Managing the lndus
River basin in light of
climate change
Four conceptual approaches
James L. Wescoat, Jr
Global warming raises troubltng questions about the ecological and economic future of large irrigated river basins
such as the lndus River in Pakistan. But
it is not clear how potential impacts
might best be identified or addressed.
This article reports on a multidisciplinary study of four distinct conceptual
approaches to climate change: climate
scenarios assessment; critical water
management
problems;
historic
antecedents and analogies; and Muslim
political reconstruction. Current scientific research emphasizes the first
approach, but the other three may be
more important for water managers in
the basin. The article reviews previous
research on water resources effects of
climate change; introduces the lndus
basin; discusses the four conceptual
approaches; and finally discusses
prospects for coordinating them.
James L. Wescoat, Jr is with the Department of Geography, University
do, Boulder, CO 80309, USA.
of Colora-
This research received support from the
US Environmental Protection Agency. I am
endebted to my colleagues in Pakistan,
especially in the Water and Power Development Authority. I would also like to
thank Bill Riebsamk, Micky Glantz, Robin
Leichenko.
Gilbert White. Ken Mitchell.
and an anonymous reviewer for comments
on an earlier draft. I take personal responsibility for the views expressed.
‘Joel Smith and Dennis Tirpak, eds, The
Potential Effects of Global Climate Change
on the United States, App A, Water Recontinued on page 382
~59-3780/91/0~381-15
In 1989, the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) completed
a report on the effects of global climate change in the USA and, in the
same year, launched its first studies in developing countries. r One of the
developing country studies focused on water resources impacts in the
Indus River basin of Pakistan (Figure l).” Global warming is troubling
in irrigated basins like the Indus, where some 75% of the cropland is
irrigated. But it is not clear what the most serious problems might be or
how they might best be addressed. The Indus case study initially
followed a climate scenario assessment approach widely used in the
USA. This article discusses the problems with that approach, the
alternatives found to be relevant in the Indus basin, and their implications for international research on global climate change.
Previous research in the USA
During the late 1970s and early 198Os, government and scientific
research organizations began to study the potential effects of global
warming on water resources in the USA.3 Although these studies differ
in emphasis, they share a common line of thought which may be termed
“climate impact assessment’, or more narrowly, ‘climate scenario
assessment’.4
Climate scenario assessment stems from a concern that under certain
projections or ‘scenarios’ of climate change, expected water resources
patterns would be disrupted. The scenarios are generally constructed
with general circulation models (GCMs), historical records, or sensitivity analyses. Expected climatic, hydrologic, and water management
conditions define the ‘baseline’ or reference for estimating impacts. A
baseline may be static or dynamic. Many studies consider how the water
system might develop without climate change and use multiple baselines
to assess impacts under different water development scenarios.
Once scenarios and baselines are defined, the logic of assessment
proceeds as follows. Outputs from global climate models serve as inputs
@ 1991 Butte~o~h-Heinemann
Ltd
381
Managing the Indus River basin
Figure 1. The lndus River basin and
major structures and political units in
Pakistan.
Source:
US
Environmental
Protection
Agency.
continued from page 38 1
sources,
US Environmental
Protection
Agency, Washington, DC, 1989.
‘The other river basin case studies are the
Mekong, Zambezi, Nile, and La Plats. In
addition to the river basin studies, USEPA
has sponsored research on agricultural,
forest, sea level, and health impacts.
3For example, Peter H. Gleick, ed, The
Colorado River Basin and the Greenhouse
Effect: Water Resources and Water Management, Pacific Institute, Berkeley, CA
1990; National Research Council, Water
Science and Technology Board, Managing
Water Resources Under Conditions of Climate Uncertainty, Conference papers from
14-16 November 1990, Scottsdale, AZ;
William E. Riebsame, ‘Adjusting water resources management to climate change’,
Climate Change, Vol 13, 1988, pp 69-97;
P. Wagonner, ed, Climate Change and US
Water Resources, John Wiley, New York,
NY, 1990; and J.R. Wallis, ed, Climate,
Climate
Change,
and Water Supply,
National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC, 1977.
4The term ‘climate impact assessment’
encompasses a wide range of modelling
and empirical approaches.
See Robert
Kates, et al, eds, Climate Impact Assessment, SCOPE Report No 27, John Wiley,
New York, NY, 1985.
‘For more detailed discussion of adjustment and adaptation, see William E. Riebsame, Assessing Social tmpacts of Cfimate Fluctuations,
United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, 1988.
‘International Seminar on Climate Fluctuations and Water Management: Abstracts,
Government
of Egypt, Waler Research
Center, Cairo, 1989. An important exception is Kennet Hewitt, ‘Climate hazards
and
agricultural
development:
some
aspects of the problem in the IndoPakistan subcontinent’,
in K. Hewitt, ed,
interpretations
of Calamity, pp 181-201,
continued on page 383
382
for regional hydrologic
models. Outputs from the hydrologic
models
become inputs for water management
models (eg reservoir operation,
allocation,
and river basin management
models).
Initial impacts thus
include changes in physical hydrology and associated costs and benefits.
Because most models allow for numerous
water management
adjustments, many studies go beyond initial impact assessment to estimate the
physical impacts after adjustment,
the costs and benefits of adjustment,
and the residual
costs and benefits
after adjustment.
Impacts
are
compared
across scenarios
and baselines
to gauge the sensitivity,
vulnerability,
resilience,
or robustness
of the existing system.5 Engineering and policy alternatives
are inventoried
to establish the range
of potential
adjustments
to climate
change.
The consequences
of
adjustment
are then estimated
to gauge the adaptability
of the water
system under each scenario.
This chain of scenario assessment
proceeds from climate change to
human adjustment.
It requires plausible scenarios of climate change and
an ability to complete
each link of the physical impact assessment.
Because human impacts and adjustments
emerge only at the end of the
analytical
process,
provided
analysis can proceed
that far, climate
scenario
assessment
may be characterized
as a ‘natural
sciences’
approach.
Extension to developing countries
The same approach
has recently
been extended
to developing
countries.6
The justification
for a similar research
design is that it
enhances the comparability
across regions and resource sectors, and it
establishes a common frame of reference for international
research and
negotiation.’
For example, the USEPA case studies began with uniform
procedures
for constructing
climate scenarios and baselines.
Common
impact assessment
categories and measures were also sought.
Developing
country case studies diverged from their US antecedents
in several respects. More emphasis was placed on social adjustment.
The river basin was chosen as a common
spatial framework
for
investigation.
Modelling
was complemented
by a parallel stream of
empirical research to address unmodelled
impacts. USEPA also emphasized close collaboration
with water managers in the case study basins. It
GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE
December 1991
Mmaging
the fndus River basin
was this final difference which revealed the limitations of the scenario
assessment approach.
Some Pakistani water managers questioned the value of studying
hydroclimatic problems five to six decades in the future, in view of
pressing water problems facing the country today. Most were frustrated
with implausible GCM scenarios, model limitations, and scientific
uncertainties. Some felt that scenario assessment was useful but that
alternative approaches were needed. These concerns led to an expansion of the research team and an exploration of four distinct conceptual
approaches:
*
0
0
@
Climate scenario assessment.
Critical water management problems.
Historical antecedents and analogies.
Muslim political reconstruclion.
If scenario assessment is largely a ‘natural sciences’ approach, the other
three begin with social issues and can be construed as ‘social research’
approaches. The four approaches define water problems differently.
They employ different spatial and temporal scales. They have different
aims and logic. They point to different types of solutions. To appreciate
these differences, it is useful to consider the context in which they arose.
Profile of water management
in the Indus basin
The upper basin
coff tinued from page 382
Allen 8. Unwin. Boston, MA, 1983.
7These justifications were not problematic
at the outset of the project, but they became so. It must be kept in mind that
USEPA plays a dual role by supporting
international
research which shapes, in
turn, the terminology
and approach for
international negotiations.
‘Nigel Allan, ‘Ecological effects of land
intensification in the central and eastern
Hindukush’, in E. Groetzbach and G. Rinschede, ed, Beitraege-zur
Vergleichenden
Kufturge~rapbie
der f-focbebirge, 1984, F.
Pustet, Regensberg,
pp 193-212; Tariq
Husain, ~Deve~opment, politics, society
and the social contract: reflections on the
relevance
of AKRSP-type
pa~icipato~
approaches’,
unpublished paper, Islamabad, 1990; and Edward Vander Velde,
‘Irrigation management in Pakistan mountain
environments’,
Country
faperPakistan, No 3, International
Irrigation
Management
Institute,
Columbo,
Sri
Lanka, 1989.
gUpper In&s Basin - Karakorum Himalaya, Final Report, Snow and Ice Hydrology Project, Wilfrid Laurier
University,
Waterloo, 1989.
The Indus originates in western Tibet and flows northwest through
precipitous mountain gorges of India and northern Pakistan. The
climate of the upper basin is dominated by westerly air masses which
contribute late winter snowfall to massive glaciers and snowfields whose
meltwaters define the annual and long-term hydrologic regime of the
Indus. Following a steep descent, the river swings south through
irrigated valleys of Gilgit and Swat into the Northwest Frontier Province.
Upper basin tribal groups have developed decentralized
village
irrigation systems which produce grain and forage for local consumption
and fruit for regional markets.* Upper basin water supplies are regionally reliable but locally variable, especially in areas dependent on small
glaciers which rapidly advance, retreat, flood, or waste away.”
Before the Indus reaches the plains, it is impounded behind Pakistan’s largest dam at Tarbela, built in the early 1970s with a live storage
capacity of 8.9 million acre-feet (maf). Siltation of Tarbela reservoir and
escalating water and power demands have generated pressure for
additional dams on the Indus. Major dam construction has been
blocked, however, by water conflicts among Pakistan’s four provinces.
Water released from Tarbela receives the Kabul River from Afghanistan, which is the only major tributary without international conflict to
date.
Five eastern tributaries rise in mountains of India and Kashmir where
headwaters receive winter snowfall. The foothills receive monsoon
rainfall in late summer. Each river has a different hydroclimatic regime.
Monsoon influence increases, and glaciological influence decreases, as
one travels east. The easternmost rivers - Beas, Sutlej, and Ravi - carry
heavy monsoon flows. The Chenab River is transitional, and the upper
Jhelum has almost no monsoon influence.
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE December
1991
383
Managing the Indus River basin
A computer
model of the upper Jhelum River, developed
by University of British Columbia
scientists,
forecasts inflows into Mangla
reservoir,
the second of Pakistan’s
two major storage dams.10 The
Jhelum,
which drains the disputed territory
in Kashmir,
is the only
upper basin watershed
modelled to date.
The eastern rivers
International
water conflicts occurred on all of the Indus tributaries
before the treaty of 1960. The treaty allocated
exclusive use of the
Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab to Pakistan and exclusive use of the eastern
rivers - Ravi, Setlej, and Beas - to India.”
Allocation
of entire rivers
rather
than partial
flows reflects an international
situation
which
requires
independent,
rather than cooperative,
river management.
Depletion
of the eastern rivers prompted
massive construction
in the
1970s to transfer
water from the western
rivers to areas formerly
irrigated by the Sutlej and Ravi. Pakistan has assumed that inflows from
the eastern tributaries
will drop to zero by the turn of the century,
except in times of flood.
The main system
“Michael
Quick and Anthony
Pipes,
Manual: UBC Watershed Model, Department of Civil Engineering, University of
British Columbia, Vancouver.
“Aloys
Michel, The lndus Rivers, Yale
University Press, New Haven, CT, 1967.
“E.H. Aitken, Gazetteer of fhe Province of
Sind, lndus Publications, Karachi, 1988
(first published 1907); Hunting Technical
Services Ltd and Sir M. MacDonald and
Partners, Lower lndus Report, Lion House,
London, 1966: M. Rahman. ‘Land tenure
systems in Sind Province, Pakistan’, Asian
Profile. Vol 6. No 1, 1980. DD 5565.
‘3Government
of Sind, &joinder
of fhe
Government of Sind to the Representations of Punjab and other units of the
Report of the lndus Commission, Government Press, Karachi, 1944.
“‘G.M.
Shah, ‘The tragedy
of IndoPakistan water and the robbery of the
lndus waters’, Sind Quarterly, 4 parts,
1984-l 986.
384
The Indus and its tributaries
enter the plains at locations known as ‘rim
stations’ where water is stored, measured,
and diverted into an extensive network of canals in the province of Punjab (Figure 2). From the
rim stations to the sea, the irrigation system is managed more or less as
an integrated system that is altogether different from the tribal irrigation
systems of the north.
Four political provinces
are involved:
Punjab,
Northwest
Frontier
Province (NWFP), Sind, and Baluchistan.
The Indus is, for part of its
length, the boundary between Punjab and NWFP in the northern plains.
Punjab is the most populous,
powerful,
and economically
productive
province
in the country.
Rainfall
averages
l&20 inches per year.
Irrigated areas produce rice and wheat in the northeast,
and cotton and
wheat in the southwest.
Farmers at the canal heads are powerful and
tend to have excess water, while those in tail areas practise deficit
irrigation.
Rainfed cultivation
areas (barani)
are vulnerable
to variations in precipitation,
so they produce low-value crops for the market
and soldiers for the army. NWFP is mountainous,
renowned
for its
orchards,
and has elements of both large-scale centrally administered
irrigation and decentralized
tribal irrigation.
The Indus and its tributaries
converge
in southern
Punjab
before
entering the province of Sind, an arid, barely sloping landscape
with
chronic problems of waterlogging,
salinization,
economic disparity, and
political strife.‘* Irrigated crops are cotton, rice, and sugarcane.
Yields
are generally lower than in Punjab (and comparable
areas of Egypt) due
to problems of soil drainage and social organization.
The mountains
and
valleys of Baluchistan
lie to the west of Sind. They contribute
a small
amount of runoff to the Indus from hill torrents,
which provide some
water for local irrigation,
and a few valleys still maintain the old Persian
system of qanat irrigation.
Water conflicts between the provinces date back to the turn of the
century.”
They combine
classic upstream-downstream
rivalry, with
cultural conflict between Sindhis, Punjabis,
and Pathans.14 Water was
allocated among the provinces on an annual ad hoc basis until March
1991 when a final agreement
was reached. Concern will now shift to
project selection and operating agreements.
GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE
December
1991
Managing
Chenab
Jhelum
lndus
the Indus River basin
Ravi
Sutlej
Kabul
-
River
-
Canal
i
Barrage
Dam
/
Delta
Figure 2. Schematic
diagram
of the
lndus River, main system.
“Robin
Leichenko, ‘The potential effects
of climate change on Karachi, Pakistan’,
Master’s thesis, Department of Geonraphy, University of Cdlorado, CO, 1991:
‘6G.S. Qureshi. ‘Variation in the lndus
River discharges and their hazards’, in M.I.
El-Sabh and T.S. Murty, eds, natural and
fan-jade
Hazards, D. Reidel, Boston,
MA, 1986, pp 36Q-375.
“Nazir Ahmad and G.R. Chaudury, Irrigation Agriculture
of Pakistan,
Shahzad
Nazir, Lahore, 1988; David Freeman et a/,
Local Organizations
for Social Development: Concepts and Cases of Irrigation
Organization,
Westview Press, Boulder,
CO, 1988; and G. Jones et al, Informational Sources on Water Management for Agricultural Production in Pakistan with Special Reference to lnsfitutional and Human
Factors, 2 vols, Water Management Technical Report No 31, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, 1974.
Arabian
Sea
Water supply in the lower basin is falling behind agriculture and
urban demand, particularly in Karachi where population growth exceeds the physicai and institutional capacity of the public water
system.” Conflict between Sindhis, Mohajirs, and Pathans - parallelled
by conflicts between the urban and agricultural sectors - obstructs
cooperation on lower basin water issues.
Of the 140 maf of water annually available in Pakistan, some 40 maf
reach the delta. The delta supports important fish and shellfish industries. The lower reaches of the river have several unique aquatic and
riparian species but are ecologically stressed by upstream impoundments of freshwater and sediment.16
The 100 maf of water consumed over an area of 40 million acres of
Pakistan, constitute one of the largest integrated irrigation systems in
the world. Bureaucratic responsibility for this system is complex and
hierarchical. The federal Water and Power Development Authority
(WAPDA) has responsibility for major dams, power production, and
water planning. Provincial irrigation departments operate the distribution system from the major canals to farm watercourse outlets. Local
water-management
groups are bound up with complex kin and class
relations. l7 In recent decades, surface irrigation and drainage problems
have stimulated massive groundwater development involving hundreds
of thousands of public and private tubewells.
The Indus is one of the best documented basins in the world. Seasonal
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE December 1991
385
‘*H.G. Raverty, The Mihran of Sind and its
tributaries, Sang-e-Meel,
Lahore, 1979,
reprint.
‘?mran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism, 788!?-1947, Oxford University Press,
Delhi, 1989; David Gilmartin, ‘Scientific
empire and imperial science: The colonial
politics of irrigation technology in the lndus
Basin’, unpublished paper, 1990.
20Masood Ahmad ef at, Guide to the fndus
Basin Model Revised, World Bank Environment Operations and Strategy Division, Washington, DC, 1990; John Duloy
and Gerald T. O’Mara, lssues of Efficiency
and Interdependence
in Water Resources
Investment: Lessons from the lndus Basin
of Pakistan, World Bank Staff Working
Paper No 665, Washington, DC, 1984; and
P. Leiftinck et al, Water and Power Resources in West Pakistan: A Study in Sector Pfanning, 3 vols, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1968. The
tBMR was most recently applied to WAPDA’s massive Wafer Sector fnves~menf
P/arming Study, 5 vols, Lahore, 1996-91.
*‘See, for example, the US Agency for
International Development (USAID), MidTerm Evaluation of the Command Water
Management Project, ISPAN Report No 5,
2 vols, Washington, DC, 1989.
22World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department,
The Aga Khan Rural Supporf
Program in Pakistan: An fnterim Evafuation, Washington, DC, 1987.
inundation canals date at least to the 3rd millenium BC. References to
the Indus have been traced from Greek, Sanskrit, Arabic, and Persian
chronicles.‘s The colonial irrigation system involved record-keeping on
an unprecedented scale.” Since independence in 1947, hundreds of
technical studies, surveys, and plans have been prepared. One of the
most sophisticated river basin optimization models in the world, the
World Bank’s Indus Basin Model (IBMR), was developed to evaluate
investment programmes.*”
After 1980, emphasis shifted from water development to management. ‘Management’ includes operations; maintenance; institutions;
on-farm practices; irrigation system rehabilitation; and organizational
development. Although water-management programmes have become
increasingly sophisticated, there is concern that they are not meeting
their social or institutional goals.“’ Non-governmental
organizations
stand out for their success in assisting local water management.22
Political stresses have compounded water problems - between India
and Pakistan; WAPDA and provincial irrigation departments; agriculture and water sectors; Sind and Punjab; political parties and military
rule; landlords and tenants. International assistance is erratic, especially
from the USA.
The result is paradoxical: as water-resource information and planning
advance, so do river basin problems. Add the issue of change, and the
uncertainties become overwhelming. It is not that climate change is
unimaginable. Scientists have been studying paleoclimatic change in the
Indus for a century. But managing the Indus is now so complex,
interdependent,
and contingent upon international events, that the
cascade of potential climate impacts seems impossible to envisage. So
much rides on the sustainability of the Indus, however, that few dispute
the need to take climate change seriously. The question is how.
Investigation of the four approaches was partly a function of a
research design which began with a mandate for climate scenario
assessment aligned with a commitment to addressing the complexity of
water problems in the basin. The original research design did not
envisage four approaches, but rather some ten topics for investigation.
The study expanded to 22 topics - stopping at the limit of its resources and then sought to discern common patterns of inquiry. The discussion
below recapitulates this process of expansion and clarification; and is
thus a narrative, as well as a comparison, of the four approaches.
Four approaches
Climate
scenario
assessment
The study began with a scenario assessment approach, using the Jhelum
River (UBC) model to assess hydrologic impacts in the upper basin and
to generate
inflows to the main system. The Indus Basin Model (IBMR)
was used to assess economic and water management impacts in the main
system. The strengths of this approach are its clarity and logic (Table 1).
Criteria for a successful scenario assessment are: plausible climate
scenarios; an unbroken chain of analysis that stretches from climate
change through hydrologic impacts and water management impacts to
adjustments;
a procedure that has the confidence and commitment of
basin water managers; and output in the form of viable policy alternatives
‘+*
Difficulties
were encountered
GLOBAL
in applying the scenario assessment
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE
December 1991
Managing the Indus River basin
Table 1. Climate impact assessment
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
23After the Simla Accords of 1972, India
insisted that South Asian water issues
were strictly bilateral affairs. Tensions between India and Pakistan had a brief respite in 1988 followed by recent political
conflict over Kashmir.
*“James
L. Wescoat,
Jr and Robin
Leichenko, ‘Climate change scenarios for
the lndus basin, Pakistan’,
Technical
Memo, No 1, University of Colorado, Natural Hazards Center, Boulder, CO, 1990.
GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
in the lndus basin.
Assemble project team and obtain government approvals.
Construct regional climate scenarios and baselines.
Construct water management scenarios and baselines.
Adapt Jhelum model to examine upper basin scenarios.
Assess hydrologic impacts in the Jhelum.
Extended Jhelum results to other upper basin watersheds to simulate inflows into the
main system.
Adapt IBMR model to assess main system scenarios.
(Rainfall, evaporation, crop water use tables; water policy assumptions; impact asses:
criteria.)
Assess impacts in the main irrigation system.
Construct adjustment scenarios for the main system.
(Project, policy, and management alternatives.)
Assess the adaptability of the main system.
(Through modelling and expert opinion.)
approach in the Indus basin despite the cooperation
of an outstanding
team of Pakistani
engineers,
planners,
and scientists.
It was not
politically feasible to organize an international
basin study with India.*’
Global climate models failed to simulate existing monsoon
patterns,
undermining
the credibility of COZ warming scenarios.24 Climate models and river basin models had different spatial configurations,
requiring
further modification
of climate change scenarios. Only the Jhelum River
has been modelled in the upper basin, so runoff scenarios in adjacent
watersheds
had to be derived from sub-basins
of the Jhelum, introducing problems
of correlation
and scale. Glaciological
processes in the
main stem of the upper Indus would not be modelled due to a lack of
data and scientific knowledge.
Once upper basin inflows were projected
at the rim stations,
the
Indus Basin Model (IBMR) was used to assess impacts on the plains.
First, hydroclimatologic
data in the IBMR were modified. Because the
model uses pan evaporation
and crop water requirements
rather than
temperature
to estimate consumptive
water use, temperature
scenarios
and water use were derived independently.
The model also uses a
monthly
time step and mean data which dampen
out interannual
variability,
seasonality,
and extreme events. A 20% change in monthly
runoff is well within the range of water management
experience,
but a
20% increase in extreme flows would breach every bund and barrage in
the system. Some of the most difficult problems - salinity, drainage, and
flooding - can only be crudely assessed with the IBMR model. Finally,
no model of the Indus main system can gauge raw hydrologic impacts,
because the entire system is subject to human intervention
and control.
The Indus basin model does help assess social impacts and adjustments to climate change. It provides output for land use, water use,
production
patterns, and farm revenue at various levels of aggregation canal command,
province, agroclimatic
zone, and the irrigated basin as
a whole. It includes a complex array of cropping technologies,
farm
budgets, labour variables, water allocation rules, and investment
possibilities which can be varied to gauge the efficacy of adjustment
to
climate impacts. The number of adjustment
combinations
is enormous,
but each model run requires six hours of computer time and produces
about 100 pages of output, so only a small number of well designed
adjustment
alternatives
can reasonably
be examined.
Moreover,
because the model optimizes government
and/or farmer
irrigation
decisions,
thousands
of adjustments
are built into every
optimization
run. Most of them cannot be directly inferred from model
output.
The model assumes that decision
makers are economically
CHANGE
December
1991
Managing the lndus River basin
Table 2. Critical
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
water problems
approach.
Survey current water problems.
Survey current plans and policies for dealing with them.
Identify water problems and plans likely to be especially sensitive to climate change.
Refine spatial and temporal scales of assessment.
Evaluate the potential effects of climate change on selected problems and plans.
Evaluate alternative plans.
Draw practical conclusions.
rational,
but it is calibrated
mentioned
earlier.
It does
embedded
water management
with data reflecting
all of the problems
not identify,
explain,
or examine
those
problems.
Critical water management problems
Some Pakistani water managers asked why they should spend time on
climate change issues that might emerge 50 years from now when critical
water management
problems confront them today. Some suggested that
such ‘speculative’
studies should be conducted
by a university
rather
than a government
agency. Others argued that all the global and river
basin models were ‘unrealistic’.
In response,
the Pakistani
case study
leaders argued that climate change is relevant to medium- and long-term
investment
planning,
that climate change is an emerging
theme in
international
irrigation
programmes,
and that government
is the only
organization
with the expertise and tools to conduct the research.
It was concluded
that the study should shift its attention
to a set of
critical water problems that might be influenced
by climate change.”
Table 2 outlines the logic of the critical water problems approach.26
An inventory of problems was compiled from unstructured
interviews
with project participants,
previous water sector studies, and the following studies underway between 1988 and 1991:
0
0
0
0
0
0
25A~, for example, in Peter Gleick, ‘The
effects of future climate change on international water resources: The Colorado River, the United States and Mexico’, fo/;cy
Sciences, Vol 21, 1988, pp 23-39; N.S.
Jodha, ‘Potential Strategies for adapting to
greenhouse warming: Perspectives from
the developing world’, in N. Rosenberg et
al, Greenhouse Warming: Abatement and
Adaptation,
Resources- for the Future,
Washinoton, 1989, pp 147-158.
26The concept of ‘critical water factors’
was suggested
by Le Huu Ti of the
Mekong Secretariat at a project meeting in
Boulder in February 1990. Whereas Ti
stressed critical factors for basin management, here the scope is extended to include water problems in the basin that may
or may not fall within the scope of river
basin planning.
388
Water Sector Investment
Planning Study.
National Flood Protection
Study.
National Drainage Sector Study.
Command
Water Management
Mid-term Evaluation.
Irrigation
Systems Management
Research Project.
National Conservation
Strategy.
The Water Sector Investment
Planning
Study (WSIPS)
included
a
thorough
review of previous
plans and investigations
through
1991.
Table 3 lists the problems given priority in that study. The WSIPS study
also used the Indus Basin model to evaluate a range of water development scenarios
for the year 2000, taking into account the level of
financing
available
and the projects likely to be built. These current
government
water development
scenarios provided
the baselines
for
assessing climate impacts.
The case study team selected eight problems for attention:
salinity,
waterlogging,
and drainage; flood hazards; local irrigation management
problems;
ecological
conditions
in deltaic and riparian
ecosystems;
lower basin water conflicts; reservoir management;
bureaucratic
organization and performance;
and coordination
with the agricultural
sector,
particularly
on crop water requirements.
One team member
took
responsibility
for each problem area and prepared a research programme to study the implications
of climate warming for that problem.
The spatial and temporal scale of investigation
are key issues in the
critical problems
approach.
Water problems
are often addressed
at a
GLOBAL
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December 1991
Managing the Indus River basin
Table 3. Water sector
problems
and constraints.
Financial
Inadequate levels of funding.
Inefficient control and disbursement of funds.
Coordination of public and private investment (eg for tubewells).
Institutional
Water allocation agreement between provinces.
Inadequate environmental, social and technical assessment in project planning and design.
Project selection and approval delays.
Contractor capability and performance.
Mismanagement of Annual Development Programme and Special Development Programme funds.
Poor coordination with Agriculture Sector.
Poor cost recovery (water charges and collection).
Obstacles to conjunctive management of reservoirs; and surface and groundwater.
Source: Water and Power Development
ity, Draft, Federal Report, 1990.
Author-
Technical constraints
Waterlogging and drainage.
Inflexible water allocation.
Deficit irrigation.
Inadequate storage.
Constraints on new storage, especially provincial water allocation and conflict.
Increasing crop water demands.
scale smaller than the river basin, making it difficult to determine the
implications of findings in one area for other areas in the basin or the
basin as a whole.
Within the scope of this study, it was only possible to assess problems
at the scale of previous investigations. The full Indus basin model was
used to generate scenarios for sub-basin case studies of flooding,
salinity, and canal water management. Broader inferences were drawn
by comparing the local results with analogous investigations in other
areas in the basin or with sector studies at a larger scale.
Timescales for water planning are generally 1 year, 5 years, 10 years,
and 15 years. Aside from engineering analysis of extreme events, the
50-60 year timeframe of climate change is rarely employed, This
difference in timescales can be dealt with in three ways (Figure 3):
a
Use transient climate change scenarios (ie, where 10 years of
climate change correspond with 10 years of water development).
This is the most scientifically appropriate approach. Unfortunately, it is often difficult to discern the water resources effects of small
changes in climate normals.
a
Collapse 50 years of climate change onto the present or near-term
water management system. The purpose of the investigation is to
identify potential water impacts, so it may be useful to exaggerate
impacts. Moreover, the water plan imagined for 10 years hence
may require a much longer period to implement.
a
Extrapolate water development trends 50 or 60 years into the future.
In light of the past 50 years of water development, it would be
highly speculative, and of dubious value, to project water development trends beyond conventional planning periods.
The second strategy was judged most appropriate for the Indus case
study and its models, for it combines the best available estimates of
future climate with the best available estimates of future water management. It must be kept in mind that impacts are exaggerated with this
approach.
Once impacts have been examined, ‘adjustment workshops’ were
designed to focus on planning alternatives. The critical water problems
approach is distinguished by its assessment of alternatives in the light of
climate change, rather than as responses to climate change.
GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE
December
1991
Managing
the 1ndu.t River basin
1990
Water
Climate
Use equal
2020
2030
2040
2050
Exaggerate
climate
2000
2020
2030
2040
2050
impacts
2010
development
change
Figure 3. Water development
Extrapolate
water
Ali,
personal
planning
and climate change timescales
Historical
390
2010
change
(3)
“lmran
1990.
2050
timescales
2000
1990
Climate
2040
development
(2)
Water
2030
change
1990
Climate
2020
development
(1)
Water
2010
communication,
scenarios
in the critical water problems approach.
antecedents
and analogies
Antecedents
help explain the current situation: how it arose; why some
problems
were avoided and others were not; why adjustments
succeeded in some areas and not others. Determining
the antecedents
of a
problem establishes its depth and structure. For example, water pricing
is often recommended
to improve
water-use
efficiency
and system
maintenance.
International
agencies blame Pakistani government
agencies and officials for avoiding price reforms. But a survey of colonial
irrigation records reveals that water pricing was considered
many times
in the late 19th and early 20th century - and dropped each time for
political and practical reasons.27 After 100 years, circumstances
favourable to water pricing reform are still not evident. Would climate impacts
be more or less likely to make pricing a feasible
or appropriate
adjustment?
The pricing example also contains an analogy: pricing is an adjustment to non-climate
problems;
climate impacts are analogous to some
of these non-climate
problems;
therefore
the use of pricing as an
GLOBAL
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December 1991
Managers the Indm River basin
adjustment to climate change may be analogous to the use of pricing in
other contexts.
Analogies are widely employed in studies of climate change, but they
are not well understood and must be used with care.** Fischer would
narrowly restrict historical analogies to those formal cases where:29
AX:BX::AY:BY
28MichaelGlantz, ed. Societal Responses
to R~ionat Cf~matic Change: Forecasting
by Anat~y, Westview Press, Boulder, CO,
1988.
*‘II .H . Fischer, Historians
Faflacies: Toward a logic of Historical Thoughf, Harper,
New York, NY, 1970, pp 243-262.
30Dale Jamieson, ‘Grappling for a glimpse
in Michael Glantz, ed,
of the future’,
Societal Responses to Climate Change:
Forecasting by Analogy, Westview Press,
Boulder, CO, 1988, pp 73-94.
3’Michael Glantz, ‘The use of analogies in
assessing physical and societal responses
to global warming’, unpublished
paper,
1990.
32R .L . Raikes and R.H. Dyson, ‘The prehistoric climate of Baluch~stan and the Indus Valley’, in G.L. Possehl, ed, Ancient
Cities of the Indus, Vikas Publishing
House, New Delhi, 1979, pp 223-233.
Gurdip Singh, ‘Stratigraphical and palynoloaical evidence for desertification in the
Great Indian Desert’, Annals of the Arid
Zone. Vol 16. 1977. DD 310-320:
A.M.
Swain et al, ‘istimaies’of
holocene precipitation for Rajasthan, India, based on
pollen and lake-level data’, Quaternary
Research, Vol 19, 1983, pp l-l 7.
33Louis Flam, The fale&eography
and
Prehistoric Settlement Patterns in Sind.
P&k&fan (ca #~Zff~
SC), unpublished
PhD dissertation, South A&an -Regional
Studies. Univers~~ of Pennsvlvania. 1981.
I
34Mich& op cit. def 11.
35B Allchin, A. Goudie and K. Hegde, The
Prehistory
and Pateogeography
of the
Great Indian Desert, Academic
Press,
New York, NY, 1978; Rafique Mughal,
‘The present state of research on the lndus
Valley civilization’,
in G. Possehl, Ed,
Ancient Cities of the Indus, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, pp QC100; R.L. Raikes and G.F. Dales, ‘The
Mohenjo-Daro
floods reconsidered’, Journal of the Palaeontologicaf
Society of India, Vol 20, 1977, pp 251-260.
GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
Situation A is analogous to B, because both possess property X (eg
warm temperatures,
severe flooding); therefore A and B are also
analogous with respect to Y (eg an impact or adjustment relevant to
climate change).
Dale Jamieson has criticized such formal approaches, suggesting that
analogies be viewed as stories about climate change which are more or
less salient, more or less useful.“‘) He argues that the effectiveness of an
analogy depends more upon the significance, than upon the number or
formal logic, of comparisons. He is careful to point out pitfalls as well as
the power of analogies. Glantz has stressed the importance of specifying
the exact purpose (eg education, generation of alternatives, or forecasting) and limits of the analogy to avoid vague or misleading
comparisons.“l
Three types of analogy have been employed in climate impacts
research. The most common involves previous instances of climate
change in historic, protohistoric, or prehistoric times. The more recent
the ‘climate analog’, the more it may reveal about adjustment in
complex societies. In the case of the Indus, some archaeologists believe
warming occurred in the second millenium BC, triggering massive
environmental and cultural adjustments.“* Others have disputed the
regional applicability of local paleoclimatic evidence and questioned the
importance of climate in protohistoric social change.“”
A second type of analogy involves hydrometeorological
phenomena
such as floods and droughts. Although not climatic phenomena, per se,
extreme events illuminate short-ter? adjustments which may be analogous to long-term adjustments. For example, 1990 was a warm wet year
in the upper Indus. Snowmelt came early. The warm weather was
analogous to climate change scenarios in the upper basin, so the Chief of
Dam Operations and Power (WAPDA) kept a detailed record of
problems and actions taken during this period to include in his discussion of the potential effects of climate change on reservoir operations.
A third type of analogy is not climate-related. For example, partition
led to a diminution of flows into Pakistan, followed by construction of
dams and link canals to transfer water into the affected areas.34 These
engineering adjustments, built to deal with dwindling water supplies,
provide a useful analogy for some climate change scenarios.
Four periods were selected for detailed historical investigation:
protohistoric
(3000-1OOOBC); medieval (100~17OOAD);
colonial
(1800-1948); and Pakistani (1948-90).
Protohistoric. Environmental archaeologists have sought connections
between evidence of climatic fluctuation and river channel change,
sea-level change, and flooding. They have sought to associate these
environmental linkages with archaeological evidence of changes in the
regional settlement system and social organization during the second
millenium.35 Although inundation canals and floodplain farming in
protohistoric
times bear little comparison with the modern water
system, research on the protohistoric period reminds us that the
CHANGE
December
1991
391
Managing the Indm River basin
dramatic
demographic
and settlement
account in the Indus basin model.
changes
are
not
taken
into
Medieval. The medieval
period provides the earliest antecedents
of
modern water development.
Perennial canal systems were developed in
Kashmir during the 8th century and in Punjab and Sind during the
13th-16th centuries.‘6
Modern land revenue and administrative
records
survive from the 16th century.j7 These brief periods of large-scale water
development
were punctuated
by military conquests,
courtly intrigues,
and frequent political restructuring.
Well-irrigation
was the most common technology during periods of instability and decentralization.
Thus,
the medieval period indicates that large-scale integrated
water development occurs during brief periods of internal
and external
political
stability or imperial expansion.
At all other times, the system decentralizes. Established
water systems are at best maintained,
and at worst
degraded or abandoned.
Colonial. The modern irrigation system was laid out between 1880 and
193O.“s Most of the problems faced by Pakistani water managers today,
including
salinity,
drainage,
water pricing,
maintenance,
provincial
conflict,
and bureaucratic
organization,
began during the colonial
period and have been studied for over 100 years. For example, Pakistani
irrigation officers are sometimes criticized for not going into the field to
know what is happening in their jurisdictions.
Part of the problem is that
they are transferred
often. Policies of administrative
rotation date back
to British and even Mughal times, where it is clearly indicated that the
aim of rotation is to maintain
loyalty to the state rather than to the
locale. The sobering lesson from the colonial period is that a problem
may be well understood,
and potential solutions may be well known, but
it may take decades or centuries before the problem can be resolved.
36M.A. Stein, ‘Memoir on maps illustrating
the ancient geography of Kashmir (Rajatarangini)‘, Journal of the Asiatic Society
of Bengal, Extra No 2, 1899; and James L.
Wescoat, Jr, ‘Early water systems in
Environmental
Design:
Mughal
India’,
Journal of the lslamic Environmental Design Research Centre, Vol 2, 1985, pp
50-57.
37Abu’l Fazl, Ain-i Akbari, Vol 2, (Tr H.
Bolchmann). Low Price Publications, Delhi, 1989 (f&t translated 1927-49).
38Ali op tit, Ref 19; Gilmartin, op tit, Ref
19. ’
39Anita M. Weiss, Culture, C/ass, and Development in Pakistan: the Emergence of
an Industrial Bourgeoisie in Punjab, Westview Press, Boulder, Co, 1991.
Early modern. Partition of India and Pakistan led to serious uncertainties about water supplies for Pakistan. The mobilization
of domestic and
international
water development
discussed earlier provides an analogy
for potential
adjustments
to climate change. But the lesson from that
analogy is complex. Notwithstanding
its benefits,
national
water development
may have contributed
to the decline of provincial
and local
irrigation organizations.
If concerns that global change were further to
concentrate
water management
authority at the national scale, provincial and local organizations
might be further weakened,
and problems at
those scales exacerbated.
The ‘successes’ of the 1960s Indus basin
development
programme
were not always sustained
in subsequent
projects.
If one could explain why, it would clarify both the current
situation and the prospects for adjustment.
Muslim
Political Reconstruction
The Indus case study began during the transition
from martial law and
Islamization
under General Zia ul-Haq to the more secular democracy
of Benazir Bhutto. Pakistan had been closely aligned with the USA and
was the third largest recipient of US foreign aid. As the Soviet-Afghan
conflict subsided,
US-Pakistan
relations
entered
a turbulent
phase.
Prime Minister Bhutto was removed from office by President
Ghulam
Ishaq Khan, shortly after the onset of the Persian Gulf conflict in
August
1990. A new goveinment
under Nawaz Sharif, a Punjabi
industrialist,
marked a shift in the cultural and economic politics of the
country.”
The Pakistani military has remained an everpresent
factor in
GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE
December
1991
Managing the lndus River basin
national governance .40 At the same time, escalating law and order
problems, especially in Sind, are disrupting all aspects of public life
including water management. US aid was suspended in October 1990
over compliance with a nuclear non-proliferation
law. When the Gulf
war began in January 1991, US personnel in Pakistan were greatly
reduced in number. Anti-American demonstrations occurred in Rawalpindi, Karachi, Peshawar, and Lahore.
Turbulence has more often been the rule than the exception in the
past four decades of Pakistan’s independence and in its relations with
the USA.4’ During some periods, relations between Pakistan and the
USA have been close, especially in the water resource field. Hundreds
of Americans have worked on water issues in Pakistan; and hundreds of
Pakistanis have studied in water resources programmes in the USA.
Other periods have been characterized by bitter political, economic,
and cultural tensions that have adversely affected international water
programmes.
Pakistan is especially sensitive to American misrepresentations
of
Islam and interference in the domestic politics of Muslim societies.42 In
principle, Islam calls for complete integration of political and religious
life and for brotherhood among fellow Muslims regardless of ethnicity,
nationality, or class. This ideal has been difficult to achieve. Pakistan is
over 93% Muslim, but religious, political, and ethnic tensions have
haunted every political leader since independence. When a water main
breaks in an ethnic political centre of Karachi, for example, water
department personnel from other ethnic groups will not go to fix it, both
from fear and politics.
Yet every day at l.OOpm, the call to prayer sounds in the headquarters
of WAPDA, and hundreds of employees from all ethnic backgrounds
leave their offices to pray in the hallways or in nearby mosques.
Meetings begin with the words bismillah al-rahman al-rahim (‘In the
name of God, the merciful and compassionate’).
On one occasion
my colleagues left the office for prayers, a clerk asked:
when
Why do you negiect the most obvious aspect of climate change? It happens by
the will of God and is a sign for men of understanding; it indicates that we are
not living as we should. If we do not change our ways, the problems will become
worse. If we live in accordance with our faith, we will be sustained. This is the
most important thing.
40Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter,
eds. Pa/r&fan under the ~ilita~:
Eleven
years 0fZia ul-Haq, Westview P&s, Soul-
der, CO, 1991.
4’K. Arif, America-Pakistan
Relations. 2
vols, Vanguard, Lahore, 1984; Bashir A.
Tahir and Shabbir A. Khalid. fakistanUnited States Relations: A bhronology,
7947-1985, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 1986.
42Eqbal Ahmed, ‘Islam and politics’, in
Ashgar Khan, ed, Islam, Politics, and the
State: the Pakistani Experience, pp 13-30,
Zed Press, London, 1985.
GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
Statements of this sort are not taken to be taken lightly. They spark
intense theological debates in Pakistan about the relation between
divine will, spiritual intercession, and human agency - and they carry
over into debates about political parties and public policy. Religion and
politics are intertwined.
Not surprisingly, water officials have developed a dual strategy of
expanding their relatively powerful bureaucratic position while insulating themselves from the precarious realms of cultural politics. The
semi-autonomous character of some water agencies, such as WAPDA
and urban development authorities, provides some insulation. However, as the largest employers and construction agencies in their
jurisdictions, water agencies are subject to intense political pressure in
all matters of hiring, budgets, appointments, project selection, and
contracts. Economic decisions are shaped by political considerations
and political decisions are designed to have a complex mix of economic
repercussions.
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December
1991
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Managing the Indus River basin
43Environmental
Design: Journal of the
Islamic Environmental
Desion Research
Centre, special issue on -‘Water
and
architecture’, Vol 2, 1985; M.A. Haleem,
‘Water in the Qwan’, The lslamic QuarterIy, Vol 33, 1989, pp 34-50.
44The Qwan 30:48.
45The Qwan 55:1-78.
““A.J. Wensinck, A Handbook of Ear/y
Muhammadan Tradition, E.J. Brill, Leiden,
1960.
47Pervez A. Hoodbhoy, Muslims and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Strugg/e for Rationality, Vanguard Press, Lahore, 1991.
4BL Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan; University of California, Berkeley, CA,
1961; FL Braibanti,
Research
on the
Bureaucracy in Pakistan, Duke Universitv
Press, Duiham, NC, 1966; Charles i.
Kennedv. Bureaucracv in Pakistan. Oxford
Univers& Press, Karachi, 1987.
4QR.Kurin, ‘Indigenous agronomics and
aaricultural develooment
in the lndus
B&in’, Human Org&ization,
Vol42, 1983,
pp 283-294;
Douglas Merrey, irrigation
and Honor: Cultural impediments to the
Improvement of Local Level Water Management in Punjab, Pakistan, Water Management Technical Report No 53, Colorado State University,
Fort Collins, CO,
1979.
“‘FL LaPorte and M.B. Ahmed, fuolic Enterprises in Pakistan: The Hidden Crisis in
Economic Development, Westview Press,
Boulder, CO, 1989.
394
Researchers
have rarely examined the political economy or culture of
water management,
despite their importance
at all levels. Perhaps it is
politic for some matters to be left unsaid or beyond debate. However,
the problems described earlier suggest that a Pakistani cultural perspective may be the best way to explain certain water problems and to assess
future adjustments
to climate change. This idea was informally
discussed by the project team, which identified
several promising
lines of
inquiry.
First, Islam has a rich heritage of values with respect to water.43 Rain
which
is a sign of divine benificence. 44 Paradise gardens, ‘underneath
rivers flow’, await the faithful on the day of judgement.45
The Prophet
Muhammad
emphasized
the cleansing role of water and the importance
of providing water for the basic human needs of all, without charge.46
Some Muslim writers have stressed the need to increase
public
consciousness
of religious traditions and to view orthodox, mystical, and
pragmatic beliefs as potential sources of water reform. Others argue for
a revival of scientific rationality
by Muslim societies and an end to the
quest for ‘Islamic science’.47 Is there any basis for dialogue?
Muslim fraternity
represents
one basis for collective social adjustment. In a situation where class, ethnic, and political conflict constantly
disrupt water management,
it is crucial to understand
the possibilities
and pitfalls of pan-Islamic
ideologies,
and to strengthen
common
commitments
and responsibilities
with respect to water. The challenge is
to build communities
which guard against communalism
and rectify
class conflict.
Water researchers
have made little use of the massive literature
on
Pakistani
politics, bureaucracy,
religion,
and economic
policy.48 Research on the social organization
of community
irrigation
systems
renresents an imoortant
exceotion.4”
Higher
echelons
of
Pakistani
water
I
I
’
management
deserve additional
study.‘” Collaboration
between federal
and provincial planners and the implications
of the new provincial water
allocation law will affect all aspects of water management
in Pakistan.
Political-economic
and cultural conflicts are the most serious problems facing the Indus basin. They are also the largest uncertainties
related to climate change. It would be naive to envisage governmentsponsored
research
on the cultural
conflicts
and politics of water
management.
On the other hand, the Indus basin case study demonstrates that when international
research
teams develop
a sense of
community
and trust, they can address such issues with the sensitivity
and directness required.
Summary questions
The four approaches
discussed
here remain
at an early stage of
conceDtua1 development.
Many studies have used the climate scenario
approach.
Some have examined
critical water problems,
or drawn
analogies
from past experience.
Very few have explored
indigenous
political
and cultural perspectives
on climate change. None, to my
knowledge,
has asked which approach has the highest priority, or how
different approaches
might be coordinated?
If we ask who has the most
at stake in the event of climate change and which approach
deals most
directly with those stakes, then the chtical water problems and cultural
approaches
emerge as the most important.
Climate scenario assessment
can identify the stakes and raise the consciousness
of water managers,
GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE
December
1991
Managing the lndus River basin
5’G.F. White, ‘Preface’, Integrated River
Basin Development, rev ed, pp ix-xiii, United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, New York, NY, 1970.
52Allama lqbal is given credit for the ‘idea
of Pakistan’ in the early 20th century, and
devoted his philosophical writings to the
relations between Islam, nature, and the
philosophy of science (Allama Muhammad
Iqbal, The Reconstruction
of Religious
Thought in Islam, ed M. Saeed Sheikh, 2
ed, Lahore, Institute of Islamic Culture and
lqbal Academy of Pakistan, 1989. For
more recent cultural perspectives,
see
Fazlur Rahman, /s/am and Modernity, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, 1982;
Akbar S. Ahmed, Pakistan Society: /s/am,
Ethnicity, and Leadership in Soith Asia,
Oxford Universitv Press, Karachi, 1986.
53For a more general discussion of this
point, see James L. Wescoat, Jr, ‘Resource management: the long term global
trend’, Progress in Human Geography, Vol
15, No 1, 1991, pp 81-93.
GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
but it is doubtful that scenario assessment
would ever be the principle
guide for action.
The more important
question
is: how can the four approaches
be
coordinated?
For exploratory
studies like the Indus case study, the goal
is first to identify the relevant approaches,
along with the knowledge
and resources needed to address them. This case study showed that four
distinct approaches
could be pursued concurrently,
interactively,
and to
the mutual benefit of the participants.
It also identified points of tension
and potential
conflict among the different approaches.
The challenge for future research is thus to incorporate
and coordinate different and often conflicting approaches.
It is easy to visualize how
three of the four approaches
discussed
here can complement
one
another. After all, river basin planning has always sought to ‘integrate’
diverse aims and interests.“’
Integration
of climate impact modelling
and empirical research is moving ahead. However, the fourth approach,
Muslim political reconstruction,
presents a more complex picture of the
conflicts and contradictions
in modern water management.
Fortunately,
there are historic leaders, like Allama Iqbal and Mohammad
Ali Jinnah,
and historic experiments
which address the alternative
meanings
of
Islamic reconstruction,
tradition,
and relations with the West.52 Those
experiments
must not be ignored by water researchers,
for they embody
and help explain some of the longstanding
water problems in the region.
They also offer creative analogies
for human adjustment
to climate
change.
This pluralistic
situation
in the Indus has broader implications
for
research on global change. First, we are not at a point where it is
appropriate
to focus on a single approach to impact assessment,
even
one which incorporates
those discussed above.5’ At this stage, it is
important
to expand the domain of investigation
and communication:
to
include a wider range of social groups and disciplines
in a sustained
dialogue.
Second,
the Indus
case study revealed
that different
approaches
are taken up sequentially,
beginning
with scenario assessment and proceeding
toward more academic and cultural approaches
under the right set of certain circumstances.
A systematic understanding
of those circumstances
is essential for understanding
the prospects and
limits of scientific inquiry in the region. This suggests that research
design should aim at an ‘expansive process’ rather than a ‘comprehensive plan’.
At the same time, the aims of international
research
on climate
change problems must be realistically
and concretely
assessed. Climate
impacts research,
if it is to make a difference,
will have to deliver
practical insights in a political context. It will have to be increasingly
concrete about the linkage between climate change and other waterresource
problems.
It will have to achieve this with limited data,
models, and political influence.
If it succeeds in these respects - in
expanding
the domain of practical inquiry - it will make an important
contribution
in a changing climate and uncertain
times.
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