Justin D. Kingsolver, Department of Political Science
Indiana University—Bloomington
Prospects for Continued
European Political
Integration
A Case-Study Analysis of the United States and Its Implications for Europe
Professor Timothy Hellwig, Ph.D. (Thesis Advisor)
Professor Gerald Wright, Ph.D. (Honors Program Director)
Professor Brendon Westler, Ph.D. Candidate (Second Reader)
Abstract:
Political integration, defined as the loss of sovereignty amongst integrating member states in favor of an increasingly
sovereign supranational entity, is among the most studied and most frequently-occurring phenomena within political
theory. But what variables cause this phenomenon? This study examines three distinct cases of political integration—the
American post-constitutional period, the American post-Civil-War era, and the European Union since 1950—to determine
variables correlated to alterations in political integration levels. Specifically, this study seeks to understand how social
homogeneity, economic interconnectedness, and constitutionalism correlate to elevated or diminished levels of political
integration. The conclusions ascertained therein contribute to the body of research regarding political integration, building
upon the work of giants of political integration theory to determine, among these three important contributing factors,
which seems to provide an atmosphere conducive to the growth in supranational political institutions. Notable among this
research study’s findings is that social homogeneity seems to be more significant in determining the level of political
integration than economic interconnectedness, undermining the theory upon which the European Union was created: that
economic ties lead naturally to an interconnected political union.
4/30/2011
Table of Contents
Motivation............................................................................................................................................... 3
Research Question ................................................................................................................................... 5
Political Integration Theory ....................................................................................................................................... 7
Neofunctionalism.................................................................................................................................................. 7
Intergovernmentalism .......................................................................................................................................... 9
Previous Approaches to Measuring Political Integration ................................................................................... 10
My Approach ......................................................................................................................................... 13
Identifying and Defining Contributing Factors: Political Integration ....................................................................... 14
Identifying and Defining Contributing Factors: Social Integration and Homogeneity ............................................ 16
Identifying and Defining Contributing Factors: Economic Interconnectedness ...................................................... 17
Identifying and Defining Contributing Factors: Constitutionalism .......................................................................... 18
Research Design ..................................................................................................................................... 19
Research Methods: Specifying Quantification of Variables .................................................................................... 24
Political Integration............................................................................................................................................. 24
Social Integration and Homogeneity ................................................................................................................. 26
Economic Interconnectedness ............................................................................................................................ 30
Constitutionalism ................................................................................................................................................ 33
Proposed Analysis ................................................................................................................................................... 36
Data Analysis ......................................................................................................................................... 36
Level of Political Integration .................................................................................................................................... 36
Social Integration and Its Effect upon Political Integration ..................................................................................... 45
Economic Interconnectedness and Its Effect upon Political Integration................................................................. 53
Constitutionalism and Its Effect upon Political Integration ..................................................................................... 61
Results and Implications ......................................................................................................................... 68
Brief Overview of Results ........................................................................................................................................ 68
Implications for the European Union ...................................................................................................................... 70
Implications for All Politically-Integrating Entities ................................................................................................. 71
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 73
Appendix ............................................................................................................................................... 77
Appendix 1: Regression Analyses ........................................................................................................... 77
Appendix 2: EU Member-State Government Revenues (1990-2005) ...................................................... 83
Appendix 3: Economic Interconnectedness/Trade Data ......................................................................... 84
Appendix 4: Constitutionalism/Voter Turnout Data ............................................................................... 91
Appendix 5: Social Integration/Demograhic Data ................................................................................ 101
2
Motivation
The natural tendency of mankind is to gather together in groups. When primordial man
realized that individual effort alone could not adequately meet all of a family’s individual human
needs (i.e. making clothing, gathering food, treating sickness, building shelter), these primitive
humans integrated into communities or tribes with social and economic obligations shared
throughout the commune. Gradually throughout the two most recent millennia, the rise of the
nation-state compelled these small clans of people to unite to form political and social
organizations able to provide economic security and homeland defense. As economic
superpowers extended their reach, smaller, less competitive nation-states felt extreme pressure to
band together, yielding a measure of national sovereignty in favor of international relevancy.
Nearly every phase of written human history manifests examples of political
integration—two or more semi-sovereign political entities 1 yielding military, economic, or
governmental power to a centralized integrating agent or organization. When faced with colonial
pressures, Native American Indians united to form the Native American Indian Nation—
allowing the multitude of diverse tribes to speak to colonists with a single, robust voice. As the
nomadic tribes of (what is now) Germany witnessed the enlargement of the English and French
superpowers’ spheres of influence, they amalgamated to become modern Germany. Fearing
American, European, and Southeast Asian economic and political dominance, and to amass
military power and diplomatic influence, the Russian empire merged with nearby likeminded
nations to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) and continued along the
1
For purposes of this study, the term “semi-sovereign entities” will be utilized to describe the individual units within an
integrating supranational entity. For example, each American state would be a “semi-sovereign entity” in the integration process
and every European Union member-state would likewise be a “semi-sovereign entity”. This is merely nomenclature to describe
those units, therefore it should not be interpreted in terms of any other academic context (such as in globalization studies, some of
whose theorists argue that every nation in our globalizing world is “semi-sovereign”). This is not meant to contend that these
factors only apply to entities once they have formally begun the integration process (as the initial supposition of “semisovereignty” may suggest).
3
political integration path by spearheading the formation of the Warsaw Pact defense league of
nations.
One of the most apparent and academically-reviewed examples of modern political
integration has occurred within the European continent over the past six decades. Plagued by war
and discord during the First and Second World Wars and into the Cold War era (and, even, since
the end of the Cold War), European nations strove to prevent further international conflict on the
continent. Following the failures of the League of Nations to preclude the inevitability of World
War II, leaders within Europe understood that the only way to ensure an enduring peace was to
promote indissoluble and resilient economic relationships and secure unity in political purpose
between European nations. 2 Beginning with six nations participating in the European Coal and
Steel Community’s (1951) internal, tariff-free product marketplaces with an overarching
governing body funded by the member-states, the process of European political integration has
broadened its scope to encompass a functioning, treaty-bound supranational policy-making
Parliament and a “President of Europe” 3 representing twenty-seven tax-paying member-state
constituencies. 4
As Europe enters a new decade, what will become of the European Union’s prospects for
further political integration? Is a drive towards a “federal Europe”—similar in structures of
federalism to the United States of America—likely to occur? Are forces within Europe likely to
encourage an extension—or demand a contraction—of European Union power and influence?
This paper seeks to examine the factors likely to induce political integration, so as to apply those
factors to the European Union and make justifiable predictions as to the outlook of future
2
A more complete historical description of the drivers of European integration is found later in the text, on pages 21 through 24.
The post-Lisbon President of the European Council.
4
Garcia, Jorge Juan Fernández, et al. The Student’s Guide to European Integration. 2004.
3
4
European integration, as well as recommend a prescription of necessary actions in order to
continue the integration process, if it is so desired. Specifically, links between political
integration and other conceptual variables—social homogeneity, economic interconnectedness,
and constitutionalism—will be examined 5 to discover which of these measured phenomena
contributes most significantly to an environment conducive to political integration.
First, this study identifies the fundamental topical question of what causes political
integration, breaking down the theoretical concepts into three researchable questions for study.
Then, this study examines the body of scholarly work surrounding the idea of political
integration, its causes, and its cases. Adapting and reviewing previous conceptual notions, this
study then lays out an innovative research design operationalizing and measuring all relevant
variables in novel manners and, of course, a thorough analysis is included. After drawing distinct
conclusions for the research design—including the notable conclusion that social integration has
a more profound effect upon political integration than economic interconnectedness—specific
implications and recommendations are detailed for the European Union (if it hopes to continue
politically integrating) and other integrating supranational entities.
Research Question
In order to ascertain policy recommendations for future European Union political
integration, it is important to discover what factors contribute to an increased potential for semisovereign entities to further integrate. 6 Therefore, the general research question for this paper is:
What factors contribute to a political environment between two or more semi-sovereign
entities 7 that is conducive to political integration?
5
Utilizing a bivariate correlation (Pearson’s R) test to discover p-values leading to an understanding of the statistical significance
of bivariate relationships.
6
Demonstrated through examples of historical precedence.
5
Without garnering a complete understanding of factors tending to produce political and social
outcomes that encourage political integration, Europe’s prospects for future political integration
will be difficult to forecast. However, if specific factors can be identified to correlate to
increased levels of political integration between historical examples of integrating semisovereign entities, those factors could be exploited by leaders in the European Union to further
the Union’s scope and power. Specifically, this study will examine three factors, chosen because
they seem most likely to result in increased levels of political integration:
1. The extent to which two or more semi-sovereign experience economic
interconnectedness—maintaining elevated trade relationships—and its implications for
political integration.
2. The measured levels of constitutionalism present between two or more integrating
entities, defined as an expressed acceptance of the validity of supranational government,
and its repercussions likely to cause political integration.
3. The intensity of social integration or homogeneity, classified as a similarity in
demographic characteristics, and its contribution to disparate political entities’ integration
processes.
Thus, in order to determine a concrete and complete answer to the general research question, (at
least) three smaller research questions must be evaluated to discover which variables must be
present in order for political integration to occur:
1. Does economic interconnectedness contribute to an increased potential of political
integration?
2. Does elevated supranational constitutionalism contribute to increased political
integration?
3. Does existing social integration or demographic homogeneity contribute to political
integration?
6
By ascertaining evidence responding to these three questions, a clearer picture can be drawn as to
the agents that propel political integration.
Political Integration Theory
As one of the most prevalent historical topics in political science, political integration
theory abounds. Political theorists have hypothesized on topics ranging from a difference in
definitions of political integration, political integration’s fundamental drivers and actors, the
operationalization of political integration as a researchable variable, and whether political
integration has an endpoint or occurs on a nearly infinite continuum. Branches of this theory,
especially as it relates to the European Union, are mainly divided into two distinct thought sects:
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism.
Neofunctionalism
Neofunctionalists take a broad approach to political integration, citing its definition as
encompassing many distinct elements of political, social, and economic unity. One of the most
esteemed neofunctionalist theorists—Ernst Haas—defines political integration as when:
“political actors in several, distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties,
expectations, and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or
demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states’”. 8
In his later works, Haas identifies three major components of international integration:
institutional integration, functional integration, and environmental integration. 9 By
accommodating commonplace needs of member-states in a more effective manner than each
could do alone, integrating agents usurp institutional control of many major processes6, such as
8
9
As cited in European Integration Theory. Wiener, Antje and Thomas Diez. 2009. Page 2.
Haas, Ernst. International Integration: The European and Universal Process. 1961.
7
the European Union’s supranational environmental directives or the nationalization of the
American armed forces from disparate bands of militiamen following the Revolutionary War.
Functional integration theory, largely associated with the “spillover” process of integration,
suggests that as issues arise between member-states requiring supranational attention,
supranational actions to solve those problems propel the process of political integration
holistically, not solely in the stated policy area in question.6 Haas’s third component of
integration—environmental integration—contends that natural human desires to (1) associate
with homogenous social groupings along regional lines and (2) acquire and secure cross-border
relationships that further individual economic self-interests contribute to an environment that
self-propels a process of integration once initiated.6
Leon Lindberg, another noted neofunctionalist, defines political integration as:
“(1) (t)he process whereby nations forego the desire and ability to conduct foreign and
domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or
to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs; and (2) the process
whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their
expectations and political activities to a new centre.” 10
Lindberg, it seems, criticizes Haas’s suggestion that some kind of endpoint can be reached in the
integration process. 11 Instead, Lindberg seems to suggest an unending continuum of integration
in which the integration process cannot be completed until no national or member-state power
exists outside of the boundaries of the supranational government entity (when all “decisionmaking [powers are delegated]…to new central organs”), which is arguably not the desired
outcome of any but the most extreme proponents of international integration.
10
As cited in European Integration Theory. Wiener, Antje and Thomas Diez. 2009. Page 47.
Neimann, Arne and Philippe Schmitter. “Neofunctionalism”. European Integration Theory, 2nd ed. 2009. Ed. Antje Wiener and
Thomas Diez. Page 47.
11
8
Intergovernmentalism
Intergovernmental political integrationists argue that political integration is both incited
and tempered by the semi-sovereign entities that voluntarily relinquish sovereignty to give
supranational agents their power and authority. Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig
argue in “Liberal Intergovernmentalism” that the theory of intergovernmentalism relies upon the
principles that semi-sovereign member-states of an integrating agent are both political actors and
rational, thus acting of their own self-interest. Therefore, decisions made to yield sovereignty in
the regional integration process are mainly perpetuated by state government negotiations with
one another to create institutions that act solely in the best interests of the individual memberstates 12, thus explaining the European Union’s Council of Ministers and the European Council.
Intergovernmentalism focuses purely upon the institutional framework as the product of
supranational integration, dismissing social integration as a factor within political integration.
The sole drivers, the theory argues, of political integration are national interests, substantive
international bargaining, and institutional creation, dismissing other factors driving that
integration, such as persuasive supranational leadership, citizen preferences, and international
social fusion. 13
As an increasing number of supranational integration studies have been conducted,
specifically with the focus of the European Union, many researchers—like Andrew Moravcsik—
have begun to focus solely upon the implications and measurable institutional outcomes of the
political integration process. As European citizens continue to demand measurable products and
12
Moravcsik, Andrew and Frank Schimmelfennig. “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”. As cited in European Integration Theory.
Wiener, Antje and Thomas Diez. 2009. Page 67-69.
13
Moravcsik, Andrew and Frank Schimmelfennig. “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”. As cited in European Integration Theory.
Wiener, Antje and Thomas Diez. 2009. Page 69-73.
9
benefits from the integration process, a shift towards intergovernmentalist theories, which place
more of a focus upon the outcome of political integration than the process (which retains the
focus of traditional neofunctional theorists), could forecast future political integration prospects
worldwide.
Political Integration Theory in Practice (for this study)
These theories each possess important components that must be included in our
comprehensive view of political integration. The theory of intergovernmentalism identifies a
clear, measurable indicator of political integration (the growth in institutional power yielded by
actions of state political actors), while the spillover theory of neofunctionalism provides context
to the integration process (occurring largely after the point of yielding state power. Therefore, for
our purposes, intergovernmentalism will be much more valuable to quantify the idea of political
integration (as seen in “Identifying and Defining Political Integration” below), while
neofunctionalist theory will be essential to interpret and understand the implications and
prospects for political integration. 14
Previous Approaches to Measuring Political Integration
A well-developed body of research exists detailing both the European Union’s prospects
for political union and the topic of political integration moreover. Four authors that will prove to
be the keystones of my arguments and research methods are James Caporaso, Leon Lindberg,
William Fisher, and Karl Deutsch, all of whom both initiated and critiqued methods of
quantifying political integration. Caporaso and Alan Pelowski hypothesized in 1971 that three
14
Also, it is important that I add a complete disclaimer: this project does not recognize continued political integration as
necessarily good or necessarily bad—no qualitative judgments are meant to be made as to the merit of European political
integration. This study approaches this question as to whether the process, initiated in the early 1950s, will continue and expand.
However, any positivity surrounding the continuance of this process should be viewed as that of Altiero Spinelli or other
European “federalists” and not that of this study’s author.
10
distinct classifications of international integration exist: (1) integration in terms of transactional
occurrences between units, (2) integration in terms of attitudes and opinions of citizens and
political elites within semi-sovereign integrating entities, and (3) integration in terms of the
growth of supranational political institutions. 15 It is my assertion that political integration lies
mostly in the third classification (with obvious political impact from the second classification)
and that the first classification—the transactional viewpoint of explaining European
integration—is not an indicator of political integration but may instead be a cause of the
phenomenon. While Caporaso’s first classification of transactional interactions may be a cause
of political integration, many models exist attempting to explain why entities choose to
politically integrate. One such archetype is Karl Deutsch’s social assimilation and cultural
integration model 16, which argues essentially that political integration is a byproduct of existing
informal social structures, and thus, homogeneity and social interactions may lead to political
integration. This approach, validated by a great deal of scholarly work, will be revisited later in
the research design.
The most compelling definition of political integration originates from William Fisher,
who defines political integration as the growth of the decision-making capacity of political
institutions at the international level, which is an objective, measurable trait of political
integration. 17 Defining this measure as the “institutional output performance”, Fisher argued that
opinions and directives of European supranational organizations (then, the European Economic
Community, EURATOM, and the European Coal and Steel Community) that continued to
demonstrate the competence creep of the supranational government illustrated an increase in
15
Caporaso, James and Alan Pelowski. “Economic and Political Integration in Europe: A Time-Series Quasi-Experimental
Analysis.” June 1971.
16
As reviewed by Fisher in his “Analysis of the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigm of Political Integration”. 1969.
17
Fisher, William. “An Analysis of the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigm of Political Integration” 1969.
11
supranational control and thus, political integration. Caporaso later critiqued Fisher’s work,
discussing that he contended that Fisher was headed in the right direction with the definition of
true political integration, but his measurements may have contained error; specifically, Caporaso
expressed concern that Fisher’s “institutional output performance”, a relative index combining
actions by the three European supranational organizations whose actions were actually quite
diverse and potentially incomparable. However, Caporaso’s concerns may be assuaged by
modern reporting standards of the institutions of the European Union, especially after the Treaty
of Maastricht unified diverse supranational European ventures. 18
Several authors, especially Leon Lindberg in his “Political Integration is a
Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement”, argue that political
identity and other factors must be considered when gaining a holistic image of the entirety of
political integration. As with most overarching topics in the social sciences, political integration
can invariably be measured by several factors; however, I argue that multivariate measurement is
not absolutely essential to establish a competent indicator of political integration. Although may
indicators may signify an increase in the level of political integration, a comprehensive
measurement of the most important one (the growth in supranational institutions, according to
Fisher)—such as the operationalization of political integration defined in the next section—
should give a proper estimate of the degree of political integration. 19
18
Including many of the predecessors to the European Union, including the European Communities, the European Coal and Steel
Community, the failed European Defense Fund, and EURATOM.
19
I grapple with this question utilizing an analogy: the variable of “age”. While many indicators exist that could represent an
increase in a person’s age (gray hair, wrinkled skin, a deeper voice, etc.), the most useful operationalization of age is a
quantifiable data source—of course, the number of years since birth. As seen in the following pages, the operationalization
method utilized in this study uses specific quantifiable data to validate Fisher’s “institutional output performance” measure.
12
My Approach
Obviously, cases of political integration throughout world history have undergone a
multiplicity of factors spurring and sustaining their integration processes. This begs the question:
how can different cases of political integration be compared to draw distinct conclusions
between disparate examples with incongruent economic, political, social, legal, and international
environments? Haas assumes that, as long as “attention to the environment in which the process
of integration is taking place” is paid due diligence, unequal cases can be compared across
despite a variety of diverse characteristics. 20 Haas states that “while ‘Europe’”—or, for the
purpose of this discussion, any integrating supranational entity—“possesses no completely
common factors at all, significant islands of almost identical environmental factors exist among
certain of them”. 21 Therefore, it seems that Haas suggests that if researchers can identify those
common “islands of identical environmental factors", disparate instances are comparable.
This study will utilize a comparative analysis method between three selected cases of
political integration—the United States in the aftermath of the ratification of the Constitution of
1787 (1790-1830) 22, the United States during the American Civil War and the subsequent
Reconstruction era (1860-1890) 23, and the modern European Union (1990-present day). 24 In this
analysis, I will pair analysis of political integration alongside three variables identified by this
20
Haas, Ernst. International Integration: The European and Universal Process. 1961. Page 374.
Haas, Ernst. International Integration: The European and Universal Process. 1961. Page 374.
22
Decennial demographic statistics have been collected since 1790 by the United States Census Bureau, and therefore, a logical
start date for our data collection series. As this is the most comprehensive and arguably the most reputable data collection service
in the United States, decennial statistics are utilized. This time frame has been selected to allow researchers to examine longerterm post-Constitutional political integration, especially as new states began joining the new nation in the early 19th century.
23
A near mirror to the immediate previous footnote. Census data will again be utilized, and this time frame has been selected to
reflect changes in political integration levels that occurred during the Reconstruction era, which can be argued to have lasted until
the late 1880s.
24
The European Union, of course, received its formal title as well as its formalized, three-pillar institutional structure from the
Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty on the European Union), agreed to in 1993. Earlier data will be examined, by this study’s primary
conclusions about the European Union result from the period between 1990 and 2010. (Desmond Dinan, Encyclopedia of the
European Union, pg. 232)
21
13
study as potential forebears of political integration—social homogeneity, economic
interconnectedness, and constitutionalism. As these concepts are operationalized, and data points
are ascertained and analyzed, this study utilizes bivariate correlation methods (specifically,
Pearson’s R test and its p-values) to determine the existence of statistically significant
relationships between each of the three identified variables and political integration. This allows
detailed analysis as to which relationships exhibit more relevant correlative connections.
W. Phillips Shively, the political statistician, describes the regression analysis as “a
convenient way to summarize data on two interval-scale variables…[to]easily see…the
relationship between them.” 25 These regressions, he contends, compile a series of seemingly
unrelated data points in order to make sense of trends in variables and allow those relationships
to be compared to concurrent trends in other variables--in a clearly visible, linear manner. This
comparative trend analysis corresponds perfectly to the goal of this research project: to
determine correlations between trends in political integration compared with trends in the levels
of three other factors.
Identifying and Defining Political Integration
Building upon Fisher’s operationalization of political integration, and taking into account
Caporaso’s subsequent critique of Fisher’s method, I propose a new measurement of political
integration—one substantiating Fisher’s definition yet not falling victim to Caporaso’s critique
of misplaced and nonparallel data sets. To gauge supranational integration, I adopt Fisher’s
understanding that political integration is best signified by the growth in decision-making ability
of supranational integrating organizations and institutions of government. In place of his
“institutional output performance” matrix, though, I utilize a single measure—the relative budget
25
Shively, W. Phillips. The Craft of Political Research, 4th ed, 1997. Page 95.
14
revenues of supranational and member-state governments. It is reasonable to assume that, as
citizens and member-state governments grant more—and more significant—powers and
responsibilities to supranational governments, an increase in supranational budget revenue (a
significant sign of citizen and member-state government trust) will outpace the combined budget
revenues of the integrating member states. Compared over a substantial time period, trends will
emerge indicating a general increase or decrease in the level of integration. 26
In some cases, all combined state government revenues will be significantly larger than
supranational budget revenues; however, in other examples of integrating semi-sovereign
entities, the national government budget revenue far exceeds the totality the revenue of state
governments. Therefore, this measurement focuses mostly upon the change over time of the
relative percentages of state revenue and supranational revenue contained in the general
government revenue pool. Fisher’s “institutional output performance” model maintained
objectives similar to those of this study; however, his “institutional output performance” model
(among the most peer-reviewed models in political integration) compared apples to oranges,
attempting to aggregate dissimilar data (the magnitude of actions taken by three distinct
supranational European political institutions with dissimilar missions and authority). By utilizing
budgetary figures received by different levels of government—which, throughout a thorough
reading of relevant authors, has not been utilized thus far—this study compares apples to apples
by focusing upon the quantifiable and measurable point of receipt by governmental institutions,
rather than the vague and imprecise point of dispersal, measured through Fisher’s “institutional
26
Therefore, this measurement will not be able to give a specific “threshold of political integration” (so, at any given point in
time, this study will not be able to conclude whether or not a supranational entity is “integrated” or “not integrated). Instead, an
analysis of the regression of all data points over time will allow this study to conclude merely whether political integration is
increasing or decreasing over time.
15
output performance”, in an attempt to make a unique contribution to the field of knowledge
surrounding political integration.
Identifying and Defining Contributing Factors: Social Integration and Homogeneity
Natural human tendencies encourage humans to associate with people like themselves.
Relations between political entities are no different. Throughout history, most examples of
political integration involve two (or more) semi-sovereign entities with largely similar cultures,
demographics, and traditions. Many—most influentially political theorist Karl Deutsch—argue
that without social homogeneity between political entities, little hope exists for those entities to
enter into a politically-integrating relationship.
Deutsch contends that
“political integration cannot occur until after a process of social assimilation creates a
homogenous transnational population…[and] to describe the levels of political
integration in Western Europe [or, rationally, any integrating polity] he need only
examine data relating to the levels of social homogeneity which characterize that
region.” 27
Although Deutsch’s argument has merit, Fisher later critiques Deutsch’s version of the
sociocausal paradigm, citing that it completely undermines that role that political elites and heads
of government—as well as general public opinion—play in the integration process. 28 While
agreeing with Fisher by recognizing that Deutsch’s approach overlooks some important external
variables (such as economic partnerships, political identity, and other variables), this study seeks
27
28
Fisher, William. “An Analysis of the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigm of Political Integration”. 1969. Page 254.
Fisher, William. “An Analysis of the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigm of Political Integration”. 1969. Page 290.
16
to build upon Deutsch’s work to discover whether social homogeneity between multiple
integrating political entities, as measured through available demographic data such as racial
heritage, urban-rural breakdown, and age hierarchy (dependent upon the most politically relevant
demographic data in a specific polity) 29, has a significant impact upon the resulting level of
political integration.
Identifying and Defining Contributing Factors: Economic Interconnectedness
Neofunctionalist theory dictates that when nations and peoples engage in economic
partnerships (or any bipartite partnerships, for that matter) and long-term trade relationships, a
closer connection will develop.
Therefore, a major contributor to political integration could be economic
interconnectedness and thus, it will be quantified and analyzed in this study. To measure the
extent to which specific economies are connected, the most obvious manner is to examine trade
flows (imports and exports) between political entities. For some cases of political integration,
these trade flows can be measured through available data detailing exports to and imports from 30
entity X to entity Y and vice versa. However, national macroeconomic data exists only in very
basic forms for years before the turn of the twentieth century, so creative approaches to
measuring economic interconnectedness are necessary. Since both gross domestic product
estimates and trade flow figures with selected important trading partners exist for nearly all
examples dating back to 1790, the development and strength of an internal marketplace (within
the supranational entity) can be interpreted as the proportion of an economy (GDP) included in
foreign trading markets (net exports) and domestic markets (GDP—net exports).
29
These factors in this study are often chosen based upon the data collected in each time period. As this study examines colonial
American populations, very little solid data still exists, so we must make do with the data at hand.
30
Of both goods and services.
17
Identifying and Defining Contributing Factors: Constitutionalism
Constitutionalism is a difficult—yet not impossible—concept to quantify. Stefano
Bartolini succinctly encapsulates many definitions of constitutionalism, stating that the:
“essential goal of constitutionalism [is] the normative construction of political
responsibility—who is responsible for decisions—and following this, the identification of
the target of positive and negative orientations—who should be praised or blamed for
those decisions—and, closing the circle, the positive and negative sanctions associated
with perceived behavior.” 31
Bartolini’s understanding of constitutionalism identifies the foundational core of the topic: the
identification of political responsibility. 32 A high degree of constitutionalism is not solely
dependent upon the existence of a written constitution 33, but instead upon the acceptance by the
citizenry of that constitution, and the governments and institutions established under its purview,
as legitimate and binding. This acceptance leads to political efficacy, which Bartolini identified
as the goal of constitutionalism.
Therefore, the measurement that quantifies constitutionalism in this study focuses upon
voter turnouts—the natural expressions of political efficacy. It is reasonable to equate casting a
vote in an election for a candidate and accepting as legitimate the government institutions in
which those candidates desire to serve. Thus, supranational and statewide voter turnouts are
31
Bartolini, Stefano. EU Federalism and Constitutionalism, ed. Andrew Glencross and Alexander Trechsel. 2010. Page 16.
At least as it applies to democratic societies, which constitute the vast majority of this study.
33
And, in many cases, the most specific, detailed constitutions govern nations with the least levels of constitutionalism (see: the
Russian Constitution).
32
18
compared to determine the extent to which voters in semi-sovereign entities accept member-state
and supranational governments. 34
Research Design
This study consists largely of a case analysis of three distinct cases throughout history of
political integration. Each case will be assessed at multiple points in time on all three factors
(social integration, constitutionalism, and economic interconnectedness) and their corresponding
level of political integration, through the specific operationalization described above and detailed
below.
For this case study, the focus will be on the three aforementioned historical examples: (1)
the United States during the immediate post-Constitution phase, (2) the United States in the
immediate aftermath of the American Civil War, and (3) the European Union from 1979 to the
present day.
In order to fit Haas’ requirement for comparison of different cases of integration,
“islands of identical environmental factors” must be identified and defended to explain how
researchers can draw reasonable conclusions from one historical case applicable to another.
Multiple islands of extraordinarily similar—if not completely identical—economic, political, and
social factors draw multiple parallels between these three cases. The specific “islands” this study
utilizes will be explicated and detailed below, after first summarizing a brief history of the
European integration project.
34
For example, when discussing constitutionalism in the European Union, combined voter turnouts for national parliamentary
elections in each member-state will be compared to EU-wide voter turnout in European Parliament elections to determine the
extent to which citizens view member-states vs. EP (and thus, the EU) as legitimate.
19
In 1951, spearheaded by Robert Schuman, then-French Foreign Minister and later one of
the most prodigious and stalwart supporters of the European Community, six European nations
took the first steps to building resolute economic bridges in the formation of the European Coal
and Steel Community—guaranteeing an unparalleled internal marketplace for these products. 35
Through decades of additional measures to further integrate the European Union 36 politically—
through treaties like the Treaty of Maastricht (that established the Euro and the three-pillar
structure for, and the formalized name of, the European Union) 37 and the Treaty of Lisbon
(acting as a pseudo-constitution and including such measures as formalizing the role of the
President of the European Council to be essentially the “President of Europe”) 38 and
economically—through the considered manufacturing of an internal market guaranteeing the free
movement of goods, services, persons, and capital within the European Union 39—the prospects
for “ever-closer union” have exceeded many mid-century European leaders’ wildest dreams.
Altiero Spinelli, a leading European federalist who served in both the European
Commission and the European Parliament, propagated the idea of a “federal Europe” modeled
largely based upon the constitutional principles of the United States. 40 He stated that
“the supranational unification of certain specific aspects of public authority cannot escape
the logic of the U.S. system, because both belong to the same logic of the construction of
political authority.” 41
35
Dinan, Desmond. “European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)”. Encyclopedia of the European Union. 1998. Pages 179-182.
Through its various names (European Communities, European Economic Communities, etc.).
37
Dinan, Desmond. “Treaty on European Union (TEU)”. Encyclopedia of the European Union. 1998. Pages 463-466.
38
No specific reference besides course notes from a course I took entitled “Law and Politics of the European Union” at the
Universiteit Maastricht during July-August 2010 with Professor Sarah Schoenmakers (notes available upon request)
39
No specific reference besides course notes from a course I took entitled “Law and Politics of the European Union” at the
Universiteit Maastricht during July-August 2010 with Professor Sarah Schoenmakers (notes available upon request)
40
Glencross, Andrew. “Idea of the U.S. Constitution as a Model for Europe”. EU Federalism and Constitutionalism, ed. Andrew
Glencross and Alexander Trechsel. 2010. Page xv-xx.
36
20
Spinelli continued drawing parallels, maintaining that
“state and federation would each have in common, on the one hand, the citizen,
belonging equally to the state and the federation, obliged to obey the laws of both and
owing taxes to both, and, on the other hand, state and federation would each have a
common duty to obey a federal court whose task was to uphold the federal pact
[Constitution in America or the Treaties in the European Union].” 22
Since the earliest days of the European integration process, political theorists have drawn
parallels between the United States’ experiment in political integration and that of the European
Union. In fact, one of Ernst Haas’ initial articles published about European integration prospects
was entitled “The United States of Europe.” 42
Post-constitutional America contained many similar forces to those driving European
integration, constituting several of Haas’ “islands”. Fledgling Americans witnessed the
superpowers of Europe amassing wealth and sought to gain a competitive edge—similar to the
European Union’s economic protectionism shielding against the post-World War II (and postCold War) Russian and American empires, indicating “islands of identical environmental
factors” when discussing external economic pressures. Both political unions encountered stiff
domestic resistance—Eurosceptics denounced (and still denounce) the usurpation of state
sovereignty by a distant government and American Anti-Federalists fought the passage of the
Constitution of 1787 based largely upon the precept that individual states should be the ultimate
arbiters of political destiny, again constituting one of Haas’ “islands”. During the debate over
41
Glencross, Andrew. “Idea of the U.S. Constitution as a Model for Europe”. EU Federalism and Constitutionalism, ed. Andrew
Glencross and Alexander Trechsel. 2010. Page 67.
42
Haas, Ernst. “The United States of Europe.” Political Science Review. Dec. 1948. Page 528-550.
21
the proposed European Constitution (later passed in a weakened state in the form of the Lisbon
Treaty), prominent Eurosceptic Václav Klaus, the President of the Czech Republic, argued that
“we [Europeans] should make our society free, democratic and prosperous. It will not be achieved
by democratic deficit, by supranationalism, by etatism, by an increase in legislating, monitoring,
and regulating us…We need a political system which must not be destroyed by…weakening of
democratic institutions which have irreplaceable roots exclusively on the territory of the
states.” 43
Eurosceptic fears of increasing European governmental power mirror the fears that AntiFederalists possessed of the proposed American national government. In Brutus’ Letter I (largely
hailed as the first of the “Anti-Federalist Papers”), a still-anonymous Anti-Federalist wrote that
“so far as its [the federal government’s] powers reach, all ideas of confederation are given up and
lost. It is true this government is limited to certain objects, or to speak more properly, some small
degree of power is still left to the states, but a little attention to the powers vested in the general
government, will convince every candid man, that if it [the Constitution] is capable of being
executed, all that is reserved for the individuals states must very soon be annihilated.” 44
The rhetorical parallels between the two periods in American history point to similar political
schisms and fears of relinquishing state sovereignty, suggesting that these cases are strongly
relatable because of very similar, if not “islands of identical [political] factors” that Haas
requires.
Many parallels can be drawn between post-Civil War America and the earliest days of the
European integration project. Immediately after the Civil War, nearly half of the American
43
Emphasis added. Belien, Paul. Czech President: Europe Needs Liberty, not Unification. 9 March 2006.
http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/893
44
Emphasis added. Brutus. “Letter I”. The Federalist with Letters of “Brutus”. 2007 Ed. Terence Ball. Page 439.
22
population—who for five years had remained in a state of war against the other half—had to be
reabsorbed into the political and social structures of the re-United States. Similarly, after Hitler’s
Third Reich fell, millions of people either loyal to Hitler’s ideology or subject to Hitler’s rule
(through subjugation and imperialism) needed to be included in developing a new economic,
political, and social construction of Europe. Also, during the time period in which this study
examines (the EU between 1990 and 2010), Central- and Eastern-European countries (CEECs)
possessed great economic and political differences with “Old (Western) Europe”. Both of these
cultural schisms constituted Haas’s “islands of identical environmental factors” because
ultimately, the chief objective in both cases was preventing another outbreak of hostility—and
both, as history suggests, have been largely successful. Viewing the (First and) Second World
War (and the subsequent ideological (and sometimes even physical) divide between Eastern and
Western Europe) as the European political entity’s great “Civil War” is not a stretch of the
imagination.
Of course, the United States during the two periods faced many similar challenges. Postconstitution America required persuading Anti-Federalist leaders to participate in the fragile but
developing national political system. Similarly, southern leaders—most of whom vacated their
seats within the American national legislature to lead the Confederate States of America—were
vital to include in discussions about the Reconstruction legislation to rebuild the ravaged
southern states and the reunification of the re-United States. Without these groups’
participation 45, little validity could be imbibed into the newly (re)constructed government.
Other cases of integration throughout world history contain some similar components
with the European Union’s political union experiment. However, distinct parallels can be drawn
45
However coerced it may have been.
23
between the EU’s experimentation with political integration and integration examples throughout
American history. Especially with European federalists continuing to call upon the development
of a European system of government modeled upon the Constitution of 1787—including the
fight for the adoption of a European constitution late last decade and reforms strengthening the
supranational legislature (the European Parliament) in the Lisbon Treaty 46—no case throughout
history more directly parallels the European Union’s integration venture than the United States
during these two crucial phases in its history. At these times, American leaders asked
themselves:
1. Are our governmental institutions satisfactory to fit the needs of our polity?
2. What is the future of political integration within our system of government?
3. Is federalism working, and will it continue to function in its current state into the
future?
As the European Union enters its first decade after the passage of the Lisbon Treaty—the
European document most resembling a constitution 47—European leaders must ask themselves
these same questions to determine the future of European political integration.
Research Methods: Specific Quantification of Variables
Political Integration
Political integration, as above defined as the “growth in decision-making ability of
supranational integrating organizations and institutions of government”, is defined for purposes
46
Fairhurst, John. Law of the European Union, 7th ed. 2010. Page 27-36.
After a Constitutional Treaty (approved by an Intergovernmental Council summit in 2004) failed to be ratified by voters in
France and the Netherlands, new negotiations began, culminating in the Lisbon Treaty (that entered into force in 2009). The
Lisbon Treaty increased (and codified) the strength of the European Parliament, established a more powerful President of the
European Council heralded as the “President of Europe”, and institutionalized all intergovernmental treaty law to apply to a
singular organizational structure—that of the European Union. (Glencross, EU Federalism and Constitutionalism, page 96-99).
47
24
of this study as the relative growth in supranational budget revenue compared to state combined
government revenue. See Table 1 and its description below to garner a fuller understanding of
the manner in which the “political integration level” index is calculated for the purposes of this
study.
Table 1: Example Political Integration Level Calculation
Political Entity
Total Budget Revenue
Percentage of
Combined Revenue
Political
Integration
Level
Supran. Entity Q, Year X
Combined Member-States A₁+ B₁+ C₁
φ₁ =(A₁+ B₁+ C₁)/( A₁+ B₁+ C₁+Q₁)
Member-State A
A₁
Member-State B
B₁
Member-State C
C₁
Supranational Entity Q
Q₁
β₁ =(Q₁)/( A₁+ B₁+ C₁+Q₁)
β₁
Sup. Entity Q,Year
X+(Desired Interval)
Combined Member-States A₂+ B₂+ C₂
Member-State A
A₂
Member-State B
B₂
Member-State C
C₂
Supranational Entity Q
Q₂
β₂
φ₂ =(A₂+ B₂+ C₂)/( A₂+ B₂+ C₂+Q₂)
β₂ =(Q₂)/( A₂+ B₂+ C₂+Q₂)
For purposes of discussion, please assume that Member-States A, B, and C are all member-states of Supranational Entity Q. Also,
the symbols “β” and “φ” have no intrinsic mathematic value besides being utilized to shorten descriptions. This measurement
has not been utilized by other researchers and is completely of my creation.
Table 1 demonstrates the calculation method for the index of political integration for this
study. First, a combined member-state budget revenue figure is ascertained by locating and
summing the individual budget revenues of each semi-sovereign member-state’s government
(A₁, B₁, and C₁ in the sample table) in an integrating political entity (i.e. all 13 colonies after the
American Constitution was ratified, all 31 states in the post-Civil War period of American
history, and all 27 member-states of the European Union). Then, the supranational government’s
25
budget revenue is located 48, which is often compiled already by supranational data collection
services and added to the existing combined member-state budget revenue figure to determine
the total revenue entrusted by citizens to all levels of government. To ascertain the level of
political integration, the percentage of government revenue received by the supranational
government (in the table above, β) is calculated. An increasing β-value (if β₂ is greater than β₁)
indicates, at least in terms of this study, that in the ten-year period 49 between year “x” and year
“x+10”, that the level of political integration has increased. Conversely, a decreasing β-value
would demonstrate a diminishing level of political integration over time.
Social Integration/Homogeneity
To measure the level of social homogeneity between integrating agents—and to uncover
whether that social homogeneity is reflected across the supranational entity—it is necessary to
compare the demographic breakdown of the “average member-state” to the overall demographic
breakdown of the supranational political entity. Table 3 below and its subsequent detailed
explanation specify the methods of determining the level of social integration and homogeneity
between semi-sovereign integrating entities with their supranational polity.
48
For US examples, large amounts of information are available through U.S. Census Bureau statistics, contained in Historical
Statistics of the United States. For most of the American examples in this study, exact budget numbers were not available, but
estimated revenue per capita figures were available, which were then multiplied by the Census’ national population counts to
determine an estimate of general government revenue.
49
A ten-year time period has been selected because of the availability of data for all cases. Since the United States collects data in
a decennial census (and European data exists for all of the years in which U.S. Census data was collected), a ten-year time period
for this variable allows analysis over longer periods of time and gives more reliable, comprehensive, and comparable data.
26
Table 3: Example Social Integration Level Calculation
Political Entity
Supr. Entity W, Year X
Average Member-State
Member-State G
Member-State H
Member-State I
Supranational Entity W
Demographic
Population 1
(Ex: %
Whites)
Demographic
Population 2
(Ex: %
Blacks)
∑₁=(G₁+ H₁+ I₁)
/(Number of
Member
States)
G₁
Ω₁ =(J₁+ K₁+ L₁)
/(Number of
Member
States)
J₁
H₁
I₁
L₁
Y₁
Member-State G
Member-State H
Member-State I
Supranational Entity W
/(Number of
Member
States)
G₂
H₂
Difference in
Demographic
Population 2
Social
Integration
Level
ξ₁=|∑₁- W₁|
α₁=| Ω₁- Y₁|
ξ₁+ α₁
ξ₂=|∑₂- W₂|
α₁=| Ω₂- Y₂|
ξ₂+ α₂
K₁
W₁
Supr. Entity W, Year X+(Desired Interval)
∑₂=(G₂+ H₂+ I₂)
Average Member-State
Difference in
Demographic
Population 1
Ω₂=(J₂+ K₂+ L₂)
/(Number of
Member
States)
J₂
K₂
I₂
L₂
W₂
Y₂
For purposes of discussion, please assume that Member-States G, H, and I are all member-states of Supranational Entity W.
Also, the symbols “∑”, “Ω”, “ξ” and “α” have no intrinsic mathematic value besides being utilized to shorten descriptions. This
data set is not limited to only 2 demographic characteristics being analyzed, and it the United States examples, 5 characteristics
are utilized. The number of demographic classifications is dependent upon the specific data collection service. This measurement
has not been utilized by other researchers and is completely of my creation.
The measure of social integration is a bit more complex to configure than the previous two
measurements. The most striking difference is that, instead of ascertaining the supranational
entities’ share of the variables (the percentage of the combined state and supranational
government revenue or the total number of votes cast in supranational and state elections),
supranational entities are compared to the average member-state. It is impossibly lengthy to
create a matrix comparing a supranational entity’s demographic breakdown with each of its
constitutive member-states (especially when speaking about the European Union—which
contains 27 member-states—and the United States—which, at the later point of analysis,
27
contained 31 member-states). Therefore, this study utilizes member-state demographic data to
discover the demographic breakdown of the average member-state (represented by ∑ and Ω in
Table 3). Providing an idealized, “average member-state” will allow direct comparison between
member-state demographic breakdowns and the supranational entity’s demographic breakdown.
A scenario will best demonstrate this concept:
1. Member-states Lilliput, Brobdingnag, Laputa (member-states G, H, and I in Table 3,
respectively) are semi-sovereign entities integrating into supranational polity Gulliveria
(supranational entity W in Table 3). 50
2. The demographic breakdowns are as follows:
a. 90% (G₁) of Lilliput’s population are native Lilliputians, Brobdingnag contains
30% (H₁) Lilliputians, and Laputa contains 6% (I₁) Lilliputians.
b. The supranational entity Gulliveria contains 40% (W₁) Lilliputians.
3. The “average member-state” contains 42% Lilliputians ([90%+30%+6%]/3, or “∑₁” in
Table 3).
4. Therefore, the “difference in demographic population” for Lilliputians between the
average member-state and the supranational entity would be 2% (|42%-40%|, or “ξ₁” in
Table 3).
Once individual demographic breakdowns for each measured demographic characteristic
are determined, and the differences between the average member-state and the supranational
entity are compiled, the social integration level is found by summing the differences (ξ+ α).
Again, to understand the level of social integration, it is necessary to compare data over a time
series; if (ξ₁+ α₁) is greater than (ξ₂+ α₂), then the level of social integration increases. 51
50
Many thanks to Jonathan Swift for the nomenclature inspiration. (Gulliver’s Travels, 1726).
This is important to note, as this also distinguishes this measure from the previous two. In the previous two examples, an
increasing number over time indicated a growth in the factor. However, in this case, an increasing number results in decreasing
levels of social integration and homogeneity (remember, this is an increasing difference in demographic characteristics between
the supranational entity and the average member-state).
51
28
Conversely, an increasing value of (ξ+ α) represents a decrease in the social homogeneity of the
average member-state compared to the supranational polity. 52
This study utilizes different types of demographic data for each of the cases based upon
the importance of the demographic factors to the political entity53. In American colonial times,
large divides existed between those living in urban areas and those residing in rural areas. Also,
as the slave trade began boiling, racial issues began to come to the forefront (so much so, in fact,
that leaders in the Philadelphia Convention inserted a gag order into the Constitution of 1787
barring Congress from considering amendments concerning the slave trade 54 because they
foresaw Congress becoming mired in debates over slavery and never moving to other legislative
issues). Therefore, this study defines social homogeneity for this period as the composite index
of racial breakdowns and urban-rural categorizations. Similarly, in the post-Civil War period of
American history, racial issues were of utmost political importance (as witnessed by three
constitutional amendments and dozens of state Jim Crow laws passed during this era). Also, as
the Industrial Revolution began America’s sprint towards the cities, the urban-rural divide
continued to play a vital part in social makeup of the polity. Therefore, an identical index is used
in this instance as is used in the colonial example.
A demographic issue that remains at the front of every European leader’s mind is the
aging population of the European Union—affecting many areas of governmental functioning
(labor markets, healthcare systems, and pension programs to name a few). Therefore, a
comparison of age structures between the European Union and its average member-state could
52
Conversely, to ascertain a similarly-valid measure, one could utilize an average of these two factors. However, for the purposes
of this research study, the magnitude of the difference, as long as similar numbers of cases are being compared, will suffice.
53
And, probably more importantly, based upon the availability of data for each case. Demographic data collected in the European
Union is very different from that collected in the United States. Therefore, while the selection of demographic data may seem a
bit arbitrary, this study has done thorough research to gather comparable (or as comparable as possible) data.
54
In Article V. See any printed copy of the U.S. Constitution.
29
be a very telling piece of demographic information 55; thus, this study will examine the
percentage of each member-state (and the EU as a whole) aged less than 15 years and more than
65 years to understand an important demographic trend 56—indicative of political concerns and
illuminating of possible national social problems—in relation to the concept of political
integration.
Economic Interconnectedness
One of the foundations of European political integration theory—the neofunctionalist
“spillover” theory—assumes that economic integration between semi-sovereign entities “spills
over” to other functional areas, inciting further political, social, and cultural integration. 57
Therefore, it is of utmost importance to attempt to assess the extent to which economic
connections—viewed by this study in terms of dichotomous trade relationships—put pressure on
semi-sovereign entities to politically integrate.
Because of the differences in types of economic data collected by the European Union’s
data services and the United States Census Bureau, two different—but interrelated and
analogous—matrices are necessary to determine the level of economic interconnectedness.
A. The United States
For many of the years studied in this research design, very little economic data was
collected, especially in the American post-Constitutional period between 1790 and 1830.
However, the data that was collected suffices to provide an adequate picture of the strength of
domestic markets and, thus, the level of intrastate versus external foreign trade. Table 4 that
55
And, of course, this information is readily compiled by Eurostat, unlike racial breakdown, making age breakdowns more
comprehensive and useful for this study.
56
Again, see footnote 52 for further discussion on demographic factor selection decisions.
57
Neimann, Arne and Philippe Schmitter. “Neofunctionalism”. European Integration Theory, 2nd ed. 2009. Ed. Antje Wiener and
Thomas Diez. Page 46-50.
30
follows illustrates the methodology for ascertaining the American economic interconnectedness
index.
Table 4: Example American Economic Interconnectedness Level Calculation
Political Entity
Nominal Value (in $)
Exports to 3 Largest Trading Partners
Exports to Trading Partner M
Exports to Trading Partner N
Exports to Trading Partner O
American G.D.P.
Supran. Entity Z, Year X
M₁+ N₁+ O₁
M₁
N₁
O₁
GDP₁
Exports to 3 Largest Trading Partners
Exports to Trading Partner M
Exports to Trading Partner N
Exports to Trading Partner O
American G.D.P.
Sup. Entity Z, Year
X+(Desired Interval)
M₂+ N₂+ O₂
M₂
N₂
O₂
GDP₂
How Many Times Larger is
Domestic Trade than Trade
with Largest Trading Partners
Economic
Interconn.
Level
η ₂ =GDP/(M₁+ N₁+ O₁)
η₁
η ₂ =GDP/(M₂+ N₂+ O₂)
η₂
The symbol “η” has no intrinsic mathematic value besides being utilized to as a symbolic representation to shorten descriptions.
Gross domestic product, of course, is a basic measurement of the economic activity of a
political entity (minus net exports). By comparing domestic economic activity with trading
relationships with the United States’ largest trading partners 58, an estimation of domestic market
activities can be drawn. If the growth rate of the American gross domestic product outpaces the
growth rate of exports to America’s three largest trading partners (if η ₂ is greater than η ₁), it is
reasonable to argue that America’s level of intrastate (or at least, domestic) trade grows,
indicating a stronger level of economic interconnectedness between American states. 59
58
In terms of raw, nominal total values of exports to largest trading partners and gross domestic product.
Of course, this is not a precise measurement. I understand that a growth in domestic production does not necessarily indicate
that the level of intrastate trade will increase, but I believe it to be a reasonable assumption because of advancing transportation
technologies, especially during the 19th century. Unfortunately, after thorough research, I have found no indication that the
American states retain records of all dichotomous trade relationships with other states (i.e. Indiana does not keep historical
59
31
B. Europe
The European model is far simpler than the American model. The European Union’s
Eurostat data collection service archives specific import and export trade data for each member
state. For each year in the series and for each member-state, Eurostat provides the percentage of
imports into each member-state originating from another EU member-state, as well as the
percentage of exports from each member-state destined to other EU member-states. These
figures directly explain dichotomous trading relationships in the EU’s internal market and clearly
indicate the level of economic interconnectedness between EU member-states. Refer to Table 5
and its description to gather a fuller picture of the techniques utilized to analyze this data.
Table 5: Example European Economic Interconnectedness Level Calculation
Political Entity
Average Imports from EU
Average Exports to EU
Supr. Entity W, Year X
Average Member-State
δ₁=(P₁+ Q₁+ R₁) /(Number of
μ₁ =(T₁+ U₁+ V₁) /(Number of
Member-State P
Member-State Q
Member-State R
Supr. Entity W, Year
X+(Desired Interval)
Average Member-State
Member-State P
Member-State Q
Member-State R
Member States)
P₁
Member States)
T₁
Q₁
U₁
R₁
V₁
δ ₂=(P₂+ Q₂+ R₂)
/(Number of Member States)
P₂
μ ₂=(T₂+ U₂+ V₂)
/(Number of Member States)
T₂
Q₂
U₂
R₂
V₂
Economic
Interconn.
Level
(δ₁+ μ₁)/2
(δ₂+ μ₂)/2
For purposes of discussion, please assume that Member-States P, Q, and R are all member-states of Supranational Entity S. Also,
the symbols “μ” and “δ” have no intrinsic mathematic value besides being utilized to shorten descriptions. This measurement
has not been utilized by other researchers and is completely of my creation.
records of past import and export totals with Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and the rest of its domestic trading partners). This requires
a bit of creative thinking, but I firmly believe that this measure encapsulates the best possible alternative.
32
To calculate the level of economic interconnectedness in European Union examples in
this study, the import and export data for all member-states is averaged to find the “average
percentage of member-state imports received from other EU member-states” (in Table 5, δ) and
the “average percentage of member-state exports shipped to other member-states within the EU”
(in Table 5, μ). To determine the level of economic interconnectedness, an average of mean
imports and mean exports figures is compiled ([δ+ μ]/2 in Table 5), comprising the economic
interconnectedness index of this study. If this figure increases over time, the level of economic
interconnectedness (also termed the “strength of the internal market”) between member-states
grows.
Constitutionalism
This study’s measure for constitutionalism has many parallels to its measurement of
political integration. Constitutionalism, again, has been defined as “the acceptance by the
citizenry of that [supranational] constitution, and the governments and institutions established
under its purview, as legitimate and binding”. See Table 2 below and its explanatory text below
to understand how the “constitutionalism index” will be compiled for this study.
33
Table 2: Example Constitutionalism Level Calculation
Political Entity
Total Voter Turnout in
Most Recent Elections
for that Political Entity
Supran. Entity T, Year X
Combined Member-States D₁+ E₁+ F₁
Member-State D
D₁
Member-State E
E₁
Member-State F
F₁
Supranational Entity T
T₁
Sup. Entity T, Year
X+(Desired Interval)
Combined Member-States D₂+ E₂+ F₂
Member-State D
D₂
Member-State E
E₂
Member-State F
F₂
Supranational Entity T
T₂
Percentage of
Combined Vote Totals
Constitutionalism
Level
Ψ₁ =(D₁+ E₁+ F₁)/( D₁+ E₁+ F₁+T₁)
λ₁ =(T₁)/( D₁+ E₁+ F₁+T₁)
λ₁
Ψ ₂ =(D₂+ E₂+ F₂)/( D₂+ E₂+ F₂+T₂)
λ₂ =(Q₂)/( D₂+ E₂+ F₂+T₂)
λ₂
For purposes of discussion, please assume that Member-States A, B, and C are all member-states of Supranational Entity Q. Also,
the symbols “Ψ” and “λ” have no intrinsic mathematic value besides being utilized to shorten descriptions. Please note, also,
that all time frames within this data set will not be 10 years; instead, they will be contingent upon election cycles of entities. This
measurement has not been utilized by other researchers and is completely of my creation.
To study constitutionalism in terms of the acceptance of political institutions as valid, this
study examines relative voter turnout data at the member-state and supranational levels of
political integration. Acceptance of a government as legitimate and binding can be expressed by
participating in governmental functions. As voting is among the most widely-recorded means by
which citizens participate in their governmental institutions at the local, state, national, and
supranational levels, this study has developed a relative voter turnout index comparing the voter
turnout rates 60 between semi-sovereign integrating political entities and the supranational
integrating agents into which those entities are integrating. For example, to assess the measure of
constitutionalism towards the European Union, this study has compiled voter turnout data for
60
Raw voter turnout rates. This study utilizes the number of individuals that cast a vote, not the voter turnout percentage. This
allows for more relevant data.
34
European Parliament elections 61 and combined elections to national parliaments occurring in
either the year of, or an average of the voter turnout of any national parliamentary elections in
the five years elapsing between 62, European Parliament elections.
Once the raw number of voters that have participated in supranational and member-state
elections is ascertained, these two numbers are combined to form the “general voting pool” for
the integrating political entities. Then, the number of individuals voting in supranational
elections is divided by the “general voting pool” to determine the percentage of voters that
participated in supranational elections (signified in Table 2 by “λ”). If the percentage of citizens
voting in supranational elections increases, it can be reasonably stated that the number of
individuals participating in the supranational government is increasing. As stated above, the
participation in government can be reasonably equated with acceptance of that government as
legitimate. This study has defined constitutionalism roughly as the “the acceptance…of
governments [established by a constitution]…as legitimate and binding”. Thus, if the proportion
of citizens voting in supranational elections increases (in other words, if λ₂ is larger than λ₁), then
the level of constitutionalism within and towards that supranational political entity experiences
positive growth.
61
Which occur every five years, beginning in 1979.
Obviously, each member-state does not conduct their parliamentary elections corresponding directly with European Parliament
elections. Therefore, an estimate of past voter turnout is required to approximate a likely voter turnout in the European
Parliament election year. To put it into more concrete terms, the Netherlands did not have a parliamentary election in 1984.
Therefore, to gauge a likely state election voter turnout, this study examined voter turnout in all Dutch national parliamentary
elections occurring since the 1979 European Parliament elections. National parliamentary elections were held in both 1981 and
1982, so the number of voters that participated in the 1981 Dutch parliamentary elections was averaged with the number of voters
participating in the 1982 Dutch parliamentary elections to provide an approximate estimation of the projected number of voters
that would have participated in a national parliament election in the Netherlands if it had been held in 1984. The author
understands that this is not a precise measurement, but would argue that it provides relevant information—information that could
not be produced in any other manner—suitable for this study.
62
35
Proposed Analysis
After this data is compiled and placed into the usable “(factor X) indices”, careful
analysis must be completed. Since the entirety of the data collected is in the form of time-series
data, regression analysis will provide useful information as to the correlations between individual
factors and resulting levels of political integration. An individual regression analysis is
performed for each factor, and then, each factor’s three R-squared values will be averaged and,
of the three factors, the one with the highest average R-square value—and thus, the highest level
of correlation between the dependent and independent variables—will be assumed to be the most
influential factor contributing to political integration. Full computed regression analyses can be
found in Appendix 1, and selected regression statistics and graphs are included below to
demonstrate the study’s findings.
Data Analysis
Level of Political Integration
To begin analysis of correlative relationships between the three factors and the resulting
level of political integration experienced in each of the three case-studies, it is first of utmost
importance to understand if, in fact, the timeframes examined by this study demonstrate obvious
political integration or disintegration. Analysis of each case study’s trajectory of political
integration follows.
American Post-Constitutional Period (1790-1830)
The institution of a strong, tax-collecting American national government led to an initial
increase in the supranational political integration of the American colonies (because only a weak,
incredibly underfunded government existed before, which remained nearly completely at the
36
mercy of each individual state). 63 However, this study seeks to understand whether that political
integration was sustained over the next several decades. Graphic and textual data below explains
the research findings.
Table 6: American Post-Constitution Political Integration Calculations
United States (1790-1830)
Combined Member-States
64
Total Budget Revenue
Percentage of
Combined Revenue
Political
Integration
Level
USA, 1790/95*
A= $ 1,700,612.09
U.S. Federal Govt. (total)
B= $ 6,115,000.00
Combined Member-States
USA, 1800
C= $ 2,229,562.86
U.S. Federal Govt. (total)
D= $ 10,849,000.00
Combined Member-States
USA, 1810
E= $ 2,606,357.16
U.S. Federal Govt. (total)
F= $ 9,384,000.00
Combined Member-States
USA, 1820
G= $ 5,397,533.68
U.S. Federal Govt. (total)
H= $ 17,881,000.00
Combined Member-States
USA, 1830
I= $ 6,947,650.80
U.S. Federal Govt. (total)
J= $ 24,844,000.00
β =(B)/(A+ B)
β =78.2408%
β =(D)/(C+ D)
β =82.9525%
β =(F)/(E+ F)
β =78.2629%
β =(H)/(G+ H)
β =76.8133%
β =(J)/(I+ J)
β =78.1463%
Source: United States Census Bureau, Historical Statistics of the United States.
For purposes of discussion, all letters and symbols have no significant mathematical meaning besides descriptive symbolism. *data not completely available for all states in 1790: budget revenue available for years close after 1790 were substituted for
some member-states.
63
Described by Stephen Skowronek as the “rather innocuous role” played by the government in the earliest stages of independent
American governance (in his “Building a New American State”, page 23).
64
The U.S. Census Bureau lists data in its Historical Statistics of the United States detailing both (1) combined state revenue per
capita and (2) national revenue per capita. I multiplied these figures by the national populations figured by the Census Bureau to
gain an estimate of the amount of revenue of both the national and state governments.
37
Figure 1: Political Integration in the US
(1790-1830)
84.0000%
82.0000%
80.0000%
78.0000%
76.0000%
1780
R² = 0.1805
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
Again, the level of political integration, over the entire time-series analysis, has a general
trend of decreasing political integration, as interpreted from Figure 1 above. However, a sharp
increase in political integration occurred in the decade and a half immediately following the
ratification of the federal constitution. It could be assumed that the startup costs of a newlyformed federal government could have contributed to that initial increase, and an equalization of
spending followed. Nonetheless, it appears that between 1780 and 1800, political integration
increases and from 1800 until 1830, it normalizes and decreases. The initial spike—and
subsequent equalization—of the level of political integration is consistent with the findings of
other political theorists, especially, as Stephen Skowronek points out, because “there were no
acceptable models for the construction of an effective state [supranational] power”. 65 With
relatively few directly comparable models upon which to build, the colonial level of political
integration likely experienced volatile and capricious changes, as expressed in this study’s
findings.
Historical data supplements these findings. After the Constitution was established, strong
supranational institutions were implemented that were unparalleled throughout American history
65
Skowronek, Stephen. “Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities”, 1982. Page 20.
38
up to that point. In fact, the first powers given to Congress in the new federal constitution (found
in the first paragraph of Article One, Section 8—the “powers of Congress” clauses) stated:
“Congress shall have the Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imports and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States.” 66
Among the types of powers granted to governments, the power to tax is one of the most
comprehensive and far-reaching. One of America’s most noted jurists—Chief Justice John
Marshall—stated often that “the power to tax involves the power to destroy”, making it among
the most formidable governmental powers 67. This initiation of taxation power explains the initial
jump in political integration.
Around 1810, as seen in Figure 1 above, the nation seems to have dis-integrated from its
peak a decade before. One possible explanation of this phenomenon was the expiration of the
“gag rule” about debates over the slave trade—debates which the Constitution specifically
forbade (in Article 1, Section 9) 66 in order to gain acceptance and ratification of the Constitution
by the southern states. From the time the gag rule expired until 1860, the issue of slavery divided
the nation, acting as the primary point of contention over interstate commerce bills, measures to
admit new states to the Union, and issues surrounding the extension of suffrage, which may have
contributed to the decreasing levels of political integration that climaxed in the secession of the
southern states.
66
67
The Heritage Guide to the Constitution. Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2005. Print.
Marshall, John. Opinion in McCullough v. Maryland (1819).
39
American Post-Civil War Period (1850-1890)
During this trying time in American history, member-states of the formerly-United States
of America splintered into northern and southern sects, with several member-states formally
removing themselves from the Union of states (reversing decades of political integration) and
forming a new supranational entity—the Confederate States of America. After the South
formally surrendered at Appomattox in 1865, the north-south political integration process began
anew. Statistical data below described the flux of political integration during this chaotic
historical period.
Table 7: American Post-Civil War Political Integration Calculations
United States (1850-1890)
Combined Member-States
68
Total Budget Revenue
Percentage of
Combined Revenue
Political
Integration
Level
USA, 1850
A= $ 22,959,957.24
U.S. Federal Govt. (total)
B= $ 44,760,320.68
Combined Member-States
USA, 1860
C= $ 54,082,512.12
U.S. Federal Govt. (total)
D= $ 104,391,825.72
Combined Member-States
USA, 1870
E= $ 90,226,588.14
U.S. Federal Govt. (total)
F= 378,643,203.22
Combined Member-States
USA, 1880
G= 85,264,831.10
U.S. Federal Govt. (total)
H= $ 320,495,453.37
Combined Member-States
USA, 1890
I= $ 115,823,793.76
β =(B)/(A+ B)
β =66.0959%
β =(D)/(C+ D)
β =65.8730%
β =(F)/(E+ F)
β =80.7566%
β =(H)/(G+ H)
β =78.9864%
U.S. Federal Govt. (total)
J= $ 361,319,878.36
β =(J)/(I+ J)
β =75.7256%
Source: United States Census Bureau, Historical Statistics of the United States.
For purposes of discussion, all letters and symbols have no significant mathematical meaning besides descriptive symbolism.
68
The U.S. Census Bureau lists data in its Historical Statistics of the United States detailing both (1) combined state revenue per
capita and (2) national revenue per capita. I multiplied these figures by the national populations figured by the Census Bureau to
gain an estimate of the amount of revenue of both the national and state governments.
40
Figure 2: Political Integration in the US
(1850-1890)
90.000%
R² = 0.5222
80.000%
70.000%
60.000%
50.000%
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
A tremendous amount of political integration occurred in the immediate aftermath of the
American Civil War. The political integration index (percentage of total government revenues
collected by the American government) in Figure 2 above shows a nearly-15-point increase
within just a decade of the reintegration process beginning during Reconstruction. Not only did
the index increase rapidly within that decade time span, but it largely sustained the increase until
late into the nineteenth century. This case, above both other cases, demonstrates positive political
integration.
Theoretical evidence draws similar conclusions. Historian Jeffrey Rogers Hummel notes
in his historical analysis of the Reconstruction era that:
“the national government that emerged victorious from the conflict dwarfed in power and
size the minimal Jacksonian State that had commenced the war.” 69
He continues, citing the meteoric rise in budgetary power of the United States government in the
post-Civil War period, growing from a pre-war average of 2 percent of gross domestic product to
20 percent following the war. 70 This rise in budgetary authority—and, thus, as this study argues,
supranational political power—confirms the data shown throughout this study.
69
70
Hummel, Jeffrey Rogers. Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men: A History of the American Civil War, 1996. Page 328.
Hummel, Jeffrey Rogers. Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men: A History of the American Civil War, 1996. Page 328.
41
European Union (1990-2010)
Political integration occurred between the founding of the European Coal and Steel
Community in 1951, and the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. 71 However, since the
European Union adopted the Euro currency, questions have been raised as to the course of
political integration. An analysis of EU political integration is shown in chart, graph, and
detailed paragraph form below.
Table 8: European Political Integration Calculations
European Union
Total Budget Revenue
Combined Member-States
European Union, 1990
A= € 1,970,500,820,000
European Union (total)
B= € 46,763,747,654
Combined Member-States
European Union, 1995
C= € 2,792,054,892,000
European Union (total)
D= € 72,349,400,000
Combined Member-States
European Union, 2000
E= € 4,022,525,987,000
European Union (total)
F= € 92,724,400,000
Combined Member-States
European Union, 2005
G= € 4,874,112,471,700
European Union (total)
H= € 107,090,600,000
Combined Member-States
European Union, 2010
I= € 5,188,125,717,800
European Union (total)
J= € 122,955,900,000
(see Appendix 2 for a
Complete listing of
member- States included)
Percentage of
Combined Revenue
β =(B)/(A+ B)
Political
Integration
Level
β =2.3182%
β =(D)/(C+ D)
β =2.5258%
β =(F)/(E+ F)
β =2.2532%
β =(H)/(G+ H)
β =2.1499%
β =(J)/(I+ J)
β =2.3151%
Sources: European Union Budget (Europa.org), International Historical Statistics (B. Mitchell, 2000), IMF International Financial
Statistics.
For purposes of discussion, all letters and symbols have no significant mathematical meaning besides descriptive symbolism.
71
Given that little to no governmental institutions existed in the earliest days of the European integration process, very little
supranational revenue can be assumed. Beginning with the European Parliament’s formal election process in 1979, the process of
political integration really began and many of the “teeth” of the modern European supranational political state were instituted in
the Treaty of Maastricht.
42
Figure 3: Political Integration in the EU
(1990-2010)
2.6000%
2.5000%
2.4000%
2.3000%
R² = 0.1934
2.2000%
2.1000%
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
It appears that, from Figure 3 above, the level of political integration has actually
decreased in the European Union. Several contributing factors may explain this decrease,
including an increase in the levels of member-state domestic spending or the potential decreasing
value-added sales tax revenue (the European Union’s primary source of income) as consumers
purchased less during worldwide recessionary periods in the early and late 2000s. Nonetheless, it
seems abundantly clear that European citizens continue to entrust their member-state
governments with far more of their tax dollars than the supranational government. 72 This could
also be due to anti-European political elite opinion leadership within several European countries
(like the Czech Republic, whose Eurosceptic President Klaus is quoted above) contributing to a
generally anti-European political climate within some member-states. 73
This claim is substantiated by Eurobarometer public opinion information from the past
twenty years. This comprehensive public opinion polling service, credible because of its depth
and breadth of consistent polling information, has indicated that, since the Treaty of Maastricht,
72
However, an important caveat must be included. Most of the European Union’s functions have been policy-driven or
regulations-based in nature, rather than the traditional large-scale (and expensive) social and economic-development programs
undertaken by national governments. Notable exceptions, such as the Central Agricultural Policy (CAP), development programs
in Central- and Eastern-European Countries (CEEC), and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), do exist, though, and
account for significant budget outlays from the EU budet. (Dinan, Encyclopedia of the European Union, pg. 28-31)
73
Many thanks to Professor Westler for this suggestion.
43
the number of individuals who “tend not to trust” European institutions 74 has increased gradually
from twenty-four percent in 1993 to just over thirty-seven percent in 2010. Conversely, the
proportion of individuals that “tend to trust” European institutions has fallen from fifty-four
percent in 1993 to forty-eight percent in 2010. 75
Political Integration between Cases
Despite the European Union’s heralding as the exemplar of modern political integration,
it appears that, at least since the Treaty of Maastricht was passed, the level of political integration
has experienced a steady decrease. While colonial America experienced a steep increase in
political integration in the years immediately following the constitution’s ratification, the level
steadied. The case of the American post-Civil War period appears to be the case most
prominently indicative of political integration, owing largely to growth in power and scope of
federal institutions.
However, it is important to note the extremity of the difference between the political
integration levels of both United States cases compared with their European Union counterpart;
American cases experienced political integration levels at rates 20 to 40 times higher than the
European Union. This phenomenon could be contributed to a variety of rationale; however, the
most likely cause of this discrepancy lies in the pricetag of the governmental competences
granted to the European Union’s supranational institutions, which pale in comparison to the costs
of implementing those powers granted to departments within the American national government.
74
Especially the European Parliament, arguably the most publicized European governmental institution.
Eurobarometer statistical information.
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showchart_line.cfm?keyID=56&nationID=11,1,27,28,17,2,16,18,13,32,6,3,4,22,33,7,8,20,2
1,9,23,24,12,19,29,26,25,5,14,10,30,15,&startdate=1993.04&enddate=2010.06#fcExportDiv
75
44
Social Integration and Its Effect upon Political Integration
Social integration indices are compiled below, and the regression analysis is completed in
both tabular and textual formats below. After brief discussions of the levels of social integration
present in each case and the magnitude of the relation between that factor and the corresponding
level of political integration, a composite table compiling all three cases’ results regression is
included at the end of this subheading to draw conclusions about the relationship between these
two variables.
United States Post-Constitution Period
Table 9: United States Social Integration Level Calculation
United States PostConstitution Period
Percentage
of Urban
Population
Percentage
of Rural
Population
Percentage
of Whites
in
Population
Percentage
of Blacks in
Population
Percentage
of “Others”
in
Population
4.799%
94.471%
83.024%
16.857%
0.000%
5.13%
94.87%
80.73%
19.27%
0.000%
Average Member-State
5.773%
94.216%
83.643%
17.256%
0.000%
United States
6.07%
93.93%
81.12%
18.88%
0.000%
Average Member-State
7.128%
92.886%
82.329%
18.531%
0.000%
United States
7.26%
92.74%
80.97%
19.03%
0.000%
Average Member-State
7.514%
88.809%
79.683%
17.307%
0.004%
United States
7.19%
92.81%
81.62%
18.38%
0.000%
Average Member-State
9.963%
90.026%
82.084%
19.238%
0.000%
United States
8.76%
91.24%
81.86%
18.10%
0.000%
Social
Integration
Level
United States, 1790
Average Member-State
(see Appendix 5.2 for a list
of included states)
United States
United States, 1800
United States, 1810
United States, 1820
United States, 1830
5.43%
4.73%
2.13%
7.33%
3.78%
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States. U.S. Census Bureau.
Examining the statistical regression analysis found in Appendix 1.3b, it becomes clear
that in this case, a noticeable relation exists between social integration and political integration,
and the relationship is statistically significant. As demonstrated in Figure 4 below, polynomial
45
regressions of these variables over the time series shows a concurrent inverse relationship
(necessary to demonstrate a positive correlation between these variables) between the social
integration index and the political integration index. 76´ 77 Thus, this data suggests that as the
average member state began more closely resembling the demographic breakdown of the United
States, political integration simultaneously occurred.
The data in the polynomial regression measuring social homogeneity could validated by a
simple examination of the demographic breakdowns of the states admitted to the United States
between 1790 and 1830 (divided into 2 distinct periods characterized by the direction of the
slope of the polynomial regression, 1790-1813 and 1813-1830). In the time period this study
characterizes with increasing social homogeneity—1790 through 1813—the states of Vermont
(1791), Kentucky (1792), Tennessee (1796), Ohio (1803), and Louisiana (1812) were admitted to
the Union. 78 All of these states did not differ distinctly from the existing population base of the
United States (Virginia and New England), and they were phased into the United States very
gradually over a long period of time. Tennessee, Kentucky, and Ohio were all relatively
urbanized 79, as many settlers focused upon developing communities closer to rivers and
resources. Louisiana-the outlier in this group—was, and still somewhat remains to be, a hotbed
of international commercial activity, with large demographic influences from the French and the
Caribbean, making it somewhat of a demographically-dissimilar island not resembling much of
the existing demography of the United States. However, this trend may have subsided because
the subsequent states—Indiana (1816), Mississippi (1817), Illinois (1818), Alabama (1819),
76
The following two figures contain two axes, unlike the previous figure. This is merely for the purposes of demonstrating
correlation between the variables (as the nominal values within the European Union case are already nominally comparable). No
intention exists here to skew the interpretation of the reader.
77
In Figure 4 and several other figures throughout this study, when the polynomial regression (of the 2nd order) fit the data more
precisely than linear regressions (according to the regression coefficient in the regression analysis—Appendix 1), polynomial
regressions are utilized.
78
“ States by Date of Statehood”. http://www.accuracyproject.org/usstatehood.html.
79
Historical Statistics. United States Census Bureau.
46
Maine (1820), and Missouri (1821) 80—were all introduced much more quickly than states in the
previous two decades, rapidly changing the population-base of the United States 81 and throwing
a wrench into the chain of Deutsch’s prescribed slow “process of social assimilation” necessary
to “create[] a homogenous transnational population.” 82 These facts support the information
contained in the social integration regression in Figure 4 below.
84.00%
8.00%
Political Integration Index
83.00%
7.00%
Social Integration Index
82.00%
6.00%
81.00%
5.00%
80.00%
4.00%
79.00%
3.00%
78.00%
2.00%
77.00%
1.00%
76.00%
0.00%
1780 1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840
Social Integration Level
Political Integration Level
Figure 4: Social Homogeneity vs. Political Integration
US, 1790-1830
Poly. (Political Integration
Index)
Poly. (Social Integration
Index)
When social integration increases on
this grid, remember that it means the
"difference" is increasing. Thus, an
increase in the social integration index
is actually a decrease in social
integration.
This figure’s data originated from Appendix 1.3b.
80
“States by Date of Statehood”. http://www.accuracyproject.org/usstatehood.html.
Indiana and Illinois very closely resembled the racial and urban-rural breakdown of Ohio and Virginia. Alabama and
Mississippi very closely resembled Georgia and South Carolina. Maine was created from territory previously comprising
Massachusetts80. (Historical Statistics, United States Census Bureau).
82
Fisher, William. “An Analysis of the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigm of Political Integration”. 1969. Page 254.
81
47
United States Post-Civil War Period
Table 10: United States Post-Civil War Social Integration Level Calculation
United States Post-Civil
War Period
Percentage
of Urban
Population
Percentage
of Rural
Population
Percentage
of Whites
in
Population
Percentage
of Blacks in
Population
Percentage
of “Others”
in
Population
12.40%
86.66%
83.01%
16.46%
0.00%
15.28%
71.78%
84.31%
15.69%
0.00%
Average Member-State
15.97%
84.30%
87.29%
14.45%
0.49%
United States
19.77%
80.23%
85.62%
14.13%
0.25%
Average Member-State
21.71%
81.11%
84.89%
14.45%
0.63%
United States
24.87%
71.97%
84.36%
12.26%
0.22%
Average Member-State
25.12%
74.46%
84.66%
14.50%
0.86%
United States
28.17%
71.83%
86.54%
13.12%
0.34%
Average Member-State
32.20%
67.49%
82.77%
13.76%
0.90%
United States
35.12%
64.88%
87.53%
11.90%
0.57%
Social
Integration
Level
United States, 1850
Average Member-State
(see Appendix 5.2 for a list
of included states)
United States
United States, 1860
United States, 1870
United States, 1880
United States, 1890
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States. U.S. Census Bureau.
19.83%
10.10%
15.43%
9.47%
12.49%
The relationship between these two variables in this case is statistically significant, as can
be seen in the regression analysis found in Appendix 1.3c. A trend appears that as the
demographic difference between the post-Civil War United States and its average member-state
decreases, the corresponding level of political integration increases, as demonstrated by the
slopes of the linear regressions in Figure 5 below. In other words, as the demographic breakdown
of the average member-state began to more closely resemble the demographic breakdown of the
entire United States, the supranational political institutions experienced a strengthening of trust
from the citizenry (as demonstrated by their contribution to its budget revenue).
48
Much of the variance in social homogeneity during this period could be attributed to the
changing definition of citizenship in the United States following the American Civil War. The
Fourteenth Amendment (ratified in 1868) reads:
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States…without due process of law; nor deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 83
This, of course, was met with resistance by many southern political elites because this definition
denied many long-held traditions of southern polities. However, with this language, a standard
definition of citizenship was gradually institutionalized, and “personhood” was extended to
people of all races 84. This equalized reporting techniques, which could explain the dramatic jump
in social integration between 1870 and 1880.
25.00%
90.00%
80.00%
20.00%
70.00%
60.00%
15.00%
50.00%
40.00%
10.00%
30.00%
20.00%
5.00%
10.00%
0.00%
0.00%
1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900
Social Integration Index
Social Integration Level
Political Integration Level
Figure 5: Social Homogeneity vs. Political Integration
US, 1850-1890
Political Integration Index
Linear (Political Integration
Index)
Linear (Social Integration
Index)
When social integration increases on
this grid, remember that it means the
"difference" is increasing. Thus, an
increase in the social integration index
is actually a decrease in social
integration.
This figure’s data originated from Appendix 1.3c.
83
The Heritage Guide to the Constitution. Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2005. Print.
Reverting the Supreme Court’s opinion in the Dred Scott Decision that a slave could not possess rights because a slave
constituted property and not personhood.
84
49
European Union
Table 11: European Union Social Integration Level Calculation
European Union
Percentage
of
Population
under Age 15
Percentage of
Population
over Age 65
∑₁=20.2%
Ω₁ =13.4%
W₁=20.0%
Y₁=14.0%
European Union, 1990
Average Member-State
∑₁=19.0%
Ω₁ =14.3%
European Union
W₁=18.0%
Y₁=14.0%
European Union, 1995
Average Member-State
∑₁=18.3%
Ω₁ =14.9%
European Union
W₁=18.0%
Y₁=15.4%
European Union, 2000
Average Member-State
∑₁=17.7%
Ω₁ =15.6%
European Union
W₁=17.0%
Y₁=16.3%
European Union, 2005
Average Member-State
∑₁=17.0%
Ω₁ =16.2%
European Union
W₁=16.3%
Y₁=17.0%
European Union, 1985
Average Member-State
(see Appendix 5.1 for a list of included
Member-states in the EU-15)
European Union
Difference in
Demographic
Population 1
Difference in
Demographic
Population 2
Social
Integration
Level
ξ₁=0.200%
α₁=0.600%
0.800%
ξ₁=1.000%
α₁=0.267%
1.267%
ξ₁=0.267%
α₁=0.480%
0.747%
ξ₁=0.667%
α₁=0.687%
1.353%
ξ₁=0.707%
α₁=0.827%
1.533%
Source: Eurostat Yearbooks. (1995, 2002, 2004, 2008)
For purposes of discussion, all letters and symbols have no significant mathematical meaning besides descriptive symbolism.
For the purposes of this discussion, it is important to remember that since the social
integration index represents the difference between the average member-states demography and
that of the European Union, that a higher value represents a lower level of social integration.
Therefore, by the linear regressions on the graph below, it is easy to see that, as the level of
social integration is decreases (signifying by the increase in the demographic difference), so too
does the level of political integration. Appendix 1.3a shows the results of the statistical
50
regression performed between these two factors. Figure 6 below shows the inverse relationship
between these two variables.
Figure 6: Social Integration v. Political Integration
EU, 1985-2005
3.000%
Social Integration (negative
is positive)
R² = 0.1934
2.500%
Political Integration
2.000%
1.500%
1.000%
R² = 0.4959
0.500%
0.000%
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
When social integration increases on
this grid, remember that it means the
"difference" is increasing. Thus, an
increase in the social integration index
is actually a decrease in social
integration.
This figure’s data originated from Appendix 1.3a.
Eurobarometer data confirms the trend in social dis-integration of the European Union.
The Eurobarometer survey has asked a question since 1992 to gauge EU citizens’ perceptions
about their individual nationality—whether they characterize themselves as “European”,
according to their nationality (i.e. “French” or “British”), or a hybrid of both. As seen in the chart
below (constructed and provided by the European Union), in 1992, 38 percent of the citizens
described themselves solely according to their nationality. In the most recent survey in June of
2010, that number increased to 46 percent identifying themselves solely as “Czech” or “Belgian”
or other nationalities. 85 Also of note, nearly 50 percent of those surveyed considered themselves
somewhat European (“Nationality and European” below) in 1992, but that number dropped to
around 40 percent by 2010. This trend counteracts Deutsch’s definition of social integration as
developing “homogenous transnational populations”, and confirms this study’s findings that
social homogeneity in the European Union has decreased (concurrently with political
integration).
85
Eurobarometer Data. Thanks to the European Union for use of this chart.
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showchart_line.cfm?keyID=266&nationID=16,&startdate=1992.04&enddate=2010.06
51
Conclusions about Social Integration
All three of these cases confirmed the notion that a homogenizing transnational
population is correlated to increased levels of political integration. Additionally, the data for
these cases was solid, with all three cases containing statistically significant results. As seen in
Compound Table 1 below, this variable received the highest possible total correlation score
possible in this study.
This case confirmed many of Karl Deutsch’s arguments stating that social integration, in
terms of social assimilation to develop a transnational population, is almost a necessary
prerequisite to achieve positive political integration. While this case study cannot specifically say
52
that social homogeneity directly causes increased levels of political integration, it is clear that
there is a strong correlation between the two variables.
Compound Table 1, Correlation between Social Integration and Political Integration
Case Study
1: Do Increases in Social
2: Is this Case Statistically
Integration Correspond to
Significant In Terms Of PIncreases in Political
Values and Standard Error?
Integration?
Correlation
Score 86
United States
(post-Constitution)
Yes
Yes
+1
United States
(post-Civil War)
Yes
Yes
+1
European Union
Yes
Yes
+1
Total Correlation Score
+3
Economic Interconnectedness and Its Effect upon Political Integration
In the section that follows, the effects of interconnected economic relationships are
assessed in terms of their resulting levels of political integration. As in the previous section,
tables and graphs are used to illustrate the economic figures and regression relationships between
these two variables. At the close of this section, directions of these regressions are compiled to
determine whether or not “economic interconnectedness” as a variable is correlated to political
integration.
86
If questions 1 and 2 both receive a yes answer, the correlation score for that case is “+1”. If question 1 receives no and
question 2 receives a yes, the correlation score for that case is “-1”. If question 2 receives a negative response and question 1
receives either a positive or a negative, the score is “N/A”, which neither contributes to, nor detracts from, the Total Correlation
Score.
53
United States Post-Constitutional Period
Table 12: American (1790-1830) Economic Interconnectedness Level Calculation
United States (1790-1830)
Exports to 3 Largest Trading Partners
(list of partners available in App. 3.2)
American G.D.P.
Exports to 3 Largest Trading Partners
American G.D.P.
Exports to 3 Largest Trading Partners
American G.D.P.
Exports to 3 Largest Trading Partners
American G.D.P.
Exports to 3 Largest Trading Partners
American G.D.P.
Nominal Value (in $)
United States, 1790
LTP=$13,000,000.00
$288,000,000.00
United States, 1800
LTP=$41,000,000.00
$519,000,000.00
United States, 1810
LTP=$38,000,000.00
$827,000,000.00
United States, 1820
LTP=$45,000,000.00
$832,000,000.00
United States, 1830
LTP=$46,000,000.00
$1,113,000,000.00
How Many Times Larger is
Domestic Trade than Trade
with Largest Trading Partners
Economic
Interconn.
Level
η =GDP/(LTP)
η =22.154
η =GDP/(LTP)
η =12.659
η =GDP/(LTP)
η =21.763
η =GDP/(LTP)
η =18.489
η =GDP/(LTP)
η =24.196
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States. U.S. Census Bureau. LTP=Largest Trading Partners.
Figure 7 below shows the regressions fitting the above data. It indicates an inverse
relationship between these two factors, which suggests that increasing economic
interconnectedness does not correlate to political integration. However, this data is statistically
insignificant, as the magnitude of the standard error coefficient is larger than the magnitude
regression coefficient. Therefore, while a trend can be seen below, this study cannot adequately
utilize this data in order to draw thorough conclusions.
Since this relationship is not statistically significant and will not be included in the final
analysis, other historical context is unnecessary to include.
54
84.00%
83.00%
25
82.00%
20
81.00%
80.00%
15
79.00%
10
78.00%
5
77.00%
Political Integration Level
Economic Interconnectedness Level
30
Figure 7: Economic Interconnectedness v. Political Integration
US, 1790-1830
Economic
Interconnectedness Level
Political Integration Level
Linear (Economic
Interconnectedness Level)
Linear (Political Integration
Level)
76.00%
0
1780 1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840
This figure’s data originated from Appendix 1.1b.
United States Post-Civil War Period
Table 13: American (1850-1890) Economic Interconnectedness Level Calculation
United States (1850-1890)
Exports to 3 Largest Trading Partners
(list of partners available in App. 3.3)
American G.D.P.
Exports to 3 Largest Trading Partners
American G.D.P.
Exports to 3 Largest Trading Partners
American G.D.P.
Exports to 3 Largest Trading Partners
American G.D.P.
Exports to 3 Largest Trading Partners
American G.D.P.
Nominal Value (in $)
United States, 1850
LTP=$94,000,000.00
$2,537,000,000.00
United States, 1860
LTP=$223,000,000.00
$4,485,000,000.00
United States, 1870
LTP=$336,000,000.00
$8,153,000,000.00
United States, 1880
LTP=$611,000,000.00
$11,942,000,000.00
United States, 1890
LTP=$584,000,000.00
$14,513,000,000.00
How Many Times Larger is
Domestic Trade than Trade
with Largest Trading Partners
Economic
Interconn.
Level
η =GDP/(LTP)
η =26.989
η =GDP/(LTP)
η =20.112
η =GDP/(LTP)
η =24.265
η =GDP/(LTP)
η =19.545
η =GDP/(LTP)
η =24.851
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States. U.S. Census Bureau.
55
Graphical linear regressions in Figure 8 below seem to indicate an inverse relationship
between economic interconnectedness and political integration, thus chipping away at the theory
that economic ties lead directly to political integration. However, again, the magnitude of the
standard error coefficient is greater than that of the regression coefficient and therefore this data
cannot be utilized as a determining factor in assessing the relationship between economic
interconnectedness and political integration.
Again, as this relationship is not statistically significant and will not be included in
aggregate analysis, no further historical discussion is necessary.
US, 1850-1890
85.00%
28
26
80.00%
24
75.00%
22
20
70.00%
18
65.00%
16
60.00%
14
55.00%
12
10
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
Political Integration Level
Economic Interconnectedness Level
Figure 8: Economic Interconnectedness v. Political Integration
50.00%
1900
Economic
Interconnectedness
Level
Political Integration
Level
Linear (Economic
Interconnectedness
Level)
Linear (Political
Integration Level)
This figure’s data originated from Appendix 1.1c.
56
European Union
Table 14: European Economic Interconnectedness Level Calculation
European Union
Average Imports from EU
Average Exports to EU
European Union, 1989
Average Member-State
δ₁ = 58.43%
μ₁ = 59.86%
59.1429%
δ₁ = 64.31%
μ₁ = 65.37%
64.8429%
δ₁ = 66.32%
μ₁ = 65.66%
65.9900%
δ₁ = 66.32%
μ₁ = 69.41%
68.6934%
(see Appendix 3.1 for a full
listing of member-states)
European Union, 1994
Average Member-State
European Union, 1999
Average Member-State
European Union, 2004
Average Member-State
European Union, 2009
Average Member-State
Economic
Interconn.
Level
δ₁ = 65.77%
μ₁ = 66.63%
66.2039%
Source: Eurostat Yearbooks.
The information above only dates between 1989 and 2009 because of the lack of EU budgetary compilations before 1990.
However, in the graph below, extra economic data available through Eurostat is listed.
Figure 9 below shows the inverse relationship between economic interconnectedness and
political integration, demonstrating that, while trade between EU member-states increased, the
level of political integration decreased, indicating that in this case, increased economic
interconnectedness did not correlate to increased levels of political integration. 87 This data is
statistically significant and thus it will constitute our only usable case study between these two
variables.
87
It is important to note that in the regression process, the political integration figures were compared to the
previous year’s economic interconnectedness numbers, mainly because of the larger availability of economic
indicators in years with European Parliament elections.
57
0.0255
0.025
0.6
0.0245
0.024
0.0235
0.4
0.023
0.0225
0.2
0.022
0.0215
0
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
Political Integration Level
Economic Interconnectedness Level
Figure 9: Economic Interconnectedness vs. Political Integration
EU, 1979-2009
Economic Interconnectedness Level
Political Integration Level
Linear (Economic Interconnectedness
Level)
Linear (Political Integration Level)
0.021
2020
This figure’s data originated from Appendix 1.1a.
One of the European Union’s (and European Community’s) founding principles was the
development of an internal market between all member-states. Often, the primary justification
for voluntarily yielding state political sovereignty is the resulting free movement of goods,
services, persons, and capital in the European Union’s internal market. Much of the growth in
economic interconnectedness over the past three decades can be attributed to the EU’s emphasis
on the free movement of capital, according to Desmond Dinan of George Mason University, who
argues that
“[r]eal capital mobility has increased worldwide since 1988, and the EU has been able to
attract rising foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, especially owing to increasing
intra-EU flows.” 88
In the table below (constructed and provided by the European Union’s Eurobarometer service 89),
public opinion tracking between 1983 and the present day indicates the levels of economic
88
Desmond Dinan, Encyclopedia of the European Union, pg. 155. 1998.
58
benefit perceived by individuals in the European Union. Albeit an unscientific measure to gauge
actual economic benefits and interconnectedness, this data shows that, especially since the Treaty
of Maastricht institutionalized the European Union’s institutions (in 1993/4), a general upward
trend in this poll indicates that European citizens are noticing more benefits from the Common
Market and economic interconnectedness, potentially as the result of the higher magnitude of
economic interconnectedness measured in this study.
89
Eurobarometer Data. Thanks to the European Union for use of this chart.
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showchart_line.cfm?keyID=6&nationID=16,&startdate=1983.04&enddate=2010.06
59
Conclusions about Economic Interconnectedness
Again, a wide range of statistically-significant and –insignificant indicators are unearthed
in this study. Although two of our case studies lacked statistically-significant correlations, all
three cases demonstrated that economic interconnectedness had an inverse relationship with
corresponding political integration. However, because two of our case studies were unusable, the
validity of these results may not be generalizable past these specific cases.
This finding undermines the neofunctionalist “spill-over” theory because, in these cases,
closer economic ties did not spillover to incite closer political ties. One possible explanation for
this departure from the spillover theory could be explained by intergovernmentalists, who would
argue that political integration is driven by political elites and compelling national interests—
largely unrelated to aggregated individual economic and commercial decisions.
Compound Table 2, Correlation between Economic Interconnectedness and Political Integration
Case Study
Do Increases in Economic
Is this Case Statistically
Correlation Score
Interconnectedness
Significant In Terms Of PCorrespond to Increases in
Values and Standard Error?
Political Integration?
United States
(post-Constitution)
No
No
N/A
United States
(post-Civil War)
No
No
N/A
European Union
No
Yes
-1
Total Correlation Score
-1
60
Constitutionalism and Its Effect upon Political Integration
In the section that follows, the effects of constitutionalism (quantified through increasing
supranational voter turnout) are assessed in terms of its resulting levels of political integration.
As in the previous section, tables and graphs are used to illustrate the constitutionalism figures
and regression relationships between these two variables. Then, the directional relationships are
coded to ascertain the total correlation score.
United States Post-Constitutional Period
Table 15: United States (1790-1820) Constitutionalism Level Calculation
United States (1790-1820)
Combined Member-States
(see Appendix 4.2 for all states)
United States Elections
Combined Member-States
United States Elections
Combined Member-States
United States Elections
Combined Member-States
United States Elections
Total Voter Turnout in
Most Recent Elections
United States, 1790
73,100
Percentage of
Combined Vote Totals
Constitutionalism
Level
48,688
United States, 1800
204,425
205,270
United States, 1810
427,994
336,818
United States, 1820
559,860
465,245
39.98%
λ=39.98%
50.10%
λ=50.10%
44.04%
λ=44.04%
45.39%
λ=45.39%
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States. U.S. Census Bureau. Data was collected for every Congressional election in this
30 year period, but space limitations do not allow complete reprinting within this text. Therefore, only the results of elections
occurring in years in which political integration budget data was collected are reported here. However, that information is
included in the graph below and completely reprinted in Appendix 4.2.
This data set represents a picturesque set of time-series data indicators. For this time
period, there is an extraordinarily high level of relation between the two factors measured by the
regression. As seen in Figure 10 below (in which a “polynomial” regression line most adequately
demonstrated the near-identical movements across the large set of data). Significant correlation
61
exists in this example and in every instance in which the constitutionalism gained strength, a
corresponding increase in the level of political integration ensued, and vice versa.
Figure 10: Constitutionalism vs. Political Integration
US, 1790-1830
1
0.8
Constitutionalism Level
Political Integration
Level
0.6
Poly. (Constitutionalism
Level)
0.4
0.2
1780
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
Poly. (Political
Integration Level)
This figure’s data originated from Appendix 1.2b.
Scholars tend to confirm these observations. Skowronek contributes much of the rise in
national administrative capacity (loosely, our definition of political integration) to the growth in
size and importance of American political parties. Parties, Skowronek says, are tasked with
“solv[ing] the knotty operational problems of governing” 90. By doing so, these parties united
masses of people behind parties vying to most effectively govern—indicating an implied
acceptance of the government as valid. Skowronek describes another factor increasing American
constitutionalism, stating
“the idea of two parties competing on a continental scale…was first conceived in
America as a way to circumvent…factionalism within the national government.” 89
Thus, the rise of the two-party system—with masses of individuals competing en masse with
other groups of individuals based upon philosophies for governance—indicated an acceptance of
government as valid and worth seeking, confirming the general increase in constitutionalism
measured by this study over this period.
90
Skowronek, Stephen. “Building a New American State”, page 24.
62
United States Post-Civil War Period
Table 16: United States (1860-1890) Constitutionalism Level Calculation
United States (1860-1890)
Combined Member-States
(see Appendix 4.3 for all states)
United States Elections
Combined Member-States
United States Elections
Combined Member-States
United States Elections
Combined Member-States
United States Elections
Total Voter Turnout in
Most Recent Elections
United States, 1860
4,507,231
Percentage of
Combined Vote Totals
Constitutionalism
Level
4,692,710
United States, 1870*
6,109,220
6,091,692
United States, 1880
8,465,022
9,219,467
United States, 1890*
11,161,809
11,730,460
51.01%
λ=51.01%
49.93%
λ=49.93%
52.13%
λ=52.13%
51.24%
λ=51.24%
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States. U.S. Census Bureau. Data was collected for every Congressional election in this
30 year period, but space limitations do not allow complete reprinting within this text. Therefore, only the results of elections
occurring in years in which political integration budget data was collected are reported here. However, that information is
included in the graph below and completely reprinted in Appendix 4.3.*--in this example, presidential election results were used.
In the starred (‘*”) years, an average of the presidential elections from two years before and two years after are used for this
table and the regression. However, in the graph below, no estimates are necessary.
As can be seen in Figure 11 below, both variables continue throughout the time-series
with a positive slope, however the linear regression slope the constitutionalism dataset exceeds
that of the political integration dataset, indicating that dramatic increases in the level of
constitutionalism are correlated to smaller increases in the level of political integration.
As members of the southern states began returning to the Congress and again
participating in the functions of the federal government, common sense dictates that more
individuals would see the federal government as a worthwhile entity. Also, the influx of newlyenfranchised African-American voters—who added tremendously to the poll figures because of
their previous inability to do so (and ultimately became a much sought-after voting constituency
in the Reconstruction era)—who saw the inherent value of the American federal government (a
63
government that had most recently fought to end slavery) contributed to the increase in
constitutionalism during this timeframe. 91
Figure 11: Constitutionalism vs. Political Integration
US, 1850-1890
0.9
0.525
0.52
0.7
0.515
0.6
0.5
0.51
0.4
0.505
0.3
0.5
0.2
0.495
0.1
0
1850
Political Integration Level
Constitutionalism Level
Political Integration Level
0.8
1860
1870
1880
1890
0.49
1900
Constitutionalism Level
Linear (Political Integration
Level)
Linear (Constitutionalism
Level)
This figure’s data originated from Appendix 1.2c.
91
Donald, David Herbert. The Civil War and Reconstruction, 2001. Page 577-603.
64
European Union
Table 17: European Union Constitutionalism Level Calculation
European Union
Combined Member-States
(see Appendix 4.1 for a full listing
of member-states)
European Union
Combined Member-States
European Union
Combined Member-States
European Union
Combined Member-States
European Union
Combined Member-States
European Union
Total Voter Turnout in
Most Recent Elections
European Union, 1989
191,816,156
Percentage of
Combined Vote Totals
137,932,917
European Union, 1994
206,854,343
41.8297%
150,871,209
European Union, 1999
219,383,304
42.1751%
143,800,610
European Union, 2004
237,530,876
39.5944%
159,757,089
European Union, 2009
249,834,614
40.2119%
162,317,371
Constitutionalism
Level
58.1703%
λ=41.8297%
57.8249%
λ=42.1751%
60.4056%
λ=39.5944%
59.7881%
λ=40.2119%
60.6171%
39.3829%
λ=39.3829%
Source: Eurostat Yearbooks.
The information above only dates between 1989 and 2009 because of the lack of EU budgetary compilations before 1990.
However, in the graph below, extra European Parliament voter turnout data available through Eurostat (for the 1979 and 1984
elections) is listed.
In the case the European Union, although the level of constitutionalism seems to have
greatly increased over the past three decades, there was no subsequent increase in political
integration. In fact, as Figure 12 below demonstrates, these two variables have nearly a complete
inverse relationship, illustrating that as constitutionalism has increased within the European
Union, the corresponding levels of political integration have decreased.
65
Figure 12: Constitutionalism vs. Political Integration
0.43
0.026
0.42
0.025
0.024
0.41
0.023
0.4
0.39
1970
0.022
1980
1990
2000
2010
0.021
2020
Constitutionalism Level
Political Integration Level
Constitutionalism Level
EU, 1979-2009
Political Integration Level
Linear (Constitutionalism
Level)
Linear (Political
Integration Level)
This figure’s data originated from Appendix 1.2a.
Data from the Eurobarometer survey indicates that constitutionalism has increased at
both the supranational and national level since the Treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1993. As
seen in the first chart below (constructed and provided by the European Union’s Eurobarometer
service), when asked as to their satisfaction with European democracy, Europeans have
illustrated increased satisfaction both by answering “very satisfied” and “fairly satisfied” more
often, as well as by gradually decreasing their “not very satisfied” and “not at all satisfied”
responses. Nearly identical results exist in the table below, in which Europeans list their
satisfaction with their national democracies. These trends illustrate a general increase in the level
of constitutionalism, which confirms this study’s research findings.
66
Conclusions about Constitutionalism
Reaching the last of the three examined factors in this study, it appears that
constitutionalism is another concept whose presence seems to relate to elevated levels of political
integration across varied cases. As seen in Compound Table 3 below, the aggregated results of
this study’s inquiry into constitutionalism showed that in two-thirds of the cases, increases in
constitutionalism corresponded to increases in political integration, resulted in a summative
scored value of “+1”.
67
Compound Table 3, Correlation between Constitutionalism and Political Integration
Case Study
Do Increases in
Is this Case Statistically
Constitutionalism
Significant In Terms Of PCorrespond to Increases in
Values and Standard Error?
Political Integration?
Correlation Score
United States
(post-Constitution)
Yes
Yes
+1
United States
(post-Civil War)
Yes
Yes
+1
European Union
No
Yes
-1
Total Correlation Score
+1
Results and Implications
Brief Overview of Results
This study reveals a plethora of useful information for the study of political integration.
Two of the variables measured—constitutionalism and social integration—lead to an increase in
the level of political integration within a supranational entity. However, this study has
demonstrated (albeit with little grounding in statistical significance), that economic
interconnectedness does not possess as great of a correlation to political integration, and may
even have an inverse relationship with it.
This study seems to confirm Deutsch’s understanding of social assimilation and its
necessity as a prerequisite for political integration. In each case studied, Deutsch’s model was
validated, with increasing levels of social homogeneity—the drive towards the development of
“homogenous transnational populations”—yielding increased degrees of political integration. In
68
this study, it appears that the old cliché “birds of a feather flock together” holds up—with semisovereign entities as birds and supranational organizations as flocks.
However, the level of constitutionalism also showed a direct relation to corresponding
political integration. In nearly every example of regional integration that comes to mind, some
kind of guiding principle (codified or not) is usually involved in the process of bringing people
and nations together. Without a common purpose and shared principles (which, after all, are the
core components of any legitimate constitutional system based upon the rule of law), this study
proves that a lasting trajectory of continued political union is significantly less likely.
Supranational voter turnout, as this study’s bell-weather for constitutionalism, could be
interpreted to indicate an acceptance of some central guiding principle—that the central
government is important, legitimate, and worth the time spent in participating in it.
The apparent inverse relationship between economic interconnectedness and political
integration is puzzling. Conventional wisdom (and the foundations upon which the European
Community was built) dictates that already-close trading partners are more likely to integrate
than nations with no economic ties to one another. However, when viewed through modern
examples, just because the United States and China and the United States and Japan,
respectively, have two of the largest trading relationships in the world does not necessarily
indicate that these three nations will institute the formation of supranational political entities.
So, to address the research questions posed initially in the research design, both social
homogeneity and constitutionalism have demonstrated positive correlations to political
integration. Conversely, the economic interconnectedness index utilized in this study was shown
to negatively correlate to the level of political integration.
69
Implications for the European Union
In addition to discovering some of the root causes of political integration, this study
illustrates that the European Union has progressed a great deal in terms of social homogeneity
and economic interconnectedness. Supranational emphasis on the free movement of goods,
persons, services, and financial capital—and the supranational government’s rigorous pursuit of
an internal market with no physical or fiscal barriers—have made the European Union one of the
largest markets in the world and, according to the International Monetary Fund, currently, the
world’s largest economy.
Nonetheless, does this increasingly-solidified internal market necessarily serve as a bellweather for future European political integration? As this research has exhibited, since the Treaty
of Maastricht, the level of political integration within the European Union has experienced a
generally negative trend. However, in recent years, all three measured variables—social
homogeneity, economic interconnectedness, and constitutionalism—have experienced significant
growth, which seems to imply, according to our models, that a subsequent spike in political
integration may be more likely to occur (at least in relation to the two positive variables), thus
elevating the European Union’s power and influence and potentially contributing to Spinelli’s
vision of a more institutionalized, federal Europe.
However, a great opportunity still remains for European leaders to capitalize on united
Europe’s celebrated accomplishments (including world-leading environmental policies) to rally
the European population behind a common cause. One of the leading indicators of political
integration 92 is political identity and, according to 2006 Eurobarometer polling information, only
seventeen percent of European Union citizens “often” thought of themselves as “Europeans” in
92
Which, because of limited time, unfortunately was unable to be discussed at great length in this study as it deserves.
70
addition to their individual nationalities. 93 If political integration is to continue, European
institutions must enliven their citizenries, continuously reminding their people of the common
political principles that exist between them and ensuring that individuals begin thinking of
themselves as one homogenous, transnational population of Europeans. Without an increased
level of constitutionalism within the European Union, which could be attained in a variety of
ways, chiefly among them another attempt to establish a true “Constitution of Europe” by
reopening the 2007 failed negotiations on the proposed supranational constitution as well as
increasing student exchange programs and expanding supranational trade associations 94 to
increase the level of social homogeneity, the future prospects of European political integration
will be uncertain and, as Europeans enter a new decade, established, politically-united
supranational Goliaths will surely write the next chapter of history.
Implications for All Politically-Integrating Entities
As the world economy (both political and pecuniary) continues to globalize, hegemonic
superpowers like the United States, China, Japan, and the European Union are likely to remain
the worldwide opinion and policy leaders. However, regional economic and political unions
continue to form across the globe to combat the dominion of global economic and governmental
giants. The African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the
Organization of American States—all following in the European Union’s footsteps of pooling
national economies 95 to equalize the economic playing field in a global market dominated by
leviathans—should take this study’s results into consideration as their leaders plan for a new
century of continued integration. Establishing transnational, homogenous social groups should be
93
Eurobarometer Question 39. June 2006.
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showchart_column.cfm?keyID=265&nationID=16,&startdate=2005.10&enddate=2006.09
94
Identified by Deutsch as two factors contributing to social integration.
95
However, obviously, not yet to the degree as the European Union.
71
paramount policy priorities for these organizations. As this study’s results indicate, securing and
promulgating a central, uniting force (whether that lies in supranational political institutions or
merely a statement of principles) to advance constitutionalism can result in unparalleled political
growth.
Disintegrating entities also should take this study’s findings into serious consideration. In
Spain and Canada, significant factions exist with individualized, segregated cultures and
languages. This study’s findings regarding social homogeneity indicate that those nations will
likely continue on a path of reverse political integration if events do not transpire to unite the
population. Nations whose constitutional principles have begun to erode, like Iraq and
Afghanistan whose fledgling democracies have been undermined by widespread greed and
corruption of government officials, must reaffirm their commitment to constitutionalism and the
rule of law; or else, dire disintegrative circumstances will surely befall them.
Recommendations for Future Scholars
This study’s author understands that this study represents but a first step in the
comparative studies of political integration between the United States and the European Union.
As such, only a relative few variables could be studied in-depth. However, this should not be
construed as confining political science knowledge, as significant other variables may have
measurable effects upon the level of political integration. This study recommends a continued
exploration of these variables, especially the concepts of external diplomatic pressures and war
and conflict, both of which could lead (and have led) to instances of political integration. While
this study has made several concrete contributions to knowledge, further studies of these two
variables are necessary to get a fuller picture of the roots causes of political integration.
72
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76
Appendix 1: Regression Analyses
Appendix 1.1: Economic Interconnectedness’s Effect on Political Integration
Appendix 1.1a: European Union (seen in Figure 9)
SUMMARY
OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.882861678
R Square
0.779444742
Adjusted R Square
0.669167114
Standard Error
0.000912207
Observations
4
ANOVA
df
SS
Regression
1
5.88145E-06
Residual
2
1.66424E-06
Total
3
7.54569E-06
Coefficients
Intercept
0.591428571
Standard
Error
MS
5.88145E06
8.32121E07
t Stat
F
Significance
F
7.068022328
0.117138322
P-value
Lower 95%
Upper
95%
Lower
95.0%
Upper
95.0%
0.08048
0.02158
3.72870
0.06499
-0.01239
0.17335
-0.01239
0.17335
-0.08636
0.03248
-2.65858
0.11714
-0.22612
0.05340
-0.22612
0.05340
Appendix 1.1b: United States Post-Constitution (1790-1830) (seen in Figure 7)
SUMMARY
OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.75679
R Square
0.57273
Adjusted R Square
0.35910
Standard Error
0.02152
Observations
4
ANOVA
df
SS
MS
F
Significance
F
77
Regression
1
0.00124
0.00124
Residual
2
0.00093
0.00046
Total
3
0.00217
Coefficients
Intercept
22.15384615
Standard
Error
2.68088
t Stat
P-value
0.24321
Lower 95%
Upper
95%
Lower
95.0%
Upper
95.0%
0.86896
0.04915
17.68077
0.00318
0.65749
1.08042
0.65749
1.08042
-0.00407
0.00249
-1.63734
0.24321
-0.01478
0.00663
-0.01478
0.00663
Appendix 1.1c: United States Post-Civil War (1850-1890) (seen in Figure 8)
SUMMARY
OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.4066
R Square
0.1653
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
-0.2520
0.0743
Observations
4
ANOVA
df
SS
MS
F
0.3961
Regression
1
0.0022
0.0022
Residual
2
0.0111
0.0055
Total
3
0.0132
Coefficients
Intercept
26.9893617
Standard
Error
t Stat
Pvalue
Significance
F
0.5934
Lower 95%
Upper
95%
Lower
95.0%
Upper
95.0%
0.5354
0.3483
1.5374
0.2640
-0.9630
2.0338
-0.9630
2.0338
0.0098
0.0156
0.6294
0.5934
-0.0573
0.0770
-0.0573
0.0770
Appendix 1.2: Constitutionalism’s Effect on Political Integration
Appendix 1.2a: European Union (seen in Figure 12)
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.7475208
R Square
0.5587874
Adjusted R Square
0.3381811
78
Standard Error
0.0012902
Observations
4
ANOVA
df
SS
Regression
1
4.22E-06
Residual
2
3.33E-06
Total
3
7.55E-06
Coefficients
Intercept
0.395944326
Standard
Error
MS
4.22E06
1.66E06
F
2.53E+00
t Stat
P-value
Significance
F
2.52E-01
Lower 95%
Upper
95%
Lower
95.0%
Upper
95.0%
-0.05043
0.04621
1.09125
0.38909
-0.24925
0.14840
-0.24925
0.14840
0.17601
0.11059
1.59153
0.25248
-0.29982
0.65183
-0.29982
0.65183
Appendix 1.2b: United States Post-Constitution (1790-1830) (seen in Figure 10)
SUMMARY
OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.90441507
R Square
0.81796662
Adjusted R Square
0.63593323
Standard Error
0.01936434
Observations
3
ANOVA
df
SS
MS
F
Significance
F
0.002
4E04
4.4935
0.280615361
t Stat
P-value
Lower 95%
Regression
1
0.001684962
Residual
1
0.000374978
Total
2
0.00205994
Coefficients
Intercept
0.399776661
Standard
Error
0.36946651
0.200300955
1.845
0.31626
0.91150489
0.429998297
2.12
0.28062
2.175598426
4.552141509
Upper 95%
2.91453145
6.3751513
Lower
95.0%
2.17559843
4.55214151
Upper 95.0%
2.914531449
6.375151298
79
Appendix 1.2c: United States Post-Civil War (1850-1890) (seen in Figure 11)
SUMMARY
OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.4290
R Square
0.1840
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
-0.6319
0.0326
Observations
3
ANOVA
df
SS
F
0.2255
Regression
1
0.0002
0.0002
Residual
1
0.0011
0.0011
Total
2
0.0013
Standard
Error
Coefficients
Intercept
1.04115143
1.0369
0.5310
-0.2409
0.5072
Significance
F
MS
t Stat
1.9529
0.4749
Pvalue
0.7177
Lower 95%
Upper
95%
Lower
95.0%
Upper
95.0%
0.3013
-5.7096
7.7833
-5.7096
7.7833
0.7177
-6.6854
6.2036
-6.6854
6.2036
Appendix 1.3: Social Homogeneity’s Effect on Political Integration
Appendix 1.3a: European Union (seen in Figure 6)
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.9987975
R Square
0.9975965
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
0.995193
0.0001347
Observations
3
ANOVA
df
SS
MS
F
Significance
F
415.05624
0.0312233
Regression
1
7.525E-06
7.525E-06
Residual
1
1.813E-08
1.813E-08
Total
2
7.543E-06
80
Intercept
0.012666667
Coefficients
Standard
Error
t Stat
P-value
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
Lower
95.0%
Upper
95.0%
0.0287961
0.0002904
99.169397
0.0064193
0.0251066
0.0324856
0.0251066
0.0324856
-0.4706248
0.0231005
-20.372929
0.0312233
-0.7641445
-0.1771052
-0.7641445
-0.1771052
Appendix 1.3b: United States Post-Constitution (1790-1830) (seen in Figure 4)
SUMMARY
OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.16732
R Square
0.02800
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
-0.45801
0.03245
Observations
4
ANOVA
df
SS
MS
F
0.05760
Regression
1
0.00006
0.00006
Residual
2
0.00211
0.00105
Total
3
0.00217
Coefficients
Intercept
0.054340614
Standard
Error
t Stat
P-value
Significance
F
0.83268
Lower 95%
Upper
95%
Lower
95.0%
Upper
95.0%
0.79972
0.04195
19.06348
0.00274
0.61922
0.98022
0.61922
0.98022
-0.20665
0.86102
-0.24001
0.83268
-3.91132
3.49801
-3.91132
3.49801
Appendix 1.3c: United States Post-Civil War (1850-1890) (seen in Figure 5)
SUMMARY
OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.5096
R Square
0.2597
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations
-0.1104
0.0700
4
ANOVA
81
df
SS
MS
F
0.7018
Regression
1
0.0034
0.0034
Residual
2
0.0098
0.0049
Total
3
0.0132
Coefficients
Intercept
0.198315184
Standard
Error
t Stat
Pvalue
Significance
F
0.4904
Lower 95%
Upper
95%
Lower
95.0%
Upper
95.0%
0.6047
0.1809
3.3433
0.0790
-0.1735
1.3829
-0.1735
1.3829
-1.2522
1.4948
0.8377
0.4904
-5.1795
7.6839
-5.1795
7.6839
82
Appendix 2: Budget Figures
Appendix 2.1: EU Member-State Budget Revenues
Year
1990
1995
2000
2005
2009
Belgium
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Italy
Germany
France
Ireland
United Kingdom
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
€
67,580,000,000
€
95,210,000,000
€
123,734,500,000
€
149,466,000,000
€
163,260,000,000
Greece
Year
1990
1995
2000
2005
2009
Year
€
6,595,956,000
€
6,595,956,000
€
9,616,530,000
€
12,567,237,500
€
15,770,000,000
€
107,280,000,000
€
141,650,000,000
€
191,637,124,000
€
228,516,000,000
€
262,871,000,000
Revenue
€
36,224,864,000
€
36,224,864,000
€
59,221,201,000
€
75,200,056,800
€
88,836,350,400
€
329,850,000,000
€
344,150,000,000
€
536,957,587,000
€
626,111,933,400
€
708,181,225,200
€
482,280,000,000
€
815,250,000,000
€
956,130,000,000
€
975,357,000,000
€ 1,066,709,500,000
€
421,960,000,000
€
531,330,000,000
€
728,274,778,000
€
869,938,272,000
€
923,058,180,000
€
13,720,000,000
€
18,250,000,000
€
37,562,150,000
€
57,783,606,000
€
55,077,766,500
Denmark
Revenue
€
54,610,000,000
€
74,520,000,000
€
97,899,507,000
€
119,858,068,200
€
123,215,029,200
€
284,260,000,000
€
300,290,000,000
€
656,504,032,000
€
748,253,395,200
€
632,562,878,800
Spain
Portugal
Austria
Sweden
Finland
Malta
Cyprus
Estonia
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
€ 147,310,000,000
€ 18,830,000,000
€ 165,120,000,000
N/A
€
99,330,000,000
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
€ 34,264,072,000
N/A
€
80,510,000,000
€ 49,360,000,000
N/A
N/A
N/A
€ 241,899,643,000
€ 49,698,144,000
€ 105,174,796,000
€ 155,299,375,000
€ 72,916,620,000
€ 358,064,048,000
€ 61,337,631,600
€ 117,895,091,600
€ 166,481,141,400
€ 82,900,789,000
€ 376,247,298,000
€ 65,212,634,400
€ 133,868,404,000
€ 156,217,596,000
€ 91,245,869,000
N/A
€
2,002,915,200
€
2,351,981,400
N/A
€
5,627,631,600
€
6,744,388,600
N/A
€
3,935,958,400
€
388,102,400
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Slovenia
Hungary
Bulgaria
Romania
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
1990
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
1995
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
2000
N/A
€
4,580,294,400
€
6,303,158,000
N/A
€
6,845,392,800
€
9,145,156,500
N/A
€
96,301,519,400
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
€ 41,478,701,400
€ 13,548,163,200
€ 12,596,091,600
€ 37,465,533,000
N/A
N/A
€ 115,500,606,000
€ 55,138,923,000
€ 21,490,459,200
€ 15,286,060,800
€ 42,846,077,600
€ 12,540,875,200
€ 38,056,197,600
2005
2009
Appendix 3: Economic Integration Information
Appendix 3.1: European Union (EU-15) Import/Export Data
Source: Europa World Factbooks (1979, 2004,2009), Eurostat Yearbooks (1984, 1989, 1994, 1999)
Belgium
Denmark
Exports
to EU (%)
1979
Imports
from EU
(%)
67.04%
1984
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
74.05%
Imports
from EU
(%)
68.36%
Exports
to EU
(%)
66.66%
Imports
from EU
(%)
55.94%
Exports
to EU
(%)
59.39%
Imports
from EU
(%)
45.48%
Exports
to EU
(%)
48.95%
Imports
from EU
(%)
36.22%
Exports
to EU
(%)
50.14%
Imports
from EU
(%)
54.03%
Exports
to EU
(%)
58.37%
Imports
from EU
(%)
73.58%
Exports
to EU
(%)
78.73%
65.00%
70.00%
49.00%
45.00%
52.00%
50.00%
49.00%
55.00%
35.00%
52.00%
58.00%
53.00%
45.00%
48.00%
1989
69.00%
74.00%
52.00%
51.00%
53.00%
55.00%
62.00%
65.00%
57.00%
62.00%
65.00%
62.00%
57.00%
56.00%
1994
73.40%
75.80%
69.20%
64.90%
59.20%
58.00%
67.90%
69.60%
66.40%
66.40%
68.00%
63.40%
60.70%
66.60%
1999
71.00%
76.00%
69.80%
66.90%
56.90%
56.90%
66.20%
51.60%
68.70%
71.20%
66.60%
62.40%
62.10%
57.30%
2004
72.83%
77.04%
70.85%
70.61%
65.65%
64.56%
60.16%
64.21%
67.94%
74.35%
69.63%
65.98%
65.84%
62.88%
2009
71.06%
75.88%
69.75%
67.64%
65.10%
62.97%
64.31%
62.68%
61.48%
68.79%
69.17%
62.14%
65.52%
61.20%
Italy
Luxembourg
1979
Imports
from EU
(%)
48.23%
Exports
to EU
(%)
56.01%
Imports
from EU
(%)
N/A
Exports
to EU
(%)
N/A
1984
45.00%
48.00%
N/A
1989
57.00%
56.00%
1994
60.70%
57.50%
1999
60.80%
57.30%
2004
62.17%
2009
57.23%
Netherlands
Portugal
United Kingdom
Austria
Finland
Sweden
Imports
from EU
(%)
58.73%
Exports
to EU
(%)
76.06%
Imports
from EU
(%)
50.37%
Exports
to EU
(%)
65.80%
Imports
from EU
(%)
50.94%
Exports
to EU
(%)
49.65%
Imports
from EU
(%)
65.81%
Exports
to EU
(%)
56.02%
Imports
from EU
(%)
49.29%
Exports
to EU
(%)
56.33%
Imports
from EU
(%)
59.58%
Exports
to EU
(%)
57.02%
N/A
54.00%
75.00%
43.00%
63.00%
45.00%
47.00%
61.00%
55.00%
37.00%
38.00%
55.00%
49.00%
N/A
N/A
60.00%
76.00%
68.00%
71.00%
51.00%
50.00%
68.00%
64.00%
44.00%
43.00%
55.00%
53.00%
N/A
N/A
61.60%
78.30%
73.50%
80.00%
54.50%
57.60%
68.40%
64.80%
54.70%
56.80%
62.20%
55.50%
81.70%
85.40%
55.10%
79.50%
77.40%
82.80%
53.20%
58.60%
72.30%
62.90%
65.40%
57.70%
67.60%
58.40%
61.86%
75.97%
90.27%
53.16%
79.88%
77.13%
80.10%
56.04%
58.79%
82.74%
73.55%
67.35%
58.05%
72.18%
59.02%
57.44%
71.87%
87.53%
49.05%
77.38%
78.03%
74.86%
52.91%
55.13%
77.97%
71.79%
65.04%
55.59%
68.12%
58.50%
84
Appendix 3.2: United States Post-Constitution (1790-1830)
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States, US Census Bureau.
Colonial
1790
Domestic Trade (GDP)
(compounded) (1793--HS 5-671)
International Trade
2 Facets:
Trade with Neighbors
Neighbor 1
Neighbor 2
Neighbor 3
Neighbor 4
Trade with 3 Largest Trade Partners
Exports to United Kingdom
Exports to France
Exports to "Other Countries"
1800
Domestic Trade (GDP)
(compounded) (1800--HS 3-23)
International Trade
2 Facets:
Trade with Neighbors
Neighbor 1
Neighbor 2
Neighbor 3
Neighbor 4
Trade with 3 Largest Trade Partners
$
288,000,000.00
Total:
$
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
$
$
$
7,000,000.00
1,000,000.00
5,000,000.00
$
519,000,000.00
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Total:
$
Total:
$
Total:
-
13,000,000.00
-
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with Neighbors
#DIV/0!
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with LTPs
22.15384615
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with Neighbors
#DIV/0!
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with LTPs
85
Exports to United Kingdom
Exports to Germany
Exports to "Other European Countries"
1810
Domestic Trade (GDP)
(compounded)
International Trade
2 Facets:
Trade with Neighbors
Neighbor 1
Neighbor 2
Neighbor 3
Neighbor 4
Trade with 3 Largest Trade Partners
Exports to United Kingdom
Exports to Germany
Exports to "Other European Countries"
1820
Domestic Trade (GDP)
(compounded)
International Trade
2 Facets:
Trade with Neighbors
Neighbor 1
Neighbor 2
Neighbor 3
Neighbor 4
Trade with 3 Largest Trade Partners
Exports to United Kingdom
Exports to "Other European Countries"
$
$
$
19,000,000.00
8,000,000.00
14,000,000.00
$
827,000,000.00
Total:
$
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
$
$
$
12,000,000.00
2,000,000.00
24,000,000.00
$
832,000,000.00
Total:
$
Total:
$
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
$
$
$
24,000,000.00
13,000,000.00
Total:
$
41,000,000.00
-
38,000,000.00
-
45,000,000.00
12.65853659
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with Neighbors
#DIV/0!
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with LTPs
21.76315789
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with Neighbors
#DIV/0!
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with LTPs
18.48888889
86
Exports to France
$
8,000,000.00
$
1,113,000,000.00
1830
Domestic Trade (GDP)
(compounded)
International Trade
2 Facets:
Trade with Neighbors
Mexico
Canada
Cuba
Trade with 3 Largest Trade Partners
Exports to United Kingdom
Exports to France
Exports to "Other European Countries"
$
$
$
$
$
$
5,000,000.00
3,000,000.00
5,000,000.00
26,000,000.00
11,000,000.00
9,000,000.00
Total:
$
Total:
$
13,000,000.00
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with Neighbors
85.61538462
46,000,000.00
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with LTPs
24.19565217
87
Appendix 3.3: United States Post-Civil War (1850-1890)
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States, US Census Bureau.
Post-War
1850
Domestic Trade (GDP)
(compounded)
International Trade
2 Facets:
Trade with Neighbors
Canada
Mexico
Cuba
Trade with 3 Largest Trade Partners
Exports to United Kingdom
Exports to France
Exports to Germany
1860
Domestic Trade (GDP)
(compounded)
International Trade
2 Facets:
Trade with Neighbors
Canada
Mexico
Cuba
Trade with 3 Largest Trade Partners
Exports to United Kingdom
Exports to France
$
$
$
$
2,537,000,000.00
10,000,000.00
2,000,000.00
5,000,000.00
$
$
$
71,000,000.00
18,000,000.00
5,000,000.00
$
4,485,000,000.00
$
$
$
$
$
23,000,000.00
5,000,000.00
12,000,000.00
169,000,000.00
39,000,000.00
17,000,000.00
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with Neighbors
149.2352941
94,000,000.00
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with LTPs
26.9893617
40,000,000.00
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with Neighbors
112.125
Total:
$
223,000,000.00
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with LTPs
20.11210762
Total:
$
Total:
$
Total:
$
88
Exports to Germany
$
15,000,000.00
$
8,153,000,000.00
1870
Domestic Trade (GDP)
(compounded)
International Trade
2 Facets:
Trade with Neighbors
Canada
Mexico
Cuba
Trade with 3 Largest Trade Partners
Exports to United Kingdom
Exports to France
Exports to Germany
1880
Domestic Trade (GDP)
(compounded)
International Trade
2 Facets:
Trade with Neighbors
Canada
Mexico
Cuba
Trade with 3 Largest Trade Partners
Exports to United Kingdom
Exports to France
Exports to Germany
1890
$
$
$
$
$
$
25,000,000.00
6,000,000.00
14,000,000.00
248,000,000.00
46,000,000.00
42,000,000.00
45,000,000.00
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with Neighbors
181.1777778
Total:
$
336,000,000.00
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with LTPs
24.26488095
Total:
$
48,000,000.00
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with Neighbors
248.7916667
Total:
$
611,000,000.00
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with LTPs
19.54500818
Total:
$
$ 11,942,000,000.00
$
$
$
$
$
$
29,000,000.00
8,000,000.00
11,000,000.00
454,000,000.00
100,000,000.00
57,000,000.00
89
Domestic Trade (GDP)
(compounded)
International Trade
2 Facets:
Trade with Neighbors
Canada
Mexico
Cuba
$ 14,513,000,000.00
$
$
$
40,000,000.00
13,000,000.00
13,000,000.00
Trade with 3 Largest Trade Partners
Exports to United Kingdom
Exports to France
$
$
448,000,000.00
50,000,000.00
Exports to Germany
$
86,000,000.00
66,000,000.00
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with Neighbors
219.8939394
Total:
$
584,000,000.00
How Many Times Larger Domestic
Trade is than Trade with LTPs
24.8510274
Total:
$
90
Appendix 4: Constitutionalism Information
Appendix 4.1: European Union Voter Turnout Data
Source: Voter Turnout since 1945: A Global Report. (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2002)
92
93
94
95
Appendix 4.2: American Post-Constitution Voter Turnout Data
Source: A Statistical History of the American Electorate (Jerrold Rusk, 2001) and American Governors and Gubernatorial Elections, 1775-1978 (Roy Glashan, 1979)
Connecticut
Cong. El.
1788
Delaware
State El.
-
5,604
Cong. El.
Georgia
State El.
2,059
-
Cong. El.
Kentucky
State El.
Cong. El.
Maryland
State El.
Cong. El.
Massachusetts
State El.
Cong. El.
State El.
-
2,878
-
-
-
7,885
-
11,509
22,157
-
1,954
-
-
-
17,173
-
14,235
16,518
5,488
-
-
-
16,733
-
1790
2,969
3,290
1792
3,303
4,924
4,516
4,569
1794
3,575
3,772
4,694
4,569
3,780
-
-
-
16,066
-
16,092
23,454
1796
2,897
7,773
4,071
4,494
10,241
-
-
-
12,560
-
17,300
26,493
1798
4,956
7,075
4,564
4,743
7,166
-
9,976
-
22,437
-
22,859
24,259
1800
9,285
5,554
5,014
4,743
8,616
-
21,876
21,296
14,903
-
30,369
39,059
1802
8,743
16,314
6,827
6,932
10,677
-
14,637
21,296
20,936
-
32,824
49,583
1804
9,956
19,501
8,438
8,441
9,903
-
25,917
17,352
-
52,829
54,501
25,917
30,836
-
38,445
72,826
35,996
36,451
-
68,403
81,149
1806
-
23,319
3,888
8,441
9,336
-
1808
-
21,703
6,079
6,371
23,883
-
22,464
-
-
16,894
1810
4,744
20,737
7,251
7,257
20,285
-
13,272
35,996
18,731
-
44,021
90,813
1812
10,631
13,956
7,414
7,257
14,580
-
28,341
43,056
36,164
-
69,868
104,146
12,921
6,511
8,411
16,389
-
13,554
43,056
32,207
-
53,305
102,454
18,283
-
46,997
47,442
27,843
-
44,096
97,084
1814
-
1816
9,591
21,898
7,114
7,525
1818
9,181
18,878
6,105
7,525
7,356
-
23,969
47,442
25,446
-
34,354
71,020
1820
7,334
20,671
7,947
7,485
15,574
-
4,463
62,426
26,319
-
26,383
53,297
New Hampshire
Cong. El.
State El.
New Jersey
Cong. El.
New York
State El.
Cong. El.
North Carolina
State El.
1788
2,374
8,838
13,811
-
9,831
4,747
1790
3,585
7,234
6,435
-
10,685
12,353
1792
4,306
8,386
6,993
-
24,175
16,772
1794
6,957
10,470
8,747
-
23,642
1796
7,291
10,775
11,178
-
1798
7,160
12,153
19,167
1800
9,132
16,762
28,903
1802
11,576
19,166
14,288
Cong. El.
Ohio
State El.
-
Cong. El.
Pennsylvania
State El.
Cong. El.
State El.
-
-
-
16,124
5,637
-
-
-
15,153
30,840
1,901
-
-
-
35,369
30,840
16,772
1,736
-
-
-
12,840
31,371
27,174
25,373
11,093
-
-
-
23,010
31,170
-
36,832
29,644
26,113
-
-
-
53,048
31,170
-
46,632
29,644
29,485
-
-
-
50,781
70,688
-
45,167
45,651
35,632
-
-
60,824
65,010
7,491
-
1804
21,197
24,282
13,364
-
69,713
53,004
23,961
-
5,819
5,768
36,291
65,010
1806
10,177
21,294
20,441
-
60,517
53,004
20,767
-
9,099
4,783
60,500
82,689
1808
27,293
17,177
33,407
-
82,630
66,128
39,578
-
14,794
16,891
110,384
111,430
1810
24,066
32,003
14,257
-
108,763
79,657
36,281
-
17,887
64,780
111,430
1812
34,677
32,000
26,325
-
94,153
79,657
37,290
-
22,944
19,762
91,166
59,615
1814
34,737
38,542
34,556
-
110,957
83,074
41,855
-
12,951
22,110
65,931
81,593
1816
29,271
38,407
13,949
-
124,133
84,075
32,674
-
20,900
32,461
57,459
81,593
1818
23,731
31,907
14,718
-
79,753
44,789
29,806
-
40,991
40,594
67,047
125,775
1820
11,514
25,785
5,483
-
148,867
93,560
33,360
-
17,839
48,610
139,880
134,226
Rhode Island
Cong. El.
South Carolina
State El.
Cong. El.
Tennessee
State El.
Cong. El.
Vermont
State El.
Cong. El.
Virginia
State El.
1788
-
-
-
-
-
-
1790
-
-
-
-
-
-
2,061
-
-
-
1792
-
-
Cong. El.
-
Indiana
State El.
Cong. El.
State El.
4,306
-
-
-
2,865
6,097
-
-
-
3,546
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2,859
2,865
1794
3,089
-
3,732
-
-
-
4,718
5,055
1796
3,716
-
9,748
-
-
7,403
7,015
7,550
-
-
-
1798
4,095
1,204
9,905
-
-
10,773
9,348
18,401
-
-
-
1800
3,749
1,204
7,888
-
9,238
5,312
10,578
10,163
2,428
-
-
-
1802
4,250
5,736
6,551
-
9,682
8,448
9,492
13,089
18,601
-
-
-
1804
1,618
5,736
2,670
-
15,346
12,952
15,842
14,491
5,193
-
-
-
1806
3,587
3,859
16,456
-
7,424
16,148
11,819
17,016
6,445
-
-
-
1808
6,198
3,891
-
8,120
16,148
20,396
26,836
19,562
-
-
-
1810
7,123
3,891
2,843
-
19,834
22,121
22,679
24,089
5,252
-
-
-
1812
7,618
8,011
4,923
-
7,424
19,980
31,750
35,752
17,058
-
-
-
1814
6,724
3,542
9,543
-
23,842
21,490
34,700
35,328
17,169
-
-
-
1816
2,239
6,860
25,967
-
40,893
37,822
30,762
31,352
11,731
-
1818
1,945
8,410
18,702
-
46,309
43,852
19,073
15,992
8,597
-
1820
6,454
1,981
8,125
-
12,216
45,627
21,282
14,080
12,972
-
Illinois
Cong. El.
State El.
-
1,125
-
Louisiana
Cong. El.
State El.
Maine
Cong. El.
State El.
-
6,789
17,954
9,145
12,265
Missouri
Cong. El.
State El.
97
1788
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1790
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1792
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1794
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1796
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1798
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1800
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1802
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1804
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1806
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1808
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1810
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1812
-
-
2,472
3,876
-
-
-
-
1814
-
-
2,955
3,876
-
-
-
-
1816
-
-
2,644
4,465
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1818
3,978
3,847
4,138
4,465
1820
7,680
3,847
4,599
4,754
9,685
22,114
5,574
9,132
Additional Information:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Data only reported (and included in calculations) after accession date into the United States.
Georgia data only available after 1825
Maryland data only available after 1838
New Jersey--Governor elected by legislature before 1844
North Carolina Governor elected by legislature before 1836
South Carolina Governor elected by legislature before 1865
Virginia Governor elected by legislature until 1851
98
Appendix 4.3: American Post-Civil War Voter Turnout Data
Source: A Statistical History of the American Electorate (Jerrold Rusk, 2001) and American Governors and Gubernatorial Elections, 1775-1978 (Roy Glashan, 1979)
State Voter Turnout(for election occurring in that year or the last statewide election occurring before that year)
Arkansas
California
Colorado
1852
Alabama
45,054
28,887
45,912
-
Connecticut
62,788
Delaware
12,435
Florida
8,964
Georgia
96,221
Illinois
154,221
Indiana
169,910
Iowa
24,524
Kansas
-
Kentucky
111,997
1856
76,868
43,595
97,384
-
66,715
13,185
12,108
104,487
237,323
230,020
44,537
-
135,229
1860
65,363
60,200
102,760
-
88,385
15,312
12,242
106,001
335,124
263,493
109,834
-
144,135
1864
-
-
108,906
-
73,988
16,199
-
-
349,077
283,475
142,266
21,835
85,923
1868
62,067
12,443
92,342
-
99,325
18,408
24,403
159,646
449,725
342,125
153,209
43,604
137,331
1872
171,239
80,717
120,102
-
93,098
20,594
33,607
151,014
418,043
377,911
177,778
101,323
215,744
1876
152,083
106,336
122,951
27,470
98,620
23,747
48,163
144,839
552,093
434,495
218,913
121,827
217,773
1880
177,268
115,609
160,234
53,421
132,763
13,565
51,626
182,353
622,070
470,738
291,814
198,940
226,636
1884
143,644
156,263
164,673
66,709
137,723
31,178
59,932
182,353
673,489
495,084
327,233
265,248
222,796
1888
200,991
183,502
195,653
91,920
153,648
21,918
66,740
121,999
748,447
536,816
338,411
331,602
285,100
1892
243,028
156,185
252,457
92,856
164,551
35,197
40,373
209,392
873,145
549,020
420,212
324,770
289,177
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Nevada
Nebraska
New Hampshire
-
57,717
79,180
-
-
60,423
New Jersey
1852
33,061
94,707
69,092
138,436
83,308
1856
41,799
119,814
74,026
156,915
125,487
-
60,245
115,200
-
-
66,703
99,149
1860
41,021
124,135
85,822
169,609
155,027
38,917
45,182
156,576
-
-
71,603
105,029
1864
-
111,986
72,647
174,540
165,649
32,367
104,674
16,389
-
68,425
108,017
1868
102,389
131,782
85,744
195,471
225,341
64,376
118,576
144,887
9,230
14,917
77,068
162,691
1872
127,025
127,266
132,796
193,780
222,511
78,172
114,754
278,666
13,347
27,770
76,232
158,745
1876
160,963
136,823
158,001
256,904
317,678
84,017
126,181
350,236
18,093
52,224
80,319
181,333
1880
114,038
147,802
159,350
282,346
349,034
106,180
97,727
397,644
18,829
87,345
86,164
245,635
1884
132,282
142,107
173,401
304,115
400,398
135,637
129,511
437,353
14,305
133,555
84,470
208,016
1888
188,740
145,404
190,076
343,114
474,777
261,632
89,671
518,122
12,332
202,865
90,623
231,739
1892
178,302
130,082
192,047
380,137
468,637
255,921
84,945
541,082
12,392
197,474
86,980
336,871
-
73,777
99
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
1852
524,945
91,570
282,182
1856
593,886
102,568
302,131
1860
699,925
112,586
355,806
9,997
1864
729,821
-
476,554
1868
850,656
165,829
1872
838,151
1876
1880
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
S. Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
W. Virginia
Wisconsin
44,190
-
366,440
17,908
-
125,006
28,309
50,199
126,550
-
-
373,040
17,023
-
132,842
46,339
45,983
156,468
-
72,598
492,576
23,157
-
144,115
63,788
48,101
148,655
-
112,755
10,479
523,679
17,540
-
484,603
20,355
597,370
15,769
92,950
96,584
61,445
57,978
194,366
460,446
22,822
672,237
17,851
106,722
181,789
79,373
1,014,050
233,326
592,700
25,408
609,564
19,037
183,388
210,632
896,646
237,421
669,157
33,767
702,038
22,809
121,801
243,286
1884
915,539
266,163
721,310
41,513
743,803
25,541
67,895
1888
1,315,663
285,561
746,970
54,832
819,212
39,563
1892
1,162,853
280,505
795,631
72,685
928,196
54,679
Additional Information:
1.
2.
-
-
44,802
-
19,410
122,029
59,897
49,598
142,522
58,573
220,753
83,193
147,274
198,300
65,784
213,085
100,015
170,070
264,204
70,684
106,200
118,873
189,005
257,996
326,241
63,198
214,221
137,587
319,997
58,730
301,745
348,785
69,426
289,055
159,594
354,714
56,729
263,867
435,467
59,880
285,317
171,324
371,559
Highlighted portions in 1864 (and before for some states) indicate a state in rebellion or a state not fully reporting/participating in the election.
Data only reported (and included in calculations) after accession date into the United States.
National Turnout Data:
State Totals (Compiled)
Presidential Totals
(reported)
1852
3,107,913
3,164,409
1856
3,763,667
4,030,621
1860
4,507,231
4,692,710
1864
3,880,677
4,024,425
1868
5,622,656
5,717,246
1872
6,595,784
6,466,138
1876
7,827,441
8,418,529
1880
8,465,022
9,219,467
1884
9,322,479
10,054,228
1888
10,869,692
11,389,839
1892
11,453,925
12,071,080
100
Appendix 5: Social Integration Information
Appendix 5.1: European Union Demographic Data
Age < 15
EU-15
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Austria
Portugal
Finland
Sweden
United Kingdom
1985
20.0%
19.0%
19.0%
16.0%
21.0%
23.0%
21.0%
29.0%
20.0%
17.0%
20.0%
18.0%
24.0%
19.0%
18.0%
19.0%
1990
18.0%
18.0%
17.0%
16.0%
20.0%
20.0%
20.0%
27.0%
17.0%
17.0%
18.0%
18.0%
21.0%
19.0%
18.0%
19.0%
1995
18.0%
18.0%
17.0%
16.0%
17.0%
17.0%
20.0%
25.0%
15.0%
18.0%
18.0%
18.0%
18.0%
19.0%
19.0%
19.0%
2000
17.0%
18.0%
18.0%
16.0%
15.0%
15.0%
19.0%
22.0%
14.0%
19.0%
19.0%
17.0%
17.0%
18.0%
19.0%
19.0%
2005
16.3%
17.3%
18.8%
14.5%
14.5%
14.5%
18.5%
20.7%
14.1%
18.7%
18.5%
16.1%
15.6%
17.5%
17.6%
18.2%
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Age > 65
EU-15
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Austria
Portugal
Finland
Sweden
United Kingdom
1985
14.0%
14.0%
15.0%
14.0%
14.0%
12.0%
13.0%
11.0%
12.0%
14.0%
12.0%
14.0%
12.0%
12.0%
17.0%
15.0%
1990
14.0%
14.0%
16.0%
15.0%
14.0%
13.0%
14.0%
11.0%
15.0%
13.0%
13.0%
15.0%
13.0%
14.0%
18.0%
16.0%
1995
15.4%
15.8%
15.3%
15.4%
15.4%
15.1%
15.0%
11.4%
16.4%
13.9%
13.2%
15.1%
14.5%
14.1%
17.5%
15.7%
2000
16.3%
16.8%
14.8%
16.2%
17.3%
16.8%
16.0%
11.2%
18.0%
14.3%
13.6%
15.4%
16.1%
14.8%
17.3%
15.6%
2005
17.0%
17.1%
15.0%
18.6%
17.9%
16.8%
16.4%
11.2%
19.2%
14.3%
14.0%
16.0%
17.0%
15.9%
17.3%
15.9%
101
Appendix 5.2: American Post-Constitution and Post-Civil War State Demographic Data
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111