Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics
Author(s): Alexander Wendt
Source: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 391-425
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858 .
Accessed: 15/10/2011 09:10
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White House StaffVersusthe Cabinet:
Roles
Centripetaland Centrifugal
JAMES P. PFIFFNER
Science
Associate
ofPolitical
Professor
Mason
George
University
The firsttask of any new administrationmust be the organizationof the
White House and the establishmentof the role the cabinetwill play.1If thesecentral
issues are not settled,the Presidentwill have trouble pursuingany of his political
or governmentalpriorities.And if thereare problemswithin or between these two
centralinstitutionsin an administration,much valuable time can be lost until the
tensionsare settled.The early months of an administrationare particularlycrucial
to a new presidentbecause theyprovidea narrowwindow of opportunityto accomplish his goals.
Ifthepresidentdoes not designateearlywho will be firstamong hisWhite House
staff,it is an invitationto struggle;for much is at stake. The President'sprogram
will necessarilywait while the battle forwho is in chargeis settled.The Carter administrationlost a lot of time while the relativepositions of Hamilton Jordanand
JackWatsonwereestablished.This strugglehelpedto negatesomeoftheotherelaborate
had undertakenduringthe transition.Time was also
preparationsthe administration
lost and energymisspentin the Ford and the Carterpresidencieswhile each president
experimentedwith a "spokes of the wheel" model of White House organizationand
refusedto designatea chiefof staff.
Presidentsmust also set early ground rules for the role that cabinet members
will play in the administrationand the appropriaterelationshipbetween the White
House staffand the Cabinet. It must be clear what is and is not delegatedbefore
cabinet secretariesget establishedin theirdepartments.If this is not done it will be
verydifficultto call presumeddelegationsback in. PresidentsNixon and Carterboth
feltthattheyhad delegatedtoo much to theircabinetsecretariespersonnelselection.
later found this to be an expensivemistakewhen theyfinally
Both administrations
resortedto firingand replacingseveralcabinet membersin orderto regaincontrol,
Nixon afterthe 1972 election and Carter in the summerof 1979.
This articlewill examineissuesinvolvedin the organizationof the White House
and itsrelationship
with theCabinet. It will pointout some lessonsthatcan be learned
fromrecentpresidencies.
666
WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 667
Organizingthe WhiteHouse
Presidents
choosetheirWhiteHouse staffs
fromthosewho have
primarily
workedwiththemon theircampaigns
forverygoodreasons.Thosewho haveworked
on thecampaignunderstand
bestthepersonality
and
closelywiththenewpresident
in thejudgMoreimportantly,
thepresident
hasconfidence
valuesofthepresident.
mentof thepeoplewho haveweathered
thestormsof campaigning
withhimand,
"The president's
confidence
is theonlyqualification
accordingtoJohnEhrlichman,
forworkingin theWhiteHouse."2In addition,"youuseyourowncampaignorganizationbecausepeopleknow each other"and are used to workingtogether.3
because
This naturalchoiceofcampaignaides,however,
maylead to problems,
thenatureof governing
is substantially
different
fromthenatureof politicalcamintheWhiteHouse,
with
fourteen
Patterson,
yearsworking
experience
paigns.Bradley
almosttheopposite
neededin thecrucibleofa campaign-are
arguesthat"The virtues
of thepreparation
neededforlifewithinthe White House."4
in
In a politicalcampaignissuesmustbe simplified
anddifferences
accentuated;
shadesofgrey."
willnothelp
theWhiteHouse issuestakeon "infinite
Simplification
thepresident
dealwiththetoughissues.In a campaignpeopleareeitherforyouor
againstyou,andthelatterareseenas theenemy.But in theWhiteHouse coalitions
and thecountrymust
mustbe builtto gain supportforthepresident's
programs,
In a campaignpublicityis avidlysought;exbe unitedbehindtheadministration.
the
and
his
staff
contributes
to makingthe maximumimpact
of
candidate
posure
the staffmusthavethat"passion
on voters'minds.In theWhiteHouse, however,
forstaff
members
foranonymity"
ofwhichLouisBrownlowspoke.A highpublicprofile
no
to
him.
Patterson
asks:
"Can a
and
is
service
decreasesthePresident's
visibility
bunchofegotists
be so metamorphosed
betweenNovember
hard-driving,
fast-moving
5 andJanuary
20?" His answeris "Perhaps."5
in gettingappointments
to
Becauseof the typesof peoplewho are successful
thatexistsat thehighest
theWhiteHouse staff
andbecauseofthetypeofatmosphere
levelsofpower,thebestinpeopleis notalwaysbroughtout. Thereis theopportunity
staffs
from
butalso fortheabuseofpower.In hisbook on presidential
forgreatness,
describes
White
House
staff
members:
Patrick
Anderson
Rooseveltthrough
Johnson,
andunashamedly
on themake.Theytake
"Theytendtobe young,highlyintelligent,
havea little
chances,theycut corners,and unlikemostpoliticianstheysometimes
of
their
charmand
left
in
them.
This
accounts
for
much
and
irreverence
spontaneity
mostof theirproblems."6
ofgreatpowerandpressure
ofpersonality
The combination
typesin thepresence
to achieveshorttermpoliticalgoals combineto maketheWhiteHouse a peculiar
withdangeras well as opportunity.
cauldronfrought
"Policydifferences,
piledon
and
heated
sometimes
the
time
of
clashes,multiplied
by
by
pressures,
top personality
conflict."7
newsleaks,canaddup to an incandescent
vindictive
plasmaofhigh-voltage
in
White
House
and
the
to
be
the
Withtheparticular
pressure
typeslikely
personality
issuestakeon extraordinary
filledatmosphere,
importance.
organizational
668
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
Eisenhower and Kennedy Models Contrasted
The two mainmodelsofWhiteHouse organization
in thecontemporary
aretheEisenhower
andtheRoosevelt-Kennedy
models.Recentpresidents
presidency
haveseemedtowantto imitatePresident
Eisenhower's
ofcabinetorganization
system
butnotnecessarily
hisWhiteHouse organization.
in staff
Eisenhower's
participation
in the military
led him to theconclusionthatthe White House
advisorysystems
mustbe organizedmuchmoreformally
thanTrumanand Roosevelthad organized
theirs.
Whilegoodorganization
wouldnotguarantee
toEisengoodadvice,according
howerit would enhancethelikelihoodof efficiency.
cannot
makea
"Organization
out
of
an
On
the
other
can
fail
hand,disorganization scarcely
genius
incompetent.
toresultininefficiency."8
insisted
thatas manyissuesas possiblebe settled
Eisenhower
belowthePresidential
leveland thatissuesbe presented
forhisconsideration
on one
memoranda.
page
The driving
forcebehindtheEisenhower
WhiteHouse staff
wasSherman
system
Adamswho cameto dominatetheWhiteHouse withan ironhand.Adamssaidthat
hisjob was"to managea staff
thatwouldboildown,simplify
andexpeditetheurgent
businessthathad to be broughtto Eisenhower's
and to keepas
personalattention
muchworkof secondary
as
off
his
desk."9
He
controlled
who
importance possible
saw thePresident,
andmostcabinetofficers
to thePresident
reported
throughhim.
He seemedto dominateWhiteHouse policyso thoroughly
thatone newspaper
ran
a storyheadlinedeclaring:"AdamsInsistsIke is ReallyPresident."10
One oftheusefulfunctions
Adamsperformed
wastoabsorbflackwhenthepresidentmadean unpopulardecisionon a minormatter.Adamscould be seenas the
"abominableno man"or theone who deniedaccessto thepresident.
This helped
maintainEisenhower's
leadernot concerned
withpettypoliimageas a benevolent
tics.11
On theotherhanda chiefofstaff
withtightcontrolofaccessto thePresident
canisolatethePresident
fromdiverse
pointsofviewandkeephimfromseeingpeople
whom he oughtto see. Greenstein
arguesthatthiswas not the case withAdams
andEisenhower,
the
issue
raisedlaterwithregardtotheNixonpresidency.
was
though
WhenJohnKennedywas electedhe was strongly
urgedbyhisadvisorsto reject
theEisenhower
modelof White House organization
and to adopta systemcloser
to thatof FranklinRoosevelt.In his memorandum,
thePresident-Elect,"
"Staffing
RichardNeustadtdescribedthe typeof organization
Kennedymightadopt:
You wouldbe yourown "chiefof staff . . . For ifyou followmyadviceyou
will commityourself
not to eachdetailöf Rooseveltian
practice. . . but to the
of hispresidential
and
operation;whereby
spirit
youwould oversee,coordinate,
interfere
withvirtually
staff
was
A
staff
has
to
everything
your
doing. collégial
be managed;competition
has to be audited.12
ClarkClifford
alsourgedKennedyto rejecttheEisenhower
modelwithitsdominantchiefofstaff.13
In a memorandum
to Kennedyhe argued:"A vigorousPresident
in theDemocratictradition
of thePresidency
will probablyfindit bestto act as his
own chiefof staff,
and to haveno highlyvisiblemajordomostandingbetweenhim
and his staff,
betweenhimand thepublic).It is important
thatall
(and,incidently,
WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 669
theseniorprofessional
and
personson thestaffshouldhaveaccessto thePresident,
thestaffshouldconsistof no morepersonsthancan conveniently
havesuchaccess
on a day-to-day
basis."14
and Neustadtand rana looselystrucKennedyfollowedtheadviceof Clifford
turedWhiteHousewithseveral
senioraideshavingaccessto thepresident.
Although
TheodoreSorensenwas hisprinciple
advisor,he neverbecamethekeeperofthegate
thatAdamswasforEisenhower
or HaldemanwasforNixon.Kennedy's
WhiteHouse
withEisenhower's
withrespectto thedelegationof auOperationalso contrasted
to
the
cabinet.
thority
LyndonJohnsoncontinuedtheKennedymodelof usinga fluid,unstructured
likeRoosevelt,dominated
theWhiteHouse staff
WhiteHouse staff.
WhileKennedy,
to doleout to whom;Johnson
withhisintelligence
andchoiceofwhichassignments
ofWhiteHousestaff
members
toextremes.
carried
hispersonal
domination
JackValenti
recallshow Johnsontreatedhis staff.
of humility
He brutalizedthem,alwaystriedto shovespoonfuls
throughtheir
clenchedteeth.He nevernamedanyof his aidesto be chiefof staff.He kept
as tohisthinking
othersin several
someaidesunenlightened
evenas heinstructed
directions
at the sametime.... He once said: "If anyoneis goingto makea
blunder
aroundhere,I wantit to be me and not someassistantto me
big-ass
He madesureeveryone
knewthesource
who thinkshe is runningthecountry."
oftheirpower:"Now youveryimportant
guysoughttokeeponethinginmind.
The folkstonightwho tellyou how smartyou areand how charming
you are
think
can
to
me.
don'tgivea pig'sass aboutyoupersonally.
you
They
They
get
also knowyouwon'tbe aroundthisOval Officeone secondlongerthanme."15
inJohnson's
The lackofstructure
WhiteHouseandJohnson's
styleofdominating
hisstaff
ledPatrick
Andersonto entitlea sectionofhischapteron theJohnsonWhite
The WhiteHouse underJohnsonwas so unstrucHouse Staff"Caligula'sCourt."16
chart
turedthatwhen a new aide reportedfordutyand askedforan organization
he was toldbyan amusedcareerofficial
who hadbeenin theWhiteHouse forthirty
chartat theWhiteHouse becausewe don't
years:"We don'thaveanyorganization
haveanyorganization."17
Nixon'sWhiteHouse
In contrast
President
to theKennedyandJohnson
looselystructured
styles,
While
witha clearcut WhiteHouse organization.
Nixonbeganhisadministration
oftheorganization,
staff
members
wouldchange,thelynchpin
H.R. Haldeman,mainto Haldeman"You've
tainedthesametightcontrolovertheWhiteHouse. According
in
to keepstaffrivalries
a
clear
cut
structure"
order
to
establish
organizational
got
thepolicyprocess."We all
forthePresident's
earfromdominating
andcompetition
knewwherewe fit.Therewerefiveofus thatwereequal,but as BryceHarlowsaid:
therewas a firstamongequals,andit was clearlyme. Nobodyquestionedit. I never
assertedit; I neverarguedit. I neverhad to."18
and
While otherssaw Haldemanas a barrierbetweenthemand thepresident
670
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
muchpowerto itself;Haldeman
was arrogating
thattheWhiteHouse staff
suspected
saw his roleas merelyactingat thedirectionof the President."If I told someone
he knewit wasn'tme- he knewexactlywhat it was; it was an
to do something,
orderfromthePresident.
According
Theyknewan appealwouldn'tgetanywhere."19
needssomeonewho willmakethetoughdecisionsabout
to thisvieweveryPresident
fromhavingtomake
timeandwho willshieldthepresident
thePresident's
protecting
himself:
characterized
Haldeman
about
face-to-face
decisions
personnel.
unpleasant
and
I'm his
his
buffer
I'm
and
I'm
of
a
Nixon's.
needs
a
son
President
bitch,
"Every
bastard.I get done what he wantsdone and I takethe heatinsteadof him."20
aidethatis almostan alterego to thepresident
One oftheassetsofa closestaff
is thathe can weighwhatthepresident
saysand discountit ifin hisjudgmentthe
President
madea poordecisionout ofpique.HaldemanoftenstalledanddidnotimordersuntilNixonhadcooleddown.21Nixonalsocounted
plement
pettyorvindictive
demands.This
his
on Haldemanto protect timeand shieldhimfromunnecessary
ofappointments
seekers
wasa valuableservicein thatitdrewflackfromdissappointed
fromthe Presidentto Haldeman.
The reactionin thecountryto theWatergatescandalswas so strongthatthe
from
andtheiradministrations
felta needto distancethemselves
nexttwo Presidents
withpromises
FordandCartertobegintheirterms
ThisledPresidents
theNixonlegacy.
ofWhiteHouse
and a spokesof thewheelstructure
ofopenaccessto thePresident
to run
Each was forcedto admitfailureaftera periodof attempting
organization.
the White House withouta chiefof staff.
The Ford and Carter Reactions
Ford
President
after
Nixon'sresignation,
to thePresidency
Upon succeeding
a
return
of
He
from
his administration Nixon's.22 spoke
took painsto distinguish
White
thatwouldnothavea powerful
and
to"cabinet
government" anopenpresidency
"A
members.
cabinet
his
advisors
or
and
President
the
between
House staff
standing
House
White
and
ambitious
was madepossibleby a strongchiefof staff
Watergate
thanmembersof theCabinetbut who had littleor
aideswho weremorepowerful
in judgement.I wantedto reversethe trend.. . ."23
no practicalexperience
to himandwith
withninepeoplereporting
ThusFordbeganhisadministration
who mightevoke
ofrunninghisWhiteHouse withouta chiefofstaff
theintention
to a White
ofH.R. Haldeman.Butinordertolendsomesortofcoherence
thespecter
Coorditobe "Staff
Donald Rumsfeld
ofover500people,Forddesignated
House staff
nator."And afterseveralmonthsin officeevenFordhad to admitthatsomething
in ordertoruntheWhiteHouse. Fordexplained:
wasnecessary
akinto a chiefofstaff
forscheduling
had
to
be
I
"Someone, decided,
coordinating
appointments,
responsible
thepaperflow,followingup on decisionsI had madeand givingme statusreports
I didn'tliketheideaofcallingthispersonchief
on projectsandpolicydevelopment.
but thatwas the role he would fill."24
of staff,
of Defenseand
In theWinterof 1975 FordappointedRumsfeldto be Secretary
his
his deputyRichardCheneytook overas Ford'schiefof staff.Cheneyperceived
roleas chiefof staffto be to imposeorderon presidential
advice,but to do it in a
WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 671
low keymannerthatkepthimself
outofthespotlight
andin thebackground.
Cheney
viewedhimselfas an honestbrokerwho saw to it thatall viewswerepresented
to
thePresident.
Thishadtobe apparent
to Cabinetmembers
andtherestoftheWhite
in orderto prevent
House staff
themfromtryingto establishback channelsto the
in orderto gettheirown viewsheard."It is important
President
thattherestofthe
feel
that
we
will
their
to
the
ButCheney
troops
honestly
present
position
president."25
in theWhite House thattheRooseveltsystemwill
concludedfromhis experience
no longerwork:"Somebodyhas to be in charge."26
At a WhiteHousestaff
witha bicycle
wheelmounted
partyCheneywaspresented
on a largeboardwithall ofthespokesof thewheelmangledand tangledexceptfor
one whichwas theonlythingholdingthestructure
A plaquemountedon
together.
theboardread:"The spokesofthewheel:a rarefromofmanagement
as conartistry
ceivedbyDon Rumsfeld
andmodified
Dick
When
the
Ford
administraby
Cheney."
tionleftoffice
onJanuary
on hisdeskandappended
20, 1977Cheneyleftthepresent
a notereading"Dear Ham, bewarethe spokesof thewheel."27
Cartercameto officehe did notheedCheney'swarning.Carter,
WhenJimmy
likeFord,wasreacting
to Watergate
andtheNixonPresidency
andpromised
Cabinet
Government
WhiteHouse staff.
"I believein Cabinetadministrawithno powerful
tionofourgovernment.
Therewill neverbe an instancewhileI am President
when
themembers
oftheWhiteHouse staff
dominateor actin a superiorpositionto the
membersof our cabinet."28
Carteralso startedout with nineadvisorsreporting
to him,and he intended
to be his own chiefof staff.This camenaturally
forCarterwho pridedhimselfas
a good managerand who enjoyed(or was obsessedwith) thedetailsof policyand
Thisled to a situation
in whichit was difficult
in theexecutive
branch
management.
to determine
who was in charge,and fromtheperspective
of Congressit was not
clearwho werethekeyactorsanddecisionmakersin theWhiteHouse. The situation
conflict
was also aggravated
betweentheWatsonandJordanstaffs.
bythetransition
Valuabletimewas lost in waitingforthedisputeto be resolved;and whileJordan
was unquestionably
thewinner,Carterrefused
to givehimunambiguous
authority
overthe White House staff.
Cartertolerated
thelack of anyformalchiefof staffuntilJulyof 1979 when
hefinally
admitted
theobviousneedandofficially
Jordanto thepost.Later,
appointed
whenJordanmovedto workon the1980campaign,
JackWatsontookoverthetitle.
In retrospect
bothJackWatsonandStuartEizenstathaveconcludedthatit is importantto haveone personin chargeof the White House staff.29
The Reagan WhiteHouse
The Reaganadministration
came to officewith theconsciousintention
of avoidingthemistakes
Carterhad made.One of the
theythoughtthatPresident
was put in
waystheydid thiswas thatEdwin Meese,who had runthe transition
of
the
cabinet
and
national
But
Meese
was
not
the
charge policy,
security.
president's
aide.He sharedhisprimacy
withMichaelDeaverandJamesBaker.Thus
onlytopstaff
672
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
Reagan's White House was organized in a modifiedspokes of the wheel and chief
of staffsystem.30
On November17, 1980 Meese and Baker came to an agreementon the division
of dutiesbetween themand, as befitstwo lawyers,wrote it down in a memorandum
that was initialedby each. Meese would have Cabinet rankwhile Baker would not.
Meese would coordinatethework of theDomestic PolicyStaffand theNational SecurityCouncil staff.Baker got the traditionalofficeof the chiefof staffand control
of thepaperflowto thePresidentand hiringand firingauthorityin the White House
staff."
This division of labor, though it was not immediatelyobvious, was loaded in
favorof Baker. Meese would have responsibilityfor the long term Reagan agenda
and Baker would dominateday to day operations.It is a predictablerule that in the
White House day-to-dayfirefightingdrivesout longerrange(six monthsor longer)
planning.Baker's control of operations,paper flow,and personnelwould give him
the upper hand.
Michael Deaver,who was personallyclosestto the President,ranhis scheduling,
travel,supportservices,and the FirstLady's office.Deaver was not particularlyinterestedin issues or policy,but saw himselfas the stewardof the presidentialimage
and protectorof the president'stime.32
The White House organizationofdominationbyTroika(or Quadrumviratewhen
Clark was there)seemed to work verywell forthe firstpart of the administration.
The firstyearvictoriesseemedto be engineeredquite well by thefunctionalseparation
of duties among the threetop advisors.They all had directaccess to the President,
and theycoordinatedtheirwork with daily meetingsand a minimumof friction.
In late 1983, however,reportsbegan to surfacethat some of the traditionalproblems
of lack of monocratichierarchywere being felt.
The problemsstemmedfromthe factthat no one staffmemberwas clearlyin
charge and the presidentwas not closelyenough engaged in policy making and administrationto settledisputesquickly. One White House officialwho had served
other presidentssaid: "I've neverworked in an organizationlike this. There is no
one personto give orders,exceptthe President.This lendsitselftojockeyingforposition and not lettinganyoneelse get too farahead."33Despite these scatteredcomcontinuedto dominatethe White House throughoutPresiplaints,the triumyejrate
dent Reagan's firstterm.
In thesecondtermBakermovedout of theWhite House to takeovertheTreasury
while TreasurySecretaryDonald Regan came to the White House to be chiefof staff.
With Meese at the head of the JusticeDepartment,Regan proceeded to centralize
controlof the White House in himself.The processwas facilitatedby the departure
offirsttermReagan advisorsMax Friedersdorf
and Ed Rollins,as well as OMB Director
David Stockman.The experimentwith the troikawas abandonedto revertto a system
with the strongestchiefof staffsince H.R. Haldeman and ShermanAdams. Regan's
controlover the Reagan White House might even exceed that of these two strong
predecessors.
WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 673
The Holy Grail of "True" CabinetGovernment
hascometooffice
togive
sinceLyndon
Johnson
Everypresident
promising
his cabineta largevoicein therunningof thegovernment.
President
Nixonbegan
his
in
and
hisadministration
secretaries
broad
bygiving department
leeway personnel
Ford
policy,but endedup drawingtightcontrolintothe WhiteHouse. President
the
a
White
House
staff
and
to
abandon
domination
guaranteed
by strong
promised
President
Carterpromised
truecabinetgovernaccesstohiscabinetsecretaries.
personal
ment,butin theendfelthe hadgivenawaytoo muchpowerto thecabinetandtried
to takeit backin thesummerof 1979. President
Reaganpromisedcabinetgovernmentand developeda systemof cabinetcouncilsthatwas used in innovative
ways
to coordinante
administration
policy.34
Thereis a majortugofwarin everyadministration
(betweenthecabinetsecretariesand theWhiteHouse staff)overcontrolof administration
policy.Thereis no
thechallenge
way to avoida strongWhite House staffin the modernpresidency;
of
the
cabinet.
the legitimate
is to see thatit does not overwhelm
prerogatives
harkback to is the
thatrecentpresidents
The modelof CabinetGovernment
not thatall agreewithall aspectsof his approach;but
Eisenhower
administration,
withoutmajor
rolein his administration
cabinetplayeda significant
Eisenhower's
ofthecabinetthedynamics
willexamine
conflicts
withtheWhiteHouse.Thissection
It will beginfirstwithan analysis
in recentpresidencies.
WhiteHouse interaction
thataretheconstantconforcesthatoperateon cabinetmembers
of thecentrifugal
cernof White House aides.
thatmembers
willnotbe chosen
andcriteria
Cabinetselection
guarantee
processes
Other
factorstend
to
the
and
their
for
president.
only
personal ideologicalloyalty
cabinetchoices,suchas partisan
todominate
statements,
concerns,
symbolic
expertise,
ofa cabinet
andclienteleconcerns.Thus thewaymembers
management
experience,
arechosenleadsus to expectthattheywill notalwaysseeeyeto eyewiththeWhite
forcesat workpulling
House. And once in officethereare also strongcentrifugal
Theseforcesincludethecabinetsecrethecabinetsecretary
awayfromthepresident.
ontheircareer
bureaucracies
and
and
their
to
the
law
to
duties
Congress
dependency
tary's
theirdepartments
and theconstituencies
represent.
outthelawsaffecting
theirdeparthavedutytocarry
Firstofall,cabinetsecretaries
thatcreates
arespelledout in thelegislation
ments.The dutiesofcabinetsecretaries
andthey
Theselawsareoftencontradictory,
anditsmajorprograms.
thedepartment
to be in conflict
withwhatthepresident
wantsin anygivensitmaybe interpreted
uation.35
to the
arealso pulledfromthepresident
Cabinetmembers
by theirobligations
has a majorimpacton legislation,
Congresshas the
Congress.While thePresident
finalsayon thedetailsoflaws;andwhenthereis a legaldisputeaboutthemeaning
intent."Congressalsohas
ofa law,theissueis settledbydetermining
"congressional
and programswithinthem.
the finalsayon thebudgetlevelsfordepartments
of the President
and his
Thereis also a naturaldivisionbetweentheinterests
are
chosen
to
head
becauseofthenatureoftheir
cabinetappointees
jobs. They
departofitsmission.Theythushavea stake
mentsbecausetheybelievein theimportance
674
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
and
in theorganizational
meansto accomplish
itsmission,i.e., theirorganizational
In
must
defend
turf
turf.
order
to
do
thier
well
their
jobs
they
against
jurisdictional
evenifthethreats
sometimes
comefromtheWhiteHouse. In thesesquabbles
threats,
the White House is partof "them"not "us."
This problemcameup whentheNixon administration
movedto placeNixon
in thedepartments
in orderto assureWhiteHouse control.One of those
loyalists
he has
for
the
said: "For the guy to be worthcontrolling,
placements
responsible
If he knowswhat'sgoingon there,
to knowwhatis goingon in his department.
he'slesslikelyto be amenableto centralcontrol."36
For a personto be able to be of
of the
use to theWhiteHouse, he mustalso be trustedand acceptedas a defender
the
and
its
mission.
the
White
must
somevaluesrepresented
Because
House
by agency
thedivisionofmissionwithotheragencies,
it is sometimesmakedecisionsaffecting
timesseenas a threatto the agency.
branchagenciesdependon clientelegroupsto maketheircase
Sinceexecutive
beforeCongressin supportofauthority
andappropriations,
interest
groupsseeagenin thegovernment.
Cabinetofficers
ciesas theiradvocates
seeit as partoftheirduty
to maintain
liaisonwithmajorinterests
friendly
groupsso thattheycanbe mobilized
to supportpresidential
initiatives
whenneeded.But at thesametimetheyfeelthat
to
need
some
distance.
One Cabinetofficer
they
keep
put it thisway: "It maybe
too stronga statement
to saythattheyregarded
us as theiradvocate.Theyregarded
us as theirdoor.... I wouldsaywe weremorethedoorwayin ratherthanthereal
advocate;ifpersuadedwe wouldbe theadvocate.And we certainly
impactedthem
with all of our policiesso thattheywerea partof the process."37
The pointof all of thisis thatmanagingthe Cabinetin the U.S. systemis a
On theone handcabinetmembers
thornyproblemforthepresidency.
particularly
who appointedthemandwho canremovethem
owe theirallegianceto thePresident
duties
at his pleasure.But on theotherhandcabinetmembershaveconstitutional
on thecareerbureaucracy
and
to thelaw and to Congressas well as dependencies
thatthesenonpresidential
are
theirclientelegroups.It mustbe stressed
pulls legitiPresidents
shouldbe ableto expect
mateclaimson theallegianceofcabinetmembers.
but to expectthesortofrigid,literalobedience
fromtheircabinetmembers,
loyalty
cameto expectis askingtoo muchfromtheAmerican
thattheNixonadministration
Presiof thepresidency.
ofpowerssystemand is notin thebestinterests
separation
dentsshouldrealizethattheyareactingin a systemof sharedpowers,not a unitary
of monocratic
statewith an executivestructure
hierarchy.
The EisenhowerCabinetModel
he came to officewith
When Eisenhower
was electedto thePresidency
that
stemmed
fromhis military
the
it
should
be
ideas
about
organized
way
strong
andprevious
contactwiththeWhiteHouse. "ForyearsI hadbeenin freexperience
in
the
executive
officeof the White House, and I had certainideas
contact
quent
in
or lackof system,
underwhichit operated.With mytraining
aboutthesystem,
tomethattheworkoftheWhite
itwasinconceivable
organization
problems
involving
thanhadbeenthecasein theyearsI observed
House couldnotbe bettersystemized
WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 675
it."38He was also criticalof the use to which previouspresidentsput theircabinet
muchmoreformallythan
meetings.So Eisenhowerresolvedto organizehis presidency
had his two immediateprecedessors.
He did thisthroughhis formalstaffsystemtightly
runby ShermanAdams and throughthe use of his cabinetand thecabinetsecretariat.
One aspect of Eisenhower'sabilityto use his cabinet effectively
was his choice
of personnel,who were mostly successfulbusiness men ("eight millionairesand a
plumber").39He feltthatthe interpersonalaspectsof teamworkwere important:"In
organizingteams,personalityis equally importantwith ability. . . Leadershipis as
vital in conferenceas it is in battle."40His initialconcernswith puttingtogetherthe
rightcombinationof personalitiesresultedin a cabinet with relativelylittle of the
backbiting,conflictsor leaks that have markedmore recentadministrations.Eisenhower used his cabinet by delegatingas much as possible to his cabinet secretaries
and byusingthecollectivecabinetas a deliberative,
thoughnot a decisionmaking,body.
and he wantedas many
Eisenhowerfeltthatmanydecisionswerenot presidential,
of theseas possiblemade by cabinetmembersand not broughtinto theWhite House.
This had theeffectofinsulatingthePresidentfromthedetailsofmanagingthegovernment and may have contributedto the public image that he was detachedfromhis
administration.Much of this was deliberateand the resultof a conscious effortto
The main bufferwas, of course,Sherman
createbufferzones around the president.41
Adams who carefullyscreenedall businessgoing to the Oval Office,includingmost
cabinetmembers'accessto thePresident.He also spentmuchtimetryingto get cabinet
membersto settleinteragencydisputesbeforeissueswent to the President."I always
on a varietyof problemsbeforethe issue had to
triedto resolvespecificdifferences
be submittedto the President.Sometimesseveralmeetingswere necessarybeforean
agreementwas reached.But with a few exceptionsI was successful."Sometimeshe
would have to "point out, with emphasis,thata resourcefuldepartmenthead should
be able to findan answerhimselfwithoutexpectingthePresidentto findit forhim."42
While Eisenhowerdelegatedas much as possible to his cabinet secretariesindividually,he wanted to use the cabinetcollectivelyas a deliberativebody. As he told
his newly selectedcabinet beforehe took office,"My hope will be to make this a
policy body, to bring beforeyou and foryou to bring up subjects that are worthy
of this body as a whole."43But the cabinet was not meant to be a decision making
body, and Eisenhowerdid not take votes on issues. In factmany issues had already
been decided by the time theywere brought beforethe Cabinet.44
Cabinet meetingswererelativelyformal,with fixedagendasand focusseddiscussions and follow through.Much of the organizationof the Cabinet meetingswas
due to Eisenhower'sintroductionof the Cabinet Secretariatin 1954. The function
of the Cabinet Secretariat,as describedby BradleyPattersonwho was a memberof
it, was to circulatecabinet papers preparedby the departmentsso that theycould
be consideredby membersbeforethe meetingsand to assurethatimportantmatters
were included on the agenda. This was not alwayseasy since cabinet membersdid
not necessarilywant to air theirproblemsin frontof thewhole cabinet."The Cabinet
Secretaryhad to dig, wheedle,persuadeand finesseCabinet membersto bringto the
common tablewhat were clearlycommon matters,but which the departmentheads,
676
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
in theircentury-and-a-half-long
would muchprefer
to bringprivately
to
tradition,
theOval Office.It was onlybecausetheyknewthatEisenhower
wantedit thisway
and no otherthattheyreluctantly
acceededto the CabinetSecretary's
or Sherman
Adams'agenda-planning."45
The Eisenhower
modelofcabinetgovernment
is thestandard
againstwhichfuturepresidents
wouldmeasure
theirintentions
forthepresidency.
andJohnson
Kennedy
reacted
what
a
was
too
consciously
against
theythought
rigidsystem.Nixon and
both
and
consultation
withtheircabinets,
but
Carter,however, promised
delegation
wereunableto avoidmajorconflicts
betweentheircabinetsandWhiteHouse staffs.
cabinetgovernment
andinstituted
a system
ofcabinetcouncils,an
Reaganpromised
alternative
to theEisenhowermodel.
Kennedy and Johnson
Justas President
KennedyrejectedtheShermanAdamsmodelof White
House organization,
so he also rejectedtheEisenhower
modelof cabinetorganization.Bothof thesemoveswereurgedon Kennedyby ClarkClifford
earlyafterthe
election.Clifford
advisedKennedyto rejecttheEisenhower
modelandcharacterized
itwitha bitofoverstatement:
President
Eisenhower
considered
theCabinet
"Apparently
to be in thenatureof a corporate
Boardof Directors.Decisionswouldbe madeby
theCabinetand he would carrythemout. This is contrary
to everybasicconcept
of thePresidency
and shouldbe junked.Cabinetmeetingswereattendedby 30 to
40 persons,and as a resultweresterileand timeconsuming."46
RichardNeustadtarguedagainsttheEisenhower
ofdelegation
tocabinet
practice
secretaries.
In an earlytransition
memorandum
he arguedthatKennedyoughtto ensurethatdisagreements
withintheadministration
be broughtto thepresidential
level
fordecisionbyappointing
withconflicting
viewson public
strongcabinetmembers
"If
the
President-elect
both
wants
'conservative'
and
'liberal'
adviceon ecopolicy.
nomicmanagement,
forexample,andwantsthecompetition
to comeout wherehe
can see it andjudge it, he needsto choosestrong-minded
and he needs
competitors
toputtheminpositions
ofroughly
equalinstitutional
power,so thatneitherwins thecontest
at a bureaucratic
leveltoo fardown forthe President
to judge it."47
While Eisenhower
usedorganizational
channelsto delegateand keepdecisions
out oftheWhiteHouse,KennedyfollowedNeustadt'sadviceanddrewmatters
into
theWhiteHouse so thathe andhisstaff
couldbe actively
involvedin governmental
decisions.48
He feltthepresidency
oughttobe "thevitalcenterofactionin ourwhole
schemeofgovernment
... thePresident
mustplacehimself
in theverythickof the
fight."49
In linewithKennedy's
desiretobe personally
inchargeofthegovernment
rather
thanpresiding
overtheinstitutions
of government,
he heldfewcabinetmeetings,
to
deal
his
with
secretaries
one
at
a time.Kennedy
felt"Cabinet
preferring
departmental
are
useless.
should
the
Postmaster
General
sit
there
and listen
meetings simply
Why
to a discussionof the problemsof Laos?"50
likeKennedy,
ranthegovernment
fromtheWhiteHouse,relying
Johnson,
Lyndon
on hisWhiteHouse staff.
He heldcabinetmeetingsmoreregularly
thanKennedy,
WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 677
mechanisms.
Toward
forumsratherthanas consultative
but used themas briefing
his
national
those
involved
with
on
hereliedincreasingly
theendofhisadministration
ofthoseoutsidehisimmediate
andbecamedistrustful
decision
makingprocess,
security
Nixonwhentheymetat theWhiteHouse in Decircle.As he toldPresident-elect
cember1968:"Letmetellyou,Dick, I wouldhavebeena damnfoolto havediscussed
becauseI knewthatifI saidsomething
withthefullCabinetpresent,
majordecisions
it
sure
as
hell
bet
would
could
in themorning,
papers."51
appearin theafternoon
you
The NixonAdministration
of reversing
withtheintention
RichardNixonbeganhis administration
thathad developedin the
WhiteHouse controlof thegovernment
thepersonalized
He intended
to a cabinetcentered
government.
yearsandreturning
Kennedy-Johnson
anddelegatedomesticpolicy
affairs
on foreign
hisefforts
as president
to concentrate
without
couldrunitselfdomestically
tohiscabinet."I've alwaysthoughtthiscountry
cabinetto runthecountryat home.You
All you needis a competent
a President.
forforeignpolicy.. . . "52
needa president
he presented
thedayafter
cabinetmembers
At a meetingofhisnewlydesignated
and not
he extortedthemto seizecontrolof theirdepartments
themon television
their
run
let
them
to
if
he
intended
as
It
sounded
cavein to thebureaucrats.
departAt one of thefirstcabinet
mentswitha minimumof WhiteHouse interference.53
to choosetheir
authority
meetingsin 1969 he delegatedto his Cabinetsecretaries
In the
second.54
first
and
of
the
criteria
on
based
own subordinates
loyalty
ability
beginninghe had the generalnotionthatthe Cabinetwould servea collégialand
oftheir
as managers
butsoonchangedtoviewsecretaries
function,
primarily
advisory
departments.55
or naive.But
Nixonwas eitherquiteoptimistic
toJohnEhrlichman,
According
would
soonsetin. Nixonbelieved"allthesewonderful
disillusionment
helphim
guys
The
news
that
doesn't
work
But
it
the
and all he woulddo is take 'big plays.'
way.
comesin and WallyHicklehas beenputtinghis footin his mouth.You
summary
Afteronlya fewweeksintotheadministration
can'tgivetheseguyscarteblanche."56
hisearlierstanceon delegationandgiveordersto hiscabinet
Nixonbeganto reverse
secretaries
throughhis White House staff.
The maindrivingforcebehindNixon'sconcernwithhisCabinet'sbehaviorwas
was grantedto
discretion
"As timepassed,it appearedthatwhenever
hisreelection.
theSecretaries
theyfailedto do thingsthewayRichardNixon wantedthemdone.
SinceNixonwas theonewho hadto go backto thepeopleafterfouryears,to explain
almost
by retaining
whythingshad gone as theydid, he reactedto their'failures'
Secretaries'
his
Cabinet
for
. . . Ifhe hadtopaythepoliticalprice
allofthediscretion.
thenhe,byGod, had therightandobligationto correctthosemistakes."57
mistakes,
useless.
Nixon also came to view cabinetmeetingsas virtually
was
the
in hiscabinet, feeling oftenmutual.Members
IfNixonwasdisappointed
oftheCabinetoftenfeltthattheydid nothaveenoughdirectaccessto thePresident
Someofthemcomplained,
insulated
andthathewasoverly
byhisWhiteHouse staff.
ofTransportation
included
of
access.
lack
oftheir
evenpublicly,
John
Secretary
They
678
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
Volpe,Secretaryof the InteriorWalterHickle, and Budget DirectorMayo. According
to Jeb Stuart Magruder,theywere not all wrong.
From our perspectivein the White House, the cabinet officialswere useful
spokesmenwhen we wanted to push a particularline- on Cambodia, on Carswell,or whatever.Fromtheirperspective,
however,it was oftena rudeawakening
to haveJebMagruderor Chuck Colson callingup and announcing,"Mr. Secretary,we're sendingover this speech thatwe'd like you to deliver."But thatwas
how it was. Virtuallyall the cabinet membershad to accept that theylacked
access to the presidentand that theirdealingswould be with Haldeman and his
various minions.58
Because of these factorstherewas constantfrictionbetween Cabinet membersand
the White House staff.
Given thesedevelopmentsand Nixon's perceptionof them,he did threethings
to deal with the unacceptablesituation:he reliedmore heavilyon his White House
staff,particularlyH.R. Haldeman; hejuggled his Cabinet to appointmemberswith
greaterloyaltyto himself;and he attemptedto reorganizethe executivebranch in
order to make it more responsiveto the President.Afterthe 1972 election Nixon
demandedresignationsfromall of his cabinetmembers.In his second termhe chose
cabinet membersof whose loyaltyhe could be certain.
In additionto personnelchanges,Nixon wanted to reorganizethe government
in a major way. Based on a reportby the Ash Commission, he intendedto replace
the constituencyorienteddepartmentsof Agriculture,Labor, Commerce,and Transportationwith fourgoal orienteddepartments:CommunityDevelopment,Natural
In addition,he wantedto limit
Resources,Human Resources,and Economic Affairs.59
access to the Presidentto fiveassistantsand have threecounsellors(for human resources,naturalresources,and communitydevelopment)reportto them. The result
of thiswould be to givetheWhite House staffeffective
controloverthewhole government and limit the Cabinet secretariesto a ministerialrole with no directaccess to
the President.By this time, however,the Watergaterevelationswere beginning to
break, and the plan was abandoned.
PresidentNixon's earlyintentionsto use his Cabinet as a collégial body and to
delegatemuch of themanagementof the governmentto themwhile he reservedhimselfforthe "big plays" foundered.Afterfailuresto achievehis domesticagenda and
being frustrated
by a DemocraticCongress,he resortedto the tools of the administrativepresidencyto achievehis goals.60He impoundedunprecedentedamountsof funds
that had been providedfordomesticprogramsby law.61He took militaryactionsin
SoutheastAsia without consultingor informingCongress. He tried to undermine
theCivil ServiceSystembyuse of politicalclearancesand theplacingof Nixon loyalists
And he triedto reorganizethe executivebranch
throughoutthecareerbureaucracy.62
its
levels
subordinate
to a super-cabinetof White House aides as
by making
upper
describedabove.
Nixon and his aides saw the Executivebranchas a hierarchyakin to the military
with the Presidentas Commanderin Chief; violationsof the chain of commandwere
WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 679
intolerable.
Theysaw otheropposingforcesin thegovernmental
systemas illegitimate.Congressional
Cabinetofficials'
responoppositionwas seenas obstructionist.
the
President.
siveness
to interest
and
their
seen
as
were
undermining
agencies
groups
in theexWhilePresidents
havea rightto expectloyaltyfromtheirappointees
fromclientele
ecutivebranch,theymustalsorealizethatcompelling
groups
pressures
to affect
andthecareerbureaucracy
areinevitable,
andthatmanyoftheattempts
govhavetherightand duty
Presidents
ernmental
policyby theCongressarelegitimate.
meansat theirdisconstitutional
to resistthesepressures
withall of thelegitimate,
so
frustrated
not
to
be
are
but
these
by their
posal (and
considerable); theyought
theirprerogatives.
meansto enforce
inevitable
defeatsthattheyresortto illegitimate
oftheWaterofridding
thecountry
President
Fordtookoffice
withtheintention
contrast
withthe
a
his
administration
to
and
provide sharp
gatespecter organized
inrunning
theWhiteHousewithout
Whilehewasnotsuccessful
Nixonadministration.
to thecabinet.He was alwaysaccesa chiefofstaff,
he was ableto return
collegiality
to
Richard
sibleto Cabinetmembers.
Cheney"Nobodyeverscreensout
According
will alwaysbe toldso and so wantsto see him."63
a cabinetmember.The president
oftheCabinetas a deliberative
andhisreactivation
body,
DespiteFord'saccessibility
conflict
betweentheCabinetandhisWhiteHouse
didexperience
hisadministration
But theproblems
werenot as greatas theonesthatplaguedtheNixonor the
staff.
createdtheEconomicPolicyBoard,a
The Fordadministration
Carterpresidencies.
forum
as thecentral
thatoperated
committee
CabinetandWhiteHousestaff
standing
500
times
It
met
over
economic
and
domestic
the
administration's
for
policy.
foreign
and was one of themostsystematic
advisorystrucduringtheFordadministration
in a broadareaofdomestic
turescreatedin theWhiteHouse to advisethePresident
policy.The EPB was to serveas a modelfortheCabinetCouncilsystemdeveloped
wasbroughtinto
Itsexecutive
secretary,
RogerPorter,
bytheReaganadministration.
to helpinstallit.64
the Reaganadministration
JimmyCarter's Cabinet Government
was formedin reactionagainst
Carter'svisionforhis presidency
Jimmy
Carterwouldhaveno chief
whathe saw as theabusesoftheNixonadministration.
andhe wouldrelyheavilyon hisCabinetand remainaccessibleto them.In
ofstaff,
inGeorgiaduringtheChristmas
Cabinetmembers
withhisnewlydesignated
meetings
holidaysin 1976 Cartertoldthemhe wantedto "restorethe Cabinetto its proper
first
circleofadvisors"andthattherewouldbe "no all-powerful
roleas thePresident's
unknownto the
in
White
aides,unelected,
House, no anonymous
palaceguard my
the
WhiteHouse
from
vast
the
and
unconfirmed
Senate,wielding
power
by
public,
on theKennedyandRoosevelt
Carterwantedtobe hisownchiefofstaff
basement."65
modeland refused
to designatea chiefof staff.He wouldbe thehub at thecenter
of thewheeland all White House staffmemberswould reportto him.
His Cabinetwouldalsoadvisehimandhaveaccessto him."I believein Cabinet
Therewill neverbe an instancewhileI am Presiofourgovernment.
administration
dominateor actin a superior
oftheWhiteHouse Staff
dentwhenthemembers
posiintended
beforehim,initially
as
Nixon
our
Cabinet."66
of
tionto themembers
He,
680
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
to delegatemuchof domesticpolicymakingto his cabinet.HamiltonJordan,his
havetriedto dealwith
advisor,said:"The problemis too manypresidents
principle
all of theproblemsof thecountryfromtheWhiteHouse. The firstlineof offense
or defenseis theCabinet.That'swheretheproblemsshouldbe dealtwith,in the
and agencies.You can'tdo it all fromthe White House."67
departments
Thisprinciple
ofdelegation
wasputintoeffect
earlywhenCarterlethiscabinet
choose
their
subordinates
on
the
own
theorythattheyshouldbe ableto
appointees
it
their
teams.
While
thispleasedcabinetmembers,
own
put together
management
of
and particularly
was objectedto by someof his WhiteHouse staff,
by members
had
to
have
made.
who
wanted
They
supported
Congress
patronageappointments
Butwhen
Carterduringthecampaignandthetransition
andwereowedsomefavors.
secretaries
theycalledtheWhiteHouse theyweretoldto talkto thedepartmental
claim.
whom
had
much
less
upon
they
ofthenewmembers
Carter's
wereusefulas anintroduction
earlyCabinetmeetings
to eachotherand as a meansof gettinginformation
out. Each secretary
would be
askedto reporton thepastweekand whatwouldlikelycomeup thenextweekin
theirareasofresponsibility.
oftenwithout
Butafter
a yearorso ofthistypeofmeeting,
an agenda,attendees
beganto tireof them.HamiltonJordanfelttheywerea waste
oftime.68
One Cabinetmembersaidthemeetings
"weretedious,boringandvirtually
a wasteof time."69
At a Cabinetmeetingat Camp David JuanitaKrepssaid,"The
Cabinetmeetings
arefairly
useless."70
The meetings
werenotusedfordecisionmaking,
and toughproblemswerediscussedin smallermeetingswith the President.71
The tensionand friction
betweenthe CarterWhiteHouse and Cabinetcame
to a headin the springand summerof 1979 when Carterdecidedthatsomething
hadto be done.The WhiteHouse staff
in theadministrafelttherewas no discipline
tionandthatCarterhadtotakechargeforcefully.
The experiment
withcabinetgovernmentand spokesof thewheel organization
had not worked.
To respondto concernsabouttheconductof his administration,
Carterwent
to Camp David in July1979 to consultwithadvisorsand prominent
peoplefrom
aroundthecountry.
When he camebackhe had decidedto nameHamiltonJordan
to be chiefof staff.He told thecabinetat a meetingthattheywerenot working
forhimbutforthemselves
andthathewasgoingtomakesomechanges.He demanded
writtenresignations
fromeachmemberof theCabinet.Despiteobjectionsthatthis
would seemtoo muchlikePresident
in 1972,he
Nixon'sdemandforresignations
wentforward
withit andtoldcabinetmembers
to fillout evaluation
formson their
immediate
subordinates
to evaluatetheirloyaltyto theadministration.
The resignationsweredutifully
turnedin and Carteracceptedfiveof them.
Reagan'sCabinetCouncils
RonaldReagancameto office
coherent
witha remarkably
agendaandset
ofpolicypriorities.
His priorities
to significantly
increasedefensespendingand cut
in virtually
all domesticpolicyareaslentthemselves
to a narrowfocuaand
spending
This simpleset of priorities
servedas a
simplesetof valuesforhis administration.
litmustestand guideto actionthatwas a greathelpin recruiting
forthe
personnel
WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 681
criteriaforappointees.72
administration.
Personaland ideologicalloyaltyweretheprimary
The coherenceof values led to an administrationwith much more unity than has
markedrecentadministrationswith more disparatepolicy agendas and personnel.
Reagan also came to officewith the notion that he wanted his administration
to be run throughsome formof "cabinet government."Delegating significantauthorityto theCabinet fitwell into his styleofleadershipand was consciouslydifferent
fromPresidentCarter'stendencyto become embroiledin thedetailsofdecisions.What
was not intendedfora Reagan approachto cabinetgovernment,however,was delegation to cabinet secretariesof authorityover theirbudgets or selectionof personnel.
Initialbudgetdecisionsweremadeby theWhite House staffand David Stockman.
Except fordefense,thebudgetsincludedsignificantcuts in most agencies,and newly
designatedcabinetmemberswere broughtinto the White House to sign offon the
proposedcuts.Theywerecalledto a meetingwith Stockman,thePresident,and several
White House aides and givena chance to reactto the proposedcuts,but it was difficult because "they'rein the position of having to argue against the group line. And
the group line is cut, cut, cut," accordingto David Stockman'saccount.73The newly
designatedsecretarieswere at an added disadvantagebecause theydid not have their
managementteams togetheryet and had not yet had a chance to get to know their
careerexecutives.
The Reagan White House feltthat Carter and Nixon had lost the personnel
battleto theirCabinet Secretariesand workedhardto keep tightcontrolof subcabinet
appointmentsin theWhite House. They were successful,and the Reagan administration kept closer control of administrationpersonnelin the White House than any
other recentadministration.The slowness of the appointmentsprocess resultedin
manydelaysin appointingthe subcabinet.This put the new secretariesat an added
disadvantagein disagreeingwith the White House staffif theyhad wanted to.
used the transiThe new White House staffveryconsciouslyand systematically
tion period to impresson the administrationthe importanceof the centralagenda.
In addition,the earlyagenda of the administrationwas dominatedby the economic
prioritiesof the budget and tax cuts. These were engineeredby David Stockman,
JamesBaker,and the LegislativeStrategyGroup. Accordingto one participant:"So,
the earlycabinetmeetingswere Stockman,on behalfof the president,and the other
presidentialadvisersjust laying out, 'Here's what we're going to do fellows,and I
expect you to supportit'. . . . The cabinet met often . . . but just to receivetheir
marchingordersand to hype each other up."74
Given thistightWhite House controlof the budget, personnel,and the legislativeagenda;how could theReagan systembe considered"cabinetgovernment"?Edwin
Meese explained that the "cabinet concept" intendedthat cabinet memberswould
be the President'sprincipleadvisorsand that theywould not be undercutby other
membersof the White House staff.He furtherexplainedthat PresidentReagan had
an eighteenmembercabinet:theheadsof majordepartmentsas well as Meese as counselorto the President,thedirectorsof OMB and CIA, the U.S. TradeRepresentative,
to the United Nations.75
and the U.S. representative
decisionwas made withoutat least
Meese explainedthatno major administration
682
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
one memberof the cabinetpresent,and this ensuredthat the Presidentwould have
inputfromthe cabinet.This is an expansiveconceptof cabinetgovernmentthatcorrespondedwith Reagan's expandedcabinetmembership.But the tightReagan White
House controlof administationpolicy and its legislativeagenda was a farcry from
whetherEisenhower's,Nixon's (firstterm),
previousattemptsat "cabinetgovernment,"
or Carter's.
AlexanderHaig
During thetransitionperiodand earlydaysof theadministration
When
theCabinetbegan to suspectsignsofWhite House dominationof theCabinet.
designatesmet on January7 Edwin Meese dominatedthe meeting,giving a primer
on thepresident'sideas,procedures,and priorities,while Reagan sat passively.76
Haig
recallsthat he had "the distinctfeelingthat Ed Meese and his colleagues perceived
theirrank in the Administrationas being superiorto that of any member of the
Cabinet."77At thefirstCabinet meetingMeese and Bakerwere sittingat the Cabinet
tablein sharpcontrastwith previouspractice.Haig wrotein his notesofthatmeeting:
"Governmentby Cabinet or troika?"78
The other part of PresidentReagan's approach to cabinet governmentwas the
cabinetcouncil system.It was modeled on PresidentFord's experiencewith the Economic Policy Board, the firsteffectivestandingcabinet committeein the domestic
area. Roger Porter,who had writtena book on his experiencewith the EPB was
broughtin fromthe TreasuryDepartmentto help put togetherthe cabinetcouncil
systemand to be executivesecretaryof the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs.79
The creationof the Cabinet Councils was announcedby the White House on
February26, 1981with fivecouncils:EconomicAffairs
(CCEA), Commerceand Trade
and Environment
Human
Natural
Resources
Resources
(CCNRE),
(CCHR),
(CCCT),
The
and Food and Agriculture(CCFA).80
followingyear the Cabinet Council on
(CCMA)
LegalPolicy(CCLP) and CabinetCouncil on ManagementandAdministration
were added. The purpose of the councils accordingto the White House was to act
as a "means fordeliberateconsiderationof major policy issues which affectthe interestsof more than one departmentor agency."81
The purposeof theCabinet Council approachwas to providea forumforcabinet
participationand deliberationon issues that cut acrosscabinetjurisdictionsbut still
not include secretarieswhose jurisdictionshad nothingto do with the policiesbeing
considered.It also was to provideforinteractionand integrationof Cabinet views
with those of the White House staffand avoid the strainsthat had markedso many
earlieradministrations.
The systemwould also allow second levelpolicyissues to be
dealtwith below thepresidentialleveland it would help keepthefocusof theadministrationon the centralReagan agenda. The cabinetcouncils were to be the focusof
a policynetworkthatintegrated
both Cabinet and White House resourcesand input.82
The Cabinet Councils were all formallychairedby the Presidentwith a designatedCabinet levelchairmanpro temporeand six to elevenmembers,with meetings
open to all Cabinet members.Council activitieswere coordinatedby the Office of
PolicyDevelopmentand the Officeof Cabinet Affairsand were supportedby executivesecretariats,
and functionedwith interdepartmental
workinggroups.The Councils
were active to varyingdegrees,with the most active being the CCEA which met
WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 683
100 timesin the first15 months,with the nextbusiestbeing the CCCT and CCNR
whichmet31 timeseach. The leastactivewas theCCLP which metonlythreetimes.83
The Presidentattendedabout 15% of the meetingsand the councils ofteninitiated
issues to consider,not waiting forPresidentialinitiation.84The meetingswere held
in the Roosevelt Room, acrossfromthe Oval Office.By the fallof 1983 two of the
Councils were dormant: CCNRE and CCFA, while the CCHR and CCLR were
activewith theCCEA beingextremely
marginallyactive.The otherswereconsistently
to widely varyingdegrees.
active
and
successful
Thus
the
councils
were
busy.
During the firsttermof the Reagan administrationthe cabinet council system
worked well as a means of gettingcabinet and White House input and developing
issue analysisin an orderlyway, though as has been pointedout, the councils themselvesenjoyedvaryingsuccess.Such a cabinetcouncil systementailscertainprerequisitesforit to accomplishitscoordinatinggoals.85Firstof all, therehas to be a commitmentby the White House and the Cabinet to playby the rules; the main rule being
that issues are not to be brought up to the Presidenton a bilateralbasis, but that
all issues are to be "roundtabled"by discussingthem at a cabinet council meeting.
Each cabinetmember'spolicyproposalsare to be subjectedto the scrutinyand criticism of peers in the cabinet and White House staff.
Thus the White House staffmighthave to guard the Presidentfrombeing lobbied unilaterally
by a cabinetmember.Of course,thiswill be perceivedby thecabinet
memberas the White House staffbarringcabinetmembersfromaccess to the president. Secondly,the Presidentmustrejectattemptsby cabinetmembersto induce him
to make decisionsoutside of the structure.If all membersof the cabinethave confidence in the integrityof the process,theywill be less likelyto tryto end run it by
going to thepresidentprivately.This typeof processwill onlywork in an atmosphere
of reasonablemutual trustwhich markedthe firstterm Reagan cabinet (with the
exceptionof AlexanderHaig). It is hard to imagine how it might have been able to
thatsuffered
workin otheradministrations
backbitingand competitionamongcabinet
membersand the White House staff.
But the systemis not without its problems.AlexanderHaig criticizedit because
he arguedthatit led to dominationby the White House staff.Haig feltthat he was
denied access to the Presidentby the White House staffand that the staffhad too
much anonymousand unscrutinizedpower.
But to me the White House was as mysteriousas a ghost ship; you heard the
creakof the riggingand the groan of the timbersand sometimeseven glimpsed
the crew on deck. But which of the crew had the helm? Was it Meese, was it
Baker, was it someone else? It was impossible to know for sure.86
Earlyin Reagan's second termall of the cabinetcouncils were eliminatedexceptone
on economic policy and one on domestic policy. The presidentwould thus receive
policyadvice primarilyfromthese two councils and the National SecurityCouncil.
The two new councils would be chairedby officialsplayingtwo roles.JamesBaker
and Edwin
while he was TreasurySecretary,
would chairthecouncilon economicaffairs
684
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
out his dutiesas AtMeesewould chairthedomesticcouncilalongwithcarrying
General.
torney
Conclusion: What Have We Learned?
in themodern
No one questionstheneedforan activeWhiteHouse staff
Cabinet
members
and
certain
staffers
abuse
theirpower,
may
maycomplain,
presidency.
to protecthispoliticalinterests
but thepresident
cannotoperatewithouta staff
and
focuson thecentralagenda.StuartEizenstatarguesthat
keeptheadministration's
are
and
themselves.
"Agendepartments agencies inherently
incapableofcoordinating
ciessimplydo nottrusteachother.. . . Thislackoftrustmeansthat,whenwe have
to deal withcross-cutting,
conflicting,
complexissuesof thedaythatinvolvemore
thanone agency,it is verydifficult,
ifnot impossible,
to entrustto one agencythe
to
coordinate
the
of
that
several
agencies.. . .
responsibility
development policy affects
Withouta centralized,
andeffective
WhiteHouse staff,
itis simply
strong,
impossible
to assuretheneutrality
ofthepolicymaking
because
process
agenciesbringtheirown
centralized
White
biasestotheprocess.. . . Due processcannotoccurwithouta strong
House staff."»7
fromhisyearsofexperience
in theWhiteHouse,arguesthat
BradleyPatterson,
in orderto perform
a strongWhiteHouse staffis necessary
the followingcrucial
functions
forthe President:
1. Theinterrogation/orchestration/moderator
function
oncrosscutting
policyissues.
2. The personalpolicydevelopment
function
on issuesespecially
sensitive
ofthe
President.
3. The ferret
task:ofreceiving
andjudginginformal,
information
anticipatory
on problemsaboutwhichCabinetofficers
are embarrassed
or reluctant.
4. Selective
intervention
wherepolicychangesor crisesmakenecessary
a White
House monitorship
evenofoperational
details.Patterson
that
these
are
funcargues
tionsuniqueto a White House staffand thatno cabinetofficer
would be able to
thesefunctions
and thoseof headinga cabinetagency.88
perform
But a strongWhiteHouse staff
is notwithoutitsdangers.Therewillinevitably
be complaints
fromtheCabinetand othersthattheWhiteHouse staffis isolating
thePresident
and limitingtheiraccessto him.This will be so eventhoughit will
oftenbe the President's
personaldecisionnot to see a cabinetmember.Therewill
also be criticisms
of theWhiteHouse staffthatareintendedforthePresident.
Of
oflightning
rodis an important
one forthestaff
in anyWhite
course,thefunction
House. The otherdangeris thatthePresident
come
to
too
may
depend heavilyon
hisstaff
andlimithissourcesofinformation.
Thismayhavehappenedin theJohnson
and Nixonpresidencies
whenthewagonswerecircledbecauseof theVietnamWar
andWatergate,
shouldkeephis
BowmanCutterarguesthata president
respectively.
staff
offbalancebynotlettingthemgettoo confident
oftheirpositionsin theWhite
House.89Butthiscanbe carried
toextremes
as itsometimes
Franklin
wasbyPresidents
Rooseveltand LyndonJohnson.
Thereis alsoa developing
someonemust
consensus
thatintheWhiteHouse staff
be
in
In
the
one
believes
words
of
aide:
unequivocally
charge.
Kennedy
"Everybody
WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 685
in democracyuntilhe gets to the White House and thenyou begin to believein dictatorship,because it's so hard to get thingsdone."90On this issue was have the informedopinionsof H.R. Haldeman, RichardCheney,andJackWatson. Each of them
has concludedthatifthe Presidentdoes not designatesomeone to controltherivalries
and competitionfor the President'sear, chaos will result. The Reagan experience,
with its troikaof differentiated
jurisdictions,has broughtinto questionwhetherthere
mustbe one personin charge,but duringthe firsttermtherewere complaintsfrom
within the administrationabout the lack of clear leadership.
It is stillpossiblethata Presidentmaybe electedwith the skillsand intelligence
of a FranklinRooseveltor a JohnKennedywho can act as the hub of the wheel and
be his own chiefof staff.But experiencein the Ford, Carter,and Reagan presidencies
has broughtinto questionwhetherwe can returnto the less formaldaysof the 1930s
or even1960s. The consequencesof failingto pull it off(Ford and Carter)are apparent
and presenta serious risk for any presidentwho triesit.
But the presidentmust be carefulin choosing his chiefof staffand other top
White House aides. It maybe usefulto considerMichael Medved's set of lessons for
White House assistantsthathe gleaned fromhis studyof Presidents'chiefaides over
the past century:
1. A Presidentshouldselectas his principalaide a man whose goals and experience
involvemore than the serviceof a single politician.
2. Presidentialassistantsmust do everythingin theirpower to escape publicity.
3. Emotional dependenceby a Presidenton his top aide should be avoided as
faras possible.
4. The emergenceof a centralfigureon the staff-whetherhe is called White
House Secretary,StaffCoordinator,AssistantPresident,or Chief of Staff-is necessary for the efficientfunctioningof the White House.91
With respectto the cabinet,presidentialexperienceoverthe past severaldecades
has taughtus some lessons.We know that therewill inevitablybe conflictsbetween
the Cabinet and the White House staff;it is inherentin theirdifferingfunctions.
The trickis to make the interfaceinto a dynamictensionratherthan lettingit degenerateinto a destructivehostility.This can be done by a recognitionon each side
of the legitimatefunctionsof the other side. It is particularlyimportantthe White
House recognizethat the legitimate,constitutionalroles of Cabinet membersalong
with profoundpoliticalpressuresgive themperspectivesnot alwaysin line with those
of the White House. As the Carter Presidencytaughtus, legitimatepressuresmust
be used to extractloyaltyand coherencefromthecabinet.But as theNixon Presidency
demonstrates,expectinga rigid disciplineand subordinationto the White House is
both unrealisticand harmful.
One lesson learnedis thatit is helpfulto move quicklywith the major priorities
of the administration.One of Nixon's top policy aides argued:
Everythingdepends on what you do in programformulationduring the first
six or sevenmonths.I havewatchedthreepresidenciesand I am increasinglyconvincedofthat. Time goes by so fast.During thefirstsix monthsor so, theWhite
and cooperHouse staffis not hatedby thecabinet,thereis a periodof friendship
686
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
ation and excitement.There is some animal energygoing foryou in those first
six to eightmonths,especiallyifpeople perceivethingsin the same light. If that
exists and so long as that exists you can get a lot done. You only have a year
at the most fornew initiatives,a time when you can establishsome programs
as yourown, in contrastto what has gone on before.Afterthat,afterpriorities
are set, and aftera presidentfindshe doesn'thave to talkwith cabinetmembers,
that'swhen the problemsset in, and the White House aides close offaccess to
cabinet membersand others.92
There are certainthingsa newly elected Presidentcan do in order to establish
cordialrelationsbetween the Cabinet and White House staff.They have to do with
personnel,early actions and meetings,and organizationalstructures.With respect
can recruitcabinetmemberswho can get along with
to personnelthe President-elect
each other and will not be threatenedby the White House staff.Eisenhowerconsciouslytriedto do thisand largelysucceeded.In most presidencies,however,cabinet
choices are based upon a complex of factors,and personal compatibilityis oftena
minor consideration.
But the Presidentdoes have some controlover the agenda of the initialdaysof
his transitionand administration.One of the lessons learned is that it helps to set
the ground rulesearly.Bowman Cutter who playedan importantrole in the Carter
administration,
argues that the Presidentshould have a "set speech" to give to every
new Cabinet member.This speech should spell out the role that Cabinet members
are expectedto playwith respectto the White House staff,OMB, and anyimportant
issues the administrationis expected to be facedwith. He argues that this is hard
because afterthe election victoryeveryoneis in a state of euphoria and any critical
thinkingabout organizationis apt to be lost. Lack of clarityof role and jurisdiction
leads to turfbattlesthatare wastefuland divisive.93
JohnEhrlichmanarguesthatthe
ground rules must be set beforethe cabinet membersgets settledin the new post,
because tryingto get power back once it is perceivedto be delegatedis "like pulling
teeth."It is also crucial that the Presidentsit in on the meetingspersonallyto let
the cabinetmembersknow it is coming fromhim and not merelythe White House
staff.94
The Reagan administration
learnedthislessonwell and clearlyset out the expectationsof the White House for Cabinet memberswith respectto budget and personnel matters.This was one of the reasonsthat the Reagan administrationwas less
troubledby the Cabinet conflictsthan some other recentadministrations.On the
otherhand the communicationmightbe handledin a less intimidatingmannerthan
the meetingsof new cabinet memberswith the Reagan White House.
EarlyCabinet meetingsare also importantso thatmembersget acquaintedwith
each otherand takeeach other'smeasure.These meetingsare usefulfordistributing
information,lettingpeople know what the partyline is, and fordevelopinga team
spirit.They are particularlyimportantfor keeping the focus on the centralagenda
and encouragingnew cabinetmembersto keep theWhite House perspectivein mind.
Thus it is useful to have cabinet meetingsoftenearly in the administration.Later
WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 687
it is harderto keep people's attention,and theyfeel theyhave too many important
things to do to listen to issues of secondaryimportance.
The thirdthingnew administrations
can do is to set up some kind of structure
to facilitatethe implementationof the President'sagenda without causing a riftbetween cabinet and White House staff.There are severalprecedentshere. The first
is the Eisenhowermodel of using cabinet meetingsas deliberativesessions,but few
Presidentssincethenhavebeen successfulto the extentthathe was in this.A second
approach,also establishedby Eisenhower,is theestablishmentof a Cabinet Secretariat
that ensuresthat all issues are staffedout with input fromany departmentthat has
a legitimatestake in the issue. The secretariatcan also be used to ensure that any
presidentialdecisions are implemented.
The cabinetcouncil systemis an alternativestructureformanagingrelationsand
tryingto preventa gap fromgrowingbetweenthe Cabinet and the staff.With Ford's
has made such a system
Economic PolicyBoard as a model the Reagan administration
work reasonablywell, though in only some issue areas. It is, however,possible that
some Presidentwill be elected who has the charisma,intelligence,and judgement
to ignore all of these organizationalapproaches.Until that time, however,we can
still learn a lot fromthe lessons of recentpresidencies.95
Notes
1. The authorwouldliketo thankAlanaNorthropforcommentson an earlierversionofthisarticle
book: In SearchofExecutive
to quote fromhis forthcoming
and Colin Campbellforpermission
Harmony.
Santa Fe, New Mexico,June3, 1983.
2. InterviewwithJohnEhrlichman,
3. Interviewwith H.R. Haldeman,Los Angeles,California,May 25, 1983.
theAccountability
4. Commenton "Presidential
Management"by RichardE. Neustadtin Improving
editedby BruceL.R. SmithandJamesD. Carroll(Washington:
andPerformance
ofGovernment
Brookings,1982), p. 109.
5. "The BuckStillStopsat 1600Pennsylvania
Avenue,"The Washingtonian
(December1980),p. 205.
6. PatrickAnderson,ThePresidenfs
Men(GardenCity,New York:Doubleday,AnchorBooks,1969),
p. 469.
"The BuckStillStopsat 1600Pennsylvania
7. BradleyPatterson,
Avenue,"The Washingtonian
(December1980), p. 206.
8. Eisenhower,The WhiteHouse Years:Mandate
forChange,1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday,
114.
1963), p.
9. ShermanAdams,Firsthand
Report(New York: PopularLibrary,1961), p. 57.
10. Fred I. Greenstein,The Hidden-Hand
Presidency
(New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 139.
11. Fred I. Greenstein,The Hidden-Hand
(New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 147.
Presidency
on Staffing
ThePresident-Elect,
12. Memorandum
byRichardE. Neustadt,October30, 1960,
Prepared
the White House.
A, Roosevelt'sApproachto Staffing
p. 3-4. See also Attachment
13. Interviewwith Clark Clifford,Washington,D.C. July15, 1983.
Memorandumon Transition,
November9, 1960, KennedyLibrary.
14. Clark Clifford,
PostNa15. JackValenti,"Life'sNeverthesameAftertheWhite House PowerTrip," Washington
tionalWeeklyEdition(March 19, 1984), p. 21.
Men (New York: Doubleday, 1968), p. 299.
16. PatrickAnderson,The President's
in
and the Bureaucracy:StrategicAlternatives,"
17. Quoted by FrancisRourke,"The Presidency
editedby MichaelNelson (Washington:CQ Press,1984),
ThePresidency
andthePolitical
System
p. 347.
18. Interviewwith H.R. Haldeman,Los Angeles,May 25, 1983.
688 I PRESIDENTIALSTUDIES QUARTERLY
19. Interviewwith H.R. Haldeman,Los Angeles,May 25, 1983.
20. Quoted in RichardPious, The American
(New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 244.
Presidency
21. MichaelMedved,The ShadowPresidents
(New York: TimesBooks, 1979),p. 320. See also William Safire,BeforetheFall (New York: BalantineBooks, 1977), p. 366.
in BradleyD.
22. See theanalysisof R. GordonHoxie, "Staffing
the Fordand CarterPresidencies:
York:
Center
for
the
thePresidency
Nash, et al, Organizingand Staffing
Studyof the
(New
Presidency,
1980), p. 44.
23. GeraldR. Ford,A TimetoHeal (New York: Harperand Row and Reader'sDigestAssociation,
1979), p. 147.
24. Ibid.
25. QuotedbyStephenWayne,TheLegislative
(New York: HarperandRow, 1978),p. 52.
Presidency
26. Interviewwith RichardCheney,Washington,D.C., August 1, 1983.
27. Interviewwith RichardCheney,Washington,D.C., August 1, 1983.
National
28. Dom Bonafede,"CarterWhite House is Heavyon Functions,Lighton Frills,'*
Journal
(February12, 1977), p. 234.
29. InterviewwithJackWatson,Atlanta,June17, 1983; and interviewwithStuartEizenstatJuly
15, 1983, Washington,D.C.
30. See thediscussionby Colin Campbell,In SearchofExecutive
Harmony
(forthcoming)
Chapter4.
31. LawrenceBarrett,GamblingWithHistory
(New York: Doubleday,1983), pp. 76-77).
32. For discussionsof Deaver'srole,see "MakingReagan be Reagan" TimeMagazine(August27,
1984), p. 21. See also The Washingtonian
(October 1984), p. 156.
33. "The New WhiteHouse Buzzword-Burnout" Los AngelesTimes(December19, 1983),p. 1,8.
of the U.S. cabinetfromthe beginningof the Republic
34. For an overviewof the development
see R. GordonHoxie, "The Cabinetin theAmericanPresidency,
and an annotatedbibliography
StudiesQuarterly
1789-1984,"Presidential
(Spring1984), p. 209. See also, Hoxie, ed., The White
and Operations
House:Organization
(New York: Centerforthe Studyof the Presidency,
1971).
and ways in whichtheycan give contradictory
cabinetofficers
35. For examplesof laws affecting
Cabinet(Washington:ASPA, 1976), p. 9-15.
mandatessee BradleyPatterson,The President's
36. Quoted by Hugh Heclo, A Government
(Washington:Brookings,1979), p. 97.
ofStrangers
DecisionMaking(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
37. Quoted by Roger PorterPresidential
Press,
1980), p. 13.
38. QuotedinLouis W. KoenigTheChiefExecutive
(New York: Harcourt,BraceandWorld,1969),
p. 167).
39. "WashingtonWire," TheNew Republic(December15, 1952),p. 3. Quoted in Hess, Organizing
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
thePresidency,p. 61.
TheHidden-Hand
Quotedin FredI. Greenstein,
(New York: BasicBooks,1982),p. 119.
Presidency
See StephenHess, OrganizingthePresidency
(Washington:Brookings,1976, p. 65.
York:
ShermanAdams,Firsthand
PopularLibrary,1961), p. 57.
Report(New
TheHidden-Hand
Quotedin FredI. Greenstein,
(New York: BasicBooks,1982),p. 106.
Presidency
Greenstein,
p. 115.
Cabinet(Washington:ASPA, 1976.), p. 108.
BradleyPaterson,The President's
"Memorandumon Transition"(November9, 1960), p. 6.
Check-ListforThe Weeks Between
Memorandumon "OrganizingtheTransition:A tentative
Electionand Inaugural"preparedby RichardE. Neustat,p. 11. KennedyLibrary.
Interviewwith TheodoreSorensen,March25, 1985, New York City.
ArthurSchlesinger,
Jr.,A ThousandDays (New York: Fawcett,1967), p. 117.
ArthurSchlesinger,
Jr.,A ThousandDays, p. 632.
RN: The Memoirs
ofRichardNixon (New York: Grosset& Dunlap, 1978), p. 357.
RowlandEvans,Jr.andRobertD. Novak,NixonintheWhiteHouse(New York: RandomHouse,
1971Ï. o. 11.
JohnEhrlichman,WitnesstoPower(New York: Simon and Schuster,1982), p. 88.
Evans and Novak, Nixon in theWhiteHouse,p. 66.
WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 689
55. Ehrlichman,WitnesstoPower,pp. 110-111.
56. InterviewwithJohnEhrlichman,
Santa Fe, New Mexico,June3, 1983.
57. JohnEhrlichman,
Witness
toPower(New York: Simonand Schuster,1982), firstquote,p. 112;
second,p. 88.
58. JebStuartMagruder,An American
Life:One Man'sRoad toWatergate
(Atheneum,1974),p. 102.
59. SeeHaroldSeidman,
andPower(New York:OxfordUniversity
Politics,
Position,
Press,1980),p. 114.
60. See RichardNathan,The Administrative
(New York: Wiley, 1983).
Presidency
61. For a detailedanalysisof theimpoundment
issuesee,JamesP. Pfiffher,
ThePresident,
theBudget,
andCongress:
andthe1974 BudgetAct(Boulder,Colorado: WestviewPress,1979).
Impoundment
62. See Violations
andAbusesofMeritPrinciples
inFederalEmployment,
HearingsbeforetheSubcommitteeon ManpowerandCivilServiceoftheHouse Committeeon PostOfficeandCivilService,
94th Congress,1st Session(April 10, 1975).
63. QuotedbyStephenWayne,TheLegislative
(New York: HarperandRow, 1978),p. 54.
Presidency
64. For an analysisoftheEconomicPolicyBoardsee Roger Porter,Presidential
DecisionMaking:The
Economic
PolicyBoard(CambridgeUniversityPress,1980).
65. JosephCalifano, Governing
America(New York: Simonand Schuster,1981), pp. 26-27.
66. Dom Bonafede,"CarterWhiteHouse is Heavyon Functions,Lighton Frills,"National
Journal
(February12, 1977), p. 234.
67. Dom Bonafede,"No One Triesto Roll OverJordanin theWhiteHouse," National
(April
Journal
16, 1977), p. 584.
toKeep (New York: Crowell, 1977) p. 192.
68. RobertShogun,Promises
69. Quoted in ThomasCronin,TheStateofthePresidency
(New York: LittleBrown,1980), p. 272.
70. QuotedbyJosephCalifano, Governing
America(New York: Simonand Schuster,1981), p. 410.
71. Ibid., p. 404.
72. See Hugh Heclo, "One ExecutiveBranchor Many?"in AnthonyKing,BothEndsoftheAvenue
(Washington:ΑΕΙ, 1984).
73. Stockmanquotedby WilliamGreider,"The Educationof David Stockman,"TheAtlantic
(December1981), p. 33.
74. Quoted by Colin Campbell,In SearchofExecutive
Chapter3, p. 17.
Harmony(forthcoming)
75. Interviewwith Edwin Meese,July2, 1985.
76. AlexanderHaig, Caveat(New York: Macmillan,1984), p. 76.
77. Haig, Caveat(New York: Macmillan,1984), p. 77.
78. Haig, Caveat(New York: Macmillan,1984), p. 82.
79. Presidential
DecisionMaking(New York: CambridgeUniversityPress,1980). See also Chester
PublicAdministration
ReviewÍTanuarv/Februarv
Newland,"The ReaganPresidency,"
1983). ο. 6.
ofthecabinetcouncilsystem
is basedon ChesterNewland's analysisin "Executive
80. Thisdiscussion
OfficePolicyApparatus:Enforcing
theReaganAgenda,"TheReaganPresidency
andtheGoverning
editedbyLesterM. SalamonandMichaelS. Lund(Washington:The UrbanInstitute,
ofAmerica,
1985), p. 135.
81. Officeof Planningand Evaluation,ExecutiveOfficeof thePresident,
Evaluation
MemoStrategic
randum
andDomestic
An
Evaluation
#18,CabinetCouncils
Affairs
Management:
(Washington,The
WhiteHouse,June8, 1982),p. 9. Quotedby ChesterNewlandin "ExecutiveOfficePolicyApparatus,"p. 153.
82. See Newland,"The Reagan Presidency,"
PublicAdministration
Review(January
/February
1983),
p. 10.
83. Newland,"ExecutiveOfficePolicyApparatus,"p. 128.
84. Newland,"ExecutiveOfficePolicyApparatus,"p. 157-159.
85. This sectionis basedon theanalysisof Colin Campbell,In SearchofExecutive
Chapter
Harmony
3, pp. 21-25, (forthcoming).
86. Haig, Caveat,pp. 85, 94.
690 I PRESIDENTIAL
STUDIESQUARTERLY
theAccountability
andPerformance
87. Commenton "Presidential
Management"inImproving
ofGovernment,editedby BruceL.R. SmithandJamesD. Carroll(Washington:Brookings,1982), pp.
100-101.
88. "Commentspresented
at thePanelofWhiteHouse Staff
/CabinetRelationships"
at theAmerican
PoliticalScienceAssociationMeeting,New York City, (September4, 1981), p. 9.
89. Interviewwith Bowman Cutter,July26, 1983.
90. QuotedbyThomasCronin,TheStateofthePresidency
(New York: LittleBrown,1980), p. 223.
91. MichaelMedved, The ShadowPresidents
(New York: Times Books, 1979), p. 352.
92. Quotedby ThomasCronin,TheStateofthePresidency
(New York: LittleBrown,1980),p. 264.
93. Interviewwith Bowman Cutter,Washmgton,D.C., July26, 1983.
94. InterviewwithJohnEhrlichman,
Santa Fe, New Mexico,June3, 1983.
95. Fortheviewsofprincipal
seeEdwinMeeseIII, "The Institutional
Presidency:
Reagancounsellors
A View fromtheWhiteHouse,"Presidential
StudiesQuarterly,
XIII, 2, Spring1983,pp. 191-197;
andDonald T. Regan,"The ReaganPresidency
in respective,"
Presidential
Studies
XVI,
Quarterly,
3, Summer1986, pp. 414-420.