AN ISRAELI MILITARY STRIKE AGAINST IRAN’S NUCLEAR SITES
WOULD NOT BE THE SOLUTION
OFER ISRAELI1
A nuclear Iran poses a serious threat to Israel. While neither sanctions nor diplomatic
efforts alone are able to keep Iran away from the bomb, Jerusalem should also rule out
using its own military force alone. An Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear sites
could not block Iran from developing nuclear capacity, since it will neither end Tehran’s
nuclear ambitions nor curb its ability. The results of an Israeli pre-emptive attack against
Iran’s nuclear facilities, on the other hand, would have dire consequences and hardly any
positive results for the Jewish state. It would actually produce a much more friendly
environment for Iran along with Islamic, as well as global, legitimacy for carrying out its
satanic ambitions in the future.
Operationally, even an exceptionally successful Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear
installations could not completely halt Tehran’s nuclear project. The optimal scenario
might envision the wiping out of six of Iran’s key nuclear facilities. However, insufficient
intelligence, the distances involved, and the fact that Iran’s nuclear sites are widely
dispersed and deeply underground, make the operation an enormous challenge. It is an
almost impossible mission for the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to completely destroy Iran’s
nuclear program by using conventional weapons. Using a strategic weapon that has the
potential of totally destroying Iran’s nuclear complex is not a practical choice that any
reasonable government in Jerusalem would consider for a pre-emptive attack. The choice
of this path could indeed possibly be fatal for Israel in the long-term.
Tactically, the best result of a successful conventional Israeli attack on Iran’s main
nuclear sites would be a short delay in Tehran’s higher-enriched uranium production
schedule. Ultimately, it could set back Iran’s program by two to five years, which is a
negligible length of time in strategic planning. “The moment there are centrifuges,” as the
President of the State of Israel, Shimon Peres, put it, “it is possible to destroy them. It
would not be possible, however, to destroy the know-how to create them.”2
Consequently, at the moment the ashes of Iran’s nuclear complex sites would settle, the
Ayatollahs would run amok toward the bomb and close the gap extremely quickly.
The short-term strategic results of an Israeli attack could seriously backfire and create a
danger that would be far worse than giving up this option. The day after, Islamabad
would be confronted by the gigantic pressure of excited masses within Pakistan along
with millions of Muslim demonstrators all around the world. Consequently, Pakistan
could no longer deny Iran’s repeated and stubborn attempts to buy nuclear bombs.
Islamabad would have to consent to Ahmadinejad’s and Khamenei’s envoys’ demands of
1
Dr. Ofer Israeli is a Visiting Researcher at the Center for Peace & Security Studies (CPASS), within
Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service (SFS). He is doing his postdoctoral research in the
field of complexity of international relations. He teaches International Relations Theory and Foreign Policy
Decision-making at the University of Haifa, Tel Aviv University and at the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Academy, The Colleges for Strategic & Tactical Commanders.
2
DPA, “Peres: Bombing Iran may not be the ‘best solution’,” Haaretz (April 29, 2009).
‘Islamic Nuclear Warheads’.3 Neither Israel nor the U.S. have any reliable means of
blocking such a nightmare scenario of Pakistan delivering a pack of Holy Islamic Nuclear
Bombs to Iran from its temporarily locked shelf. Choosing to walk along this path would
create a nuclear Iran almost instantly.
Some analysts predict that Iran’s response to an Israeli military strike against its nuclear
sites might be comparable to those which followed the June 7, 1981 Israeli attack on the
Osirak reactor of Iraq, and the September 6, 2007 attack on the Syrian suspected nuclear
site. Others consider three main options that Iran would be likely to adopt as retaliation.
First, the firing of ballistic missiles against Israeli targets, including the city of Tel Aviv,
the financial hub of the nation located at the center of the country, and the Dimona
nuclear reactor located in the south. Second, using its proxies, Hezbollah from Lebanon
and Hamas from the Gaza Strip, attacking Israel and forcing Jerusalem to be involved in
a long and a bloody war of attrition.4 Last, orchestrated international fundamentalist
Muslim organizations launching repeated global terror attacks against Israeli and Jewish
interests.
However, the situation that would emerge the day after an Israeli attack is potentially
exceptional and with no equivalent in the past. According to Iran’s extremely long-term
point of view, an Israeli attack on its nuclear sites would not be the end of the game, but
only its very beginning. As has been clear from Iran’s past manner of action and the
speeches of its current leaders, “Iran will respond in a way that they [Israel] will not be
able to sleep easy anymore”.5 Ultimately, the only possible termination of such a struggle
would be either the collapse of the Ayatollahs’ regime in Iran or the annihilation of the
Jewish state. The single solid predictable result of an Israeli attack would be the
uncompromising and stubborn attitude that will be adapted by the Ayatollahs, focusing
on the holy and ultimate goal of achieving the bomb.
To correctly deal with the hypothetical scenario of an Israeli military strike against Iran’s
nuclear sites we must analyze it from the metaphysical-Persian/Iranian point of view.
Accordingly, Tehran’s retaliation would be unexpected and in contrast to the results of an
analysis from the rational-modern/Western point of view. Instead of choosing a direct
confrontation with Israel and/or with the U.S., Iran’s top leaders might choose to step
back for a while, delay their response and continue slowly along a very extended path.
On many occasions in the past, Iran’s top leaders decided that their long-term strategic
goal of achieving the bomb obligated them to self-restraint and patience. This was the
case when Iran avoided retaliation after an Israeli or American operation against its
interests within Iran or abroad: the abduction of Shahram Amiri, a Defense Ministry
official, who disappeared during a summer religious pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia in 2009;6
the abduction of a top Ministry of Defense official, Ali-Reza Asgari, who disappeared in
3
In 1990, Iran had struck an agreement with Pakistan’s army chief to buy “nuclear bombs” for $10 billion
but Pakistani officials pulled out of the offer. Damien McElroy, “Iran ‘tried to buy nuclear weapons from
Pakistan’,” Telegraph (April 8, 2010).
4
Ephraim Kam, as quoted in Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, “For Israel, A Nuclear Iran Poses Existential
Threat,” NPR (Aug. 26, 2009).
5
Ali Larijani, Iran’s parliament speaker, as quoted in: “The Associated Press, Iran warns Israel not to attack
nuclear sites,” Haaretz, (Jan. 1, 2009).
6
Borzou Daragahi, “Iran accuses U.S. and Saudis kidnapping a nuclear scientist,” Los Angeles Times (Dec.
9, 2009).
ISRAELI, AN ISRAELI A TTACK ON IRAN WOULD NOT BE THE SOLUTION
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2007 while on a trip to Turkey;7 the death of Iranian nuclear scientist Massoud AliMohammadi when a bomb exploded near his home in Tehran’s northern neighborhood of
Qeytariyeh on January 12, 2010.8
Instead, Tehran would probably express its hunger for inflaming the passion of the
masses around the Muslim World and even beyond in order to support its position. Along
with the Ayatollahs’ efforts to achieve internal legitimacy, an Israeli attack would also
push them to work harder than ever to receive worldwide legitimacy, Islamic-Shiite and
Christian anti-Semite, for a future nuclear attack on the “Zionist entity”. After achieving
this legitimacy, they would use it as a strong and threatening justification for action until
the end of days.
Thus, an Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear sites, which might set back Iran’s
nuclear program by a few years, or even completely destroy it, could be a disaster for its
own interests. Simultaneously also Iran, the Middle East region and the entire world
could be negatively affected. It could ultimately cause nuclear exchanges between the
belligerent sides since, while holding the bomb and obtaining the necessary legitimacy,
the Ayatollahs could eventually turn to their ultimate goal: the destruction of the “Zionist
entity” as an essential step to becoming a local power with global aspirations.
There is only one obvious conclusion. Contending with Iran’s military nuclear ambitions
is far beyond the capability of the Jewish state. Consequently, Israel should forego this
hopeless path. The international community, and mainly the U.S., carry the responsibility
for responding to Iran’s defiant position, which endangers not only Israel, but also the
entire international order. If they fail, and given their present reluctance this what is
seems to be happening very soon, Israel should contain a nuclear Iran by developing a
novel, courageous, and efficient strategy. This mission is enormous and complicated, but
not impossible to achieve.
7
Sebnem Arsu, “German Official Adds to Mystery of Iranian Missing in Turkey,” The New York Times
(Mar. 14, 2007).
8
CNN.com, “Iranian media: Iran suspects Israel, U.S. behind scientist’s killing,” CNN.com (Jan. 12, 2010).
ISRAELI, AN ISRAELI A TTACK ON IRAN WOULD NOT BE THE SOLUTION
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