Globalization and the Failure of Democracy on the
Periphery of the Global Economy, 1870-1946
E.S. Wellhofer
Department of Political Science
University of Denver
Denver, CO 80201
Paper prepared European Consortium Meeting, Salamanca, Spain 10-15 April
2014.
A special thanks to Professor Piero Ignazi of the University of Bologna for his
gracious and generous assistance in all phases of this project.
This paper is developed from research sponsored by the National Science
Foundation under Grant SBR-94-2281. The Foundation’s support is gratefully
acknowledged. The Istituto Cattaneo of Bologna, the Dipartimento di Politica,
Istituzioni, Storia of the University of Bologna, and Istituto di Studi Avanzati of the
University of Bologna, the Ministero dell’Interno, and the Istituto Nazionale di
Statistica in Rome also provided invaluable assistance.Special thanks to Jeffery
Williamson for sharing his data and Susanne Anderson for assistance in GIS.
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Globalization and the Failure of Democracy on the
Periphery of the Global Economy, 1870-1946
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: The inhabitant of London could order by telephone,
sipping his morning tea, the various products of the whole earth, and reasonably
expect their early delivery upon his doorstep. Militarism and imperialism of racial
and cultural rivalries were little more than the amusements of his daily
newspaper. What an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man was
that age which came to an end in August 1914.
FRIEDRICH VON HAYEK: We did not realize how fragile our civilization was. … The
decisive influence was really World War I. It's bound to draw your attention to the
problems of political organization.
Abstract: This paper examines two cases of the failure of democracy with the
contraction of the global economy after 1914. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Rowgowski
model provides the theoretical basis, but the research extends and tests the
models hypotheses more fully to domestic politics. The results generally confirm
the H-O-R model, but also place emphasis on strategic choices and policies of
elites. The analysis required the application of Geographically Weighted
Regression analysis to capture the nuances of a highly detailed data base.
2
Introduction:
Although the relationship between globalization and democracy has long
interested social scientists and historians, these connections have also captured
popular imagination. Especially after the 1980, democracy and globalization
seemed unstoppable allies in global modernization see Figure 1.1. Subsequent
surges of democracy in Russia and Eastern Europe and most recently the ‘Arab
Spring’ seemed attributable in varying degrees to globalization. Proponents of
globalization envisioned a future of market economics, modernization and
democracy. Critics, on the other hand, cautioned that globalization could
generate a backlash, undermine governments, increase inequalities, destroy the
environment, and obliterate indigenous cultures. Scholars argued for an
examination of past epochs of globalization and democracy that ended in
democracies’ collapse.
To its proponents, particularly in the popular media, globalization promised to
foster several conditions favorable to democratic politics. These included:
 International economic openness, especially international trade and foreign
direct investment that would foster the economic growth and prosperity
associated with democracy.
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 Domestic free market economic policies that would stimulate economic
development, innovation, and entrepreneurship, and would encourage
social change including rising educational levels, urbanization, and female
work place participation.
 Cultural globalization and information flows that would stimulate openness
to new ideas as well Modern Post-Materialist Values.
In examining the correlations of these variables, the results seemed to support
their statements. Several measures of globalization: overall globalization score,
cultural globalization, openness of the economy, and prevalence of market based
economic policies, post-materialist values, foreign direct Investment, and tourism
all correlate with democracy.
Critics responded that generalizing from the recent cases of globalization covered
too short a time period, and ignored many intervening variables. It was essential
they argued to examine cycles of expansion and contraction of globalization and
democracy because the economic downturn following 2007 was too brief for
meaningful analysis of its effects.
Part 1: Political Scientist and Economists Examine Globalization and Democracy
Political scientists and economists studying globalization tended to pursue
different research agendas, Alt et al. offered an early attempt to bridge the gap
4
(Alt, Frieden, Rodrik, & Rogowski, 1996). A synthesis developed as political
scientists argued for long-run historical analysis to understand the success or
failure of democratization, and especially for including international dynamics. In
other words, the analysis became more historical and included both domestic and
international dimensions of globalization and democracy (Rueschemeyer,
2013)(Capoccia & Ziblatt, 2010) (Boix, 2011). Moreover, it was essential to link
international dynamics to within nation-state politics.
In the 1990s economic historians turned their attention to long-run historical
analysis, paying particular attention to the 19th century, examining both the
expansion and contraction of globalization and developing models and an
extensive body of literature (K. H. O’Rourke & Williamson, 1999)(Aghion &
Williamson, 1988)(K. H. O’Rourke & Williamson, 1999) (Hatton & Williamson,
1994)(Jeffery G. Williamson, 2001)(Eichengreen & Irwin, 2009)(K. H. O’Rourke &
Taylor, 2006)(Grossman & Helpman, 2004).
Some economic historians focused on the political correlates of globalization. For
example, one recent analysis of globalization and democracy found that the
expansion of economic globalization facilitated democracy. The authors argued
for more detailed studies on within nation-state dynamics (Eichengreen &
Leblang, 2008, p. 320).
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The correlation between economic globalization and democracy was as powerful
as it was alluring, see Figure 1.1 (Eichengreen & Leblang, 2008, p. 2).
Yet, the analysis also indicated that non-recursive models using instrumental
variables would be necessary to disentangle the causal effects. For example,
democracy could work against globalization (K. H. O’Rourke & Taylor, 2006)
(Eichengreen & Irwin, 2009); and further that globalization could also undercut
democracy (Jeffery G. Williamson, 2001) (Acemoglu & Yared, 2010).
Like the political scientists, economic historians held that the understanding of
globalization and democracy must account for the collapse of democracies in the
inter-war period. However, when research examined the impact of the economic
contraction of 1920s and 1930s at the cross-national level, it concluded that while
economic crisis favored for the rise of extremism; the success of extremist
movements was conditioned by domestic factors. In particular, extremist parties
proved most successful in countries with short histories of democracy, recent
suffrage expansions, and low thresholds of representation, and where depressed
economic conditions were permitted to persist (Bromhead, Eichengreen, &
O’Rourke, 2013). These findings again highlighted to the importance globalization
to domestic politics.
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Both approaches proposed agendas for future research. Among those common
key tasks were:
 Analysis of long-run history while recognizing that switch points, were
crucial. History unfolded forward and elite decisions were important.

More detailed examination of internal politics and directly link internal and
international politics to understand how the political economy of organized
interests and institutional arrangements affects their potential, e.g. political
parties.
 Better measures of democracy; and instrumental variables and nonrecursive models to capture simultaneity, feedback and reinforcing
dynamics.
Part 2: Globalization and Democracy in the 19th Century Atlantic Economy
The following research places the above agenda at the center of this analysis.
From economic historians, the paper draws upon models of international trade
and redistribution developed by Heckscher-Ohlin. These models perform well for
the 19th Century, an historical period which motivated and informed their
development (K. H. O’Rourke, Taylor, & Williamson, 1996)(K. O’Rourke &
Williamson, 1999b November)(K. H. O’Rourke & Williamson, 1999).
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Heckscher-Ohlin postulated that with the expansion of trade, those factors in
relative abundance (relative to the trading partner) will gain and those factors in
relative scarcity will lose. Rogowski (1989)linked this insight to political alliances
among gainers and losers and reflecting political cleavage patterns within
countries. An alliance between capital and labor in a country where both are
relatively abundant will result in an urban/rural cleavage, e.g. Britain.
The relative influence of these alliances determines the resulting tariff policies
(Blattman, Clemens, & Williamson, 2002)(Eichengreen & Irwin, 2009) (Lehmann &
O’Rourke, 2011). Of course, relative power of the several factors will vary across
time. Economic factors such as new market entrants, changing transport costs,
etc. will alter the advantages (K. H. O’Rourke et al., 1996)(Blattman, Hwang, &
Williamson, 2004). Moreover, the influence of the gainers and losers will vary
according to whether trade is expanding or contracting. In periods of expanding
trade, those factors in relative abundance will gain influence. In periods, of
contracting trade, the opposite occurs. Elaborations and modifications included
(Midford, 1993) (Alt et al., 1996) (K. H. O’Rourke et al., 1996). The general model
has performed well (K. O’Rourke and Taylor (K. H. O’Rourke & Taylor, 2006)
This research draws upon this general model to analyze cases at different
locations in the 19th Century Atlantic economy. While the paper uses insights from
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the British case, the research concentrates on two cases the periphery of the
global economy: Italy, a case on the poor periphery of Europe, and Argentina, a
case on the poor periphery of the New World.
The general approach can be found in (K. H. O’Rourke & Williamson,
1999)(Jeffery G. Williamson, 1995) (Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2002) (Bértola &
Williamson, 2003)(Pamuk & Williamson, 2000)(Eichengreen & Leblang,
2008)(Eichengreen & Irwin, 2009). These works discuss long-run trends in factor
prices and illustrate the sectorial gainers and losers. Next, the paper formulates
testable hypotheses on the impact of global economic forces within the cases that
directly tie globalization’s forces to domestic politics.
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Rowgowski model and Case Selection
The paper examines three cases at different locations in the 19th Century global
economy, but particularly on two cases of the failure of democracy in the 1920s
and 1930s.
 Italy, 1870-1925, a protectionist, poor peripheral European economy with a
low K/L and R/L ratios. Suffrage expansion in 1909 and 1913.Collapse of
democracy in 1920s and rise of Fascism.
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 Argentina, 1890-1950s, a free-trading, poor, new world economy with low
K/L and high R/L ratios. Suffrage expansion in 1916. Collapse of democracy
in 1930 and the rise of Peronism.
 Britain, 1870-1930s, a free-trading wealthy, European core economy with
high Capital (K) to Labor (L) K/L, and low Resource or land (R) to Labor R/L
ratios. Suffrage expansion in 1885-1886 and 1918. Stable democracy.
The expected trade patterns under conditions of free trade follow the HeckscherOhlin theorem. Each country exports relatively abundant factors of production
and imports relative scare factors of production. Argentina and Britain possessed
highly complementary factors. Britain exported labor and capital and imported
Argentine land. Labor migrations were more limited to Argentina, British labor
preferred English speaking British colonies. Italy, a country abundant in labor and
poor in land and capital, developed an alliance of land and capital favoring
protectionism. Government policies promoted migration. Of course, free trade
was never entirely free and varied across time. Tariff rates varied the 19th Century
period of globalization, but all countries adopt more protectionist policies after
1914.
In addition, to economics, institutional arrangements altered the bargaining
power of the several factors. For example, expansion of the franchise in countries
10
abundant with labor will favor free trade, while the expansion of the franchise in
labor scarce countries will favor protectionism (Grossman & Helpman, 2004)(K. H.
O’Rourke & Taylor, 2006)(Grossman & Helpman, 2002).
The effects of the expansion and contraction of trade are clearly evident in the
data: returns to land/rural labor, and urban/rural labor in a period of expanding
trade 1886-1913. Protectionism sustained Italian rural wages. Argentine rural
wages declined. During a period of contracting trade, 1914-1918, British and
Italian rural wages rise, but collapse with the resumption of the global trade.
Argentina entered a period of long run decline of the rural sector see Figure 2.1.
How Free Was Free Trade and When Did It Contract?
Barriers to trade most obviously included tariffs. During the expansion of
globalization, 1870-1914, tariff rates declined and global trade increases.
Following World War One, protectionism increased in the interwar period.
How did Tariff Rates Affect Rates of Return of the Factors of Production?
Protectionism will increase rates of return to those factors insulated from
international competition. Each factor input will benefit from protection in
proportion to its contribution of the value of production. In the alliance of scarce
factors of production – land and capital – sought protection. However, labor
engaged in those protected sectors also benefited. Federico and Tena (1999)
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estimated the effective tariff rates on iron and steel at 52%, grain at 35% with the
highest rates reserved for sugar at 179.9% in 1913 (Perdisa, 1938, pp. 49–57).
These rates were considerably below their high points in 1897. Federico and
O’Rourke (2000, pp. 284–88) estimated the effects of tariffs: military-industrial
production increased by 14%; gross agricultural production by 2%, wheat
production by 53%; sugar production by 50% and land rents by 8%. On the other
hand, higher food prices, largely reflecting the wheat tariff, reduced urban
unskilled labor real wages by 3.5%. The removal of the wheat tariff alone would
have increased real wages by 2.2%. However, geographical variations were great,
and as we shall see the wheat and sugar tariffs raised returns to land as well as
labor in the Po Valley and their repeal during the war contributed to the Fascist
success in 1921.
How did the Expansion and Contraction of Trade
Change Return to the Factors of Production?
Heckscher-Ohlin postulates that the expansion of trade will reduce returns to
relatively scarce factors of production and increase returns to relatively abundant
factors of production.
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International Labor Migration and Returns to Land, Labor and Capital
Migration held great consequences for returns to the factors of production.
Italian and British labor emigrated with a significant proportion immigrating to
Argentina. Data for Argentina 1885-1945 show migration corresponded to surges
during the expansion of globalization, collapses during World War One, recovers
somewhat in the inter-war period and collapses again with the economic crisis of
the 1930’s. Italian migration to Argentina followed a similar pattern. Migration
altered returns to all three factors of production. Emigration will raise wages and
immigration will reduce wages, declines of labor costs will increase returns to land
and capital. O’Rourke and Williamson (1999, p. 155) estimated that migration to
Argentina reduced real wages by 21.5% between 1870 and 1910. By contrast,
emigration from Britain raised real wages by 5.6% and by 28.2 % in Italy. For the
United States immigration reduced real wages by 8.1%. Expanding trade provided
Argentine land owners with increased returns while immigration reduced returns
to labor. Argentine rural wages show a long-run decline, but with significant
jumps during periods of low migration, World War One, and following the
economic collapse of the 1930s. Italy and Britain evidence the opposite,
particularly Italy. Rising wages in Britain and Italy are explained partly by
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emigration, partly by rural-urban migration and partly by tariff policy. James and
O’Rourke (2012, pp. 5, 18) estimate that the grain tariff increased nominal wages,
reduced employment in industry, and hence stimulated migration. Italian
protectionism followed the expected pattern until the interwar period. The
Fascist regime under its “Battle for Wheat” explains this, see below.
Commodities Trade and Returns to Land and Labor:
The European Grain Invasion 1870-1913
Commodity trade also altered returns to land, capital, and labor. The 19th Century
witnessed an enormous expansion in trade in food stuff, particularly wheat.
Between 1885 and 1914 world wheat production rose by 44%, and European
production rose by only 11%. Wheat trade provides an excellent measure of trade
in food stuffs because it formed a dietary staple; its trade expanded greatly in the
19th Century, and its history is well documented (Hevesy, 1940)(Falkus,
1996)(Malenbaum, 1953)(Scobie, 1964). Italian agricultural protectionism largely
reflecting the wheat tariff generated higher food prices which reduced unskilled
labor real wages by 3.5%, while the repeal of the wheat tariff alone would have
increased real wages by 2.2%. The Italian tariff also increased domestic
agricultural production and land prices by 8% (Federico & O’Rourke, 2000, pp.
287–99). Moreover, protectionism enabled labor to bargain for higher wages,
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particularly where rural trade unions were powerful, e.g., the Po Valley. Italian
land and labor contrast with British rural wages. Argentine land benefitted from
the grain trade, but Argentine rural labor bore the effects of immigration.
O’Rourke (1997) documented the grain invasion effects on wheat and land prices,
returns to labor, and the effects of tariffs and his estimates confirm the
Heckscher-Ohlin model. Figure 2.1 illustrates the changing returns rural and urban
unskilled labor. Rural wages declined in Britain and Argentina consistent with the
H-O model. Italian rural wages increased in the interwar years, but fluctuate
greatly and figure prominently in the Fascist success. The increases after 1922
show the effects of the regime’s agricultural policies (Cohen, 1979)(Squeri,
1990)(Nello, 1981).
International Capital Flows and Returns to Land and Labor
Finally, international capital flows shifted returns of land and labor. Argentina was
a capital and labor scarce country and its economy was complementary to the UK.
Hence, Argentina, as noted above, exported land to the UK and imported capital.
About 40% of all British capital exports went to South America and Argentina was
the largest single recipient of British capital with about 8% of total overseas
investment; British capital constituted about 60% of all foreign investment in
Argentina during the period. Capital increased the productivity of industrial labor,
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and hence, rising industrial wages led to a divergence of rural and urban wages,
see Figure 2.1. Little foreign capital flowed into Italy (James & O’Rourke, 2012)
(Hertner, 1981)(Fenoaltea, 1988) and agriculture held more political sway than
industry (Coppa, 1970, pp. 768–69)(Federico & Tena, 1999, pp. 121–22).
Predicted Political Outcomes during Trade Contraction
The H-O-R model postulates different political outcomes as a consequence of
globalization’s effect on land, labor and capital. Above the paper noted that pre1914 trade and political coalitions were consistent with the H-O-R model:
Abundant factors of production favor free trade and scarce factors the opposite. .
During periods of contacting trade, the previous arrangements are reversed. For
Italy, an economy of scarce land and capital and abundant labor, H-O-R predicts
an alliance between land and capital against labor, a classic characterization of
Fascism. However, the model assumes free trade which is not the Italian case.
For Argentina, an economy of capital and labor scarcity and abundant land H-O-R
predicts an alliance of labor and capital against land.
Agrarian and Industrial Populism: Italy and Argentina
It is the thesis of this paper that Fascism in Italy and Peronism in Argentina were
populist movements whose success can be explained by the contraction of the
global economy. Populism is defined in this research as a broad based cross-class,
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emotive, anti-intellectual, nationalist, and anti-elitist movement with a
charismatic leader not from the traditional political elite.
In Italy, Fascism emerged from agrarian radicalism in the Po Valley (Lyttelton,
1987, pp. 55–64) (Cardoza, 1982)(Corner, 1975)(Zangheri, 1960). This paper
directly links the global economy to the rise of Fascism. In addition, two switch
points figured in the Fascist success, one on the right and one on the left: tariff
reform by the Liberal government in 1921 and a left schism between maximalist
and minimalist strategies in the 1921 elections.
Argentina presents a populist alliance of newer industrial elites and urban labor,
new strata created by the collapse of global trade and import substitution
industrialization (ISI).
Part 3: Linking Globalization’s Effects to Domestic Politics:
Italian Fascism as Agrarian Populism
Until the war, Italian agriculture was insulated from the ‘Grain Invasion’ by
protective tariffs which generated higher returns to both land and labor,
particularly in high productivity wheat growing areas. Rising food costs during the
war led the Italian government to suspend tariffs on wheat imports, impose labor
arbitration, bring in labor from other provinces, mandate wage increases, and
17
promise land redistribution after the war (Cardoza, 1982, pp. 223–47)
(Salvemini, 1931)(Saraiva, 2010) (Cohen, 1979).
In 1921, the Giolitti government broke this promise. The regime reinstituted
tariffs on industrial goods, but not on agricultural imports. This is one of the
significant switch points noted above. The effects were immediate: wheat imports
invaded Italy. Figure 3.1 illustrates these effects indexed to 1913. Compared to
eve of the World War One, wheat imports jumped by 40%, while domestic wheat
plantings stagnated; domestic wheat prices plummeted by 25%, while the ratio of
wages to the wheat prices skyrocketed by 50%.
These effects on Po Valley agriculture were devastating because the Po region
accounted for 13% of the nation's farm land, but one-third of agricultural
production. It accounted for 50% of hemp, 25% of tomatoes, and 80% of sugar
beets in 1911. Profits on sugar beets and hemp were four and ten times that of
wheat respectively (Cardoza, 1982, p. 128ff)(Sereni, 1975). Several additional
contextual factors converged in the Po Valley to foster agrarian fascism: the
intensity of wheat production aggravated the impact of tariff policy, low
emigration prior to 1914 meant an oversupply of labor and augmented by
returning veterans and repatriates, the concentration of landless day labors and
militant agrarian trade unionism. With tariff protection, laborers and their unions
18
could demand and producers could concede well-paid wage agreements. It is easy
to understand how both producers and laborers could join forces against free
trade and look nostalgically on the benefits of protectionism in the decades prior
to 1914 (Cardoza, 1982, pp. 46, 128ff, 226–32).But if correct , it would contradict
the H-O-R model’s hypothesis.
Understanding Fascism’s success in the Po Valley requires understanding the rural
labor market and the consequences for property rights conflict. Two types of rural
labor predominated in the Po Valley and they coexisted on uneasy terms. Rural
day laborers (braccianti) worked for cash wages and competed for work each day.
As a more privileged stratum, contract workers (obbligati) had commitments of
work from year to year and had the right of first hire. Landless rural wage labor
constituted the dominant form in the Po Valley. Rural wage labor averaged 80
workers per cultivated hectare, compared with 29 workers per cultivated hectare
in the rest of Italy. Enterprises of 20-50 hectares constituted 21% of all
enterprises. This could mean that a commercial estate of 50 hectares had a
potential labor force of 4,000 wage laborers. Such laborers were not housed on
the estate, but in tenement-like blocks, termed “agrarian towns.”
The functioning of the labor market is also important for understanding the
strategic choices and tactics of the Socialists, Communists, and Fascists. Each
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morning, day workers gathered at specified locals to bid for work. Where trade
unions were strong, the union agents oversaw labor exchanges. In the Po Valley,
most labor exchanges were overseen by Socialist trade union leaders. However,
the two types of rural labor belonged to two different unions, both affiliated with
the Socialists. In addition, there were Catholic trade unions, but these were less
significant. Socialist union agents were naturally disposed to offer work to their
respective union members. These conditions aggravated the tensions between
the two types of labor and are important for understanding strategies and
choices. This strategy underpinned the second switch point and was pivotal in the
Fascist success.
Spatial Models of Italian Fascism
The Po Valley as the epicenter of Fascism. Figure 3.2 presents the geographical
distribution of Fascist vote in 1921. Fascist membership, organizational density
and violence, day laborers, contract laborers and agrarian trade union density
evidence similar geographic concentrations. This high spatial concentration
requires different analytical techniques: First, tests for spatial dependence in the
data and, second, incorporation of spatial dependence into the models. Spatial
dependence arises when geographically contiguous units show contextual effects.
Unless, these contextual effects are incorporated into the model, biased
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coefficients result. Spatial dependence is evidenced by spatial autocorrelation and
is similar to temporal autocorrelation in time series analysis. In time series
analysis, the observations at time T1 influence subsequent observations, T2, T3…
Failure to incorporate cross-time dependency into biases the regression
coefficients. Spatial autocorrelation is similar. The test statistic, Moran’s I,
measures spatial dependency. Just as in time series analysis, the model must
specify the scree line of the contextual effects decay. For example, a temporal
model employing first order differences assumes the temporal effect dissipates
after one observation. In GWR the researcher must examine the rate of spatial
decay. Does the spatial effect disappear after the nearest neighbor, or, if more
distant neighbors, how many neighbors?
Once spatial autocorrelation and contextual effects are identified and measured,
GIS models employing geographically weighted regression (GWR) incorporate
these into the model (O’Sullivan & Unwin, 2010, pp. 226-35) (Fotheringham,
Brudson, & Charlton, 2002). When contextual effects are measured for nested
data, the analysis takes the form of multilevel GWR modeling (Jones, 1991)
(Duncan, 1997) (Subramanian, Jones, Kaddour, & Krieger, 2009).
Moran’s I in GIS is the appropriate test statistic. If Moran’s I is above .3, significant
autocorrelation is present. The residuals of OLS models have a Moran’s I of 0.388,
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thus strong spatial autocorrelation operates in the data. Spatial dependency
appears in the several measures: Fascist organizations, Fascist violence and
Fascist vote in 1921, Fascist membership, organizational density, day laborers,
contract laborers, and agrarian trade union density. Subsequent, models
incorporate this spatial dynamic.
GWR provides several goodness of fit measures: The global R2 is the overall fit of
the model; the local R2 is the explained variance for each geographical unit
(Fotheringham et al., 2002, pp. 215–16). Mapping the standardized residuals
highlights the performance of the model.
Violence and the Rise of Fascism
One of the central questions in research on Italian Fascism was the role of
violence. In several analyzes of Fascism, violence is crucial, e.g. (Luebbert,
1991)(Lyttelton, 1987)(Elazar, 2001). The analysis deploys a series of GWR models
to test the violence hypothesis. The model estimates Fascist vote in 1921 by the
contextual effects of violence. All measures of violence under estimate the Fascist
vote. In other words, the observed Fascist vote was greater than would be
predicted by Fascist violence alone. Figure 3.3 maps the standard deviations of
the observed and standardized residuals for Fascist vote predicted by Fascist
violence. The maps show clearly those areas of greatest Fascist votes are also
22
areas where Fascist-Socialist Violence is a poor predictor of the vote. This
evidence suggests additional explanatory variables are required.
Violence, Land Tenure Patterns and Political Strategies
To more fully analyze the role of violence, violence must be presented in the
contexts of land tenure patterns and politically strategic choices. First, violence
was a consequence of class conflict among property holders; second, violence
was the strategic choice of both the right and the left.
Land Tenure Patterns and Fascism
The Family Farms and Share Croppers
Scholars in the class tradition hold that support among small property holders and
violence formed the Fascist electoral base. The hypothesis is that leftist violence
drove the property owners into the Fascist camp.
We begin with a test of the widely cited interpretation of Fascist support: Fascism
was a response to property holders to the left radicalism of the Biennio Rosso.
Property holders possess legal property rights. Rights refer legal right to alienate
property. Agrarian property rights characterize class conflict in agriculture. Seven
property rights define agricultural enterprises: the rights to alienate land, labor,
capital, technology of husbandry, produce, and extent of market engagement
(Wellhofer, 2003, pp. 365–66). Commercial agricultural enterprises predominated
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in the Po Valley; hence extent of market engagement differed little across the
enterprise types. In the agrarian sector, 40% of the heads of house hold were
agricultural day laborers, 20% family farmers, 12% renters, 13% share croppers
and the remainder non-cultivators (Statistica, 1935) (Pagani, 1932, p. 137ff). The
family farmer possessed the most extensive property rights with control over
land, labor, capital, technology and produce. Share croppers held fewer property
rights, lacking control over land and produce, but with rights over labor, capital
and technology. This is a generalization and arrangements varied.
The class conflict hypothesis states that those possessing more property rights
will react more strongly to radical left movements. Thus, family farmers will
support Fascism more strongly than share croppers. The models estimate Fascist
vote by family farmers, share croppers and agrarian strikes. If strikes can be
considered a measure of left radicalism, then family farmers and sharecroppers
will manifest higher association to Fascist vote in the presence of agrarian strikes.
The global R2 is .89, however, when we examine the residuals the model performs
poorly in the Po Valley but well in Tuscany, where family farms and share
croppers were more common (Snowden, 1989, pp. 94–96). The fit of the model is
not improved with the addition of Fascist violence. The residuals remain more
24
than 2.5 standard deviations above the mean in the lower Po Valley and
particularly the Po Delta. Therefore, the class conflict hypothesis is not supported.
Contract Workers, Daily Wage Laborers
And The Second Switch Point
In the hierarchy of rural labor, contact laborers fall between sharecroppers and
daily wage laborers. Contract laborers have greater control over their labor
possessing the right of first hire, and they were given preference over daily wage
laborers at the hiring sites. It is understandable that these arrangements and the
fact that contract laborers and day laborers were affiliated to different trade
unions would give rise to a rivalry and in some instances hostility. This is the
context for the second switch point. In the heat of the Biennio Rosso, the
maximalists promoted the proletarianization (bracciantizzazione ) of the contract
laborers which would reduce their status to that of daily wage laborers (Corner,
1975, pp. 15–16) (Zangheri, 1960, p. 350). Day laborers, who likely aspired to be
contact laborers, also naturally resisted this strategy (Corner, 1974, pp. 11–
13)(Bernabei, 1975, pp. 123, 151)(Roveri, 1974). The hypothesis states that both
gravitated to the Fascists in reaction to the Socialist Maximalists and Communists.
Both contract laborers and day laborers were over represented in the Fascist vote
25
(Wellhofer, 2003, pp. 102–3). This decision to pursue a maximalist
proletarianization strategy marked the second switch point.
Two models test proletarianization hypotheses. Model one tests the hypothesis
that the maximalist strategy, measured by 1921 agrarian strikes, accounts for the
day laborers’ support for Fascism. Model two tests the hypothesis with contract
laborers. Model one produces the global R2 is .83. The residuals show it performs
well in the lower Po Valley and the Po Delta where day laborers predominated
and the Fascists received their highest vote. In other words, the hypothesis that
day laborers gravitated to the Fascists receives support.
Model two indicates that contract laborers are associated with Fascist vote
significantly more strongly than would be predicted by left violence alone.
Overall, the model fits less well, R2 = .42 and fails to predict the Fascist vote in
both the lower and upper Po Valley. These results support the interpretation that
the maximalist strategy alienated both contract laborers and day laborers. The
Fascists also promised land distribution that drew supporters among day laborers.
Fascist promises of land reform were more important than Fascist violence
(Corner, 1974, pp. 142–58).
A related hypothesis is the Fascist violence was directed against the Socialists.
Using both 1921 Fascist violence and 1919 Socialist vote to estimate 1921
26
Socialist vote did not generate a strong coefficient for explaining the decline in
Socialist vote from 1919 to 1921. The model generates a global R2 of .57. The
standardized residuals also show the model performed well where Fascism
received its greatest support. In other words, these results support the
interpretation that Fascist violence suppressed Socialist vote in 1921. However,
the model does not take into account the splintering of the Socialists in the 1921
election, including the Communists.
Violence, Fascism, Socialism and Communism in 1921 Elections
While the Communists received only 4.6% of the vote in Italy, the party
performed much better in central Italy, particularly in Emilia Romagna (7%) and
Tuscany (10%). One hypothesis is that the day laborers abandoned the Socialists
and split between the Fascists and the Communists, and that this division
accounts for the decline in the Socialist vote in 1921. Comparing the two models
sheds light on this possibility. The first model estimated Fascist vote as a function
of day laborers and strike activity, our measure of the maximalist strategy. The
second model estimated Communist vote as a function of day laborers and
strikes. The second model performs better, global R2 = .83 compared to R2 = .44.
While the Communists received fewer total votes, the standardized residuals
show the party performed better where strikes were more prevalent, particularly
27
in the Po Delta. Entering and removing Fascist violence from the model does not
alter the outcome significantly. These results suggest the day laborers, polarized
by the Fascists and maximalist strategy, moved from the Socialists in 1919 to the
Communists and Fascists in 1921.The Fascists received the larger proportion.
Previous analysis using an alternative estimation algorithm reached similar
conclusions (Wellhofer, 2003, pp. 101–02).
Part 4: Linking Globalization’s Effects to Domestic Politics:
Argentine Peronism as Industrial Populism
With the decline of the global economy, the Argentine agricultural exports
stagnated and the economic crisis arrived in 1929. In 1930, a military junta
replaced the civilian government. The new conservative government developed
an economic policy of import substitution industrialization (ISI) (Cramer, 1998).
The Pinedo plan of 1940 featured three elements: ISI, regional economic
integration, and consumption stimulation. This policy fostered the alliance
between the new industrialists and the new industrial workers (Llach, 1984, pp.
533–37) (Taylor, 1994). Italian economic autarky policies were favorably cited.
Foreign investment had dried up by 1930 and domestic investment shifted from
agriculture to industry. As Minister of Social Welfare, Coronel Juan Peron
28
stimulated domestic incomes as industrial wages far out stripped rural wages, see
Figure 2.1 (Taylor, 2014).
Figure 4.1 illustrates in red those provinces included in the analysis; these
provinces formed the core of the export economy; provinces in blue were nonself-governing territories. Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of the Peronist vote in
1946. Figure 4.3 maps the natural log of the increase of industrial workers 19351945. Other measures of industrialization show a similar geographic distribution:
industrial horsepower and industrial workers per factory for 1935-1946.
After testing for spatial autocorrelation, the analysis employed GWR models to
estimate the Peronist vote by the natural log of the change in industrial works
1935-1945. The global R2 is .69 and the residuals have a less than 1% chance of
autocorrelation. Figure 4.4 which maps the standardized residuals confirms
previous research that Peronism had it greatest appeal in the newly industrializing
Greater Buenos Aires. None of the socio-economic variables, including migration,
land holding patterns, etc., improve the fit.
The Argentine findings conform to the H-O-R model: In periods of contracting
trade, scarce production factors collaborated to promote their shared interests. In
the Argentine case, the conservative regime of 1930 initiated an ISI strategy to
preserve conservative dominance. Unexpectedly however, the ISI created and
29
mobilized new political forces which coalesced in industrial populism which
undermined the regime.
Observations and Conclusions
The substantive findings of the research offer refinements to the existing
literature. The research examined two cases on the periphery of the global
economy during a period of declining trade. H-O-R postulates democratic failure.
The rise of Italian Fascism deviates from the H-O-R model which remains the
predominant interpretation. The H-O-R model predicted a coalition of land and
capital against labor in Italy as the case of European Fascism. This research
presents a different picture. Italian Fascism grew from a radical, agrarian populist
movement. Fascism was a cross-class phenomenon in the most intensive
agricultural region of Italy.
While superficially Italian Fascism would seem at odds with the H-O-R model, HO-R assumed free trade, but protectionism changes the outcomes. Italy stood
back from the 19th Century globalization. Tariff and trade policies insulated capital
and land from the damages of globalization’s forces. This was particularly the case
in agriculture and wheat. Government policies operated in both sectors. Tariffs
protected agriculture from the ravages of the Grain Invasion benefiting both land
30
and labor particularly in the Po Valley. Meanwhile, official policies promoted
migration which increased wages and generated remittances to cover the balance
of payments deficits.
This accommodation was thrown into crisis when international trade revived and
the war-time agricultural tariff reductions continued and marked the first of two
switch points. Fascism might not have gained a foothold except for the second
switch point: The maximalists’ strategic choice to radicalize the rural work force.
The strategy polarized the rural labor; a majority gravitated to the Fascists and a
minority to the Communists.
The regime’s agrarian development policies offer additional evidence of its
privileging of the rural sector. These policies favored both land and rural labor.
Rural wages increased see Figure 2.4. Land reclamation projects expanded
acreage for redistribution. Land reform reduced the proportion of landless
workers in agriculture from 44% to 28% of agricultural economically active labor
force from 1921 and 1936 (years of censuses). Landless day laborers (braccianti)
declined from 39% to 14%. Four thousand families received land in Ferrara alone
(Corner, 1979, p. 244ff)(Schmidt, 1966, p. 33).
Argentina, the case of a poor peripheral new world country followed free trade
policies and became integrated into the global commodity, capital, and labor
31
markets. The results fit the H-O-R model. After the collapse of globalization in
1914 and particularly after the economic crisis of 1930s, the influence of the
traditional agricultural export sector waned. Capital and labor ascended. Import
substitution industrialization (ISI) policies joined the interests of capital and labor
at the same time it further strengthened their political influence. The ISI policy
marked a switch point. Capital gained from the trade, tariff and monetary policies,
and the prospects of increased domestic consumption of the new production.
Labor benefited from rising urban industrial wages, Figure 2.4. Moreover, the
stimulation of domestic demand proved politically popular and underwrote the
Peronist electoral triumph of 1946. These results are consistent with H-O-R.
The regimes policies, however, eventually proved its undoing. ISI required
increasing importation of capital goods and intermediate inputs while terms of
trade declined (Taylor, 2014, pp. 11–13). Stimulating greater consumption
reduced the domestic saving rate and literally consumed the traditional
agricultural export products. Domestic consumption of meat increased at a rate of
0.7% per year from 1920-1959 while production increased at 0.3%. By 1955-1959
domestic demand consumed 73% of agricultural output (Diaz-Alejandro, 1970, pp.
203–04).
32
This paper broke new ground by joining of H-O-R model, democratization studies
to detailed analysis of within-system domestic political coalitions. The analysis
focused on two young democracies at different locations in the 19th Century
Atlantic economy, with different factor endowments, and different trade and
tariff policies, but experiencing democratic collapse with the contraction of the
global economy after 1914.
Extensions
This paper shifted the analysis to within-system dynamics from cross-sectional
research. New complexities challenge the analysis. First, globalization’s withinsystem effects involved subtle and nuanced dynamics requiring detailed data and
alternative analytical techniques. These both enriched and belabored the analysis.
Subtleties unobservable at the system level came into focus, but required finegrained data with a significant number of observations across time. In addition,
within-system analysis displayed geographic concentrations and spatial
dependencies requiring alternative estimation strategies. While the analysis
incorporated spatial dependency, it did not incorporate change across-time. Both
are necessary. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) with Latent Growth Curve
Models (LGCM) is promising.
33
This paper forms part of a lager project which will include four cases in a most
different systems research design. The four cases fall at different locations in the
19th Century Atlantic economy: Britain, Italy, Argentina, and the US. The cases
differ in wealth, factor endowments of Land (R), Labor (L), and capital (K), but all
experienced the expansion of globalization and democracy after 1870 followed
the economic and democratic crises in the 1920s and 1930s:
 Britain, 1885-1930s, a wealthy, free trade, European economy with high K/L
and low R/L ratios; exporting capital and labor and importing land; suffrage
expansion in 1885, 1918, and 1928; democratic crisis in 1920-1930s.
 Italy, 1890-1925, a poor, protectionist, European economy with a low K/L
and R/L ratios; exporting labor; protecting land and capital; suffrage
expansion in 1911-1912, 1919; democratic collapse in 1920s.
 Argentina, a poor, free trade, new world economy with low K/L and high
R/L ratios; exporting land; importing capital and labor; suffrage expansion
of in 1912; democratic collapse 1930s.
 United States, 1870-1930s, a rich new world economy; high R/L and K/L
ratios; exporting land; importing labor and protecting capital; suffrage
expansion in 1870s, but reversed after 1876 additional suffrage expansion
1920, democratic crisis 1930s.
34
These four cases offer the potential to investigate the negative as well as positive
aspects of globalization with the nuances necessary to begin grasping the complex
dynamics of a constantly evolving global economy intersecting with democracy.
35
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Globalization and Democracy
The Failure of Democracy on the
Periphery of the Global Economy,
1870-1946
45
Figure 1.1 Evolution of Globalization
and Democracy
46
Figure 2: 1 Ratio of Unskilled Rural to Urban Wages to GDP per
capita, 1886-1950
(1886 = 100)
47
Figure 3.1 Italy: Effects of Wheat Trade and Tariff Repeal of 1919
On Wages, Land, Prices, Wheat Imports and Wheat Plantings: 19181922, 1913 = 100
48
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