ProspecttheoryandthedefenceinClausewitz’sOnWar
PaperpresentedtotheannualmeetingoftheInternationalStudiesAssociation,
16March2016,Atlanta,Georgia.
KennethPayne,KCL
Itisquiteclearhowgreatlytheobjectivenatureofwarmakesitamatterof
assessingprobabilities.1
CarlvonClausewitz,somewhatcryptically,arguedthatdefenceinwarwas
strongerthanattack.Thisseemstojarwithmuchmilitarywritingthenandnow
whichpraisesthedynamismoftheoffensiveandadvocatesusingsurpriseasa
meansofovercominganadversary’sstrengths.Seizingtheinitiative,particularly
whendonebybold,visionarygeneralship,isthewaytowinvictoryinbattle.
Bycontrast,thedefenceseemsreactiveandpassive,notcommonlytraitspraised
inmilitarycommandersorstrategists.Waiting,Clausewitzaverred,isthe
‘leadingfeature’ofthedefence.2Passivityinthefaceofenemyhostilityisnot
commonlyremarkeduponasafeatureofmartialprowess.Evenwhenanattack
wasunderway,thedefensiveforcewouldremainonthebackfoot,reactingto
events,ratherthanshapingthemdecisively;passivelyenduringtheblowsofthe
assaultingarmies.AsClausewitzsawit,‘prudenceisthetruespiritofdefence,
courageandconfidencethetruespiritoftheattack’.3Howthencoulddefencebe
thestrongerofthetwoforcesinwar?
Nonetheless,IargueherethatClausewitzwasessentiallycorrect,andfor
reasonsthatmodernpsychologywouldrecognize.Specifically,Iclaimthatthe
defenceisstrongerbecausewehaveaninnateaversiontolosingpossessions,
andthiscausesusbothtofightmoretenaciouslytoholdontowhatwehave,and
toriskmoretosecureit.ThisargumentchimeswellwithProspectTheory,a
prominentconceptincognitivepsychologyelaboratedfirstbyDanielKahneman
andAmosTverskyinthelate1970s.Clausewitz,Iargue,wasaproto
1Clausewitz,C.v.,M.Howard,etal.(1993).Onwar.London,DavidCampbell.,p.
96
2ibid,p.741
3ibid,p.658
psychologist;indeedhispsychologicalinsightsarethekeytohisenduring
reputationasagreatthinker.4Moreover,whenitcametotherelativestrengthof
thedefence,histheorizinganticipatedimportantaspectsofthelandmarkwork
ofKahnemanandTvserky.Iillustratethetheoreticalargumentthroughoutwith
historicandrecentexamples.
Intheirresearch,KahnemanandTverskyidentifyastrikingrelationship
betweenthewayinwhichasituationis‘framed’,orexpressed,andtheamount
ofriskthatindividualsarewillingtoaccept(KahnemanandTversky1979).
Specifically,giventhechoicebetweenacceptingaguaranteedlossorgambling
onthesmallpossibilityofavoidingastilllargerloss,wearemoreinclinedto
gambleonthepossibility–becausewemighttherebyavoidanyloss.More
inclined,thatis,relativetoourbehaviourwiththesamepayoffsandoddswhen
theyareexpressedtousasagain–thechoicebetweenasuregainandthesmall
possibilityofanevenlargergain.Here,wearetypicallycomparativelyrisk
averse,settlingforthesurething.Inthemosttellingfinancialexperimentthat
thetworesearchersdid,thepayoffsandprobabilitiesineitherthe‘gain’or‘loss’
scenarioswouldbeexactlythesame,withtheonlychangebeinglanguagein
whichtheoptionsweredescribed.Thiswasdonebyhavingtheparticipants
imaginethemselves,inthe‘loss’scenariohavingbeinggivenasumwhichthey
mightthenlosesomeof–therebyfindingthemselvesina‘domainoflosses’–
belowtheirinitialimaginarystartingpoint.Intheotherscenario,thepossible
payoffswereexpressedsimplyasagainfromtheirexistingcoffers.
Inanutshell,ProspectTheorysuggestswearelossaverse,andsorelativelyrisk
acceptantwhenweareinthat‘domainoflosses’.Thisdomainispsychological–
itisjudgedrelativetosomeanchor-pointthatweuseasabenchmarkfor
calculatingrisk.Thementalbenchmarkoranchorhelpstoframethepayoffs.In
KahnemanandTversky’sexperiments,thesewerefinancial,butthetheoryhas
beenappliedmorebroadly,tousenon-financialanchorsandpayoffs.Aswewill
see,instrategicstudiesthereisconsiderablescopeforambiguityand
subjectivityaboutwhatthebenchmarkisintherealworld,outsidethe
psychologylabwithitsclear-cutfinancialchoices.
Thispropensitytogamblemoreenthusiasticallywhentheframesuggestsweare
inadomainoflossesseemsnon-rational.Anditis,atleastinthesenseofstrict
theoretical‘rationality’,whereactorsareassumedtohave‘perfectknowledge’of
payoffsandprobabilities,andconsistentlyorderedpreferencesthattheyseekto
satisfy.Rationalactors,intheabstractlyrationalsenseofutilitytheory,appraise
riskthesamewayregardlessoftheframe.
4ApointImakeextensivelyinKennethPayne,ThePsychologyofStrategy:
ExploringRationalityintheVietnamWar(London:Hurst&Co.2015)
Thereis,though,aplausiblelogictothebias-theremaybesoundevolutionary
reasonsforourinstinctivefearoflosingpossessionsoraversiontogamblingon
possibleacquisitions.Gamblingtoacquirenewresources,includingterritory,
food,andsexualpartners,comeswithuncertainoddsandthepossibilityofgrave
consequences.Losingresourcesinmarginalenvironmentsmaysimilarlyprove
decisiveinthestruggleforsurvival.Proverbially,ofcourse,abirdinthehand
trulyseemsworthtwointhebush,anddiscretionisthebetterpartofvalour.
Thereislikelytobeanemotionaldimensiontothisevolvedlossaversion–even
thoughthisisunspecifiedintheoriginal,cognitivepsychologicaltheory.
Emotionscanservetoshapedecision-makingthatisevolutionarily
advantageous,makingsuchchoicesmoreinstinctualandtimely,whilefreeingup
limitedcognitiveresources.Andsowemightfindthatlosingrelativetothe
referencepointmakesusangryandmoreresoluteinourpurpose–distorting
ourperceptionoftheodds(Druckman&McDermott,2008).
Clausewitzandthedefence
AboutacenturyandahalfbeforeKahnemanandTversky,CarlvonClausewitz
setoutanargumentaboutthedefenceinwarthatgoesaconsiderableway
towardstheirtakeonlossaversion.Clausewitz’swritingsonwarcontain
throughoutaremarkablepsychologicaldimension:hewaskeenlyawarethat
warwasastruggleofwillsbetweenbelligerents,andthatitwasintimately
boundupwithprobabilityandchance.Indeed,hewrotethat‘inthewholerange
ofhumanactivities,warmostcloselyresemblesagameofcards’.5
Clausewitzofferedsomelargelyplausiblepracticalexplanationsforthe
dominanceofthedefence,includingshorterinternallinesofcommunicationfor
thedefender,thecapacitytowaitandchoosewhenandwheretoofferbattle,the
abilitytoshapeone’sdispositionaheadofanyinvasion.Buttherewasalsothe
moralandpracticalsupportofferedbyone’sownpopulationcomingunder
attack.ItisthismoralandemotionaldimensionthatIsuggestholdsthekeyto
Clausewitz’sassertion,alongwiththenotionofpossession.Clausewitzwrote
that‘thecollectiveinfluenceofthecountry’sinhabitantsisfarfromnegligible’,
andaddedthesortofpassionsexhibitedbytheSpanishpopulationintheir
popularwaragainsttheNapoleonicforceswerea‘genuinenewsourceof
power’.6Elsewherehehadnotedthepassionatehatredofthepeopleasan
essentialforceinwar,partofhis‘remarkabletrinity’.Andwhilehedidnot
expandmuchontheseideas,preferringinsteadtoconcentrateonthemore
5OnWar.,p.97
6Ibid,pp.446-7
materialaspectsofdefence,theyseemtometobekeytounderstandinghis
contentionthatdefencewasthestrongerofthetwoforces.
Setagainstthesemoraladvantagesforthedefencewasthemoralliftforthe
attackerofbeingthedynamicforce,lookingtoseizetheinitiative,ratherthan
waiting,passivelyastheothersidedecidedonaction.Militariesprizethe
initiative,andinclinetowardsactivityoverpassivity.Takentotheextreme,this
givesusthecultoftheoffensivethatdominatedmilitarythinkingaheadofthe
GreatWar,andindeedduringit,whenwaveafterwaveofoffensivesinWestern
Europesmashedfruitlesslyagainstpowerfulstaticdefences.Inhisowntime,
Napoleonamplydemonstratedthebattlefieldadvantagesoftheboldoffensive,
sendinghugecolumnsofmotivated,patrioticFrenchmenagainstthelinesof
defenders.Onalargerstrategiccanvasstoo,Napoleon’slightingadvances
throughEuropeseemedtodemonstratethegainstobehadfromdecisiveand
dynamiccampaigning.Andtherearehistoricexamplesaplentyofbold
operationalartattainingsuccessthroughattack–considerthelightningsurprise
attackoftheJapaneseatPearlHarbourandinMalayain1941,orthedramatic
breakthroughbyGermanPanzerdivisionsatSedanin1940,beforetheircharge
acrossnorthernFrancetothechannelports.
Bythesametoken,however,wecanplunderthehistoricalrecordtofind
examplesofthedefencewinningout,inbattleorcampaigns,andsometimes
againsttheodds.Herodotus’sdescriptionofthe300SpartansatThermopylae
andtheepicBritishdefenceofRorke’sDriftagainstZuliimpiprovidecompelling
illustrationsthatheavilyoutnumbereddefenderscanthwartdeterminedassault.
Clausewitz,incommonwithothermilitarythinkersthenandnow,stressthe
valueofmass.Quantityhasaqualityofitsown,asthesaying,sometimes
attributedtoStalin,hasit.Yetterrain,technology,professionalismandmoral
cohesionallcomeintoplaytooffsetanattacker’ssuperiorityinnumbers.Ifthat
istruetacticallyinonebattle,thensotooatthelargeroperationalleveldefence
candominate,justasitdidinthetrenchesoftheWesternFrontduringtheGreat
War.
Sometimeswecanfindthedefencedominatingatonemomentandtheoffenceat
another,evenwiththesameforcesinvolved,suchisthedisparityinquality
betweenthetwosides,aswithHernanCortes’conquistadorsatTenochtitlan,
firstbreakingoutoftheirsiege,andthenreturningtostormtheIncancapital
(Hanson,2001).IntheGreatWar,thedefencedominateduntilsuddenly,inthe
Springof1918,itdidnot.Withnogreattechnicalbreakthrough,andoverthe
sameterrain,Germanforcesovercametheadvantagesofemplacedmachine
gunsvianewconceptsofcombinedarmsassault(Biddle2010).
Strategicdefence,nottactical?
Withthistremendousvarietyinthehistoricalrecord,it’shardatfirstblushto
knowwhattomakeofClausewitz’sinsistenceontherelativestrengthofthe
defence.Clausewitzhimselfwrestledwiththedifficultiesofextracting
meaningfulandenduringtheoryfromtherichnessofhistory.Perhapsananswer
cameinfindingsomelevelofabstractionfromthetacticaldetailbyapplyingitat
thestrategiclevel.Whiletacticalactionsandevencampaignsmightfavour
offence,dependingonprevailingtechnologiesandconcepts,aswellasfactors
liketerrainorthebalanceofnumbers,itmightbepossibletosaysomething
deeperonalargerscale.ThusClausewitz’skeyexample,towhichhereturns
repeatedly,ofNapoleon’sdoomedmarchonMoscow,inwhichthevastforceshe
broughtintothecampaignweredissipatedanddecimatedbythehugedepthand
inhospitabilityoftheoperationaltheatre.EvenoccupyingMoscowitselfwas
insufficienttoachievevictory,withtheRussianswithdrawing,havingtorched
manybuildings.
Again,therearemanyotherexamplesthatseemtoprovethepoint.Thesame
broadstoryseemedtoholdinbothWorldWars.Inthefirst,Germanywenton
thestrategicoffensiveatthestartoftheconflict,acknowledgingthattheonly
chanceofvictorylayinarapidsweepthroughFrance,beforeturningeasttoface
theRussians.Inmovementandoffensivespiritlaythewaytoavoidadefensive
struggleontwofronts.Theplanfailed,ofcourse,asFranceabsorbedtheblow,
andtheconflictsettledintostalematedominatedbythedefence.Later,Hitler’s
advanceontheSovietUnionwasasill-fatedasNapoleon’s–hisinvadingarmies
spreadacrossaneverbroadeningfront,astheRussiansagaintradedspacefor
timeonanincrediblescale.FromtheclassicswehaveHannibal’sinvasionof
Italy;triumphaftertriumphandanextendedoccupationofthepeninsular,
withouteverachievingthetotaldefeatofthedefendingRomans.Thiswas
followedbyeventualdefeatwhenhereturnedtoZamatofendofftheRomans’
counterattackunderScipio.OrconsiderSparta’srepeatedincursionsintoAttica
thwartedbeforethelongwallsofAthens,andthatcity’seventualdefeatyears
lateracceleratedbyitsill-conceivedexpeditiontoSyracuse.Thelessonfor
strategistsfromtheseandotherexamplesseemstobeclear–atthestrategic
level,defenceisdominant,regardlessofthetacticalvigourandacumenofone’s
adversary.
Andyet,clearlytherearetimeswhentheoffensivedoesdominate,evenatthe
strategiclevel.Thegreatestconquerors,GenghisKhanandAlexanderlivedepic
andrestlesslivesofconstantattackandconquest.Inthemodernera,theNATO
AlliesKosovorepulsedtheSerbsinshortorder;andmanyofthesamestateshad
earlierejectedIraqiforcesfromKuwait.Alltheseexamples,ofcourse,pointtoan
addedcomplication–foreseenbyClausewitz-ofwhentoreachajudgmenton
therelativestrengthofstrategicattackanddefence–Napoleonenjoyedgreat
offensivesuccessbefore1812,Hannibalwassome15yearsatlargeinItaly.In
2003,aUS-ledcoalitionsweptIraqiforcesbeforeitinadramatic,rapid
offensive;butthereafterenduredabloodycounterinsurgencybeforeleavingan
unstableregimeonlyeightyearslater.AsClausewitznoted,verdictsinwarare
oftencontingentandrelative.
Asafinalcomplication,thereistheproblemofevendistinguishingbetweenthe
defenceandtheattack.AsClausewitzargued,defenceneednotbepassive–one
couldreadilybeonthestrategicdefencewhilemakingcounter-offensives.Andat
somestage,thedefencewouldneedtogooverontotheattack–passivityturning
attheappropriatemomentintodecisiveaction.Theattackermightmakethe
firstmove,butthedefenderretainedtheadvantageofdecidingwhenandon
whattermstoacceptcombat.Thedistinctionbreaksdowninthecaseofthe
BritishEmpireinAfricaacquiredthroughconquest,butalmostasanadjunctto
strategicdefenceoftraderoutes.Wasthisanexpansionist,offensivecampaign
designedtoseizeimperialadvantageagainstEuropeanrivals,orwasita
practical,defensivemeasureintendedtopreserveaccesstotradinginterestsin
Asia?
Resolvingthishistoricalmuddle,Isuggest,liesnotindistinguishingbetweenthe
levelsofwar–ofbattle,campaignandwaritself–butinsteadinconsideringthe
mentalityofthoseinvolvedinstrategicbehaviorofwhateverkind.Thedefence,
thislogicsuggests,isstrongerasageneralmentalattitude,throughtimeand
acrosscultures.Terrain,thetechnologiesinvolved,thesizeofthearmies,the
causesinwhichtheyarefighting–allconstitutetherichdetailofhistorythat
vexedClausewitzinhisattempttodiscernageneraltheoryofwar.7
Clausewitz:ProspectTheorist?
ClausewitzhimselfdoesnotscoopKahnemanandTverskyinofferingprospect
theory,orsomethinglikeit,asanexplanationfortherelativestrengthofthe
defence.Importantingredientsaremissingfromhisanalysis,asIshallexplain.
Hedoes,nonetheless,providetwoinsightsthatgosomeofthewaytowardssuch
anexplanation.First,hisconceptualschemeforwarincludesthepossibilityofan
emotionalbasisforaction.Ofcourse,hismostfamousremarkpointstothe
instrumentalrationalityofwar–itwas,ashearguedmostfamously,the
extensionofpoliticsbyothermeans.8Warismeanttoachievesomething,and
strategyistheartofservingthepurposeofwarthroughtheinflictionofviolence
7SeeespeciallyOnWar,Book2,Chapter6,pp.199-204
8OnWar,p.99.Thediscussionintheremainderoftheparagraphheredrawson
hisBookOne,ChapterOne.
ontheenemy.Rationality,Clausewitzconjectures,isacharacteristicofwarmost
closelyidentifiedwiththegovernmentindecidingonstrategy.Yetthereisalsoa
powerfulemotionalaspecttowar,notablythatofpassionatehatredforthe
enemy,whichClausewitzmostcloselyassociateswiththepopulationofthe
belligerentsociety.Moreover,hesuggeststhatwaritselfcanactonthepolitics
thatgovernit,onceitgetsunderway.Asthefightingengendersanemotional
response,thegoalsthatthebelligerentsseekaremodified.
Thisemotionaldimensionofstrategymightholdthekeytotherelativestrength
ofthedefence.Clausewitzpointstotheroleofindigenouspopulationin
strengtheningthedefence,whetherthroughpopularwarofthesortfortagainst
NapoleoninthePeninsularcampaign,orthroughmoralandlogisticalaidtothe
regularforcesdefendingtheirterritory.Fromtheperspectiveofprospecttheory,
thisemotionalitymightconceivablyaplayapartinshapingappetiteforrisk.
Thesecondcluecomesdirectlyfromthechaptersondefence–Clausewitz
identifiesthattheattackisabouttakingpossessionofsomethingthedefenders
have.Hewritesthat‘theultimateobjectofattackisnotfighting:rather,itis
possession’.9Thislinewassomewhatunderplayedbylatertheoristswhoexalted
battleastheessenceofwar–oftenthesametheoristsadmiredtheoffensive
spiritandélanthatmightbringvictoryinsuchconfrontations.10Defeatingthe
enemyforcesinbattlewasthegoalofstrategyforthem–aviewsomewhat
detachedfromthepoliticalpurposethatClausewitzsawasunderlyingwar.For
him,inthesechaptersatleast,possessionwaswhatcounted–andhemeant
possessionofrathermorethanthefieldofbattle.Napoleonafterallsoughtglory
fromconquest,notmerelyfromfighting.Clausewitzhimselfcertainlystressed
battle,andidentifiedtheenemyforcesasapossible‘centreofgravity’.But,he
added,‘destructionoftheenemy’sforcesisthemeanstotheend’.11Thatend,for
himwasmoreoftenthannotthepossessionofenemyterritory–eitherinits
entirety,orinpart–inwhichcaseitmightbetradedaspartofasettlement.
Weappeartohatelosingpossessions,thisisthecentralthemeofProspect
Theory,andalsoofendowmenttheory,whichholdsthatwevaluepossessions
morehighlyifwealreadyownthem(Thaler1980).It’salsoafeatureofthe
theoryofsunkcosts,whichsuggeststhatweover-investinprojectswhose
objectivevalueislessthantheinvestmentwewillneedtomake.Ratherthan
continuetopursueprojectsthatwe’veinvestmuchin,butthathavealimited
prospectofsuccess,weshouldsimplywalkaway.Thatwedonotisafeatureof
9OnWar.,p.451apointherepeatselsewhereatp.639
10Foradiscussion,seeGat,A.AHistoryofMilitaryThought:Fromthe
EnlightenmenttotheColdWar.Oxford,UniversityPress,USA,2001.andHeuser,
B.ReadingClausewitz.London,RandomHouse,2011.
11OnWar,p.640
ourattachmenttoprojectswe‘own’.Inallthreeoftheserelatedtheories,the
reasonsforourattachmentisunderspecified,butIsuspectthattherearesound
evolutionaryreasonstotenaciouslyholdontopreciouscommoditiesina
resourcescarceandcompetitiveenvironment,asopposedtopotentiallyrisking
muchbyseekingoutresourcesthatonedoesnotyetown.
Anexamplefromprimatologyillustratesthepoint.Researchershavediscovered
thatchimpanzeeswillconductpatrolsintotheterritoryofneighboringgroups,
butwillonlyattackiftheypossessoverwhelmingnumericalodds.12Todo
otherwiseistoriskeverythingforalimitedgain.Thetacticsofraidandambush
arecommoninprimitivewarfaretoo,rathermoresothanarepitchedbattles,
wheretheoddsaremoreeven(Keeley,1995).Attackisworthwhileonlyalliedto
deceptionorsurprise,oringreatnumbers–allofwhichswingtheodds
decisively.Withoutthoseadvantages,discretionisthesaferoption.Whatthe
chimpanzeesareseekingintheir‘total’warfareagainstrivalgroupsremainsthe
subjectofdebateamongprimatologists.Buttheevidencesuggeststhat
victoriousgroupsacquireneighboringterritoryandmayassimilateremaining
femalesintotheirowngroup:anacquisitivemotivationthatClausewitzmight
haverecognised.Ofcourse,theiraggressive‘campaign’mayalsobeconsidered
pre-emptiveandsodefensive,as,anticipatingattack,thechimpsseektoprotect
theirownfemalesandjuvenilesfrompredation.Ineithercase,thewarisabout
possession,andtheattackers,despitethetemptingprospectofgainarenotably
riskaverse–ifthenumbersweremoreeventheywouldnotgambleonanattack.
Why?PerhapsClausewitzisright.
What’smissing?Thesubjectivityofrisk
That,however,isasfarasClausewitzgoes.HedoesnotscoopKahnemanand
Tverskybypointingtotherelativetoleranceforriskinadomainofgainsversus
losses.Thereisnokillerlinewherehesaysthedefenderwillbepreparedtorisk
morebecauseheislosingterritoryrelativetosomementalanchororbenchmark
thanifhewerewinning.TheadvantagesthatClausewitzpositsforthedefence
restlargelyonpracticalmatters,likeinteriorlines,andthedissipatingstrength
oftheadvancingforcessetagainsttheconsolidationofthedefenders.Thereis
certainlyapsychologicalelementtothedefenceofthehomelandthatClausewitz
alludestoinpointingtothesupportoflocals,whowecanpresumewillfight
tenaciouslyfortheirhomelandoroffersupporttoregulartroopsfightingon
theirbehalf.ButClausewitzdoesnotconnectthisexplicitlytoanydiscussionof
risk.
12Foragoodsummary,seeWilson,M.L.(2003).‘Chimpanzees,warfareandthe
inventionofpeace’,inFry,D.P.War,Peace,andHumanNature:TheConvergence
ofEvolutionaryandCulturalViews.NewYork,OxfordUniversityPress
Hecomesclosest,inmyreckoning,inhisconcept,elaboratedelsewhereinOn
Warofthe‘culminatingpoint’oftheattack.Astheattackingforceadvances,
Clausewitzargued,itsimpetusgraduallydiminishes.Therearesomephysical
reasonsforthis:fatigue,casualties,extendedlinesofcommunicationand
logistics,dispersionacrossawiderarea,vulnerabilitytotherear,andsoon.But
thereisalsoadiminishingsenseofresolvetopresstheattackhomefurther,a
decliningélanandacceptance,perhaps,ofadventure,onthepartofthe
commander.Thereis,Clausewitznotedsimply,a‘relaxationofeffort’.13
Thisisthereverseofhisargumentsaboutthedefence–aftertheirinitialgains,
theattackingforcesareprogressivelylesswillingandabletopresshometheir
immediateadvantage.Attheculminatingpoint,Clausewitzargued,attack
becomesdefence.Again,thereisnoexplicitlinkagetorisktolerance,butthe
culminatingpointcancertainlybereadasthatmentalanchor;theplaceatwhich
thedomainoflossesbecomesadomainofgains,beyondwhichtheattacking
commanderismoreriskaverse.Hehasachievedwhathewantedintheattack,
andanythingbeyondthatputsthosegainsatrisk.Thereis,wroteClausewitz,a
tendencyforthecommanderpossessedof‘highcourageandanenterprising
spirit’toovershoottheidealpointofculmination.Theastutecommander,by
contrast,ismorediscriminating,andmoresensitivetorisk.
Theflipsideoftheculminatingpointisthemomentthatthedefenceceasestobe
passiveandgoesontheattackitself.AsClausewitzwrote
Asuddenpowerfultransitiontotheoffensive–theflashingswordof
vengeance–isthegreatestmomentforthedefence.14
‘Retaliation’headdslater,‘isfundamentaltoalldefence’.15Themomentof
vengeancearriveswhenthoseonthedefensivegoonthecounterattack,having
waited,passively,forthemostpropitiousmoment.Thesceneissetforprospect
theory:theattackerhasputthedefenderinadomainoflossesbytaking
possessionofterritory.Thedefender,losingwhathepossessedbeforethe
assaultisangeredandseeksrevenge.
Thetrickforthecommanderofeithersideistoastutelyjudgeriskastheodds
shiftwiththeaction.Fortheattackinggeneral,thetaskistoavoidovershooting
theculminatingpoint.Forthedefender,thechallengeistoknowwhentoswing
overfrompassivedefenceintothecounter-attack.Clausewitzapproachedthis
subjectofjudgingrisktangentiallyinhisviewoftheidealcommanderhimself
13OnWar,p.638
14Ibid.,p.443
15Ibid.,p.454
beingpossessedofaparticularsortof‘genius’–onethatbalancesinstinctive
decision-makingwithconsciousreflection.War,heargued,alwaysinvolves
uncertainty,chanceandprobability,allofwhichcallsfor‘asensitiveand
discriminatingjudgment’.Inthe‘rushofevents’,henoted,‘amanisgovernedby
feelingsratherthanbythought’.Judgingthebalancebetweenforces,giventhe
plethoraoffactorsinplayis,asClausewitzargued,oftenamatterof
‘imagination’asmuchaslogic.16Nonetheless,thebrilliantcommanderfindstime
fordeliberatereflectionontheissue,withoutbeingoverwhelmedbythemyriad
possibilitiesanduncertainties.Hefindsthebalancebetweenunreflective,
emotionalinstinctandover-deliberativecalculation.
Heretoo,thereisahintoflaterfindingsfrompsychologyabouttheemotional
aspectofmuchdecision-making.Amodernneuroscientistwouldarguethatthe
separationofemotionandreasonisoverdoneinclassicalphilosophy.Emotion
actsasapowerfulingredientinreasoneddecision-making,takingmuchofthe
complexityofthesituationoutofthewaybeforeweengageourscarceconscious
resources.Thosewithemotionalimpairment,theneuroscientistAntonio
Damasioholds,tendtomakepoordecisions,beingengagedinaconstant,overly
taxingcost-benefitanalysis;impossibleanywayinsituationsinwhichthecosts
andbenefitscannotreliablybegauged(Damasio2006).Weknowfromother
researchthatemotionplaysapartinjudgmentsofrisk.PaulSlovicand
colleaguescallitan‘affectheuristic’–amentalshortcut,thatreducescognitive
load,allowingtimelydecisionswherepreciseinformationaboutpayoffsand
probabilitiesmaybeinshortsupply(Slovic,Finucaneetal.2004).
NotfornothingdidClausewitzassociatetheelementofchanceinwarwiththe
roleofthecommander.Thebestcommanderisabletoreflectonhisemotional
instinctsandreachtheidealdecisionaboutwhentoattackandwhentodefend,
eventhoughthesituationiscloudedinuncertaintyandchance.Riskjudgment,
then,isintegraltostrategy.And,moreover,asClausewitzsawit,thereisa
tendencyforthecommander’sappetiteforrisktoshiftdependingonthestageof
thefighting,withtheoverlyaggressivecommanderovershootingthe
appropriatemomentatwhichtoceasetheattack.Andso,hecomesverycloseto
prospecttheory,asacompositeviewonriskjudgment.Butheisnotquitethere.
What’smissing:Territoryversusotheranchors
AsecondaspectmissingfromClausewitz’saccountisadiscussionofthepossible
goalsonwhichtheappetiteforriskmightbepredicated.Whatisthepointof
attacking?Asnoted,hisaccount,atleastinpartsofhisbook,focusesonterritory
asthegoalofwarfare.Theattackerseekstopossessterritory,thedefenderto
regainit.Onlookingstates,includingallies,butmorebroadlyallthosewitha
16Ibid,p.639
vestedinterestinthestatesystem,seektorestoretheterritorialstatusquoex
antebellum.Territory,however,isonlyonepossiblegoalamongmanyin
strategicaffairs.Thelossofterritory,orofcapitalcities,andthedestructionof
fortressesorfieldedarmiesareallphysicalingredientsinwarfare.Clausewitz
identifiesalltheseaspossiblegoalsinwar,andindeedfocusesmuchofhis
attentiononarmies,andonbattleasthecentralfeatureofwar–afterall,hewas
writingfromthepersonalviewpointofwitnessesthetremendousdestructive
powerofNapoleon’sGrandArmée.Butatbottom,thesearemeanstoanend,
withterritoryatbottomwhatitallboilsdownto.Andso,inBook6ofOnWar,
whereheiswritingaboutthebalancebetweenattackanddefence,thestruggle
forpossessionofterritoryiswhatloomslargest.
Butterritoryneednotbetheanchoraroundwhichprospecttheoryhingesin
conflict.Clausewitztheproto-psychologistalsomadeanimportantdistinction
betweenthematerialandpsychologicaldomainsinwarfare,particularlyinhis
viewthatvictorybelongedtothepartythathadshatteredthemoraleofthe
enemy,destroyinghiswilltocontinue.Thephysicalspoilsofwarthusmatter,
butprimarilyinsofarastheyaffectthementalconceptionofwhoiswinning.Itis
theunderlyingbattletoshatterthewilloftheenemytofightthatisthecentral
featureofwar–alltheothergoals,materialdestruction,theoccupationof
territoryandeventhekillingofenemysoldiers,arealljustphysical
manifestationsofthiscentralpsychologicalclashofrivalwills.Clausewitzwrote
thatwarwas‘anactofforcetocompelourenemytodoourwill’.17Whilehe
certainlyfocusesonbattleandmaterialdestructioninpartsofOnWar,even
therehealwayskeepsinmindtheimportanceofmorale.
StephenRosenmakesasimilarpointinhisWarandHumanNature,suggesting
thatwarisessentiallyanexchangeofinformationaboutthebelligerent’swillto
pursuetheirgoals(Rosen,2009).Thisisanimportantinsightforourstudyof
prospecttheoryinwar.Whatif,insteadofsomephysicalmeasureofgainorloss
againstwhichtojudgerisktolerancetheappropriatebenchmarkissome
psychologicalmeasure?Notthephysicaldestructionofarmies,noteventhe
physicaloccupationofterritory.Territoryis,inthisview,onlyonemorepossible
goalinwar–anditspossessionisameanstotheend,justlikedefeatingthe
army.ThiswastrueinClausewitz’sera,aseventsin1812demonstrated.Even
theoccupationofMoscowitselfwasinsufficienttoassurevictory.
Insteadofterritorythen,Isuggestthatwhatreallymatterstopeopleisidentity–
theirsharedculture.Theirwillisgaugedinrelationtothisidentity–anditisthis
forwhichtheyfight.Thisisnotaparticularlynovelidea–socialpsychologists
havelongsuggestedthatpeoplearemotivatedbythegroupstowhichthey
17Ibid,p.83.Emphasisinoriginal.
belong–theyseekfairnessforthegroup,anddemandrevengewhengroup
normsareviolated.Theyaremotivatedtoprotectthereputationoftheirgroup,
andtoenhanceitsprestigerelativetoothers.Theprestigeofthegroup(orfor
thatmatter,anindividual)isanevolutionarilyimportantsignalthatcanconfer
accesstoresourcesanddeterpredation.Prestigeisaparticularlyhuman
characteristic,runningparalleltothesortofdominancehierarchyfoundinother
primates(Henrich,2015).Power,thissuggests,reflectsnotjustmaterialwealth,
butalsoaculturaljudgmentaboutstatus.NedLebowarguesinhisCultural
TheoryofInternationalRelationsthatprestigeisthecurrencyofinternational
relations(Lebow,2008).Moreover,hesuggeststhatitcouldbethemetric
againstwhichstatesmenjudgerisk,accordingtothepreceptsofProspect
Theory.
Territorymightwellformanimportantpartofgroupculture,andfeaturein
gaugingprestige,butnotnecessarily.Hunter-gatherers,pastoralistsandperhaps
evenearlyagriculturalcommunitiesmayhavepossessedasomewhatflexible
attachmenttospace.Feudalandearlymodernpopulationsmayhavebeenless
motivatedbyideasofafixedterritorialfatherland(althoughthereisalively
debateabouttheextenttowhichnationalismisapre-modernphenomenon).18
Butitisnonethelessunarguablethatmodernsocietiesdevelopdeepterritorial
attachments.
Andyetit’spossibletoassociatepossessionwithanaltogetherbroaderand
deepersharedidentity,ofwhichterritoryisonlyapart,albeitimportant.This
sharedidentityisoftenthebasisofagroup’swilltofight,whetherthatgroupisa
smallunitofsoldiers,oranentirenationstate.Onthisview,theexistenceofthe
group,notjustasaphysicalentity,butasanidea,orcultureiswhatmatters.
ThereissomegoodsupportingevidencefromTerrorManagementTheory,
whichsuggeststhattheinvocationofindividualmortalitycausespeopleto
becomemorevestedintheirreferentgroup–thesocialidentitythatmatters
mosttothem.Awarenessofourownmortalitycatalysesloyaltytoourgroup,
andexaggeratesouralienationfromrivalgroups.Ofallthepossiblefactorsthat
mightmakeusfearforourownlives,warandinvasionaresurelygood
candidates(Greenbergetal,1986).
ThedefendersinClausewitz’swarsarenotfightingjustforterritory,butfor
theirsharedcultureandidentity–andperhaps,ifTerrorManagementTheoryis
right,thesecularformofimmortalitythatderivesfromit.Afterall,Napoleon
provedtobesuchaformidableadversarybecausehewasabletotapintothe
18Forareview,seeGat,Azar.Nations:TheLongHistoryandDeepRootsof
PoliticalEthnicityandNationalism.CambridgeUniversityPress,2012.
nationalistpassionsawakenedintheFrenchRevolution,andtoreplenishhis
ranksaftereachgrandsetpiecebattle.Nationalism,whichmadeidentityclosely
associatedwiththehomeland,madeitharderforfeudingelitestotrade
territoriesandtheirpeopleaswaysofsettlingwars.Soterritorywas,as
Clausewitzarguedanimportantpartoftheidentityforwhichgroupsfought–
thenandnow.Butsotoowerelesstangiblesymbolsofgroupidentity,notably
thegroup’svalues.TheconfessionalwarsthatwrackedEuropeinthe16thand
17thCenturiesdemonstratedasmuchjustasassuredlyasthetotalitarianwarsof
thetwentiethcenturyandtheIslamistsectarianismofthenewmillennium.
Andwhenwefightforthevaluesofourgroup,fortheideasthatconstituteour
polity,weareengagedinastruggleaboutmeaning.Ourprestigeisintimately
boundupinthisstruggle–thegroupiswhoweareandwhywefight.Thiswillto
fightforourgroupcultureisperhapsthemostplausibleanchoraroundwhichto
conceiveofprospecttheoryinwar,notterritoriesorarmies,whicharephysical
artifactsofthegroup.
Tochallengesomeone’sesteemistothreatentheiridentityandplacewithin
widersociety.Inanevolutionarysetting,prestigecoulddeliverscarceresources,
includingsecurity,foodandsex.Withoutstandinginourcommunityweareinan
impoverishedposition.Consequently,wearejealousguardiansofourstatus.If
theattackinwarisessentiallyanattackonstatusandidentity,wecan
appreciatehowreadilyitmightinspireapassionateresponse.Thepassionate
hatredofthepeoplethatClausewitzidentifiedasakeyingredientinwaris
surelycontingent,inlargepart,ontheirveryidentityasapeople.Ifyou
challengethat,expectanemotionalresponse.
Whileprestigecanofcoursebepiquedbylostterritory,therearemanyother
possibilities.Moreover,weshouldexpectsomevariation:whilethesensitivityto
injusticeisapermanent,evolvedfeatureofhumannature,thereisoftencultural
elementtotheprecisenatureoftheslight,contingentonprevailingnorms.
Commonly,oursenseoffairnessischallengedbysomeonerefusingtoplayby
theacceptedrulesofthegame,whatevertheymaybe.Weseekjusticefor
ourselves,ofcourse,butalsoforthoseweseeaspartofourcommunity,however
itisconstitutedatanygivenmoment.Andso,experimentalresearchsuggests,
wewillengageinreciprocalpunishmenttoenforcenormsthatwecanseebeing
transgressed,evenwheretherule-breakergainswithouthurtingusdirectly.
Thereisanemotionalelementtothispunishment:it’snotjustthatweare
signalingtheneedtoplaybytherulesinpunishingrule-breakers,becausewe
willpunishthemevenifthey,andothers,nevergettofindoutaboutthe
punishment.Vengeance,asClausewitzargued,isindeedapowerful,instinctive
andemotionalresponsetotransgressions.So,whileterritoryisimportantinand
ofitself,itsemotionalresonanceisasabadgeofwhoweare,regardlessofthe
strategicimportanceorotherwiseofanypieceofland.Plantingflagsonsmall
atollsinthemiddleofanoceanmighthavesomeostensiblestrategicrationale,
basedonpossibleresourcesontheseabed,say,oraccesstosealinesof
communication.Butjustasplausibly,emotionsmayrunhighsimplybecauseof
theperceivedchallengetostatus.
Thisquestionoftheappropriatemetricaroundwhichtobaseprospecttheory
hashugelycomplicateditsapplicationinstrategicstudies.Suchameasuremay
besubjectiveandevenunconscious–theactorsthemselvesmightnotbeableto
explainwhatthebasisagainstwhichtheyarejudgingrisk.Moreover,evenifwe
knowwhatcurrencytheprotagonistsareusingtomeasuretheirrelativegains
andlosses,westilllackthemeansofmeasuringit.Prestigemaymattermoreto
somegroupsthanothers,oratsometimesthanothers–andevenifwecould
standardizesomehow,itlacksthequantitativeprecisionofmoneyina
controlledlaboratoryexperiment.
What’smissing:Theanchorpoint
SoClausewitzgoespartofthewayindiscussingpossibleyardsticksagainst
whichtogaugerisk,andheofferssomethoughtsonhowappetiteforriskis
subjectiveandemotional,andvariesrelativetogainsmadeorlossesincurred.
Whenitcomestotheanchoraroundwhichthecalculationofriskhinges,histake
isalsoinsightful,butnotquitecomplete–atleastintermsofscooping
KahnemanandTversky.Clausewitzdoesofferoneplausibleanchoraspartof
hisdiscussionofdefence.Thisisthestatusquoexantebellum.Hearguesthatitis
particularlyimportantforonlookingstates,whenconsideringwhetherto
interveneintheconflict,andtowhatend.19Thesestateshaveaninterestinthe
orderofthesystemitself,andarepresumedbyClausewitztobeconservatively
minded.Again,theconcertofpowersthataligneditselfagainstrevolutionary
Franceseemstohavebeenhisguideonthis.WhileClausewitzdoesn’tdwellon
themotivesofattackers,NapoleonicFrancethreatenedboththeterritorial
makeupofEurope,butmorefundamentallywasachallengetotheverynatureof
societywithinthestatesthatconstitutedit.Onemightassumethatonlooking
statesaremorewillingtotakerisksinoppositiontoapowerthatseeksnotjust
toredistributepoweramongstates,butwhoseveryexistencethreatensthe
fabricoftheirownsocieties.Clausewitz’sgreatchallengeasaPrussianofficer,as
PeterParethasargued,wastoconstructaneffectivemilitaryanswertoFrance’s
fightingpowerwithoutatthesametimeunleashingrevolutionaryforcesin
Prussia(Paret2009).
19OnWar,p.448
Evenwithoutpositingarevolutionarycharactertotheattacker,Clausewitz’s
argumentmakesintuitivesense.Onlookingstatesareplacedinadomainof
lossesbytheattacker,whoseactionsthreatenthestabilityofthesystemandthe
distributionofpowerwithinit.Forsuchstates,restoringthestatusquoisoften
sufficient–punishingtheattackerthroughfurtheractionmightbefurther
destabilizingofthesystem.Thustheinternationalsystempossessesabalanceof
powermechanismwithsomedegreeofautomaticityandequilibrium:when
challenged,onlookersarespurredintoaction,atrisktothemselves,torestore
order.Beyondthat,thereisnostrongimperativeforaction.Thissoundscloseto
riskacceptanceinadomainoflosses,andaversioninadomainofgains.The
‘possession’atriskis,inthiscase,internationalorderitself.
Thereareobviousrealworldexamples–theexpulsionofIraqiforcesfrom
Kuwait,orofSerbianforcesfromKosovoastworecentexamplesinwhichthe
restorationofthestatusquowasachieved.Againstthat,whentheattacking,
disruptivestateisrevolutionary,aswithNapoleonortheThirdReich,the
interventionofoutsiderssoughtnotjusttorestorethebalanceofpower,butthe
totaldefeatandtransformationoftheattackingsociety.Theappropriateanchor
hereisevidentlynottherestorationofterritory,buttherestorationofnonrevolutionarynorms.Theproblem,ofcourse,isofknowingexantewhatthe
interveningstateshaveastheirbreak-evenpoint.Moreover,withwarhavingits
owndynamicandshapingthepoliticsthatgovernit,weneednotassumethat
thebreak-evenpointisfixedintime.
Afurthercaveat–justrestoringthingstohowtheyweremaynotbesufficiently
attractivetoallactors,becausetheveryactofconflictwillhavearousedtheir
passions,andchangedthestakesforthem.Piquedesteemonhavingbeing
attackedandlosingterritorymayveryplausiblyresultinadesirenotfora
returntothesituationbeforehostilitiesbegan,butinsteadtoseekapunitive
settlement.Thereis,asDruckmanandMcDermottargued,apossibleemotional
dimensiontoriskframing–inwhichcertaintyinourjusticeskewsour
perceptionofrisk.
Lastly,asthefortunesofbattlefluctuate,then,wemightalsoexpecttheanchor
aroundwhichprospecttheoryhingestoshift,alongwiththeappetiteforrisk
thatthevariousbelligerentsexhibit.Andtheactorsthemselvesmaynoteven
knowasmuchexante–inthelanguageofeconomists,ourpreferencesare
revealedinthedoing,ratherthanbeingtransparentandcalculable.Warinthis
senseisaparticularformofconversation,justasSchelling,Rosenandothers
havedescribedit–anexchangeofinformationaboutresolveandsensitivityto
risk(Schelling,1966).
Theseformidablemethodologicaldifficultiesshouldtemperourenthusiasmfor
expoundinganythingmorethanthegeneralideathat,asClausewitzargued,
defencewilltendtobethestrongeroftwoforcesinwar.Atthatlevelof
abstraction,wecanremoveourselvesfromthemyriadpossiblevariationsin
warfarethatmight,infact,favourtheattackinspecificencounters.
Sometimestheattackerwillenjoygreaternumbers,bettertechnology,ormore
favourableterrain.Theymayhavegreatercohesionamongtheirtroops,better
training,ormoreexperiencedleadership.Alltheseandmorefactorsmaytellin
producingvictoryinanyparticularencounter.Ifonlywecouldholdsuchfactors
constant,ceterisparibus,inthelanguageofeconomicmodeling,wewouldbe
abletoproducemorerobustfindingsabouttheextenttowhichthedefenceis
reallystronger.
Withoutthat,weareleftwithClausewitz’srepeatedassertion,aboutthedefence
andthecompellingfindingfromKahnemanandTverskythatriskisjudged
subjectively,relativetosomeimaginedgoal.Astheattackerchallengesthestatus
quo,perhapsbytakingterritory,hethreatenstheprestigeofthegroup,
challengingitsveryidentity.Inreturn,thedefender,passionsaroused,certainin
theircause,adoptsbolder,riskierstratagems.Progressively,astheattacker
makesgains,theylosetheirappetiteforrisk;andattheculminatingmoment,
attackgivesovertodefence,andthecounter-attackislaunched.
Thesebroadgeneralitiesmightdisappointthoseseekinggreaterempirical
precision–butthen,iftherewasperfectknowledgeabouttherelativestrengths
oftheprotagonistsbeforethefight,orwhattheysoughtinfighting,andhowthey
judgedrisktherewouldbelittlepointinactuallyputtingmatterstothetest.
Evenaftertheeventthedetailsmayremainopaque.Afterall,Clausewitz,while
hestrovethroughouthislifeforageneralizabletheoryofwar,wasatpainsto
observethatsuchatheorywouldfunctionasdoconceptstoart,ratherthanlaws
toscience.
Conclusion
Clausewitzdoesnotprovideafullaccountofprospecttheoryinaction,andit
wouldbeoddindeedifhehadscoopedcognitivepsychologybyacenturyanda
half.Nonetheless,eventhoughhispictureisincomplete,itishugelyimpressive.
First,heobservedthatwarandstrategyarepsychologicalmatters–eventhough
heacknowledgedthelackofdetailedunderstandingoftherelevantforcesat
workinhisownday.Hewascertainlykeenlyawareofthematerialaspectsof
war–hefocusedonbattlebetweenlargearmies.
Second,heidentifiedamixtureofemotionandreasonasunderlyingstrategic
behavior.Theviolentchallengeofwarprovokesapassionateresponsefromall
theactors.Nexthesuggestsapowerfulpsychologicalfactorsupportingthe
defence–theattitudesoftheinvadedpeoples,whichelsewhereheassociated
withpassionatehatredoftheenemy.Warisatestofwills,notjustofmateriel,
andfewthingsmakeusmorevestedinagroupidentitythananattackby
outsiders.Andlast,hearguesthatthereisaculminatingpointinanyattack,
beyondwhichtheimpetusgivesovertothedefender.Takenaltogether,it’sa
compellingexpositionofideasthatresonatewithmodernpsychology.Whatwe
have,weseektohold,andweareliabletoriskmuchinoureffortstorepelthose
tryingtotakepossession.
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