7-
Visionary Political Leadership:
On Improving a Risky Requisite
YEHEZKEL DROR
ABSTRACT. Basic human needs combined with political processes and
societal requirements periodically make visionary political leadership
(VPL) unavoidable and functionally necessary. But VPL is highly risky,
often leading to catastrophes. Foreseeable situations sharpen the dilemma,
making VPL more likely and more necessary while also increasing its
dangers, thanks to modern technologies. Therefore it is essential to improve
VPL. Eight proposals for improvement are presented in this article:
selection and election of VPL; training, education, and insight upgrading of
VPL; advisory structures for VPL; practical vision developing organizations ; procedures for democratic choice among practical visions; special
implementation instruments; procedures for removal of dangerous VPL;
and international control and containment of fanatical VPL. The
neoplatonic nature of such proposals is recognized. But without far-reaching
innovations, there is no hope of improving VPL, its needed functions will
not be properly satisfied, and, instead, serious consequences, because of its
pathologies, will be unavoidable.
of human governance demonstrates the importance of
periodic visionary political leadership (VPL) of various types, as illustrated by
Moses, Solon, and Pericles in classical times; Peter the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte,
and Mazzini at the beginning of modern history; de Gaulle, Herzel, Hitler, Mussolini,
and Lenin, as well as other rulers in France, England, the United States, and the
USSR in contemporary Western history; and Bolivar, Gandhi, Nkrumah, Tour6,
Nyerere, and Mao in contemporary non-Western history.
The neglect of this subject by modern political science is striking and needs
rectification. Despite the prevalence and importance of VPL, no comprehensive
theory of it is available. Some work deals with VPL in particular countries (e.g.,
Jackson and Rosberg, 1982: ch. 5 especially, using the term prophetic rule); many
political biographies deal with VPL, with various degrees of penetration into its
fundamentals; efforts to explain VPL in terms of depth psychology, while sometimes
very illuminating (e.g., Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1984; Wildavsky, 1984), are just in
their beginnings; and relations between charisma and VPL receive some attention
(Willner, 1984). But a general theory of VPL, starting with an estimate of its
incidence among the approximately 13 000 historically known rulers (Tapsell, 1983),
A short look
at
the
history
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8
providing some explanation for its occasional emergence, analysing its functions and
evaluating its consequences, is sorely needed. Attempts to arrive at a broad
understanding of political leadership (e.g., Burns, 1978) also neglect VPL, as do
systematic treatments of recent leaders (e.g., Heady, 1974; Blondel, 1980, 1985).
The neglect of VPL illustrates major weaknesses in modern political science, such
as the lack of deep analysis of political phenomena, the scarcity of adequate historic
and comparative perspectives, adherence to ideological biases and to fashionable,
culture-bound common sense (Geertz, 1983: ch. 4 especially). This article cannot
overcome such problems and develop a comprehensive theory of VPL, which requires
a major interdisciplinary research and theory-building effort; rather, it explores needs
for and possibilities of improving VPL and poses some conjectures for further
study.
I first present the thesis that VPL is an unavoidable and functional necessity under
present and foreseeable conditions. Next, I suggest that VPL is risky, with many
inherent dangers. Then I design a bridging synthesis in the form of a set of proposals
for improving VPL. In terms of intellectual history, I return in some respects to
Plato’s concern with political reform (Klosko, 1986), as developed in The Republic and
revised in The Statesman and The Laws, adopting a broad view of political science, as in
the 19th century (Collini et al., 1983).
On the Importance of VPL
Examination of the importance of VPL requires consideration of the grounds and
causes of it on the one hand, and of its functions on the other. The basis for VPL is
probably human beings’ need (in a broad sense, Springborg, 1981) to identify with
belief systems that provide meaning to life and protect against existential pains. The
conjecturel that VPL is grounded in deep psychological needs is supported by early
work by Karl Jaspers (Jaspers, 1922). It is strengthened by my preliminary finding
that VPL is scarce in societies where other institutions take care of needs which, in
other conditions, require visionary leadership. This was the case thanks to fixed
cosmologies in most of Ancient Egypt (Frankfort, 1958); in Rome while the Empire
was stable and provided for public belief (Millar, 1977); and in medieval kingship
(Myers, 1982), when religion took care of human psychological needs.
But when traditional religious visions are undermined by reason (Murray, 1985) or
&dquo;reform&dquo; (Ozment, 1980), the need for VPL emerges, whether based on new religious
foundations, as illustrated by Calvin (Hoepfl, 1982) or Savonarola, or on secular
foundations, as illustrated by Nazism and Leninism.
A special case is posed by modernity, when secular consumerism and economic
models of human needs dominate (see the related concept of the &dquo;Danegeld State&dquo; in
Gellner, 1964; interestingly discussed in Hall, 1981: ch. 7 especially). But if human
needs for visions are fundamental, then the demise of VPL is temporary and lasts only
as long as the satisfaction of material desires and the innovations of the welfare state
meet psychological requirements. This is a temporary state of affairs. If economic and
welfare expectations are frustrated, then a return to VPL-and/or non-political
fundamentalism (see Barr, 1977) which in turn may move either in the direction of
sect formation or of political activity and VPL-is likely. Also, if economic and
welfare expectations are continually satisfied, they become routinized and no longer
meet human needs for existential answers. VPL is likely to emerge under both
conditions, though probably in different forms.
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9
The subject of VPL leads directly to the broad and inadequately studied domain of
culture and politics, which conditions the emergence and forms of VPL. For instance,
conditions such as those that prevailed in Vienna in the 19th century (Schorske,
1980) and in Germany before the Nazi takeover (Reich, 1946), may be conducive to
strong rulership with a tendency towards negative forms of VPL. Different cultures
may have various propensities to multifarious VPL (e.g., Sarkisyanz, 1955), and
different external environments (Bozeman, 1960) may stimulate various forms of
VPL.
Accelerated social change, which undermines prevailing institutions and imposes
stress on human beings, probably causes upsurges in VPL. Especially when
traditionalism meets modernity, new visions are sought and VPL with a religious
foundation emerges, as illustrated in Iran (Bakhash, 1986; to be studied in the
contexts provided by: Ajami, 1981; Abrahamian, 1982; and Sivan, 1985, as
in Sivan, 1986).
The individual need for visions, especially under conditions of distress (insightfully
presented by Llosa, 1984), but also as a result of ennui, combines with mass
psychological processes (Moscovici, 1985; Graumann and Moscovici, 1986) to
produce conditions conducive to VPL. Real instances of VPL depend on unique
specific causes and historical circumstances and are partly random in nature. But the
grounds for VPL include deep psychological necessities and mass-psychological
needs and phenomena. It follows that VPL may well increase in the foreseeable future
because of expected predicaments (Dror, 1986a: ch. 2 especially), producing much
stress and turmoil conducive to VPL. When the influence of the modern mass media
are taken into account (e.g., Brantlinger, 1983), the probability of more VPL is
further increased.22
Leaving aside the complex theoretical issues facing any effort to predict the
probability of VPL emerging3 and moving on to a functional analysis, VPL is
functionally useful and perhaps necessary during accelerated change, when
governments must engage in structural adjustments (OECD, 1983) and constructive
destruction (Schumpeter, 1952: ch. 7). Minimal, neo-liberal views of the functions of
the state (e.g., Nozick, 1974) suffer from a lack of understanding of societal needs
which in part require VPL. Necessary changes in values, the needed mobilization of
effort, the maintenance and rebuilding of social consensus (Cerny, 1980), the
prevention of wanton behaviour by visionless rulers (Frankfurt, 1971; strikingly
presented in literary form in Bastos, 1986) combine and make VPL a very functional
supplemented
phenomenon.
from the behavioural and explanatory to the prescriptive, VPL
growing number of societies to provide needed identity guidelines
(Erikson, 1975: 22), to engage in required &dquo;soulcraft&dquo; (Will, 1983), to shift declining
trends with the help of breakthrough policies and heroic projects (Dror, 1988), and to
undertake societal architecture.
The recommendation to build up VPL applies in particular to developing societies
(Wriggins, 1969), in order to mobilize participation by the population and to provide
needed inspiration and direction.’ Nowadays most countries must engage in difficult
adjustments (Olson, 1982), in part requiring VPL. When the competition between
democracies and other regimes is taken into account, with the possible danger of a
decline of democracies (e.g., Revel, 1983) because of a lack of will and authority
(McNeill, 1982), which can be supplied by VPL, then 5the recommendation to
strengthen VPL in democracies also seems well supported.5
Therefore,
to move
is necessary in
a
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10
VPL is Risky
The risks of VPL are not difficult to document, on the basis of much empirical
material available on the horrors propagated by VPL in the name of visions. But to
move from a surface look to deep analysis, the risks of VPL require systematic
consideration. This can be done by considering three distinct risks of VPL, related
respectively to defects of visionary political leadership, the malignance of some
visions, and the over-utopianism of others.
Defects of Visionary Political Leadership
In order to examine some of the inherent propensities for the failure of political
leaders with visions, we must first look at some common defects of all rulers and then
at some of the special pathologies to which visionary political leaders are prone.
First, a distinction must be made between bona fide and authentic visionary
political leaders who believe in their vision and try to realize it, and others who
deliberately present a vision as a means of gaining power and other benefits without
believing in it. An important in-between case is posed by symbolic uses of visions as
part of public argument and rhetoric, while actual policies are mainly pragmatic.
Also, we must take into account the tendency of bona fide VPL towards routine and
mainly symbolic uses of vision, including ritualization of the terminology, without
any authentic continuous belief in the vision. The reverse dynamic is also possible,
visions presented for tactical reasons becoming internalized and developing into bona
fide VPL.
The following inherent defects of rulers
extensive treatment, see Dror, 1987a):
are
particularly salient
to
VPL
(for
more
(a) Strain and stress, which degrade all decision-making (Janis and Mann, 1977), but
are especially dangerous in crisis decision-making, where critical choices often
have to be made under extreme stress (Hermann, 1979). _The difficulties of
realizing more utopian visions may increase strain and stress, but a rigid vision
may also produce dissonance-reducing images of reality, diminishing stress but
distorting reality.
(b) Court politics and corridors of power syndromes, with gate controls and also mind
controls over inputs to the ruler (Kernell and Popkin, 1986). Loyalty to a vision
can add to court politics and aggravate their negative impacts (Lang, 1979).
(c) Preponderance of positive feedback, caused by deference to the ruler and often
fear of him. Rulers are always surrounded with mirrors that declare them to be the
wisest in the land, and those persons who tell them they are without clothes have a
short survival expectancy. As a result, world pictures of rulers become
increasingly distorted, and their self-esteem is soon inflated. The closed-mind
syndrome of VPL, discussed below, interacts synergistically with this factor,
producing serious self-delusions.
Such defects of rulerss are much reinforced by VPL, as a result of two main types of
phenomenon, namely the closed mind and motivated irrationality. Strong attachment
to a belief system necessarily produces closed minds (Rokeach, 1960), which inhibits
learning. Other very serious handicaps are motivated irrationalities (Pears, 1984:
ch. 2 especially), which are a direct product of strongly held visions. They distort
cognitive maps (Axelrod, 1976) and spoil attribution theories (Nisbett and Ross,
1980; Hewstone, 1983), with consequent misapprehensions.
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11
Strong tendencies towards what Tacitus diagnosed as Caesar’s craze are
threatening, as discussed for instance by Scherr (1914: pt. 7, ch. 1 ) with respect to the
Kaiserwahnsinn of Napoleon Bonaparte. Modern literature neglects tendencies
towards Caesar’s craze (a partial exception is Buchanan, 1978; striking illustrations
are discussed in Kapuscinski, 1983, and Khalid, 1985). Such propensities are
especially acute when visions are clung to, which easily produce hypertrophy of
VPL’s self-esteem and self-image, with dire consequences. At the same time, visions
may also control wanton desires (Frankfurt, 1971) and constitute a kind of moral
superego, which restrains VPL behaviour. These contradictory possibilities illustrate
well the complexity of psycho-social and political processes related to VPL.
Such complexities are further aggravated by the usefulness of some VPL
misperceptions and self-deception. Thus, unjustified belief in an unrealistic vision
may increase its feasibility thanks to self-fulfilling prophecies.
Malignant
Visions
the risks of VPL, the contents of visions must be taken into
It makes a big difference whether a propounded vision is benign or
malignant, in terms of specific target populations. Building up a just and peaceful
society is a very benign vision, though it may involve some tough societal
interventions that make it malignant to some groups, thus illustrating the relativity of
evaluative concepts. Aspiring to conquer half the world and proselytizing
non-believers through holy wars is a malignant vision, especially when supported by
To
fully appreciate
account.
modern weapons systems.
Having expounded elsewhere the
possibilities of crazy states (Dror, 1980) and
aggressive ideologies (Dror, 1987b), I simply note here that VPL which adopts a
fanatical stance is a regular feature of history that satisfies deep political needs, such
as the search for enemies (Schmitt, 1963). International ideological cleavages,
north-south conflicts, economic crises in poor countries, and modernization versus
traditionalism are just a few of the features which in the foreseeable future will
increase the probability of malignant VPL. Combined with the spread of modern
weapons systems and the proliferation of lethal nuclear and biological instruments,
fanatical VPL is a serious danger to the world. Some features of modern terrorism are
but a slight foretaste of what may be in store for humanity if fanatical VPL develops
unchecked.
Over-utopian Visions
An ambiguous concept is that of realistic versus over-utopian visions. In principle, it
may seem reasonable to prefer the former, which pose a significant challenge to
society but are probably feasible. Otherwise, frustration of expectations is likely, with
many negative effects (Dror, 1983: 116-119). But matters are not so simple.
No society fully understands itself and its potential. Therefore, what looks
over-utopian may be realizable, and what looks easy may be impossible to achieve.
The history of Zionism (Hertzberg, 1959; Vital, 1975, 1982; Avineri, 1981) provides a
striking case of an impossible dream being realized, calling for caution in posing rigid
limits of realism
Second, while
on
no
visions.
revolution has
Zionism, Eisenstadt, 1985),
achieved its visions (Eisenstadt,
have had significant
revolutions
many
fully
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1978;
on
impact.
12
Accordingly, utopian visions, even when not realizable, may bring about meaningful
changes. Indeed, whether adopted by political movements or not,~ they may
constitute a main mode of human evolution which should not be constrained by
feasibility assessments.
Without going further into difficult historical and philosophical issues, the above
considerations call for caution in imposing present concepts of reasonableness on
sociopolitical visions. While Tertullian’s credo quia absurdum applies much less to
sociopolitical visions than to religious beliefs, over-utopian visions may still be
realizable and have other benefits.
The proposition that VPL is risky seems well supported by the defects of visionary
leaders and the dangers of malignant visions, besides some problems of over-utopian
visions. Taken together, the thesis on the inevitability and the importance of VPL,
and the antithesis on its inherent risks, pose a major challenge to attempts to arrive at
a synthesis which improves VPL so as to increase its benefits while containing its
risks.
Proposals for Improving VPL
Having probed some of VPL’s issues and features, the challenge now is how to
balance its importance and its defects. This involves moving into political
architecture (a term I prefer to political engineering, as used by Ranney, 1976) and
developing what might be regarded as a political vision.
Leaving aside involved issues of design approaches and methods (Dror, 1986a:
ch. 9), a number of methodological points need to be mentioned:
(a) The proposals that follow are prescriptive conjectures, based on available
knowledge and design and reform theory and experiences, as processed and
discussed elsewhere (Dror, 1983, 1986a).
(b) The suggested method for evaluation of the proposals is to subject them to critical
analysis and refutation by mind experiments, and available social science theory
and governance experience (cf. Faludi, 1986).
(c) Another main set of criteria are political values, especially democratic ones. I
suggest distinguishing between the basic values of democracy, and the various
habits of thought and common-sense notions surrounding them. The proposals
presented below do not contradict basic democratic values,9 but I do deviate from
many of the accepted notions surrounding them. I think that without some
constructive destruction of democratic folklore, there is no hope of upgrading
capacities to govern, as is urgently needed.
(d) In principle, improving VPL should be undertaken within broader efforts to
retrofit governance. Some proposals converge with improvement suggestions
dealing with other dimensions of the capacity to govern (Dror, 1986b). But here I
explicate only those facets of the proposals dealing with VPL.
(e) The prescriptive conjectures are presented in general and in outline. Their fuller
elaboration, application, and adjustment to various conditions require much
(f)
additional work and are not discussed here.
I present below what may be more provocative, rather than more conventional,
proposals. This is not only a choice made for the purpose of stimulating thought,
but expresses my conclusion that the essential upgrading of democratic capacities
to govern depends on the innovative redesign of governance, which in turn is
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13
contingent upon iconoclasm in respect to some commonly accepted notions of
political science and, even more so, of practical politics.
Bearing in mind these observations and the mainly intellectual and problem-posing
tasks of this article as a whole, I now discuss eight main prescriptive conjectures for
upgrading VPL.
Selection and Election of Visionary Leaders
Common notions of normality are not a guide for identification and evaluation of
leaders as a whole and visionary leaders in particular (Lange-Eichbaum and Kurth,
1927; and, much later, Simonton, 1984; not applicable is Barber, 1972). In any case,
basic democratic values preclude meritocratic testing and selection of leaders, even if
theoretically possible, which at present is not the case.
Still, some improvements are possible. One necessity is to overcome political
marketing with the selling of synthetic visions on the mass media under the guidance
of political consultants (Sabato, 1981). Tendencies towards populist politics in most
democracies aggravate such dangers and make countermeasures urgent.
Enforced self-presentation of candidates for primary political positions and their
public in-depth interrogation and cross-examination by teams of diverse professionals, broadcast on television networks, illustrate a possible recommendation. Such
public presentation meets basic democratic values and allows for a better-informed
choice by the public. Close examination of leaders with vision can permit early
identification of malignant visions.
More problematic is a second proposal, namely for the institutionalization of a
special procedure for exclusion of candidates with malignant visions from politics, by
limiting their political rights. I am speaking about a modern version of Greek
ostracism, as introduced in Athens by Cleisthenes (Fine, 1983: 239-240, 291-292; for
context, see Meier, 1980b). Setting up a supreme constitutional court, in conjunction
with existing supreme court institutions supplemented by political experts, with the
authority to deny political rights to those judged a danger to democracy and the
public good, may be necessary.
Some unjustified brakes may be put by such an institution on ideas which are
radical in terms of accepted democratic values, somewhat impairing social and
political dynamics. But the dangers of fanatical and malignant political visions
outweigh such costs. Reliance on the common sense of the electorate is an inadequate
substitute for the proposal, in view of possible mass psychological processes. This is
true also in societies with highly developed schooling. Therefore the proposal merits
consideration despite its problems.
Training, Education, and Insight Upgrading of Political Leaders
The ideas that
political leaders need no focused training and education, and that the
patterns of politicians are adequate preparation for those who reach the top,
have little basis in fact. The insidious effects of ignorance and perversions of the mind
(Pears, 1984: ch. 2 especially) on rulers, who in any case suffer from the congenital
defects of their roles, reinforce the need to provide appropriate training, education,
and insights to political leaders. Some leaders engage in adequate self-development
on their own (Keren, 1983), but more is needed.
career
Possibilities include:
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14
(a) A new generation of public policy schools, where people interested in politics can
study during their formative years. Alternatively, in countries with a strong state
tradition and much movement from administrative to political elites (Badie and
Birnbaum, 1983), suitably restructured institutions like the French National
School of Administration may prepare future VPL.
(b) Publicly financed learning opportunities for politicians, with paid years of study
leave, national policy colleges, and party cadre training institutes may constitute a
preferable mode for meeting urgent needs.
(c) Workshops for senior politicians, including rulers, and writing books for them, as
a modern version of the classical mirror-of-princes genre
(d) More radical, obligatory participation of senior politicians in learning activities,
up to recommended and perhaps enforced psycho-didactic processes for rulers.
these
Admittedly,
proposals
contradict the present conventional wisdom in
democracies, and in the main also in other types of regimes. Also, when applied to
VPL, they pose special difficulties in handling visions which may seem over-utopian,
and in handling values that seem to be beyond examination. Still, the first three
proposals are feasible and partly realized in some countries; and the fourth proposal,
while unconventional, in no way contradicts basic democratic values and may be
essential
to
permit
VPL
improvement.
Advisory Structures for Visionary Leaders
Much easier and relatively conventional proposals are those to upgrade advisory
for VPL, including various types of policy and ideological advisers. But,
contrasted with more pragmatic leaders, VPL advisory structures involve particular
difficulties, such as the contradiction between the hot atmosphere of visionary
commitment and the cold culture of professional policy advice, as well as the possible
dysfunctional effects of clarifying objective realities (Rejai and Phillips, 1979; Dror,
1986a: 95-97). Therefore, professional advisers working for a VPL must be highly
sophisticated and understand its dynamics, which in turn requires radically new
policy analysis and pblicy-planning approaches and methods.
To be mentioned here is the dislike of a VPL for advisory input which necessarily
deviates from the VPL’s opinions and preferences. Therefore, VPLs are apt to close
down advisory units or staff them with yes people. What is needed is self-binding by
the VPL, in line with the Ulysses and the Sirens metaphor (Elster, 1979: pt. II;
Schelling, 1984: chs. 2, 3). Accordingly, it may be necessary to institutionalize
advisory units so as to make them able to withstand at least some resistance by the
VPL and to survive passing desires to close them down (a relevant case is discussed in
structures
Hennessy
et
al., 1985).
Or~anizations for Developing Practical Vision
of policy research and development organizations, namely
well
suited to the specific needs of VPL (Dror, 1984). Some
think-tanks,
planning agencies have developed practical visions, but they tend to engage in
detailed programming instead of broad vision development (Johnson, 1982; Estrin
and Holmes, 1983; Dutt and Costra, 1984). Still, revised think-tanks and planning
agencies, with suitable additions to their staff such as applied philosophers and
literati, can serve as practical vision development organizations.
The present
major type
are
not
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15
Party research organizations have an important role to serve as practical vision
development organizations, as demonstrated in a number of countries (Flohr, 1968;
Ramson, 1980; Heatherly, 1981). Various types of commissions on the future
illustrate other possibilities (a relevant experience is evaluated in Wittrock et al.,
1985).
Procedures for Democratic Choice Between Practical Visions
The idea and practice of futures study organizations leads
back to the proposal of
Bertrand de Jouvenel to set up so-called &dquo;surmising forums&dquo; where the public are
presented with alternative practical visions for choice (Jouvenel, 1967: pt. V
especially). At least on a local level, such ideas can be realized, and perhaps major
parties should be required to present coherent versions of their practical visions,
which in some cases may be put to a referendum.
Special Implementation Instruments
Recent empirical studies show that in a number of countries politicians are being
innovative than the bureaucrats, partly by trying to improve different ideologies
and at least mini-visions of society (Aberbach et al., 1981). This leads to the very
important need to provide the VPL with implementation instruments to try and
realize innovative visions despite recalcitrant bureaucracies. Providing the VPL with
special staff to force their preferences on civil servants, and setting up special project
managements to implement specific visions, illustrate relatively mild instruments
needed by a VPL.
More vexing is the issue of forcing visions on opposing interest groups. With
respect only to democracies, and assuming that the visionary policies have been duly
approved and are not malignant, use of legal force to implement visionary policies is
fully justified, even if repugnant to some forms of participatory democracy.
more
Removal of
Dangerous Visionary Leaders
point reinforces the need to provide additional safeguards against
dangerous visionary leaders, including removal procedures that are less cumbersome
than impeachment procedures in countries with rulers elected for a fixed term.
Removal by a special majority of the legislature may be a necessary counterbalance to
the increasing influence of a VPL.
A more radical innovation is to grant a special constitutional court the power to
remove a leader and bar him or her from further public activity.
The above
International Control and Containment of
the Fanatical
VPL
danger is posed by fanatical malignant visionary leaders who are fully
supported by their own countries, whether they come to power dramatically or
otherwise. Nazi Germany should remind us of such possibilities also in highly
developed societies. This possibility leads to the need for international action against
crazy states, as detailed elsewhere (Dror, 1980). Permitting vicious VPLs to
accumulate instruments of destruction and threaten their neighbors, and perhaps the
world, under the cloak of outdated doctrines of sovereignty is unacceptable.
The greatest
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16
international control and containment of fanatical VPLs, including
their forceable removal, is necessary.
This is not simple to do, especially when big powers suspect each other of
tendencies towards dangerous VPL. As a first step, at least, small international actors
should be prevented from becoming dangerous VPLs, even at the cost of inhibiting
some perhaps justified innovations.
Accordingly,
Towards Neoplatonism
The reader may discern in the above proposals some elements of what can be called
neoplatonism, with the emphasis on rulers and related guardian elites and academies,
attention to education of politicians, and a radical approach to political reforms.
This is not the place to discuss in detail my version of neoplatonism, its relations
with some classical Chinese ideas and experiments, and related issues such as the
critical re-examination of Popper’s handling of such problems (Popper, 1966). But at
least the VPL issues demonstrate the need for new problemizations in the sense of
Michel Foucault (Rabinow, 1984: 381-390), for deep analysis of issues and for
readiness to consider seriously radical reforms in democratic governance, including
unconventional proposals. Without an open mind to such needs and possibilities, the
requisites and dangers of VPL may not be amendable. As a result, not only may
potential benefits of VPL be lost, but fanatically malignant VPL might substitute new
versions of barbarism for democracy and endanger the survival of humanism and
perhaps humanity.
To face such challenges, political science must thoroughly re-examine its accepted
frames and modes of thinking. VPL issues, besides their inherent importance,
dramatize the need to restructure political science, inter alia in the direction of more
realistic consideration of rulership, elites, and the psychological needs of mass
societies, and with an orientation towards redesign of governance. Neoplatonism
challenges much of contemporary conventional political science, a challenge brought
out by the fundamental issues and needs of VPL.
Notes
subjects discussed in this article a version of the Popperian method of
progressing by conjectures and their refutation, rather than by positivistic
methods, is appropriate (see Munz, 1985).
Additional support for the proposition that VPL is here to stay and may be
expected to increase can be offered, ranging from conjectures on shifts between
private interest and public action (Hirschman, 1981; Schlesinger, 1986), to this
author’s empirical findings on the growing power of heads of governments in
1. For
2.
OECD countries, related in part to the need for VPL. Also relevant is
examination of the relationship between social movements and utopia (e.g.,
Frankel, 1981; Robertson, 1984: 191-220).
3. Factual explanation of particular instances of VPL as well as of the many cases
where VPL did not emerge despite conducive situations, and efforts to predict the
emergence of VPL, at least probabilistically, face three major theoretical
difficulties: first, a theory better integrating analysis on the level of individual
needs and on the level of social institutions is needed, on the lines for instance of
structuration theory (Giddens, 1984). Second, a more balanced theory of social
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17
is necessary (e.g., Boudon, 1986). Third, the role of chance in history
needs much better treatment. Also essential is much progress on the uses of
historical material for social scientific theory, with all its problems (Skocpol,
change
1984) .
4. Relevant is an historical study of Julius Caesar, which shows that with all his
power he had little direct impact on Rome because he lacked an alternative vision
(Meier, 1980a, 1982).
5. A number of important additional issues need exploration, such as what is the
maximum production function of VPL in terms of impact on historical situations.
To take two relevant historical cases: the decline of Spain and the ascendance of
France in the 17th century can be well explained in terms of economic features
and social institutions. But the excellent studies by J.H. Elliott (Elliott, 1984,
1986; see also Brown, 1986) succinctly raise the question whether VPL in Spain
might not have made a real difference. The outstanding study by Frederic
Wakeman, Jr of &dquo;The Great Enterprise&dquo; of the Manchu reconstruction of China
(Wakeman, 1985) clearly indicates the importance of VPL in significantly
influencing history. For my tentative views on this issue, see Dror (1986a: ch. 4).
6. I leave aside semi-medical approaches, as illustrated by L’Etang (1968, 1980).
Metaphorically relevant is Hogwood and Peters (1985), but more work is needed
to apply it to VPL.
7. Here, two additional contexts within which VPL should be considered emerge.
On the one hand, VPL needs to be considered within the concept, history, and
social impact of utopian thinking (e.g., Manuel and Manuel, 1979; Alexander
and Gill, 1984). On the other hand, VPL needs analysis in relation to ideologies
and their political functions (e.g., Seliger, 1976; Centre for Contemporary
Cultural Studies, 1977), as well as intellectual history in a broad sense. One
possibility that needs consideration is that VPL constitutes a main vehicle for
translating visions generated by social and intellectual processes into effective
political action.
8. A more speculative view of VPL is to look at it as a mode of human cultural and
social evolution, new visions put forth by VPL constituting daring conjectures
which are put to the test of confirmation and refutation through a kind of
socio-historical experimentation (Munz, 1985, thus can be applied). Within such
a perspective, all VPLs are useful as collective learning episodes, no matter how
costly in human suffering, as long as the survival of humanity is not in doubt.
Such a view is hardly a basis for recommendations on how to improve VPL,
which must necessarily adopt a narrower perspective. But a broad view of VPL
as an evolutionary learning process may help us to see problems correctly and to
&dquo;jump out of the system&dquo; (Hofstadter, 1979: 37-38 and ch. 15).
9. The discussion focuses on democracies, but I am not implying that all countries
are ripe for Western-type democracy. VPL is especially important for
high-aspiration developing countries, where conditions often do not permit
10.
Western-type democracy.
Workshops run by the author for top decision-makers, including some VPLs, in a
variety of countries, and experience at such workshops with preliminary chapters
from A Policy Mirror for Rulers, on which I am working, provide experimental
support for the feasibility and usefulness of such activities.
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18
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Biographical Note
of Political Science, Wolfson Professor of Public
of the Center for Security Studies at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem. His research interests are policy sciences and governance
redesign. He has held senior positions in the Israeli government and been consultant
to organizations and countries, as well as Fellow at various Think-tanks and
Institutes for Advanced Study. In 1983 he received the first Annual Harold Lasswell
Award from the Policy Studies Association. His books include Public Policymaking
YEHEZKEL DROR is
professor
Administration, and director
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22
Reexamined, Design for Policy Sciences, Ventures in Policy Sciences, Crazy States: A
Counterconventional Strategic Problem, and Policymaking Under Adversity. At present, he is
working on books dealing with advice to rulers, with policy-gambling and with
retrofitting governance. ADDRESS. Department of Political Science, The Hebrew
University, Jerusalem, Israel.
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