Záhořík, Jan. “Ethiopia Between Constitutional Principles and Reality.”
In The Scale of Globalization. Think Globally, Act Locally, Change Individually in the 21st Century, 374-378. Ostrava: University of Ostrava, 2011.
ISBN 978-80-7368-963-6 http://conference.osu.eu/globalization/publ2011/374-378_Zahorik.pdf.
Ethiopia between Constitutional Principles and Reality
Jan Záhořík
Jan Záhořík
University of New York in Prague, Czech Republic
E-mail: [email protected]
Abstract
At the beginning of 1990s, Ethiopia was perceived as a promising democratizing country.
Two decades later, it is obvious that such an image is unbearable. The paper deals with
discrepancies between the Ethiopian constitution and the principles on which the ethnic
federalism in Ethiopia is built, and real daily politics in various corners of the state where the
dominance of the ruling party (EPRDF) is overwhelming and does not allow other parties to
freely participate in decision-making processes. As the author argues, Ethiopia has returned
back to its former Stalinist nature.
Key words: Ethiopia, constitution, federalism, decentralization, dictatorship
Introduction
In 1991, Ethiopia witnessed a final wave of political unrest against the regime of Mengistu
Haile Mariam. Shortly after the fall of Colonel Mengistu, a new period of re-building and reshaping the nation and state began, with Ethiopia embarking on apath towards what later
became "ethnic federalism". Already at the end of 1980s, the leading military-political party,
Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), prepared for political dominance by establishing
Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF), a seemingly multi-ethnic party
representing the free will of all Ethiopian peoples. The reality was much different as the
EPRDF served only as a platform for the TPLF to reach its political and economic goals by
increasing its coalition potential.
From the very beginning, TPLF's desire was focused on establishing such a model of state
which would respect an ethnic composition of Ethiopia, a country inhabited by approximately
80 different ethnic groups speaking more or less the same number of languages. Since 1995,
enormous space has been given to ethnicity and ethnic principles appearing to be the most
decisive when it comes to the decision-making process or political competition. A vast
number of political parties still arise from ethnically definedmovements which is a heritage of
the struggle against the Derg government in the 1980s. An emphasis put on ethnicity has a
direct impact on the political development in Ethiopia and the struggle for identity and selfdetermination can be seen in many parts of the state, especially in border areas by which I
mean borders between regions or federal states where people may protest against the ethnic
category into which they had been previously put. Such stories can be best illustrated on the
example of the Silt'e in Gurageland, where a brand new ethnic identity came into existence as
a result of the power of ethnic debates deriving from the government's policy of "ethnic
federalism".
This paper deals with certain discrepancies between constitutional principles and reality.
Ethiopia, as other non-democratic regimes, does not follow its own Constitution. As
compared to other authoritarian governments, the Constitution serves only as a useful tool of
propaganda which the government can always point at. As stated later in the text, especially in
374
Záhořík, Jan. “Ethiopia Between Constitutional Principles and Reality.”
In The Scale of Globalization. Think Globally, Act Locally, Change Individually in the 21st Century, 374-378. Ostrava: University of Ostrava, 2011.
ISBN 978-80-7368-963-6 http://conference.osu.eu/globalization/publ2011/374-378_Zahorik.pdf.
terms of ethnic policy, human rights and free access to information, the government strongly
violates its own laws and constitutional provisions so it resembles the previous regime of
Mengistu Haile Mariam.
Ethiopian Ethnic Federalism in Theory
Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is based on the Federal Constitution that came into existence
in 1995. It has promoted "ethnic" states and regions and ethnicity has become one of the most
crucial aspects of political life. For the purpose of our study, three articles of the Constitution
seem to be the most important and questionable. Article 8 in its first paragraph says that "All
sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples in Ethiopia". Paragraph 3 of
Article 29 states that freedom "of the press and other mass media and freedom of artistic
creativity is guaranteed. Freedom of the press shall specifically include the following
elements: a) Prohibition of any form of censorship; b) Access to information of public
interest." Probably the most crucial and politically sensitive of all articles of the Constitution
is the Article 39 with its first paragraph which declares "an unconditional right to selfdetermination, including the right to secession" to every nation, nationality and people in
Ethiopia. The basic principle of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is ethnicity and territoriality.
Regardless of differences in origin, federations simply imply territoriality as the basic element
which is guaranteed by a constitution and is usually associated with some kind of territorial
autonomy. This should be respected by the central government (Fiseha 2007: 269). An often
discussed issue is the question of self-determination of nations, nationalities and peoples
which is prescribed in the Constitution as one of the most significant articles proving the truly
democratic character of Ethiopia but as suggested elsewhere (Dagafa 2008: 147) this principle
remains an illusory one and serves only as a rhetorical theory.
The Ethiopian Constitution established nine federal states from which six are supposed to
be ethnically homogeneous (Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali and Harari)while two
(Benishangul/Gumuz and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region) distinctly
heterogeneous (Article 47 of the Constitution). The idea of ethnically homogeneous states has
not only stemmed from primordialist views on ethnicity but has never fully corresponded to
reality as no region can be regarded as fully homogeneous. The problem of the Ethiopian
Federal Constitution lies in the fact that ethnicity is taken as a primary identity of an
individual and group alike without taking into account other variables. Ethnicityhas thus
become, especially in many conflict zones at local levels, strongly politicized identity and has
gained remarkable mobilizing potential (Aalen 2011, Abbink 1997, Keller and Omwami
2007). In contemporary Ethiopia a discourse on ethnicity has created so far unseen entities or
gave the existing ones a different meaning, turning them into the most fundamental political
criteria.
Some authors, e. g. AsebeRegassaDebelo (2007: 3), distinguish between 'formal
ethnicisim' and 'ethnic federalism'. While the first denotes, at least in the Ethiopian context, "a
top-down approach used by ethnic entrepreneurs in their pursuit to mobilize and legitimate the
diverse ethnic groups in the country", the latter is a formal term "used both as a legal and
analytical concept derived from the ethnic-based federal arrangement put in place since 1991"
(Debelo 2007: 3). The problem I see in Ethiopia when it comes to the application of ethnic
federalism is an absence of political will to fully implement real federal structures and
materialize its policies in daily life. Federalism implies a shared-rule accommodating unity
and diversity within a larger political union; in theory it means that it advocates both unity
and autonomy (Fiseha 2007: 102-103). Decentralization, autonomy and self-rule are probably
the key terms associated with federalism and its application in the practical ground and they
stand in opposition to centralization and unification, on which the Ethiopian state was
established until 1991. The ruling EPRDF has managed to completely reverse the course of
375
Záhořík, Jan. “Ethiopia Between Constitutional Principles and Reality.”
In The Scale of Globalization. Think Globally, Act Locally, Change Individually in the 21st Century, 374-378. Ostrava: University of Ostrava, 2011.
ISBN 978-80-7368-963-6 http://conference.osu.eu/globalization/publ2011/374-378_Zahorik.pdf.
democratization from the early 1990s and Ethiopia can now be regarded as a non-democratic
country with strong dictatorial features based on ethnic favoritism and privileges.
Political and Ethnic Favoritism in Reality
The ideological roots of TPLF/EPRDF can be found in the socio-political atmosphere of
the 1960s and 1970s characterized by the emergent Eritrean struggle for independence,
increasing regional tensions and student Marxist initiatives of Stalinist and/or Maoist types.
"Tigray", being a part of both Ethiopia and Eritrea, became a sort of a taboo and newly
formed TPLF was considered a band of criminals (Praeg 2006: 78). TPLF still bears a legacy
of its Marxist past and the struggle against Mengistu, at least as far as its paranoia towards
political and public opposition goes. This means that a number of non-Tigrayan managers and
businessman as well as opposition politicians (especially those of Oromo origin) are often put
in prison without any clear accusation, in many cases simply because of being blamed of
cooperating with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) which still remains a symbol of
resistance against the central government.
One of the basic problems in contemporary Ethiopia is the ethnic terminology itself which
is not even clear in the Constitution. As has already been mentioned, the Federal Constitution
speaks about nations, nationalities, and peoples, but whom to label as nation and whom as
nationality is not officially declared, even though these 'nuances' may present a serious
problem at the very local level. The existing confusion in the terminology has been
appropriately described by DerejeFeyissa (2006: 217):
"Thus, the Amhara, Oromo or Tigrayans are often referred to as 'nations' (biher), whereas
the rest are referred to as either nationalities (behereseb) or peoples (hizboch). The difference
in usage seems to be related to the size of the groups. But, to add to the terminological
confusion, the Harari, one of the smallest ethnic groups, is also referred to as a nation and is
thus given the status of a regional state. In the absence of a standard definition, the politics of
entitlement in the multi-ethnic regional state draws on a wide array of ideologies of
entitlement."
Problems and conflicts at the local level often arise from the historical animosity between
the so-called indigenous population and highlanders, i.e. those coming from the center/north
to the 'periphery'. Examples of such conflicts can be found in various regions including
SNNPR, Gambella or Benishangul/Gumuz (Kefale 2008) where recently members of EPRDF
gained political and mainly economic power through various national companies,
development projects, construction of dams, roads, etc. Unequal development and unequal
treatment from the government towards the indigenous population can be regarded as another
example of the violation of the Constitution.
In its ideal form, all federal states or regions should be treated equally in terms of
distribution of wealth, powers, duties, responsibilities and finances. Such a principle can be
based on many criteria including population size, territorial space or some other factors but
people in all regions should live under equal conditions comparable to other federal states.
The problem of 'ethnic federalism' in Ethiopia, as suggested by some scholars, lies in the fact
that Ethiopia does not implement these federal principles in reality. As shown, for instance,
by Solomon Negussie (2008), distribution of wealth in Ethiopia is a matter of unequal
manipulations as the Tigray region with a tiny population and lack of natural resources gets
significant incomes compared to overpopulatedOromia, the richest region of Ethiopia. Only
due to diaspora, several areas of Ethiopia are able to get developed and revitalized (see Addis
Standard 2011: 20), the government can hardly meet the needs of the majority of its eighty
million people.
In spite of promoting decentralized governance as written in the Constitution, the
government of MelesZenawi tends to restrict the full establishment of democratic civil society
376
Záhořík, Jan. “Ethiopia Between Constitutional Principles and Reality.”
In The Scale of Globalization. Think Globally, Act Locally, Change Individually in the 21st Century, 374-378. Ostrava: University of Ostrava, 2011.
ISBN 978-80-7368-963-6 http://conference.osu.eu/globalization/publ2011/374-378_Zahorik.pdf.
where every person would have equal status (according to the Constitution). Furthermore,
oppression of political opposition including the free press and true opposition parties, human
rights activists and journalists only strengthens the despotic nature of the government which
has completely lost its earlier promising democratizing rhetoric (Záhořík 2011).
Conclusion
Ethiopia is an example of a country where we can perceive technically correct and regular
elections with a number of political parties participating but where due to severe violations of
law and the basic principles of its Constitution one can hardly speak about democratization.
While the Ethiopian party system can be in a theoretical level called a system with a
hegemonic party, in reality we may observe a return to a one-party state where other political
parties and civil society actors are destined to play the role of onlookers or observers. The
near future does not promise any change since the government of MelesZenawi keeps a grip
on power as it is not severely challenged either by internal or external pressures calling for a
regime change.MereraGudina even talks about a masquerade when describing the policy of
the EPRDF and adds that "if the current course of events is not reversed, the hope for
Ethiopia's democratic transition will be reduced to a mere lofty ideal" (Gudina 2007: 140).
At least since 2001, Ethiopia has witnessed a continual tendency of centralization and a
reverse of its previous seeming successes in political reforms from the beginning of the
1990s. Access to information, education, privileged jobs and positions can be done only
through membership in the EPRDF. The ethnic and political exclusion and ethnic favoritism
have become a 'trademark' of contemporary 'ethnic federalism'and this trend seems not to be
reversed in years to come as MelesZenawi has no serious opposition to his rule. With 5.5
million members, the EPRDF can hardly be challenged through parliamentary elections,
especially in view of the 2005 elections. Despite all constitutional principles mentioned
above, Ethiopia fails to meet the standards of a democratic country and continues to follow its
previous authoritarian legacies.
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Záhořík, Jan. “Ethiopia Between Constitutional Principles and Reality.”
In The Scale of Globalization. Think Globally, Act Locally, Change Individually in the 21st Century, 374-378. Ostrava: University of Ostrava, 2011.
ISBN 978-80-7368-963-6 http://conference.osu.eu/globalization/publ2011/374-378_Zahorik.pdf.
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