The Operational Code of John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Comparison of
Public and Private Rhetoric
Author(s): B. Gregory Marfleet
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Sep., 2000), pp. 545-558
Published by: International Society of Political Psychology
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Vol.21,No.3,2000
Political
Psychology,
The OperationalCode ofJohnF. KennedyDuring
theCuban MissileCrisis:A ComparisonofPublic
andPrivateRhetoric
B. GregoryMarfleet
ofPoliticalScience
Department
State
Arizona
University
thebeliefsystem
ThisstudyexaminesthemannerinwhichtheCubanmissilecrisisaffected
source
materials
The
uses
data
F.
John
President
derivedfrom
primary
Kennedy. analysis
of
thathave becomeavailable onlyin the last 2 years,in additionto well-known
public
statements
by thepresident.The Verbsin ContextSystem(VICS) was used to generate
acrosssourcesand changedduring
intohowKennedy'soperationalcode differed
insights
initialprivatebelligerence
evidence
theperiodofthecrisis.Theresults
ofKennedy's
provide
intoquestionsomeother
thesis"
while
the
andprovisionalsupport
calling
"Gettysburg
for
beliefs.
ofthecrisison thepresident's
oftheeffects
potentialinterpretations
KEY WORDS: JohnF. Kennedy,Cubanmissilecrisis,operational
code,contentanalysis,ExCom
transcripts
theworldcloser
tohavebrought
TheCubanmissilecrisisis generally
thought
or
As
than
event
before
since.
a
to nucleardestruction any
result,it occupiesa
in
and
relations
ofAmericanforeign
superpower
policy
uniqueplace thehistory
intheColdWarera.Scholarsfromthreegenerations
andvirtually
all socialscience
angles.As thetemporal
disciplineshave examinedthecrisisfrominnumerable
restrictions
on documentclassification
have expiredand as thearchivesof the
ofnewinformation
former
theemergence
SovietUnionareopenedandexplored,
to fuelacademicinterest
in the
fromdomesticandforeign
sourceshas continued
eventsoftheautumnof 1962.
In thisstudyI examinethemannerin whichthoseeventsaffected
thebelief
inthecrisisfromtheAmerican
ofthemostprominent
system
figure
perspectiveJohnF. Kennedy.
Theanalysisisbasedonevidencederivedfrom
President
primary
thathavebecomeavailableonlyin thelast2 years-transcripts
sourcematerials
545
0162-895X? 2000 International
Societyof PoliticalPsychology
Publishedby BlackwellPublishers,
350 Main Street,MaIden,MA 02148,USA, and 108 CowleyRoad,Oxford,OX4 1JF,UK.
546
Marfleet
ofprivatemeetings
thattookplacebetween16 and29 October-pluswell-known
I usetheVerbsinContextSystem(VICS)
statements
made
public
bythepresident.
into
how
togenerate
code (see Schafer'sintroducinsights
Kennedy'soperational
in
for
of
this
a
discussion
see also Walker,Schafer,
VICS;
toryessay
symposium
& Young,1998)differed
acrosssourcesandchangedduring
theperiodofthecrisis.
thatrecurin thequalitative
I notefourpatterns
historical
literature
and,after
them
in
of
terms
belief
conduct
an
aimed
at
defining
change,
analysis
exploring
is thelong-standing
theveracity
oftheobservations.
One pattern
assertion
thatthe
Cubanmissilecrisiswas the"Gettysburg
oftheCold War"-a pointintimewhen
theconfronting
horrors
theyhadunleashed
partiesfacedfullythepotential
bytheir
actionsand,aftersomesoberreflection,
tooka stepbackwardfromtheedgeofthe
is theseemprecipiceof war(Sorensen,1965). A second,contradictory,
pattern
convictions
inglyoverconfident
displayedlaterin U.S. foreign
policyregarding
ofcoercivediplomacy(George,Hall,& Simons,1971).A thirdpattern
theutility
thebeliefchangethatKennedymayhaveexhibited
concerns
as thecrisisunfolded.
Sorensen(1965) and White(1992) bothnotedthatthroughout
theearlieststages
of thecrisis,Kennedywas angeredby theSovietactions.However,Schlesinger
furiousat SovietPremier
(1965) indicatedthat,althoughKennedywas initially
Khrushchev
and AmbassadorDobrynin,
his demeanorchangedalmostimmeditactician.
Thisraisesthequestionofwhen
atelyto thatofa soberandcalculating
abated.
Kennedy'sinitialbelligerence
A fourth
is one thathas onlyrecently
beenidentified
pattern
bycomparison
withtheseothers.It is thedisparity
betweenthepublicand privateaspectsof
Kennedy'shandlingofthecrisis.A newlyacceptedviewofthecrisis,generated
fromrecently
availabledata,holdsthatKennedynegotiated
in a quid pro quo
manner
theremovaloftheSovietmissiles
(orwouldhavebeenwillingtonegotiate)
in Cuba in exchangefortheremovalofU.S. Jupiter
missilesin Turkey(Blight&
as
Welch, 1989). AlthoughtheCuban missilecrisishas long been understood
of an Americanultimatum
and a Sovietwithdrawal
(Abel, 1966),this
consisting
newerperspective
raisesquestionsconcerning
thedifference
betweenthepublic
and privateconductof crisismanagement
the
beliefs
and,potentially, attendant
involved.Thisdifference
meritsa deeperinvestigation.
Patternsand Expectations
afterthecrisis,observers
characterized
itas a textbook
case of
Immediately
theappropriate
use offorce(Abel,1966;Schlesinger,
1965;Sorensen,1965).The
UnitedStates,it was understood,
helda preponderance
ofconventional
forcesin
the area of dispute.The Sovietswerepresentedwithan ultimatum
of either
theirmissilesorpreparing
to fighta nuclearwar.Havingexpressed
withdrawing
theirbeliefthattheUnitedStateswas "too liberalto fight,"the Sovietswere
andbackeddownwhenconfronted
withanAmerican
resolvetouseforce
surprised
examinations
ofthepublicrhetoric
(Sorensen,1965,p. 669). Qualitative
support
ComparingKennedy'sPublicand PrivateRhetoric
547
theinterpretation
thatKennedymade a stand,theopponentsfacedeach other
"eyeballto eyeball,"to quote Dean Rusk,"and theotherfellowjust blinked"
(White,1997,p. 120).
haveindicated
that,
However,morerecentrevelations
Kennedyhad
privately,
a withdrawal
settlement
of
beenwillingtonegotiate
a morecooperative
including
In
sent
on
28
October
in
&
a
letter
missiles
Welch,
1989).
Turkey(Blight
Jupiter
1962 and neverofficially
receivedby theKennedyadministration
(butreleased
thathisconcessions"took
intimated
fromRussianarchivesin 1992),Khrushchev
to resolvetheJupiter
missileproblem
intoaccount"the Americanagreement
with
todiscuss
Robert
secret
1965,
(Sorensen,
Kennedy's
p. 56).
meeting Dobrynin
record.Earlypublic
thisarrangement
has also come to be partof thehistorical
histories,
includingRobertKennedy's(1969) own memoirs,describeda very
be consistent
withtheories
ofimpresdifferent
setofevents(whichmustcertainly
sionmanagement).
betweenKennedy'spublic
Thesenewerqualitative
a disparity
analysespredict
In thecase of themissilecrisis,it wouldappear
and privaterhetoric.
utterances
was
fromthehistorical
accountsthatthenatureof theU.S.-Sovietrelationship
muchmorecooperative
thanone wouldexpectfroman examination
ofthepublic
inpublicandprivaterhetoric
record.We shouldexpectthisdifference
tomanifest
in
in
the
VICS
indices
the
view
ofthe
itself
followingways:Kennedy'sprivate
thanhispublicone (hypothepoliticaluniverse(P-l) shouldbe morecooperative
sis 1). He shouldalso be moreoptimistic
abouttherealization
of politicalgoals
2). If theAmericansand Sovietswere
(P-2) in privatethanin public(hypothesis
we shouldalso expect(hypothesis
a compromise,
3) Kensecretlynegotiating
thanitspubliccounterpart,
and
(I-1) tobe morecooperative
nedy's privatestrategy
4) thesameshouldbe trueofhistactics(1-2).
(hypothesis
A secondpattern
tothe
suggested
bysomeanalystsstandsin partialcontrast
outlinedabove. Initially,
thesescholarshold,
dichotomy
simplerpublic-private
Kennedywas privately
belligerent-acondition
sparkedlargelybyangerat what
he perceivedtobe Sovietattempts
todeceivehim-and hisfocusattheoutsetwas
on theairstrikeoption,becauseofhisconcernoverthenear-operational
statusof
themissiles(Schlesinger,
1965;Sorensen,1965).Buthisinitialhostility
gaveway,
at somepointduringthecourseof thecrisis,to a moreflexibleposition(White,
to his initialleanings,he optedfortheleastprovocative
1992, 1997). Contrary
and
firstby
then,
despitehis earlierrejectionof thepositionforwarded
response
U.N. Ambassador
AdlaiStevenson,
movedtowarda negotiated
resolution
(May&
shouldmanifest
itselfmostclearlyina
Zelikow,1997;White,1997).Thispattern
shiftin Kennedy'soperational
code overtime.Thatis, his view of thepolitical
universe(P-1) shouldbe initially
hostile(hypothesis
(P-2)
5), hisinitialoptimism
shouldbe low(hypothesis
and
we
should
also
6),
7) hisstrategic
expect(hypothesis
conflictual.
Ac8) tacticalpropensities
(1-2)to be initially
(I-1) and (hypothesis
to
shift
from
an
cording Schlesinger(1965), Kennedy's
away
angryresponse
towarda reasonedstrategy
occurredrapidly.Each of thesefourVICS indices
Marfleet
548
9 to 12) and
shouldalmostimmediately
becomemorecooperative(hypotheses
13 to 16).
continuetodo so as thecrisisprogresses
(hypotheses
thesis.Had leadersbothin theUnitedStates
A third
is theGettysburg
pattern
closeto
andtheSovietUnioncometorecognizethattheyhadmoveddangerously
thebrinkofglobaldestruction?
Kennedy'sresponseto thisquestionseemsmost
8 monthslater,duringhisAmericanUniversity
speech.In the
clearlyarticulated
Unionand
of
attitudes
toward
the
Soviet
called
for
a
reexamination
he
speech
arguedthatwe shouldno longerfeel "grippedby forcesbeyondour control"
inthisdirection
in
toshift
(Kennedy,1964,p. 460). Had Kennedy'sbeliefsstarted
towardtheSovietsthen?Had he feltthe
October?Did he arriveat a newattitude
situation
outofcontrolduringthecrisis,andhadthisrealization
changed
spiraling
hisbeliefs?
Muchofwhatwe mighthypothesize
fromtheGettysburg
thesisis consistent
withthe patterndetailedabove (more cooperatively
valencedself and other
and tactics).In additionto these
and a cooperativeshiftin strategy
attributions,
of
three
others
are
note:
the
ofthepoliticaluniverse
beliefs,
particular
predictability
and
the
role
ofchance(P-5). We
control
over
historical
(P-4),
(P-3),
development
shouldexpectlowerscoreslaterin thecrisison thepredictability
17)
(hypothesis
and control(hypothesis
18) indices,and a higherscore on therole-of-chance
indicator
thanat theoutsetofthecrisis(hypothesis
19).
The "overconfidence
thesis"standsin contrastto the Gettysburg
thesis.
therewas greatreliefamongtheU.S. decision-makers
as thecrisiswas
Certainly
resolved.Was thisreliefcoupledwithpridein makingtherightdecisionand
confidencein theirabilityto manipulatetheircapabilitiesand influencetheir
learnedthe utilityof
opponents?We have been told thatsome policymakers
coercivediplomacy(Georgeet al., 1971). Theyperceivedthattheescalationof
onadversaries
workedinthisinstance
andthat,
whenmetwith
pressure
eventually,
theappropriate
orforce,anyadversary
wouldbackdown--even
degreeof threat
In the mindof at least one observer,the Cuban missilecrisis
a superpower.
toU.S. policymakers
a faithinthestrategy
ofescalationandperhaps
"bequeathed
a misplacedbeliefin theirown infallibility"
thatpossiblycontributed
to the
in Vietnamseveralyearslater(White,1997,p. 152). If
deepeninginvolvement
we wouldexpecthypotheses
17, 18,and 19
Kennedydid becomeoverconfident,
tobe reversed.
Thepredictability
indexshouldbe higher
attheendthanattheoutset
ofthecrisis,as shouldthelocus-of-control
whereastherole-of-chance
indicator,
indicator
shouldbe lower.
Sampling
To testthesehypotheses,
I firstdividedtheperiodof thecrisisintophases
basedon theimportant
tothe
turning
pointsinKennedy'sstateofmindaccording
literature.
Forthepurposesofthisstudy,
theseturning
secondary
pointsare(1) the
eveningof 18 October,whenKennedyappearedto settleon theblockadeas a
PublicandPrivateRhetoric
Kennedy's
Comparing
549
of 24 October,whentheblockadewas implecourseof action;(2) themorning
nuclearwarloomed,andtheExecutiveCommittee
mented,
(ExCom)1waitedfor
theSovietresponse;and (3) 28 October,whenKhrushchev's
broadcastsignaled
theend of thecrisis.Thesetimepointsdividethetimelineof thecrisisintofour
phases.2
I definephase 1 as the"pre-decision"
phase.It beganin lateAugustwhen
evidenceof Sovietconventional
forcebuildupsand rumorsof missilesfocused
on Cuba andhissuspicions
on theSoviets.Duringthisphase,
Kennedy'sattention
to
of
it
is
that
the
up
point decision, mycontention Kennedy'sbeliefswouldbe in
a stateoffluxbecauseofsomeuncertainty
Sovietactionsandmotives.
regarding
theprocessofproblem
wasvirtually
Bytheeveningof18October,
recognition
intoKhrushchev's
motiveshadbeenextensive.The
complete.The investigation
ExCom deliberations
had identified
Sovietdesignson Berlinas thelikelywellspringfortheiractions,and thisbeliefwas amongthosecentralto Kennedy's
decisionnottotakea moreforceful
orprovocative
action(May& Zelikow,1997).
Phase 2, the "decision"phase of thecrisis,was enterednearmidnight
on the
eveningof 18 October,as Kennedydictatedintoan Oval Officetapemachine
theadministration's
theblockadein 2 days(May& Zelikow,
plansto implement
1997). The blockadewould notactuallybe announceduntil22 Octoberand
the morningof 24 October.However,afterthisseriesof early
implemented
thefocusoftheExComdiscussionshifted.
Insteadofbeingdominated
meetings,
bya discussionofwhatactionsoughttobe taken,theparticipants
beganfocusing
oftheExComwere:Vice President
I Thecoremembers
ofStateDeanRusk,
LyndonJohnson,
Secretary
UnderSecretary
of StateGeorgeBall, LatinAmericanAssistantSecretary
EdwinMartin,Deputy
UnderSecretary
Alexis Johnson,
FormerSovietAmbassadorLlewellynThompson,Secretaryof
DefenseRobertMcNamara,DeputySecretary
RoswellGilpatric,
Assistant
Paul Nitzeand
Secretary
Chairman
oftheJoint
ChiefsofStaffGeneralMaxwellTaylor,CIA Director
JohnMcCone,Attorney
GeneralRobertKennedy,
Treasury
Secretary
DouglasDillion,WhiteHouseaidesMcGeorgeBundy
andTheodoreSorenson.Occasionalparticipants
andvisitors
included:Dean Acheson,AdlaiStevenson,RobertLovett,CharlesBohlen,MarshallCarter,Arthur
Lundahl,KennethO'Donnell,Henry
Fowler,RogerHillsman,EdwardMcDermott,
SidneyGraybeal,GeneralCurtisLeMay and other
oftheU.S. SenateandCongress(Sorenson,1965,p. 674-675;
leaders,andseveralmembers
military
May & Zelikow,1997,p. 40-42).
2 Thesephasesparallel
madebyGuttieri,
Wallace,andSuedfeld(1995)
largelythephasedesignations
withoneexception,
theendofthepre-crisis
orpre-decision
phase.Theseauthors,
usingthesamedata,
focusedon theroleofstressinpatterns
ofcognition
andtherefore
placedemphasison thediscovery
of missilesas a stress-inducing
For reasonsdiscussedin thissection,froma belief
development.
thisdateis notas important
as thepointsat whichtheproblemfirstbecomes
systemsperspective
salientanda decisionis made(although
thearrivalofthemissilesshortened
theelapsedtimebetween
thesetwopoints).Earlierattempts
toconductcontent
or
analysesofeithertheMcBundytranscripts
memoranda,
(1992) andAnderson
byPurkitt
meeting
(1987),havealso focusedon temporal
changes
in ExCom meeting
dynamicsbuthavebeenseverelylimitedbydataavailability.
By focusingon 2
atthebeginning
andendofthecrisis(16 and27 October),Purkitt
daysofmeetings
adoptedan earlyversuslate-crisis
theearliestoftheseattempts,
usedmemoranda
approach.Anderson'sstudy,
generatedby 3 daysof meetingslate in thecrisis(25 to 27 October)andcontainedno earlysamples-a
limitation
thatAnderson
wouldbe overcomeintime.
correctly
predicted
550
Marfleet
on how to implement
thevariousplans(White,1997). In particular,
contingent
of American
military
preparations,
diplomaticmaneuversin the Organization
States,andlikelySovietresponsesoccupiedKennedyandthediscussants.
Thissecondphaseended,andphase3 began,on 24 October.As we havebeen
toldon numerous
camecloserto nuclear
occasions,on thisdaythesuperpowers
warthanatanyothertime.As Sovietfreighters
steamedtowardCuba,joinedbya
of submarines,
and Americannavalvesselsmovedto intercept
them,
contingent
theExComwaitedfornews.RobertKennedyobserved,
"Thesefewminutes
were
thetimeof gravestconcernforthePresident.
Was theworldon thebrinkof a
holocaust?Was itourerror?"(Kennedy,1969,p. 69). As thepresident
appeared
toquestionhisdecision,"Hisfaceseemeddrawnandhiseyespained,almostgray"
theactionsoftheSovietships,
(Kennedy,1969,p. 70). As newsarrived
concerning
tensions
eased.Manyfeltas iftheyhaddodgeda bullet.Kennedydecidedtomatch
Khrushchev's
cautionwithhis own (Schlesinger,
1965). In this"post-decision"
and the basis fora
phase,Kennedyand Khrushchev
corresponded
frequently
settlement
statement
on28 October,
that
begantoemerge.Khrushchev's
indicating
themissileswouldbe withdrawn,
markstheonsetof phase4, the"resolution"
phase. This phase endedon 20 November,whenKennedy'spressconference
remarks
indicated
thatKhrushchev
hadkepthispromise.
The recordof Kennedy'spublicstatements
andthetranscripts
oftheprivate
ExCom meetingswereexaminedforeach of theseperiodsto determine
which
utterances
the1,500-word
satisfied
minimum
lengthrequiredby theVICS samEach of thetranscripts
of theExCom meetingswas examinedto
plingcriteria.
an
estimate
of
the
of
the
discussion
thatKennedyalonegenerated.
generate
quantity
all
of
the
transcribed
satisfied
the
minimum
for
1,500-word
Virtually
meetings
content.
Those
where
amounted
to
less
Kennedy
meetings
Kennedy'sparticipation
than1,500words,andtheprivaterecording
thathe madeintheOval Officeon 18
were
excluded
from
the
frame.3
October,
sampling
In theprivatesphere,morethanone utterance
satisfied
thelengthcriteria
in
threeof thefourperiods.In thepublicsphere,onlythefirstperiodoffered
more
thanone utterance
thatcouldbe coded.The 13 September
was
pressconference
therecorded
the1,500-word
minimum
foruseoftheVICS method,
3 Although
monologue
approaches
itwasexcludedbecause,unliketheotherrecordings,
Theabsence
Kennedywas notina groupsetting.
of advisorsmakesthisrecording
distinct.
In theinterest
of maximizing
qualitatively
comparability
across phasesand limitingthe introduction
of confounding
factorsintotheanalysis,theprivate
wasexcluded.Publicutterances
werecollectedfromtheNationalArchives(Kennedy,1962,
recording
of theprivateExCom meetingsweredrawnfromMay and Zelikow
1963, 1964). The transcripts
transcribed
accountsofthecontents
ofall ofthepublicly
released
(1997).Thisbookpresents
carefully
thiscrisis(16 to29 October).Theefforts
ofthe
tapesthatKennedymadeofthemeetings
surrounding
authorsin getting
thesetranscripts
services,audiospecialists,
made-includinghiringtranscription
andcourtrecorders
andbringing
inoutsideexperts,
historians
andformer
staff
to
members,
including
details-farexceedsanycomparable
efforts
todate.TheMayandZelikowtranscriptions
must
clarify
be considered
themostcompletedatasetavailableofKennedy'sprivateutterances
duringthecrisis.
Rhetoric
Public
andPrivate
Kennedy's
Comparing
551
chosen over Kennedy's4 Septemberstatement
usingrandommeans.For the
thanbymeeting)
ExCommeetings,
a decisionwas madeto samplebyday(rather
weredevoted
thattheday'searliermeetings
in ordertocontrolforthepossibility
weremore
anddissemination,
whereasthelatermeetings
tointelligence
assessment
anddiscussion.Aftera daywas randomly
focusedon assessments
selected,all of
as separatemeasures.
Each utterance
thatday'smeetings
wereselectedandtreated
I
anda
VICS
method.
coded
all
of
the
was content-analyzed
the
utterances,
using
wasrandomly
selectedandcodedbya second
20% sampleofeachoftheutterances
withthemethod.
The totalpercentandexperience
coderwithequivalenttraining
score
for
all
utterances
is
.88.
age agreement
thedocuments
selectedforcodingandthephasedesignaFigure1 illustrates
Notethatthethird(post-decision)
tionson a timeline.
phaseis without
anypublic
statements
were
issuedduring
thistime,no
two
White
House
utterances.
Although
were actuallycommunicated
statements
by Kennedy.Questionsof authorship
if
these
two
White
House
statements
werecombined,
even
aside,
theywouldnot
As
the
minimum
size
set
VICS.
a
no
criteria
result, publicor private
satisfy
by
werecodedforthatperiod,leavingonlythreeperiodsforcomparison.
utterances
Analysisand Discussion
Table I presentstheresultsof sevenseparatetwo-wayanalysesof variance
codeindicesforwhichhypotheses
were
(ANOVAs),oneforeachoftheoperational
These analysesincludedthephase,thesourceof rhetoric
generated.
(publicor
ofphaseandsourceofrhetoric
andtheinteraction
as sourcesofvariance.
private),
differences
Althoughthe ANOVA resultsindicatethepresenceof significant
anddifferences
betweenKennedy'spublicandprivaterhetoric
acrossphases,the
F scoresalonedo notindicatethenatureofthisdifference.
As thegraphsinFigure2 illustrate,
thesedifferences
appeartobe theopposite
of whatwas hypothesized
1 to 4). The scoresforstrategy
(I-1) and
(hypotheses
tactics(1-2)areconsistently
morenegativein Kennedy'sprivaterhetoric
throughout thecrisis.The politicaluniverse(P-1) and optimism
(P-2) indices,although
morepositive
roughly
equivalentat theoutsetofthecrisis,becomesubstantially
in Kennedy'spublicrhetoric
as thecrisisprogresses.
becausenoneof
Moreover,
theinteraction
effects
are significant,
we can statewithsomeconfidence
thatthe
of
and
difference
is
that
indicated
these
indices
holds
pattern private public
by
acrossphases.Contrary
to hypotheses
1 to 4, Kennedywas on thewholemore
in all phases.
negativeinhisprivaterhetoric
was
valenced?One
Why
Kennedy'sprivaterhetoricmoreconflictually
could
be
the
nature
of
discussions.
and
his
advisorswere
explanation
Kennedy
ofteninvolvedin crafting
for
worst-case
scenarios.
Theirlosscontingency
plans
often
led
to
the
consideration
of
some
extreme
prevention
perspective
options,such
as invasion,nuclearretaliation,
and evenall-outwar.Therewas littlediscussion
morepositive,goal-oriented
settlement.
The
regarding
approachesto negotiated
PrivateStatements
5:00p 6:00p 5:00p 5:00
3:00D
10:00a 010:
11:30a10:a
10:Oaa 1
6:30P
11:50a
15
1
16
11:00a
i1
9:45a
17
I.......
13
September
PressConference
18
.... .
19
20
21
1ii
22
23
24
i1
25
I I I I
October
22
Television
Address
PublicStatements
[P1]
Pre-decision
[P2]
Decision
P
Crisis Phases
arefromtranscripts
ofExCom meetings
Figure1. Samplingframe.The privatestatements
(tho
ComparingKennedy'sPublic and PrivateRhetoric
553
Table I. Comparison
ofVICS IndicesforElementsofPresident
Code,by
Kennedy'sOperational
ofPhaseand Source,12 September
to20 November1962
Phase,Source,andInteraction
VICS index
Philosophicalquestions
Natureofthepoliticaluniverse
Realizationofpoliticalgoals
ofthepoliticaluniverse
Predictability
Controloverhistorical
development
Role ofchance
Instrumental
questions
I-1. Approachtogoals(strategy)
1-2. Pursuit
ofgoals(tactics)
P-1.
P-2.
P-3.
P-4.
P-5.
Phase
F(3, 1)
Source
F(3, 1)
Phasex
Source
F(3, 1)
8.74*
6.30*
2.99
0.71
1.71
7.22*
7.88*
1.09
9.69*
0.15
4.90
4.89
1.90
0.49
0.67
15.04*
11.41**
59.12***
34.06***
1.35
1.10
tests.
*p < .10,**p < .05,***p< .01; N= 9, one-tailed
A
is a highfrequency
ofnegativeselfandotherattributions.
resultofthispattern
could
comfortsecondexplanation
relatestotheissueofaccountability.
Kennedy
Thisincludedvoicinghisanger
ablyexpressthefullrangeofhisviewsinprivate.
aboutSovietmotives.He couldnotarticulate
at Khrushchev
and his uncertainty
in
he
forthem.
thesebeliefs public,where mightbe heldaccountable
The second set of hypothesesrelatesto allegationsof Kennedy'sinitial
andangeroverKhrushchev's
actionsandthetimeat whichthishostility
hostility
abated.The resultsof theanalysisindicatethatKennedydid appearbelligerent
withtheexpectations
duringtheearliestphase of thecrisis.This is consistent
and expressedin hypotheses
5 to 8.
generatedfromthe qualitativeliterature
little
However,as shownin Figure2, theseVICS indicesdemonstrate
relatively
anddecisionphases,regardchangeinKennedy'sbeliefsbetweenthepre-decision
less of source.Virtually
all oftheobservedchangesin Kennedy'sbeliefsappear
tohaveoccurred
afterthecrisishadentered
theresolution
phase.4Kennedyindeed
butthisbelligerence
was onlyminimally
diminished
appearedinitially
belligerent,
untilthecrisiswasall butresolved.Thisobservation,
whichcontradicts
hypotheses
9 to 12 butconfirms
13 to 16,leadsnaturally
towardtheexamination
hypotheses
of lessonsdrawnfromthecrisisand thefinalhypotheses
thatrelateto thenature
andtrajectory
ofKennedy'sbeliefsat theclose ofevents.
In termsof lessonsdrawn,we are presentedwithtwo verydifferent
and
theGettysburg
andoverconfidence
theses.The genercontradictory
possibilities:
and instrumental
beliefs
allycooperativetrendin Kennedy'smainphilosophical
4 Separateone-wayANOVA analysescomparing
phases1 and2, firstforprivateutterances
onlyand
thenforall utterances
differences
betweentheVICS scores.A
combined,revealedno significant
similaranalysisusingonlypublicutterances
cannotbe conductedbecauseofthelackofdegreesof
freedom
(N = 2).
P-1. NatureofthePolitical
Universe
toG
I-1. Approach
.8.4
.6
.4.
a000
.7
2
/
-2
/
-.
2/
4
E
85Public
-- .;
.......
.8E
........
........
SOURCE
"
Private
S-1.00
12
.8
-.6
w
-1.0
4
1
PHASE
2
PHASE
P-2. Realization
ofPolitical
Goals
1-2.Pursuit
ofGoal
(Optimism)
.6
.4
0)
0.0
.2
.
0.0
SOURCE
2
----2
w
-.4
.
Public
Private
.S
E
2
PHASE
3 ,Public
4
-.4
12
PHASE
Figure2. Estimated
marginalmeans,byphaseandsourceofVICS indices,forKennedy'smainphi
ComparingKennedy'sPublic and PrivateRhetoric
555
thatwould
towardtheendofthecrisiswouldappeartoconfirm
partofthepattern
of
thesis.However,theindicesforpredictability
be associatedwiththeGettysburg
thepoliticaluniverse(P-3), locusofcontrol(P-4),and roleofchance(P-5) were
designatedas theones thatwouldmostclearlyindicatewhichof theselessons
Kennedymighthavetakentoheart.
As thegraphsfortheseVICS scoresindicate(Figure3), thegeneraltrend
theidea thattheviewsthatKennedyexpoundedin hisspeech
appearsto support
of
attheendofthecrisis.Thepredictability
at AmericanUniversity
wereformed
thepoliticaluniverse(P-3) declinesas thecrisisends,as doesthelocus-of-control
variable(P-4), indicatingthatKennedyfeltless in controlof theU.S.-Soviet
indicator
trends
afterthecrisis.The role-of-chance
(P-5) predictably
relationship
in
are
consistent
These
results
as
the
crisis
mid-crisis).
progresses
(peaking
higher
noneofthesedifferences
withhypotheses
17, 18,and 19,respectively.
Although
I
direction
acrossphasesis statistically
significant,believe-giventhecoincident
we canexcludethepossibility
thatKennedywas overconfident
ofthetrends-that
oftheGettysburg
thesis.
andinterpret
theresultsas provisional
confirmation
Conclusions
The resultsfromtheVICS analysisofthenatureofKennedy'sbeliefchange
Kennedy'sprivate
duringtheCubanmissilecrisisand at itsconclusionconfirm
at theoutsetofthecrisis.Theyalso suggest,contrary
to someaccounts,
hostility
thattherewas nota greatchangein Kennedy'sapproachto thecrisisin theearly
wasdetected
betweenthepre-decision
anddecisionphases
stages.Littledifference
in Kennedy'sprivaterhetoric.
Althoughhe mayhavechosentheblockadepath,
Kennedyappearedwillingto continueto considerothermoreconfrontational
optionswellintothecrisis.5Theresultsalso suggestthatKennedy'sbeliefsatthe
endof thecrisiswereon a trajectory
consistent
with,andperhapsleadingto,the
sentiments
expressedintheAmerican
University
speech.Thisprovides
provisional
fortheGettysburg
thesisandsomedisconfirming
evidenceregarding
the
support
overconfidence
thesis.It also raises some interesting
counterfactual
questions
the courseof U.S. foreignpolicyhad Kennedycontinuedin office
regarding
(Fearon,1991;Tetlock& Belkin,1996).
The studyalso providessomeinsights
intothepublic/private
rhetoric
debate.
The absenceof significant
interaction
termsin the ANOVA analysisand the
ofparallellinesthatappearin thegraphical
theinstrupatterns
plots,particularly
mentalmeasures(I-1 and 1-2),suggestthatalthoughtheremaybe differences
betweentheactualvalues of theindicesgeneratedusingthedifferent
typesof
5
This echoesAnderson's(1987) findings
thattheExCom was stillengagedin "decision"-oriented
behaviors(taskdescriptions
and theconsideration
of alternatives)
well intothepost-decision
phase
andwas notsolelyfocusedon theconsequencesofpastactions.
P-3. Predictability
ofthePolitical
1.0
Universe
P-5. Role ofChance
5.9
C
a.4
ca
...
3
c
Fc
C
2
E
.1
W
0.0
SOURCE
-- --Public
E
Private
1
2
4
w
.6
1
PHASE
2
PHASE
P-4. ControlOverHistorical
.8
Development
c?.7
SOURCE
.6
6
Public
E
W
.5 1
12
Private
4
PHASE
andro
means,byphaseandsourceofVICS indices,forpredictability,
Figure3. Estimated
control,
marginal
ComparingKennedy'sPublic and PrivateRhetoric
557
thegeneraltrendstheydefinemaybe similar.Thissuggeststhatchanges
rhetoric,
shouldbe the
in theVICS scores,rather
thanthevaluesofthescoresthemselves,
focusof futureanalyses.It also suggeststhateven thoughprivateand public
statements
ofbeliefchangeusing
bothcan serveas thebasis foran examination
theVICS method,thecontext-sensitive
natureof theindicesmeansthatspecial
attention
mustbe paidtothenatureoftherhetoric
anditssourcewhencomparing
acrossindividuals
orovertime.
The analysisalso generatessome questionsforfutureresearch.The first
noutterances
concernsthepost-decision
werecodedinthisphase
phase.Although
becauseofthelackofpublicstatements,
thehistories
ofthecrisissuggestthatthis
withthe
phase was the mostvolatilein termsof tacticalchanges,interaction
had
on
and
decided
the
of
opponents, possiblelearning.Kennedy
utility a diplomaticapproacharound24 October,
butitwas notuntillaterthata tradeofmissiles
was approved.The intervening
seriesofletters
exchangedbetweenKennedyand
Khrushchev
an
alternative
basis
for
betweentypesof
mayprovide
comparison
rhetoric.
Anotherarea thatmeritsfurther
is therolethatthepresident's
investigation
interaction
withhisadvisorsplayedin shapinghisbeliefs.A considerable
portion
of thesecondaryliterature
on thecrisisconcernsitselfwiththenatureof group
andthecrisisoutcome.How different
deliberations
werethebeliefsexpressedby
thehawksfromthosearticulated
the
How
doves?
didKennedy'sbeliefsreflect
by
theadvicehewasgetting?
Did hisstatements
affect
thepattern
ofbeliefsexpressed
constitutes
the
byothers?As MayandZelikow(1997) noted,thissetoftranscripts
mostcompletedatasetavailableon howan elitegroupofpolicymakers
arrived
at
a setofimportant
decisions.Thereis a needforfurther
systematic
analysisofthese
data.
AUTHOR'S ADDRESS
thisarticleshouldbe senttoB. Gregory
Marfleet,
Correspondence
concerning
of
Political
ArizonaStateUniversity,
Science,
Department
Tempe,AZ 852872001. E-mail:[email protected]
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