Yasemin ÖZDEK*
RECENT DEBATES ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
UNIVERSALISM OR CULTURAL RELATIVISM**
Ours is an era in which the presence of ethnical, religious and cultural
differences are very conspicuous. The 'identities' which emphasize the right
to be different, rather than universal subjects are deemed significanl.
Unİversalism is regarded as a reflection of the imperialist expansion of
Europe and is not held İn high esteem. The tendeney of the individuals and
communities to determine their collective identity in the framework of race,
religion, ethnicity and culture, of which theyare a member, becomes
increasingly pronounced.
In our time, nationalism is dominant in cultural plane as well. Cultural
exclusionism which developed through the polarization of Western and non­
Western cultures also displays the 'macro' character of nationalism. One of
the areas, on which the effect of cultural nationalism is most pervasive, is
human rights. There are ongoing debates on the universality of human rights,
apart from the demand of the Southern cultures to underline their
differences. Thus, in an age when the ethnocentric attitude adopted by the
West that attempted to involve all of the world in a universal project through
'Enlightenment' is criticized, the 'human rights' concept which forms a part of
the heritage of the Enlightenment, and its pretension to universality are also
subjected to this scrutiny. The criticisms of non-Western cultures focus on the
point that the values represented by human rights concept, a product of
Western history, are also particular to the West and that the Universal
Declaratİon of Human Rights does not express transcultural, universal values.
Some African, Asian and Islamic approaches, taking as their premise the fact
that the actual human rights concept and the international human rights
norms of the United Nations are shaped by Western cultural values, bring
forth theİr own local and cultural values and stress the incompatibility
between Western human rights standards and their own values. The very
people who question the 'human rights imperialism' of the West as an entity,
are also prone to interpreting the universaHty claim of human rights as an
element of the imperialist policies of the WesL. Even if they do not
completely abandon the concept of human rights, they draw a border between
*
**
Dr. Y. Özdek is a member of the Publie Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East.
This artiele is a version of the artiele titled "EvrensellikIKültürel Görecelik Geriliminde İnsan Haklan",
published in Birikim, September 1994, translated into English by the author with the collaboration of
Mustafa Yılmazer.
24
TURKISH YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS
their specific human rights conception and the Western one. One of the most
important indications of this situation is the presence of Islamic movements
which elaim that the Universal Deelaration of Human Rights issued half a
century ago by the United Nations does not represent their own human rights
values and proclaim an alternative 'Universal Islamic Deelaration of Human
Rights'.
In the 1990's, while human rights are presented as the 'global' ethical
values of the new order by the dominant discourses in the world, on the other
hand, Asian and African cultures, particularly Muslim world, are observed not
to accept readily the universality of present international human rights
concept. In this context, World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993)
revealed that the South did not want to be completely disregarded in the
attempts to determine the content of human rights concept and this demand
was expressed by means of the criticisms directed at the universality of human
rights concept especially by the representatives of same Asian countries.
While the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia stated that human
rights could only be based on 'Shari'a' for Muslims, the remarks of the head of
the Chinese delegation in the Conference elearly iIIustrated an opposition to
the universality of the conceptualizatİon of human rights: "The concept of
human rights is a product of historical development. It is Cıosely assodated with
specific social, political and economic conditions and the specific history,
culture and values of a particular country. Different historical development
stages have dılferent human rights requirements. Countries at different
development stages or with different historical traditions and cultural
backgrounds also have different understanding and practice of human rights.
Thus, one should not and cannot think the human rights standard and model of
certain countries as the only proper ones and demand all countries to comply
with them. til The reaction of Western representatives to the views of the non­
Western countries indicated that the West insisted on the unquestionable
universality of human rights concept. Although the preference of the West
overweighed that of South and determined the final document of the
Conference which acknowledged that the universal nature of human rights is
beyand question1 , it is obvious that this is far less than adequate to show an
agreement between cultures on the matter of human rights. For example,
same Asians, in particular, maintain that the conelusİon of the Conference at
Vienna was only able to postpone the conflict between the viewpoints of the
West and the Asians on the subject of human rights. 3 In this approach, Asia is
considered too strong to submit to the West, and it seems that Asia gives
i
See "Human Rights News", Netherlands Quarterly or Hurnan Riglıts, 11/3, 1993, pp. 294-5. 1 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (25 June 1993), I, paragraph ı. 3 See Silaha'; Kausikan, "İnsan Haktan Asya Gücüne Uyum Göstermelidir" (Human Rights Must Recagnize the Power of Asia), New Perspectlves Quarterly.Türklye, ın, 1994, p. 12.
UNIVERSALISM OR CULTURAL RELATIVISM
25
priority to Asian values over universal human rights because of 'its cultural
confidence due to increasing economic success'.
The opposition of Asian countries, in Vienna Conference, to the
Western human rights policies could be considered as a pragmatic one as they
were subjected to the pressure of the West due to human rights violations in
their countries. For example, the recent American pressure on China could
explain the reason why China was the 1cader of the opposition to the
universality of human rights in Vienna. Yet regarding the opposition as only a
pragmatic one would be an underestimation of the problem, since it would
alsa imply a denial of the Western hegemony on human rights concept and
policies. Indeed, the specificity of the debates in Vienna is due to histarical
conditions of our time. The Conference is viewed as a confrontation between
the West and a coalition of Islamic and Confucian states rejecting Western
universalism. 4 In paraHel to the presentation of the concept of 'culture' as the
fundamental one in our age, the tendeney to explain new conflicts on cultural
grounds is increasingly observed. What is happening here İs, İn fact, the
struggle between states with different cultural traditions for dominance in the
international system being restructured. The universality of human rights has
recently become controversial again despite the pradamatian of the
U nİversal Dedaration of Human Rights nearly half a century ago, and the
human rights concept appears to be one of the areas where the conflicts
sharpened by the new world order become expIicit.
As it is shown by Vienna Conference, in the debates on the universality
of human rights, two approaches gain prominence nowadays: Those who
represent Eurocentrist approach have no doubt that the universal nature of
international human rights norms is beyand dispute, and that the reaction of
the West on this subject is the most correct one. Mareaver, they insist that
the 'human rights' projects which are incompatible with the present Western
model have nothing in comman with the human rights nation. On the other
hand, the defenders of the regionaI approach, who do not accept the
necessity of universality, hold that the present dominant human rights
concept cannot be universal for it is historically of Western origin and
underline their faith in the human rights values present in their own culture.
it is evident that this second approach, which affirms the superiority of its
own culture and rejects Westernisation by defending a future perspective
aiming at the so called unique and unchanging cultural values, involves as
much an ethnocentric standpoint as Eurocentrism. A third way of overcoming
the dilernma of ethnocentrisms is still awaited.
4 Samuel P. Huntington, "If Not Civilizations, What?", Foreign Atfail'S, 72!3, 1993, p. 188, cited in,
Bassam Tibi, "Islamic Law/Shari'a, Human Rights, Universal MoraUty and International Relations",
Human Rights Quarterly, 16/2, May 1994, p. 282.
26
WRKlSH YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Thus, the current debates on the cultural origin and universaHty of
human rights have been combined with the old criticisms, directed at the
liberal essence of the human rights concept. In the background of the revival
of the discussion, lie the unique histarical conditions of our age in which the
ethnical and national identities become more important and communitarian,
local, cultural and conservative reactions are getting stronger. it cannot be
said that these discussions do not bear the risk of resulting in abandonment of
the idea of the universality of human rights. At least, this likelihood is not a
weak one, in view of the fact that Eurocentrİst views and cultural nationalism
dominated approaches of the South on human rights are similar in essence,
and that we have yet to develop an alternatiye perspective to these
ethnocentric perspectives. Yet, these debates can be considered as a fruitful
starting point to the extent that they can be utilized as an opportunity to
İntroduce a real universal dimension to the human rights concep! the
universality of which has only been assumed so far. In this sense, it can be said
that the criticism of both the present Western approach and of culturally
specific human rights approaches can create a more positive situation which
will save human rights from being a baule ground for ethical legitimacy
struggle between distinct cultures, and that it harbors the potential to
construct it as a concept again.
Political criticisms directed towards human rights owing to their liberal
origins have to date become the indications of the dubious reception of the
universality of human rights concept. Right from the moment, modern human
rights concept was conceived, both conservatives and socialists advanced
serious objections to the argument for the universality of human rights
concept. Ever since the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen
in ı 789, while conservatives have criticized the individualist nature of human
rights on the grounds that they split the society into its atoms, destroyed the
traditions and degenerated the customs, socialists aUacked the same concept
on the basis of collective ideas. Briefly, the individualism of human rights
concept has always been the target of the dual aUack of the right and the left
on communitarian and collectivist grounds respectively. During the Cold War
period, when the socialist and the Third World countries rebelled against the
imperialist attitude of the West towards the Third World, theyalsa took stand
against human rights policies of the West which emphasized civil and political
rights instead of national, economic and socia1 ones. As a concrete example of
this opposition in the '60s, while the Third World was attempting to adapt
human rights to 'basic human needs' approach and to incorporate the rights
of the peoples İnto the agenda of human rights, it was in fact trying to refine
the concept of human rights in the light of the criticisms of the liberal
conception of human rights. In this respect, the current criticisms embodied
by the concept of 'human rights imperialism' are inspired by the criticisms
made in the past. But, in our period when cultural identities are in vogue, the
objections against the universality of human rights are predominantly of
UNlVERSALISM OR CULTIJRAL RELATIVISM
27
cultural nature İn accordance with the general tendency which might be
characterized as the decline of the 'class struggle', İn parallel to the downfaıı
of socialist systems, replaced by the 'struggle of cultures' as the major contlict.
The criticisms of the South against dominant human rights conception at
present are virtually based on the questioning of the human rights policies of
the West. Southern countries believe that their interests are subordinated to
those of the West, and that the international human rights policies, which
have double standards, are formed to protect the interests of the West. The
most popular and cited examples of this are the policies, developed by the
United Nations as a 'neutral' universal institution, which protects the interests
of the West rather than guarding human rights in the Gulf War, Bosnia and
Somalİa. Hence, that the Southern countrİes perceive themselves as the
victims of the imperialist and liberal human rights agenda determined by the
United Nations may play a part in theİr defense of the cultural specificity
against the idea of the universality of human rights. In addition, it İs a
widespread belief that the policies of the West, which are very particular
about the violations of the civil and political rights outside the West (e.g. the
pressure of the West on China foııowing Tian-anmen massacre), disregard the
social and economic rights so much that theyare not even considered human
rights, and thus serve the interests of the West. Among the proponents of this
idea, especiaııy Asians state that, İn spite of the rapid economic development
in various countrİes of Asia, a major proportion of Asian population is
deprived of economic and social rights, namely Asian poor live without
sufficient food, clothing, shelter, education, employment and wages, and that
in so me countries of Asia poverty has become a variation of slavery such as in
the examples of child labor exploitation and child prostitution. They draw the
conclusion that their own cultural va]ues, which do not separate rights from
responsibilities, are more beneficial for them than the Western human rights
no tion.!
The criticisms of the Western human rights policies, that do not consider
the hunger and poverty of millions as violations of human rights in the context
of neo-liberal policies, reveal that existing human rights concept and policies
are criticized from economic perspectives apart from cultural ones. That is,
non-Western cultures question the libera1 essence of human rights (although
it is usually impIicit) as much as they criticize their Eurocentrism.
'Individualism' is the main target of the charges in which the criticism of the
capitalist system and of the Western cultural values complement each other.
The criticism of the secondary importance attributed to social and economic
rights as a result of the Western cultural traits overlaps with that of dominant
human rights policies marked by neo-liberal policies. This, İn turn, shows that
the opposition against the universality of human rights can not be solely
! See Baharruddin Shamsul, "Human Rights Between Universality and Cu1tural Conditioning", D+C,
May/lune 1993, pp. 4-5.
28
TURKISH YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS
regarded as an emphasis on cultural identities and is an indication of the wish
not to submit to exploitative relations. The oppositions of the South, even
though theyare of a reactionist nature, excessively nationalist and idealize
their culturaI identity, are on legitimate ground when opposing the economic
and cu1tural consequences of the Western imperialist hegemony. The present
Southern opposition which stresses their own cultural identity rather than
directly objecting to Western capitalist policies, originated from the unequal
development of different cultures in the world.
Capitalist consumption and life-style, uniformization and anti-humanist
individualism, consequences of capitalist mo de of production, are sources of
discontent for Western civilization as well. Yet, the incorporation of all
nations to the capitalist world order means that this discontent is more
pronounced for the peoples in the 'periphery'. The Southern people, who are
unable to achieve modern consumption standards, express their reactions to
being devoid of means of even leading their daily lives, by overestimating
theİr own cu1tural values. They disregard that capitalism created a universal
cu1ture even with its impoverishing version, and that local cultural forms have
lost their authentic meaning, and the wish to revive them is a tragical
dilernma.' Capitalism came of age in Europe, but is no longer solely
European. For this reason, proclaiming Europe as the enemy is no solution
for the Southern people. Just as it was imperative to defend and apply a
universalist ideology in the search for limitless capital accumulation,' a
universal perspective also seems inevitabJe for overcoming this situation.
Denying the fact that we live in a universal culture appears to be destined to
turn İnto a utopianism of the past which dreams of reviving the cultural
variation and the ethical values dependent on it.
Today, the most vigorous criticisms oriented against the universality of
human rights are from the conservative right. A version of the socialist
criticism of the dominant human rights policies during the CoId War seems to
be adopted by the Right. The socialist criticism, remaining from the Cold War
period, that the Western policies confines the human rights to civil and
political rights and ignores economic, social rights is echoed today with
nationalist arguments. There is an opposition against the policies of
identifying human rights with free market and of making the market plus
democracy formula dominant, which bring about the increasing exploitation
of oppressed classes. At present, this opposİtion İs directed towards a
natİona1İst-conservatİve channel by means of the claİms that the individualist
,
Samir Amin, Avrupamerkezdlik: Bır ideolojinin Ele§tirisi (Eurocentrism: Critique of an Ideology),
Ayrıntı Pub., İstanbul, 1993, p. 20.
7
Immanuel Wallerstein, "Kapitalizmin İdeolojik Gerilimleri: ırkçılık ve Cinsiyetçilik Kal'§ısında
Evrenselcilik" (ldeological Tensions of Capitalism: Universalism versus Racism and Sexism), in,
Etienne Balibar & lmmanuel Wallerstein, Irk, Ulus. sanır: Belirsiz Kimlikler (Race, Nation, Class:
Ambiguous ldentities), Metis Pub., İstanbul 1993, p. 42.
UNIVERSALISM OR CULTURAL RELATlVISM
29
nature of human rights do not mirror the communitarian values of 'non­
Western cultures'. In this sense, that the conservative wing of the neo-right is
fostered by the policies of its liberal wing, and that the former gains strength
from the reactions against the negative policies of the latter seems like an
internal paradox of the right. Yet, the contemporary rise of the neo-right
movement can be accounted for by the very paradox. U nder the
circumstances where socialism has seriously lost its influence, the reaction
against the infinite exploitation conditions of the market, brought about by
the 'globalisation' of the neo-liberal policies, can not find any channel of
expression but the introverted communitarian way. The denial of the
universality of human rights includes a racist dimension in so far as it is based
on the incompatibility of life styles and traditions and thus overlaps with neo­
racism,8 in which the dominant theme is formed not by biological inheritance,
but by the idea of the insurmountability of the cultural differences. Cultural
exclusionism which develops through the polarization of Western and non­
Western cultures seems to have a function in that it runs parallel to the
regionalism tendeney of the international system which is being restructured.
Regionalism, that accompanies globalisation in the 'New World Order'
encourages racism, and in the South nationalist, racist movements develop in
the framework of the opposition against dominant Western policies.
Therefore, Western policies, regarding human rights as their unique values,
view their presence as a sign of their cultural superiority and consider the
intervention to other cultures, under the pretext of human rights, as their
right induce the cultural nationalism against the West. The reactions against
the West, rationalized with cultural relativist arguments, result in the denial
of the human rights concept and/or its universality.
THE IMPACT OF POSTMODERNısT DISCOURSE ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
Cultural relativism, which gained ground in the aftermath of World War
II, has recently become prominent again. The existing type of relativism, we
encounter now, is represented by 'postmodernism'. The rising popularity of
postmodernist movement -whose preference of relativity, opposition against
single, comprehensive and objective truth conception, and inclination to
evaluate the insistence on a supposedly objective reality as a simple tool of
dominance is explicit-, seems to be related to the reappearance of the
opinions based on the denial of the universality of human rights. Because,
culturally specific human rights conceptions against the universality of human
rights rests on the 'cultural relativism' theory.
'Cultural relativism' sees all reality as solely comprised of culture. it
claims that human experience is determined exclusively by culture, and
8 See Etienne Balibar, "Bir Yeni ırkçılık Var mı?" (ls There a Neo-Racism?), in, Ibid, p. 30.
30
TURKISH YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS
assumes that all values are a function or product of cultures and reflect them.
it is based on the idea that world history is the story of the plurality of
cultures and that, as existing different cultures produce their own cultures, it
is possible for different, even conflicting value systems to coexist. As to moral
relativism, it is onlyan element of cultural relativism. "It asserts that moral
claims deriye from, and are enmeshed in, a cultural context which is itself the
source of their validity."9 There is' no universal morality. An attempt to put
forward 'universality' as a criteria of morality is a concealed imperialist
attitude and an effort to dissolve the values of different cultures in the
dominant culture. Cultural relativism emerges as a defense of life styles of
different cultures against the Western culture, the universalization of which
has tried to been imposed for two centuries. The opposition against the
supposition of a single culture all over the world, which determines 'others',
exhibits an egalitarian attitude as well. Cultural egalitarianism seems to follow
from cultural relativism, developed against the belief that the white, Christian
societics of the West were superior to others, and it is the creed of a valuable
defense against the attades of the conquerors, missionaries and the colonists
on natiye peoples in the course of colonization.
Its egalitarianism with regard to culture and sensitivity to subjectivity
constitute the attractive aspects of relativism. Nevertheless, it is open to
criticism since it leads to cognitive nihilism rather than amoral one. 10 Arter
all, a scientific methodology, which includcs the comparative study of diverse
cultures, enables human beings to transcend same ethnocentric limitations
and to liye in a comman world of reality.1I Whether we want it or not, we Iive
in such a world that there is only a single mode of knowledge, rapidly adopted
by all cultures and which destabilizes many of them. Apositian, pretending to
liye in a pre-scientific world, prevents us from seeing and formulating our
problem. When all criteria are accepted to be an expressian of culture, no
culture could be criticized by any criteria, sİnce there is no relevant
transcultural criteria to jUdge cultures with. ız Taday, capitalism has created
the conditions of objective universalization, thus it cannot be said that
cultural relativism represents a realist perspective, as there is no chance of
turning back for the cultures subjected to the imperialist policies of the West.
On the other hand, the acceptance of culture as the only reference in the
explanation of moral values bears the risk of overvaluatİon of cultures.
Accordingly, in the precarious balance bctween cultural egalitarianism and
ethnocentrism, absolutist attitudes are developing, which refuse the positive
R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International RelaHoDS, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
1986, p. 37.
10 Ernest Geliner, Postmodernizm, İslam ve Us (Postmodernism, Islam and Reason), Ümit Pub., Ankara
1994, p. 105.
9
II David Bidney, "Cultural Relativism", International Eneyclopedia or tbe Soclal Sclences, Macmillan
and Free Press, USA 1968, 3, p. 545.
ız Ernest Geliner, op.ctt., p. 77.
UNIVERSALISM OR CULTURAL RELATIVISM
31
and enriching exchanges between cultures and oppose the human rights
concept just because it is of Western origin. Relativism, today, is supported by
an absolutist philosophical position,U which defends ethnocentrist
dependence and maintaİns that the culture of a society is its highest ethical
value. This "radical cultura! relativism" holds that culture is the sole source of
the validity of a moral right or rule. 14 And, cultural relativist arguments on
human rights daim that human rights is a cultural notion, peculiar to the
West, and have no relevance for cultures that do not share the Western
traditions, norms, beliefs and the values. It asserts that different soeieties have
different cultures which are not comparable, and that human rights are not
and must not be universaL. CulturaI absolutists believe ·that they reject the
presence of a universal ethics, but they actually posit one universal ethical
law, that there are no universal moral principles and that one ought to act in
accordance with the prineiples of one's own group. IS They do not only daim
that the concept of justice is determined only within one's own culture, but
also insist on the obligation to conform to il. This process, we witness, displays
the potcntial of cultural relativism to be articulated with cultural nationalism.
When Claude Levi-Strauss stated that human rights was an ethnological
issue, he expressed the idea that, in view of the prineiple of equaIity of
culturcs, instead of taking Westcrn human rights approach as the absolute
criteria to judge other cultures, we should confer an equal status to the idea
and values developed by other cultures. 16 His current followers also try to
develop culturally different conceptions of human rights, given the
controversial status of the universality of human rights conccpL When C.
Levi-Strauss asserted that all comprehensive human rights d~clarations
express an ideal which tends to overlook the fact that human nature is
realized in traditional cultures, not in an abstract humanity ideal,17 he was
certainly right for he expressed a facL The value of his views and those of his
followers Hes in the contribution to the struggle against the hegemony of
imperialism, imposing homogenization, destruction of minorities or oppressed
cultures and ethnical genoeide. Unfortunately, today cultural racİsm also
upholds the values of the same approach and draws strength from the idea
that the mixture of cultures and the elimination of cultural distances impIies
the intellectual death of humanity. it appears that the criteria of culture can
imprison individuals and groups within the borders of arace, the
determination of which is inviolable and immutable, although it apparently is
against a hierarchical modeL. lS
13 See Rhoda E. Howard, "Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community", Human RighlS
Quarterly, 15/2, May 1993, p. 315.
14 Jack Donnelly, UniversalHuman RlghlS, Corneli University Press, Ithaca and London 1989, p. 109.
IS Rhoda Howard, op.cil., p. 319.
16 Mit ve Anlam (Myth and Meaning), Alan Pub., İstanbul, 1986, pp. 65, 79.
17 Irk ve Tarih (Race and History), Metis Pub., İstanbUl, 1985, p. 41.
IS Etienne Balibar, op.cil., pp. 31-2.
32
TURKISH YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The main reason why almost aıı cultural relativists oppose Western
human rights conception is that its individualist essence do es not represent
different cultural values. Whilst they ascribe individualism to Western culture,
they stress the cooperative and communitarian virtues of their traditions.
That this cultural difference is not immanent in the present human rights
concept is the basis of the criticism that human rights concept does not have a
'universal' character. The 'difference' between Western and non-Western
cultures is expressed in the context of individualism/coııectivism dichotomy.
For instance, it is pointed out that, in traditional African society, to be a
person means being a member of a group and that personality can be
constructed solely in or against the group, in contrast to Western
individualism. African worldview is marked by group solidarity and coııective
responsibility}' it is emphasized that traditional African cultures attached
importance to justice in the distribution of social goods. Reciprocal rights and
duties characterize Confucian thought as welL. In line with these ideas, the
importance of duty is underlined in Islamic thought and leads to the
description of human beings in 'Qur'an' as a being who 'giyes' more than he
receives. ıo As to the Buddhist perspective, it is observed that Western view of
human rights is criticized as one that is generaııy based on a 'hard
relationship' as can be seen in utilitarianism, pragmatism and hedonism.
Conversely, Buddhist views are based on the assumption that human beings
are primarily oriented in soft relationships.ıı Thus, it is clear that, in the
cultural comparison of human rights between Western and non-Western
views, the dichotomy of rights/duty accompanies that of individual!coııectivity.
In the non-Western cultures, the emphasis on group values corresponds to
the privileged role of dutyand responsibility concepts in these societies.
N amely, while the responsibility of individuals towards each other reinforces
the idea of coııectivity, the tradition of community produces group solidarity,
not isolated individuals. In this respect, the criticism of the individualist
essence of Western view of human rights seems to be areflection of the
differcntiation between pre-modern and modern cultures.
Conceiving of the dichotomies of individual!society and right/duty as
abstract ones, instead of appreciating them in a certain given historical reality
See, Josiah A M. Cobbah, "Afriean Values and the Human Rights Debate: An Afriean Perspective",
Human Rights Quarterly, 9(3, August 1987, pp. 309-31; Olusola Ojo, "Understanding Human Rights
in Africa", in, Jan Berting et aL. (Eds.), Human Rights in a PluraJist World, Roosevelt Study Center
Pub., London 1990, pp. 115-123.
ıo Yaşar Nuri Öztürk, "İnsan, İnsan Haklan ve İslam" (Human Beings, Human Rights and Islam), Yenı
Toplum 2, Eylül-Ekim 1992, p. 65. For ideas asserting the priority of group interest over those of the
individual in Arabic world, see Kewin Dwyer, Arab Voices: The Human Rights Debate in the Middle
East, Routledge, London and New York 1991, p. 87 ff.
ıı Kenneth K. Inada, "A Buddhist Response to the Nature of Human Rights", in, Claude E. Welch Jr. &
Virginia A. Leary (Eds.), Aslan Perspectives on Human Rights, Westview Press, USA 1990, pp. 91­
103.
i'
UNIVERSALISM OR CULmRAL RELATIVISM
33
may appear at the first sight as a source of threat against the freedom of the
individual, in the sense of recognition of priorities of collectivity and duty
over individual and rights. Yet, these criticisms are not simply an idealization
of 'duty', since the emphasis on duty is important with respect to the
possibilities of individuals to realize their rights. The special emphasis on duty
in the Southem cultures emanates from the idea that in societies where there
are plenty of people in need of help, subjects must have duties as well as
rights. The presentation of community and duty as the key concepts
corresponds to the criticism directed against anti-humanist individualism of
Western countries.
The concept of 'duty', made current again by the criticisms from the
South, is an essential one to reconsider for the foundation of a morality of
human rights based on the mutuality of rights. Yet, we must not overlook the
potential of the criticisms against the 'individualist' essence of human rights to
change into an undiscriminating rejection of 'individual freedom' as a
consequence of the overestimation of communitarian values. In other words,
the potential danger of dissolving the individual in the group, caused by the
emphasis on the group, should not be disregarded. Hence, although human
rights concept is formed as the economic freedom of bourgeois 'individual' in
the historical development of liberalism when bourgeois elass become the
dominant one and is characterized as 'negative freedom', which corresponds
to non-intervention of the state to the 'private' sphere, it is not possible to
view the idea of individual as only the egoist individual of capitalism and
market economy. For a human rights perspective which takes the universal
ethical dimension of the no tion of individual into consideration, 'individual'
and 'individual freedom' words have a significance going beyond the
economical freedom of bourgeois individuaL. ıı Therefore, we need a human
rights approach which, in the confrontation of social interests and individual
freedom, will establish abalanced relatİon between them instead of
subordinating the freedom of the individual to the interests of the society.13
That the main criteria used in specific human rights conceptions based on
cultural relativist arguments is 'culture' leaves no space for a comprehensive
perspective serving freedom, ineluding the freedom of the individual, in these
approaches.
In the defense of the culturally specific values of human rights, the
Universal Deelaration of Human Rights is under criticism particularly for its
artiele on the right to property. The presence of this right in the Deelaration
is viewed as an indication of cultural imperialism because it seeks to impose
II For runher explanation, see Yasemin Özdek, ''Yokohama Krizi, İHD ve Sosyalist Bir İnsan Haklan
Kavrayışı Üzerine" (On the "Crisis of Yokohama", Human Rights Association and a Socialist Human
Rights Conception), Birlldm 52, August 1993, pp. 90-2.
13 Taner Akçam, "İnsan Haklan Kavramının Evrimi ve Marksizm" (The Evolution of the Concept or
Human Rights and Marxism), Birikim 19, November 1990, pp. 18-9.
34
TURKISH YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS
free enterprise and capitalism on the rest of the world and/or it is criticized
that community ideology does not admit private property except in consumer
goods. The artiele, in the Deelaration, on the right to free elections is alsa
interpreted as an attempt at the universalization of the Western style
elections.14 Although the criticisms of the right to property and the right to
free elections, constituting a component of Western democracies, seem to
have a libertarian perspective in that the capitalist system marked by market
and representative democracy is radically criticised, this impression is reversed
when the conservative standpoints underlying the criticisms are revealed. For
example, the criticism of the right to free elections hinges on the idea that
there are monarchies, dictatorships and single-party rules or single-canditate
elections in addition to Western democracies, and that it is a disservice to the
universality of human rights to ignore their existence. ls As it can be seen here,
a perspective resting on culture İs revealed to lack the capacity to extend and
deepen present human rights as it bears the circumstances of reopressian.
Against the Eurocentrist conception of human rights, the defense of
particular human right conceptions by other cultures, oppressed since the
beginnings of unİversalization process of capitalism, is on a legitimate ground.
Here, it can be elaimed that human demands underlies this debate as well and
that these demands can be considered universal since theyare the basic
needs. l ' Nevertheless, as only the cultures oppressed and disregarded
throughout history su ffer from a systematic suppression policy, theyare not
able to exhibit a 'pure' humanist 'nature'. In this respect, cultural reasoning
which recognizes the discrimination and violence against the women has a
particular significance. Similarly, the authoritarian nature of the Islamic
tradition which is prominent İn the criticism of Western human rights
conception, is uncovered owing to its legitimization of dominatian in different
ways rather than opposing it. When the moral values in different societies are
not discussed and compared and all cultural features are considered to be
acceptable just because theyare cultural values, there is a danger of ineluding
them as moral norms, forming cuIturaI identity, even if theyare in conflict
with 'equaIity, freedam and solidarity' ideals. For this reason, the protectian
of cultural features İn the framework of human rights should be applicable
only to the extent that they fulfill the potential of human rights to eliminate
the dominatian relationships. In the same way, the right to be different can
only be formulated in a fashion, which accepts all kinds of differences arising
from sexual identity and culture ete., approves and encourages these
differences but does not allow these differences to be turned into dominance
14 Cited in, Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Righls: Universalism Versus Relativism,
Sage Pub., USA 1990, pp. SI·2.
l! Cited in, Ibid, p. S2.
U See Christian Comeliau, Kuzey-Güney İlişkileri (lbe Relations Between the North and the South),
Cep Üniversitesi, İteti§im Pub., İstanbul 1992, p. 83.
UNIVERSALISM OR CULWRAL RELATIVISM
35
and oppression relations. At this point, it is apt to state that the proposition of
evaluating class differences in the same framework with the right to be
different, one of the most important arguments of neo-right, can not be
possible without harming the idea of freedom, that is the essenee of human
rights. Beeause, it is not possible to coneeive of class differenees without
exploitation and dominance. That the absolutization of eultural differenees
result in politieal relativism comprises another dimension of the İssue. ''To
espouse eultural absolutism as if these politieal regimes do not exist is, in
effeet, to espouse politieaI relativism and to argue that all regime types
possess ethieally equal 'eultures' of human rights."ı7 Politieal relativism, in
turn, can reaeh apoint legitimating dietatorships.
The eulturaI absolutism Ieaves us faee to faee with the dangers of
ereating 'minorities' in aecordanee with the religious principles and eulture of
eaeh state and the rationalization of all violations of human rights by means of
religious and eultural codes or norms. Here, it İs appropriate to remember the
explanations of state adminİstrators in Turkey about torture, evaluating it as a
eultural entity. Such an attitude aims at the politieal exploitation of eulture
for making violations aeeeptable and the governments to be aequitted. Thus,
human rights violations may politieally exploit eulturaI engagements and the
state seleetively garners support from traditional eulture. Within the
centralized state, eulture is not free from the exigencies of power. ıs First of
all, eultural rationalization makes the maintenanee of the regime possible.
This points to the neeessity of differentiating politics from eulture and it has
beeome essential to evaluate human rights violations from a politieal
perspeetive, not from a eulturaI one.
CULTURAL RELATMSM IN THE ISLAMIC
HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSES
In the defense of the eulturally specifie human rights approaehes, Islamİe
human rights projeets have a partieular signifieanee. In general, Muslims do
not have a eommon out1ook regarding the IsIamie attitude towards human
rights and the relation between their traditions and the international human
rights norms. Yet, the po1itieal Islam, whieh rests on anti-Western diseourse,
dominates the human rights approaeh of Muslim world, having in mind the
idea of following a different path in human rights as well.
The critical approaeh of Asia and Afriea towards Western human rights
politics is shared by some in favor of an Islamie human rights eoneeption. The
West is aeeused of using human rights as a tool for hegemony and of trying to
ı7 Rhoda Howard, op.dt., p. 336.
18 Reza Mshari, "An Essayon Islamic Cultural Relativism in the Discourse of Human Rights", Human
Rlghts Quarterly, 16/2, May 1994, p. 251.
36
TURKISH YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS
achieve political, military and economical ends through the manipulation of
human rights values. The criticism of Western policies is parallel to the
opposition to dominant human rights conception. The incompatibility
between Western human rights values, considered to be basis of international
human rights norms, and the nature of Islam is underscored: "We, as the
Muslim world, look at the world with the conceptual model of a different
culture. lt is not possible for our de[mitions to overlap with those of the West.
(...) As long as we do not change our worldview and paradigm upon which this
view rests, it should not be expected that the values transfe"ed from the West
will have any co"espondence to our mental, psychological and social life. "19
This idea that accepts cultural differences as the basic determinant, is
expressed in the field of rights in this manner: "We can estabiish that
something which is considered as a right in a culture can be a crime in another.
For example, drinking alcohol which is regarded as one 's right in modem culture
is a crime which requires punishment in Islamic law. Likewise, while the person
has the right on his or her body in modem culture, this is not accepted in Islam
and thus adultery and suicide are considered as a crime. This difference applies
to the differentiation between rights and freedoms. There are such categories of
rights in Islamic law that they do not have any co"espondences in Westem law.
For example, the right of God (Hukukuilah), the rights of the person on
himself/herself (Hukukunnefs) and even the rights of the dead, etc."30 it is seen
that, in this outlook which approaches Islamic human rights from the
perspective of Islamic law (Shari'a), the decrees of the Shari'a which consider
'drinking alcohol, adultery and suicide' crimes that should be punished are
approved with the idea that there is nothing disputable in them with regard to
human rights philosophy, and how the rights, claimed to exist in Islam, such as
the right of God, the right of the dead, can serve the freedom of human
beings in the world is disregarded in this context.
Some Muslim thinkers clearly express the Islamic human rights do not
mean that 'everything is permissible'.31 The arguments of Saudi Arabia as the
only Islamic country which did not accept the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights on December the 10th 1948 are supported today by them.
Saudi Arabia condemned the Declaration on the grounds that it reflected
Western culture and was at variance with cultural patterns of Eastern states,
and that the provisions for religious liberty violated Islamic law. 31 The
opposition, once led by Saudi Arabia, which emphasized that the Declaration
was not compatible with Islamic law İn many aspects such as the equality
19 Ali Bulaç, "Yeni Degerler, İslam ve İnsan Haklan" (New Values, Islam and Human Rights), Yeni
Toplum 2, Eylül-Ekim 1992, p.17.
38 Iblcl, pp. 20- ı.
31 For example, the views of Muhammad Naciri, quoted in Kevin Dwyer, op.ciL, p. 39.
31 see Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human RIghIs: Tradilion and Politics, Westview Press, Boulder
1991, p. 13.
UNlVERSALISM OR CULTURAL RELATIVISM
37
between man and woman and the right to apostasy, still guides the Islamic
resistance against the Western human rights conception.
lt is evident that the 'universality' of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights is not much in favor with the political Islamism. The
Declaration is criticised as "it incorporates the perspective ofone speciflc culture
and is deeply influenced by Westem and secular concepts. "33 The statements of
Ali Khamene'i auacking the Declaration is one of the clear articulations of
this aUitude: "When we want to flnd out what is right and what is wrong, we do
not go to the United Nations; we go to the Holy Koran ... For us the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is nothing but a collection of mumbo-jumbo by
disciples ofSatan. "34
Even though, theyare in the minority, there are same views asserting
that the argument for the presence of human rights in Islam is 'at least the
expressian of an inferiority complex' and essentially against Islam and that
testing Islam with new values means lack of canfidence in Islamic values. 35
Yet, it is a more acceptable idea among Muslim intellectuals that human
rights are inherent to the nature of Islam. In this context, it is claimed that the
first human rights declaration in history is 'Farewell Speech' of Muhammad,36
and that Qur'an is an extended declaration of human rights 37 and the theory
of human rights is express ed in Qur'an. 38 Mareaver, it is stated that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is originally influenced by Islamic
principles 39 and that human rights accordingly is a novelty solely for the West
and Muslim world recognized them since the beginning of Islam. 40 According
to this view, "Islam had issued a Universal Declaration of Human Rights
nearlya thousand years ago before the writing of English Bill of Rights".41
The discrepancy between the Muslim circles which assert the presence of
human rights in Islam and contemporary modern human rights approach is
due to the fact that Muslim intellectuals conceive of a 'Divine natural law'.
From the viewpoint of Islam, the decrees of Qur'an are the expressian of
33 Rachid Ghannouchi, quoted in Kevin Dwyer, op.clL, p. 43. 34 Cited in, Ann Elizabeth Mayer, op.clL, p. 34. 35 See Ahmet Turan Alkan, "İnsan Haklannın Etik Temeli, Kölelik ve İslam Üzerine" (On the Ethical Foundation of Human Rights, Slavery and Islam), Yeni Toplum 2, Eylül-Ekim 1992, pp. 39, 42.
36 See İskender Pala, "Üçyüz Yılın Adaleti", (The Justice of Three Centuries), in, Ibid, p. 72.
37 See Yaşar Nuri Öztürk, op.clL, p. 64.
38 See Hüseyin Hatemi, İnsan Haklan Öğretisi (The Doctrine of Human Rights), İşaret Pub., İstanbul
1988, p. 66.
39 See İskender Pala, op.clL, p. 72.
40 Muhammad Naciri, quoted in Kevin Dwyer, op.clL, p. 38.
41 Khwaja Gulam Sadık, "Bugünkü İslamda İnsan Haklan" (Human Rights in Today's Islam), in, İoanna
Kuçuradi (ed.), İnsan Haklannın Felsefi TemelleriUluslararası Semineri, Hacettepe University Pub.,
Ankara 1982, p. 121.
38
TURKISH YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS
natural law41 and all people have some natural rights such as life, property
and equality:u Muslim intellectuals believe that God is the source of human
rights. The origin of human rights is also Divine doctrine and since the human
rights derive from God, the final authority on this subject is also God. 44
Furthermore, they daimed that as there is no agreement so far between
intellectuals on what human rights are, if the rights were natural rights, there
would be no disagreements on them. 45
The idea that the source of human rights is God and that these rights are
divine in nature is not consistent with the secular approach dominant in
present human rights conception. The thoughts of Islamic thinkers is parallel
to the natural law view of Christianity, before Enlightenment movement had
secularized the natural law. Furthermore, it is distinct also in context from
modern approaches, which no longer recognize even the secularized version
of natural rights approach as the basis of human rights. At present, human
rights in international laware conceived with a legal positivist view: The
modern meaning of human rights is the creation and enhancement of the
protection of universal human rights by means of restrictions on the national
sovereignity of nation-states.
Islamic natural rights view is not in harmony with the historical context of
human rights that presupposes the rights of the individual versus the state by
constituting the dichotomy of civil society/state and limits the government in
the historical development of Iiberalism. In the historical development of
liberal human rights, natural right theories based on social contract depended
on the restriction of political power through the acceptance of natural rights
of the individuals, which could never be violated by the state. Prior to these
secular natural rights, only a holy power could limit the power of the ruler. At
present, Islamic natural law idea also accepts only the holy power of God as a
limiting force on the sovereignity of the ruler. Even though it cannot be said
that Islamic natural rights idea completely exdudes the concept of individual,
owing to the importance of the human beings in Islam like the other religions,
the framework of the rights of the individual can only be Islam. On the other
hand, it is obvious that human rights were not conceived against the state as
the state has a central importance in Islam. The most important impIication of
this situation is that there can be no Iimİtation of the absolute power of the
state, the foremost violator of human rights in our time, on its citizens except
for divine wiıı. Because, all power belongs to God and accordingly to political
authority, which is its representative on Earth.
41 See Ibkl, p. 120. 43 Ali Bulaç, op.dt., p. 21. Also, see Hüseyin Hatemi, op.dt., pp. 64-5. 44 Hüseyin Haıemi, op.dt., p. 58. 45 Rachid Ghannouchi, quoled in Kevin Dwyer, op.dt., p. 41. UNlVERSALISM OR CULTURAL RELATIVISM
39
Each restriction on poHticaJ authority of worldly nature such as modern
human rights concept, which presupposes the rights of the individual against
the state, is open to be perceived as an opposition against Divine wiIl and
political authority is always prone to exploiting its power by rationalizing its
actions with the word of the God. For this re aso n , a political authority of
divine origin can expect a absolute submission from its citizens as the
'Iegitimate' representative of Divine will and it is inevitably of totalitarian
character in this respect. In a state founded on Islamic principles, the rights of
the individual are bound to be seen as nothing but the 'present and favor of
the greatest power to its subjects'," They can only produce the 'material and
tools' of the realization of a 'spiritual evolution' process,47 the rewards of
which will be reaped only in the other world.
Among the Muslims, who maintain the presence of human rights in Islam
by adapting divine natural rights idea to Islam, there are aIso approaches who
consider the reformation of Islamic law by reference to first sources and
principIes as the precondition of the foundation of an Islamic human rights
projects, as well as the ones that present, without any alteration, the
dominating and discriminating decrees of Shari'a as the genuine human rights
approach. White the latter approach regard the aspects of Shari'a
incompatible with equality 'indispensable'48 and rationalize the discrimination
against the women and non-Muslims, the former approach contends that
although Islam has had a Universal Dec1aration of Human Rights hundreds of
years ago enunciated in the Farewell Speech of Muhammad, these principles
were not applied. In this regard, it is stated that Islam is oppressed by the
Shari'a and the despotic actions which are contradictory with life itself kill the
spirit of Islam. 49 lt is thought that the rights conferred to women by Qur'an
were degenerated, violated and taken back one by one by pagan Arab
unconscious and that the interpretations of Qur'an are full of views, originally
not belonging to Qur'an and maltreating the rights of women, and thus, it is
thought that a reconstruction based on Qur'an İs required. so
The main problems of Islamic human rights theory are that Islamic law
discriminates against women and non-Muslims, and that Islam has not
completely abolished the institution of slavery and Islamic penal code has
some inhuman punishments. According to Shari'a, all citizens are c1assified
with respect to sex and religion. Muslim men are at the highest level of this
" İnsan Haklan ihlallerf ve işkence (Human Rights Violations and Torture), İnsan Haldan ve
Mazlumlar için Dayanı§ma Deme~i Pub., Ankara 1991, p. 10.
47 Hüseyin Hatemi, op.clt., p. 70.
48 Servet Anna~an, islam Hukukunda Temel Hak ve Hürrfyetler (Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in
Islamic Law), Diyanet ݧleri Ba§kanlı~ı Pub., Ankara 1987, p. 38. For similar views, see Ahmad Farrag,
"Human Rights and Liberties in Islam", Human RighCs In a PluraUst World, pp. 133-43.
49 Khwaja Gulam Sadık, op.cit., p. ııl.
50 Y3§3r Nuri Öztürk, op.clt., p. 67.
40
TIJRKISH YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS
hierarchy. Muslim women and non-Muslims have a lower status. This
discrimination is not onlyallawed by Islamic law but alsa imposed by it.
Shari'a divides the subjects of Islamic state into three categories: Muslims,
non-Muslim believers (mainly Christİans and the Jews), and the members of
religions except the recognized minority religions and unbelievers. SI Only
Muslim men have complete citizen status. Non-Muslim believers have certain
rights, for example, theyare secured İn person and property, and permitted to
practice their religion and regulate their private affairs inaccordance with
their lawand custom. But theyare alsa confronted with important
restrictions. For example, they cannot be high level administrators in a
Muslim state. Theyare forbidden to marry a Muslim woman, even the extra
tax (jiziya), they have to pay, is daimed to serve the purpose of humiliating
them. When it comes to unbelievers, theyare not even allawed to reside
permanently in a Muslim state unless there is a special permission.
One of the serious problems regarding Shari'a is the freedam of religion
and conscience. Although the freedam of the non-Muslim minorities to
exercise their religion is daimed to be a guarantee of freedam of religion,
such a freedam is full of limitations in public life for them. A serious
limitation of freedam of religion is the Shari'a rule on apostasy. A Muslim
would be subjected to death penalty if he should repudiate his faith in Islam,
whether or not in favor of anather religion. In addition, the apostate's
property is confıscated by the state, hislher marriage to Muslim spouse is
nullified. sı Shari'a has alsa not provided complete legal equality between
Muslim men and women. Discrimination against women in law of succession,
family lawand pubtic law is institutfonalized. For example, women receive
only half a share of a man in inheritance and are generally considered
incompetent to testify in serious criminal cases. Whilst a man is entitled to
marry up to four wifes and divorce any of them at wiIl, a woman is restricted
to one husband and can only seek judicial divorce on very limited and strict
grounds. Furthermore, the cruel aspects of criminal law in Shari'a such as
death penalty and cutting the hand of the thieves contradict with the right to
life, the prohibition on torture, and inhuman treatment. On the other hand,
even if Islam chose to 'abolish it gradually',SJ that the slavery is not forbidden
is an important obstade for human rights that can not be readily overcome.
These rules which retlect the histarical conditions of seventh century,
nowadays produce the problematic aspect of Shari'a for those who try to find
a basis for human rights in it.
See Abduılahi Ahmed An-Naim, "Religious Minorities Under Islamic Lawand the Limits of Cultural
Relativism", Huoum Rlgls Quar1erly, 9/1, February 1987, pp. 1-18; Taner Akçam, islam'da Hoyörü ve
Smın (Tolerance and Its Limits in Islam), B8§3k Pub., Ankara 1994.
sı see AbduUahi Ahmed An-Naim, "Islam, Islamic Lawand the Dilemma of Cultural Legitimacy for
Universal Human Rights", Aslan Perspeetlves on Human Rlghls, p. 39.
SJ Ahmet Turan Alkan, op.elt., p. 41.
SI
UNlVERSALISM OR CULTURAL RELATIVISM
41
Claiming the presence of human rights İn Islam on the one hand and
disregarding these problematic aspects of Islamic law with regard to human
rights on the other hand, is an attitude commonly encountered among
political Islamists. it is see n that specific Islamic human rights projects rely on
Shari'a without engaging İn a critical interaction with it. An important
example of this İs the Universal, Islamic Deelaration of Human Rights (1981),
prepared by people from countries like Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia
under the auspices of the Islamic Council, a private, London-based
organization affiliated with the Muslim World League, that is an
international, non-governmental organization that tends to represent the
interests and views of conservative Muslims. 54 In the Deelaration, dominated
by the views of the conservative wing of Muslim cireles, the borders of the
rights are drawn by Shari'a. In other words, many rights present İn the
international human rights documents are found also in the Deelaration, but
the exercise of these rights is restricted with the condition that they must be
compatible with Sharİ'a. 55 On the other hand, Iranian Constitution referred
to by Muslim intellectuals in order to support the idea that 'human rights are
present in Islam'56 limits the rights within the framework of Sharİ'a just as the
Islamic Deelaration. Iranian Constitution secures the rights of women
'according to Islamic standards' (Artiele 21). it permits recognized minority
religious associations provided they do not contradict the 'principles of Islam
or the Islamic Republic' (Art. 26). These artieles stabilizes the secondary
status of women and non-Muslim believers. Iranian Constitution elassifies the
citizens according to their religions (Art. 13), yet it do es not recognize Baha'is
as a religious minority. For this reason, Baha'is and unbelievers do not have
even the status of secondary elass citizens. The Constitution which anticipates
penal law to be consistent with the Islamic criteria (Art. 4) and considers
judicial organ responsible from implementing the Islamic penal law (Art.
156/4) approves the inhuman penalties of the Shari'a and has them
implemented.
Islamic human rights schemes the horizon of which is limited by Shari'a,
keep their distance from the idea of freedom of religion. They oppose the
freedom of religion because of the fact that it permits atheism, propaganda
against Islam, and some groups which are just see ts such as Baha'i to impose
themselves as a religion. 57 While they pay lip service to the equality between
Muslims and non-Muslims in a state based on Islamic principles, they also
accept the he ad of state and key ministers such as the minister of education
54
55
56
57
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, op.cll, p. 27. Ibid, pp. 86-9. For example, see Hüseyin Hatemi, op.dl, p. 298. For the views of Muhammad Naciri, see Kevin Dwyer, op.dl, p. 39. 42
TURKISH YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS
should strictly be a Muslim.'· Thus, political Islamists reveal the extent of
their tolerance to the groups outside themselves.
Islamic human rights projects are the variations of Shari'a spiced with
categories of human rights borrowed from the Wesİ. Therefore, we see an
admixture of Islamic and Western elements in these projects.'9 For example,
though they were restricted by the condition of not contradicting Shari'a, the
fact that the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights includes rights
such as freedam of thought, freedam of belief, the right of expressian, and
that Iranian Constitution similarly mentions rights such as the rights of
women, freedam of press, freedam of assembly, etc. indicates a repetitian of
the international human rights norms. Thus, we do not see an original Islamic
human rights catalogue, completely differentiated from the Western modeL.
Furthermore, when Muslim inteIlectuals try to put forward the specific
human rights approach of Islam, they usually take the U niversal Declaration
of Human Rights as their reference and try to find the rights present in the
Declaration alsa in Islam.~ That the Muslim authors who try to develop
Islamic human rights approaches are influenced by Western human rights
conception support the argument that the West affects political formatian of
present Islamic world.'· Even though it wants to challenge the West, political
Islamism is guided by the concepts of the Wesİ. Islamism sees no drawback in
borrowing human rights concept from the West, even though it interprets the
concepts according to its own principles. An important majority among
Muslim circles other than the ones who completely reject human rights
concept, cannot disown the effect and central role of the West in theİr
thinking, despite their strong reaction to the Wesİ.
The fact that Islamic authors can advocate human rights could be based
onlyon Islam, by disregarding the other cultural and religious traditions,'2
exhibits the exclusİonist character of their Islamic human rights approaches.
Indeed, the attempts of the political Islamists to develop their specific human
rights catalogue is closely linked to their ethnocentrist attitudes commending
their own religious and cultural values. That they see the origin of human
rights in Islam reveals they indeed do not want to take them from the Wesİ.
Hence, the ones who attempt to develop an Islamic human rights conception
represent an Islam-based resistance against the West with a cultural
nationalist attitude. The fact that Islam, principally developed within the
Arabic culture, is accordingly not ethnically neutraI and that the transference
of Arabic culture to the other peoples who become Muslims in time
58
59
~
,.
'2
For the views of Rachid Ghannouchi, see ibid, p. 44. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, op.dL, p. 199. For example, see Hüseyin Hatemi, op.dL, p. 212 ff. See Olivier Roy, Siyasal islamm inası (Failure of Political Islam), Metis Pub., İstanbul 1994, p. 33. For example, Hüseyin Hatemi states that "human rights theory is never be based on an atheist worldview" (op.dL, p. 7); "the real source of the doctrine of human rights is... Islam" (p. 299).
UNIVERSALISM OR CULTURAL RELATIVISM
43
iIIustrates that the Islamic resistance against Westem culture does not signify
a purely religious resistance without any ethnic components.
Currently, the schemes of Islamic human rights are derived from cultural
originality arguments and draws strength from total moral relativism of
postmodernism. Nevertheless, some Muslims who reinterpret their beliefs in
a relativist manner face the dilernma of Islam's being a universal religion,
when attempting to develop Islamic human rights approach according to their
culture. On the one hand, they seem to recognize the right of every culture to
have a human rights conception commensurate with their own cultural
tradition, by stressing cultural relativism and maintaining that the Islamic
world will approach human rights İn the framework of their cultural
traditions. Yet, on the other hand, they do not refrain from proclaiming
'universal' rights such as, in the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human
Rights. This suggests that some political Islamists are integrated to the
postmodernist discourse in a pragmatical manner, in our time when
postmodernism has many proponents of its evaluation of the new status of the
world.
The views of the conservative Muslims on human rights can be divided
into two approaches: That is, they either openly reject the concept of human
rights as based on alien (Western) notions and as a conspiraey against Islam
or take pains to establish specifically Islamic human rights scheme within an
ideological framework devoid of a legal reform in Islam.63 But, there are also
ones, even if theyare in the minority, who establish that the international
human rights norms are not contradictory to Islam and claim that Islamic
human rights conception could only be developed through a legal reform.
The idea that Shari'a should be reformed is not a new tendeney in the Islamic
world. At present, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim is one of the leading
representatives of the idea that Western human rights can be reconciled with
Islam. Indeed he believes that Islam is in substance compatible with Western
human rights norms if interpreted accordingly. An-Naim, guided by the
opinions of Sudanese Muslim reformer Mahmud Muhammad Taha, do not
consider that Shari'a is the totality of the word of God. For this reason, he
asserts that Islamic law is open to revision and reformulation. According to
him, Shari'a is the interpretation of Islamic sources by the early Muslims. But,
social and physical circumstances has changed to a great extent to date and
the historical responses of early MusIİms through their interpretations of
Islamİc sources are no longer valid. The new formulations that wiU be
developed will constitute the present Islamic law. The principles of Shari'a
are not the final words of Islam, and he beIİeves that Islamic Shari'a can be
reformed by using the fundamental sources of Islam, namely Qur'an and
Sunna, to fully accomodate and even contribute to the further development
63 See and compare Bassam Tibi, op.dt., p. 286.
44
TIJRKlSH YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS
of the current unİversal standards. What is open to restatement and
reinterpretation are the social and political aspects of Shari'a. The prescribed
worship rituals such as prayer and fasting, known as the five pillars of Islam,
remaİn valid and binding for every Muslim. An-Na im supported Mahmud
Muhammad Taha's reform methodology which submits that Qur'anic verses
of the Meccan era are more appropriate as a starting point for a modern
Islamic law than the ones of Medina stage due to the fact that Meccan verses
support complete freedom of choice and prohibit any degree of coercion on
non-Muslims. According to An-Naim, the essential question is an
'enlightened construction' of fundamental Islamic sources in order to achieve
complete legal equality for Muslim women and non-Muslims. The basic
requİrement of such a law reform İs that it must be based on fundamental
sources of Islam. The ideas of An-N aim represents a radical break from the
views of conservative Muslims and sides with the Islamİc 'liberal' wing.
Although he thİnks that it is legitimate to rebel against the cultural
dominance of the West, he attempts to reconcile Islam with the international
human rights norms without having any qualms about their Western origin.
According to him, the inereasing impact of human rights movement,
destroyed the moral foundations of the discrimination against women and
non-Muslims. The present duty of Islam is to adopt the international
standards on the rights of the individuals and render tradition compatible with
developmen t. 64
Whether the reforms proposed by An-Naim in order to make Islam
agree with human rights will be adopted depend on the direction political
Islam will take in the near future. Reformist approach can be said to be
supported in Muslim circIes, in as much as political Islam abandons anti­
Western and anti-modernist discourses. Nevertheless, the fact that the efforts
of human rights proponents in Muslim world for a regime based on human
rİghts were sacrİficed to the patriarchal and hİerarchical order, such as in the
example of Iran, suggest that this probability İs not very hİgh for the present.
Although, the softening in the Islam policy of the West and the support given
to liberal Islamic wing by the West points to the likelihood that the liberals
will become stronger in the future, that the rage of radical Islam will cease to
be one of the determining dynamics of Muslim world does not appear to be
very likely. Whose vision will determine the future of Muslim world depends
on the struggle of the various factions of political Islam and secularİsts and
the objective conditions of their actions.
Although secularism and pluralism might be rejected as values İn
themselves, the guaranteeing of secularism against religious intolerance can
64 See Toward an Islamic: Reformatlon: CivU Liberties, Human Righes and International Law, Syracuse
University Press, New York 1990; "İslamiyette Refonn" (Refonn in Islam), New Perspec:tives
Quarterly-Türklye, I/I Summer 1991, pp. 56-60. Also,supra, notes 51, 52.
UNIVERSALISM OR CULTURAL RELATIVlSM
45
be said to enable aıı factions of Islamism (radical, liberal, conseıvative, etc.)
and secularist and feminist movements to co-exist. At this time, however,
there is hardly any alternatiye permits a people to deliberately reckon with its
cultural heritage, select what is valuable in a process which is free from
xenophobia and reaction, and divest itself of patriarchal values and
practices. 65 "In Muslim countries, the secular agenda is not an exploration
into unknown worlds. Preoccupied with the Islamist and fascinated with the
Muslim as the Other, Western obselVers have largely ignored the secular
intellectuals, discounting them as marginal irrelevancies. In the midst of
Islamist sound and fury, the secular and feminist discourses are making an
impact on the consciousness of many Arab and Iranian Muslims."" In this
context, the new critica1 discourse in the Middle East has trİed "to break not
only from traditional Western models but also and simultaneously from
Islamic fundamentalism and 'modernized' Arab neopatriarchy."67 This means
that it is "to subvert simultaneously the existing social and political
(neo)patriarchal system and (the) West's cultural hegemony."68 "The Middle
Eastern critical discourse asserts that valuable cultural attributes of the past
can be preseıved and made to nurture development of a progressive national
character only if the cultural icons are purged from their inherent patriarchy.
(...) In this context, Shari'a itself, in all its various interpretations, is an icon
that enshrines the conseıvatism of the patriarchy in an inviolable code of law.
(...) Cultural iconoclasm, therefore, is an essential means to political
liberation from patriarchy, itself a precondition for creating indigenous roots
for human rights standards.""
To date, the debate on human rights in Muslim world has tried to identify
which one of the many alternatiye Islamic human rights interpretations is
authentically Islamic. But, at present the ones who determine the Islamic
human rights schemes are the conseıvatives. They do not go beyond Sharİ'a in
evaluating human rights and the cultural nationalism developed in opposition
to the West determine their attitudes. What Shari'a offers İn respect of
human rights are seen to be nothing, but oppression, discrimination, hierarchy
and violence. At this point, the violations of human rights in the countries
ruled by Sharİ'a or the ones where Shari'a is powerfuI seemilluminating. "For
the most part, the Shari'a İs employed for the regulation and control of the
subjects, not of the government".70 Strict compliance with Sharİ'a may not be
65 Reza Afshari, op.ciL, p. 273. " Ibid, p. 274. " Hisham Sharabi, "The Scholarly Point of View: Politics, Perspeetive, Paradigm", in, Hisham Sharabi (Ed.), Theory, Politics and tbe Arab World: Critlcal Responses, Routledge, New York 1990, p. 21,
cited in, Reza Afshari, op.c1L, pp. 274-5.
68 Hisham Sharabi, op.dL, p. 23, cited in, Reza Afshari, op.dL, p. 275.
" Reza Ahshari, Ibld.
70 Sami Zubaida, "Human Rights and Cultural Differenee: Middle &stern Perspectives", New
Perspedives on Turkey, 10, Spring 1994, p. 10.
TURKISH YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS
46
the primary motive or objective of the government in pursuing the policy or
the action which leads to the violation of human rights, but there is a Cıosely
relationship between Shari'a and human rights violations to the extent that
Shari'a İs used for the goals of the regime. "If Shari'a does not provide for the
general principle or specifıc rule underlying the particular policy or action, it
would not have been possible for the regime to justify or legitimize such
policy or action in Islamic terms."71 For example, during the constitutional
debates of the early 1950s in Pakistan, the religious leaders of the majority
demanded, on the grounds of Shari'a, that the Ahmediyya sect be declared a
non-Muslim minority, and the widespread rioting caused by the resistance of
the government against these demands later compelled the government to
support the molestation and cruelty against the members of this sect. 71. J ust as
it was not a surprise that the Ahmediyya individuals were killed as a
consequence of the offıcial policies, Shari'a is not innocent of the death
declaration issued against Salman Rushdie and Teslime Nesrİn. The death
declaration on Rushdie by Imam Khomeini of Iran indicates the intolerance
of Shari'a based Iranian Constitution towards the freedom of thought. The
people who issued a death declaration against Teslime Nesrin in Bangladesh
and the ones who can not tolerate the ideas of Aziz Nesin in our country rely
on the same Shari'a.
The ones who try to approach human rights from a liberating
perspective, not from the limitations of cultural relativism, should ask what
Islamic human rights schemes mean for everyone. It is evident that a human
rights approach determined by Shari'a and that can not tolerate freedom of
thought and belief protects the rights of (male) Muslim more than the rights
of everybody. In this context, Islamcentrİst human rights projects seem Iike an
accompaniment to Islamization programmes. The fact that the 'origina!'
Islamic human rights interpretation based on Shari'a rests primarily on
cultural relativism must not be independent of its essence which we hesitate
to defıne as unİversal owing to exclusion of women, non-Muslims and
unbelievers. In other words, although Islam appears to have a unİversal
humanity idea, in fact its claim to universality is disproved by religious and
sexual discrimination. The 'human rights' view of Shari'a and Shari'a based
despotic regimes implies 'violation' of their rights for the women and non­
Muslims. Oppressed social classes can be added to the victims of these
violations. Because Islam, which did not outlaw slavery in the past, exhibits its
structure permitting class dominance. Hence, the criticism of Shari'a with
respect to human rights can not be refuted with the accusation of holding an
'Orientalist' viewpoint. Although the criticisms directed against the violations
of human rights in the Middle East is exploited by the West in line with
71 Abduılahi Ahmed An-Naim, "Islam, Islamic Lawand the Dilemma of Cultural Legitimacy for Universal
Human Rights". p. 4L.
71. See Ibid.
UNlVERSALISM OR CULTURAL RELATIVISM
47
orientalist outlook, the critidsm of despotic regimes and fascist Islamic
movements in the region carries a meaning beyond Eurocentrism for the ones
who are guided by a universal human rights morality.
BEYOND CULTURAL NATIONALISM IN HUMAN RIGHTS
While some specific human rights models of non-Western cultures reject
the Western human rights philosophy, West, İn turn, responds to these
attempts by not regarding any conceptualization apart from its own human
rights concept as human rights. The Western dominant vİew is based on the
idea that the concept of human rights is historically Western and tends to
restrict human rights to its own meaning characterized by bourgeois
revolutions in the West, namely civil and political rights. It also asserts that
the human rights views focusing on the community, not on the individual, and
on the duties not on the rights are not valid as they do not agree with this
historical modeL. Western dominant view considers human rights only in the
framework of the imagined opposition between civil society and the state and
deems it a condition that the subject of the right is the individual living in the
civil society, and the responsibility for it belongs to the state. Therefore, the
Western human rights view is constrained by liberal human rights theory. The
counter criticism of the West against the 'specific' human rights conceptions
that Asian and African cultural and religious traditions tried to form have a
focus as well. It is a focus determined by liberal ideology.
Hence, we obseıve a historical process during which human rights
concept has turned into an arena of conflict between different cultures and
ideologies and this conflict seems sharper than the one between capitalist and
socialİst systems during the Cold War period. Following the conflict on
human rights between Western liberal democracies and real socialist systems,
there is an ongoing debate on human rights at present between the South and
the West which İs patterned by cultural themes. The reaction of the West
against the criticisms from the South on human rights and to the demands to
question their content resembles a challenge against the reaction of the South
rather than an agreement and reformulation on human rights between
cultures.
That the Western view draws attention to the history of human rights
when rationalizing its own argument, reveals its own consciousness of
historicity İs full of contradictİons: For Western liberal thought, human rights
date back to two centurİes ago when bourgeois revolutions took place. In this
sense, it confines the historicity of human rights to a certaİn period, and
restricts the development conditions of human rights to the age of bourgeois
revolutions, neglecting the ones in our time. The Western liberal view
disregards the fact that the 'social rights' the moving force of which was labor
movements and prepared by Keynesian economic policies and that the
48
TURKISH YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS
collectivist nature of the 'rights of the peoples' defended by the Third World
peoples who became independent during the '60s altered the individualist
nature of human rights for good. Mareaver, it neglects the unique aspects of
our histarical conditions characterized by the increasing criticism of Western
liberal human rights conception by the Southern cultures. it insists on not
recognizing this strong opposition which could be described as the new
challenges of the history. Briefly, the context of 'historicity' is manipulated by
the Western view. it can not be said that the neo-liberal policies, aiming to
res t rict human rights within the framework developed in the wake of
bourgeois revolutions, claiming that social rights can no longer be considered
as human rights and trying to take the previous social and economic advances
of working classes back through policies such as privatization, marginalization
of trade unions, minimizing the state, etc. do not play a part in this approach.
Thus, we see Western view exhibits a manipulation of historicity overlooking
the history of our century that created two generations of human rights,
namely second and third generations, and the specific histarical aspect of
restructuring at the threshold of the twenty first century due to its interests.
The Western dominant view reveals that it has no interest in discussing
the moral dimension of human rights by conceiving the morality of only
individualist values, but no other moral codes. Western outlook which
amounts to liberal human rights conception sees the moral foundation of
present human rights concept only in its own attitude overestimating the
value of the individuaL. So that, it restricts the moral nature of human rights
to that of liberalism. The Western view that prefers to proclaim its own moral
values as universal, explaining and rationalizing liberal human rights theory,
instead of engaging in a real discussion, cannot help displaying its positivist
attitude on the issue of human rights as well.
The Eurocentrist perspective that claim the only legitimate conception
of human rights is Western liberalone, asserts that non-Western cultures lack
not only the practise of human rights, but alsa the concept itself. Even
though, same Western scholars concede that 'human dignity' İs central to
non-Western cultural traditions,73 it seems they prefer to ascribe the concept
of human rights only to the West due to its histarical roots in the West and to
consider non-Western cultures as bereft of a human rights approach. This
view granting that non-Western cultural traditions could only have same
values on 'human dignity', not actual human rights values, is confronted with a
contradiction: The concept of 'human dignity' is in fact the ethical basis of
present human rights concept, and this is acknowledged in the international
documents on human rights, first of all in the U niversal Declaration of
73 For example, see Jack DonneHy, "Human
Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non­
Westem Conceptions of Human Rights", The American Polltkal Sc:ience Review, 76, 1982, pp. 303­
316.
UNIVERSALISM OR CULTURAL RELATIVISM
49
Human Rights. "Neither the concept of human dignity nor its connection with
rights, however, are objective or fundamental. Dignity as recognized and
granted by others is subjectiye and variable".74 In this sense, whilst the
'concept of honour' in pre-modern ages implies that identity is essentially
linked to instirutional roles, the modern 'concept of dignity', by contrast,
impIies that identity is essentially independent of institutional roles. 75 Modern
concept of dignity assumes that the individual can only discover hislher true
identity by emancipating himselflherself from hislher socially imposed roles."
Thus, the concept of human dignity which is the basis of liberal human rights
concept accepts that the individual can discover hislher essence solely by
isolation and alienation from hislher social roles. This 'human dignity'
foundation of liberal human rights concept could only imply the
rationalization of individualism with respect to morality. Therefore,
presuming the presence of different human dignity values on the one hand,
and daiming that only liberal 'human dignity' conception can be the moral
foundation of human rights on the other is a logical contradiction. Moreover,
it implies that human dignity values other than those of the West cannot be
the foundation of human rights. Hence, Western approach reveals its
condescending attitude towards other societies by imposing its own values on
them.
Western liberal thought does not refrain from daiming that a consensus
has been achieved on human rights. The presentation of human rights as
'global' values, particularly after the fall of Soviet Union underlies this idea of
consensus. This idea denotes the victory of 'individualism' over egalitarian
ideals because the challenge between the concepts of liberal freedom and
socialist equality seems to end. It is such a consensus that socialist systems has
no longer the power to place social rights in human rights documents and for
this reason, new human rights documents, especially in the process of CSCE
following 1989, dedare that an economic freedom based on freedom of
market and free enterprise is a right on which agreement is reached.
The culturally based resistance to individual human rights despite the
globalisation is defined also as a resistance against the universal morality of
globalised world. According to this outlook, while our time is marked by the
globalisation of structures, cultura) fragmentation indicates a conflict between
the local cultural resistance and the global civilisation. 77 For this approach,
since globalisation necessitates a universal morality, an agreement on it is
immediately required and universal human rights form a suitable foundation
O'Manique, "Universal and Inalienable Rights: A Search for Foundations", lIuman Kıghis
Quarterly, 12/4, November 1990, p. 469.
75 Peter Berger, "On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honour", in, Michael Sandel (Ed.), Liberalism
and lls eritles, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1984. p. 154.
76 Ibid.
77 Bassam Tibi, op.ciL
74 John
50
TIJRKlSH YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS
for this. The manner of constituting universal human rights morality in our
time is to view human rights as a 'cultural' concept and to approach
international human rights norms from cross-cultural foundations. Seeking
the cross-cultural foundatioos of human rights means resting the validity of
international human rights standards on the principles of cosmopolitan
justice. This approach that accepts the imperativeness of establishing the
present international human rights norms in a local culture, views human
rights as a means of bridging conflicting civilisations and bringing cultures
c1oser.
The importance of this approach, that seeks for cross-cultural
foundations for globalisation policies, in a period globalisation has chosen
human rights as its ethical foundation, corresponds to the need of re­
theorizing the universalisation of liberal human rights view. Globalisation
ideology illustrates the unification of all parts of the world under a single
economic system and envisions the universalization of human rights concept
as well. This impIies that all societies look for freedom on the basis of market
and that the fundamental rights are those of private property, free enterprise
and competition. However, it is difficult to explain to the peoples of the
South why they have to experience the pauperization under the ruthless and
brutal circumstances of capitalism. Consequently, formulating Western liberal
human rights concept on cross-cultural foundations serves to explain the
imposition of a universal ethical responsibility on these societies and to make
them accept living under conditions that even puts their lives in peril, in order
that they will not violate 'universal' human rights. Globalisation tries to find
the moral foundation legitimizating itself by recourse to human rights
concept, when its lack of moral foundation for the exploited people is
uncovered. Such an approach towards human rights represents a moral
defense against the possible threat of Southern cultures on globalisation.
The struggle carried out by non-Western cultures against the West in
concert with their own religious and cultural values is so vigorous that it
jeopardises the universality of Western liberal modeL. As to the West, it is
observed to require some pragmatic reforms to sustain capitalist system by
questioning its own culture. The new perspectives in international politics
that depend on the argument that near future of the world would be
determined by 'the c1ash of civilizations'7S points out to the possibility that the
uncompromising policies of the West, based on the assumption that the West
is the sole representative of human rights, may start to change -although it is
not explicit yel. The tendeney to exclude Confucian and Islamic traditions is
replaced by the approach that these traditions can be win over to
- 7s Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?", Foreign AfJairs 72/3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49;
"Müslüman-Konfüçyüsçü Baglantısı" (Relation Between Muslims and Confucians), New Perspectives
Quarterly-Türldye, 2n, 1994, pp. 22-6.
UNIVERSALISM OR CULTURAL RELATIVISM
51
democraey." International political theorists, who play a considerable part in
the determination of American foreign poliey, grant that it is getting more
and more difficult for the United States to protect its position as the leader of
the World due to the fact that hedonist, consumptionist, and individualist
values of its society can no longer offer the world a moral motivation, and that
the spirituality of Confucian and Islamic traditions presents a serİous
alternative to the ethical degeneration of the West. While, it İs acceded that
the economic success of Eastern Asian countries casts doubt on the
universality of the Western liberal model, our attention İs also drawn to the
presence of certain rules in all religions which can be adopted by a secular
society. it is recommended that obsession with self should be limited and that
liberal American and European societies should develop ethical
consciousness and be more aware of the benefits and attraction of moral
motives.1O
Thus, it seems likely that West gives up its insistence on being regarded
the only legitimate representative of human rights, following the
abandonment of the idea that Western secularism is the sole model for
human rights. On the background of a such political renewal, we can observe,
inter alia, the recognition by the West of the power of countries such as
Southeastern Asian states that have serious economic competition capacity in
the international market. On the other hand, the fact that the West begins to
pursue milder policies towards Islam since Islamic movement draws strength
from the increasing gap between the poor and the rich countries under the
conditions of the New World Order, and the pauperization of the South,
represents one of the examples of the attempts to live in peaceful relations
with religious and cultural traditions. But the most important development is
that the West tries to internalize religious values. Under the conditions, the
'materialism' of liberalism destroy the ethical foundation of capitalism, the
need for new ethical motives arises and theyare borrowed from religions. It
will not be surprising if these tendencies to instill morality from religions into
capitalism are followed by the attempts to formuIate 'multicultura!' human
rights concept in international level recognizing different cultural and
religious values.
We live in an age when ideologies are proc1aim~d to be dead and the
conflicting subjects are established to be whole cultures themselves.
Nowadays, 'multicultural' human rights concept resembles the appIication of
the arguments that we live in the postmodern political condition to the
human rights field. Although multicultura! human rights view appears to
7' See Samuel P. Huntington, Üçüncü Dalga: Yirminci Yüzyıl Sonlannda Demokratlaşma, (1be Third
Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Centuıy), Türk Demokrasi Vakfı Pub, Ankara 1993, pp.
304-5.
Lo See Zbignie\V Bızezinsti, "Esnek Batı'nın Zayıf Surlan", New Perspedlves Quarterly-Türklye, ın 1994,
pp. 6-11.
52
TURKISH YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS
~xhibit an egalitarian dispositian in that Westem culture is no longer the only
determinant of human rights and the moral values of other cultures are
incorporated to the concept of human rights, the main difficulty of develaping
this view lies in the fact that it bears the elements of reoppression: Cultures
are not static, theyare formed in a given histarical reality and are liable to
change consistently through internal and external factorso Theyalsa have a
comman, universal oppressive nature, as can be seen İn the examples of
patriarchy and class hegemony. For this reason, the objection that oppressive
dynamics of the cultures are invariably immanent in the multicultural human
rights approach is not irrelevant. The oppressed subjects do not consist solely
of cultural identities. Therefore, multicultural human rights approach bear
the imminent danger of legitimizing oppression for same other identities, in
particular, women. In this context, it is appropriate to keep in mind that the
universality notian of capitalism developed by excluding mostly blacks and the
women sı and that even the terminology of human rights (rights of man)
exposes its contradiction. On the other hand, conceiving of cultural equality
after the colonization process has terminated the authenticity of cultures
means protecting cultural styles integrated under capitalist life style. The
criteria of culture may legitimize that human being is the prisoner and victim
of hislher own cultural conditioning and serve to rationalize certain
oppressive relations when it does not question the characteristics of cultures
and excludes a meta-cultural criteria that can judge them. For this reason, it
does not see m likely to develop a liberating dynamics for human rights, by the
mediation of cultural life styles.
The criticisms of non-Western cultural and religious traditions towards
human rights has shown considerable progress in exposing the nature of
human rights, which is, in fact, conceptualized as, the rights of a particular
class and a culture, despite the fact that they were presented as 'universal'.
However, the current debates jeopardises the hope of developing comman
ethical values among different cultures and a genuine universal human rights
view, as long as they reflect the struggle of cultural nationalist attitudes to the
concept of human rights. The need to initiate a novel process that will reaııy
universalize human rights, by relieving them from a nature presently
characterized by the dominance based on class, culture and sex, is apparent.
In the debates on human rights, it is pointed out that the notian of human
rights must transcend its liberal conceptua1ization in the guidance of ideals of
freedam and equality which have yet to be realized. Human rights born from
the Enlightenment philosophy over two hundred years ago may be
reinterpreted as anatian providing a means of emancipating human beings
when, as in our time, dominance relations not only continue, but alsa become
more complex and intense. Reinterpretation of human rights will be possible
through the establishment of an alternative human rights ethics beyand
8ı See lmmanuel Wallerstein, op.clt.
UNlVERSALISM OR CULWRAL RELATIVISM
53
cu1tures. Instead of liberal human rights ethics, that rationalizes alienation,
we need to develop the ethics of freedom, equality and solidarity that are
fundamental for conceptualizing a genuine human rights view. For such a
human rights approach that wİIJ primarily take freedom from all dominance
and oppressive relations İnto account and will be based on 'ethics and
knowledge beyond cuIture', there is no trustworthy reference but reason.
That the rationalism of a new human rights conception is supposed to go
beyond the rationalism of Enlightenment that corresponds to the
development conditions of capitalism, as it was founded on the totalitarianism
of economic realm and realized a model competing with its religious
predecessors, is indisputable. The attempt to reformuiate human rights in a
manner beyond all kinds of exclusionİst and oppressive relations implies
transcending the human rights conception envisaged by the Enlightenment as
a tool for the absolute dominance of market economy. Moreover, it also
means something beyond and distinct from its positivism with respect to an
ethical standpoint. In the conditions, the İnner life of human beings is
threatened by the commodity alienation and reification, developing a human
rights interpretation, which will save human beings from this predicament,
seems possible through the recognition of the liberating character of human
rights, the awareness of theİr dynamic essence, the transfer of the still
unexhausted content of freedom and equality to human rights struggle and
the reformulation of them as one of the tools of escape from oppression.