Interdisciplinarity and
Peirce’s classification
of the Sciences:
A Centennial
Reassessment
Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
University of Helsinki
This paper discusses the American scientist and philosopher Charles S.
Peirce’s (1839–1914) classiªcation of the sciences from the contemporary
perspective of interdisciplinary studies. Three theses are defended: (1) Studies
on interdisciplinarity pertain to the intermediate class of Peirce’s classiªcation of all science, the sciences of review (retrospective science), ranking below
the sciences of discovery (heuretic sciences) and above practical science (the
arts). (2) Scientiªc research methods adopted by interdisciplinary inquiries
are cross-categorial. Making them converge to an increasing extent with the
sciences of discovery, especially the methodeutic of normative logic, is one of the
future challenges for studies on interdisciplinarity. (3) The overall structure
of Peirce’s classiªcation, were it to be applied in today’s situation, would not,
in any major respect, be radically different from what it was designed to
reºect a hundred years ago, in spite of the virtually exponential creation and
production of new domains and the massive increase in investment in research
and scientiªc publication. Accordingly, charges that the sciences of discovery
are becoming ever more fragmented are not new.abs
1. Introduction
Interdisciplinarity is like history: it is much more fun—or at least more
rewarding—to do it than to discourse about it. This paper will rest content with the latter and discuss the methodology of interdisciplinary research from the point of view of the American scientist and pragmatist
philosopher Charles S. Peirce’s (1839–1914) century-old but sophisticated
classiªcation of the sciences which dates from c.1903.1
Peirce was himself a master practitioner of interdisciplinary studies,
1. For Peirce’s classiªcation, see e.g. 1.176–1.283. This reference is to Peirce (1931–58)
by volume and paragraph number. Peirce’s classiªcation has been studied e.g. in Kent
Perspectives on Science 2006, vol. 14, no. 2
©2006 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology
127
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Interdisciplinarity and Peirce’s classiªcation of the Sciences
unparalleled in his intellectual devotion to endless ªelds of inquiry ranging from logic, mathematics, physics, chemistry, astronomy, engineering
and geodesy to philosophy, psychology, philology, lexicography, linguistics, economics, the history of science and storytelling.2 In consequence,
his vast research output is not easily classiªed according to the usual criteria. In Aristotelian fashion, his proposed classiªcation divides all human
inquiry into the theoretical sciences of discovery and the practical sciences
of human conduct and art.3 Importantly, it then proceeds to add a third
main class between these two: the retrospective sciences of review.
A key argument put forward in the present paper is that both the
metascientiªc studies on interdisciplinarity and what is known as ‘science
studies’ would, according to Peirce’s classiªcation, pertain to the category
of the sciences of review, the second of the three main categories of all sciences and art. Further, Peirce’s remarks on that category are expanded and
a subclassiªcation is suggested. Many of the textual sources used throughout the paper are from Peirce’s unpublished manuscripts (Peirce 1967).
It follows from this parallel between the 19th-century philosophies of
science and the suggested view (according to which Peirce’s classiªcation
prevails and has plenty of room for interdisciplinary inquiry) that currentday philosophers and sociologists of science may need to refocus their
analyses on how the methodologies of various integrative and interdisciplinary studies ought to be best characterised. To this effect, it is noted
that a need exists to steer interdisciplinary inquiry towards the theoretical,
positive sciences of discovery, in particular to make it cohere on philosophy in the sense of cenoscopy, and especially the methodeutic of normative
logic within that class. Cenoscopy is one of the three main subcategories
alongside mathematics and the special sciences (idioscopy). Mathematics,
cenoscopy and the special sciences all pertain to the ªrst main category in
Peirce’s classiªcation, the theoretical sciences of discovery.
Some obstacles that such endeavours face are nevertheless inevitable
given the current fragmentary status of the sciences of discovery. On the
other hand, the overall situation in the sciences of the late 19th century
does not appear fundamentally different from that which now prevails.
Despite the outpouring of published and publicized research compared to
(1987) and Anderson (1995). Peirce’s systematic philosophy of logic and language has been
explored in Pietarinen (2005).
2. There was no special term such as ‘interdisciplinary’ to describe that kind of activity.
According to Frank (1988), the term was probably born for bureaucratic reasons amongst
people working in the Social Sciences Research Council in New York in the mid-1920s.
3. The theory/practice distinction in science is not the same as the one referring to basic
vs. applied research. Sintonen (1990) discusses the latter in the light of the overarching interrogative approach to science.
Perspectives on Science
129
those times, the boundaries of the overall classiªcation of the sciences that
Peirce provided have not been probed to any great extent in terms of their
breadth, even though the content has, of course, accumulated in depth.4
To summarize, three theses are defended in this essay:
1. Contemporary studies on interdisciplinarity pertain to the intermediate class of Peirce’s classiªcation of all science, the sciences of review (retrospective science), ranking below the sciences of discovery
(heuretic sciences) and above practical science.
2. Scientiªc research methods adopted by interdisciplinary inquiries
are cross-categorial. Making them converge to an increasing degree
on the sciences of discovery, and especially the methodeutic of normative logic, is one of the future challenges for interdisciplinary
studies.
3. The overall structure of today’s vastly expanded chart of the
sciences does not look signiªcantly different from what it was
designed to reºect a hundred years ago in spite of the virtually exponential increase in investment in research and scientiªc publication. Accordingly, charges that the sciences of discovery are becoming ever more fragmented are not new.
Each of these claims will be approached in turn. First, it is necessary to
present the essentials of Peirce’s mature scheme for classiªcation of the sciences which he presented c.1903.
2. “Three great kingdoms of science”: Peirce’s perennial classiªcation
(1903)
According to Peirce, there are three main classes of scientiªc inquiry: All
science is either “A. Science of Discovery; B. Science of Review; or C. Practical Science” (1.181, 1903, An Outline Classiªcation of the Sciences).
Quoting one of his unpublished manuscripts:
We must recognize, in the ªrst place, three great kingdoms of science; ªrst, Theoretical Science whose sole end is to discover new
truth, for Truth’s sake. Then there is Practical Science which discovers truth of a less lofty kind for the sake of some deªnite purpose. (For those who cultivate it need not themselves contemplate
applying it.) Thirdly, between these two we must place that science
which sets forth the results of Theoretical Science, so that it may
4. The advent of new ªelds such as biochemistry or nuclear physics would be examples
of increasing the depth of the classiªcation in terms of branching, separation and disintegration. Much harder is to provide cogent examples of widening its breadth, such as adding entirely new headings to its uppermost levels (see Section 2).
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Interdisciplinarity and Peirce’s classiªcation of the Sciences
serve any purpose, practical, philosophical, educational, or even
merely amusing. This ranges all the way from Comte’s Cour de la
Philosophie positive and Spencer’s Synthetic Philosophy, through von
Humboldt’s Cosmos, and all the dictionaries and digests, down to
college text-books and popular presentations. (MS 655: 17–18,
1910, Quest of Quest: An Inquiry into the Conditions of Success in Inquiry
(beyond the collection and observation of facts.)).5
In Peirce’s view, Class A of the science of discovery is further divided according to the following outline:6
A. Science of Discovery (Heuretic science, Explanatory science)
A. a. Mathematics
A. a. 1. Formal logic
A. a. 2. Discrete mathematic
A. a. 3. Continuous mathematics
A. b. Philosophy (cenoscopy, philosophia prima)
A. b. 1. Phenomenology (phaneroscopy)
A. b. 2. Normative sciences
A. b. i. Aesthetics
A. b. ii. Ethics
A. b. iii. Logic
A. b. iii. a. Speculative grammar
A. b. iii. b. Critic (Logic proper)
A. b. iii. c. Methodeutic (Speculative rhetoric)
A. b. 3. Metaphysics
A. b. i. Ontology
A. b. ii. Physical metaphysics
A. b. ii. a. Cosmology
A. b. ii. b. Time and space
A. b. ii. c. Matter
5. See also MS 693a (pp. 78–80, n.d., Reason’s Conscience: A Practical Treatise on the Theory
of Discovery; Wherein Logic is conceived as Semeiotic): “Science of Discovery is that science which is
pursued simply to ªnd out the truth, regardless of what is to be done with the knowledge.
Science of Review is that science which endeavors to form a systematized digest of the whole
or some part of human knowledge, using whatever the science of discovery has brought to
light and ªlling up its lacunae for its own purpose by investigations of its own. Practical
Science, or the theory of the arts, is that science which is selected, arranged, and further investigated in details as a guide to the practice of an art”. The reference to Peirce’s manuscript writings (Peirce 1967) is by manuscript number, followed by page numbers or an alternative identiªer, year and title.
6. Some variations in this classiªcation exist at lower levels across Peirce’s numerous
writings on the topic, but this fact does not affect the main arguments of this paper.
Perspectives on Science
A. b. iii. Religious metaphysics
A. b. iii. a. Theology
A. b. iii. b. Theory of freedom
A. b. iii. c. Doctrine of another life
A. c. Special sciences (Idioscopy)
A. c. 1. Physical sciences
A. c. i. Nomological (general) physics
A. c. i. 1. Molar physics (dynamics, gravitation)
A. c. i. 2. Molecular physics (thermodynamics)
A. c. i. 3. Etherial physics (optics, electrics)
A. c. ii. Classiªcatory physics
A. c. ii. 1. Crystallography
A. c. ii. 2. Chemistry
A. c. ii. a. Physical
A. c. ii. b. Organic
A. c. ii. c. Inorganic
A. c. ii. 3. Biology
A. c. ii. a. Physiology
A. c. ii. b. Anatomy
A. c. iii. Descriptive (explanatory) physics
A. c. iii. 1. Geognosy (geology, geography)
A. c. iii. 2. Astronomy
A. c. 2. Psychic sciences (psychognosy, human sciences)
A. c. i. Nomological psychics (general psychics, psychology)
A. c. i. 1. Introspective psychology
A. c. i. 2. Experimental psychology
A. c. i. 3. Physiological psychology
A. c. i. 4. Developmental psychology
A. c. ii. Classiªcatory psychics
A. c. ii. 1. Special psychology
A. c. ii. a. Human psychology
A. c. ii. b. Social psychology (economics)
A. c. ii. c. Animal psychology
A. c. ii. 2. Linguistics
A. c. ii. a. Phonetics
A. c. ii. b. Word linguistics
A. c. ii. c. Grammar
A. c. ii. 3. Ethnology
A. c. ii. a. Social
A. c. ii. b. Development
A. c. ii. b. 1. Customs
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Interdisciplinarity and Peirce’s classiªcation of the Sciences
A. c. ii. b. 2. Laws
A. c. ii. b. 3. Religion
A. c. ii. c. Technology
A. c. iii. Descriptive psychics (History, Individual subjects)
A. c. iii. 1. History proper
A. c. iii. a. Monumental history
A. c. iii. b. Ancient history
A. c. iii. c. Modern history
A. c. iii. 2. Biography
A. c. iii. 3. Criticism
A. c. iii. Literary criticism
A. c. iii. Art criticism
B. Science of review
C. Practical Science
Characteristic of Class A.a mathematics is that it is science of negative discovery, in other words it does not rest upon experience but upon tracing
out consequences of particular hypotheses. It studies “what is and what is
not logically possible” (1.184, 1903, An Outline Classiªcation of the Sciences)
and is the science of necessary reasoning and discovery, since it discovers
imaginary objects and constructs the contents created by the mind, “without undertaking to ascertain what actually exists” (MS 693a: 80). It is autonomous and does not depend on any other science, being, we are told,
applicable to “every other science without exception” (1.245, c.1902, A
Detailed Classiªcation of the Sciences).
Subordinate to mathematics is Class A.b philosophy, the characteristic
of which is that it is positive inquiry resting upon familiar, general experience. Like mathematics, philosophy relies on observations, but the objects
of observation differ in that they fall within the range of every human’s
normal, general, universal experience. Common, general observations are
the hardest ones to make. Also autonomous, but not to the same degree as
mathematics, philosophy has no particular need to draw on the special sciences except as a “condiment to excite its own proper observation” (1.241,
c.1902, A Detailed Classiªcation of the Sciences).
As regards the “three Orders of Science”, in cenoscopy one can, according to Peirce, “detect some analogy, though not a very deªnite analogy, to
the three orders of Idioscopy” (MS 655: 22). These three orders subordinate to philosophy are phenomenology (phaneroscopy), the normative sciences and metaphysics. Phenomenology is “the science of the different elementary constituents of all ideas” (MS 602: 12, c.1903–1908, On
Classiªcation of the Sciences). It studies “whatever is present at any time to
the mind in any way” (1.186, An Outline Classiªcation of the Sciences). A nor-
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133
mative science “is simply the theory of a dual distinction between a ‘may’
and an ‘ought not’” (MS 602: 11). It is “essentially classiªcatory” (MS 602:
12). Metaphysics gives “an account of the universe of mind and matter”
(1.186).
Overall, normative sciences of aesthetics, ethics and logic consider what
is compelling in experience and how phenomena relate to aims such as
beauty, right or truth, and “how Feeling, Conduct and Thought ought to
be controlled” (MS 693a: 24). They rest on the preceding branches of inquiry, phenomenology and mathematics. Normative logic nevertheless
differs from formal logic of mathematics. Mathematics and formal logic
draw necessary conclusions; they do not tell how to draw them. They reason rather than are concerned with the science of reasoning. Mathematics
makes hypothetical, logic categorical assertions, and its task is deªning
the necessary consequences of supposing a particular universe. In contrast,
the task of normative logic is to determine the general conditions for attainment of truth. Accordingly, formal logic was for Peirce “by no means
the whole of logic, or even its principal part. Logic [in the general sense]
has to deªne its aim; and in doing so is even more dependent upon ethics,
or the philosophy of aims, by far, than it is, in the methodeutic branch,
upon mathematics” (4.240, c.1902, The Simplest Mathematics).
Normative logic further divides into speculative grammar, critic and
methodeutic. Peirce took these terms from the scholastic philosophers.
In terms of Peirce’s theory of signs, semeiotic, speculative grammar
studies signs in relation to other signs, and is thus the study of relationships between signs and the “general conditions of signs being signs”
(1.444, c.1896, The Three Categories). It provides the conditions “to which
thought or signs of any kind must conform in order to assert anything”
(2.206, 1901, Why Study Logic?). Examples of speculative grammar are
‘user-independent’ studies of syntax and the grammatical structures of
language. Critic, on the other hand, studies signs in relation to their objects, providing, among others, the truth-conditions of assertions. It has to
do with semantics, truth-conditional meaning and theories of truth.
Methodeutic, the third brand of normative logic, is “the study of the
proper way of arranging and conducting an inquiry” (MS 606: 17, 1905–
06?, The Nature of Logical Inquiry). It studies signs in relation to their
interpretants, providing necessary conditions for relationships between
representations and their interpretations, and classiªes and measures the
strength of arguments. It thus studies the meaning of assertions and focuses on pragmatic aspects of signs.
Unlike A.a and A.b, Peirce considered that Class A.c of the special sciences (idioscopy) differed from the other two in the primary respect that it
rested upon special experiences in its generation of new information and
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Interdisciplinarity and Peirce’s classiªcation of the Sciences
uncovering of new phenomena. It “is occupied in making new observations” and “uses these to ªnd out what further it can by inference” (MS
693a: 80).
As regards some of the subclasses of the special sciences, Peirce
identiªed nomological physics, which discovers general phenomena of the
physical universe and formulates corresponding laws. Classiªcatory physics, on the other hand, discovers and classiªes physical forms and “seeks to
explain them by the laws discovered by nomological physics”. Descriptive
physics “describes individual objects” and seeks to explain them “by the
principles of nomological and classiªcatory physics” (1.188, An Outline
Classiªcation of the Sciences).
According to Peirce, nomological psychics “discovers elements and
laws of mental phenomena” and is inºuenced by logic, metaphysics and
biology, while classiªcatory physics classiªes “products of minds and endeavors to explain them on psychological principles”. Descriptive psychics
studies “individual manifestations of mind” (1.189, An Outline Classiªcation of the Sciences). What is notable here is that, unlike most other branches
in the classiªcation, Peirce divided the special sciences into two main subclasses instead of the more common triadic ones.
In Peirce’s view, Class B, the sciences of review (also termed retrospective sciences, systematic sciences or digestive sciences), encompasses issues
concerning the history of science, the classiªcation of sciences itself, and
synthetic forms of philosophy. According to him, “By ‘science of review’ is
meant the business of those who occupy themselves with arranging the results of discovery, beginning with digests, and going on to endeavor to
form a philosophy of science. Such is the nature of Humboldt’s Cosmos, of
Comte’s Philosophie positive, and of Spencer’s Synthetic Philosophy. The
classiªcation of the sciences belongs to this department” (1.182, An Outline Classiªcation of the Sciences). Peirce did not subdivide this class any further.7 He did, however, note that:
We can now no longer postpone the recognition of a second
subbranch of theoretical science. It is a department perfectly well
recognized. It belongs by virtue of its purpose to the branch of
Theory; yet varies enough in its purpose from the active science to
be erected into a subbranch. It is the subject of Humboldt’s Cosmos,
Comte’s Philosophie positive, and Spencer’s Synthetic Philosophy. It is
science en retraite, Wissenschaft a.D. Its design is to sum up the results of all the theoretical sciences and to study them as forming
one system. It may be called retrospective [science of review], in con7. “No classiªcation of the science of review has been attempted” (1.202, An Outline
Classiªcation of the Sciences).
Perspectives on Science
135
tradistinction to active science. (1.256, A Detailed Classiªcation of the
Sciences)
It is argued in the next section that the retrospective sciences, in other
words the sciences of review, though not much discussed by Peirce, are the
natural home for contemporary studies on interdisciplinary inquiry, as
well as for metascientiªc issues in the philosophy of science and sociologically oriented science studies in general.
Class C, the practical sciences, comprise in Peirce’s opinion a form of
scientiªc inquiry that has an ulterior end, existing for the uses of life itself.8 It is intended to fulªll genuine human needs. In contrast to the normative science of aesthetics, ethics and logic, moral sciences that concern
human conduct in its everyday, common sense pertain to this class. Peirce
suggested a vast number of possible subjects that could be subsumed under practical sciences in a hierarchical and hereditary fashion, at no point
being able to settle on any ultimately agreeable classiªcation.9
Overall, Peirce’s classiªcation of sciences, which perhaps should be
viewed in the form of a lattice rather than a tree, provides the outline of
8. While many think the arts as practical science, Peirce added some qualiªcations to
this alignment in an Aristotelian fashion: “The distinction rests on the fact that every purpose and every wish is more or less indeterminate, being directed toward the production of
a result of which something or things shall be true, without caring whether other things
are true of it or not. It is therefore natural to endeavour to ªnd some natural division of
purposes into a less determinate and a more determinate class. Of this nature is Aristotle’s
distinction. He conªnes his consideration, however, to such purposes as are worthy of a
slave-holding gentleman’s attention, and pays no attention to such things as hair-cutting,
phlebotomy, shoemaking, and the like. The purposes he considers are either to produce an
advantageous way of acting, such as a skill in tending the stick, the study of which will be
the study of a practical science; or to produce some object having durably useful properties,
such as the writing [of ] a treatise upon medicine, and the proper rules for accomplishing
such a purpose will be an art. If it be an art with which every freeman ought to be acquainted, such as writing or music, it will be a liberal art” (MS 655: 13–14).
9. “I mean, then, all such well-recognized sciences now in actu, as pedagogics, goldbeating, etiquette, pigeon-fancying, vulgar arithmetic, horology, surveying, navigation,
telegraphy, printing, bookbinding, paper-making, deciphering, ink-making, librarian’s
work, engraving, etc. [the list has been abbreviated by the editors of Peirce (1931–58), vol.
1)] In short, this is by far the more various of the two branches of science” (1.243, A Detailed Classiªcation of the Sciences). In MS 1135 (c.1903, An Attempted Classiªcation of Ends),
we ªnd attempts at hundreds of subtitles for different kinds of practical sciences, including
the following:
Amusement
Public Amusements
Entertainment
Shows
Motionless
Giants, dwarfs, monstrosities, etc.
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Interdisciplinarity and Peirce’s classiªcation of the Sciences
what has been characterized as his “perennial” classiªcation.10 He devised
it with a view to bringing out “the principal afªnities of the objects
classiªed” (1.180, An Outline Classiªcation of the Sciences). Accordingly, it is
by no means meant to accommodate all possible scientiªc ªelds, niches
and corners that now exist or ever will. To do this, it would need to be
constantly revised. According to Peirce, its primary purpose is survey:
Every person who wishes to form an opinion concerning fundamental problems should ªrst of all make a complete survey of human
knowledge, should take note of all the valuable ideas in each branch
of science, should observe in just what respect each has been successful and where it has failed, in order that in the light of the thorough acquaintance so attained of the available materials for a philosophical theory and of the nature and strength of each, he may
proceed to the study of what the problem of philosophy consists in,
and of the proper way of solving it. (6.9, 1891, The Architecture of
Theories)
For example, concerning some of the speciªc branches of A.c and their interrelations, Peirce noted the following: “It is probable that all the differences of races, individuals, and tissues are chemical, at bottom” (1.195, An
Outline Classiªcation of the Sciences). Moreover, “Both experimental and
physiological psychology are dependent upon introspective psychology”,
and “Psychology is too young a science to have any further living divisions
Games and Amusement
Regular contests
Intellectual contests
Games of calculation of necessary results
Board games
Chess.
It is clearly impossible, as Peirce himself rightly admitted, to produce a neat and concise classiªcation as these items expand and vary indeªnitely. As an example, see MS 602
(p. 16): “I have bestowed little attention upon the subdivision of Systematic Science [Class
B of the science of review], which perhaps would not be difªcult, but I have bestowed
much more labor upon attempts of classifying the Practical Science that [sic] upon all the
others, and have a scheme embracing over three hundred different branches. I do not submit it to the reader’s judgment because I think myself that it must be consigned to the
long list of my failures”. Just as with Class B the science of review, this third category has
so far been studied but little in Peirce scholarship. Unlike A and B, it is bound to be
indeªnitely longer and vastly more variegated. See also MS 1343, c.1902, Of the Classiªcation of the Sciences. Second Paper. Of the Practical Sciences, which classiªes practical sciences in
terms of different notions of human instincts, since instincts are taken to subsume desires
and desires are taken to subsume purposes.
10. See Anderson (1995) and Kent (1988).
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137
than such as are here admitted” (1.199, An Outline Classiªcation of the
Sciences).
Countless interrelations exist between the speciªc sciences classiªed according to Peirce’s schema. It is not meant to be an all-encompassing umbrella for all inquiry, but a dynamic, organically evolving blueprint or a
roadmap, highlighting the various networks of inºuences and the most
salient features and presuppositions involved, with logical relationships
between its speciªc nodes that are continuously being modiªed and reshaped. In this connection, Peirce notes that “knowledge embraces substantially everything we think or say. Arrangements of the sciences are numerous. On the whole, I think those are most useful which seek to arrange
them in order of their logical dependence upon one another, and in their
degree of specialization” (MS 1335: 1–2, The Categories: studied with reference to the English Language ).11
For completeness, we should note that the perennial classiªcation was
not the only possible one inspired and supported by Peirce’s mature work.
In the unpublished manuscript 1345 (no date, c.1900) he proposed dividing the whole of inquiry into the three main classes of mathematics,
empirics and pragmatics.12 The purpose of mathematics is to study “ideal
constructions without reference to their real existence”, the purpose of
11. In Richard S. Robin’s Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce (Peirce
1967).
12. The alternative scheme runs as follows (a reconstruction of parts of MS 1345):
I. Mathematics
1. Geometry
2. Arithemetic
3. The theory of ªnite groups
II. Empirics (Phenomenology)
1. Philosophy (the study of universal characters of phenomena)
a. Logic
b. Metaphysics
2. Nomology (the study of those characters of phenomena which, though
not universal, belong to whole classes of phenomena, and the attempt
to account for them by connecting them with the universal laws which
philosophy discovers)
a. Psychics
ii. Psychology proper (the science of mind viewed from internal
standpoint)
ii. Anthropology (Empsychonomy, the science of mind viewed
from external standpoint)
1. Individuals
2. Families
3. Communities
b. Physics
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Interdisciplinarity and Peirce’s classiªcation of the Sciences
empirics is to study “phenomena with the purpose of identifying their
forms with those mathematics has studied”, and the purpose of pragmatics
is to “study how we ought to behave in the light of the truths of Empirics”. He then sketched a somewhat more detailed classiªcation emanating from this triadic base, but this alternative classiªcation was not developed to the extent the perennial classiªcation was. Notable is that, unlike
in the perennial classiªcation, this alternative scheme does not have any
speciªc provision for studying the classiªcation itself, the retrospective
sciences of review, which probably was a sensible reason for Peirce to not
continue studying it much further.
3. Interdisciplinarity and the science of review in the light of Peirce’s
classiªcation
Peirce understood the term “science” in broad terms as that which illustrated a systematic, institutionalised method of organising any body of
human knowledge. It is not knowledge or opinions as such, but a method
of reaching them. It is “the total activity of a social group whose members
devote, as far as they can, their whole being to ªnding out and helping one
another to ªnd out the truth in a certain department into which they are
peculiarly well equipped to search” (MS 675: assorted page 13, 1911, A
Sketch of Logical Critic), and “the collective and coöperative activity both of
ii. Energetics (the science of physics, without reference to the
differences of different kinds of matter)
ii. Molecular physics
3. Descriptive and Explanatory Science (Episcopy) (the description of
individual things, with a view to explaining them by the laws
nomology makes out)
a. Ergography (Technology, the account of the works of intelligent
beings)
b. Empsychography (the account of those beings themselves)
c. Cosmography (the account of inanimate nature)
ii. Geognosy
ii. Astronomy
III. Pragmatics
1. Ethics (the study of general principles of conduct)
a. Private ethics
b. Public ethics
2. Arts (the study of general problems not going back to ªrst principles)
a. Private arts (arts practiced by individuals)
b. Sociology (public arts)
3. Policy (the study of special problems arising in history)
a. Policy toward men
b. Religion (policy toward superior beings)
c. Policy toward lower animals.
Perspectives on Science
139
all and of any group of such men” (MS 615: 14, 1908, Logic. Book I. Analysis of Thought. Chapter I. Common Ground). There is no doubt that such an
activity is likely to create wide-ranging and complex structures of interdependencies as well as independencies between individual branches and departments, and therefore an extensive study of these dependencies, degrees
of freedom and level of autonomy is required.
The sciences of review are meant to accomplish just that. They study
the particular regularities in individual sciences according to which they
could be classiªed and evaluated, not general regularities. They do not attempt to discover universal laws, but to derive their material from discoveries made within the speciªc branches of A and C classes. As such, the
sciences of review appear to be an eventual philosophy of science, not only
a true mediator between positive discovery and practicality, but also a
prime critic of individual disciplines.
Regrettably, Peirce never appears to have attempted a detailed
classiªcation of studies that would pertain to this category. He noted that
the history of science and the classiªcations and enumerations are themselves parts of the science of review, but detailed remarks by him concerning this branch of inquiry are quite rare.13 In MS 602 (p. 16) he candidly
remarks, “I have bestowed little attention upon the subdivision of Systematic Science [science of review], which perhaps would not be difªcult”.
The idea was similar to philosophies of Alexander von Humboldt (1769–
1859), Auguste Comte (1798–1857) and Herbert Spencer (1820–1903),
together with “all those encyclopaedic handbooks” and “the whole activity
of those who classify the sciences and those who compile handbooks and
other digests” (MS 615: 18).14
Peirce warned not to confound this kingdom of science with that of
cenoscopy (philosophy). The business of the science of review “is not to
discover truth at all, but only so to arrange the discoveries of the sciences
of discovery—Mathematics, Cenoscopy, and Idioscopy, both psychical
[human] and physical—that they may be grasped by the mind and rendered useful in the arts of life, such as war, medicine, divinity, etc.” (MS
326: 20, n.d., Some Applications of Pragmaticism). While philosophy, in the
13. See, among others, Peirce (1998: 258–262); MS 675; MS 1342–1354.
14. An alternative heading for the science of review was Digesting Science: “Scientiªc
men usually apply the word science to the business of producing knowledge, of which one
large part consists in the revision, digestion, and generalization of all the works of discovery which have been carried out in given ªelds. We may term this work which form a second great division of science, Digesting Science. This division of science rests in its turn
upon the achievements of the business of discovery; and this business makes the third and
leading division of science, Heuretic Science” (MS 605: 7, n.d., On the Classiªcation of the
Sciences).
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Interdisciplinarity and Peirce’s classiªcation of the Sciences
sense of cenoscopy, is “the study which ascertains all the truth it can by
reasoning from facts familiar to all the world, instead of devoting itself,
like a special science, to the accumulation of novel phenomena,” the other
philosophy, which Peirce sometimes termed synthetic philosophy as well
as the science of review, “undertakes merely to arrange and restate the results of the sciences of discovery” (MS 326: 12–13).
On a constructive note, studies on interdisciplinary research and the
methods employed are to be counted as falling within such a major class of
the sciences of review. This is already clear by virtue of the fact that classiªcation of the sciences itself is one of its major tasks. Likewise may be
classiªed the trend that goes under the umbrella of science studies, presently and predominantly a sociological take on the plentiful peculiarities
of scientiªc activities, ranging from studying practical, everyday academic
work and its idiosyncrasies to theoretical and philosophical studies of science, with an eye on fostering collaboration and communication between
scholars and promoting shared perspectives on special branches of science.15
It thus appears that both interdisciplinary studies and science studies
would be well advised to look more closely at what Peirce’s suggestions
about the sciences of review might imply in academic environments.
Among other things, understanding of the special sciences is not only a
key issue but also a bottleneck that Peirce attempted to overcome via the
sciences of review. Such an understanding is also among the major goals
that contemporary studies on science strive to attain.
We should also be mindful of the fact that Peirce became a notable precursor of mathematical economics by initiating study of the economics of
research, including the cost-beneªt analysis,16 which later became a prominent issue in science studies.
In a manner similar to the broad task of classifying the sciences, understanding studies on interdisciplinary inquiry requires understanding the
manifold logical dependencies to which the regularities of different individual sciences give rise.17 For example, by way of alluding to the history
of science, interdisciplinary studies trace the commonalities and analogies
across fragmentary disciplines into their historical, occasionally shared, origins. Progress in understanding the history of intellectual ideas should
15. See e.g. Ziman (1984) as well as the journal Science Studies: an Interdisciplinary Journal for Science and Technology Studies published by the Finnish Society for Science Studies.
16. See Mirowski and Sent (2002), which reprints Peirce’s classic “Note on the Theory
of the Economy of Research (1879)”, together with James R. Wible’s commentary article
“Charles Sanders Peirce’s Economy of Research (1994)”. See also Mirowski (2004).
17. The importance of such logical dependencies has not yet received enough focus in
interdisciplinary studies. Key reference works in the area include Klein (1990, 1996).
Perspectives on Science
141
not be at all hampered by the existence of wedges and boundaries in some
special domains of investigation. Perhaps most importantly, and in order
to present the sciences of review as a unitary class of systematic research,
among the chief purposes of interdisciplinarity is making discoveries
within individual sciences accessible and applicable to other disciplines, in
a form that is as free as possible from presuppositions, bias and other predispositions concerning such applicability. Its main concerns are therefore
simultaneously educational, digestive, investigative, logical, practical and
historical. While this lays a considerable burden on its practitioners, it
also provides the possibility of being located in a unique position upon
our great scientiªc chart.
The following outlines a suggestion for a possible subclassiªcation of
the sciences of review, or science studies as it also may be called, which
Peirce apparently did not go on to present.
B. Sciences of Review
a. History
1. History of science
2. Genealogy and development of science
3. History of intellectual ideas
b. Theoretical (systematic) review
1. Classiªcation of the sciences
2. Studies on interdisciplinary inquiry
iii. Multi- and pluridisciplinarity
iii. Cross-disciplinarity
iii. Inter- and transdisciplinarity
3. Studies on synthetic (integrative) inquiry
iii. Systems theory
iii.Consilience
iii. Cognition
c. Practical review (Science and technology studies)
1. Studies on publication and the dissemination of research
iii. Bibliometry (Scientometry, peer review)
iii. Library studies (Informatics)
iii. the Internet18
2. Pedagogy
18. A century ago, a good candidate that, retrospectively, paralleled the importance of
that of the Internet as the key encyclopedia and reference work for all research and study of
science was The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia and its supplementary volumes, edited by
William Dwight Whitney (1889–1891) and Benjamin Eli Smith (1894–1909). Peirce
wrote thousands of entries for these volumes. See the Century Dictionary Online at
www.global-language.com/CENTURY/ (accessed 20 June 2005).
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Interdisciplinarity and Peirce’s classiªcation of the Sciences
iii. Scientiªc communication
iii. Science education
iii. Popular science
3. Research policy making19
iii. Academic, institutional conduct
iii. Social, governmental conduct
iii. Economic, industrial conduct
The titles are, it is hoped, largely self-explanatory. Use and application of
this proposed classiªcation will not be discussed in the present essay. Further expansion and branching of the scheme is of course entirely possible.
The focus in the remainder of this paper is on Class B.b.2 studies on interdisciplinary inquiry, which according to this classiªcation is part of the
theoretical, systematic science of review betwixt and between the
classiªcation of the sciences and studies on synthetic and intergrative inquiry. It accordingly has close ties with scientiªc methodology at large.
4. Interdisciplinary research methods and their challenges
According to Peirce’s classiªcation, the study of methods of all sciences
pertains to the sciences of discovery, in particular to the methodeutic
(A.b.2.iii.c), a subclass of logic, which in turn is a subclass of normative
sciences within cenoscopical, philosophical inquiry. Methodeutic is concerned with the pragmatic account of meaning and applications of the
pragmatic maxim.20 It studies arguments and logical tools that aim to create stable habits of conduct and ascertained belief in attaining the goals of
intellectual inquiry tending to the increase of the common idea-potential
of humankind, its summum bonum. As an example of such scientiªc
method, Peirce offered the three-fold division of all good, trustworthy reasoning into abductive (plausible reasoning, hypothesis formation), deductive (necessary reasoning) and inductive (probable reasoning, testing and
law-formation) parts.
An element of the positive sciences therefore readily exists in interdisciplinary studies. Their methods are moreover logical in Peirce’s sense of
conceiving logic as semeiotic, namely providing the general theory of
signs in conjunction with the practical theory of discovery (MS 693a).
19. Nowotny et al. (2002) make a case—by no means unique or unprecedented—for
the increased entanglement of science with socio-economic rules and procedures.
20. The pragmatic maxim suggests the recommended way of tracing out the meaning
of our intellectual concepts in terms of their practical effects. For example, genuine, novel
concepts and methods applied in studies on interdisciplinarity should, according to the
maxim, give rise to some tangible, practical consequences for the individual sciences that
it studies, such as predicting the integration, differentiation, specialization or emergence
of new scientiªc disciplines.
Perspectives on Science
143
This is but one instance of the fact that any proposed classiªcation is
bound to be both coarse and elastic, in other words each object (i.e.,
a scientiªc discipline) in the lattice of the classiªcation may ªnd either
(i) correlate objects elsewhere in the lattice with which it forms a bidirectional and symbiotic relationship (e.g., in seeking its lower and upper
bounds) as well as (ii) some contrasting objects with which it forms an incomparable pair of subdisciplines (e.g., forming anti-chains through the
structure).
In particular, a natural cohesion exists in contemporary science studies
according to which it is just to conclude that characters of the science of
review increasingly tend to become heuretic and specialised, in a fashion
similar to that in which practical sciences tend to become more classiªcatory and more scientiªc (Section 6 of this paper). In this light, it seems
that investigating and evaluating interdisciplinary research methods
ought to draw some main insights from the sciences of discovery and the
philosophical inquiry therein, especially methodeutic. Depending on the
future success in ªnding such methods, the following phenomenon may
occur: metascientiªc studies on interdisciplinarity and science studies
might grow to be parts of the special sciences, specialising as they do from
their umbrella status of accommodating several subdisciplines which preserve their own identities, and moving towards distinct and special methodology, borrowing exact tools from scientometric studies and elsewhere.
However, should the science studies however abstain from using such specialised methods and stick to their overarching character of remaining of
the umbrella nature of the review, are they in such a case to be allowed
into the club of science at all? What would be the point of practicing such
studies in academic circles for any reason other than as a mere ornament
for, say, scientiªc policy makers?21
To put the point in a different perpsective, if the tendency for content
to migrate from sciences of review to sciences of discovery increases—as it
may be predicted to be likely—it would not diminish the importance of
the science of review in the least. New, higher-order versions of studies on
interdisciplinarity, scientiªc integration and science and technology studies would then emerge, examining the kinds of interdisciplinarities that
were transparent in the earlier hierarchy at the subordinate level of the sciences of discovery.
What is more, this process appears to be continuing one, the overarch21. The ensuing scenario is somewhat similar to the one Peirce sketched in terms of his
alternative three-fold classiªcation of the sciences into mathematics, empirics and
pragmatics (see Section 2 and note 13), a system which does not have similar provision for
the sciences of review as that provided in the perennial classiªcation.
144
Interdisciplinarity and Peirce’s classiªcation of the Sciences
ing studies of review not only feeding the sciences of discovery, especially
the special sciences, but also being prepared to set out and re-digest once
again the material that emerges from scientiªc discoveries.
What then, in the light of Peirce’s methodeutic, are the actual methods
to be recommended in interdisciplinary studies? Perhaps the only appropriate answer that can be offered is that one of the foremost current challenges is the making of a concentrated effort to ªnd such feasible research
methods with the aid of all that is proposed by methodeutic. Accordingly,
logic has a large role to play in it. But logic itself is not a “Systematic Science, any more than a Practical Science” (MS 603: 8, 1905–06?, [On
Classiªcation of the Sciences]). Logic is needed when applying methods from
one discipline into another, for one thing because it helps us to understand
the intricate relationship between theories and models. A century ago,
Peirce recognised that such methods, not only those used for classifying
the sciences but also the ones used in tracing out their practical consequences, logical interdependencies, mutual inºuences and all-pervading
overlaps are not nearly as well developed as the methods for the special sciences. The need for this task is ever more acute today.22
5. Is the fragmentation of present-day research unprecedented?
The time at the end of the 19th century in which Peirce shaped his
classiªcation was also the prime era in which waves of the second industrial revolution were felt and relived in Europe as well as in North America. Groundbreaking scientiªc innovations that had a permanent effect on
shaping everyday life abounded. The situation at that time was startlingly
similar to that at the turn of the millennium. For example, the public image of science was comparable to the image typically attributed to science
one hundred years later.23
A widespread conviction in contemporary science is that the everincreasing fragmentation, differentiation and dispersion are inevitable
given the nearly uncontrollable or, at least in practice, unsurveyable outburst of recent research and the increasing need for ‘expert knowledge’ to
serve as a mediator between science and its neighbours in social and eco22. Alestalo (1979) provides a quantitative study of interdisciplinary research methods.
‘Actor-network’ styles of account have also been proposed to provide explanations for
scientiªc activities in terms of identifying the kinds of agents and agencies responsible for
the observable effects in our technoscientiªc society. It appears that a better theory is at our
disposal in terms of habits of actions and the conceivable effects to environment, in which
habits and effects may be both individual and collective in a larger scale. This would be in
consonance with Peirce’s pragmatic maxim and his theory of action.
23. See Cantor, Shuttleworth and Topham (2003).
Perspectives on Science
145
nomic public space. Individuals can hardly learn, it is thought, anything
more than small fragments of such a specialised body of knowledge, and
such learning can only take place within some strictly deªned, approved,
properly audited and well-identiªed scientiªc projects.
Such distrustful claims are hardly novel, similar ones were made during
the late 19th century. Peirce himself fell victim to a system that was singularly inadequate in, incapable of and even unwilling to comprehending
his visions, which were far ahead of his time.24 More readily, then, these
claims underscore the topicality of ªnding new methods for the sciences of
review in general and interdisciplinary studies in particular, rather than
engaging in pessimistic pronouncements concerning the overall state of
scientiªc inquiry and prospects for it.
It is of particular importance to recognize that the way in which practitioners of practical sciences learn about special sciences already happens
and will happen to an increasing degree through the sciences of review,
especially via its role of putting discoveries into a critical, educable and
publicly communicable perspective. The sciences of review are therefore
likely to gain ever more signiªcance in future scientiªc and scholarly
endeavours, since those endeavours are likely to include methods that increasingly have a truly interdisciplinary origin.25
6. On the contemporary status of classiªcation
Given the charges of fragmentation and disintegration, have attempts to
classify science become obsolete and useless, or even worse, misleading
and spurious? What is the status of the perennial classiªcation in contemporary science? The conclusion in this section is that in broad respects, the
24. Among the notewortly events that shifted the progress of science away from
Peirce’s interdisciplinary and intergrative concerns was the turning down of his magisterial
application to the Carnegie Institution (MS L 75, 1902, Carnegie Institution Correspondence,
see http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver2/l75frame.htm (accessed
20 June 2005), for a partial transcription of that application). Among that application
were plans to ªnally state what the nature of reasoning in scientiªc inquiry consists of, to
expound logic as the science of ascertaining a stable set of indubitable beliefs, to characterize the nature of mathematical reasoning, and to argue for universal phenomenological categories. See also the editorial introduction to the application by Joseph Ransdell, 1998,
“The Signiªcance of Peirce’s Application to the Carnegie Institution”, http://members
.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/l75/intro/l75intro.htm (accessed 20 June 2005).
25. To preserve a correct balance, it should be noted that the movements and propositions for the unity of science that prospered in the early 20th century have by no means
been forgotten. Particularly noteworthy examples include recent attempts to integrate, via
new, overarching logical tools and methods, the hitherto dispersed ªelds of scientiªc inquiry and its epistemology. See e.g. Rahman et al. (2004) and Vanderveken (2005).
146
Interdisciplinarity and Peirce’s classiªcation of the Sciences
classiªcation has prevailed. The three kingdoms of science are even more
salient, prominent and relevant to the progress of inquiry than a century
ago. In particular, Peirce’s perennial classiªcation strikes us as particularly
well adapted to many current-day concerns about the complexity of the
classiªcatory structure and the intricate interdependencies between multiplicities of different domains. Even though it was certainly not intended
to provide the last word on all categories of human inquiry, the overall
structure of Peirce’s classiªcation is remarkably astute, ºexible and fullbodied. Nothing in its ªrst two levels is easily to be rewritten. Even the
most novel forms of inquiry in the sciences and arts, many of them boasted
of as representing genuinely multi-, pluri-, cross-, inter-, or trans-disciplinary ªelds, do not appear to identify themselves as anything like primary categories of their own, falling as they do within the extant classes.26
Let us list a few cases in point to support this claim.
Examples of novel forms of inquiry that have emerged, migrated or
separated from the extant disciplines include the heuretic ones of cognitive science, cognitive linguistics, computer science, quantum theory,
complexity studies, environmental sciences and medical informatics, and
the practical ones of, for example, the nursing sciences, visual culture and
multimedia. Countless others also exist.
Let us consider ªrst the heuretic examples. Cognitive sciences, perhaps
among the clearest examples of contemporary interdisciplinary studies,
pertain to nomological, human, psychic, and introspective idioscopy.
They draw on physical, classiªcatory sciences, primarily on biology, in
which the neurosciences belong. Thus emerges, for example, cognitive
neurosciences.
Unlike linguistics, cognitive linguistics appears to not be a human
classiªcatory science, but rather to pertain to the normative sciences of
critic and methodeutic, in a similar sense to which semantics and prag26. The different degrees of disciplinary interaction and cohesion as seen from the perspective of Peirce’s classiªcation would deserve a separate treatise. Sufªce it to note how
these ªve notions may be classiªed into three parts according to their increasing level of
common methodologies (see Section 3, B.b.2.). First, multi- and pluridisciplinary studies
promote multiple and autonomous perspectives to a common phenomenon without sharing methodologies. Second, cross-disciplinary studies exemplify a unilateral transfer of
methods from one discipline onto another. Third, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary
studies bear a bidirectional relation of inºuence and cross-fertilization towards common
frames of reference and common, self-standing theories. Alluding to Peirce’s theory of categories, we may think of the third as bringing the ªrst and the second into a law-like relation, in other words multiple disciplines that are in continuous interaction tend to evolve
and mould into ones that use mutually accepted vocabulary of concepts and pursue their
goals through common scientiªc methods.
Perspectives on Science
147
matics fall within these areas. Moreover, cognitive linguistics draws on introspective cognitive sciences while using inputs from phenomenology.
The latter is also being increasingly considered as lying within the cognitive sciences.27
Theoretical computer science is, in effect, discrete mathematics, and
thus a ready-made slot exists for it in Peirce’s classiªcation. Moving towards the artiªcial-intelligence front in computing sciences, one may hold
that parts of computing share elements of the cognitive sciences and parts
of it fall within nomological physics. Control and robotics fall under physics (A.c.1.i.3), but are crossdisciplinary in interacting heavily with formal
logic, discrete and continuous mathematics.
Quantum theory, in its turn, is certainly nomological physics, but it
moves in a different branch of dynamic systems. It draws on formal logic
and discrete mathematics.
Closest to a self-standing branch that cuts through several subclasses of
physical and psychic idioscopy stands the currently popular study of complexity phenomena. The sciences of complexity originate from physics and
mathematics but are nowadays in vogue across much of the entire
scientiªc and even practical spectrum.28
It is the inherent nature of complex systems that in order to originate
new qualitative phenomena, they tend to maximize the number of elements and the transitions and information ºows between them. Even so,
the methodology employed in this branch has not so far been identiªed in
sufªcient detail and scope. It remains to be seen at which point on the lattice of sciences it will ªnally settle. As so often in science, systems of a dynamic, organic and continuous nature are not likely to converge on any
unique equilibria. As general laws of complexity are found, such science
will develop into a nomological idioscopy. The curious but no means
unique position in these early stages of this relatively young discipline is
that studies of complexity are still as much sciences of review as they are
sciences of discovery.
What about the environmental sciences, represented by Morillo et al.
(2002) as one of the top categories with respect to interdisciplinary orientation? Are they parts of nomological, classiªcatory or descriptive (explanatory) idioscopy, presumably that of physical sciences? Apparently they
exhibit thumbnails of all these, and also draw on the social sciences and
psychology for perimeter and guidance. Such a cluster of inquiry thus ad27. On semantic explanations in cognitive linguistics, see e.g. Lakoff and Johnson
(1999).
28. See Heylighen, Bollen and Riegler (1999).
148
Interdisciplinarity and Peirce’s classiªcation of the Sciences
mits of no straightforward classiªcation, but it is important to recognize
its umbrella-like, preliminary and intergrative status as a review science
that at the same time pursues its idioscopic constituents at individual
fronts.
What is also notable in the perennial classiªcation is the absence of
health sciences, such as biomedicine or biochemistry. No doubt they are
classiªcatory. It is pertinent to make some adjustment to the classiªcation
by moving A.c.1.ii.1 (crystallography) under A.c.1.i.3 and replacing the
former with medical science. Medical informatics is, on the other hand,
partly nomological and partly explanatory.
Furthermore, geochemistry would intersect general, classiªcatory and
descriptive physics, while thermodynamics, currently a branch of physics
that has a fairly high interdisciplinary orientation, was classiªed already
by Peirce within general, molecular physics (A.c.1.ii.2).
As far as the practical sciences are concerned, one may at once make the
pivotal observation that activities in this class by no means fall outside the
purview of academic activities. Peirce had a clear objective in attempting
to study and properly classify them, even though his rationale has not
been vindicated in subsequent literature. In the contemporary science of
our time, a concentrated tendency has existed for many individual ªelds of
practical sciences to become amenable to the scientiªc methodology and
explanatory schemes that are familiar from the special sciences of discovery.29 Examples of such tendencies are the engineering sciences, including
materials science and environmental engineering, the nursing sciences,
sport science, warfare and architecture. Design, crafts and applied arts are
good cases in point that have gravitated towards the scientiªc methodologies employed by the special sciences in recent years and decades.
Conversely, endless practical sciences may emerge out of the special sciences and their methodologies. Technology (part of ergography, see note
13, II.3.a and Section 2, A.c.2.ii.3.c) is an offshoot of the mathematical
and physical sciences interspersed among others with social psychology
and rhetoric of normative logic. Consumer culture and behaviour are connected with numerous special sciences, including the cognitive ones. Ever
perspicacious, Peirce noted that “out of every science may grow a practical
science, or theory of some kind of performance, and one of the great divisions of science is the study of the theories of the arts, or Practical Science”
(MS 605: 6). Moreover, such a practical science “has to be based upon an
29. The importance of such ‘scientiªcation’ of practical sciences has been cogently
highlighted by Niiniluoto (1995). Peirce noted this in terms of “cultivators” of practical
sciences that are “aided by the digests of the second branch [science of review], while those
who further that depend upon the published works of theoretical science” (MS 615: 18).
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149
exhaustive acquaintance with all the means actually available for accomplishing the different parts of the ªxed purpose, and has quite enough to
do in considering all the circumstances of the existing situation” (MS
693a: 124). For example, those involved with technological advancements
in our visual and communication cultures are applying their scientiªc
knowledge to create new forms of art.
What is notable is that, as soon as new practical sciences ensue from the
special sciences, they are open to the sciences of review, and depending on
the methodologies that the review stage comes up with may return to a
position within the special sciences in a more advanced and sophisticated
form. This is not new to the sciences of our time: “But every such study
[practical science] needs a systematic statement of all that has hitherto
been discovered within certain ªelds of study. The drawing up of such
statements involves a study of the sciences which itself is a high science”
(MS 605: 6). The overall progress of science, connected as it is with the
emergence of new ªelds through the interplay of theoretical, practical and
digestive sciences of review, thus contains an element of cyclicity and feedback.
At this point the earlier claim needs to be recapitulated, namely that
some parts of the sciences of review, such as studies on interdisciplinarity,
are likely to be absorbed by the sciences of discovery as soon as they adopt
their own methodologies. Should this prediction eventually fulªll itself,
it would remain improbable that entirely new branches would emerge
alongside the main ones of mathematics, philosophy and the special sciences, or even alongside the main classes of the special sciences.30
Another, related prediction that can be made is that (i) the special sciences are capable of accommodating their most relevant interdisciplinary
30. Cognitive sciences have certainly made notable efforts in attempting to wedge
themselves into a position between the physical and psychical sciences. This has increased
the degree of multidisciplinarity rather than inter- or transdisciplinarity, however. As such,
cognitive sciences rely heavily on philosophy and struggle to gain autonomous position. It
was one of Peirce’s many predictions that “both Physics and Psychology will, as time does
on, tend to become welded to Metaphysics” (MS 655: 21). This may be read as an early anticipation of the tendency of separating the sciences of cognition from the mother discipline of philosophy. Another cogent remark was with respect to the division that exists between physiognosy, “that branch of idioscopy which observes by the senses and reasons
upon what is observes, without the exercise of those faculties by which we recognize persons and moral inºuences”, and psychognosy, “that branch of idioscopy which observes the
evidences of beings like ourselves and reasons upon them”: “There is no third branch here.
But perhaps this is because nobody occupies himself with observing the workings of ideas
like Truth, Humanity, etc. which, it is true, appear only in persons, just as persons appear
only in the material objects which they mould, but which appear to be as distinct from the
persons as the persons are from matter” (MS 693a: 84–86). Note also Peirce’s statement
that “matter is effete mind” (6.25, 1891, The Architecture of Theories).
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Interdisciplinarity and Peirce’s classiªcation of the Sciences
problems, and (ii) the logical relationships between the special sciences
themselves readily exemplify the kinds of interdisciplinarities in question.
As to these points, Peirce noted the existence of “cross-classiªcations” (MS
615: 24), which is “of subsidiary importance, it is true, to the families so
far noticed”, but all the same “more important than any subdivisions of
those families”. According to him, “this cross-classiªcation depends upon
the different natures of the single objects observed” (MS 615: 24–25).
With respect to classiªcatory sciences, new families arise, among others,
by asking questions about how objects of study become separated, which
gives rise to the “Evolutionary family of Classiªcatory science”, and by
asking questions of how different phenomena are connected, giving rise to
the “Physiological family of Classiªcatory science” (MS 615: 22–23). New
disciplines and areas of interest may emerge out of such questions, but
they only increase the depth of the classiªcation, not its breadth.
I will end on a note that is slightly more somber: Has the increased interest in science studies and studies on interdisciplinarity been a symptom
of a more general phenomenon of our era, namely that many of the special
sciences have been exhausted of their innate creativity and the dynamics of
discovery, so much so that the kinds of cross-classiªcations that might
very well be possible tend to regress? What many might have been led to
believe is that the sole task that remains in such a situation is some retrospective, systematic organization, digestion and non-interpretive wrapping up of what has been achieved thus far.
On the face of it, more than a century ago, Peirce appears to have stated
something similar:
As an explanatory [descriptive] science progresses it becomes acquainted with great numbers of more or less similar objects, and
thus tends to pass into the second order, that of the Classiªcatory
sciences. Each such science seeks, in the ªrst place, to form a
scheme of classiªcation which shall truly represent the degrees,
kinds, and ranks of importance of all the resemblances that it ªnds
among the single objects of the general type that it studies. (MS:
615: 21–22)
These are pertinent examples of separation, migration and disintegration
in science. What should be noted, however, is that classiªcation in Peirce’s
sense would be merely the starting point for true investigative inquiry.
The iron grip of the science of discovery pertains to its heuretic nature, of
which cross-classiªcation plays a prominent part, and is thus not solely
conªned to the seeking of classiªcatory schemes. Classiªcation is no meek
residue of what is left to be done when progress no longer appears imminent. On the contrary, it is an indispensable reference point and a roadmap
Perspectives on Science
151
in the genesis of innovative research exchanges and in seeking new contact
points between individual objects and classes.
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