Exaggerating Current and Past Performance: Motivated
Self-Enhancement Versus Reconstructive Memory
Richard H. Gramzow
Greg Willard
Northeastern University
The authors propose distinct reasons why individuals exaggerate
their current and past performance. Current performance is of
motivational and self-evaluative significance, and exaggerations
of current performance often stem from motivated self-enhancement
concerns. Self-reports of past performance are influenced less by
motivated self-enhancement, instead reflecting more subtle biases
in reconstructive memory. For students currently in college, grade
point averages (GPAs) reflect a currently important goal pursuit,
whereas Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores reflect a goal that
was important in the past. Study 1 demonstrated that dispositional self-enhancement predicted greater GPA (but not SAT)
exaggeration, whereas advanced class standing predicted greater
SAT (but not GPA) exaggeration. Study 2 demonstrated that a
self-affirmation manipulation attenuated the association between
dispositional self-enhancement and GPA exaggeration but not the
association between class standing and SAT exaggeration. The
distinction between motivated self-enhancement and reconstructive memory bias has important implications for the broader literature on self-evaluation.
Keywords:
self-enhancement; memory bias; self-affirmation
I don’t exaggerate, I just remember big.
—Juan “Chi-Chi” Rodriguez
C
related to the present self stem from the same psychological process as do biased memories of one’s past?
The quote by Rodriguez suggests a distinction between
motivated misrepresentation and the unwitting effects
of memory distortion. Our research is guided by a
similar premise.
Specifically, we argue that biased self-reports can result
from motivated self-enhancement (exaggeration) but
also from more subtle biases in reconstructive memory
(“remembering big”). We propose that self-reports of current and past achievements are differentially influenced
by these distinct processes. Current achievements that
reflect ongoing goals typically are of potent emotional
and self-evaluative consequence; thus, motivated selfenhancement concerns are likely to influence self-reports
of current performance. Past achievements that reflect
completed or abandoned goals typically have less relevance for the current self; thus, self-enhancement concerns are less likely to influence self-reports of past
performance. We argue instead that self-reports of past
performance are more susceptible to memory distortions
due to the reduced accessibility of the specific details over
time (see also Willard & Gramzow, 2006).
Temporal Focus and Self-Evaluation
hi-Chi Rodriguez is a retired professional golfer
with a dynamic flair for showmanship and bravado. He
also appears to be an astute observer of the human condition, with a laudable capacity for self-insight. People
clearly are prone toward bias in their self-evaluations
and in their memories for self-relevant attributes and
events. Self-evaluations typically are unrealistically positive
when focusing on current aspects of the self (Taylor &
Brown, 1988).1 Likewise, autobiographical memories tend
to cast the self in a favorable light (Greenwald, 1980;
Neisser, 1981, Ross, 1989). But, do biased self-reports
A growing body of research demonstrates that selfevaluative motives differ as a function of temporal
focus, or the degree to which an attribute reflects a current versus a past goal pursuit (Karniol & Ross, 1996).
Authors’ Note: Please address correspondence to Richard H.
Gramzow, Northeastern University, Department of Psychology, 125
Nightingale Hall, 360 Huntington Ave. Boston, MA 02115-5000;
e-mail: [email protected].
PSPB, Vol. 32 No. 8, August 2006 1114-1125
DOI: 10.1177/0146167206288600
© 2006 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.
1114
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 12, 2016
Gramzow, Willard / EXAGGERATING CURRENT AND PAST PERFORMANCE
For example, predictions for one’s future tend to be
uniformly positive, whereas memories of one’s past
tend to be more affectively mixed (Newby-Clark & Ross,
2003). People are more likely to engage in self-enhancing
deceptions involving their current and future selves than
their past selves (Robinson & Ryff, 1999). Likewise, they
are less willing to criticize aspects of their present than
their past selves (Ross & Wilson, 2000). In part, intolerance for negative aspects of the present and future self
reflects the psychological proximity of relevant goals
and aspirations (Ross & Wilson, 2002). There is a need
to perceive the self as continuously improving (Ross &
Wilson, 2003) and, therefore, to enhance perceptions
and reports related to the current self. These findings
suggest that the motive to self-enhance is especially
potent for self-attributes that reflect current, ongoing
goal pursuits.
Nevertheless, memories of the past also tend to favor
the self. People remember their past performance as
better than it was in actuality (Crary, 1966), they preferentially recall positive events (Walker, Skowronski, &
Thompson, 2003), and they ignore and forget negative
self-relevant information (Sedikides & Green, 2000).
Although motivated self-enhancement processes likely
underlie some biases in autobiographical memory
(Sedikides & Gregg, 2003), more subtle positivity biases
also may influence recall for information about one’s
past. As the accessibility of specific self-relevant information decreases over time, reconstructive memory
becomes increasingly susceptible to the influence of the
broader self-concept (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1983; Ross,
1989; Sedikides, Green, & Pinter, 2004). For example,
persons with high self-esteem tend to recall past autobiographical events as having been more positive than they
rated the events at the time (Christensen, Wood, &
Barrett, 2003). Because the self-concept is predominantly
positive for most persons, autobiographical memory typically is biased in a positive direction (Greenwald, 1980).
In sum, we propose that the processes underlying
self-evaluation bias differ as a function of temporal
focus. Motivated self-enhancement concerns are more
influential when focusing on attributes that reflect current goals, whereas reconstructive memory biases are
more influential when focusing on attributes that reflect
past goals. No previous research has demonstrated that
these distinct processes contribute differentially to the
tendency to exaggerate specific achievements that vary
in temporal focus. In the present research, we apply
this general logic to the specific cases of self-reported
grade point average (GPA) and Scholastic Aptitude
Test (SAT) score. GPA and SAT are specific indicators
of achievement that differ in temporal focus for
students currently in college.2 Thus, we propose that
distinct processes contribute to the tendency for college
1115
students to provide overly positive self-reports for these
two attributes.
GPA Exaggeration as Motivated Self-Enhancement
We use the phrase “motivated self-enhancement” to
refer to the motive to maintain and elevate the positivity
of one’s self-concept (Sedikides & Strube, 1997). As we
noted earlier, the motive to self-enhance appears to be
heightened when evaluating attributes about the self
that reflect currently significant and ongoing goals. A
student’s current GPA reflects one such goal pursuit.
The cumulative GPA is a running tally of all the performance evaluations that a student has received in his or
her courses, with its ultimate value yet to be determined.
For many students, the desire to maintain or improve
their GPAs is a primary motivation (Elliot & Church,
1997). Along with practical implications (e.g., academic
scholarships or suspensions), grades can have dramatic
effects on self-evaluation (Crocker, Karpinski, & Quinn,
2003). The GPA is of potent and ongoing motivational
significance for many college students. We hypothesize,
therefore, that motivated self-enhancement strivings
contribute to exaggerated GPA self-reports.
Individuals differ, however, in the degree to which
they typically engage in self-enhancing judgments and
behaviors (Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 2002;
Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003; von
Hippel, Lakin, & Shakarchi, 2005). One common indicator of dispositional self-enhancement is the degree to
which a person expresses the better-than-average effect
(Alicke, 1985; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). This effect
refers to the tendency to rate the self as superior to others across a wide variety of traits and abilities. If GPA
self-reports are influenced by self-enhancement processes,
then individuals with a dispositional proclivity toward
self-enhancement (assessed by the better-than-average
effect) also should show a heightened tendency to
exaggerate their GPAs.
Furthermore, it is well established that behaviors
stemming from a self-enhancement motive (e.g., rationalization, excuse making, self-promotion) can be curtailed when the motive is otherwise satisfied (Steele,
1988; Tesser, 2000). That is, the impact of the selfenhancement motive on a given judgment or behavior
is reduced when people are provided with an alternative method of affirming the self (Fein & Spencer, 1997;
Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005; Sherman & Cohen, 2002).
Given our hypothesis that motivated self-enhancement
strivings contribute to GPA exaggeration, we predict that
temporarily satisfying this motive via a self-affirmation
manipulation will reduce GPA exaggeration among
students who typically do exaggerate (i.e., students high
in dispositional self-enhancement).
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 12, 2016
1116
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
SAT Exaggeration as Reconstructive Memory
The SAT reflects a past goal pursuit for students
currently in college. These students took the SAT months
or years previously. At that time, many had a strong
motivation to secure a high score, given that the SAT is
a key determinant in admissions to U.S. colleges and
universities. Presumably, however, the potency of this
goal has since diminished. Because SAT performance
is no longer an active goal pursuit, we propose that
motivated self-enhancement processes are less likely to
have an impact on self-reported SAT scores. Thus, we
predict that the tendency to exaggerate SAT scores will
be unrelated to the dispositional tendency to selfenhance. Likewise, we predict that SAT exaggeration
will not be influenced by a self-affirmation manipulation,
which primarily affects motivated self-enhancement
processes.
Why would self-reports related to a past goal pursuit
(such as SAT) be exaggerated if not for motivated selfenhancement reasons? We propose that biases in reconstructive memory contribute to the tendency to exaggerate
in this context. We noted earlier that global self-evaluation
guides global evaluative ratings for self-relevant events
from the past (Christensen et al., 2003). Likewise, we
propose that as memory for a specific score declines,
more general beliefs about one’s performance guide
estimates of that score. Because beliefs about SAT performance would tend to be positive at a selective university, the reconstructive memory process will result
in a greater tendency to overreport SAT scores than to
underreport them. Of importance, however, the effects
of reconstructive memory on SAT exaggeration should
only emerge under reduced accessibility.
Previous research is consistent with this perspective
(Bahrick, Hall, & Dunlosky, 1993; Willard & Gramzow,
2006). Bahrick et al. (1993) demonstrated that students’
accuracy when recalling their SAT scores declined
during the first 2 years of college and then stabilized.
Furthermore, as accuracy declined, there was a greater
corresponding increase in exaggeration than in underreporting. Thus, upper-level students tended to exaggerate their SAT scores more than did 1st-year students.
Willard and Gramzow (2006) directly examined the
role of reduced accessibility in this process. In addition
to exaggerating their SAT scores more than 1st-year
students, upper-level students took longer to report
their scores. These longer response times suggest that
the specific score values were less accessible in memory
for upper-level students. In a related set of studies,
Willard and Gramzow randomly assigned scores to
participants on a novel test of “integrative ability.”
Accessibility of the specific test score was reduced by a
distractor task and by the natural passage of time. In
both cases, reduced accessibility resulted in an increased
tendency to exaggerate the score.
It remains to be demonstrated, however, that reconstructive memory processes that contribute to exaggeration of past performance are independent from
motivated self-enhancement processes that contribute
to exaggeration of current performance. Given our
hypothesis that SAT exaggeration is unrelated to motivated self-enhancement concerns, we predict that upperlevel students will continue to exaggerate their SAT
scores more than 1st-years students, irrespective of level
of dispositional self-enhancement, and irrespective of
whether they experience an earlier self-affirmation. By
contrast, GPA is of current relevance from the 1st year
of college through graduation. Students receive regular
reports of their GPA, maintaining the accessibility of its
value. Thus, the accessibility of its specific value should
be relatively high overall and should not differ as a
function of year in college. Reconstructive memory
biases, therefore, should be limited when students
report their GPAs. Thus, we do not predict that 1st-year
students and upper-level students will differ in the
tendency to exaggerate their GPAs.
STUDY 1
Study 1 was designed to provide an initial test of our
hypothesis that the psychological processes contributing to exaggeration differ based on the temporal focus
of the attribute. We focused on GPA as an attribute relevant to a current goal pursuit and SAT score as an
attribute relevant to a past goal. We predict that a measure of dispositional self-enhancement will predict GPA
exaggeration, but not SAT exaggeration. Likewise, we
predict that class standing (1st-year vs. upper-level) will
predict SAT exaggeration but not GPA exaggeration.
Method
Participants. One hundred fifty-six (104 women,
52 men) students from Northeastern University participated as part of an introductory psychology course
option. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 23 years
(M = 18.80). First-year students represented the majority of the sample (76%), with the remaining being
upper-level students. SAT scores were not available for
every student, resulting in an effective sample of 151 when
examining SAT exaggeration.
Procedure and measures. The experiment was computeradministered. Each participant sat at an individual terminal shielded from the others. A maximum of four students
participated in each session. Consistent with past research
on exaggeration, no gender effects were observed for
either study (Gramzow, Elliot, Asher, & McGregor, 2003).
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 12, 2016
Gramzow, Willard / EXAGGERATING CURRENT AND PAST PERFORMANCE
GPA and SAT self-reports. Participants completed a
questionnaire that included requests for their GPAs:
“What is your cumulative GPA (through your last completed academic term)? Please round to two decimal
places and do not adjust for how well you are doing
in your present courses.” In addition, participants
reported the combined score that they received on the
math and verbal subsections of the SAT. Participants
were asked to provide their best estimates if they were
unsure of the specific value of their GPAs or SAT scores.
With participant consent (requested at the end of the
session), we obtained academic records from the university registrar.
Dispositional self-enhancement. Participants completed
the Self-Attributes Questionnaire (SAQ; Pelham &
Swann, 1989) as a measure of the dispositional tendency
to self-enhance. The SAQ includes 10 attributes reflecting a variety of domains of self-evaluation (e.g., leadership ability and physical attractiveness). Participants
estimated their standing on each attribute relative to
other college students using a 1 (bottom 5%) to 10 (top
5%) scale. A composite measure of dispositional selfenhancement was created from the mean of these ratings, with higher scores indicating a general tendency to
rate the self as superior (Cronbach’s α = .79).
Results
Patterns of exaggeration and dispositional self-enhancement.
GPAs at this university are recorded on a 0 to 4 scale,
with higher values indicating better academic performance. Consistent with previous research, students
reported higher GPAs (M = 3.05, SD = .55) than they
actually achieved (M = 3.01, SD = .60). Although
descriptively small, this discrepancy was statistically significant, t(155) = 2.21, p = .029.
SAT scores are scaled in 10-point intervals, with
1,600 being the maximum score. Students reported
SAT scores (M = 1119.97, SD = 125.43) that significantly
exceeded their official scores (M = 1099.34, SD =
122.13), t(150) = 2.46, p = .015.
We created a GPA exaggeration index by regressing
self-reported GPAs onto actual GPAs and saving the
standardized residuals.3 We used the same strategy to
compute an index of SAT exaggeration. Based on these
indexes, there was essentially no correlation between
the tendency to exaggerate GPAs and SAT scores,
r(149) = −.01, p = .980.
In addition to the tendency to exaggerate their specific GPA and SAT values, there was a strong tendency
for participants to display the better-than-average effect.
The mean on the dispositional self-enhancement measure (M = 7.03, SD = 1.08) was significantly higher than
the midpoint of the scale (5.5), t(155) = 17.70, p < .001.
1117
Thus, participants rated themselves as being superior to
other college students across the 10 attributes.
Predictors of GPA exaggeration. We used hierarchical
regression to examine the prediction that GPA exaggeration would be associated with dispositional selfenhancement but not with class standing. In the first
step, we determined that self-enhancement (which was
mean centered for all relevant analyses) was a positive
and significant bivariate predictor of GPA exaggeration,
B = .16, SE = .07, β = .18, t(154) = 2.24, p = .027. We
added class standing (0 = 1st-year, 1 = upper-level) in the
second step. Class standing was not a significant predictor of GPA exaggeration, B = −.07, SE = .09, β = −.03,
t(153) = -0.38, p = .702. Moreover, dispositional selfenhancement remained a positive and significant predictor when class standing was included, B = .16, SE =
.07, β = .18, t(153) = 2.22, p = .028. Finally, in the third
step, we added the Class Standing × Self-Enhancement
interaction term. This interaction term was not significant, B = .12, SE = .18, β = .06, t(152) = 0.68, p = .500.
Thus, the significant association between dispositional
self-enhancement and GPA exaggeration was consistent
across levels of class standing.4
Predictors of SAT exaggeration. We applied a similar
analysis strategy to examine the prediction that SAT
exaggeration would be associated with class standing but
not with dispositional self-enhancement. In the first step,
we determined that class standing (0 = 1st-year, 1 =
upper-level) was a significant bivariate predictor of SAT
exaggeration, B = .61, SE = .19, β = .27, t(149) = 3.42, p <
.001.5 When we added dispositional self-enhancement in
the second step, it was not a significant predictor of SAT
exaggeration, B = .07, SE = .07, β = .07, t(148) = 0.90, p =
.368. Of importance, the class-standing effect remained
significant when self-enhancement was included, B = .62,
SE = .19, β = .28, t(148) = 3.47, p < .001. Finally, in the
third step, the Class Standing × Self-Enhancement interaction term was not significant, B = .08, SE = .19, β = .04,
t(147) = 0.40, p = .688. Thus, the significant tendency for
upper-level students to exaggerate their SAT scores more
than 1st-year students was consistent across levels of
dispositional self-enhancement.
Discussion
Study 1 provided initial support for our hypothesis
that predictors of bias in self-evaluation vary as a function of the temporal focus of the attribute. First, the
dispositional tendency to self-enhance predicted the
specific tendency among college students to exaggerate
their current GPAs but not their SAT scores. This pattern
is consistent with the hypothesis that self-enhancement
strivings contribute to the exaggeration of GPA (which
reflects an ongoing goal pursuit) but have a limited
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 12, 2016
1118
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
contribution to the exaggeration of SAT scores (which
reflect a past goal pursuit). Second, upper-level students
exaggerated their SAT scores to a greater degree than
did 1st-year students, but this class-standing effect was
not observed for GPA exaggeration. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that reconstructive memory
processes contribute to the tendency to exaggerate
attributes that stem from past goal pursuits.
One limitation of Study 1 was that the strength of
the association between dispositional self-enhancement
and GPA exaggeration was significant but modest in
size. It is possible that the measure that we used to
assess self-enhancement was not ideal. The SAQ contains a relatively small number of attributes and was
developed to assess the positivity of the self-concept
rather than self-enhancement per se (Pelham & Swann,
1989). In Study 2, we include a measure developed
specifically to assess dispositional self-enhancement.
In addition, Study 1 provided only indirect (correlational) evidence that motivated self-enhancement
processes contribute to GPA exaggeration but not to
SAT exaggeration. In Study 2, we experimentally reduce
the strength of the self-enhancement motive in some
participants immediately before they report their GPAs
and SAT scores.
STUDY 2
Study 2 was designed to replicate the findings from
Study 1 that dispositional self-enhancement predicts
GPA (but not SAT) exaggeration and that class standing predicts SAT (but not GPA) exaggeration. In addition, we introduced an experimental manipulation
in Study 2 to examine whether situational variations in
the need for self-enhancement moderate the patterns
observed in Study 1. Previous research has demonstrated that the impact of self-enhancement processes
on a given judgment or behavior is reduced when participants are provided with an alternative way to affirm
or enhance the self (Steele, 1988; Tesser, 2000). In
Study 2, half of the participants were provided with a
self-affirmation opportunity immediately before they
reported their GPA and SAT scores. If, as we predict,
students who exaggerate their GPAs do so largely for
self-enhancement purposes, then temporarily satisfying
the self-enhancement motive should reduce its influence.
That is, a prior self-affirmation opportunity should
reduce the subsequent tendency to exaggerate among
students who otherwise might do so (i.e., students with
dispositions toward self-enhancement). This reasoning
leads to a prediction of an interaction between dispositional self-enhancement and the self-affirmation manipulation, such that dispositional self-enhancement will
predict GPA exaggeration in the control condition but
that this association will be reduced or eliminated in the
affirmation condition. By contrast, the self-affirmation
manipulation is not predicted to alter patterns of SAT
exaggeration. This is because motivated self-enhancement
processes are not hypothesized to be the source of bias
in self-reported SAT scores, nor is the association
between class standing and SAT exaggeration hypothesized to be the result of a motivated self-enhancement
process.
Finally, in addition to asking participants to report
their overall GPAs, we asked them to list all their
courses from the previous academic term and to indicate the grade that they received in each. We compared
these ratings to the actual grades received in that
semester to form a second indicator of the tendency to
exaggerate current academic performance.
Method
Participants. One hundred forty-one (75 women, 66
men) Northeastern University students participated as
part of an introductory psychology course option. The
majority of participants were 1st-year students (64.5%).
Participants who did not have an official SAT score, had
not yet received grades at the university, or improperly
completed the semester grade section were removed
from subsequent analyses, resulting in an effective
sample size of 112.
Procedure and materials. The Study 1 procedure was
essentially replicated, with the addition of a request for
specific course grades, the use of a better-validated measure of dispositional self-enhancement, and the inclusion of the self-affirmation manipulation.
Self-reported GPA and SAT. Cumulative GPA and SAT
self-reports were collected using the same procedure as in
Study 1. In addition, participants were asked to list each
of the courses that they completed in the previous semester and to indicate the letter grade (A through F) that
they received in that course. We calculated self-reported
semester GPA based on the grades reported for courses
matching those in the registrar’s database. With participant consent (requested at the end of the session), we
obtained actual records from the university registrar.
Dispositional self-enhancement. We used the How I See
Myself Questionnaire (HSM; Taylor et al., 2003; Taylor
& Gollwitzer, 1995) to assess the dispositional tendency
to self-enhance. The HSM includes 21 attributes that are
positive (e.g., confidence, personal appearance) and
21 attributes that are negative (e.g., selfish, awkward).
The HSM is thus a more expansive measure of selfenhancement than the 10-item SAQ used in Study 1.
For each of the 42 items, participants estimated their
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 12, 2016
Gramzow, Willard / EXAGGERATING CURRENT AND PAST PERFORMANCE
standing relative to other Northeastern University
students of their own age and gender using a 1 (bottom
5%) to 10 (top 5%) scale. A composite measure of
dispositional self-enhancement was created from the
mean of these ratings (after reverse-scoring the negative attributes), such that high scores indicate a consistent tendency to rate the self as superior to others
(Cronbach’s α = .77). One participant had an average
response time of less than 500 ms per item and was
removed from relevant analyses.
Self-affirmation manipulation. The self-affirmation
manipulation occurred after participants completed
the HSM but before they reported their GPAs, SAT
scores, and semester grades. We based the manipulation on procedures described by Fein and Spencer
(1997, Study 2). Participants were shown a list of six
values (business–economics, art–music–theater, social
life–relationships, science–pursuit of knowledge, religion–
morality, and government–politics). Participants randomly assigned to the self-affirmation condition chose
the value that they considered to be most important
and wrote about why they believed that value to be
important. Participants assigned to the control condition chose the least important value and wrote about
why others might think that the value is important.
Results
Exaggeration and self-enhancement. Consistent with
Study 1, students reported significantly higher cumulative
GPAs (M = 3.07, SD = .54) than they actually achieved
(M = 3.00, SD = .57), t(111) = 2.67, p = .009. Students
also reported SAT scores (M = 1207.19, SD = 123.23) that
significantly exceeded their official scores (M = 1173.93,
SD = 133.08), t(111) = 4.37, p < .001. Finally, GPAs calculated from the grades participants reported for each
course they took in the previous semester (M = 3.08,
SD = .56) significantly exceeded their official GPAs for
that semester (M = 2.94, SD = .65), t(111) = 4.39, p < .001.
Note that these exaggeration patterns collapse across
self-affirmation conditions.
For each of the three criteria (cumulative GPA, SAT,
semester GPA), we created an exaggeration index by
regressing students’ self-reported values onto their actual
values and saving the standardized residuals. The two
GPA-based exaggeration indices were positively correlated with one another, r(110) = .45, p < .001, and were
averaged to create a single GPA exaggeration index
(Cronbach’s α = .62). The SAT exaggeration index was
significantly correlated with cumulative GPA exaggeration, r(110) = .24, p = .011, and with semester GPA exaggeration, r(110) = .23, p = .013. Note, however, that these
latter two correlations were markedly lower than the
correlation between the two GPA-based indexes.
1119
There again was a strong tendency for participants to
display the better-than-average effect. The average
score on the dispositional self-enhancement measure
(M = 7.03, SD = .96) was significantly higher than the
midpoint of the scale (5.5), t(111) = 16.74, p < .001.
Thus, participants rated themselves as being superior to
other college students across the 42 attributes.
Predictors of GPA exaggeration. We used a hierarchical
series of regression models to examine the prediction
that dispositional self-enhancement would be associated
with GPA exaggeration in the control condition but that
this effect would be reduced by the self-affirmation
manipulation. This analysis also examined the potential
(but not predicted) relation between class standing and
GPA exaggeration. We report the results focusing on the
combined GPA exaggeration index (i.e., the average of
the two GPA-based standardized residual indexes).6 The
results of this analysis are summarized in Table 1.
In the first step of the analysis, self-affirmation was
included as a categorical predictor (0 = control, 1 = selfaffirmed) and dispositional self-enhancement was
included as a mean-centered continuous predictor.
The self-enhancement effect was significant, such that
the dispositional tendency to self-enhance predicted the
specific tendency to exaggerate one’s GPA (see Table 1).
The self-affirmation manipulation was not a significant
predictor of GPA exaggeration in Step 1.
In the second step, we examined whether the affirmation manipulation qualified the effect of dispositional self-enhancement on GPA exaggeration. As
predicted, the Self-Enhancement × Affirmation effect
was significant (see Table 1). Figure 1 displays the predicted values of GPA exaggeration as a function of affirmation condition at high and low levels of dispositional
self-enhancement (i.e., at 1 SD above and below the
mean). Dispositional self-enhancement was a strong and
significant predictor of GPA exaggeration in the control
condition, B = .21, SE = .06, β = .47, t(107) = 3.70, p < .001,
but was not associated with GPA exaggeration among
students who were self-affirmed, B = .01, SE = .06, β = .03,
t(107) = 0.23, p = .816. Thus, the effect of dispositional
self-enhancement on GPA exaggeration was eliminated
by the self-affirmation manipulation.7
In Step 3, we added class standing as a categorical
predictor (0 = 1st-year, 1 = upper-level) and the Class
Standing × Affirmation interaction term. As predicted,
neither of these terms was significant. Furthermore,
with these terms in the model, the predicted SelfEnhancement × Affirmation effect remained significant
(see Table 1).
Finally, we examined the possibility of a three-way
interaction. The Self-Enhancement × Class Standing ×
Affirmation effect was not a significant predictor of
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 12, 2016
1120
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
TABLE 1:
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting GPA Exaggeration (N = 111)
Model
Coefficients
Variable
∆R2
df
p
Step 1
Self-enhancement
Affirmation
Step 2
Self-enhancement
Affirmation
Self-Enhancement × Affirmation
Step 3
Self-enhancement
Affirmation
Class standing
Self-Enhancement × Affirmation
Class Standing × Affirmation
.072
2, 108
.018
.047
3, 107
.016
5, 105
B (SE)
β
t
p
.115 (.04)
–.087 (.16)
.26
–.05
2.78
–0.55
.006
.580
.207 (.06)
–.088 (.15)
–.194 (.08)
.47
–.05
–.30
3.70
–0.57
–2.38
.001
.570
.019
.190 (.06)
.013 (.18)
.349 (.25)
–.175 (.08)
–.377 (.37)
.43
.01
.18
–.27
–.14
3.32
0.07
1.39
–2.07
–1.01
.001
.943
.168
.041
.316
.019
.383
NOTE: GPA = grade point average.
0.5
GPA Exaggeration Index
0.4
β = .47***
0.3
0.2
0.1
β = .03
0
–0.1
Low
High
Dispositional Self-Enhancement
Condition
Control
Affirmed
Figure 1 Predicted values of GPA exaggeration as a function of level
of dispositional self-enhancement (1 SD above and below
the mean) and self-affirmation condition (0 = no affirmation,
1 = affirmation).
NOTE: GPA = grade point average.
***p < .001.
GPA exaggeration, B = −.19, SE = .20, β = −.14, t(103) =
−0.96, p = .337.
Predictors of SAT exaggeration. We applied a similar
analysis to examine the prediction that upper-level
students would exaggerate their SAT scores more than
would 1st-year students and that this effect would not
be reduced by the self-affirmation manipulation. This
analysis also examined the potential (but not predicted) relation between dispositional self-enhancement
and SAT exaggeration. The results of this analysis are
summarized in Table 2.
In the first step, we included class standing (0 =
1st-year, 1 = upper-level) and self-affirmation condition
(0 = control, 1 = self-affirmed) as categorical predictors.
Class standing was a significant predictor of SAT exaggeration, indicating that upper-level students exaggerated their SAT scores more than did 1st-year students
(see Table 2). The self-affirmation manipulation was not
a significant predictor of SAT exaggeration in Step 1.
In the second step, we examined whether the affirmation manipulation qualified the effect of class standing
on SAT exaggeration. The Class Standing × Affirmation
effect was not significant (see Table 2). Therefore, as
predicted, the tendency for upper-level students to exaggerate their SAT scores more than 1st-year students was
not significantly reduced by the self-affirmation manipulation. Indeed, as shown in Figure 2, the effect of class
standing was significant in both affirmation conditions.
In Step 3, we added dispositional self-enhancement
and the Self-Enhancement × Affirmation interaction
term. Neither term was a significant predictor of SAT
exaggeration. In addition, the predicted class-standing
effect remained significant with these two terms in the
model (see Table 2).
Finally, we examined the possibility of a three-way
interaction. The Self-Enhancement × Class Standing ×
Affirmation effect was not a significant predictor of SAT
exaggeration, B = .10, SE = .23, β = .07, t(103) = 0.43,
p = .666.
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 12, 2016
Gramzow, Willard / EXAGGERATING CURRENT AND PAST PERFORMANCE
TABLE 2:
1121
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting SAT Exaggeration (N = 111)
Model
Coefficients
Variable
∆R2
df
p
Step 1
Class standing
Affirmation
Step 2
Class standing
Affirmation
Class Standing × Affirmation
Step3
Class standing
Affirmation
Self-enhancement
Class Standing × Affirmation
Self-Enhancement × Affirmation
.079
2, 108
.012
.003
3, 107
.016
5, 105
B (SE)
β
t
p
.623 (.21)
–.106 (.18)
.27
–.05
2.94
–0.58
.004
.562
.737 (.29)
–.046 (.21)
–.246 (.43)
.32
–.02
–.08
2.53
–0.22
–0.58
.013
.826
.565
.697 (.30)
–.013 (.21)
.044 (.07)
–.330 (.44)
.046 (.10)
.31
–.01
.09
–.11
.06
2.34
–0.06
0.65
–0.75
0.46
.021
.952
.521
.457
.645
.565
.387
NOTE: SAT = Scholastic Aptitude Test.
0.6
SAT Exaggeration Index
0.5
β = .31*
0.4
0.3
β = .30*
0.2
0.1
0
–0.1
–0.2
–0.3
First–Year
Upper–Level
Class Standing
Condition
Control
Study 1). However, a self-affirmation manipulation significantly reduced the tendency for students high in
dispositional self-enhancement to exaggerate their
GPAs. We also used a better-validated measure of dispositional self-enhancement in Study 2 (Taylor et al.,
2003). This may account for the stronger pattern of
association we observed between self-enhancement and
GPA exaggeration in the control condition (β = .47)
relative to that observed in Study 1 (β = .18).
Dispositional self-enhancement was not associated
with SAT exaggeration. Instead, SAT exaggeration was
predicted by class standing (replicating Study 1). This
pattern is consistent with the notion that positivity
biases during reconstructive memory contribute to
exaggeration under reduced accessibility. The effect of
class standing on SAT exaggeration was not affected
by the self-affirmation manipulation, providing further
evidence that this effect is not driven by a motivated
self-enhancement process.
Affirmed
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Figure 2 Predicted values of SAT exaggeration as a function of class
standing (0 = 1st-year, 1 = upper-level) and self-affirmation
condition (0 = no affirmation, 1 = affirmation).
NOTE: SAT = Scholastic Aptitude Test.
*p < .05.
Discussion
Study 2 provided a direct test of the hypothesis that
motivated self-enhancement contributes to GPA exaggeration but not to SAT exaggeration. Students with a high
dispositional tendency to self-enhance tended to exaggerate their GPAs in the control condition (replicating
The tendency to exaggerate specific attributes about
the self, such as one’s GPA and SAT scores, is well documented (Bahrick et al, 1993; Dobbins, Farh, & Werbel,
1993; Gramzow et al., 2003; Kirk & Sereda, 1969;
Shepperd, 1993; Willard & Gramzow, 2006; Wright, 2000).
Such findings could imply that a common psychological process underlies the tendency to exaggerate performance on different attributes. The present research,
however, examined the novel hypothesis that processes
contributing to exaggeration vary as a function of the
temporal focus of the attribute. For specific attributes
that reflect one’s standing with respect to a current goal
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 12, 2016
1122
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
pursuit (GPA for college students), we hypothesized
that overly positive self-reports result from a motivated
self-enhancement process. By contrast, for attributes
that reflect one’s standing with respect to a past pursuit
(the SAT for college students), we hypothesized that
overly positive self-reports result from more subtle biases
emerging during the reconstructive memory process.
Motivated Self-Enhancement
Versus Reconstructive Memory
Motivated self-enhancement and exaggeration. Results
from two studies supported the hypothesis that motivated self-enhancement contributes to GPA exaggeration.
A global measure of dispositional self-enhancement was
positively correlated with the specific tendency to exaggerate one’s GPA (Study 1). A self-affirmation manipulation provided a more direct test of the motivated
self-enhancement hypothesis (Study 2). Students with a
dispositional tendency to self-enhance tended to exaggerate their GPAs in a control condition; however, a
self-affirmation manipulation known to temporarily satisfy the self-enhancement motive reduced the tendency
for students high in dispositional self-enhancement to
exaggerate their GPAs. These patterns are consistent
with the hypothesis that GPA exaggeration (which
reflects an ongoing goal pursuit for college students)
stems from motivated self-enhancement concerns.
By contrast, dispositional self-enhancement was not
significantly associated with SAT exaggeration in either
study. Moreover, the self-affirmation manipulation did
not affect patterns of SAT exaggeration. These findings
are consistent with the hypothesis that motivated selfenhancement does not contribute substantially to
the tendency to exaggerate scores on the SAT (which
reflects a past goal pursuit for college students).
Although consistent with our predictions, these
results do not directly address whether patterns differ
significantly across the two attributes. Therefore, we
conducted follow-up analyses to examine whether dispositional self-enhancement was a significantly stronger
predictor of GPA exaggeration than of SAT exaggeration across the two studies.8 First, we used standard
meta-analytic procedures to determine that the combined association between self-enhancement and GPA
exaggeration was positive and significant (r = .31, p <
.001), whereas the combined association between selfenhancement and SAT exaggeration was not significant
(r = .08, p = .208). Second, we examined whether the
difference between these associations was significant
across the two studies. In this analysis, we first computed the difference between the two nonindependent
correlations involving self-enhancement and exaggeration within each study (Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin,
1992). Next, we used Stouffer’s method to combine the
effects across studies (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney,
Star, & Williams, 1949). This analysis confirmed that
the association between self-enhancement and GPA
exaggeration was significantly stronger than the association between self-enhancement and SAT exaggeration
at the meta-analytic level, Stouffer’s Z = 3.14, p < .001.
Reconstructive memory and exaggeration. Results from
the two studies also supported the hypothesis that
biases in reconstructive memory contribute to the tendency to exaggerate one’s past SAT scores. Upper-level
students exaggerated their SAT scores to a greater
degree than did 1st-year students. Willard and Gramzow
(2006) demonstrated that past test scores (such as the
SAT) become less accessible over time and that reduced
accessibility of a specific test score generally increases
the tendency over time to exaggerate that score. The
present research builds on this past work by demonstrating that this reconstructive memory bias is distinct
from motivated self-enhancement processes. In particular, the association between class standing and SAT
exaggeration was not qualified by either dispositional
self-enhancement (Studies 1 and 2) or the self-affirmation manipulation (Study 2). Class standing was not significantly associated with GPA exaggeration in either
study. It is likely that reconstructive memory plays less
of a role in GPA exaggeration because a student’s GPA
is highly accessible regardless of class standing.
Although consistent with our predictions, these
results do not directly address whether the effect of class
standing significantly differs across the two attributes.
Therefore, we adopted a meta-analytic strategy similar
to the one we used earlier to assess the differential
effects of self-enhancement on GPA exaggeration versus
SAT exaggeration. First, we determined that the combined association between class standing and SAT exaggeration was positive and significant (r = .27, p < .001),
whereas the combined association between class standing and GPA exaggeration was not (r = .02, p = .750).
Second, we determined that the association between
class standing and SAT exaggeration was significantly
stronger than the association between self-enhancement
and GPA exaggeration at the meta-analytic level, Stouffer’s
Z = 3.01, p < .002.
Limitations and Future Directions
The present research focuses on processes contributing to exaggeration within the United States. Whereas
self-enhancement is the prevailing self-evaluative motive
in Western society, self-criticism is more normative in
East Asian cultures (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama,
1999; Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit,
1997). Japanese participants also do not show the Western
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 12, 2016
Gramzow, Willard / EXAGGERATING CURRENT AND PAST PERFORMANCE
tendency to evaluate the current self more favorably
than the past self (Ross, Heine, Wilson, & Sugimori,
2005). At the same time, more subtle or indirect selffavoring biases often are observed among both Japanese
and American participants (e.g., Kitayama & Karasawa,
1997; Kitayama & Uchida, 2002). Past research on cultural differences in self-evaluative tendencies generally
focuses on relatively global and abstract traits and attributes. We are not aware of any research addressing cultural differences in the tendency to exaggerate specific
attributes about the self, much less whether these tendencies vary as a function of temporal focus. East Asian
respondents presumably would be less inclined to
exaggerate current performance for motivated selfenhancement reasons (cf. Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi,
2003). We emphasize, however, that exaggeration can
result from a variety of sources, only one of which is
motivated self-enhancement (see also Gramzow et al.,
2003; Willard & Gramzow, 2006). For example, it is
unclear whether there are systematic (self-favoring or
self-effacing) biases in reconstructive memory for
performance-related attributes within East Asian cultures.
Consideration of cultural influences on exaggeration
would yield valuable insight into the underlying mechanisms and thus presents an interesting avenue for future
research.
The present research focuses on GPA and SAT
because these attributes have important implications
for nearly all U.S. college students. It is possible, however, that these two attributes differ in ways other than
temporal focus. For example, GPA may be perceived to
be an indicator of effort, whereas the SAT may be perceived to be an indicator of innate ability. The fact that
millions of dollars are spent annually on SAT preparatory
courses implies that many students believe that SAT
scores are controllable. Nonetheless, the generality of
our hypotheses would be strengthened by extending
the findings to other specific attributes that differ in
temporal focus. It also would be enlightening to track
changes in the processes that contribute to biased
reports for a single attribute as that attribute changes
in temporal focus. For example, do motivated selfenhancement processes contribute to GPA exaggeration
during college, whereas reconstructive memory processes
contribute to GPA exaggeration after graduation?
It is important to emphasize that students generally
were quite accurate in their GPA and SAT self-reports
and that average levels of exaggeration (although statistically significant) were small in magnitude. Previous
research has demonstrated that biases are more pronounced for abstract traits (e.g., reading ability) than
for concrete attributes (e.g., specific grades; Wells &
Sweeny, 1986). This pattern was observed in the present
research, with the better-than-average effect (assessed on
1123
abstract traits) being quite large relative to the specific
exaggeration effects. It appears that biased self-reports
of specific and verifiable attributes are less normative,
requiring a particularly strong enhancement motive
(for attributes reflecting current goals) or the creative
license that comes with reduced accessibility (for attributes reflecting the past).
The present studies were not designed to account for
individual differences in the tendency for (upper-level)
students to exaggerate their SAT scores. We proposed
that general beliefs about one’s performance guide the
reconstructive memory process under reduced accessibility and reasoned that these beliefs would be positive
by default (particularly at a selective university). Willard
and Gramzow (2006) provided a direct test of the influence
of evaluative beliefs on exaggeration by demonstrating
that evaluative feedback accompanying a (randomly
assigned) test score qualified the tendency to exaggerate that score under reduced accessibility. For selfreports collected shortly after the score was received,
there was no difference between participants who were
told that their score represented excellent performance
compared to participants told that their score represented below-average performance (or when compared
to a no-evaluation control group). Following a 1-week
delay, however, participants who believed their performance had been excellent exaggerated significantly
more than did control participants, and participants
who believed their performance had been below average exaggerated significantly less. Thus, it appears that
participants relied on the general quality of their test
performance when reconstructing the specific test score
that they had received.
Dunning, Heath, and Suls (2004) recently provided
an extensive review of research and theory on flawed selfassessment. A main premise of the review was that people
overestimate the objective quality of their performance
largely because they do not have access to the information that would allow them to judge their performance
accurately or because they neglect such information. It is
important to emphasize, therefore, that the attributes
examined in the present research are distinct from those
reviewed by Dunning et al. (2004). Specifically, participants in our studies were aware (at some point) of the
precise values of their GPAs and SAT scores, whereas participants in the studies reviewed by Dunning et al. were
never aware of their objective standing on the attributes.
Information deficits and information neglect certainly
account for some biases in self-evaluation, but these
mechanisms provide less plausible accounts for the patterns observed in the present research.
Finally, the present research focused exclusively
on biased self-reports of academic achievement. We
believe that the findings have broader implications
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 12, 2016
1124
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
for research and theory on self-evaluation bias. The
distinction between motivated self-enhancement and
reconstructive memory as sources of bias likely applies
to other domains. We believe that it is important to
determine the process contributing to a particular bias
in self-evaluation because this may determine the
broader implications that the bias may have for psychological well-being (Colvin & Block, 1994; Taylor &
Brown, 1988). For example, biases resulting from motivated self-enhancement processes may have performance
advantages (Gramzow et al., 2003) while negatively
affecting the quality of one’s interpersonal relationships (Paulhus, 1998). By contrast, biases resulting from
reconstructive memory may have less of an impact on
interpersonal relationships. Future research should
examine the consequences of these different sources of
self-evaluation bias. As Chi-Chi Rodriguez insinuates in
the opening quote, it may be less socially appropriate to
exaggerate than to “just remember big.” We suspect,
however, that there are both costs and benefits to selfevaluation bias regardless of its source.
NOTES
1. Although American culture clearly is conducive to selfenhancement, East Asian cultures are not, and individuals are more
likely to self-criticize (Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit,
1997). Thus, there is debate as to whether self-enhancing biases
are a human universal or unique to contemporary Western culture
(see Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Sedikides, Gaertner,
& Toguchi, 2003). We address this point further in the General
Discussion.
2. Results of a pilot study confirmed that grade point average
(GPA) and Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) differ in temporal focus
among students currently in college. As predicted, students rated
their GPAs to be significantly higher in current importance, t(50) =
16.12, p < .001, and to have significantly greater self-evaluative
impact, t(50) = 6.12, p < .001, than their past SAT scores. GPA and
SAT were rated as being equally high in past importance, t(50) =
0.99, p = .326.
3. In both studies, a difference score approach (e.g., self-reported
GPA – actual GPA) yielded identical patterns of results to those
reported. The use of difference scores has been criticized because
such scores typically are correlated with both of their components
(Cronbach & Furby, 1970). This feature complicates interpretation of
correlates of difference scores (Campbell & Kenny, 1999). In the present research, representing exaggeration as a difference score would
confound exaggeration with actual GPA and SAT scores. Consistent
with previous research, therefore, we used residuals to control for
individual differences in actual GPA and SAT scores (Paulhus & John,
1998; Robins & John, 1997). In addition, focusing on standardized
residuals allows a more ready comparison between patterns of GPA
exaggeration and SAT exaggeration and facilitates the meta-analyses
we present in the General Discussion.
4. The patterns of results are not affected by the order in which
the effects involving dispositional self-enhancement and class standing are entered into the regression models for either attribute in
either study.
5. Although it is more conventional to report a t test when examining a mean difference between two groups, we primarily report
results from regression analyses to maintain consistency across all
analyses in both studies.
6. The results are nearly identical when separately examining
cumulative GPA exaggeration and previous semester GPA exaggeration.
7. Given our coding procedure (0 = control, 1 = affirmed), the
self-enhancement effect displayed in Step 2 of Table 1 represents the
significant relation between self-enhancement and GPA exaggeration
for students in the control condition (i.e., when class standing = 0).
The significant interaction indicates that this self-enhancement effect
was significantly lower in the affirmation condition (Aiken & West,
1991). Figure 1 presents the self-enhancement slopes in each of the
two affirmation conditions.
8. We wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these
analyses.
REFERENCES
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Alicke, M. D. (1985). Global self-evaluation as determined by the
desirability and controllability of trait adjectives. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 1621-1630.
Bahrick, H. P., Hall, L. K., & Dunlosky, J. (1993). Reconstructive processing of memory content for high versus low test scores and
grades. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 7, 1-10.
Campbell, D. T., & Kenny, D. A. (1999). A primer on regression artifacts.
New York: Guilford.
Christensen, T. C., Wood, J. V., & Barrett, L. F. (2003). Remembering
everyday experience through the prism of self-esteem. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 51-62.
Colvin, C. R., & Block, J. (1994). Do positive illusions foster mental
health? An examination of the Taylor and Brown formulation.
Psychological Bulletin, 116, 3-20.
Crocker, J., Karpinski, A., & Quinn, D. M. (2003). When grades determine
self-worth: Consequences of contingent self-worth for male and
female Engineering and Psychology majors. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 85, 507-516.
Cronbach, L. J., & Furby, L. (1970). How should we measure
“change”: Or should we? Psychological Bulletin, 74, 68-80.
Crary, W. G. (1966). Reactions to incongruent self-experiences.
Journal of Consulting Psychology, 30, 246-252.
Dobbins, G. H., Farh, H. L., & Werbel, J. D. (1993). The influence of
self-monitoring and inflation of grade-point averages for research
purposes. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 23, 321-334.
Dunning, D., Heath, C., & Suls, J. M. (2004). Flawed self-assessment:
Implications for health, education, and the workplace.
Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 5, 69-106.
Elliot, A. J., & Church, M. A. (1997). A hierarchical model of
approach and avoidance in achievement motivation. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 218-232.
Fein, S., & Spencer, S. J. (1997). Prejudice as self-image maintenance:
Affirming the self through derogating others. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 73, 31-44.
Gramzow, R. H., Elliot, A. J., Asher, E., & McGregor, H. A. (2003).
Self-evaluation bias and academic performance: Some ways and
some reasons why. Journal of Research in Personality, 37, 41-61.
Gramzow, R. H. & Gaertner, L. (2005). Self-esteem and favoritism
toward novel in-groups: The self as an evaluative base. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 801-815.
Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal history. American Psychologist, 35, 603-618.
Heine, S. J., Lehman, D. R., Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1999). Is
there a universal need for positive self-regard? Psychological Review,
106, 766-794.
Karniol, R., & Ross, M. (1996). The motivational impact of temporal
focus: Thinking about the future and the past. Annual Review of
Psychology, 47, 593-620.
Kihlstrom, J. F., & Cantor, N. (1983). Mental representations of the
self. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 159-187.
Kirk, B. A., & Sereda, L. (1969). Accuracy of self-reported college
grade averages and characteristics of non and discrepant reporters.
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 29, 147-155.
Kitayama, S., & Karasawa, M. (1997). Implicit self-esteem in Japan:
Name letters and birthday numbers. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 23, 736-742.
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 12, 2016
Gramzow, Willard / EXAGGERATING CURRENT AND PAST PERFORMANCE
Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., Matsumoto, H., & Norasakkunkit V.
(1997). Individual and collective processes in the construction of
the self: Self-enhancement in the United States and self-criticism
in Japan. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 1245-1267.
Kitayama S., & Uchida, Y. (2002). Explicit self-criticism and implicit
self-regard: Evaluating self and friend in two cultures. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 476-482.
Meng, X., Rosenthal, R., & Rubin, D. B. (1992). Comparing correlated correlation coefficients. Psychological Bulletin, 111, 172-175.
Neisser, U. (1981). John Dean’s memory: A case study. Cognition,
9, 1-22.
Newby-Clark, I. R., & Ross, M. (2003). Conceiving the past and future.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 807-818.
Paulhus, D. L. (1998). Interpersonal and intrapsychic adaptiveness of
trait self-enhancement: A mixed blessing? Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 74, 1197-1208.
Paulhus, D. L., & John, O. P. (1998). Egoistic and moralistic biases in
self-perception: The interplay of self-deceptive styles with basic
traits and motives. Journal of Personality, 66, 1025-1060.
Pelham, B. W., & Swann, W. B. (1989). From self-conceptions to selfworth: On the sources and structure of global self-esteem. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 672-680.
Robins, R. W., & John, O. P. (1997). The quest for self-insight: Theory
and research on the accuracy of self-perceptions. In R. Hogan,
J. Johnson, & S. R. Briggs (Eds.), Handbook of personality psychology
(pp. 649-679). New York: Academic Press.
Robinson, M. D., & Ryff, C. D. (1999). The role of self-deception in
perceptions of past, present, and future happiness. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 595-606.
Ross, M. (1989). Relation of implicit theories to the construction of
personal histories. Psychological Review, 96, 341-357.
Ross, M., Heine, S. J., Wilson, A. E., & Sugimori, S. (2005). Crosscultural discrepancies in self-appraisals. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1175-1188.
Ross, M., & Wilson, A. E. (2000). Constructing and appraising past
selves. In D. L. Schacter & E. Scarry (Eds.), Memory, brain, and belief
(pp. 231-258). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ross, M., & Wilson, A. E. (2002). It feels like yesterday: Self-esteem,
valence of personal past experiences, and judgments of subjective
distance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 792-803.
Ross, M., & Wilson, A. E. (2003). Autobiographical memory and conceptions of self: Getting better all the time. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 12, 66-69.
Sedikides, C., Campbell, W. K., Reeder, G., & Elliot, A. J. (2002). The
self in relationships: Whether, how, and when close others put the
self “in its place.” European Review of Social Psychology, 12, 237-265.
Sedikides, C., Gaertner, L., & Toguchi, Y. (2003). Pancultural selfenhancement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 60-70.
Sedikides, C., & Green, J. D. (2000). On the self protective nature of
inconsistency negativity management: Using the person memory
paradigm to examine self referent memory. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 79, 906-922.
Sedikides, C., Green, J. D., & Pinter, B. (2004). Self-protective
memory. In D. R. Beike, J. M. Lampinen, & D. A. Behrend (Eds.),
The self and memory (pp. 161-179). Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
1125
Sedikides, C., & Gregg, A. P. (2003). Portraits of the self. In M. A. Hogg
& J. Cooper (Eds.), Sage handbook of social psychology (pp. 110-138).
London: Sage Ltd.
Sedikides, C., & Strube, M. J. (1997). Self-evaluation: To thine own self
be good, to thine own self be sure, to thine own self be true, and
thine own self be better. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 29, pp. 209-269). New York: Academic
Press.
Shepperd, J. A. (1993). Student derogation of the Scholastic Aptitude
Test: Biases in perceptions and presentations of College Board
scores. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 14, 455-473.
Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. (2002). Accepting threatening information: Self-affirmation and the reduction of defensive biases.
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 119-123.
Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining
the integrity of the self. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 21, pp. 261-302). New York: Academic
Press.
Stouffer, S. A., Suchman, E. A., DeVinney, L. C., Star, S. A., &
Williams, R. M. (1949). The American soldier: Adjustment during army
life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social
psychological perspective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin,
103, 193-210.
Taylor, S. E., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1995). The effects of mindset on positive illusions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 213-226.
Taylor, S. E., Lerner, J. S., Sherman, D. K., Sage, R. M., & McDowell,
N. K. (2003). Portrait of the self-enhancer: Well adjusted and well
liked or maladjusted and friendless? Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 84, 165-176.
Tesser, A. (2000). On the confluence of self-esteem maintenance
mechanisms. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 290-299.
von Hippel, W., Lakin, J. L., & Shakarchi, R. J. (2005). Individual differences in motivated social cognition: The case of self-serving
information processing. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
31, 1347-1357.
Walker, W. R., Skowronski, J. J., & Thompson, C. P. (2003). Life is
pleasant—and memory helps to keep it that way! Review of General
Psychology, 7, 203-210.
Wells, L. E., & Sweeney, P. D. (1986). A test of three models of bias in
self-assessment. Social Psychology Quarterly, 49, 1-10.
Willard, G., & Gramzow, R. H. (2006). Exaggeration in memory:
Systematic distortion of self-evaluative information under reduced accessibility. Manuscript submitted for publication, Northeastern
University, Boston.
Wright, S. S. (2000). Looking at the self in a rose-colored mirror:
Unrealistically positive self-views and academic performance. Journal
of Social and Clinical Psychology, 19, 451-462.
Received November 4, 2005
Revision accepted February 21, 2006
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 12, 2016