also in the Ivory Coast where the Force
Commander have much time to dedicate to the local leaders.
I realize that this politico-military role that is performed from a
land force command is perfectly convenient for a Joint Land CP
(“PCTIA”). When we endorse responsibilities of operational
level, we are obliged to be on the field by the side of the local
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ADJ Jean-Raphaël Drahi/SIRPA Terre
SPECIAL ISSUE MN COMMAND
authorities; otherwise we miss our mission. Naturally it’s a
ground force responsibility since the major part of the
operations is of ground nature. Somebody who limits his
activities to his tactical tasks cannot obtain all the data
necessary to comply with his total mission. It’s a lot of
synthetic work, at the right level, with the right approach, to
apprehend those always important meetings where every
word has its value.
Beyond the topics already dealt with, what are the main
lessons that you have learnt from your mission?
The first lesson learnt deals with the preparation for the
mission. The units must be assigned early enough and be
prepared in conditions as close as possible to those of
the theater; it is what I strive to do presently with the (French)
Army National Training center (“CPF”). Due to the four months
unit rotations, the personnel must be able to comply perfectly
with their mission after one week on the theater. We have also
some effort to make for the benefit of our inserted personnel
who must be nominated with sufficient advance notice for their
own preparation. Thus we think about a preparation center for
the benefit of all individuals inserted, the training program of
which would include a common knowledge part and options
adapted to the theater and the staff they would join.
The second lesson learnt is that a campaign plan must exist
that precise the desired final end state and the steps to get
there. In all stabilization operations, one notices that there is a
political process to which the force is linked so that it develops
in a secure environment, for example in elections time. It’s a
part of our mission.
There is also a Security sector reform (SSR) type process that
consists in supporting effectively the building of security on
the territory. This process concerns disarmament,
demobilization and re-conversion of the former armed forces
(DDR), the establishment of the national army and police as
we are doing in Afghanistan, as well as the legal organization.
There are also some domains that are specific to the country.
In Afghanistan it is to fight drug trafficking. We can help the inplace power to oppose the opium and heroine production
thanks to our information operational capabilities and through
our persuasion efforts, but also thanks to the support
provided in the establishment of alternate crops or, dealing
with education, by providing pedagogical manuals to
the schools. It is not a direct assistance but it has its value.
Finally, there is the reconstruction. Forces are also part of it
through CIMIC actions; but is it enough since nowadays it
generally consists in short term high visibility projects. The
problem rests often in the existence of large amounts of
money provided by the international community and the real
difficulty is to know how these funds are spent: the concrete
form of projects due to create employment and thus reduce
the economical crisis is not visible. In the provinces, it is
possible to control the financial flows through the PRTs. Today
many NGOs have expertise and get funds from the
international community in order to conduct projects. But the
development of the country misses a large part of this money
that the NGOs invest very often in the realization of studies.
It would perhaps be better and more efficient to control the
financial flows by supporting the local reconstruction, through
the governors monitored by the PRTs, rather than providing
money to the central government.
I consider that it is important to deal with this subject because
even if we need civilian experts to operate in these domains,
it’s a global effort that we have to accomplish. Nevertheless
the tactical operations are to proceed and will always be
oriented the same way, i.e. by the military presence, patrols,
contacts with the population in order to win their confidence
but also to keep the capability to react immediately should
the threat shift. It is at the core of the military duty.
The different topics I have developed here above show that
we are still far from mastering stabilization. It’s impossible
to rebuild a country destroyed by several years of war if a
process is not developed that be coherent with local culture to
allow people to go back to work. If we are not part of it, there
will be many people to join the organized crime networks.
What advices would you give to a future multinational
force commander?
For me, the objective is to exist on the theater as the force
commander after fifteen days of presence and to be
recognized from the start as a valuable interlocutor. When you
have to do business with a high level personality, member of
the government, ambassador or else, you have to show him
that you know where you are going to, that he has to take into
account your existence, your personality, your mission.
Afterwards he will be inclined to consider you as a “main
player”. It is what I call mastering the environmental situation.
For the rest, it depends on the theater, on the mission.
That is the only advice that I could give.
1 SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
2 HRF: High reaction force.
3 LCC: Land Component Command.
4 TAOC: Tactical air operations center.
5 Senior officer in charge of representing and if needed advocating the French
national caveats in the frame of a MN operation.
6 FRENIC: French national intelligence cell.
7 NRF: NATO Response Force.
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ACCOUNT OF FRENCH GENERAL OFFICERS WHO
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As a Reminder...
Task Force 150 (TF 150)
within Operation PAMIR
F
ollowing September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks,
Americans and their allies launched operation Enduring
Freedom designed to fight the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan and terrorism based in this country. France’s
participation is named Operation PAMIR.
Within the disposition of Enduring Freedom, Task Force 150
is a naval force assigned to the surveillance and control of
commercial navigation as well as the global fight against
terrorism and illicit trafficking in the north of the Indian
Ocean.
SIRPA MARINE/Major (R) Fromentin
Task Force 150 operates under command of (US) ViceAdmiral Nichols, Commander, US 5th Fleet based in Bahrain.
He fulfills the role of USNAVCENT and is himself
subordinated to Lieutenant General Abizaïd, USCENTCOM
based in Tampa (Florida).
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TF 150 runs mainly air-maritime security control missions of
the area of action (Red Sea, Oman Sea, Arabic Sea, Persian
Gulf ). It also denies terrorists to flee the Afghan zone
towards the Arabian Peninsula or the Horn of Africa.
It is currently composed of about 10 vessels from
8 countries (USA, United Kingdom, Pakistan, Germany and
France with Escort Vessel Commandant Birot (which has in
particular discovered more than 2 tons of cannabis offshore
Yemen on June 4th, 2005).
France has been in command of this force three times within
EUROMARFOR
- from September 2003 to January 2004;
- from June to September 2004;
- from August to December 2005.
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The Account from Vice Admiral
(Ret) Jacques MAZARS,
SIRPA MARINE/Major (R) Fromentin
Former Commander,
Task Force 150 (TF 150)
raduated from the French Naval Academy, and specialized in AntiSubmarine Warfare (ASW), he commanded the Fast Patrol Boat Kara,
the Dispatch Boat Commandant Ducuing, the Escort Vessel Balny,
and the Missile-launching Frigate Aconit. On two occasions, he commanded
TF 150, from September 2003 to January 2004, then from August 2005
to December 2005.
He has been retired since February 2006.
G
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ACCOUNT OF FRENCH GENERAL OFFICERS WHO
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Admiral, when were you in command of Task Force 150?
I have been in command twice, first from September 2003
to January 2004 then from August to December 2005.
What was the scope of your responsibilities?
TF 150 is a naval multinational force set up to complement
the intervention against the Taliban in Afghanistan. These
Taliban may be willing to escape from the country towards
Pakistan then towards other countries likely to support
them, as for instance Somalia. Subsequently the naval
force took part in the confinement on land of these “bad
guys”. Otherwise, these would try to flee their homeland in
order to establish a new terrorist center elsewhere. Then
they could have trained and become troublemakers in
another country. The role of TF 150 was then to stop
harmful flows of all kinds either directly connected to
the movements of personnel or connected to the support
of these groups.
The mission changed between 2003 and 2005. At the
beginning TF 150 should mainly ensure the secure and safe
transit of vessels taking part in operations and their related
logistic support. This involved, in particular the various
choke points1 such as Bab el Mandeb and Hormuz. Then
the mission was clarified in a rationale not only related to
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choke points but also to maritime security operations.
The aim was to deny harmful flows of people, money,
weapons and high value commercial materials such as drug
to occur.
Between my two commands, the mission also evolved due
to the increase of acts of piracy. Indeed for long pirates
have been haunting these areas; this is however small
piracy, I would say, just aiming at personal profit.
On the other hand, much stronger organizations can
operate another course of action. After abducting
individuals or equipment, they can deliver the result of
ransoms to terrorist networks. So in November 2005,
we went through a peak of piracy cases with a series of
actions. This made the entire world aware of the level
of potential threat. This situation required a significant
evolution of the mission to take into account the need to
launch counter-piracy actions. This brought this component
to a level equivalent to the fight against trafficking.
The second evolution we were witness of was the
implementation of a calming down strategy for the region.
This was equivalent to an attempt to get out of a crisis.
Following military operations and before the Military to
withdraw, setting up conditions where a peaceful life may
be recovered is necessary before the hand-over. The aim is
to stabilize the situation.
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As a summary, what were the main features
of the mission during your two command periods?
The first stage consisted in maritime security control.
The second stage stressed the fight against piracy. Then
the third stage consisted in taking part in a multinational
environment to significant activities called “Theater security
cooperation”. Through a range of various actions, the goal
was to come much more in contact with navies or
authorities of foreign countries to propose them activities
and generally to bring them towards more democracy. This
diverted them from temptations which could be more
harmful for hem as for us.
This states how TF 150 evolved in the framework of
operation Enduring Freedom.
In which political environment was your mission
accomplished?
Due to political sensitivities of each country, a mission and
its conditions of execution are defined in relation to the
whole political posture each country wants to hold.
Regarding the maritime area, the issue was to know
whether we stayed off Hormuz or not. If not, entering into
the Persian Gulf would have had a strong political meaning.
Several nations decided not to enter considering possible
interferences with Iranian and Iraqi affairs. As far as French
forces are concerned, they can operate in the Gulf within
bilateral activities but they cannot be committed there
within a coalition.
TF 150 theater ranges from Hormuz in the north to
Mogadiscio in the south including Suez.
It is twofold multinational. On the one hand, the force and
its headquarters are multinational. On the other hand,
TF 150 is continuously and simultaneously keeping contact
with a number of countries. Subsequently it is not like a
multinational force supported by the sole country where it is
stationed and where the host nation support is applied.
By the mobility and variety of its resources, this force is in
touch at the same time with Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan,
India..., these countries being themselves in relation with
other countries sharing the theater.
Subsequently, the multinational force commander being
himself from a nationality shall deal with relations between
vessels from other nationalities distinct from his and a
country representing another nationality.
What resources were available to you?
For the first mission, I sailed from France with a sub task
force already multinational consisting of EUROMARFOR i.e.
three French ships and one Italian. The HQ also
multinational EUROMARFOR type was composed of French,
Italian, Spanish and Portuguese staff. They were aboard
“Tourville2”. We took advantage of our move towards
Djibouti to train the HQ staff through a warm-up as they
had not worked together before; it was really an occasional
ad hoc HQ.
Having left the command ship in Suez to join Bahrain to be
assigned my mission, I joined back my command in Djibouti.
I assumed then command of TF 150 composed of French,
Italian, Spanish and German ships. This sub-group was
the core of TF 150 knowing that from time to time some
American or British ships were attached to it. I had only
TACOM3 of such force.
For my second mission, it was the same thing but American
and British ships were much more present. I had
continuously under my command ten ships in average.
I commanded up to sixteen ships including a US aircraft
carrier I had under TACOM for half of the embarked air wing.
This represented about fifty aircraft which I tasked directly.
What was new is that I had Pakistanis; communications
were then an issue as they had only navy VHF as
interoperability assets. Commanding from a French frigate
US elements and a Pakistani frigate was sometimes a real
challenge as everyone was armed and using their own
ROEs4.
Moreover we should be afloat and in the same time be in
line with what occurred ashore. In order to facilitate this
coordination, I was granted liaison officers, a US Marine
from (US) CJFT HOA 5 from camp Lemonier in Djibouti, a LNO
and an intelligence officer from COMUSNAVCENT in Bahrain.
How was organized the chain of command ?
I had a principle to always place myself at multinational
level and certainly not at French level. I was under French
operational command.
First of all, I positioned myself as a French officer who had
received OPCON for EUROMARFOR elements from the
Spanish, Portuguese and Italian. Then French Armed Forces
COS transferred EUROMARFOR OPCON to COMUSNAVCENT
in Bahrain. US command added forces, significant for my
second mission and gave me TACOM at sea.
In practice, I perceived that COMUSNAVCENT is managing
in a smooth and pragmatic way: he conducts a maritime
campaign and is trying to implement the key ideas
of the campaign while liaising with CENTCOM. As general
directives for the campaign have been delivered, he gives
full delegation to commanders in charge of regional subareas for them to operate on their own initiative. This is
expresses by “you have TACOM”. At sea, this is like you had
OPCON. You receive guidelines from an operational
commander. There is a clear will of non-interference from
land based command to command at sea.
What are the main features of the employment
of maritime assets?
In terms of responsibilities, the US provide the ships needed
to execute the mission as well as the employment
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ACCOUNT OF FRENCH GENERAL OFFICERS WHO
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procedures (type of action, place, time constraints). We
could draw a parallel with what is done for the rules of
engagement (ROE); the ship commanding officer receives
the same information. In the case of a multinational
commander employing a ship outside the scope defined
to him, the ship commanding officer refuses to obey. Doing
so, the US do not need a counterpart of our REPFRANCE
to make sure of forces employment.
The senior command is there to support combat.
My operational controller was there to support me.
Clearly speaking, I was supported by my commander; this
is pleasant.
Should you highlight a French specificity, which would
you select?
SIRPA MARINE/Major (R) Fromentin
Without any doubt, it is the existence and importance of
our Defense attachés network. It facilitated my mission as
a multinational commander via the French resources.
I could have a number of activities organized because
there was a French attaché in the country I was inter
ested in.
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For you is interoperability a reality or a constraint?
I would rather use the word opportunity. It is an opportunity for
us as we took pleasure in “Franco-French” interoperability. However
it sometimes generated issues as we got closer to multinational.
This does not mean now that the French are not successful in
multinational. On the contrary, we are very successful if we put
a lot of effort in it.
For long, interoperability has been the icing on the cake,
now this is the core of the matter. We should be
interoperable both with highly equipped forces such as
the US, huge forces not equipped at the same level and not
having the same identity such as NATO forces but also with
Pakistan, Oman Singapore and some others. We are then
committed to adapt both upwards i.e. the very well
equipped one and to the other partner, the one with less
assets available but nonetheless of a high added value.
This challenge obliges us to do a balancing act, which is
not so simple.
However, there are things not to be shared for instance
some pieces of intelligence. For me, intelligence is
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SPECIAL ISSUE MN COMMAND
frequently or even always a bilateral business: it is each
time restricted to a mere dialogue. Wordings of the mission
and operational duties may be dealt in a consensus
allowing each OPCOM to transfer OPCON of national forces
to a foreign authority. However, the end state desired at
political level or the way to understand it are not necessarily
identical from one country to another. The result is that
the actual “in order to” may be part of your private secrets.
So there is obviously a part which remains national.
Although TF 150 HQ staff was reduced in strength, it was
nevertheless multinational. I could not however be only
multinational, this is why I had a FRENIC6. I had then
the capability to be connected to DRM7, to contact Defense
attachés...and various agencies. I could not do this through
multinational means: I could not ask a French officer
attached in multinational system to do that because he
would turn suspect for his buddies. There are subsequently
staff identified as multinational and staff identified as
French. All are aware that their jobs are distinct and they
are perfectly living under the same roof although
the restricted space.
Admiral, have you coordinated joint actions?
On the one hand, I have done few as the other services are
too remote from the maritime theater, in Afghanistan.
On the other hand, I have worked jointly under various
accounts with CJTF HOA and even with Bahrain. Like a
French “OVIA”8, it assumed a joint role such as logistics or
Force Protection in ports. During my command, I had not
to include a joint component within a combined operation.
Are French officers trained to operate
in a multinational HQ?
What are the lessons learned from your two missions
and should you have an advice to deliver to somebody
what would it be?
I would not dare deliver advices but maybe some facilitating
pieces.
First of all, being French, we should not be afraid: we are up
to standard to work in multinational. We should not be
ashamed. Then we should remain professional that is to say
humble. The key is to succeed in the alchemy between
these three matters: professionalism, know-how, humility.
I believe of interest to remain natural, as nature may
destabilize a stubborn person. Not being curt is also
required as it does not go down well in a multinational
environment.
To my mind, the commander finds interest in being
transparent, i.e. in finding a style to answer anybody from
another nationality about the grounds of his action. In the
scope of his role, he cannot maintain “private secrets”:
it is normal to be asked questions by his executives and not
only by media. If we do not answer, we generate suspicions.
This does not mean that we do not have private secrets but
these should remain well hidden and cannot be used as an
excuse.
A convocation or a formal meeting are not necessarily
the best tools to convince somebody; friendly times will
certainly be more favorable for a piece of information to go
through.
Among Anglo-Saxons relationships between individuals are
more developed than in France. We have a tendency to
command through “coercion”. In multinational, it is
preferable to command through persuasion, explanations.
I strongly believe that some “connivance” while making sure
of reciprocity is a key to success with some people.
They are beginning to be well trained but we had to make
progress.
Compared to the Army, the Navy was lucky to use NATO as
an expansion tank. Up to 1989, the Army had only two areas
of concern, Africa and Thüringen9 salient. The Navy in
addition to national matters and Africa could easily work
with Americans and Brits. This occurred without any too
visible political connotation in particular within NATO.
Subsequently the French Navy has an old NATO culture
maintained through the years.
This was however a NATO culture related to a force and not
to a headquarters. A ship knew how to operate within
a NATO force and under command of a NATO HQ without
any problem. However we were not in HQs. Since a large
decade, the concept of force employment requires us to
“multinationalize” at forces level as well as at HQ level.
This seems to me relatively recent. For instance,
in DAGUET10, we had only liaison officers but no French
officer integrated in US HQ. Now in Bahrain, we have
officers part of USNAVCENT.
1 Straits.
2 A French frigate.
3 Tactical Command.
4 Rules of Engagement.
5 Combined Joint Force Horn of Africa.
6 French national intelligence cell.
7 Direction du renseignement militaire : (French) Directorate, Military
Intelligence.
8 Organisation à vocation interarmées : joint orientated organization
9 Translator’s note: a region of Germany. A former supposed axis of
approach for the Soviet forces.
10 Translator’s note: French Operation for Gulf War I.
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Some Doctrinal Documents
about Command of Multinational
Operations
Documentation from the European
Union and NATO
- Doctrine of operational level - PIA-00.202 (issued in
July 2006).
- Petersberg Declaration on June 19, 1992.
- Joint doctrine of forces command in operations PIA-03.201 August 6,2003.
- European Union Structures and military capabilities:
Permanent Political and Security Committee, European
Union Military Committee (December 2000).
- Establishment of the European Union headquarters
dated January 22, 2001.
- Military CIS concept for EU-led crisis management
operation (November 12, 2001).
- CIMIC concept for EU-led crisis management operation
(March 18,2002).
- EU crisis management and conflict prevention
guidelines on fact-finding missions (December 2001).
- Directive for the implementation of responses to crisis
within NATO crisis response system (April 21, 2004).
- Process for planning joint operations PIA-05.200
(I. 4000) September 29,2003.
- Setting up echelons for joint forces in operation:
instruction 8000 - PIA-05.202 June 2003.
- Joint doctrine on the use of force in overseas
operations - PIA-05.203 and 05.400 July 2, 2004.
Land Forces Employment
- TTA 901: Land forces in operation (April 1999).
- TTA 902: Manual for the employment of an army corps
(issued in September 2006).
- TTA 903: Manual for the employment of a division
(release scheduled end 2006).
- TTA 904: Manual for the employment of a generic
combined arms brigade (2004 issue).
French Documentation
(Joint) Forces Employment
- Concept of forces employment (PIA - 00.100)
July 23,1997.
Communications and Information Systems
- Concept of operational level - PIA-00.102 July 6, 2004.
- Handbook on liaison system for multinational
headquarters in operations (March 14, 2000).
- Joint doctrine for the employment of forces in
operations - PIA-00.200 (instruction 1000
September 2003).
- SIC 6031: User’s handbook for multilateral
interoperability program (MIP), block 1 within HQ
(2004 issue).
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Table of contents
SPECIAL ISSUE MN COMMAND
Directeur de la publication :
Général (2s) Jean-Marie Veyrat
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS AND FORCES COMMAND
Rédactrice en chef :
Lieutenant Marie-Noëlle Bayard
Tél. : 01 44 42 35 91
PERSUASION AND TRUST
LESSONS LEARNT FROM MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
Capitaine Grégoire de Montmorillon
(Rédacteur en chef par intérim)
Tél. : 01 44 42 47 57 ou 01 44 42 35 91
- Multilateral interoperability program tactical C2IS,
interoperability requirement (version 3.1 dated March
14, 2005).
p. 3
AND FORCES COMMAND
CONSTANTS AND PROMINENT FEATURES
- SIC 603 / volume 1: Manual for the employment of
operational information systems - operational system
of information (2002 issue).
p. 4
AN HISTORICAL BASIS
Relecture des traductions :
Colonel (ER) Philippe Jolly
Maquette : Christine Villey
Tél. : 01 44 42 59 86
Création : amarena
Crédits photos :
ECPAD (1ère de couverture)
CCH Jean-Jacques Chatard
SIRPA Terre (4e de couverture)
Diffusion : Etablissement
de Diffusion, d’Impression
et d’Archives du Commissariat
de l’Armée de Terre de Saint-Etienne
Impression : Point d’impression
de l’Armée de Terre
de Saint-Maixent-l’Ecole
Tirage : 2 000 exemplaires
Dépôt légal : à parution
ISSN : 1293-2671 - Tous droits
de reproduction réservés.
Revue trimestrielle
Conformément à la loi
«informatique et libertés» n° 78-17
du 6 janvier 1978,
le fichier des abonnés à
DOCTRINE a fait l’objet d’une
déclaration auprès de la CNIL,
enregistrée sous le n° 732939.
Le droit d’accès et de rectification
s’effectue auprès du CDEF.
Centre de Doctrine
d’Emploi des Forces BP 53 - 00445 ARMEES.
Fax : 01 44 42 52 17 ou 821 753 52 17
Web : www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr
Mel : [email protected]
A Short Chronological Survey
p. 6
The Allied Armies on the Oriental Front and the Learning of Multinationality (1915 -1918)
p. 8
- SIC 603 / volume 2: Manual for the employment of
operational information systems - contribution of an
operational system of information in the operational
decision-making process (2002 issue).
p. 11
Command Organization
French General Officers in Multinational Forces or Operations
The Imaginary Account of Ferdinand Foch, Maréchal de France, Field Marshal
of Great Britain and Poland, the First Allied Commander and the Man of the 1918 Victory
Level 1 HQ
- TTA 956: Structures of operational command for forces
in operation (pending drafting).
ACCOUNT OF FRENCH GENERAL OFFICERS WHO COMMANDED A MULTINATIONAL
FORCE OR OPERATION
General (Ret) COT, Former Commander of the UNPROFOR
from July 1st 1993 to March 15th 1994
p. 14
Lieutenant General (Ret) SOUBIROU, Former Commanding General
of the RRF Multinational Brigade in Bosnia from July to October 1995
p. 22
- Circular 2350 dealing with national procedures for
administrative and logistic support of a land force in an
overseas operation (July 23, 2005).
- Manual for organizing and running a level 2 HQ (July
2004 issue, version 5).
- SIC 603 / volume 4: Manual for employment of
operational information systems - information system
of a division (provisional release 2003).
- SIC 903 : Manual for employment of divisional
information systems (2001 issue).
Level 3 HQ
- Manual for organizing and running a level 3 HQ
(2001 issue).
- SIC 603 / volume 3: Manual for employment of
operational information systems - information system
of a brigade (2002 issue).
- SIC 904: Manual for employment of CIS in a generic
combined arms brigade (2005 issue).
- LCC HQ handbook (July 1999).
- SIC 902: Manual for employment of level 1 CIS
(2002 issue).
General (Ret) RIDEAU, Former Commanding Officer of the Multinational
Division South East (MNDSE) in Bosnia from December 1995 to May 1996
p. 30
General (Ret) (UK) JACKSON, Former Commander of NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)
from June to october 1999
p. 36
Lieutenant General de KERMABON, Former Commanding General
of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) from September 1st 2004 to September 1st 2005
p. 42
Major General MARAL, Former Commander of the European Union Operation
in Macedonia (CONCORDIA), from March 31st to December 15th 2003
p. 48
Major General NEVEUX, Former Commanding General of Operation “ARTEMIS”
in the Democratic Republic of Congo from June to September 2003
p. 54
Lieutenant General PY, Former Commanding General of the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) from August 2004 to February 2005
p. 62
Vice Admiral (Ret) MAZARS, Former Commander, Task Force 150 (TF 150)
p. 68
SOME DOCTRINAL DOCUMENTS ABOUT COMMAND
OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
p. 74
This Doctrine's special issue has been achieved by the CDEF/DREX (Forces
Employment Doctrine Center/Research & Lessons Learned Division), and especially
Col Billières head of the AAR section for the accounts by general officers, Lt Col Goya
from the lessons learned branch, Lt Col Cario, Cpt Vitry and Ltn (Res) Lasconjarias
from the research section for the other documents.
SIRPA TERRE
Traductions :
Colonel (CR) Robert Travaillot
LCL (CR) Jean-Claude Laloire
LCL (CR) Daniel Sillon
LCL (CR) Jacques de Vasselot
LCL (CR) Alain Pérignon
LCL (CR) Donatien Lebastard
Level 2 HQ
FÉVRIER 2007
75
DOCTRINE NUMÉRO SPÉCIAL
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DOCTRINE
# SPECIAL
2007/01
general military review
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS AND FORCES
MULTINATIONAL
OPERATIONS AND FORCES
C.D.E.F
Forces Employment
Doctrine Center
DOCTRINE
FRENCH
COMMANDERS