June/July 2016
Volume 47, Number 3
Th e Pr o fe s s i o n a l Re s e a r ch Jo u r n a l o f t h e Pr o j e c t M a n a g e m e n t I n s t i tu t e
3
Guest Editorial
Efrosyni Konstantinou and Ralf Müller
PAPERS
1 2
Minima Moralia in Project Management: There Is No Right Life in the Wrong One
Louis Klein
2 1
The Projectification of Everything: Projects as a Human Condition
Anders Jensen, Christian Thuesen, and Joana Geraldi
3 5
Philosophy of Project Management: Lessons from the Philosophy of Science
J. Davidson Frame
4 8
An Existential Hermeneutic Philosophical Approach to Project Management
Bradley Rolfe, Steven Segal, and Svetlana Cicmil
6 3
Let’s Discuss Aesthetics for Projects
Bronte van der Hoorn and Jon Whitty
7 7
Why Distinctions Matter: What Does Philosophical Analysis Have to Do with Project Management?
José Idler
8 6
The Metaphysical Questions Every Project Practitioner Should Ask
Lavagnon A. Ika and Christophe N. Bredillet
101
Living With the Unknown Unknown: Uncertainty in Projects
Øyvind Kvalnes
1 09
Root Metaphors for the Management of Projects: Toward a Knowledge-Based View
Terence Ahern, P. J. Byrne, and Brian Leavy
1 24
Project Management Between Will and Representation
Serghei Floricel and Sorin Piperca
1 39
The Open Secret of Values: The Roles of Values and Axiology in Project Research
Thomas Biedenbach and Mattias Jacobsson
156
Calendar of Events
157
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Guest Editorial
Efrosyni Konstantinou and Ralf Müller
The Role of Philosophy in Project Management
In creating a special issue on the philosophy of project
management, the first questions we need to be asking
ourselves are: Why should we be interested in philosophy? Why should we be interested in philosophy in project
management? What does philosophy have to offer to us as
project management professionals and academics? These
are fundamental questions that need to be answered with
capable and adequate responses; otherwise our endeavors
in this field can be considered futile. The answers to these
questions aren’t straightforward. Academic thought and
professional practices have been supported by many fields
including, but not limited to, sociology, management
science, organization studies, anthropology, engineering
and, more broadly speaking, the arts and humanities (of
which philosophy is a part), and the natural and social
sciences. Is an advanced focus on philosophy needed? We
believe that it is for the following reasons.
We Need Philosophy Because. . . The World
is Changing
Our world and the world of projects are changing in, perhaps what can be termed, an unprecedented rate. The
aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008; the refugee crisis;
the slowdown of China’s growth; the increases in terrorist
threats and cybercrime; the ongoing commercialization
of education; the continuously changing power balance
between nations, governments, citizens, religions, and
professions; the weakening and strengthening of political and economic unions, such as the European Union;
the persisting levels of poverty in wide areas across the
world; and the ongoing technological advancements can
perhaps be considered miniscule issues in the face of climate change. These issues are interdisciplinary, in many
cases time-critical, and reflect the context in which all
projects will need to be inspired, designed, executed, and
delivered.
Most importantly, however, these are issues that seem
to be driven by different, yet persisting forms of inequality—
social inequalities, political inequalities, economic inequalities, technological inequalities. For example, executives
are better paid than workers and professionals; foreigners
are better received in some places of the world than others;
Project Management Journal, Vol. 47, No. 3, 3–11
© 2016 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
and information asymmetry is a fundamental characteristic of financial markets and projects. The finite resources
of our planet, our systems/technologies, and ourselves in
devising economic and political systems that can allow
us to live and prosper fuel manifestations of inequality
and establish different types of privileges, some we would
consider legitimate, others we see as the source of pain and
inequality (Abbot, 1988). People who live in resource-rich
countries of the world are privileged with natural resources
that often become the source of political, economic, and
social privileges when combined with strong politics. Based
on their advanced command of an area of practice, extensive socialization in the profession and membership in
a professional community, professionals legitimize their
claims over areas of expertise. And in so doing, they are
required to be accountable for privileges such as their
expertise, higher pay, and social status. So, how can we
address inequality and privilege? In answering these questions, we turn to and debate different philosophies, different ways of doing things, arguing for priorities, means, and
goals of actions. For example, Pierre Rosanvallon, Professor
of Political History at the Collège de France, Director of
Studies at l’Ecole des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales,
(2016) writes:
“Equality based on singularity requires a type of society grounded
in neither abstract universalism nor identity-based communitarianism but rather the dynamic construction and recognition
of specificities. Singularity is not a sign of withdrawal from society
(individualism as retreat or separation). Rather, it signals an
expectation of reciprocity, of mutual recognition. This marks the
advent of a fully democratic age: the basis of society lies not in
nature but solely in a shared philosophy of equality. Democracy
as a type of political regime is mirrored by democracy as a form
of society.” (p. 21)
Philosophies underlie our thinking; our social and
personal existence; our innovation; and, ultimately, the
solutions and the actions we undertake to address the
challenges we face collectively and individually.
The world of projects is equally changing. Most obvious is the trend toward agility, which blurs the longestablished demarcations between operations and
projects by questioning existing roles (such as those of
project managers) and project management methodologies. The trend toward agile/Scrum shows a change in the
underlying philosophy of project management. The traditional ontology of a one-time, unique undertaking is
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 3
Guest Editorial
replaced, at least in some projects, by a process philosophy
that uses repetitive daily mechanisms in which, for example
people, not plans, are the media for communication, and
change is embraced rather than avoided. This change in the
inward-looking view of managing projects is complemented
by an outward-looking view that puts projects in their larger
context. A key concept to mention here is project governance.
Biesenthal and Wilden (2014) remind us that the number
of publications on this subject has virtually exploded since
2005. This is underpinned by another change in philosophy,
in which projects are no longer perceived as standalone entities to deliver standalone products or services, but rather are
parts of a larger whole or system in which they fulfill a clearly
defined role, using clearly defined interfaces to their environment in the forms of governance structures and mechanisms.
In other words, the macroscopic global changes are also
reflected in the microscopic world of project management,
and each of these levels requires underlying philosophies so
that the humans living within them can make sense of their
world and their roles and tasks therein.
We Need Philosophy Because . . . We
Don’t Know
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) writes:
“Nature, the world, has kept so much freedom for itself, so that we
cannot—even through knowledge and science—come close to understanding what it is or place it in an uncomfortable position. (p. 93)”
Goethe personifies the world and nature, almost as if it
were a real human being that can stand in front of us and we
could talk to, and claims that he or she is keeping meaning, reason, experience, and emotions away from us. For Goethe, the
world is a cryptic entity—a reserved individual that remains
silent and fundamentally unknown to us. Goethe alludes to
that which is not known and cannot be known; to the ideas,
meanings, mathematical equations, laws of physics, concepts,
feelings, abstractions, and paradigms that we have yet to discover and to that ‘which is not, but exists’ and we cannot discover. For Goethe, and much earlier for Parmenides, the world
consists not only of truths that can be discovered, understood
(through science) and be learned, but also of that ‘which is not’
and cannot be examined via reason and experience—the illusion. To the question, ‘What is?’ (i.e., what is the world, what
is a human being, what is a rose, what is a book?), P
­ armenides
answers: ‘everything is’—that ‘which is’ and ‘which is not’—
and alludes to ‘the unity of antitheses’ as a core fundamental mechanism that holds that ‘which is’ and ‘which is not’
together. Similarly, in writing about the space the poet or
author needs to create literary art, Blanchot talks about ‘the
reader that is yet to come’ (1989, p. 199). Obviously, ­Blanchot
is not talking about a reader that is out there as a market segment that is in existence and can be studied and a­ nalyzed
4 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
for its key consumer characteristics; he is talking about the
unknown reader, the reader who will inspire the ‘genesis of
the work.’ He too, personifies the unknown and alludes to the
existence of that which is unknown and will remain unknown,
and which by remaining unknown, serves as inspiration and is
an eternal source of imagination and creation.
So, if our sciences and scientific methods can help us
understand and explain truths, what can we do about that
‘which is not’? What can we do, how can we exist and live with
that ‘which is not’? Where scientific method does not apply?
One answer is religion. That which cannot be explained and
grasped has been addressed by humanity by the creation of
religions, the creation of gods, and other deities. In a more
fundamental reading and understanding of the world, it is
philosophies—different ways of existing with the unknown—
that prevail. Philosophies underlie our fears and the extraordinary potential of human beings to be inspired and create
images and impressions of the unknown, while it persistently,
stubbornly remains as such. Our philosophies help us dress
up the unknown in ways, which comfort us in its presence,
while it remains as such.
There is so much ‘which is not’ in projects. Flyvbjerg
(2011; 2014) reminds us that the long-standing notion that
project success can be secured through processes, tools, and
techniques is too narrow a philosophy. By looking at megaprojects, he raised the understanding that not only optimism
bias, but also strategic misrepresentation are main factors (or
‘which is not’ elements) that need to be considered in projects. Thus, the need to adjust the ontology of projects being
tasks and processes that we know, can predict, and just need
to apply correctly, by also positioning projects as phenomena
at the crossroads of sociology and humanity to make sense
of them. Examples include the countless aid and support
projects started and executed by the people in the European
Union for the refugees who had to leave their war-shattered
countries; these are hardly understandable by using economic
philosophies and traditional “business case” perspectives.
A multiplicity of philosophies is required for sensemaking
of and in these projects. We see traces of this multiplicity of
new philosophical perspectives, for example, in:
• Gauthier and Ika’s (2012) ontological framework to transcend
the abstract epistemological and methodological debates and
create a wider view and broader understanding of projects;
• Morris’ “management of projects” tradition (Morris, 2013),
which firmly establishes the ethos of the project as one that
needs to be primarily concerned with building value for the
sponsor and attended to in the front-end and throughout the
life of the project;
• The “rethinking project management” movement, which
attempts to understand project-based working in the context of
creating a better, more organized relationship between theory
(knowledge) and practice (experience) (Winter & Smith, 2006).
Coming back to the above quote from Goethe, we can
say that these approaches help us “through knowledge and
science–[to] come close to understanding what it is” this thing
called a project, but we can not put it in an uncomfortable
position, as it is up to us to understand projects, not vice versa.
management (Konstantinou, 2015). They will—somewhat
uncritically—adopt and even obey the professional values of
the profession. In this case, the profession and the practice
are—in the best case—sustained, reproduced, and preserved
throughout time as the professional ‘votes for’ and supports
the existing status quo—the existing philosophy.
However, for those who realize that they have and can
play an active role in defining their professional philosophy, there is a point in one’s professional career where one
becomes interested in a debate about different philosophies
(i.e., different ways of living life and practicing). Similarly,
those professionals interested in developing the profession
and, far more importantly, the practice will feel the need to be
engaged in a debate about different philosophies with the aim
of a better practice, growth, development or, if nothing else, a
professional life that holds some excitement. For example, is
a project manager responsible for fulfilling the expectations
of all stakeholders of a project or only of the project sponsor,
who is his or her employer or contract partner? Should we be
asking how the ethics of the project management profession
will develop and who will drive such a change? (See, Eskerod,
Huemann, and Savage, 2015, for a discussion). The biggest
challenge here is that there is a notable lack of inspiration
and debate about the different philosophies for practitioners
to turn to.
We Need Philosophy Because . . . Some of us
are Driven Toward Growth, not Followership
We Need Philosophy Because . . . it is the
Antecedent for Theory Development
For Kogler (2012) the beginning of selfhood is intent. Being
human requires intention or, what is commonly known, as a
purpose in life, a sense of direction that has been consciously
selected by the individual him or herself and has not been
imposed. For sociologists, human beings and, more interestingly here, professionals will find their purpose and define
their intentions via a process of socialization, where the
individual chooses to affiliate or disassociate him or herself
with professional, organizational, one’s own, and higher
order values. In this process of socialization, the individual
will engage, ‘test’ different sets of values, reflect, and will ultimately create his or her own, unique (professional) identity
that reflects an amalgam of different values that are brought
together and ultimately reflect who they are and how they go
about living life and practicing their work (i.e., their philosophy) (Konstantinou, 2008). In other words, our philosophy
(i.e., the guiding principles and values that we choose to
follow via a process of socialization with the world and our
work) is a fundamental constitutive part of our selves in life
and at work.
Some professionals do not realize they can have an
active role in defining their professional philosophy and thus
improve their profession and practice. Indeed, a recent study
showed that top project professionals rarely think about
ethics when asked to talk about professionalism in project
Academics in project management have criticized the theoretical base of project management as being too narrow or
insufficient. Although this critique in itself is debatable, it
opens the path for a bigger question: Which philosophies
should underlie these theories? Any theory is contingent on
a philosophy, an antecedent stance, from which a theory is
developed. Weick’s statement that a theory should only be
interpreted within the ontological and epistemological framework within which it was developed indicates that. Examples
include agency theory and its underlying philosophy of
economics. Attempts to develop theories of project management, such as those by Turner (2006), are often based on economic and process ontologies/philosophies. A much wider
field of possible theories could be derived from a broader
ontological/philosophical base, including sociological and
humanities ontologies. To that end, we must first ask what the
philosophical base of project management can be before we
can develop a theory about it. The likely result is a kaleidoscope of different theories, based on a kaleidoscope of different philosophies. A first glance is given through the different
schools of project management, such as those by Söderlund
(2011) or Turner, Huemann, Anbari, and Bredillet (2010),
in which each school builds on a different philosophy. The
scope of these theory frameworks has thus far been limited to
management and organizational perspectives, which bear the
Thus, a different philosophical stance, grounded in subjective
human experience rather than objective planning and control;
• The “projects-as-practice” movement (e.g., by Blomquist,
Hällgren, Nilsson, & Söderholm, 2010), who try to understand
projects from the practices applied in managing them. Yet
another philosophical stance, which centers on the way project management work is executed;
• The “making projects critical” movement (Hodgson & Cicmil,
2006) which introduced the notions and ideas of critical management studies in our understanding of projects and their
management; and
• Borrowing philosophies from neighboring sciences, such as
transcending the ‘genotyping–phenotyping’ concept from the
natural sciences to the world of projects. This philosophical
stance assumes that projects (just as flowers) may have the
same genetic setup (genotyping) at the start, but develop very
differently over the course of the their lifetime (phenotyping),
because of exogenous and endogenous influences (Joslin &
Müller, 2013).
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 5
Guest Editorial
potential to develop project management theory from very
different perspectives.
The academic world, which could be seen as a promising destination for philosophical alternatives and debate,
has been dominated for decades now by a rather unbearable
over-reliance on evidence-based, ‘scientific’ research that significantly compromises our ability to envision and debate different philosophical positions about practice. On this, Dreyfus
and Dreyfus (2005) remind us of the ‘heightening danger that
in future skill and expertise will be lost through over-reliance
on calculative rationality’ (p. 790). Academics, and by implication practitioners and the practice, are restricted by the
pace of innovation in practice. Academics have to wait for the
practitioner community (or in the best case, devise actionlearning projects and join the practitioners in their efforts) to
produce new approaches to practice that will translate into
academic, scientifically compiled evidence bases. The role of
the academic is restricted within the framework and/or the
space of the data from existing practice; this is partly due to
the intellectual comfort that is attached to evidence.
“Because we are afraid of speculative ideas, we do, and do over and
over again, an immense amount of dead, specialized work in the
region of ‘facts.’ We forget that facts are only data; that is, are only
fragmentary, incomplete meanings, and unless they are rounded out
in complete ideas—a work which can only be done by hypotheses, by
a free imagination of intellectual possibilities—they are as helpless
as are all maimed things and as repellent as are needlessly thwarted
ones.” (Dewey, 1927, p. 8)
Our research mindset, methods, and our professional
standing necessitate and depend on the collection of strong
datasets from the realities of existing practice. Transcending
this mindset into the natural sciences, Higgs, Englert, and
Brout would have never predicted the Higgs boson (first time
measured 50 years after its prediction); just as Einstein could
have never predicted gravitational waves (measured for the
first time 100 years after Einstein’s prediction). Arguably,
using existing practice as a point of departure can be a source
of new philosophies and approaches to work; however, we
wouldn’t be able to quote many examples here. The practitioner can turn to the academic for expertise in a variety of
tools, techniques, methods and methodologies, and insights
into existing practice. But where can the practitioner (including the academic practitioner) turn to for a well-informed,
well-thought out, intelligent, and dynamic discussion about
how he or she can change his or her profession for the better? Where can we find out about different views on how we
can marry competitiveness and ethics; how we can handle
ethics when business schools have been heavily criticized for
their lack of attention to business ethics; how we can bridge
inequalities; how we can handle climate change; and so
forth? Where can we find out about transformative views and
inform our professional philosophies in ways that supersede
6 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
existing thinking and can lead respective industries into the
future? We have been criticized for our lack of attention to
these matters (Morsing & Rovira, 2011), and the examples are
abundant. For example, in May 2015, the Schumpeter blog in
The Economist urged practitioners to adopt ‘a palette of plans’
and ‘smudging the canvas’ on the premise that ‘choosing a
strategy is a lot more complex for companies than it used to
be’ (p. 66). Underlying this piece and the author’s thought
is that the existing approaches (philosophies) to strategic
development are no longer relevant. According to the author,
the only alternative seems to be a combination or ‘smudging’
of the existing strategic approaches. Is this really the best we
can offer practitioners?
So, the news is out! Faced with a world that is changing,
that can only be partly known to us, and with a distinctive lack
of alternative approaches and philosophies to existing practice, it is now time to perhaps turn to the field of philosophy
for inspiration. In this attempt, our allies will be:
• Our datasets and evidence bases, which can be interpreted
anew from different philosophical perspectives;
• Our existing insights from practice, which can inform our
future searches and help us avoid re-inventing the wheel;
• Our existing good practices and academic thinking/insights,
which have helped us thus far (and may prove to be invaluable), but do need to stand our scrutiny anew. Critically evaluating our existing ideas for their strengths and limitations will
help us decide and prioritize the areas that need to capture or
attention in the short- and long-term future;
• Our existing theories, which helped us to understand the
world to the level we do today;
• Our curiosity, which helps us to combine, broaden, and
deepen all of the above, but also look at the missing links
between them, such as the Higgs boson in natural science.
In other words, we may need new perspectives,
approaches, or philosophies but not at the cost of severing
our relationship with the past and our development to date.
As Dewey (1927) writes:
“Philosophy sustains the closest connection with the history of culture,
with the succession of changes in civilization. It is fed by the streams
of tradition, traced at critical moments to their sources in order that
the current may receive a new direction. [. . .] [Philosophy] is itself a
change; [. . .] The intellectual registrations which constitute a philosophy are generative because they are selecting and eliminating exaggerations. [. . .] [philosophy] is additive and transforming in its role in
the history of civilization” (p. 5).
Dewey seeks to explain the relationship among new ideas,
philosophies, change, and the past; he views them as interlinked, with the clear objective of philosophy to eliminate
that which is excessive and unnecessary—unnecessary ideas
that grow on our thinking like mosses and lichens on rocks by
the ocean. The role of philosophy is to clear our thoughts of
excess and therefore provide clarity in terms of future directions and orientations. In this way, philosophy is by nature
transformative, progressive, and forward looking.
The Role of Philosophy
Philosophy has a very clear role to play in practice: to offer
and propose a range of ideals that can be developed into
entire philosophies that can guide and inform practice. Different ideals will produce different philosophies, which will
apply in some cases but not in others. Swift (2008) argues that
ideals and, by implication the philosophies they generate,
will entail intellectual and conceptual merits and limitations
that—when known to the practitioner—can help him or her
critically discuss, compare, evaluate, and sensibly judge his
or her approach to practice. He writes:
“As long as philosophers can tell us why the ideal would be ideal, and
not simply that it is, much of what they actually do when they do
“ideal theory” is likely to help with the evaluation of options within
the feasible set” (p. 365).
Swift makes strong claims about the need for ‘fundamental, context-independent, normative’ philosophies and
approaches on the basis that the challenges we face reflect
non-ideal circumstances, very much like the challenges that
project managers face. As we mentioned above, these are
complex, interdisciplinary and, in many cases, time-critical
issues that require a sophisticated understanding of an issue
and ways of addressing an issue that are underlined by different philosophical orientations and approaches. The latter will, by definition, entail conceptual and intellectual
strengths and limitations, and will ultimately lead to very
different outcomes in practice. An aggressive philosophy and
approach to climate change would solve some problems and
create others, as would a fair/just philosophy/approach, an
inclusive philosophy/approach, and so on and so forth. Some
philosophies/approaches will reflect favorable and relevant
solutions in some cases and irrelevant and impractical solutions in other cases. But without an understanding of different philosophical orientations, what is possible, and why, we
remain fundamentally limited in our capacity to evaluate our
options. We remain attached to past experiences that may no
longer apply and may not represent adequate solutions to
problems, or—even worse—we may be left with luck and the
hope that we may get it right. Surely the relevance, applicability, and feasibility of different philosophical approaches will
play a significant role in the process of critically evaluating
new philosophical approaches for their merits and limitations
in practice. But the fact that a philosophical approach may
not be relevant or applicable in a particular case or problem
is not an adequate reason to not evaluate different options
about how to go about practice, how to practice. Philosophy
can create and help us envision options, alternatives, propositions, suggestions that can inspire groundbreaking or
incremental, new conceptualizations of practice. These are
options, alternatives, propositions, suggestions that can help
redefine or reposition what practice is and can be. Philosophy
can produce a variety of options and alternatives that can
help us grow and develop the practice through a process of
critical evaluation. It can distract us from the existing status
quo; shake our core; create alternatives and space for debate
and evaluation; and construct different targets that once
imagined and conceptualized can start to become feasible,
practical, and relevant in some, if not many, cases.
If we pay attention to creating different options and alternatives to approaching practice, we might have a better chance
at sensibly evaluating what to do, how to proceed, and what
our options are. We might have a better chance at drawing new
directions for practice, a new state of affairs; a better, fairer,
more equitable, more inclusive, more relevant state of affairs
that can be prioritized and help us renew the ways in which we
think about practice and the inequalities that create our challenges. We can start an intelligent, well thought-out, considered and informed process of exploration, risk-taking, growth,
new thinking, and new orientation—a process of creating a
reality that does not yet exist but can be and is perhaps waiting
to be imagined and created. We can create new philosophies
tailored to the challenges we face, new philosophies which
allow us to explore different ways of interpreting the unknown
part of the world, and which allow the personal development
a professional needs—a consciousness about our choices that
will require us to become accountable and inseparable from
our practice. If philosophers can outline our options and the
reasons why they can be important for our practice, the practitioner will be obliged to take full responsibility for his or her
actions. For the professional, this increased accountability
over the choice of practice reflects a need, because accountability is a fundamental characteristic of being a professional.
“An expert’s role also determines the scope of accountability for the
expert’s work. Professionals account for the complete professional
task, including treatment. We can say that experts represent not only
units of expertise (as human capital) but also units of accountability
for the application of expertise in accordance to their expert role.”
(Mieg, 2009, p. 753)
For those who feel comfortable reproducing practices;
who do not seek to understand their options, and critically
evaluate them and claim the accountability of their choice
of practice, an emphasis and discussion of fundamental,
context-independent, normative philosophies/approaches
would indeed seem threatening. This is fair enough, yet
does not constitute a professional profile. For the latter, a
philosophical debate and enquiry with the aim of critically
evaluating different philosophical approaches to practice
isn’t relevant.
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 7
Guest Editorial
What Are the Risks of Engaging
With Philosophy?
First, different philosophies and, more generally philosophy as a discipline, is frequently criticized for its normative
nature. The very notion of a philosophy is seen as elitist,
relevant to conservative thinking and moralistic views, which
seek to dominate over other views and claim universality.
Our message here is the exact opposite. We suggest that the
role of philosophy is to create a space in which different
philosophical orientations and approaches can be critically
evaluated. The role of philosophy is to create alternatives and
new ideas, while the professional remains firmly responsible
and accountable for the choice of philosophical orientation
and approach that he or she chooses to apply in practice. We
suggest that the value of philosophy in practice does not lie in
creating and adopting one, single, unitary, universal philosophy, but rather in creating and exploring different philosophical orientations to practice. As a process, this can enhance
our thinking, train our instincts, educate our intentions, help
us envision different goals for our practice and, ultimately,
become another resource we can use to address the challenges we face, the unknown, and our need to immerse ourselves in our practice and serve it as professionals.
Second, in the same way that some disciplines can be
criticized for their lack of attention to philosophy—such as
management science and in many cases organization studies—
philosophy as a discipline is frequently criticized (and arguably
so) for its lack of attention to facts. Dewey (1927) writes:
“But in all of them there is an exuberance and fertility of meanings
and values in comparison with which correctness of telling is a secondary affair, while in the function termed science accuracy of telling
is the chief matter” (p. 7).
Dewey provides a great answer to this problem. He sees
scientific thinking and method as a means of testing different
ideals and the philosophies they generate, and is clear about
those philosophies that do not pass the test: they should be
eliminated.
“This confers upon scientific knowledge an incalculably important
office in philosophy. But the criterion is negative; the exclusion of
the inconsistent is far from being identical with a positive test which
demands that only what has been scientifically verifiable provide the
entire content of philosophy. It is the difference between an imagination that acknowledges its responsibility to meet the logical demands
of ascertained facts, and a complete abdication of all imagination in
behalf of a prosy literalism” (p. 7).
And here Dewey agrees with Swift, who similarly suggests that the distinction between philosophy and science
is ill-conceived, one that has been unduly established. Our
world philosophers Plato, Aristotle and, even before them,
Parmenides, were all mystics and scientists at the same time,
8 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
searching for meaning amongst reason, experience, and illusion (Parmenides); structure and phantasia (Aristotle); and
the intricate relationship between philosophy and action (as
in Plato’s Republic).
Finally, our discussion on the role of philosophy cannot end without acknowledging the political significance
of philosophy and, by implication, our suggestions. A focus
on inequality is one way of explaining and interpreting the
challenges we face, and as such is a political statement. We
have prioritized issues of social, humanitarian, and economic
concern in our opening paragraphs—this has political bearings. We have put forward a view of the world being partially
known to us and this too has political implications and
gravitas. We have reinstated an extended role for the professional, one that needs to include a healthy preoccupation
with philosophy—again, a view that could be seen through a
political lens. These are choices with significant implications;
they suggest that we need to focus on a particular aspect (e.g.,
inequality) and direct our limited resources (time, knowledge, human potential, funds, etc.) to address this aspect of
reality; in other words, we suggest an emphasis on inequality
rather that—say—profit maximization or communitarianism.
A philosophy that targets inequality would enable and disable
other competing philosophies and, if established, would give
rise and power to practices seeking to address inequalities
and the relevant communities.
Indeed, philosophy is a political issue; it creates alternatives and is intrinsically and by definition transformative. It
is fundamentally political in that it creates impactful action
and change; it prioritizes and sets aside; it gives and takes
power. We suggest that by creating a discussion about philosophy in project management in this special issue, perhaps
we have the opportunity to render different philosophical orientations on project management more visible and therefore
more manageable and open to scrutiny by peers and others
before we proceed and put them into practice. Then we will
perhaps have a better chance to be more poignant in our
choices and more effective in our practice. We hope we have
offered a first step in this direction not only for the benefit
of the communities involved (academics, practitioners, and
policymakers) but—far more importantly—for the practice of
project management.
In This Special Issue
In this special issue there are four streams of articles. The first
stream takes a broad view and addresses projects as an everyday or social phenomenon. The second group addresses philosophy in project management, including the people working
in projects. The third group focuses on projects as such—what
they are and what is done in projects. The last group of articles
addresses philosophy in project management research.
The group of articles on broader perspectives starts
with “Minima Moralia in Project Management: There Is No
Right Life in the Wrong One” by Louis Klein, who addresses
Aristotle’s long-standing question: “How to live a good life?”
but does it from a contemporary perspective using the lens
of Theodor Adorno’s Minina Morialia. This article relates the
broader picture of worldwide systemic social and industrial
developments and the role of the individuals therein, with
the particularities of the development of project management
in its context and the role of the individual project manager.
This allows for pointing out a number of factors, such as rationalization, systemization, and individualism, whose interplay
should be considered by project managers in finding their
own ways of being a good project manager.
The article “The Projectification of Everything: Projects
as a Human Condition” by Anders Jensen, Christian Thuesen,
and Joana Geraldi describes an alternative understanding of
projects, beyond organizational practices. That is, projects
as a human condition. Hereby human condition emerges
through a shift from a merely disciplinary to a merely project society. Four philosophical concepts are used to explain
this change: activity, time, space, and relations. The changes
in these principles provide for a variety of worldviews and
explain a number of issues and phenomena observed in
recent times.
“Philosophy of Project Management: Lessons from the
Philosophy of Science” by J. Davidson Frame addresses the
development of a philosophy of project management. This
is a fundamental issue for the community of practitioners
and academics in the field, as theory development builds on
philosophy as an underlying base. To that end is the development of project management related theory contingent on
the existence of one or several philosophies of project management. Frame suggests using the Philosophy of Science as
a role model for the development of a philosophy of project
management. Specifically, he suggests developing simple and
lean criteria that allow the demarcation of project management philosophy against other areas of philosophy. To do
this, he suggests avoiding excessive abstraction and being
open to inspiration from outside the project management
discipline. Using the discourse on realism versus antirealism
from the philosophy of science as an example, he shows the
role of observable and non-observable entities in developing
research that is repeatable, systematic, and unbiased, as well
as acknowledged by the research community.
The group of articles on philosophy in project management
starts with “An Existential Hermeneutic Philosophical Approach
to Project Management,” by Bradley Rolfe, Steven Segal, and
Svetlana Cicmil using the philosophies of Martin Heidegger
and Richard Rorty to re-describe the fundamental assumptions
underpinning project management. They go beyond seeing
project management as only a science and develop the significance and value of philosophy for project management. The
authors use re-description as philosophical practice to respond
to existential disruptions of the lived experience in managing
projects. The authors perceive this as vital, not only to being a
project manager but to describing project management.
The article “Let’s Discuss Aesthetics for Projects” by
Bronte van der Hoorn and Jon Whitty addresses the aesthetical
aspects of projects, focusing on the often neglected aspects
of sensory and lived experiences in projects. Starting from a
Heideggerian perspective of aesthetics, two empirical studies
were conducted to identify project managers’ sensory experiences in managing their projects. Results show how project
managers decide on rendering processes and tools as effective or ineffective based on their aesthetic perception of their
“fit” to particular project situations (i.e., “an equipmental
totality in particular worlds” in a Heideggerian sense), which
leads to the conclusion that in the various worlds of projects
the aesthetic qualities of equipment can become catalysts for
human behavior.
The article “Why Distinctions Matter: What Does Philosophical Analysis Have to do With Project Management?”
by José Idler addresses the practical problem of optimizing
project outcomes through the analytic philosophical method
of making distinctions. Using examples from the Aristotelian
and Kantian methods of finding distinctions, he derives at
a process of identifying differences and contradictions (for
example, in project deliverables) and then refining them conceptually by identifying classes of sub-concepts or elements
and their relations, for example, in the form of essential and
contingent attributes of project deliverables. While obviously
appropriate for traditional approaches to project management, he points out the additional appropriateness for agile
contexts, in which the focus lies on developing the project in
the right direction as opposed to the traditional optimization
of project outcomes.
The next group of articles addresses the nature of projects and starts with the article “The Metaphysical Questions
Every Project Practitioner Should Ask” by Lavagnon A. Ika
and Christophe N. Bredillet, which addresses the question:
What are projects? For that, the authors turn away from the
popular worldview of how projects are used toward what
projects really are. Through that, they aim to help practitioners understand how their metaphysical stance informs their
project management style; more specifically, how a thingbased understanding tends to lead to planning-based project
management and process-based understanding tends to lead
to emergent management style.
“Living With the Unknown Unknown: Uncertainty in Projects,” by Øyvind Kvalnes addresses ways to deal with uncertainty in projects. Using the famous example of Wittgenstein’s
fly-in-the-bottle as a metaphor, he shows how existing project
management theory and practice can similarly turn project
practitioners into prisoners in their fly-bottle, in this case, in
the context of uncertainty. To that end, the article discusses
a variety of different philosophical perspectives before it
settles on philosophical pragmatism and concludes that the
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 9
Guest Editorial
prevailing approach of uncertainty reduction during project
planning might be too narrow a perspective. This perspective
should be complemented with other views, such as those that
embrace uncertainty for the benefit of the project.
“Root Metaphors for the Management of Projects: Toward
a Knowledge-Based View,” by Terence Ahern, Brian Leavy, and
P.J. Byrne addresses the philosophical differences between
traditional and situated approaches to the management of
projects. The authors see projects as modes of organizing
and learning for temporary undertakings. Using the metaperspective of Pepper’s root-metaphor framework (1942) and
interpreting it from a knowledge-based view using Popper’s
(1979) work on problem solving learning, Pettigrew’s work
(2012) on process research, and Polany’s work (1967) on
knowledge’s tacit dimension, they identify different modes
of learning in different project types. In addition, the article
offers a different way of looking at projects, that is, as modes
of organizing and learning. Following Pepper they suggest a
Mechanism hypothesis for projects using explicit knowledge,
thus traditional project management approaches; and a
Contextualism hypothesis for projects taking a context contingency approach to knowledge in projects. Both metaphors
are linked through tacit knowledge. Following the line of
Pepper, they further suggest organicism for portfolio management and formalism for program management. With its four
metaphors the article provides another philosophical base for
subsequent theory development.
The article by Sergei Floricel and Sorin Piperca, “Project
Management Between Will and Representation,” addresses
the differences in perspectives toward projects. Using
Schopenhauer’s concept of will and representation, they
show the inadequacy of one-dimensional perspectives, such
as purely rational or purely human perspectives toward
projects. Rather, they argue for projects being a process of
bricolage, which tries to accommodate opposing interests
and disparate sensemaking strands. The process advances
projects through a constant repositioning and rebuilding
process, driven by a large variety of rational and non-rational
influences. Moreover, the representation of this process is
conditioned by its visibility, which often leads to more
rhetoric-based representations of the project rather than
factual narratives about the project. By building a framework
of different perspectives, the authors suggest reconsidering
various aspects of project management from new, emerging,
and constantly changing views.
“The Open Secret of Values: The Roles of Values and Axiology in Project Research,” by Mattias Jacobsson and Thomas
Biedenbach addresses the benefits for project research
gained through a more philosophical treatment of axiology, especially when beyond the simple acknowledgment
of values as concept or in project management methodologies. For this the authors review the concept of axiology
and value theory and explore their use in published project
10 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
management research. Subsequently, they reflect on the
historical–logical development of its influences on projects
and project management.
In summary, this special issue provides for a large variety
of philosophical perspectives toward projects and their management, including perspectives of classical thinkers, such
as Aristotle, but also later and contemporary writers, such as
Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Rorty, Popper, and Wittgenstein.
As such it is the first work that brings together such a variety
of perspectives and interpretations to explore new understandings and insights into the realms of projects and create
the space in which the study and understanding of projects
under different philosophies can help create excellence in
practice. May this be the trigger for a new stream of thinking
in the world of projects and their management.
It is our great pleasure to introduce the new call for papers
for a special issue on process studies in project organizing
with three invited editors: Viviane Sergi, Lucia Crevani, and
Monique Aubry. Full papers must be submitted by 31 January
2017. For additional details please visit PMI.org/learning/
publications-project-management-journal.aspx
References
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division of expert labor. London, England: The University of
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Biesenthal, C., & Wilden, R. (2014). Multi-level project governance: Trends and opportunities. International Journal of
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stakeholder management—Past and present. Project
Management Journal, 46(6), 6–14.
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again. In P. W. G. Morris, J. K. Pinto, & J. Söderlund (Eds.),
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UK: Oxford University Press.
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6–14.
Gauthier, J. B., & Ika, L. A. (2012). Foundations of project
management research: An explicit and six-facet ontological
framework. Project Management Journal, 43(5), 5–23.
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Reflexionen. Athens, Greece: Stigmi.
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doi:10.1111/j.1468-2370.2010.00290.x
Hodgson, D. & Cicmil, S. (2006). Making projects critical.
London: Palgrave Mamillan.
Swift, A. (2008). The value of philosophy in nonideal circumstances. Social Theory and Practice, 34(3), 363–387
Joslin, R., & Müller, R. (2013). A natural sciences comparative
to develop new insights for project management research. In
N. Drouin, R. Müller, & S. Sankaran (Eds.), Novel approaches
to organizational project management research: Translational
and transformational. Copenhagen Business School Press,
Copenhagen, Denmark.
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Kogler, H. H. (2012). Agency and the other: On the intersubjective roots of self-identity. New Ideas in Psychology, 30, 47–64.
Konstantinou, E. (2008). Knowledge management in a
global context: A critique of knowledge transfer and the role of
knowledge worker, PhD thesis, University of Stirling, Stirling,
Scotland.
Konstantinou, E. (2015). Professionalism in project management: Redefining the role of the project practitioner. Project
Management Journal, 46(2), 21–35.
Mieg, H. A. (2009). Social and sociological factors in the
development of expertise. In K. A. Ericsson, N. Charness,
P. J. Feltovich, and R. R. Hoffman (Eds.), The Cambridge
handbook of expertise and expert performance. New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press.
Morris, P. W. G. (2013). Reconstructing project management.
Oxford, England: Wiley-Blackwell.
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and A. S. Rovira (Eds.), Business schools and their contribution
to society. London, England: Sage Publications.
Parmenides. Πíς   ́ς: ı ıς.
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Overcoming today’s crisis of inequality. Foreign Affairs, 95(1),
16–22.
Schumpeter blog (2015). A palette of plans: Choosing a
strategy is a lot more complex for companies than it used to be.
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Söderlund, J. (2011). Pluralism in project management:
Navigating the crossroads of specialization and fragmentation.
Turner, J. R., Huemann, M., Anbari, F., & Bredillet, C. (2010).
Perspectives on projects. Milton Park, UK: Routledge.
Winter, M., & Smith, C. (2006). EPSRC Network 20014-2006:
Rethinking project management: Final Report. EPSRC.
Since 2001 Efrosyni Konstantinou has been studying people in organizations and
how they use their knowledge. Her research is informed by philosophy—especially
the reading of Parmenides—and contemporary management thinking that emphasizes a critical approach to business. Her experience in the industry informs her
ideas, which she is now exploring in relation to the professionalization of project
management. She has reviewed issues of knowledge and its management in nine
industries and across the public and private sectors, and her work has been published
in international, peer-reviewed journals and conferences. Following the award of her
PhD from the University of Stirling, Scotland, Dr. Konstantinou managed the Centre
for Performance at Work (City University London) as a Research Fellow and worked in
Deloitte LLP as a Knowledge Manager before joining the University College London
(UCL) and the Bartlett School of Construction and Project Management, where she
leads the MSc in Strategic Management of Projects. Dr. Konstantinou is Fellow of the
Higher Education Academy (UK), a member of the Institute of Directors, and co-chair
of the “Knowledge and Learning” track at the British Academy of Management
Conference. She can be contacted at [email protected].
Ralf Müller is a Professor of Project Management at BI Norwegian Business
School in Norway. His principal research interests are in leadership and the
governance of temporary organizations. He is senior editor of Project Management
Journal ®, the author or co-author of more than 180 publications and, among
other accolades, the receiver of the 2015 PMI® Research Achievement Award,
the 2012 IPMA Research Award, and Project Management Journal ®’s 2009 Paper
of the Year Award. He holds an MBA from Heriot Watt University and a DBA
degree from Brunel University in the United Kingdom. Before joining academia,
Professor Müller spent 30 years in the industry consulting with large enterprises
and governments in more than 50 different countries on their project management
and governance and also held related line management positions, including the
worldwide Director of Project Management at NCR Teradata. He can be contacted
at [email protected]
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 11
PAPERS
Minima Moralia in Project Management:
There Is No Right Life in the Wrong One
Louis Klein, The Systemic Excellence Group, Berlin, Germany
ABSTRACT ■
INTRODUCTION
“There is no right life in the wrong one,”
Theodor W. Adorno (1951/2006) concluded in
the Minima Moralia. In project management,
this idea calls for rethinking the contributions and implications of the discipline for
the greater context of society and the life of
the individual project manager. What does it
mean to be a good project manager and to
pursue the right life? And what are we doing
to the world? In the end, we will have learned
that there is no way to be a good project
manager without a systemic perspective on
the real world.
iving by the book does not make us good project managers. There is
more to it than knowledge, skills, and certifications. We know this,
and senior project managers never cease to stress the importance
of experience, but how good are we, really? What are the references
for good and right? It may not be enough to refer to project management
only, even though project management as a discipline constantly wants to
improve. Yet, the primary frame of reference of project management remains
management, efficiency, and excellence. The claim of this article, following
Theodor W. Adorno, is that this focus is not enough. We need to put project
management into a broader context, and a philosophical approach may be
the best way to do so. We may ask: What do I bring to the world as a project
manager besides simply the project? To what greater context are my deeds
contributing? Do I create good or do I contribute to the plundering of the
planet and the destruction of humankind’s future on earth? What kind of
person do I become if I dutifully pursue project management? What do I do
to myself if I manage projects? What kinds of behavior do my deeds promote?
And is this—whatever it is that we as project managers are contributing to—
what we want to see in the world? Project management as a discipline should
be constantly under this kind of critical surveillance.
There is no right life in the wrong one. Adorno’s (1951/2006) insight from
the Minima Moralia provides a good starting point for our quest. Adorno
puts personal action into a greater context: a context that may violate individually good intentions and that violates any attempt to compensate on
the micro scale for what is wrong on the macro scale. There is no right in
the wrong. Adorno stands for critical thought; however, we shall go further
than critique. We want to explore opportunities to overcome discomfort and
the major challenges of industrialized Western society. Yet, addressing those
challenges—namely, systemicity and individuation—as shortcomings of the
Enlightenment is a philosophical endeavor. Building on this, in the pursuit of
solutions and the integration of project management into broader contexts,
systems thinking, cybernetics, and sociology can all play major roles. The
power of context, generic emergence, and operational closure are three major
systems concepts that allow us to look for systemic change and balance. For
the individual project manager, however, there is always the chance to be en
garde—to keep a watchful eye and take good care of oneself. Reflecting—
realizing your position in the world, observing your observations, and
critically realizing yourself—seems to be good, ancient advice for successfully
pursuing not primarily a better, but rather a right life.
KEYWORDS: critique; systemicity;
individuation; systemic change; systems
thinking
L
Discomfort
Project Management Journal, Vol. 47, No. 3, 12–20
© 2016 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
12 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
“There is no right life in the wrong one.” (1951/2006, aphorism number 18,
p.39) This is probably Theodor W. Adorno’s most prominent quote, and for
many people, it represents the essence of the Minima Moralia (1951/2006).
It is more a statement, however, than an answer to the question of how we
should lead our lives, and over the years
it has become a mantra for addressing
discomfort and a warning form luring
complacency. In the Minima Moralia,
Adorno brings forward a collection of
reflections on the dark days of Nazi
Germany and World War II, as well
as on the life of a German exiled in
the United States. How shall I lead my
life, so he asks, in disruptive times and
discomfort?
Adorno’s observations on how cunning and effective the (project) management of war and genocide had been are
discomforting. His work was indeed an
accusation against some of his countrymen: those who tried to hide in their
own niche; those who were just doing
their jobs, being tiny cogs in the horrifying, big machine; those who tried to
do the right thing within their private
niches, doing good only for friends and
family, but not caring for their neighbors. What we see when we broaden our
view and look beyond the boundaries
of project management may indeed be
discomforting. How can we make sure
that we get it right this time? Do we
know, or do we only believe that engaging in project management is harmless
and providing the right context for the
right life?
In hindsight, the Minima Moralia marks a middle position between
Adorno’s two major works—the Dialectics of Enlightenment and the Negative
Dialectics. In 1947, he published the
Dialectics of Enlightenment, along with
Max Horkheimer (1947/1977), bringing
forward a thesis on the dead end of
positivism. In the Dialectics of Enlightenment, they review the course of reason from the Enlightenment into the
Industrial Revolution and the machine
age toward the totalitarian structures
of capitalism, socialism, and fascism.
Left alone, the course of reason does
not necessarily lead to a desirable end.
On the contrary, it seems necessary to
re-induce the idea of responsibility and
accountability of the individual based on
ethical values. This idea carried forward
the Frankfurt School of the 1930s and
the critical theory of which Adorno and
Horkheimer were major protagonists.
In 1966, Adorno published his second major work, the Negative Dialectics
(1966/1973). It reads like a reflection on
reflection. It is the critique of critique. In
this, it follows the path from ontological
observation to epistemology; only on the
surface is it less empirical. It leads the way
from looking at the world in general and
at practices to maneuver within it toward
observing the practices of observation,
sensemaking, and the creation of meaning. In all this, Theodor W. Adorno, as a
major antagonist of the critical school,
explores the conditions for the possibility
of leading one’s life well.
You might ask: Why is this relevant
in the context of a philosophy of project
management? The answer is twofold:
First, it addresses a certain discomfort
with project management, as a discipline rooted deeply in the rationality of
the industrial age and what this brings to
the world; second, it addresses equally
discomfort with the demands of project
management for the project manager
and the impact of those demands on
the individual. We know there much
criticism of project management; it is
challenged from the inside as well as
the outside. Projects fail, and the life of
a project manager is certainly no picnic
in the park. We have a certain idea that
there must be more to project management than a body of knowledge or various competence baselines. We know
that we can rightfully assume that there
is a shadow of project management,
and that all the effort to create a shining project management practice creates an equally rich shadow (Bértholo,
forthcoming). We know that in project
management we focus great attention
on things we would like to see in the
world and we turn a blind eye to those
things we would prefer to avoid dealing with. There is no place for lust,
love, anger, rage, and wrath in project
management. We strive to be rational
and we want to deliver superior results.
However, the large equation of project
management, its disciplinary matrix
of models, methods, and instruments
does not work out well. And we know
this. For the individual project manager,
uncertainty prevails. We ask ourselves:
How can I manage my project well?
What can I do? What am I responsible
for? Rather than reinforcing the known
and investing in more of the same, we
may want to join the critical school and
Theodor W. Adorno in exploring the
conditions necessary for the possibility
of living the right life.
Unlike Dialectics of Enlightenment
and Negative Dialectics, Minima Moralia is not a coherent philosophical work.
It is a collection of aphorisms, a collection of the most diverse reflections.
Adorno varies his perspectives; he ventures various points of view, leading to
different observations and insights. The
Minima Moralia talks in aphorisms and
does not lead to any final word; rather,
it is food for thought and an invitation
for further reflection. Implicitly, it leads
from ontology, engaging in the factual
world, to epistemology, reflecting on
our ability to observe and understand. It
is an invitation to engage in sensemaking and the creation of meaning.
On this account, applying the Minima Moralia to project management is
an invitation for project managers to
combine two pursuits into one: to be
a good project manager and to pursue
the right life. To attempt this requires
a certain awareness of the contexts
beyond project management as a discipline. What is the broader context we
are working in and what does our work
do to the individual as a whole person?
This question has an ethical dimension
as well as a systemic one. Awareness
may begin with discomfort, but to be
turned into constructive solutions, it
needs to be articulated well and is best
done in the form of critique.
Critique
Critique operates from a distance. Any
critique needs a well-elaborated frame
of reference to gain a firm position. This
differentiates it from negative criticism
and moaning. Discomfort does not carry
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us far. Only if critique overcomes negative criticism and operates on the basis
of a positive alternative can it result
in change. This idea points to Thomas
Kuhn’s (1962) scientific revolution and
his works on paradigm shifts. Discomfort is necessary, but is not sufficient
for change. Only if we see an attractive
alternative that overcomes, adds to, and
incorporates the existing paradigm are
we willing to change.
So any discomfort we address with
our existing understanding of the paradigms of project management can be
fruitful only if we engage in critique
based on the exploration and elaboration of attractive alternatives. We should
never forget that those attractive alternatives must embrace and build on the
benefits that come with the existing
paradigm. Change represents an evolution, rather than a revolution.
Any critical position, hence, needs to
explore alternative perspectives to gain
additional insight, adding to our understanding and leading us toward the path
for change. Bernard Scott (2009), in his
principles of observation, submits that
to any given observation there is always
more detail, there is always a bigger picture, and there is always an alternative
perspective. This notion may lead the
exploration; however, every new position of critique needs to be reasoned,
named, and become visible for the discourse to gain a right to play.
What reads as an in-depth examination of the theory of science has very
practical implications for a discourse
on project management. What is project management? How can we improve
it? What is there beyond the body of
knowledge and competence baselines? A
good example for pushing the boundaries of project management as a discipline
is the Cross-Cultural Complex Project
Management research project (CCCPM).
Over the past seven years, an array of
12 PhD projects addressing the challenges of social complexity in project
management has engaged in this kind
of critique. Scientifically embedded in
cultural studies, 12 distinct perspectives
beyond the known project management
discourse have been ventured. Critique
operates from a distance; hence, all of
those research projects had to find and
work out their own specific positions of
critique within the frame of reference.
Joana Bértholo’s (forthcoming) work on
the shadow of project management, to
give just one example, engaged in Jungian psychology. This allowed for the
elabora­
tion of a contrasting perspective on the body of knowledge and the
various competence baselines; it brought
forward profound insights, learned about
new limitations, and opened doors for
further engagement.
Critique often runs into judgment.
Once a new perspective enters the
discourse through critique, we need
to be careful about debates on judgment. Project managers seem to be safe
when it comes down to this challenge,
however. In accordance with evaluation theory in project management, the
dominant belief and insight is that for
proper assessment, we need smart goal
setting and to elaborate objectives precisely. We have seen a lot of progress in
this field, with active debates on topics
such as shareholders versus stakeholders, people versus profit, and humankind versus nature. The discourse on
sustainability has especially enriched
good project management practices and
found its way into the International Project Management Association (IPMA)
project management excellence model.
The consideration of judgment, however, goes deeper. Only on the surface are
we concerned with goal attainment and
the achievement of objectives. When
confronted with critique, we need to be
careful about categories of judgment.
They may be scientific and we may distinguish between right and wrong. They
may be moral and we may distinguish
between good and bad or evil. It makes
a difference which category is applied—
even if we choose pragmatism as a category and distinguish between functional
and not functional. We may easily run
into a dead end, where judgments collide irreversibly because we are not only
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confronting different opinions within a
given category but are clashing on the
category level as well. Something may
be scientifically right but morally evil
and not functional; in such a case, it is
necessary to go back and gain a distance
and allow for the perspective to see the
different categories. If we do not do this,
we will fight and argue on the wrong
grounds. The evaluation of different
categories of judgment is an unsolved
philosophical question in itself; knowing about this, however, at least allows
us to agree to disagree.
The most pragmatic solution that
philosophy itself has brought forward
to solve the judgment and values issue
is a systemic one. Discourse ethics, by
Jürgen Habermas (1983, 1991), allow
for self-referential derivation, variation,
selection, and retention to the answers
to the questions of ethics, judgment,
and values. This reflects the approach of
Heinz von Foerster in his Cybern-Ethics,
which strongly argues that ethics need
to be implicit if you do not want to get
lost in the debate on morals (Foerster
1985, 1993, 2002; Foerster & Poerksen,
2002). In consequence, discourse ethics
demand a continued conversation on
judgment and values, allowing for judgment at a given time and demanding the
continuous development of values.
Coming back to project management, we may want to suggest one general leading question—namely, how
much is enough? The question is not
so much an ultimate question as it is a
carrier—a guide that allows us to address
both sides of the equation and may lead
to the idea of sufficiency (Klein & Wong,
2012). It counterbalances the tendency
to do more of the same on the side of the
existing, dominant paradigm as well as
on the side of the critique. How much is
enough?
Systemicity
You cannot beat the house. The logic of
the context is always stronger than the
logic of the intentions, says Josef Stalin.
It seems cynical to quote such a man
on systemic insights, but his bon mot
reflects very well the insights of the
early 20th century. Industrialization
and capitalism had created production
systems without human dignity. Charlie
Chaplin’s films Modern Times and The
Great Dictator very cunningly demonstrate the atmosphere that these systems created for the majority of people.
There is no right life in the wrong one.
What Theodor W. Adorno (1951/
2006) addresses in Minima Moralia and
the critical school is the positivism of
the factual. Rationalism went over the
top in pursuing the reduction of complexity. For example, in what we call
scientific management, this created the
dehumanization of production systems.
The scientific perspective went hand in
hand with capitalism and was propelled
forward by a technocratic education.
The early 20th century saw an excess
of technological possibilities with little
ethical reflection, driving the success
story of industrialization further and
further into human areas. Agriculture
was industrialized, along with housing,
education, and healthcare. Even mass
murder was industrialized in the killing
factories of the Holocaust (Neitzel &
Welzer, 2011). Rationalism went over the
top, and the critical school addressed
the course of a development that started
with the Enlightenment and that could
neither be trusted nor left alone. The
invisible hand is not our friend.
Systems are dreadful; they can kill
people. And what is even more disturbing is that we do not address this and
do not hold systems accountable. There
has been a remarkable debate in the
theory of law over the past 60 years on
crimes against humanity and genocide
(Lattimer & Sands, 2004; Sands, 2003).
Approaching the Nuremberg Trials after
World War II, there had been competing positions on whether the prosecution should be based on the concept of
crimes against humanity or genocide.
The notion of crimes against humanity
addresses mass murder and accounts
for a large group of individuals being
victims of the atrocities. In contrast,
genocide does not look at the individual
but rather at the specific traits of a
group, which leads to a more abstract
legal concept. This makes it possible
to address the crime at an early stage,
when the frame of reference for the
crime is used as a rationale, with a
specific group, people, or religion being
targeted. People are victimized simply
because they belong to that specific
group. The Nuremberg Trials, however,
were argued on the basis of crimes
against humanity. The systemic category of genocide was avoided because
it may have drawn the attention to the
history of the World War II allies as
well. Yet, what is more appalling is that
both concepts only argue on the side
of the victims—neither concept overcomes the idea that individuals should
be prosecuted and punished. Even
today, we do not engage in a concept
that allows us to address a specific configuration of a political or a legal system
for expectable implications at a very
early stage, prior to the unfolding of the
events. If we had had the concept of a
system as an actor as early as 1935 and
with the Nürnberger Reichsgesetze that
constituted the necessary legislation for
victims of the Holocaust, action could
have been taken. Nobody has the right
to obey, concluded Hannah Arendt
(1966), in reporting on the Eichmann
trial in Jerusalem. Otto Adolf Eichmann
was charged, in the rank of a lieutenant
colonel, with the management of the
logistics of mass deportation of Jews to
the concentration and extermination
camps. He defended his own actions,
which contributed substantially to the
Holocaust as obedience. “I just followed
orders,” he said. This is, however, all
after the fact. What if we had the means
to investigate and intervene into the
course of events at an early stage?
Systems are wonderful; they allow
us to excel. The Porsche 918 Spyder is a
lighthouse project of German manufacturing: a total of 918 units were manufactured and sold at an average of close
to a million Euros per car. The Porsche
918 Spyder is a carrier of the best of
what Porsche engineering, design, and
manufacturing are capable of delivering. The car sold out long before the last
unit left production. The Porsche site in
Stuttgart-Zuffenhausen prides itself as
an example of Manufacture 2.0. In an
almost business-romantic way, Porsche
refers to individual craftsmanship.
The entire manufacturing facility for
the Porsche 918 Spyder displaced the
idea of the good old workshop. Being
clean and silent, however, the car neither resembles mass production nor
the workshop. Manufacture 2.0 plays
with a romantic image just to highlight
the idea that this kind of manufacturing and this kind of excellence requires
a wide-ranging systemic embedment.
Manufacture 2.0 is embedded within
the Porsche production system, its
logistics, and its production principles.
It is embedded within the industrial
environment of southern Germany and
the technical know-how and skills of
generations; it is embedded within the
German education system, work legislation, and legal structures. Manufacture 2.0 taps into profound German
work ethics and a cultural dedication to
excellence. We know this, and Porsche
could have brought this forward, but
instead the company remarkably displayed the romantic notion of individual craftsmanship. Do systems want to
hide, or are we shying away, avoiding
acknowledging them?
For the Minima Moralia in project management, these examples raise
the question of the systemic context.
In what kind of context are specific
projects embedded? In what kind of
rationale is project management as a
discipline, embedded? And in what kind
of context does the individual project
manager do his or her job? Mind the
context, choose wisely, and mind your
own contribution. You are either part of
the problem or part of the solution.
Individuation
The individual carries the burden of
Western society. This characterizes
what Ulrich Beck (1986) calls the ‘risk
society’; when they are not addressed as
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systemic actors or accountable entities,
economic as well as political systems
seem to have the inherent tendency
to cascade risks to the lowest possible
level, which is to shift societal risk onto
the individual.
Individualization went over the top.
All the responsibilities for individual
life and the systemicity of Western societies seem to end up on the level of
the individual, and the individual is
overburdened (Beck, 1986; Ehrenberg,
1998; Sennett, 1998; Sloterdijk, 2009;
Trojanow, 2013). The excess of individualism is running in two ways: resulting in what we may want to call heroic
management on the one side and the
exhausted self on the other side.
We love heroic managers. Hollywood movies teach us that we can save
the world almost single-handedly. The
dominant narratives of the West nurture what Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
called ‘fantasies of what is possible and
a frenzy of creativity,’ resulting in classical hubris. Ancient Greek drama is full
of tragedy when it comes to processing human hubris. Many men in those
ancient days set out to venture heroic
tasks; none managed without trouble
and only a few survived. The Enlightenment promoted the individual and
the enlightened culture chose to over
identify with successful heroes. A single
person can save the world; hence, we
expect individuals to do so as a moral
obligation. Heroic management is the
consequent adaptation of this belief. As
long as we turn a blind eye to systemicity, the individual has to save the day.
We expect managers to be heroes, to
take on leadership, and ultimately to be
successful entrepreneurs wherever they
go, both inside and outside the project.
The focus is on individual skills. The
growth of management literature nurtures this perspective and offers more
and more ways of pretending to enable
individuals to live up to this impossible
challenge. Of course, there are successful managers. We used to call them
A-players. We distinguish them from
B-players and we try to get the C-players
out of the way. Yet, we learn from systemic practitioners that wherever these
ABC-player policies are at work, it is
appropriate to suspect that organizations are not adequately caring for the
state of the organization and the systemic implications. Good business processes and management systems allow
average people to do a proper job, if not
to excel. Our Western culture and value
system, however, make it all too easy to
place blame on the individual and to
dispose of the burden. The pitcher goes
often to the well, but is broken at last.
The exhausted self cracks. We may
call it depression or burnout, but the
symptoms remain the same. The individual commits and tries to carry out
more than is actually possible. The
actual tragedy we find is when individuals do not blame the system and
the systemicity of the environment
but rather believe the inability to cope
exists within us ourselves, naming it an
individual deficiency. ‘Slow down,’ the
bystander wants to tell the exhausted
individual. However, the more committed and established someone is the farther up the ladder, the further advanced
in the career, and the more successful, the more the person tends to carry
on, to march on. We can call people
lucky if they are not suffering from their
next heart attack. In any case, however,
they have sacrificed at least and long
ago what is worth calling “a good life.”
And this is certainly another good reason to reconsider Theodor W. Adorno’s
(1951/2006) Minima Moralia. There is
no right life in the wrong one. We do
not need heroic management. We are
all in this together. We are not alone.
However, it is about time to address the
challenges of systemicity and individuation and look out for systemic solutions
that redistribute risk, responsibility, and
accountability to the right levels.
To what extent, we may ask, does
project management account for the
individual? Is project management just
another performance-oriented discipline that pushes the negative externalities of its practice over to the other
16 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
side, which we like to call privacy? Does
project management as a discipline
facilitate the right life? Does it encourage and promote a good life? Do we
ask too much? Is the well-being of the
project manager and the people working in the field not the business of the
discipline? And if not, then what kind
of person do I become if I go along with
the field as it stands? What do I do to
myself and others if I accept this notion
of impersonal business practices? And,
last but not least, do I want to be that
kind of person?
Integration
The extreme is the absurd. Project management is embedded in the two major
challenges of modern society: systemicity and individuation. In a certain way,
this challenge reflects the antagonism
between the individual and the collective. We may as well call it the antagonism between the self and society or
social systems in general. The challenge, however, goes far beyond. It is
not so much a question of myself and
others. With the terms systemicity and
individuation, we acknowledge, following Adorno, that the specific rational
of the Enlightenment went over the
top and created realities far from the
intended. Hence, we are not only looking at the challenge that comes with the
very nature of any antagonism, but we
are looking at a violated antagonism at
its extreme, entirely out of balance. We
also need to acknowledge that nobody
seems to be in charge of either systemicity or individuation. Who takes care of
the systems of society and their emergent interplay? And who takes care of
the individual whose hubris is driving
him or her into exhaustion?
In any case, we could know a lot
about systems, but we hesitate to further
research and shy away from the implications. Systems thinking and cybernetics provide models, methodologies,
and tools allowing for deeper insight
into systemicity, complexity, and their
implications, both in general as well as
for management (Jackson, 2000; 2002).
Out of the variety of systemic models
and concepts, three are highlighted to
illustrate these possible approaches: the
power of context, generic emergence,
and operational closure.
The power of context guides our
view toward the systemic embedding of
any observable entity. The context facilitates specific activities and developments and hinders others. By examining
the context of a system, we can learn
much about the conditions for any possibility for the system in focus. Within
a given frame, specific developments
are possible and others are not. Peter
Senge (1990) cunningly brought this
notion forward in his book, The Fifth
Discipline, in which he draws a cascade
of structure, behavior, and results. The
structure of an organization or of a
professional discipline determines the
behavior of the actors. Determination
in this context does not mean predictability of the single action; however, it
determines the overall course of action
and the behavioral attractor for each
individual contribution. Behavior, in
consequence, determines results. If, for
instance, an educational system only
rewards individual performance, then
individuals will behave accordingly and
try to display individual performance.
Good teamwork will not be a likely
result; in contrast, individualism will
be enforced and, with it, pseudo-heroic
behavior.
Generic emergence seems to be the
most underestimated systems concept.
The interplay of the individuals will
inevitably result in the emergence of
social systems, being distinct entities
in their own right. Regulations, institutions, and norms will form. More than
acknowledging that the whole is more
than the sum of its parts, we have to
recognize that the whole determines the
additional behavior of its parts. A social
system emerges from individual behavior and from the interplay of the actors;
yet, once emerged and established, the
social system will, in an autopoetic way,
as Niklas Luhmann (1984) puts it, regulate and determine the behavior of
individuals in such a way that the system will be reproduced over and over
again. It does not allow for variation
and produces more of the same. As long
as we neglect the generic emergence
of social systems, we will be blind to
systems as actors. We will not be able
to see, as in the case of the Holocaust,
that just by following orders individuals
can create evil in the most banal way.
Looking at social systems, we know that
organizations and corporations can be
addressed systematically as actors, but
to what extent does that account for
projects as well? Is a project an emergent social system in its own right?
Operational closure sits at the very
heart of systems concepts (Beer, 1979,
1982; Luhmann, 1984) and it creates
the boundary between the system
and its environment. However, there
is a generic perspective carried with
the notion of operational closure. The
boundary of a system is not made from
stone. It is volatile. It is malleable. Many
activities are necessary to maintain the
system and the boundary between the
system and its environment. So it is
the selected interaction between the
parts that create the system and its
boundary by only interplaying with the
very elements of the system. Beyond
that, there is no link to the environment. The only link to the environment
can be described as structural coupling
(Luhmann, 2000), but now we are back
to the power of context. Two systems
are environment and context for each
other. One system limits the other. One
system determines and facilitates the
further development of a specific system. Project management is embedded
in modern society and is an element of
it; it is determined by modern society
and also contributes to it. So the question is: How does it change, or is change
possible at all?
Systemic change is possible, although
the overall nature of systems of any
kind—and consequently, social systems
as well—are conservative by nature. In
an autopoetic way, systems safeguard
their further existence and are averse to
change but this is only one part of the
story. Systems tend to be conservative
and ultra-stable. On the other hand, they
are sensitive to the change of initial conditions. This is what we know from chaos
theory and the famous butterfly effect
(Lorenz, 1963). Systems theory comes
with the threefold concept of evolution,
which includes variation, selection, and
retention. To a larger extent, evolution
makes sure that variations, and especially
deviations, are discharged and only the
favorable elements are selected—only
favorable behavior will be rewarded, promoted, and kept. To a large extent, this
idea stresses that change can only come
from within. Variations of activities and
the behavior of the elements produce
the opportunity for change. In a very
surprising way, minimal variations cause
large-scale change. If we want change, we
certainly want to keep an eye on those
minimal variations and their implications; however, as long as we turn a blind
eye on systemicity, then guided change
is beyond reach. What is worse—change
happens incidentally and is neither controlled nor contained.
What we can hope for is balance.
Before we engage in the heroic idea of
change, which again tends to be just a
reaffirmation of the hubris of modern
society, we may want to have a look
at balance. Rationality and individualism are neither good nor bad, neither
right nor wrong by nature. Only if we
get too much or too little of something,
are we exposed to challenging problems. Containing excess and deficiency
points toward balance and asks for
ways to realize it. Cybernetics, especially in the works of Stafford Beer,
brought forward the idea of homeostasis, which addresses active balance on
the basis of negative feedback (Beer,
1979, 1982; Espejo & Harnden, 1989).
Beer argues that any system fit for
viability, as he calls it, needs to be in
touch with itself and must evaluate the
implications of the results it produces
for itself. If systems are not capable
of self-reflection, then they are not
viable. We have examples from biology.
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Yeast, for example, in the fermentation
process of turning sugar into alcohol,
cannot control its excess and will eventually die of the alcohol it produced
itself. The system that is out of balance
will die; however, we do not necessarily
need to consult cybernetics to access
knowledge about balance. The wisdom
of tai chi philosophy and the balance
between yin and yang bring forward
similar notions. An excess of yin or
an excess of yang will be fatal for any
living body. If the two conflicting energies are in balance, that is what we call
health (Klein & Wong, 2012). Balance,
however, is only the first insight of tai
chi; the second is sufficiency. There
should be sufficient and not excessive
yin or yang. Enough is enough. So,
how much rationality and how much
individualism are sufficient? We immediately see that this brings us back to
questions of evaluation and values. We
are back with Theodor W. Adorno and
the Minima Moralia. What is a good
life? What is the right life?
Adorno’s point, however, is critique.
Systems approaches and cybernetics
facilitate an understanding that goes
beyond discomfort and critique. They
facilitate an understanding of modern
society, social systems, and culture that
enables a thorough exploration of the
possibilities for change. In this context,
we meet project management as a paradigmatic reference for a community
of practice. Project management is a
manmade, scientific, and professional
discipline; hence, it can be changed
accordingly; it can be reviewed in the
light of performance and unintended
implications; and it can be changed and
improved by taking into account the
bigger picture of society and individual
well-being.
Reflection
Gnō´thi seautón—know thyself—read
the inscription on the entrance of the
oracle temple in Delphi. This recommendation greeted those who came to
the oracle seeking advice when challenged by the problems in their lives.
Be in touch with yourself and you will
know the answer. Self-recognition, selfawareness, and self-assurance may not
be sufficient to find a solution, but they
are necessary. This brings us back to Stafford Beer’s homeostasis and cybernetics. The prefix—self—in self-recognition,
self-awareness, and self-assurance indicates one of the essential feedback loops
we find in cybernetics. The self is relating to itself. This is a feedback loop; this
lies at the heart of any reflection. We can
go even further by not restricting the self
to the conscious mind, but acknowledging that any emerging entity, any living
system, any conscious mind, any social
system needs a notion of self to exist,
and hence has the possibility to relate to
its own self (Klein, 2012). This holds for
the individual as well as for the collective, for the social system as well as for
the project.
Observe your observation! This is
what cybernetics brings forward in its
second order, observing observations
(Foerster, 1985, 1993, 2002; Watzlawick,
1984). Self-observation is the most critical activity any emergent entity can conduct. It allows us to evaluate whether
anything is out of balance or if things are
still just fine. Second-order cybernetics
now invites evaluation and variation. A
system can evaluate what it can observe
and vary its observations. This brings
us back to Scott’s (2009) principles of
observation. There is always a bigger
picture, there is always more detail, and
there is always an alternative perspective. If I observe differently, I will see
different things and I can evaluate differently. I can act accordingly, and I can
change. This is what people mean when
they ask you to think outside the box.
It is an invitation to choose a different
perspective, to see things differently,
and to arrive at different judgments and
conclusions (Beyes, 2003). It is an invitation to multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity—an invitation to not do
more of the same. We can push it even
further and suggest not just thinking
outside the box, but thinking without a
box at all. We may follow the invitation
18 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
of transdisciplinary approaches to leave
behind the idea of a discipline and
allow, for example, for emotions and
intuition. We probably do not need to
go as far as thinking without a box,
however, acknowledging that the possibility to choose different perspectives
comes with an obligation: the obligation
to take on the responsibility for the perspectives we choose to make sense and
create meaning of and within the world
(Bredillet, 2010; Klein, Biesenthal, &
Dehlin, 2015). The extreme is the absurd
and sticking to only one perspective is
certainly extreme. In the pursuit of the
right life, we should look at least twice
and from different angles.
All problems result from things that
are not thought through. This statement, attributed to Albert Einstein, carries a lot of systemic wisdom. Changing
perspectives allows for a richer picture
of the world. Impact evaluation allows
for responsible action. It would be irresponsible to reduce project management to the iron triangle of cost, time,
and quality. We know there is more
to project management than that but,
even in its current state, operational
closure tends to promote more of the
same. Challenged by complexity, project management teaches us that we
find the major sources for complexity
beyond the technical realm in the political and cultural domain. Noel Tichy’s
(1983) TPC balance combines a technological (T), a political (P), and a cultural
(C) perspective and suggests that by
focusing on the technological aspects of
organizations or, in our case of projects,
we only see one-third of the world and
remain blind to the other two-thirds of
social complexity. By not watching, by
not observing, and by not evaluating the
impacts of political and cultural micro
and macro structures, we allow project
management to walk almost blindly.
Even the CCCPM research project—bold
as it may be—is just a humble beginning that is trying to change project
management by engaging in alternative
perspectives to create a richer picture.
It is a beginning, which allows us to
address systemicity and individuation
as challenges to modern society as well
as to recognize their impact on project
management and the work and lives of
project managers. Finally, there is one
question whose enlightening power we
cannot overestimate—it is an evaluation
question that, despite its simple character, allows us to evaluate the right life in
its context. We all will benefit from asking it and answering it sincerely. It is a
humble question we should all take very
seriously: How are you?
Here, we may want to start all over
again, beginning with discomfort and
critique and allowing for reflection
rather than being subjected to a discipline, a system, or project management,
for that matter. In reference to Adorno,
project management should contribute
to improving the world and elevating
the well-being of those involved, and
should not only be addressed as an
end but also all along the way. If project management does not live up to
this ethical imperative, it will be shattered and will need to be rebuilt from
scratch.
Conclusion
A philosophical perspective on project
management is long overdue. Philosophy provides a platform for reflection
and it immediately shows, challenges,
and critiques the dominant points of references of project management: engineering, economics, and management
sciences. Turning to Adorno and the
Frankfurt School allows us to embark on
the critique of an unfinished Enlightenment that never learned to reflect upon
its own reflections and instead pushed
rationalism and the glorification of the
individual well over the top into malign
extremes.
Adorno addresses our responsibility
for what is, what has become, and what
we contribute to with our deeds. This is
not reduced to the obvious contribution
to the bad things we see in the world;
rather it also addresses our unintended
and implicit contributions to the banality of evil. Adorno introduces a much
broader perspective of accountability,
which may be called individual, and
eventually collective, responsibility for
systemic emergence. It is an ethical
obligation for systemic integrity.
Individuation and systemicity reveal
the blind spots of our time giving the
context for project management as we
know it. The heroic manager in his
hubris is exposed as a self-exploiting
individual driven into exhaustion, and
the invisible hand fails to be trustworthy. Through systems thinking and
cybernetics, we learn to see the implications of our thinking and doing. We see
the threats and opportunities of project
management as a discipline.
Following Adorno, we may say that
there is no right project management
in the wrong project management. Philosophy enables us to reflect, whereas
systems thinking and cybernetics allow
us to act, to explore the conditions for
the possibility of a desirable future, and
to change.
References
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June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 19
PAPERS
Minima Moralia in Project Management: There Is No Right Life in the Wrong One
Klein, L., Biesenthal, C., & Dehlin, E.
(2015). Improvisation in project management: A praxeology. International Journal
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20 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
Watzlawick, P. (1984). Invented reality:
How do we know what we believe we
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Company.
Dr. Louis Klein is a leading expert in the field of
systemic change management and complex project
management on a global, cross-cultural stage. He is
the founder of the Systemic Excellence Group, the
Systemic Change Institute, and the Systemic Projects
Incubator. He is an entrepreneur and researcher working as a consultant and coach. Chairman of the Focus
Group on Social and Cultural Complexity with the
International Center for Complex Project Management
(ICCPM), he also serves as director at the World
Organisation of Systems and Cybernetics (WOSC) and
as vice president of the International Society for the
Systems Sciences (ISSS).
Dr. Klein studied management sciences, cybernetics, sociology, anthropology, psychology, philosophy,
politics, and economics at universities in Germany and
the United Kingdom, and holds a PhD in sociology.
He is member of the German Society for Political
Consultants (degepol) and publisher/editor of agora42,
a philosophical business magazine in Germany.
Dr. Klein is a long-distance runner and mountaineer, a
wine lover, and a close-to-decent accordionist. He is
the father of two children and lives in Berlin. He can be
contacted at [email protected]
PAPERS
The Projectification of Everything:
Projects as a Human Condition
Anders Jensen, Filosoffen.dk, Copenhagen, Denmark
Christian Thuesen, Technical University of Denmark – Engineering Systems Group, DTU
Management Engineering, Lyngby, Denmark
Joana Geraldi, Technical University of Denmark – Engineering Systems Group, DTU
Management Engineering, Produktionstorvet, Lyngby, Denmark
Abstract ■
Projects have become omnipresent not only
in the economy but also in our society and
our lives. Projects organize and shape our
actions at work, in our professional profiles
and networks, and also in our homes and
free time activities. Drawing on the philosophical cornerstone concepts of activity,
time, space, and relations, this article introduces an alternative conceptualization of
projects as a “human condition.” The article
concludes with implications to the project
management community, in terms of both
project management practice and research.
KEYWORDS: project society; philosophy;
projectification; project studies; project
theory
Project Management Journal, Vol. 47, No. 3, 21–34
© 2016 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
Introduction
P
rojects abound in contemporary society. In the 1990s, “projects”
spread across organizations in what was called the projectification
of the firm (Midler, 1995). Whittington, Pettigrew, Peck, Fenton,
and Conyon’s (1999) survey of 3,500 European firms reveals a sharp
increase in the use of project-based structures, from 13% to 42%, over the course
of 4 years. The trend intensified in the following years, and projects became
a prevalent form of organizing work. Indeed, a cross-sector survey conducted
in 2004 with 200 firms by PWC confirmed the trend. Notably, about a quarter
of the sample had a portfolio of 100 projects or more. The report concludes
that “it is hard to imagine an organization that is not engaged in projects”
(Nieto-Rodriguez, Manager, Evrard, & Partner, 2004, p. 4). Accompanying
the emergence of project portfolios was the growing relevance of a better
context for projects inside and outside organizations, including portfolio
management, governance structures, PMOs, and professional bodies. This
programmification of the firm led to the development of a context for projects
(Maylor, Brady, Cooke-Davies, & Hodgson, 2006; Morris & Geraldi, 2011).
The programmification took place across organizational boundaries. First,
we noted how some sectors have traditionally been organized around projects,
such as the advertisement and construction industry—what Grabher (2004)
termed “project ecologies.” Yet the proliferation of projects goes beyond specific
sectors. Projects have become the unit (or at least a key driver) of economic
action. “World Bank (2009) data indicate that 22% of world’s $48 trillion gross
domestic product (GDP) is gross capital formation, which is almost entirely
project-based. In India it is 34%, and in China it is 45% [of GDP]” (Scranton,
2014, p. 1), and this is only one type of projects. Projects are also the key to
innovation, research, IT, and organizational change, to name just a few. Hence,
projects have become a key vehicle for economic and social action.
However, the morphology of projects seems to extract much further. One
example could be the change of warfare to terrorism, which most emblematically has the structure of projects. The threat rarely comes from state apparatuses in neighboring countries (as in the cases of Ukraine and Russia in 2014)
but rather comes from the project workers and their network activities, organizing terror attacks that can take place in innovative forms and unexpected
geographical locations.
In sociology, Castells (2011) discusses individual’s project portfolios in a
network society. Boutinet (2004) proposes a typology of projects that includes
individual or life projects (such as retirement and relocations) and social
projects (e.g., revolutions). Boltanski and Chiapello (1999) have stated a new
regime of legitimation, a cité par projets, in which capitalism can no longer
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 21
PAPERS
The Projectification of Everything: Projects as a Human Condition
legitimate itself as bringing security to
the individual in the form of predictability but rather has to reinvent individual
security to be dependent on the possibility of movement and change, through
transitions between projects.
Hence, projects have become intrinsic to our lives. They permeate what we
do, how we speak, how we think of our
daily activities (Lundin et al., 2015),
how we construct our identities, and
ultimately, who we are. In this regard,
we organize a portfolio of projects in
our lives—from a family vacation to a
career move—and in many respects,
these projects and programs of projects
will profoundly shape our lives, not only
in terms of their consequences but also
in terms of how we live, act, and relate
to others. Indeed, we are experiencing
the “projectification of everything.” It is
therefore reasonable to argue that we
are in the wake of the project society, a
society in which projects are omnipresent as a form of coordinating human
activities (Lundin et al., 2015), and in so
doing, become a human condition.
Indeed, this article proposes a new
way of understanding projects and their
role in society: projects as a human
condition. In classic philosophy, a
human condition is something universal and stable over time, like breathing or becoming older. This perspective
has changed in the past few decades,
and today, a human condition is widely
understood also in the context of historical and sociological transformations. This opens the understanding of
human condition to something more
fluid while still permanent enough to
have a lasting impact on us as individuals and a society. For example, living in
a world where communication is aided
by machines is a historical change that
translates into a “new” human condition. Analogously, we argue that living with projects has become another
human condition.
Our analysis of the project society
is structured around four fundamental
concepts of philosophy, which are useful to describe a human condition: what
we do (activity), where we do it (space),
when we do it (time), and with whom
(relations).
Our main thesis is that a reshaping
of activity, time, space, and relations has
taken place in the past 5 decades, not
only at work but also in social living in
general, and that this new condition is
based on projects and can be described
as the project society. This is argued
more in detail in Fogh Jensen (2009). This
article presents his main thesis and proposes avenues for further studies in project management as a field of research.
In parallel to the development of
projects in society, project management as a research field has gained on
importance and moved from a focus
on operations management to being
more strongly embedded in organization theory. We join the authors in this
special issue, and in the past, to expand
project theorizing to the helm of philosophy. By introducing a philosophical
lens and its four cornerstone concepts,
we introduce a new vocabulary for
understanding project organizing, and
thereby build a new platform for theorizing about projects.
We open the article by outlining
the philosophical underpinning of the
concepts of activity, space, time, and
relations (a Newtonian understanding of time, space, and activity). The
subsequent two sections introduce the
societal forms—the disciplinary society and the project society—followed
by a detailed discussion on each of
the philosophical concepts in which we
identify central characteristics of the
project society. The article concludes
with a summary of these characteristics, a discussion of its ethical implications, and suggestions for avenues for
further theorizing about projects and its
management.
Philosophical Underpinning:
Time and Space, Activity, and
Relations
In this section, we introduce the four
fundamental philosophical concepts
and their complex interrelations.
22 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
Time and Space
Time and the three dimensions of space
form the four dimensions of our human
reality. We are oriented in a space that
has three axes. Time comes into being
when we or something else moves in
space. Such movement constitutes activity (or, as Newton would put it, motion).
Activity, in turn, allows us to discern one
moment from another. Phenomenologically, the experienced space is limited
because of the limitations of our body.
For example, we cannot see 360 degrees,
and so space doesn’t reveal itself to us
as 360 degrees, unless we begin moving. Therefore, our bodily experience of
space allows us to add what we cannot
see. Merleau-Ponty (1945) proposes a
famous example to explain this condition: the cube. We only see three sides
of the cube in a given glance, and yet we
experience it as six-sided.
We can never perceive space and time
in themselves. As argued by Kant (1781),
space and time are Anschauungsformen—
that is, a precondition for human perception. Therefore, they constitute part
of our synthetic a priori knowledge. In
other words, space and time are the very
condition for perceiving. They are just as
unchangeable as breathing to the human
existence; meaning, intrinsic to a human
condition and does not mutate through history, rather they need to be present for every
activity to occur.
Activity
Activity takes place in time and space.
First, activities extend beyond a moment
in time and have a duration; hence, activity can only be understood in relationship
with time and space.1 Understanding time
also requires activity, because if there
were no activity, it would not be possible
to discern one moment from another—
when every moment is the same, we
1It could be argued that space is not a precondition for
activity, as thought is an activity that does not occupy space.
However, we could alternatively argue that on a microscopic
level, neurons are moving in the process of thinking, and
hence, there is a spatial dimension to thinking. The same
argument is valid in regard to other activities that may appear
not to require space, such as getting older.
cannot perceive the passing of time. Such
a relationship is evident in mythologies
about the beginning of time and space.
For example, the Big Bang theory, activity begins as a result of an explosion that
opens space if the universe is expanding
continually. The expansion of space is in
itself not space; rather, it is an activity that
unfolds in space and time.
- How should I know . . . maybe it
was . . . the local priest, perhaps he
thought that when the blind people
could no longer see the images, the
images should not be able to see the
blind either
- Images don’t see
- You are wrong, images see with the
eyes of those who see them, it is only
now that blindness is for us all
- You can still see . . .
- Even though I may not lose my eyesight I shall become more and more
blind because I shall have no one to
see me (p. 3172)
Relations
Philosophically conceived, relations
begin with being more than one. That
is to say, relations can be triggered with
just a reflection, a relation to oneself
(Kierkegaard, 1849) or a relation from
the partial to the total (Spinoza, 1678).
Relation in Newtonian physics is cause
and effect, with relations between
bodies having effects on motion. In
the social world, relations take place
between people. They are what we
call psychological and moral bonds,
embedded in feelings. We can be
tricked by spatial metaphors that suggest that society is nothing more than a
container where individuals are placed
but are not necessarily related to one
another. However, it is widely accepted
that humans do not exist in the absence
of relations. In society, relationships
become even more fundamental. In
Marx’s (1939) words, society is not
the sum of entities but of relations. In
the philosophy of language, meaning
and value are formed in relationships
between subjects, conceptualized as
intersubjectivity of language (Geraldi,
1991). To describe this, we usually use
different metaphors for human relations, such as the pyramid, the network,
the organism, or the shoal. Saramago
(1997) provides an alternative illustration in the following passage of Blindness (the story is about an outbreak of
blindness in human society, and the
following dialogue takes place between
the only seeing person and her blind
husband):
- You won’t believe me if I tell you what
I have in front of my eyes, all the images
in this church have their eyes covered
- How strange. I wonder why
In summary, relations are an intrinsic part of our existence as humans
and as social beings. Relations provide
the foundations for communication,
understanding, and the development
of meaning.
The Disciplinary Society as a
Historical Foundation for the
Project Society
In order to understand the rise of the
project society, we will first explore
how activity, time, space, and relations
changed from antiquity to the Renaissance, when humanity was built around
mathematized “time” and “space” and
fixed “relations” and “activities.” The
project society not only builds on top of
this grid but also transcends it. In particular, we focus on the transformations
of the disciplinary society becoming
postdisciplinary. We use the terms discipline and disciplinary society3 following
Foucault (1975) to denote a way of organizing human behavior set during the
period from 1650 to 1850 on the grounds
of Renaissance conceptions.
During these centuries, we observed
a fundamental transformation from a
qualitative to a quantitative perception
of space and time. In ancient Greek culture, a movement in space was viewed
as a qualitative change: If the fire moved
up, it was because it belonged there,
and so it was, like Odysseus’s movement
home to Ithaca, a movement toward the
better, toward order. Aristotle stated this
as Physis arché kineseos, meaning that
nature comes before movement. In other
words, nature starts movements to bring
the world from a more chaotic to a more
orderly form.
What the Renaissance brought forward was, in the words of Alexandre
Koyré (1948), a transformation from
a closed, finite, and ordered space to
an open universe. Space changed from
being a home or a place for what happens to being quantified in equal pieces
and transformed into a linear coordinate
system, such as time. This had consequences for our understanding of both
time and space. First, space became
quantified in mathematics, and thereby
infinite, because the line of numbers in
mathematics is infinite—that is, without end. Another consequence was that
movement became indifferent. Movement is no longer viewed as a qualitative
change toward a higher or lower degree
of perfection but rather, as Newton put
it, simply matter in motion. Hence,
through the quantification of time and
space, the world loses its ethical dimension. It becomes indifferent.
This indifference is central to the
post-Renaissance world, including what
we shall call the disciplinary society and
the project society. Humans become subjects that are alienated from the objects
they relate to. Such alienation can be
clearly seen in the exploration of nature
after the Renaissance. Nature is not part
of us but is at our service—a way of thinking that German philosopher Martin
Heidegger (1954) called tecknik (technique) but inaugurated by the dictum of
16th-century philosopher Francis Bacon
(1597/1985): Scientia est potentia.4
The change in worldview to an
indifferent view of space and time was
exactly the condition that made the
measurement and calculation of space,
time, activity, and resources possible.
2The
authors translated the text and changed to format of
paragraphs to improve readability.
3In some contexts, synonyms for disciplinary society could be
modernity, industrial society, urbanity, or later, Taylorism.
4Scientia potentia est is Latin and often claimed to mean
“knowledge is power.”
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 23
PAPERS
The Projectification of Everything: Projects as a Human Condition
Scientia est potentia created the foundations for new forms of organizing
human activity, which shaped the
disciplinary society. For example, new
forms of organizing space allowed new
forms of control and surveillance, as
depicted in the Panopticon prison5 and
the assembly line. Scientia est potentia
found its form in scientific management
in the 20th century.
As in the case of space, it is important to distinguish between on the one
hand, experienced time, what Bergson
(1968) called durée, and on the other,
homogenized and quantified time.
Although time is experienced as durée
(moments or episodes), many people
will claim that they experience time
as seconds, minutes, and hours. This
is a sign that the homogenization and
quantification of time, with hours of
equal length despite the variation of
the extension of the sunlight during the
days, seems to have been incorporated
by humans even more than the homogenization and quantification of space.
The homogenization and quantification of time follow a transformation
comparable to that of space described
earlier. However, it is important to note
that our mathematical conception of
time relies on a metaphorization of time
as space. Homogenization and quantification come into being by projecting
time onto space—as a timeline or as a
clock, where a movement in space (like
the hand on the clock) indicates that
time is passing.
The
Renaissance
worldview
explained earlier was a system of
thought. This system made it possible to
think about organizing human behavior
in new ways during the 17th century.
The quantification of time, space, and
activity, and the homogenization, made
planning possible. As Foucault shows
it, the disciplinary organization divided
5Proposed
by Bentham, the panopticon prison is a circular
building with an observation tower at the center reflecting
bright light into the cells. Due to the lighting, the prisoners
cannot see whether they are being observed, and hence
feel constantly observed. Foucault built on the concept and
proposed the panopticism as a social theory.
movements, time, and space into pieces
and organized them in a precalculated
flow—in other words, the plan. The
plan unrolls activities in a deterministic sequence and speed and can be
repeated reliably.
The project society exists on the top
of and in dialogue with this older form
of planning and fixations. The modern
factory is just one example of fixed relations (colleagues), codification of activity (assembly line), mathematized space
(factory, assembly line), and mathematized time (working hours). Discipline
was and is not only an eminent way of
controlling procedures and outcomes,
but it was and is also something that
concerns the individual body. As Foucault (1975) shows, discipline is written
into the body through surveillance and
repetition, and just as a docile body
becomes a purposive instrument for
a disciplinary organization, discipline
also becomes integral to the way that
urbanization and democratization can
evolve, as the citizen becomes a curbed
individual.
It is exactly the precalculation of
activities in time, space, and fixed relations, which was challenged during the
last third of the 20th century. Acceleration and globalization increasingly
precluded prediction and long-term
planning for nations, public or private
organizations, families, or individuals
and contributed to the raise of the project society. Neither repetition of the
past nor long-term planning and deterministic predefinition of the future is an
adequate organizational response in a
society that is in constant flux. In this
context, projects emerge as a flexible
vehicle for organizing activities geared
toward change.
The Rise of the Project Society
Stating that we live in a project society does not imply that people never
had projects previously in history or
that all human activity is organized
as projects today. Instead, what we
claim is that projects have become so
omnipresent as a form of coordinating
24 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
human activity and behavior in the past
decades—particularly in Western (and
mostly European) culture—that we can
talk of a project society.
The project society arises when
(1) activity comes to play a central role;
and (2) the precodification of time,
space, activity, and relation is no longer
suitable in a context of the ever-fasterchanging world. The predetermination
of activity allowed for predictability
and repetition. Classic examples can
be found in the assembly line and
even in the routines of the traditional
nuclear family. However, with increasing change and much more rapid speed
of change, three factors gained in
importance: (1) the ability to reorganize
quickly, (2) the ability to incorporate
what happens accidentally in oppose to
eliminate accidents to happen, and (3)
the ability to respond to feedback from
the environment (Fogh Jensen, 2009).
Much more than the competencies of a
planning machine, like a handball team
training with the same combinations
again and again, it became necessary to
have the agility, sensitivity, and feeling
of the right moment: to take what destiny brings (the surroundings, nature,
the other people, the market, and so
on), go with it, and use it your way, following, in some respects, what Weick
(2001) illustrated as managers surfing
waves. On social matters, the politeness
of the trained aristocrat is challenged
by the charm and the humor of Clumsy
Hans, the protagonist of a classic Danish children story by Hans Christian
Andersen about a boy who is able to
impress the princess with unorthodox
answers to simple questions.
One example of this shift can be
seen on the dance floor from the beginning of the 1960s (explained in more
detail in Fogh Jensen, 2012, Chapter 2,
pp. 35–38). Because people let go of one
another’s hands to do the Twist, the
relation between dancers ceased being
fixed throughout the dance. One could
no longer answer clearly the question,
“With whom will you dance the next
four minutes?” Instead, dancing came to
rely on the actual activity that took place
during those four minutes, connecting
and disconnecting without touching.
The relation is continually negotiated
during the dance and depends on the
activity that one puts into the dance and
where this activity is directed. Therefore, it is possible to dance with more
people at once and with a different quality of relation between the people at the
same time. The moment the activity
stops, the relation is no longer there,
and if all activity stops, the dance floor
simply disappears, as the space is no
longer a dance floor if no one is dancing.
This example is not a metaphor. The
history of dance develops together with
the rest of society, and so the rise of the
project society can be seen in the history of dance as well as in the history of
warfare, types of appointments between
friends, or the history of the distribution
of sex and coupling (Fogh Jensen, 2009).
Another example is the rise of the
single. The disciplinary society had
maidens and widows, bachelors and
widowers, but it didn’t have the single. The single is a person living alone,
accommodated to freedom, and who
tries to turn it into his or her advantage,
which is serial monogamy and polygamy rather than security in the repetitive. Dreams of freedom from 1968 have
become realized as project life: temporary investments, multiplication of
connections, overlapping activities. It is
often brought forward as a choice to live
in freedom, but to many people, it is a
structural condition, that the potential
partners will not engage in long-term
planning. Consequently, one has to
adopt the single status in order to cope
with the conditions of temporary relationships. In romantic movies and TV
series, it is often pictured as the men not
wanting to be monogamous boyfriends
and this leaves the girl with an opportunity to take on the single status. In
the 1990s, this theme blossomed in TV
series, such as Ally McBeal and Sex and
the City, all trying to answer the questions: How do we navigate in temporary
relations? How do we get the comfort
and security of repetition, without losing the freedom of the project? In the
first episode of Sex and the City, Carrie
Bradshaw, the protagonist, reflects on
the question: “How do we [women] have
sex like men?” In other words: sex without feelings. This becomes relevant as
relationships become increasingly temporary, with no guarantees of long-term
bonds but as rather fluid connections.
Emotional survival in such a context
requires the ability to transit from one
connection to the next or from one
project to the next. Instead of having
marriage as the main vision of each of
these projects (and potentially scoring
lower success rates than IT projects!),
it may be useful to learn to accept this
as a human condition and turn it into
our own advantage—that is, to focus
on enjoying the connections instead of
insisting on conceiving of each connection as a potential “marriage.” Hence,
one of the key consequences of the
projectification of everything, even love
and sex, is the priority of aesthetic criteria for judging which projects to surf
with and which to let go.
Projectification organizes human
behavior in a more flexible way on top
of and in dialogue with the old ways of
planning and prediction. We see synchronic transformations in all sorts of
fields: tactics in sports, warfare and terror, coupling and the distribution of sex,
architecture and organization of spaces,
pedagogy, leadership and management,
dance, social help, the avoidance of epidemics. However, the projectification of
everything does not come from a single
institution or particular areas of the society, such as the prisons that Foucault
(1975) analyzed as the model institution
for the disciplinary society. Rather, the
fields seem to inspire and contaminate
one another toward a more flexible and
temporary form of organizing that we
sometimes call projects or sometimes
call by another name (such as one-night
stand or terrorist act) even though they
have a “projective structure.”
Therefore, one has to keep in mind
that the word and the concept are not
the same. By the concept “project” we
mean the “throw” toward the future
and that is limited in time (although not
always determined in time). As Martin Heidegger argues in Sein und Zeit
(1927), when humans (to Heidegger,
dasein) are oriented toward the future
(Protention), the future always comes
first, and the past, condition, and necessity (Fakticität) follow. A more existential way of interpreting this is closer
to Jean-Paul Sartre’s (1943) phenomenological analysis in L’être et le néant:
When people put forward a projection,
something they want to do, they are
forced to look at the conditions and
necessities for realizing this. But that
necessity, condition, and past come
only after the projection (which is different from what a timeline, which suggests a linear development starting with
the past and moving toward the future).
Furthermore, from this perspective,
projects are only supposed to take place
once, and therefore are only done for
the first time and are never repeated.
The consequence is that they are pervaded by uncertainty. This means that
some of the tasks in work life—referred
to by the word project—are basically not
projects, because they have been done
before and we know exactly how to
work our way forward. Thus, we could
imagine a continuum between task and
duties at one end and projects at the
other end.
Classic project management is often
the discipline that is concerned with
the deprojectification of the project,
trying to get more certainty without
losing too much of the three factors
that challenged disciplinary society:
quick reorganization, incorporation of
the accidental, and feedback sensitivity.
The projectification of everything is thus
not a question of the proliferation of a
word (the omnipresence of the word is
rather confusing). It is instead a proliferation of a temporary, future-oriented,
purposeful, time-limited organizational
form that is more agile, sensitive, and
flexible than the disciplinary codification and planning, which operates in
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one-off activities (such as a one-night
stand or terrorist act).
In the following sections, we turn to
the characterization of the project society as opposed to disciplinary society as
two ideal types that shape the human
condition. The discussion is organized
around the four cornerstone philosophical concepts of space, time, activity,
and relations.
Activity
As mentioned previously, the constitution of the disciplinary society relies
on a plan. This again relies on a mathematization of space and time so that
the performance of the activity can be
predicted in space and time: when,
where, how, and how fast it is going to
take place. Through establishment of
discipline(s), activities are institutionalized and uniformalized. Thus, activity in the disciplinary society is mostly
defined by space, time, and relations.
For example, a waltz is learned at a
dance school, by following certain patterns in a certain tempo, predecided by
the dance teacher.
As exemplified by the dance school,
change in the disciplinary society operates through uniformization (discipline)
and negation (correction). For example,
the production line is optimized by the
definition of an ideal mold (specific set
of movements, pieces, setting, and so
on) so that change (the production process) is about the implementation of the
mold. Anything that does not follow the
mold is considered waste and should
be eliminated. This mindset permeates throughout the society: In school,
the pupil learns through corrections of
faults compared to a scheme (e.g., the
perfect letter P), whereas professionals
are trained to follow a pre-established
body of knowledge. Hence, in disciplinary society, the discipline plays a
much stronger role than, for example,
independent thinking, initiative, and
development of personal interests.
Therefore, activity is calculated and put
in frames based on former experiences.
For example, bureaucracy determines
rational procedures for activities so that
humans should work as consistently as
machines.
This works as long as change is only
an exception and not a rule. But in the
20th century, we began to experience an
ever-faster-changing world. The organization of activity could no longer be
built on the same type of predictions—
or the predictions had to be made on a
short-term basis. Hence, the project as
a temporary organization emerged as
a flexible form of activity, which can be
more easily adapted and redeveloped
on a temporal basis.
One of the main characteristics of
the project society is that activity has
gained importance and power to decide
and format space, time, and relations.
In other words, what the relations are,
when the acting is unfolding, and where
it unfolds is to a larger degree shaped by
the activity itself rather than by a predetermined time, space, and relation.
The prestructuring of time, space,
and relation (when and where and with
whom are we going to do it) is still an
important basis for activity. For example,
we agree to meet at the tennis court to
play tennis at 9:00 a.m. on Sunday, and
we will play with our usual partners. But
we claim that to a larger extent, the activity shapes the space, the time, and the
relations. For example, the skateboard
course is a space that is opened by an
activity; the bench, the sidewalk, and the
stairs become the course as long as skateboarding goes on, and these places close
down as a course when the activity stops.
When they go skateboarding, the playtime is opened by the activity and relations are formed by it; skaters might not
know one another’s names, parents, or
schools, but they are together in the activity. In the same way, at a private party, the
dance floor is not there before someone
starts dancing—that is, the dancing space
is opened through the activity.
One could imagine the world of
bureaucracy (Weber, 1922) and discipline (Foucault, 1975) as a scene in a
theater: The wings are set, the time is
set, the roles are set—and then begins
26 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
the play, the activity. The project society
is more like a dynamo: It is the activity
that opens the space, the time, and the
relations, and when the activity stops,
the space shuts down, the time shuts
down, and the relations stop.
Here, we can talk about a change from
a priori determination to a posteriori
determination. What, when, where, and
with whom something is going to happen
is, in the project society, to a larger extent
decided by what actually happens rather
than by the plan. In extreme projects,
even the criteria for and measurements
of success are determined by the activity: Aim cannot be well articulated until
some activity has unfolded.
Of course, planning responds to this
knowledge by trying to keep obligations open. If the market changes fast,
it is important (1) to have only a small
number of items stored (lean production), (2) not to be obliged for long
periods of time (contracts by activity
is preferred to contracts by time), and
(3) to postpone decisions close to the
execution, and therefore to work in temporary structures. Because the future is
unpredictable, everyone fights to keep
his or her own flexibility. Paradoxically,
this increases the unpredictability when
everyone postpones their decisions. For
example, if no one wants to say if they
will come to a party before the same
day of the party, the host has to operate
in probability calculations or put the
flexibility elsewhere—wait to order food
until the guests have arrived or ask them
to bring their own.
By organizing activities as projects, projects become the new home
for action. Projects are sometimes
driven by excitement and uncertainty.
The activities in the project society are
often characterized by excitement and
uncertainty—most positively in the
spirit of exploration, but often also in
mediocrity, the feeling of being inexperienced, and sometimes even in a spirit
of anxiety or fear.
The very concept of “being experienced” is undergoing change. If experience is to be able to use yesterday to
handle tomorrow, then experience in
project society becomes something else.
In the disciplinary society, experience
equates to the repetition of the same
activity a large number of times. In
the project society, experience becomes
doing a large number of different activities in different contexts. This type of
experience enables the flexibility to
evaluate the different options for engaging in projects—which combination of
projects is most beneficial? Even though
this experience creates a platform for
navigation, it is always obsolete, and
hence experience gains a dynamic
dimension.
This adds on to the anxiety of the
passage between projects (see “Relations” section): Even though an individual might not be threatened by the
expiration of the project, he or she can
perceive himself or herself to repeat too
much and thereby not gain enough new
experiences and, paradoxically, becoming less experienced. Thus, the will to
passage is not just something pushed
forward by the increased flexibility of
organizations but also by individuals
dealing with the human conditions in
the project society.
This also has implications on an
individual level. Being active is a condition in the project society. It is a premise
for being seen. If you are not active, you
become invisible or, at best, just boring.
Thus, identity in the project society is
not defined by position but by activity.
To rephrase Descartes: I am doing, therefore I exist, ago sum ergo. Here, the CV
(curriculum vitae) plays a central role
in illustrating who someone is, as they
represent the collection of projects this
person has been involved in and thus an
account of his or her accumulated experience. However, identity is not only
defined by what someone’s activities in
past and present but is increasingly also
defined by potential activities to be conducted through future projects.
Space
What is characteristic to the disciplinary space is that it is formatted before
the activity takes place. Just as the scene
with its décor is there before the play
begins and the dance floor exists before
the dance, so is every institution formatted to make certain activities take place
at a certain time. The project society
builds upon and rebuilds the sorted
space inherited from disciplinary society, where functions are sorted out in
different spaces. A space with a specific
function and with opening hours could
be an institution, but it could also be,
for example, a classroom with specific
functions. In order to perform a certain
activity, one would have to go to that
space at the settled time for that special
activity.
What happens in the transition from
the disciplinary society to the project
society? Activity becomes more central, and the formatting of space loses
some of its determinative power. Society becomes characterized by functions
rather than institutions. For example,
learning becomes important, not the
school. Healthcare becomes central, not
the hospital itself.
Using a verb from Deleuze and
Guattari (1980), one could say that the
project deterritorializes time and space
in order to make it reappear as activity
and that the project deterritorializes
the institutions in order to make them
reappear as functions. As a result, to
understand project society, it is more
relevant to look at the world from the
angle of activity than from the angle of
space (which would be the disciplinary
worldview).
This, however, does not mean that
space does not exist in the project
society; space remains fundamental to
human experience. Nor does it mean
that we don’t have spaces organized
for certain functions to take place anymore. Rather, it means that activities
open space and can change the meaning attributed to that space. For example, a dance floor opens in the kitchen
if somebody dances there. The activity
of having a meeting opens a working
function in what is formatted as a café
and so on.
Of course, architects are a part of
this. They create more open and flexible
spaces that invite activities to define
them. In urban planning, the zone
or the cloud becomes a term for this.
In this regard, contemporary designers understand the nature of spaces as
designed but also evolving. For some
decades, the danger was that spaces
became too open or unformatted. If the
café doesn’t seem like a café, but looks
too much like an office, then having a
working activity in such café will not
have the same effect as transforming
something that looks and feels like a
café into a work space. In this regard,
spaces are nudged to be perceived as
a café, or office, or gym. However, they
are purposefully designed for maximum
flexibility, and in so doing, they create
the probability that some activity will
happen, in oppose to allocating certain
types of activities to specific spaces.
Furthermore, the traditional, Newtonian understanding of space has
been challenged by the rise of communication technologies, the Internet,
and social media. Through these technologies, virtual space emerges as the
connection of different spaces, and it
becomes possible to act in several locations simultaneously. Thus, we are now
able to be active in multiple spaces at
once. The consequence is that what was
previously separated is now blended.
We work at the café and we do our banking activities from home or work. The
increasing importance of virtual spaces
is one of the reasons for the space formation to lose power. The important
point here is that the blending is not
a mess; it is ordered by activity rather
than by space and only when considered from the viewpoint of space does it
look like a mess.
Time
Parallel to discussions with regard to
space, we observe an inversion from
time followed by activity to activity followed by time. Instead of the hour coming for the activity, the activity opens the
time. Just as the dance activity opens a
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time for dancing, the learning activity
opens school time, instead of a school
bell ringing based on a predefined plan.
Planning very often is a predetermination of a “when” and “how fast”
as well as a “where,” a “how,” and a
“with whom.” In the disciplinary society, planning very often focused on repetition. Here, time was associated with
tact (on the dance floor and production
line), ensuring continuous flow between
different types of activities. However,
because a project only runs once, planning a project can never be planning
a repetition. Moreover, because it is
the first time the project runs and the
event is therefore surrounded by uncertainty, planning can be very illusionary
or sometimes a play in order to imitate
the more predictable world of the disciplinary organization.
This shift has also been mirrored in
the development of scheduling techniques and, in Western cultures, dominated by scientific management logic.
It was Henry Gantt who introduced
time as a key dimension to coordinate
production in the late 1900s (Geraldi
& Lechler, 2012). Originally, a Gantt
chart was actually used to report the
completion of past tasks. Only later did
the Gantt chart become an instrument
for planning projections in the future.
Thus, time moved from a focus on repetitions and plans to projections and
orientation toward the future.
The project society, always oriented
toward the future with its projections,
is caught in the omnipresence of the
idea of change. And projects are used
exactly to make changes. As citizens in
the project society, we expect tomorrow to be different from yesterday. We
require change. This is partly a new
form of capitalism, where expanding
the market is not finding new physical
domains (territories) to export to but
rather an expansion in time: The existing becomes the old as the new model
appears. However, it is also a more
inherent logic in culture that has since
the dispute between the ancients and
the moderns in the 1690s (Rigault, 1856)
been the condition in art: Something
only has value if it has not been seen
before. This has a further impact on
what experience is worth (as discussed
in activities). Previously, experience
was to have done the same thing lots of
times. Now, experience also means having done a lot of different things.
We have thus moved our orientation in time from the past to the future.
Project society is oriented forward, not
relying so much on repetition of the
past. As Giddens (1994), Sennett (1998),
and others have pointed out, tradition
has lost its legitimatizing force. This
affects even our identities: We draw
meaning from the future, from what
we are becoming, when we understand
ourselves, rather than where we come
from (space) and what we have repeated
(past time) or our family (relations).
Furthermore, “project language”
has also been used to enrich repetitive jobs; from a business perspective,
this is useful to increase variability and
response to change, but it also creates
more human, engaging, and interesting work (e.g., the mini-factories where
employees plan their shifts and rotate
in a “project-based” rhythm). Time
thus becomes a motivator and way
to coordinate work—deadline-driven
work (different from “time at work”
and time measurements in scientific
management).
One of the ways in which time
appears in projects is as temporality.
Projects finish! They are made to end.
Thus, time is always present as “What
next?” or “What after this?” This also
makes us think of questions such as:
Are we going to deliver by X? How can
we complete the work? How can we
successfully conclude it? (So we can
continue moving on to the next one.)
Thus, the omnipresence of the mentality of the passage from one project to the
next is the form time takes in the project
society.
We have time in projects and time
out of projects, and these times and
timing are felt and organized differently.
Yet time without projects is avoided.
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We are often afraid of being in transition, afraid of not finding new projects,
of being inactive, and hence ceasing
to “exist” in the project society. Therefore, we don’t say “no;” we double-book
work, we nurture different project ideas
simultaneously, and we jump into the
most interesting one just in time, delaying others. And if the project is not as
interesting or things are not developing
as expected, we may well find opportunities to exit the project and start in a
new one. We may also commit to several
projects and attempt to execute them
simultaneously, multitasking between
them. This principle of multitasking is
connected to the decline in the importance of being in the space where
the activity takes place (see “Space”
section).
Even though multitasking is an
important skill, a person only has the
ability and time to participate and contribute to a limited number of projects.
We can partially offset this limitation
by creating synergies. For example, the
same activity can contribute to two projects, for example, a vacation to an exotic
location can contribute to an educational project with the family, in which
you aim to expose your child to different cultures, and data collection for a
research project. For active members
of the project society, time becomes
the scariest resource, and despite the
temporality of projects, we have a feeling of never being finished, always in
flow, always catching up. Experts in
project society manage to “book” time
for relaxation, vacation, and reflection.
Interestingly, such “booking” becomes
a project in itself: It is not the scary
and inactive “emptiness” in a transition
time; instead, it becomes a transitory
project, a time for oneself.
Finally, the speed of changes in life
is accelerating. The orientation toward
the future and the central features that
we realize ourselves through projects
results in a constant striving for personal development. Through private
and professional projects, we are always
seeking to live multiple lives and to
achieve as much as possible. We simply
live our lives faster (Rosa, 2003; Virilio
& Bratton, 2006) and the normality of
this speed becomes a normative of this
speed bringing forward the “slow” activities as compensation, as mentioned
earlier regarding leisure projects.
Relations
In the disciplinary society, relations
were formatted by space (the village,
the neighbor) and time (the generation).
Relations were formed by structure and
existed only within it: spatial (neighbors), blood (family), and functional
(colleagues). The relations were between
entities or persons that in some sense
belonged together within the structure.
For example, the colleague was the one
working beside us during the same working hours. Just as time and space were
settled before the activity, so were relations. The dance partner in the disciplinary society was defined before the dance
because one had to ask for a dance. Moving from the disciplinary to the project
society, the dance relation changes character by not requiring physical contact
to create space for self-expression. This
opens the opportunity to dance with
more people at the same time.
As we enter the project society, relations are (in the purest form of the
project society) no longer relations in a
hierarchical structure but in a network.
It is more adequate to describe the relations in the project society as connections. Connections between individuals
are, ideally, on the distance, where they
don’t oblige you to do anything or to
abstain from doing anything but are still
so close that they can be “used” in projects or in passages between projects.
Connections are considered pathways,
partners, or providers of a quasi-security. When we have a lot of connections,
we call it a network. A project is an
activity within a network (Boltanski &
Chiapello, 1999).
When the project society distributes, its goods and projects (apartments,
jobs, projects) are not distributed by
time (you wait until it is your turn) or
qualification (hierarchal structure), as
it was the case in bureaucracy, but by
who you are connected to. The network
has always existed, but for a period of a
few centuries, it was the unofficial way
of getting something. From the beginning of the 1990s, networks appeared
on conference and meeting programs.
Networking as an activity became the
legitimate and official way to obtain
something, thereby breaking with one
of the formulations of Kant’s (1985) categorical imperative that you must never
treat another person only as a means
but always as a goal in himself or herself
as well.
Still, the ability to connect to others,
build a network, and use it becomes an
important skill. This skill is a balance of
distance versus proximity: The ability
to keep relations at a certain distance
(so that they remain connections) is
a core competency for the individual
in the project society. You don’t want
relations to be too close or too far away.
Relations should be within a manageable distance so you’ll be able to “use”
them in your activities/projects but not
so close that they obligate you or limit
your flexibility. The administration of a
network is thus centered on the ability
to connect and disconnect with a minimum of obligations. This practice is
obviously supported not only by social
media such as Facebook or LinkedIn
but also simply through the address
book in our mobile phones, which contains many names and numbers that we
may no longer use but could be useful
in the future.
In order to exist, a connection must
be renewed from time to time. As connections begin to get cold, they must
be encouraged. Networking is itself an
activity—namely, the activity of creating
or holding close (warming up or renewing) connections. The constant encouragement in the network increases the
transactions’ costs (i.e., waste). The
disciplinary society had its waste in
bureaucracy and formalities. The project society has two great sources of
waste: the work for passages to new
projects that doesn’t give passage (such
as the effort dedicated to the application for a research project that is wasted
if the project is not funded) and networking (maintaining a large network of
connections is time consuming).
Whereas the old structure of relations was hierarchal, the network seems
flat and equal. However, the new role
of connections in the project society
gives priority to social skills. This gives
way to new hierarchies and the need to
learn to behave in ways that keep doors
open for future passages. Connections
enable the shaping of a personal identity through passages from project to
project. Thus, on one hand, each individual has the potential to design his or
her own identity through the choices of
projects and connections. On the other
hand, an individual who is not active
will have a reduced visibility and the
network will diminish. This results in
a paradox where it is preferable to be
exploited than it is to not be used.
Uncertainty plays a key role in
this context. Because every individual
is uncertain about the future, he or
she tries to remain flexible, keeping
the appointment “open” and the connection at half distance to be able to
maneuver later on. This provides a culture of overbooking, where all individuals as well as all companies take
in more “projective promises” than
they can ever execute, knowing that
some of the appointments will probably
run into the sand. Overbooking again
increases the uncertainty in the system
of projects: It encourages the attitude
of “yes” and makes people less reliable.
Their “yes” does not mean “yes” anymore; it means “perhaps in the future”
or “maybe.” Similarly, maintaining connections in the network also means
keeping a positive language among
project people, who learn to behave as
always encouraging, and so, for example, corrections of “bad performance”
are packed into jokes (Bechky, 2006).
Table 1 summarizes the discussion earlier and characterizes disciplinary and
project societies as two ideal types.
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Disciplinary Society
Project Society
Relationship between activity, space,
time, and relations
Space, time, and relations define activity.
Activity becomes the order and opens up time, space,
and relations.
Space, time, and relations can create the probability that
an activity will take place.
Activity
Activity is mostly repetitive and organized
through predictions.
Activity is emerging, unique, temporary, and organized
through projections into the future as opposed to
repetitions of the past.
Space
Space shapes activity: One space is related to
one activity.
Activity shapes spaces. Spaces are designed for
maximum flexibility aimed to create the probability for
activity.
Time
Activity is “permanent” based on repetition in
a constant flow.
Activity is temporary; hence, there is time in and
between projects. This raises the need for a passage
between projects.
Relations
Relations exist in a fixed hierarchy bounded by
time and space.
Activity is relational, thus connecting is more important
than relying on fixed relationships.
Table 1: Disciplinary versus project societies.
Ethical Implications
First, this manifestation of projects as
a human condition and an imperative
for life obviously has ethical implications. One of the formulations of the
categorical imperative by Kant (1785)
was that you should never treat humanity in yourself or in another person
solely as a means to something else but
always as an end in itself. Networking to
secure passages to future projects, that
is, engaging with others with the purpose of using them as means to future
activities such as paid temporary work,
seems to violate this humanistic rule of
the Enlightenment (1620–1789). One of
the ethical flanks that the project society
opens is how far you can go in treating
your relations as connections for your
own future optimization.
Second, these considerations can
be prolonged into ethical questions
about new forms of exploitation. It is
clear that if the passage between projects poses problems to individuals,
then they would be willing to refrain
from claiming basic rights such as a
wage or security rights. This is one of
the main challenges to labor unions in
the 21st century. Their help is based on
older organizational forms and more
stable relations, whereas the project
society keeps bringing forward an
individualization of the risk of passages
between projects; in other words, the
individual carries the risks involved
in, for example, potential unemployment, delays in the start of new project,
need to undertake projects that are
far from one’s competencies or intensions, and so forth. This is why we
see concepts such as employability
in opposition to employment and a
rhetoric of “free agents,” moving from
one task to the next, accompanied by
a “reality” marked by the explosion
of work for nothing, freelance, and
unending sequences of traineeships. In
other words, the project society makes
not only the labor market but also the
human condition that it pervades more
precarious (Standing, 2014). Nation
states can only set down limits through
frameworks defining working conditions. However, such efforts are met
with great difficulties as long as states
see themselves as being in competition
with one another.
Third, an ethical dimension is
brought forward by the coping mechanisms related with uncertainty of the
passage and the practices of double
booking, for example, the promise that
is not really a promise to keep flexibility
needed in a world with high level uncertainty. Such attitudes may become more
30 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
prevalent in the project society, but
they are, by in large, still recognized as
unprofessional and potentially unfair.
Navigating relationships as connections
and delaying commitments until the
last minute, while still maintaining high
levels of professionalism and good reputations, are some of the ethical dilemmas and paradoxes that go along with
living in a project society.
A fourth and perhaps more serious Nietzschean consideration involves
the values of the project society. What
is described above is how the project
society came into being, and how it
functions, but it is unclear what such a
society holds as its values. As Boltanski
and Chiapello (1999) have showed, capitalism is in itself a meaningless system
(in the sense that it lacks a purpose or
greater “meaning”) and has thus always
needed to borrow meaning from religion, human needs and rights, or other
value systems. The same seems to be
the case for projects. Projects—whether
they are intended to produce a nuclear
bomb or develop the FairPhone6 or just
6A FairPhone is a mobile phone that attempts to increase
awareness of the supply chain behind mobile phones, which
can be sourced through child labor and in war zones, instead
offering a “fair” alternative.
to do something “new”—seem to have
no value other than bringing forward
change, regardless of the ethical dimension of that change. This is not to say
that valuable missions cannot take the
form of projects, nor that project managers cannot develop the values often
required to manage passages between
projects, such as reputation (Clegg &
Courpasson, 2004). Instead, our point is
that if the project as an organizational
form seems to gain its own rationality
(and by this we mean that it is selfevident and self-legitimating), then it is
not human, global, environmental, or
other values that justify the project, but
solely the change.7 Put in Kierkegaard’s
(1843) terms, project people are afraid of
repetition because repetition has boredom as its shadow. Put in Nietzsche’s
terms, the project society seems to be
at great risk for producing a still more
profound nihilism, if values are not constantly in sight (Nietzsche, 1887).
This raises the need for an open discussion around ethics in projects, both
for practice and theory. How can we
as a society and as individuals develop
ethical values that are acceptable and
compatible with a project society?
Implications and Avenues for
Further Research
The project society provides a different Weltanschauung—that is, a different
perspective into ourselves, our work,
and society at large. This opens space
for a new domain of research in and
around projects. This section explores
some of the potential avenues for further research.
Following Foucault’s analysis of the
disciplinary society, the first avenue of
research calls for a discussion of the
project society from a philosophical
7This
point has been widely debated by the authors, and we
did not reach an agreement. Some of us argue that the being
“new” is the only self-legitimizing and self-evident value of a
project; others argue that the value is in the “change” (which
involves but is not necessarily conditional to the “new”). What
we agreed on is that projects are in themselves value-free, and
hence, they require external value systems.
and historical perspective. Here, there
is room to explore questions: Is projectification intensifying? What impact
does the project society have in ways of
living? Are people born in project society more apt to live in it? In what way
does the project society coexist with
the disciplinary society and in what
way is it a substitute for the disciplinary
society? How will it shape future generations? Can we observe project society spreading across outside European
and Western culture? How do historical
and cultural differences shape different
forms of project societies? Can they still
be considered a project society? How is
the project society evolving?
Second, the projectification of society has a political dimension. It shifts
responsibility from government and
companies to the individual level and
positions all of us as entrepreneurs
who “commercialize” ourselves and
develop our “unique value proposition” (to use classic managerial jargon)—in other words, a unique profile
that builds on our identity, constructed
as unique and valuable. Therefore, the
lack of success becomes individualized,
and the breaks and passages inherent to the project society are suffered
at an individual level. In this respect,
the projectification works in tandem
with neoliberalism. These reflections
raise fundamental questions regarding
power. What is power in the project society? How is it exercised? Which classes
have advantages? Which interests does
it serve? Who becomes marginalized?
Third, the projectification calls for
normative and ethical guidance on living in project society. What can we do
to escape the rationality of the project
society? Can we escape it? Or should we
see it as an opportunity? How can we
develop sustainable living for everyone
in project society? What kind of competencies and skills are needed? How can
we educate children and adults to live
in a project society? How do we cope
with the stress and anxiety inherent to
this new form of living? How can we
maintain high levels of professionalism,
legitimacy, and reputation if temporality is a human condition?
Although professions as structures
of the disciplinary society can still have
some relevance, they are not sufficient
to navigate in the project society. Profession and private life melts into the
development of our identities. The aim
becomes that of developing an identity,
which is recognized to be “exciting,”
unique, and based on one’s own path
beyond profession. In a disciplinary
society there were doctors, lawyers,
engineers, and so forth. Today even
lines of study are becoming increasingly
blurred and varied based on interdisciplinary projects. Profession and other
structures therefore become springboards to the development of one’s own
identity. For example, an interesting
character in the project society will be
more than only a lawyer; he or she will
be someone fighting for the rights of X
or Y; he or she will be more than an ophthalmologist, someone also involved
in the irradiation of blindness in the
world. Trajectories become individualized and partly unpredictable. The
project society values being connected
to “cool things,” having an interesting
life, opinions, and experiences, along
with the old recognition of titles or professions. In this context, projects such
as a year of travel across the world,
being part of Mèdecins Sans Frontiéres
(Doctors Without Borders), participating in an Olympic game, or involvement
in other bold projects and programs
increase the perception of success.
In this respect, projects become
opportunities to develop “interesting”
and “exciting” identities, and thereby
build attractive and successful individuals. In other words, projects become the
building blocks of our identities—both
as individuals and as professionals. People like being involved in projects with
so-called interesting people, and such
interesting people themselves increase
the legitimacy of projects. Therefore,
survival in project society depends
on how each of us manages, proliferates, and cuts connections in order to
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 31
PAPERS
The Projectification of Everything: Projects as a Human Condition
become and remain an interesting and
exciting person—hence, the importance
of “self-marketing” increases. This also
entails reframing existing structures
and practices. Thus, the practice of the
caretaker can be reframed as a project with the goal of helping increase
the quality of life for the elderly, even
though the task is still highly repetitive.
In this respect, we construct narratives
of our lives as a collection of “meaningful” projects, independent of whether
this would follow a classic view of projects in a more realist ontology.
Marginalization and attempts to
escape it are interesting avenues for further research, particularly as we explore
the development of identities and the
negotiation of meaning in project society. For example, there is ongoing pressure for each individual within a crowd
to, paradoxically, “stand out” from
the crowd. In this process, the private
and professional persona merge into a
single identity, and “private” decisions
such as types of vacations, ways of raising children, sexual orientation, and
so on all become part of the development of a unique and interesting profile.
Similarly, participation on global social
movements, driven and aided by social
media, acts as a form of demarginalization and helps with the development of
an alternative profile. The construction
of meaning becomes essential. “Professions” that don’t have a clear project
orientation may find an increased need
to frame and verbalize even the most
repetitive operations as projects—that
is, activities geared toward a unique
and relevant purpose. This raises further questions, such as how identities
are developed and constructed in project society and how to keep up with
the relentless momentum in the face of
increasing depression and anxiety.
Fourth, there is a need for reflection
on organizing, managing, and leading in
project society. Are classical models of
project management a heritage of disciplinary society in project society? What
are the emerging forms of organizing/
managing/leading in project society?
What could it all mean? Is it possible
to “lead”? What is the role of distributed leadership? How can we integrate
efforts? How do we address different
levels of commitment? In other words,
how does the project society challenge
and substantiate existing managerial
theories, models, and practices?
The project society has implications on how we theorize about projects. Common to the abovementioned
questions are a call for theoretical framings that emphasizes the role of agency
compared to structure. In parallel to
the development of the project society,
theories have been developed to help
understand increasingly vibrant and
fluid societies. These include Giddens’
(1984) duality theory of structure and
agency, DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983)
criticism of the iron cage of the disciplinary society, and Vygotsky’s work on
activity theory (e.g., Engeström, Miettinen, & Punamäki, 1999), to mention
just a few. Thus, a wide range of theoretical perspectives is promising in the
further research of projects as a human
condition enabling us to understand
the complex relationship in and around
projects, humans, and society.
Finally, broadening the concept of
projects to view them as part of the
human condition can intensify fragmentation in the field of project management.
It is difficult to develop any sense of integration and common theorizing if we,
as a knowledge field, study a phenomenon that is so diverse and ill-defined
to include both a megaproject that costs
billions of euros and the finding of a new
life partner (Söderlund, 2011). We do
not advocate for the understanding of
projects as a human condition. We only
posit the possibilities that such perspective might entail and note the potential
for cross-fertilization between the two
domains (projects as an organizing system and projects as a human condition).
First, the growing and insightful body of
literature on project organization can
become useful for each one of us as
individuals as we navigate within project
society. Understanding how we navigate
32 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
projects as human beings, in turn, can
help us understand some of the underlining challenges of managing projects,
such as engagement, careers, transitions
between projects, construction of meaning, value and ethics, leadership, and
so forth. Second, seeing projects as a
human condition opens up to a far more
extensive empirical context—studying
the behavior of people in projects outside of classic organizational settings.
Such studies can have, at least to some
extent, common theorizing and can
allow for fruitful cross-fertilization. They
also reiterate some well-known fundamental theoretical questions, such as
why projects (in the sense of human
condition) exist, what constitutes a project, what kinds of projects exist, and
whether projects can be managed.
Conclusion
Building on Fogh Jensen (2009), this article describes an alternative understanding of projects beyond organizational
practices: projects as a human condition. This human condition emerges as
society shifts from a disciplinary to a
project society. Guided by the philosophical concepts of activity, time,
space, and relations, we describe the
project society as an ideal type, in opposition to the disciplinary society. This
article is only a first step. It scratches
the surface of a complex and dense
philosophical subject. We hope to spark
interest for future research that explores
projects as human condition and its
implications for organizing projects as
well as the applications of concepts of
project organization to our way of living.
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The Projectification of Everything: Projects as a Human Condition
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Anders Fogh Jensen, philosopher, has a Diplomé
d’Études Approfondies from Université de Paris I,
Panthéon-Sorbonne, and a PhD from the University
of Copenhagen. He is currently an external lecturer
at the University of Aarhus, Denmark. For a decade,
he has been one of the leading Danish researchers
in the legacy of French philosopher Michel Foucault.
Among his publications is a large monograph on the
philosophy of Foucault, Mellem ting. His PhD thesis,
The Project Society, treats synchronic developments in 10 different empirical fields during the
20th century—architecture, organizations, education,
social security, warfare, forms of sports, football
systems, dance forms, prevention of epidemics,
and coupling and dating—all to explain how the
project became so omnipresent by the end of the
20th century. He is the author of seven books and a
range of articles. Currently, he works as an independent philosopher and intellectual, running his own
company, giving speeches and seminars, providing
philosophical counseling, and engaging in debates
in the media. He can be contacted at anders@
filosoffen.dk
Christian Thuesen, PhD, is Associate Professor
at the Technical University of Denmark. He has
been working with projects for more than 15 years
as teacher, researcher, and consultant in various
34 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
engineering settings, including construction and
IT. This has sparked his fundamental research
interest in the role of projects in engineering work
but also more broadly in today’s society—as a
human condition. Most of his research focus
is on the practices of project organizing, often
combined with critical and alternative perspectives on projects. His research is awarded
internationally and currently counts more than 40
peer-review publications in journals and at conferences. His current research interest concerns
linking management of projects, programs, and
portfolios with societal challenges such as climate
change and sustainability. He can be contacted at
[email protected]
Dr. Joana Geraldi is Associate Professor at the
Technical University of Denmark, and Honorary
Senior Research Associate at the Bartlett School of
Construction and Project Management at University
College London (UCL). Joana is passionate and
intrigued by projects. Over the past 10 years, she
has been researching and integrating knowledge
on, in, and around projects. Her research has
earned international awards and led to more than
50 publications, most of which can be found in the
key project management journals and conferences.
Today, Joana is devoted to the study, education, and
development of a fruitful institutional context for
projects, and specifically the practices of integration, decision making, visualization, and complexity
in and between projects. She can be contacted at
[email protected]
PAPERS
Philosophy of Project Management:
Lessons From the Philosophy of Science
J. Davidson Frame, University of Management and Technology, Arlington, Virginia, USA
ABSTRACT ■
This article examines how insights offered
by a well-established philosophy of science
can provide lessons that have a bearing on
formulating a philosophy of project management. It has three principal aims: (1) to
highlight key concepts from the philosophy
of science that characterize the philosophy of
science perspective, (2) to explore the possible relevance of these concepts to formulating a philosophy of project management,
and (3) to showcase a model of a successful
philosophical discipline (i.e., philosophy of
science) that can provide guidance on how
to develop a philosophy of project management that has meaning not only to academic
philosophers but to practicing project managers as well.
KEYWORDS: philosophy of science;
ontology; epistemology; demarcation;
realism; antirealism; project management
Project Management Journal, Vol. 47, No. 3, 35–47
© 2016 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
INTRODUCTION
T
he philosophy of science began as a discipline in the first half of
the 20th century. Its development was triggered by unprecedented
discoveries in the realms of physics, chemistry, and biology. At the
outset, its proponents aspired to approach the emerging discipline
with the same degree of logical rigor that underlay the sciences themselves.
But they discovered painfully that their commitment to making philosophy
of science scientific was leading them down blind allies and creating a crisis
of relevance, because their ruminations grew increasingly detached from the
actual practice of science, and scientists did not take their efforts seriously.
After several decades of floundering, they were finally able to find the path to
establishing a vibrant philosophical discipline, primarily by abandoning their
arcane perspectives and making their thoughts and speculations accessible to
practitioners—the scientists whose work efforts they were studying.
This article holds that those who want to establish a philosophy of project
management can learn a lot from the experiences of scholars and practitioners who strove earnestly to articulate a vibrant philosophy of science. It does
not engage in a deep exposition of philosophy of science, focusing instead
on examining some basic precepts that have a bearing on establishing a philosophy of project management. The article makes no attempt to formulate a
philosophy of project management, although it suggests several avenues of
exploration. Hopefully, by examining some philosophy of science principles
and gaining insights into the spirit of philosophy of science, readers will see
how what works well in philosophy of science can have a bearing on developing a vibrant philosophy of project management.
Can an investigation of philosophy of science actually help us gain insights
into formulating a meaningful philosophy of project management? This article suggests the answer is “yes.” Throughout history, and up to the present
day, comparative analyses have been important in stimulating advances in
knowledge across disciplines. Insights developed in one area contribute to
corresponding insights in others. As one example, consider how advances in
neural networks in computer science are inspired by an increasingly deeper
understanding of how the brain works (Grossberg, 1982).
Of particular relevance to project management is the recent paper by
Joslin and Muller (2015), which sees value in comparative analyses that enable
constructs and theories from the sciences to provide insights into how social
systems function. In searching for science-rooted models that might apply to
understanding the complexities of project management, the authors ultimately
turn to biology as offering good prospects and conclude: “There are many
similarities between biology and project management in terms of complexity,
design, impact of changing environments, and product lineage.” In particular,
the effective handling of complex adaptive systems in biology offers promising insights that may increase understanding of the dynamic nature of project
management. The authors adapt basic elements of complex adaptive systems
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 35
PAPERS
Philosophy of Project Management: Lessons From the Philosophy of Science
in biology—genotypes, phenotypes, and
environmental influence—to a project
management scenario, focusing on new
constructs of progenotypes, project outcomes, and environmental influences.
This article carries out a comparative
analysis of existing philosophy of science
and an aspiring, though not yet realized,
philosophy of project management. Of
all the branches of philosophy, philosophy of science is the least abstruse and
the most directly relevant to a philosophy
of project management, which appeals
to philosophers and practitioners alike.
A core premise of this article—a lesson
derived from an examination of the evolution of philosophy of science—is that
for a viable philosophy of project management to be established, it must resonate with practitioners and theoreticians
alike. Philosophy of science is grounded
in real-world experience. In philosophy
of science, no one is counting how many
angels dance on the head of a pin, unless
they have developed solid evidence-supported theory suggesting that angels do,
indeed, dance on pinheads! Philosophy
of science addresses real problems routinely faced by highly educated, intelligent people who attempt to explain how
and why things function the way they do.
Consider how when scientists formulate hypotheses, they ask: Can our
view of how things work be supported
by the evidence? Are we asking the
right questions? Are our speculations
addressing real phenomena? For example, important questions that have arisen
as science evolves include the following:
Are atoms real? Is the ether real? Is dark
matter real? In philosophical terms,
they are concerned with what Hofweber calls “first approximation ontology,”
akin to asking, “Does God exist?” That
is, they are concerned with whether
theories that are being proposed and the
phenomena that are being observed are
real (Hofweber, 2014).
Ontology has taken on multiple
meanings that are only loosely linked to
each other. In mainstream philosophy,
it is treated as a subset of metaphysics,
and even here, it is approached in a
wide variety of ways. Plato approached
it by identifying reality as embedded in
Forms (Allen, 2006). Descartes raised
ontological questions with his treatment of mind–body dualism (Descartes,
2000). Alfred North Whitehead (1929)
focused on the relationship between
reality and actuality. Information technology and knowledge management,
which take a nonphilosophical approach
to ontology, assume an applied character and address how classes are related
to each other in triplet connections, in
which triplets are defined by subjects,
predicates, and objects (Devedzik, 2002;
Gruber, 1993).
For the most part, in the philosophy
of science, ontology is employed as it
was originally formulated by the ancient
Greeks, meaning that it is primarily concerned with understanding what is real
and what justification can be used to
determine whether or not something is
real (Burian & Trout, 1995). Hofweber
identifies this straightforward perspective as one of the four broad formulations of ontology currently used in
philosophy (Hofweber, 2014).
In carrying out their research,
these same scientists also wrestle with
epistemological issues. Epistemology
is concerned with how we gain and
use knowledge and the value of this
knowledge (Steup, 2014). In the case
of scientist researchers, an obvious
source of knowledge generated by their
experiments is data cranked out by their
instruments. An epistemological perspective requires investigators to ask
the following: Are the instruments we
use the most appropriate to provide
needed knowledge? Does our experiment offer the best approach to generating the knowledge we seek? Are there
other, better ways to obtain pertinent
knowledge? Once data are gathered,
how can they be analyzed to make sense
of them? Scientific researchers also hold
the same broad concerns raised by the
ontological perspective: Are the results
emerging from an experiment real,
or simply an artifact of inappropriate
experimental design or faulty data?
36 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
The epistemological challenge does
not end with data collection; it extends
to data analysis and interpretation.
Perhaps the most fundamental question a scientist can raise is: Do our
conclusions make sense? To answer
this, he or she must ask additional
questions. Do the conclusions point
us in the right direction? Even if the
experimental design and execution are
beyond reproach, have we interpreted
the results correctly?
In science, ontological and epistemological questions go hand in glove.
Consider the relationship between theoretical and experimental physics. A large
part of what experimental physicists do is
to confirm or reject theories articulated
by theoretical physicists. A well-known
example is found in Arthur Eddington’s
experimental confirmation of a component of Einstein’s general theory of
relativity, which predicted that massive objects bend light. In a 1919 globespanning experiment carried out across
two continents, during a total eclipse
of the sun, Eddington’s team measured
the extent to which starlight bent as it
traveled “around” the blacked-out sun.
His data confirmed empirically that the
light bent according to Einstein’s prediction, which immediately gave Einstein’s
general theory of relativity the credibility
that it previously lacked (Isaacson, 2008).
It is not clear, however, that Eddington’s
measurements were refined enough to
support Einstein’s theory, and the merits
of his grand experiment are still being
debated (Kennefick, 2009; van Biesbroek,
1953). The ontological issue here focuses
on whether Einstein’s speculation about
light being bent by massive objects truly
describes a real phenomenon that supports his theoretical model. From an
epistemological perspective, the big
question is whether Eddington’s collection and analysis of data were sufficiently
accurate to support Einstein’s theory.
In science, philosophical issues are
clearly relevant to the conduct of the
research enterprise. Although scientists
themselves may not be familiar with
philosophical terms such as ontology
and epistemology, they are deeply
concerned that the phenomena they
address are real (ontological concerns)
and that the procedures they pursue
to gain knowledge to support or refute
theories are on target (epistemological
concerns). In dealing with these issues,
they become philosophers by accident,
if not by design.
The bearing of philosophy of science on the philosophy of project management appears compelling when
we recognize that scientific activities
are carried out through projects. Consider how one of the first proponents
of modern, empirical science—Galileo
Galilei—was a project manager, setting
up and running small-scale research
projects that ultimately revolutionized our understanding of the physical
world. On many of these projects, he
worked with small teams, composed of
himself and assistants, who fabricated
the equipment for his studies and ran
his experiments. He was meticulous in
defining the scope of his work efforts
and labored under constraints of time
and budget.
Scientific projects occupy just a
small portion of project space, thus
their special characteristics make them
more amenable to philosophical speculation than other types of projects, such
as construction projects, where project
efforts tend to be routine and levels of
uncertainty are relatively low. Scientists
are explorers working their way through
terra incognita, and sometimes their
understanding of what they encounter
is correct, often it is not. As they struggle
with the rightness or wrongness of their
emerging understanding of phenomena, it is natural for them to assume a
philosophical perspective to deal with
the uncertainties and unknowns they
encounter.
Philosophy of
Science Background
Philosophy of science as a branch of
philosophy has its roots in the early
20th century (Godfrey-Smith, 2003) and
was a natural outgrowth of astonishing
scientific breakthroughs in areas such as
relativity theory and quantum mechanics. The breakthroughs demonstrated that
the unquestioned truths of the clockwork,
Newtonian world, were shaky. Relativity
theory suggested that when dealing with
very massive objects or objects moving
at very fast speeds, we operate according to a different set of rules than traditional physics dictates (Gutfreund, 2015).
Quantum mechanics offered a parallel
perspective on operating on an atomic
and subatomic scale: When dealing with
very small things, we need to work with
a set of bizarre rules that often contradict
common sense (Kumar, 2011).
In this brave new world, thoughtful
people began questioning the underlying premises of scientific inquiry that
had prevailed since the time of Galileo.
It was no longer clear what constituted
scientific truth. Scientists and philosophers began examining the ontological and epistemological foundations of
science. One early task was to define
what distinguishes science from other
endeavors; this was called the demarcation problem (Hansson, 2013; Resnik,
2000). Another task was to explore the
kinds of truths scientists gain through
their experimental observations, particularly when dealing with so-called
unobservables, such as protons and
electrons, along with human behavior
(Chakravartty, 2014). Their attempts
to establish a philosophy of science
took them down a number of interesting paths, which ultimately did not bear
fruit; for logical positivists, it entailed
exploring semantics and pure logic
(Friedman, 1999; Godfrey-Smith, 2003;
Wittgenstein, 1922/1988).
Ultimately, the drive to create a philosophy of science led to an approach to
the subject that is widely employed today.
When students enroll in a graduatelevel class covering the philosophy
of science, they encounter a familiar
course syllabus regardless of where they
carry out their studies. Following are
the standard topics they explore, which
are covered in the philosophy of science
texts they read (Cover & Curd, 2012;
Godfrey-Smith, 2003; Okasha, 2002;
Rosenberg, 2011; Stayley, 2014):
• General epistemological issues—
determining how scientists generate,
store, interpret, and distribute knowledge
• General ontological issues—identifying
whether the theories being pursued
address real phenomena
• Demarcation—defining the boundaries of scientific effort
• Scientific explanation—defining ap­­
proaches scientists use to explain
phenomena
• Scientific realism versus antirealism—
understanding the role of observable versus unobservable entities in
explaining phenomena
• Normal science versus scientific
revolutions—experiencing paradigm
shifts that lead to scientific revolutions
• Theory ladenness—understanding the
impossibility of scientists being fully
objective
• Under determination—recognizing that
a phenomenon can be explained by
multiple explanations
The fact that there is a general
consensus on what constitutes the
knowledge-coverage of philosophy of
science is a good sign, reflecting the
maturity of the discipline; it indicates
that there is a body of knowledge that
captures a common understanding of
what the discipline should focus on. If
philosophy of project management is to
become a serious area of investigation
in its own right, it will need to follow the
philosophy of science example, where
philosophers and practitioners agree on
what constitutes central concepts and
issues of concern that the philosophy of
project management community understands to be core concepts and principles.
How Relevant Is the
Scientific Experience to
Project Management?
The most distinguishing feature of scientific effort is the attempt to reveal new
understanding of phenomena. What we
refer to as science today (particularly
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physics and chemistry) was labeled natural philosophy through the 19th century, suggesting that science—such as
philosophy—is concerned with exploring
truth (Rosenberg, 2011). Project management, in contrast, is primarily focused on
“getting the job done—on time, within
budget, and according to specifications”
(Frame, 2003, p. 69). It can be employed
in many ways, encompassing work
efforts, ranging from event management
to bridge construction to IT development
to quantum physics. Whereas science is
directed at the search for truth, project
management is geared toward achieving
tangible results effectively, in other words,
getting things done.
Science specializes in dealing with
unknowns. When oncologists examine
the growth of tumors at the molecular
level, they face high levels of uncertainty regarding their understanding of
the phenomenon. A significant first step
toward understanding is to guess how
the terrain they are examining is laid
out. The answers to their questions cannot be discovered by a Google search or
a quick review of the scientific literature;
the oncologists must operate within the
framework of a theory. They must use
the theory to guide them in conducting original experiments to obtain the
answers they seek; furthermore, these
experiments do not automatically yield
valid results and, more often than not,
the results they generate are designated
as preliminary. In science, we do not
encounter research papers that state:
“This is the final word on this subject.”
Although the general public does not
realize it, scientific findings are highly
imperfect. This reality is highlighted
in David Freedman’s insightful book
Wrong, which shows how a surprisingly
large number of scientific discoveries
are off target and require substantial
refinement over years before scientists
get the answers right (Freedman, 2010).
Even when a disputed idea finally gains
substantial support from peers, new
insights developed 10 years in the future
may invalidate the initial, accepted
findings.
The distinguishing uncertainties
defining scientific effort can be called
uncertainties of discovery. These uncertainties arise because scientists are
exploring new terrain. The paths they
travel offer plenty of forks in the road;
when arriving at one of these paths,
they ask: “Should I go left, right, or
straight ahead?” Twenty paces later,
they encounter another fork, and repeat
the process. And so on. As they move
forward, they may see what appear to
be mountain peaks in the distance, but
they could be low-lying clouds. Are the
mountain peaks real or a mirage? If
real, are they reachable? Will trekking to
them serve a worthwhile purpose?
Scientists raise questions like these
all the time with respect to their investigations. But so do many nonscientists who execute nonscientific projects
and also face uncertainties of discovery.
This occurs with projects whose principal output is knowledge. Consider the
case of market research projects—the
goal of market researchers is to develop
insights into the sizes and compositions
of markets and to understand buyer
behavior. Data are gathered through
interviews, expert panels, and questionnaires. Increasingly, data are “mined”
from vast databases of consumer purchases; the data are then analyzed using
sophisticated analytical techniques.
What market researchers encounter is not much different from what
scientists face. As with the reported
findings in science, it is important
to ask: “Are the findings real?” In a
famous market research fiasco, it
turned out that an elaborate market
research effort misread the appeal to
consumers of a radical design change
in an automobile—the 1958 Ford Edsel
(Dicke, 2010). The highly touted Edsel
tanked soon after it was introduced.
Other famous examples of where market research misdirection led to futile
investments in new products include
the case of the development of Corfam, an artificial leather, and New Coke,
a sweetened replacement for Classic
Coke (Kanigel, 2007; Schindler, 1992).
38 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
Misreading the market in both cases
led to the loss of substantial investment
dollars funneled to new products that
ultimately failed and to embarrassing
public-relations problems.
Staff working on nonscientific,
knowledge-driven projects often find
themselves in this position. Examples include projects launched by HR
departments to determine employee
satisfaction with their jobs; architectural initiatives to design corporate
headquarters; projects to design training curricula, and then to develop
courses to satisfy the curricula; projects
to organize major events, such as an
upcoming Olympics event; and military projects to plan a battle. On these
projects, project managers cannot pull
a handbook off the bookshelf to provide them the answers they seek; they
must acquire the answers themselves
through investigative work, and this
brings them face-to-face with ontological and epistemological issues. Interestingly, the Latin root word investigare
translates into “follow a trail.”
Projects that do not generate new
knowledge experience lower levels of
uncertainty of discovery. Included here
are projects to upgrade a kitchen, to
install a computer software package, or
to build townhouse number 25 in a project consisting of 32 townhouses. While
technically qualifying as projects, these
are routine work efforts carried out
according to well-established processes.
The project of catering a wedding is routine, as is a project to organize a conference for a professional society—both
have been executed many times before,
and over time, their implementation
has been reduced to following a number
of prescribed steps. While some projects
entail traveling through new territory,
routine projects are more akin to taking
a stroll to the corner grocery. With such
projects, talk of grand explorations into
the unknown that require philosophical
insights does not resonate.
This raises an interesting philosophical question. What philosophers of
project management might ask is: When
defining the project management effort,
should routine work efforts that produce
deliverables be considered projects?
Aren’t they more like the processes we
encounter in controlled environments,
for example, in manufacturing? They
face uncertainties, but the principal
ones are uncertainties of execution, as
opposed to uncertainties of discovery,
which is typical of knowledge-generating projects. That is, in carrying out
their work efforts, problems with executing the process prevail. Here is an
issue that a philosophy of project management might address: When defining project management efforts, should
catering and routine construction projects be considered bona fide projects
or be relegated to process management
(or something else)? At what point does
an initiative go from being a routine
work effort to a bona fide project? These
questions would generate spirited philosophical discussion and can transform
the way project management is viewed.
Highlighting the Lessons
Learned From Philosophy of
Science
What specific lessons can be learned
from the experience of philosophy of
science? From this point forward, this
article will highlight a number of potentially fruitful actions that a philosophy
of project management can pursue,
derived from the philosophy of science
experience, which can contribute to the
establishment of a viable branch of philosophy that serves project management philosophers and practitioners
alike.
Philosophy of Science Lesson for
Philosophy of Project Management:
Demarcate the Discipline
According to the second century AD
geographer, Pausanias, the words “know
thyself ” were inscribed on the walls of
the forecourt of the temple of Apollo
at Delphi (Jones & Omerod, 1918). The
Delphi oracles offered good advice and
alert us to the fact that a solid first
step in understanding how the world
works is to understand who we are.
This insight applies to the project management discipline itself. An important
lesson that a philosophy of project management could derive from the philosophy of science experience is to devote
effort to demarcating the discipline—to
know itself. As noted earlier, demarcation strives to define what inquiry
lies legitimately within the boundaries
of the discipline and what stands outside. This section presents a thumbnail
summary of the philosophy of science
demarcation debate and then turns to
discussing how a corresponding debate
might be approached in the philosophy
of project management.
During the first half of the 20th century, the deliberations on demarcation
were important in the development of
a healthy philosophy of science. This
effort got members of a disparate group
of people—scientists, philosophers,
logicians, semanticists, and others—to
concentrate their attention on a topic
that everyone believed to be important
and had them addressing the defining questions: Who are we and what
distinguishes our inquiry? In a real
sense, it got the ball rolling in building a meaningful philosophy of science
that had appeal to philosophers and
practitioners alike. A similar situation
might arise in the case of the philosophy of project management. It is likely
that addressing demarcation in project
management would help establish the
foundations of a fruitful debate.
Philosophy of Science Perspective.
Philosophers of science use demarcation to define what constitutes the
boundaries of science and makes it
special. For example, they examine how
science differs from religion; each has
the discovery of truth as its principal
goal. Given this shared goal, why are
they carried out so differently? Why are
their fundamental values so different?
Another example: When scholars execute a study that employs the trappings
of science (e.g., through data collection,
systematic thinking, statistical analysis),
does this make their studies truly
scientific? Still another example that
often surfaces: Is astrology a science?
One of the best known philosophers
of science, Karl Popper, addressed these
questions in the first half of the 20th
century (Popper, 2002). He was particularly concerned with differentiating true
science from what he labeled “pseudoscience.” At the time he was active as a
philosopher, two highly popular bodies of thought were acclaimed by their
adherents to be scientific: Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxism. Popper did
not consider either to be truly scientific.
He looked at how Einstein carried out
his work and compared that with the
way Freud and Marx functioned. He saw
great differences. He stated that the work
of Freud (interestingly, a cohabitant of
Vienna, Austria, at the time) and Marx
encompassed pseudoscience. True science was exemplified in the works of
people such as Galileo, Newton, Planck,
and Bohr. What distinguishes true science from pseudoscience is that in real
science, the veracity of every scientific
proposition is questioned and subjected
to rigorous tests. Popper articulated this
view in his principle of falsifiability.
According to Popper, for a research
effort to be deemed scientific, it must
be testable to determine whether its
findings can be rejected (i.e., shown to
be false) because in science, scientists
cannot prove things to be true (see the
problem of induction [Hume, 2008]),
but they can determine whether they
are false (this perspective underlies the
fundamental rationale of hypothesis
testing). In Popper’s view, a shortcoming of both Freudian psychoanalysis
and Marxism was that their adherents
defined Freudian and Marxist principles so vaguely that they could not be
falsified.
Popper makes a good point when
he suggests that true science is testable.
However, many contemporary philosophers and science practitioners believe
that his focus on falsifiability as a litmus test for identifying true science is
too narrow. Consider how, in the earliest stages of scientific discovery—when
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insights are weak—scientists swim in
a sea of uncertainty and speculation.
This is good for science. Scientists
need to generate creative, speculative
thought in order to surface possible
explanations of why the phenomena
they observe operate in the ways they
do. At this formative stage, it may be
that insufficient information exists to
conduct definitive falsifiability tests of
the correctness of theories and speculations. When dealing with entirely new
insights, it is likely that many would fail
tests of falsifiability and thus be deemed
nonscience—further exploration of a
promising insight might be abandoned
prematurely. Scientific progress would
be stifled.
While strongly criticized, Popper’s
ideas on falsifiability have not been
rejected outright. The points he raises
on the need to test new ideas are solid; in
fact, his arguments regarding the falsifiability of propositions are so strong that
they constitute an important component
of hypothesis testing. However, his views
regarding the use of falsifiability to test
the true science nature of broad theories
(such as those of Freud and Marx) are
handled gingerly. Yes, new theories need
to be tested; no, the rigid application of
falsifiability tests may not be appropriate
in demarcating research effort.
It is interesting to note that scientists
themselves have established a common
sense approach to demarcating science
based on their experience as practitioners, without reference to philosophical
insights, which entails addressing three
questions. When looking at what purports to be a scientific research effort:
• Can the findings made in the study be
replicated by others?
• Were systematic, unbiased, and logical
procedures followed to produce unbiased conclusions?
• Are the results of the research effort generally acknowledged by the scientific
community to reflect “good science?”
For a scientist’s work to be acknowledged to possess scientific merit—to be
deemed real science—the community
of scientists should be able to give the
scientist a strong “yes” on each of the
three questions listed earlier, regardless
of his or her academic credentials, ethnicity, gender, and so on.
Philosophy of Project Management
Perspective. A lesson that philosophy
of project management can learn from
the philosophy of science experience
is that philosophy of project management should strive to demarcate project
management in well-defined terms that
can be justified philosophically. Like
philosophers of science, the philosophers of project management should
consider taking a lean approach and
avoid excessive complexity. It is argued
here that current approaches employed
by project management authorities to
define project management might not
pass a well-formulated philosophy of
project management demarcation litmus test, if one existed. Consider the
definition of project management provided in A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK®
Guide) – Fifth Edition:
Project management is the application of
knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques
to project activities to meet the project
requirements. Project management is
accomplished through the appropriate
application and integration of the 47 logically grouped project management processes, which are characterized into five
Process Groups. (Project Management
Institute, 2013, p. 5)
Such a prescriptive definition would
lead fervent philosophers to raise a host
of questions, for example:
• Are people who lack the knowledge of
“official” project management practice,
but who supply satisfactory deliverables
cost effectively, “doing” project management? For example, when Galileo set up
elaborate experiments to measure the
acceleration of falling objects, can we
say that he was a project manager?
• Can meaningful project management
practice be reduced to a set of standards
40 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
developed by standards committees
creating principles to cover all imaginable projects, in other words, can we
establish universal standards?
• Do highly flexible approaches to executing projects that are heavily used
today—such as the agile techniques—
reflect basic project management
principles, given that they operate
according to different principles
than those espoused by the PMBOK®
Guide, IPMA’s Competency Baseline,
and Prince2? (IPMA, 2006, 2011;
Office of Government Commerce,
2009; Project Management Institute,
2013).
• Should a definition of project management be tied closely to the tools
and techniques employed to execute
projects?
• Because project management practice
covers so many disciplines, is a comprehensive definition of project management meaningful?
Philosophy of science shows us
that demarcation of a discipline can be
addressed in simple terms. For Popper,
this was done by raising the question:
Are the findings of a research effort falsifiable? The commonsense approach to
demarcation is also simple; it requires
us to raise and answer the three questions articulated earlier. If the answer
to any of them is “no,” then the effort
that is being carried out lacks scientific
merit. Note that both the Popper and
commonsense approaches apply to all
branches of science, from physics to
biology to the social sciences. These are
lean tests that apply universally.
The bottom line is that a meaningful philosophy of project management
should provide insights on what constitutes the boundaries of project management. This would require vigorous
debate among philosophers and practitioners on the fundamental nature of
the practice of project management.
The philosophy of science approach
to demarcation provides a model of
how this can be approached. Through
energetic debate, different philosophers
and practitioners holding different perspectives can articulate their views, and
through the colloquy, a stronger sense
of how we should define project management may emerge.
Philosophy of Science Lesson for
Philosophy of Project Management:
Avoid Excessive Abstraction
Philosophy is inherently oriented to­­
ward abstract reasoning. In their quest
for truth, philosophers desire to rise
above the mundane and their batteries
are charged by speculating on questions and concepts that go beyond the
obvious. Consequently, they have a propensity to engage in discussions that are
somewhat (or substantially) removed
from so-called real-world experience.
A review of the evolution of the
philosophy of science suggests that,
although abstraction is an important
component of philosophical thinking,
excessive abstraction, while satisfying
philosophers, can lead to a sense among
practitioners that philosophical insights
have no bearing on them, which raises
questions about the relevance of these
insights.
Philosophy of Science Perspective.
As noted at the outset of this article,
science is a practical undertaking.
Most scientists have little patience for
abstract thinking that is detached from
real-world phenomena. They like to
speculate, but ultimately, the speculation must be confirmed with evidence.
If a philosophy of science is going to
resonate with scientists and get them
to engage willingly—even eagerly—in
philosophical discourse, it must be
rooted to some degree in concrete experience. What holds for science holds
also in the arena of project management. To be vital, a philosophy of project management must be accessible to
professionals who engage in the management of projects, project portfolios,
and programs. These professionals are
for the most part intelligent, highly educated, and capable of handling abstract
reasoning, but their tolerance for piein-the-sky dialogue is low.
A look at the history of the philosophy of science illustrates how excessive
concern with philosophical abstractions can lead to a dead end. A wellknown example is the case of logical
positivism, an attempt to be logically
tight in approaching the philosophy of
science through scientific formalism
(Rosenberg, 2011); ultimately, it was so
divorced from the practice of science
that it came to be viewed as largely irrelevant, leading to its ultimate demise as
an area of inquiry.
Interestingly, what has kept the philosophy of science alive in university
programs are ideas developed and promoted by a historian of science, Thomas
Kuhn. It is difficult to envision a doctoral research-oriented program not
requiring students to read The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn’s widespread appeal is rooted in his depicting
the scientific effort as real. Scientists
are grounded in the real world, in the
observation of real things, and in speculation about what might be real. They
work in real professional communities
that collectively identify what the most
interesting subjects of study are and
what constitutes good practice.
Although the most celebrated areas
of science entail working with abstract
concepts (e.g., theoretical physics,
cosmology), what most scientists do
is concrete. Ultimately, scientific discovery is based on the concrete, the
material. One thing that makes Einstein
special (among so many things) was his
ability to make the abstract concrete,
which enabled him to visualize experiments that would corroborate his fantastic theories. Remember: When asked
what triggered his ideas on relativity, he
responded that when just a teenager, he
asked himself: “What would it be like
to ride a beam of light?” The arrival of
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
in 1962 was propitious; at that time,
the philosophy of science was going
nowhere. Kuhn’s insights, however, gave
it a kick-start, which invigorated it and
led to its spread as an academic subject
to be shared with armies of men and
women studying the research process
at the graduate level. His insights are
profound, yet accessible—even a high
school student who has taken basic science courses would be able to understand his points.
Philosophy of Project Management
Perspective. In developing a philosophy
of project management, its proponents
need to remind themselves that when
dealing with project management, they
are dealing with a concrete world. The
key challenges project management
practitioners face are not abstract. They
address real customers, hard deadlines, resource constraints, contractual
obligations, demanding customers,
self-interested stakeholders, and deliverables. They are concerned with getting
the job done “on time, within budget, and according to specifications.”
However, a philosophical perspective
requires going beyond the obvious when
trying to understand how the world
works and entails a measure of abstract
reasoning. Of necessity, a philosophy of
project management requires formulating and handling abstractions. Two pillars of philosophy of science—ontology
and epistemology—assume fundamental philosophical perspectives, requiring abstract conceptualization, yet as
handled in most philosophy of science
dialogue today (not all), they are accessible to practitioners.
The big question is, “How far
removed from the actual practice of
project management can philosophical
speculation be without slipping into
the realm of irrelevance?” In the philosophy of science, the philosophical
debate reached a point where the discussion ultimately was dominated by
addressing philosophical formalisms—
scientists, the scientific community,
and actual scientific acts were not considered. Kuhn’s commonsense treatment of the science enterprise and
his use of a handful of constructs to
explain scientific progress convincingly
rescued the philosophy of science by
making it relevant to the practice of science. Paradigm, normal science, and
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scientific revolution—key accessible
constructs in Kuhn’s world and abstract
by definition—are now integral parts of
our thinking about how knowledge is
gained and how it advances.
In a philosophy of project management, an attempt to demarcate the discipline will require substantial, focused
debate on what distinguishes project
management practice. To be fruitful, demarcation needs to go beyond
the pedestrian definitions offered by
standards-setting documents and dig
into the essence of what makes project
management special.
Philosophy of Science Lesson for
Philosophy of Project Management:
Be Open to Cross-Disciplinary
Perspectives
The vibrancy of philosophy of science is
partially rooted in its adoption of crossdisciplinary perspectives. Although the
philosophers draw inspiration from
the traditional big questions that have
engaged philosophers over the centuries—indeed, millennia—they are open
to diverse lines of inquiry stimulated by
insights coming from other disciplines.
As previously noted, it was a historian
of science that rescued philosophy of
science from oblivion born of irrelevance. Kuhn, not Kant, saved the day. A
philosophy of project management can
learn from the philosophy of science
experience: It should strive to assume a
cross-disciplinary outlook.
Philosophy of Science Perspective.
In his Theory and Reality, GodfreySmith sees a strong imperative for philosophers of science to gain insights
from what is transpiring in “neighboring disciplines” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003).
The principal neighboring disciplines
include the following:
• Semantics and linguistics, which defined
much of the outlook of the logical positivists in the early years of the philosophy
of science (Wittgenstein, 1922/1988).
• History of science, which examines
how science has evolved over time
by focusing on the details of specific
•
•
•
•
•
scientific achievements and failures
over the centuries (Kuhn, 1962).
Sociology of science, which addresses
how the community of scientists carries out the scientific enterprise. Robert
Merton’s work in this area was seminal
(Merton, 1996).
Economics of science and technology, which examines how science and
technology contribute to economic
growth, as well as how economic factors affect how science and technology
are carried out. Edwin Mansfield was
an important early contributor in this
area, as was Jacob Schmookler (Mansfield, 1970; Schmookler, 1966).
Psychology, which looks at how hu­­
mans perceive and process information
and maintains that when approaching scientific problems, they cannot
escape the sum total of their life experiences and emotions (Hanson, 1958).
Organizational behavior, which examines how research efforts are carried
out in an institutional setting. Two
seminal works were those by Pelz and
Andrews (1976) and Allen (1977).
Although not a discipline per se, the
social dimension of scientific knowledge concentrates on contemporary
societal concerns that are closely connected with developments in science.
The value to philosophy of science of tracking insights and developments that are addressed in a variety of
neighboring disciplines is obvious. An
understanding of how science works
is enriched by examining its broader
context. If it is based solely on the labor
of scientists in the laboratory, it will
be incomplete. For example, by looking in detail at the development of the
American railroad industry in the 19th
century, the economic historian, Jacob
Schmookler, showed that a substantial swath of scientific and technological pursuits were guided by economic
concerns far removed from abstract
wonderings on what constitutes interesting questions to be studied. If the
money is there, the science will follow
(Schmookler, 1966). Another example:
42 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
Looking at the psychological aspects
of scientists at work, Norwood Russell
Hanson argued that when approaching
their scientific travails, scientists cannot escape the cumulative effects of
their life experiences, meaning that the
problems they choose to address, the
theories they develop, and explanations
of phenomena are necessarily colored
by subjective factors—the idea that they
can be objective in an abstract sense is
a myth (Hanson, 1958). This phenomenon is called theory ladenness.
The last item on the list—the social
dimension of scientific knowledge,
which is not a discipline as such—is a
hot area these days. It is rife with philosophical implications, particularly in
the area of ethics. Longino identifies it
as a growth area in philosophy of science (Longino, 2015); it addresses such
issues as follows:
• The ethics of research, for example,
the use of fetal tissue in vaccines,
embryonic stem cell research, the
ethics of cloning humans, contributions of science to the degradation of
the environment
• Social epistemology, which focuses
on how the scientific community collectively determines the merits of
scientific work, for example, through
peer-review processes
• The role of the scientific community
in establishing the norms of normal
science
Philosophy of Project Management
Perspective. A philosophy of project
management can benefit substantially
by looking outside the narrow confines
of the project management discipline,
which as it now stands focuses heavily on the most mundane aspects of
executing projects, programs, and project portfolios. In the practice of project
management, substantial attention is
directed at the tools that lead to project
performance to meet deadlines, stay
within budget, and produce deliverables
according to defined specifications.
Little attention is directed at deeper
issues that underlie what transpires as
projects are carried out, an understanding of which can lead to a richer grasp
of what drives project management.
This can also lead to practical improvements in project performance. A crossdisciplinary perspective expands the
horizons of inquiry and deepens our
knowledge of the context of project
management practice.
Capitalizing on the experience of
the philosophy of science, philosophers and practitioners building a
robust philosophy of project management can focus their attention on the
same cross-disciplinary areas that have
served the philosophy of science well:
history, sociology, economics, psychology, organizational behavior, and the
catch-all category—the social dimension (which includes ethics). They can
ask the following:
• What bearing can a historical perspective on project management have on
developing philosophical insights? For
example, historical insight suggests
that humans have executed sophisticated projects for millennia but have
only recently formalized the management process. Under what circumstances did the formalization arise?
Was it really necessary? As the challenges project managers face change,
how should project management
thought and practice change?
• What bearing can a sociological perspective have? In doing their jobs,
project managers are not operating in
a vacuum. They are part of a social
network comprised of customers, vendors, regulators, stakeholders, disinterested bystanders, and others. So how
does the larger community affect their
outlooks and actions? How do project
managers see themselves in relation to
other players?
• What bearing does an ethics perspective have? There is a host of approaches
one can take to address this question.
At one end of the continuum, we can
focus on the nuts-and-bolts ethics concerns of project effort. For example,
how honest should we be in informing
our customer of the problems we are
encountering? At the other end, we
face big issues: For example, as a project contractor, how ethical is it for me
to build weapons of mass destruction
to strengthen the national security of
my country?
And so it goes. The principal point
being raised here is that in building a
meaningful philosophy of project management, philosophers and practitioners need to stretch the discipline and go
outside its narrow confines. They need
to know what contributions they can
garner from other disciplines. They
will develop an appreciation that getting the job done on time, within budget, and according to specs is not a
mechanical process but is carried out
in a broader social and cultural context.
A cross-disciplinary orientation has
been important in the development of
the philosophy of science and will also
serve the interests of a philosophy of
project management.
Philosophy of Science Lesson for
Philosophy of Project Management:
Encourage Spirited Debate on
Profound Issues of Importance to the
Advancement of the Discipline
One measure of the success of philosophical inquiry is the extent to which it
stimulates a spirited debate within the
communities of philosophers and practitioners. If both communities become
actively engaged in the discussions,
the dialogue will move forward and
evolve through its own momentum; it
will become enriched with side-shoot
explorations, heated disputes, and a
growing consensus about which issues
are important and which are not. If
a philosophy of project management
reaches this point, it will be a great
success.
The principal goal of the last section of this article is to provide an
example from the philosophy of science of an area of debate that both
philosophers and practitioners enjoy
participating in: the debate on scientific
realism versus antirealism. The topics it
addresses are as pertinent today as they
were years ago when the debate began,
because as science moves forward and
introduces us to new puzzles, the new
problems refresh the pertinence of the
old dialogue.
The following discussion on scientific realism versus antirealism illustrates the dynamics of philosophical
give-and-take in one area of philosophy of science and offers a scenario
of the kind of debate that a future philosophy of project management might
foster. The scientific realism versus
antirealism debate has been a spirited
one. It is an appealing subject to both
philosophers and practicing scientists
because it looks carefully at the intriguing connection between theory and
reality.
Philosophy of Science Perspective.
The scientific realism versus antirealism debate has been ongoing since
the first half of the 20th century and
is loosely tied to long-standing philosophical exchanges on realism versus
idealism that have been argued about
over the centuries (Okasha, 2002). It
ties to Immanuel Kant’s distinction
between phenomena (things that have
been perceived) and noumena (things
that have not been perceived) (Kant,
1999). Its basic propositions emerged
after the decline of logical positivism,
a philosophical point of view that promoted the empiricist idea that good
science requires scientific statements to
be empirically rooted or based on airtight logical arguments (Carnap, 1995;
Wittgenstein, 1922/1988).
Scientific realism holds that science
as it is practiced is capable of describing
how the physical world functions, and it
does so by working with a full range of
entities and phenomena, both observable and unobservable (Chakravartty,
2014; Leplin, 1984). Observable entities
and phenomena are readily perceived,
whereas unobservables are not. When
Galileo released two balls of differing
masses from a tower (purported by a
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Philosophy of Project Management: Lessons From the Philosophy of Science
pupil to be the leaning tower of Pisa),
he was trying to determine empirically
whether the acceleration of dropped
objects depended on their mass. In his
experiment, he observed that the two
balls struck the earth at the same time,
suggesting that the acceleration of falling bodies is independent of mass. This
experiment had both observable and
unobservable components to it: The
two balls were observable entities and
gravity was an unobservable entity.
From the scientific realism perspective,
Galileo’s experiment advanced science;
the fact that it drew on insights based
on both observable and unobservable
entities was immaterial.
Antirealists believe that although
scientists can draw justifiable conclusions from observables, they cannot
do so confidently when dealing with
unobservables (van Fraassen, 1980).
Examples of unobservables include
subatomic particles, gravity, causation, and human beliefs. If scientific
models employ unobservables in their
formulation, and the models yield
useful outcomes, then the unobservables and affiliated models are viewed
as convenient fictions, but they are
not considered as providing bona fide
explanations of the true state of affairs
of the physical world (Chakravartty,
2014). Antirealists do not reject the
use of convenient fictions in developing scientific theory. They recognize
that their employment can enable science to move forward, even though
the convenient fictions fall short of
explaining phenomena convincingly.
This is called the instrumentalist perspective, meaning that convenient
fictions can serve as useful instruments by which science can progress
(Rosenberg, 2011).
To the antirealists, the distinction
between observable and unobservable
phenomena is an important one. At the
bow wave of scientific discovery, where
ignorance outweighs insight, scientists
engage in enormous amounts of speculation regarding the nature of the phenomena
they are exploring. To move forward, they
pursue out-of-the-box speculation based
on unvalidated constructs, inventing
unobserved entities (e.g., black holes,
dark matter, and gravity) that contribute
to the development of their theories but
that have not been established as irrefutable, observed fact. On the one hand, this
bold approach is what leads to great discoveries; on the other hand, it can result
in the development and promulgation of
incorrect scientific theories.
In a criticism of antirealism, proponents of scientific realism argue that the
distinction between the observable and
unobservable is often not clear. It is not
a binary proposition, where something
automatically falls into one or the other
category. A well-known paper on the
philosophy of science addresses this
point convincingly. It was written by the
American philosopher, Grover Maxwell,
in 1962, and is titled The Ontological
Status of Theoretical Entities (Maxwell,
1962/1998). In his paper, Maxwell
reflects on the difficulty of clearly defining what constitutes observation. When
individuals look at an object with the
naked eye, they experience relatively
unimpeded observation. If they view
the same object through a clear glass
window, what they see has altered
slightly, the changes being hardly perceptible to the human eye. If they view it
through binoculars, the observation has
altered substantially. In this case, the
observation is enhanced by technology,
raising the question: Is this observation as true as one made by the naked
eye? What about observations made
through an optical telescope? By means
of a radio telescope? At the other end of
magnification, when looking at something through a magnifying glass, is this
observation on par with one carried out
by the naked eye? What about observations through an optical microscope?
Through an electron microscope? Note
that these questions bring us to the
realm of ontology. To what extent do
differences in the conditions by which
we observe phenomena bring us closer
to or remove us from the realm of what
is real?
44 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
In philosophy of science, the difficulty
of defining what constitutes observation
has been mollified somewhat by
introducing the concept of detection
(Okasha, 2002). While observation
requires the observer to view an object
or phenomenon actively, detection simply requires that observers encounter
evidence of an event through secondary
channels. Following is an example that
illustrates the contrast between observation and detection:
In June, at dawn, Mary steps outside her
beachside bungalow at a beach resort. She
observes a young couple, holding hands,
walking eastward, toward the rising sun.
They leave a trail of footprints behind them
on the wet sand.
Two hours later, Marvin arrives at the
beach. He sees two sets of footprints heading east along the shoreline. He speculates
on how they were produced. Following are
the hypotheses he generates:
• Two separate people walked along the
beach at different times. They roughly
follow the same trail.
• Because one set of footprints is larger
than the other, Marvin speculates that if
two people walked together, one individual was a man and the other a woman.
Or one was a man, the other a child.
Or one was a giant lady from the circus
currently in town, and the other a dwarf.
(Why not?)
•
Although it is a bit of a stretch, Marvin
wonders whether the two people walked
backward, along the beach, from east
to west. The data do not refute this
conjecture.
This example illustrates the strength
of direct observation over detection.
Both provide information we can
employ to study our problem, but observation data are stronger than detection
data. Mary saw the footprints form as
a young couple walked eastward along
the beach. She knows how they were
created. This constitutes an observation. Marvin’s speculations are based
on detection—seeing secondary evidence of people strolling on the beach.
To explain the footprints on the sand, he
must resort to speculation. Many possible explanations arise owing to what
philosophers of science call underdetermination (Stanford, 2013). To sort
through the alternatives, he will resort
to inference to the best explanation (typically referred to by its initials—IBE),
possibly employing the principle of
Occam’s Razor to draw his final conclusion (Baker, 2013; Okasha, 2002). While
detection is weaker than observation, it
still has value. Note that it provides some
relief from the criticism against the use
of unobservables in scientific explanation: While an entity or phenomenon
may be unobservable, it may still be
possible to detect it, which suggests
that it can contribute to scientific explanation, even though the contribution
would be weaker than had it been based
on direct observation. This is illustrated
in the case of the cloud chamber, a simple instrument that enables scientists
to detect electrons by means of vapor
trails—demonstrating their existence,
while not directly observing them.
In very recent times, the value of
detection to science was illustrated in a
spectacular fashion in two discoveries.
First, in July 2012, CERN’s Large Hadron Collider detected the existence of
the Higgs Boson after a 40-year search
for this elementary particle. The existence of such a particle supports the
likelihood of the existence of a Higgs
field, which—according to theory—
explains why particles have mass. Second, in February 2016 gravity waves
were detected for the first time, confirming a prediction made by Einstein
100 years ago in 1916 and strengthening
the credibility of his theories on the
nature of space-time. The gravity waves
were generated by the collision of two
black holes a billion light years away. As
physicists gain a deeper understanding
of gravity waves, this opens up entirely
new avenues to exploring the nature of
the universe.
In both discoveries, detection
occurred through the employment of
supersensitive detecting devices.
Philosophy of Project Management Perspective. The chief value of
the realism versus antirealism debate
to an emerging philosophy of project management is that it provides an
example of the kind of rich, productive, philosophical colloquy that can
arise if the project management discipline experiences the development of
a vibrant, mature philosophical perspective on the theory and practice
of project management. As aspiring
philosophers of project management
strive to identify where the pursuit of
philosophy of project management will
take them, they should consider looking carefully at the scientific realism
versus antirealism debate to see what
aspects of it contribute to maintaining a vibrant philosophy of science.
The summary offered here is highly
imperfect. The full debate is built on
an abundance of twists and turns of
argument and counterargument and
counter-counterargument that makes
philosophy fun.
As Peter Godfrey-Smith has pointed
out, the importance of the scientific
realism versus antirealism debate is that
it focuses on how theory and reality are
connected in science (Godfrey-Smith,
2003). It forms the hub of philosophy of
science because it forcefully addresses
the important core topics of epistemology and ontology in the theory and
practice of science. From an epistemological viewpoint, it asks: What is the
value of scientific knowledge based on
insights tied to unobservables? From
an ontological viewpoint, it asks: When
formulating scientific theories, does the
inclusion of insights tied to unobservables taint the findings by making them
less real?
Does the scientific realism versus
antirealism debate have a direct bearing on a philosophy of project management? Clearly its significance is not as
momentous as it is in the philosophy
of science, which is focused on understanding and explaining how the physical world works. But yes, it has a bearing,
because it raises basic epistemological
and ontological questions central to
philosophical discussion. It reminds
us that the information we employ to
strengthen our understanding of the
theory and practice of project management varies substantially in quality.
Some insights held by project decision makers are based heavily on solid
experience and established practice
(observables: e.g., documented project
processes, system test results), whereas
others depend heavily on poorly supported speculation (unobservables: e.g.,
team morale, corporate culture, office
politics). As with the case of scientific
explanation, the value of the project
decision makers’ insights depends on
how effectively they integrate information generated by observable and unobservable entities.
More significant, however, is that
the realist versus antirealist debate
illustrates the value of philosophical colloquy in bringing together the
community of philosophers and practitioners to discuss things of mutual
interest. This kind of discussion keeps
philosophy of science alive. Philosophy
of project management will, of course,
need to surface and debate its own
profound questions, and these will be
tied to the specific challenges facing the
project management enterprise. While
early discussions will likely be stilted
and forced, once the dialogue begins,
it will gradually assume a more natural
flow, increasingly addressing topics of
genuine interest to philosophers and
practitioners.
Conclusion
Ultimately, a vibrant philosophy of project management will need to develop
naturally, in response to philosophical questions arising within the project management enterprise. It can
be inspired by philosophy of science
and borrow some of its perspectives,
but its basic framework and content
must be sui generis. It needs to identify what questions to address. As with
other branches of philosophy, it can be
expected that a substantial portion will
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 45
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Philosophy of Project Management: Lessons From the Philosophy of Science
have epistemological and ontological
implications. If it can generate lively
discussions, this will stimulate new
branches of investigation, constructive
disputes, and a better understanding of
how project management works.
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Dr. J. Davidson Frame, PMP, PMI fellow, is
Academic Dean at the University of Management
and Technology, Arlington, Virginia, USA. His
research efforts have been directed toward the
management of science and technology as well
as the management of projects in organizations.
Dr. Frame has taught philosophy of science at the
doctoral level since the early 2000s and was on
the faculty of George Washington University for
19 years, where he directed GW’s Program on
Science, Technology, and Innovation, established
the university’s project management program, and
served as the chairman of the Management Science
Department. He can be contacted at davidson.
[email protected]
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 47
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An Existential Hermeneutic
Philosophical Approach to Project
Management
Bradley Rolfe, Sydney University Business School, Sydney, Australia; Macquarie Graduate
School of Management, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
Steven Segal, Macquarie Graduate School of Management, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
Svetlana Cicmil, University of West England, Bristol, United Kingdom
ABSTRACT ■
The philosophies of Martin Heidegger and
Richard Rorty are used to redescribe the fundamental assumptions underpinning project
management. Rather than viewing project
management as merely a science, the significance and value of philosophy for project
management are developed. The philosophical practice of redescription as a way of
responding to existential disruptions of the
lived experience of managing projects is seen
as vital not only to being a project manager
but also to describing project management.
KEYWORDS: existential; hermeneutic;
disruption; redescription; Heidegger; Rorty
Project Management Journal, Vol. 47, No. 3, 48–62
© 2016 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
48 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
INTRODUCTION
T
his article argues that there are certain conditions under which
philosophy becomes essential for project management. These
conditions are called existential disruptions. Existential disruptions
are those kinds of disruptions in which a practitioner’s habits or
conventional ways of doing things are threatened and can no longer be taken
for granted. There are a number of philosophical practices that can enable
project managers to work with and through existential disruptions both to
their own practices and the practices of their clients. Examples include the
reframing or redescribing of assumptions, working through the space of
disruption, and bringing into being the results of a project. It will be argued
that it has been a historical mistake to view project management only through
the dominant discourse of a scientific prism, which in its essence is focused
on implementing a representation of a scenario designed in terms of the rules
of logic and science rather than creating new possibilities in the context of
disruption and the unforeseeable contingencies of day-to-day practice.
The word unforeseeable is used purposefully to counteract the suggestion that lived experience is predictable. The language of prediction belongs
to a particular epistemology—that of science—yet science does not deal
with everyday lived experience. The ontology of science is limited to dealing with the objects of experience but not the experience itself. Philosophy
deals with lived experience rather than the objects of lived experience. This
is especially the case in the field of philosophy called existential hermeneutic
philosophy. Existential hermeneutic philosophy is a broad discipline of philosophy, which began in the marketplace of ancient Greece and returned in
the 19th and 20th centuries through the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, existentialism, and some forms of American pragmatism that promote practices
of continuous redescription and of “keeping the conversation going” (1979),
as Rorty calls it.
The way in which we will present the significance of philosophy for
project management is with a general and accessible introduction to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. We will then provide a description of the role
of disruption in project management, utilizing the philosophy of Thomas
Kuhn, before moving to reconstruct the way of being of managing projects
in terms of reframing or, more specifically, in terms of Richard Rory’s notion
of redescription. In terms of the latter, we shall maintain that an essential
dimension of project management is holding effective conversations for
redescription.
Philosophy and Heidegger
This article draws on the framework of
the philosophy of Martin Heidegger; the
works of this philosopher, however, are
notoriously difficult to read. In order to
make his writing accessible to an audience not familiar with his work, we will
use a particular interpretation of his
work developed by Segal, in his book,
Management Practice in the Context of
Creative Disruption: Existential Skills for
Managers, Management Researchers and
Educators (2015). Segal maintains that
Heidegger’s philosophy, especially in his
early work, can be thought of in a circular relation of three movements: convention, disruption, and authenticity or
envisaging new possibilities. It is crucial
to appreciate that Heidegger’s view of
philosophy does not mean a rejection of
science but rather, as Rorty would say, a
redescription of it in a broader context.
The danger with a scientific view of project management is not the science itself
but what we do with it. Science is constituted as the dominant and legitimate
discourse through which to gain access to
the community of project management
practitioners. Heidegger allows us to see
that science is important, but it is not the
only “grammar,” as he calls it, that is helpful in project managing. Project managers need to be able to move between a
range of “grammars” or language games
in a business: the way in which, for example, marketing people speak; the way in
which finance people speak and think;
the way in which engineers speak; and
so forth. Philosophy is that activity that
allows us to work between different disciplinary or functional languages through
the art of redescription.
Heidegger views philosophy as a
destruction of conventions that clear the way
for disclosing new possibilities. To phrase
in the technical language of Heidegger:
“Tradition takes what has come down to
us and delivers it over to self-evidence;
it blocks our access to those primordial
‘sources’ from which the categories and
concepts handed down to us have been in
part quite genuinely drawn” (1996, p. 43).
Heidegger wants to engage in activity
of what he calls “destroying” the tradition or conventions, until we arrive at the
“primal” sources so that new possibilities
of ways of being can be disclosed. It is the
basis of, as he puts it, staking out “positive
possibilities” (1996, p. 44). It is by destroying the familiar conventions in which we
are embedded that we create the space
for disclosing new worlds. It is not that
Heidegger wants the destruction of conventions for its own sake however; rather,
it is under the conditions of changing
circumstances—where the traditions bog
us down in the past rather than allowing
for the disclosing of new possibilities, ways
of doing things, or worlds—where the tradition becomes a set of empty rituals. It is
when these empty rituals are mimicked in
the state of existential anxiety, and we can
no longer rely on the traditions of the past,
that a destruction of traditions emerges as
a possibility. Thus, it is in the context of a
range of lived experiences that destruction
opens up as a possibility. On the other
hand, according to Heidegger, there is
often a temptation to play it safe, become
defensive, and not change our ways of
doing things, thinking, and being with the
way in which circumstances change. This,
as we shall see, is a more dangerous option
than destruction for Heidegger; for in the
former view, we become wedded to a past
that has been surpassed.
Although it is tempting to say that,
for Heidegger, destruction is a method
or process, it is in fact more than both
of these. It expresses itself as an inhabited way of being; it is experienced as
a disruption of our habitual and conventional ways of doing things; and in
its most extreme case, this disruption
is the experience of existential anxiety.
In less intense cases, disruption functions as a shift in perception in which
our attention is transformed from an
involvement in using entities as equipment to examining equipment as an
object. In the same way, conventions
and disclosures are ways of being; they
aren’t just detached ideas but embodied
scripts that are encountered in the ways
in which we do things. It is impossible
to fully explain how there are ways of
being until the phenomenon of ways
of being has been explained. In other
words, the framework for making sense
of the notion of a way of being itself
needs to be established first.
It is reasonable to ask: Why introduce
Heidegger into the field of management
in general and project management in
particular? Heidegger’s notion of “disruption” cuts across many fields within
management1; for example, in the context of economics, Joseph Schumpeter
(1955) wrote about a “creative destruction,” which is focused on capitalism
or the free market and is a dynamic
process that constantly destroys and
creates itself. The free market constantly
destroys the conventions of industries
and businesses and discloses new ways
of doing things—for example, on-line
retail is constantly destroying the conventions of buying and selling in a
store and disclosing the possibility of
exchange online, or online education is
destroying conventional forms of education and disclosing new possibilities.
Christensen and Overdorf (2000)
have written on the way in which technology creatively destroys organizations
and forms of economic life. Fernando
Flores (2000) writes on the way in which
careers are being creatively destroyed,
and Nietzsche (1969) wrote on the way
in which the death of God creatively
destroyed forms of life in general. While
Heidegger did not write about creativity per se, he did call his philosophical
methodology “destruction” (1996) and
considered destruction the basis for disclosing new worlds and possibilities.
Indeed, both Nietzsche and Heidegger
articulated the challenges to be faced
in a world of creative destruction; thus,
it is not unreasonable to begin a text
on Heidegger for managers with a work
that deals with the ways in which new
possibilities emerge out of practices of
disruption.
1In his essay, “What Is Metaphysics?” Heidegger engages in
a “destruction of logic,” demonstrating that logic is not able
to ground itself; however, an elaboration on this would be an
article in its own right.
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In the field of marketing, Jean-Marie
Dru wrote a book called Disruption:
Overturning Conventions and Shaking
Up the Marketplace (1996). There are
three moments in Dru’s dynamic logic
of disruption: convention, disruption,
and vision and he believed that it is
through the disruption of existing conventions that new visions are disclosed.
According to Dru, conventions consist of background scripts that allow
us to get on with the task of everyday
practical coping without having to think
about them. Conventions allow us to do
things—such as drive cars, sit in lecture
theatres, manage a business, and go to
the movies—without having to think
about how to conduct ourselves in each
of these contexts. It is because we do not
have to think of them while performing acts based on them that they are in
the background rather than the foreground of our attention. In the context
of management, there are conventions
for managing, leading, and following,
and they enable the managers to perform the activities of managing without
having to think about managing while
they are managing, leading while they
are leading, and following while they
are following. Conventions thus allow
us to cope without having to think about
our conventions for coping. Dru states:
“Although conventions are everywhere,
they are generally hard to see. These are
things that we don’t even notice because
they are so familiar. . . . Depending on
the case, we will talk about unquestioned assumptions, good old common
sense, or the current rules of the game.”
(1996, p. 56)
Conventions open and close possibilities. They allow us to see the world
in certain ways and not in other ways;
for example, the conventions of finance
in management allow the finance manager to see things in one way, not in
another way; someone who has been
habituated in marketing will see the
world in one way and not in another
way; similarly, a manager with an
engineering background will see the
world in one way, not in another way.
In Organizational Behavior, Bolman
and Deal (2013) call these “frames.”
Our frames open up and close down
possibilities and because they exist in
the background of our attention, we do
not even begin to know that our way of
seeing is shaped and limited by a set
of frames or conventions. We assume
that the way in which we see the world
is the natural way in which to see the
world. Although not expressed by Dru,
for Heidegger, it is important to say that
we are embedded in conventions and
frames for seeing things. We are also
embedded in habits of practice and ultimately in existence itself. We are hardly
ever free of being embedded in conventions, frames, and habits of practice.
Moments of estrangement or perplexity
disrupt our habitual and conventional
ways for doing things.
Like Heidegger, Dru believes that it
takes an act of disruption to see our own
frame or set of conventions, to question them and to open up new possibilities. Dru sees the act of disruption in
terms of the notion of defamiliarization
of our familiar, conventional way of seeing the world. When we are estranged
from our conventions through acts such
as surprise, perplexity, or disbelief, we
stand at an emotional distance from our
beliefs such that we begin to see what
we had taken for granted. Dru says that
the “idea of viewing the familiar in a
different manner” is achieved by making the “unstrange strange, the familiar
unfamiliar.” (1996, p. 69). The act of defamiliarization emotionally distances us
from our familiar conventions such that
we can see them and question them.
We cannot do this when we are simply
embedded in them. The act of questioning our conventions paves the way
for seeing new possibilities or disclosing
new worlds.
Although Dru does not acknowledge
the philosophical ancestry of the notion
of defamiliarization, it has a long history.
It is expressed by, for example, Richard
Rorty, who maintains that “the attempt
to edify (ourselves or others) may consist in . . . the attempt to reinterpret our
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familiar surroundings in the unfamiliar terms of our encounter with other
culture[s] or historical periods” (p. 360).
Rorty calls the process of defamiliarization through disruption, “redescription.”
Redescription takes “us out of our old
selves by the power of strangeness and
aids us in becoming new beings” (Rorty,
1979, p. 360). A version of the same idea
may be found in the work of Spinosa,
Flores, and Dreyfus (1997), who demonstrate how disruption of a paradigm is
the basis for disclosing new worlds. They
focus on our “ability to appreciate and
engage in the ontological skill of disclosing new ways of being” (p. 1). This ability,
they claim, relies on becoming “sensitive
to anomalies that enable us to change the
style of our culture” (p. 181).
None of the authors above makes reference to the Heideggerian proposition
that disruption through de-familiarization
is an existential experience. Existential
implies that it is not only a cognitive or
intellectual activity that is disrupted, but a
disruption that is experienced with one’s
whole being. An author who allows us to
make clear sense of this existential form
of disruption is Douglas-Mullen, who in a
work on Kierkegaard says:
One feature peculiar to humans is the
ability to detach ourselves from our lives
and see ourselves as if we were “just one
of them.” For some of us, the thought
of this comes more often and stays
longer. This type of person is described
as “reflective,” “self-conscious,” “neurotic,”
“ironic,” “pensive,” “deep,” etc. (1995, p. 11).
The form of detachment referred to
by Douglas-Mullen is not the detachment of the positivist scientist who
stands at a separate, neutral, and objective distance from the subject matter of the research. It is the activity of
experiencing oneself at an emotional
distance from one’s own set of conventions so that we see ourselves, as
Douglas-Mullen says as “just one of
them.” It is the experience of watching
oneself while doing; the experience of
being detached from one’s own beliefs
or sense-making habits. Thus, we begin
to lay the foundation for one of the central theses of philosophy, namely that
reflection is a form of experience; not so
much experience in the form of a sensory but an existential experience. The
experience of being detached from what
we are involved in is a lived experience,
and it is an existential experience—one
that defines itself in terms of an emotional detachment as when a person is
preoccupied or “not there.” This being
“not there” for Heidegger is a dynamic
state. It is a state of being drawn away
from habitual conventions to disclosing the world in new ways. It is the
space of insight, foresight, and hindsight.2 It is also the state of being in
existential questioning, for existential
questioning is that kind of question
that involves mood, body, and cognition. It is this state of detachment that,
for Heidegger, allows us to question our
heritage or historicity. Heidegger calls
this kind of questioning “destruction,”
which, as Samuel Ijsseling maintains,
“is ultimately oriented toward trying
to direct attention to the unthought
(das Ungedachte) in thinking and to the
unsaid in saying. . . . The unthought or
the unsaid can be that which was never
expressly thematized although it was
presupposed in (philosophical) thinking and which, indeed, can be thought
and said.” (1982, p. 15)
For Heidegger, however, destruction applies not only to thought and
saying but also to habits of practice
and conventions for doing as well. It
is the unstated ways of doing things
that is the subject matter of the form of
questioning that arises in the disruption of destruction. For Heidegger, the
link between questioning and disruption is crucial. Questioning occurs in
experiences of disruption.
2It
is expressed technically by Heidegger in the following
way: “What withdraws from us, draws us along by its
very withdrawal, whether or not we become aware of it
immediately, or not at all. Once we are drawn into the
withdrawal, we are drawing toward what draws, attracts us by
its withdrawal. And once we, being so attracted, are drawing
towards what draws us, our essential nature already bears the
stamp of ‘drawing towards.’ As we are drawing towards what
withdraws, we ourselves are pointers pointing toward it.”
Thus, we can conclude this section
by saying that philosophy is that kind
of activity in which the assumptions
behind a set of conventions for doing
things are questioned in the context
of the lived experience of disruption:
in moods of estrangement or, more
broadly speaking, in the context of a felt
sense that things are not just quite right.
This opens up the possibility for seeing
and being in new ways. The view that
philosophy is a destruction of assumptions (Plato, 2003, p. 553) is grounded
in the point of departure of philosophy.
The following section explores disruption in the context of a specific practice:
that of project management. It will show
how the assumptions on which current practices of project management
have been built leave it poorly equipped
to deal with the contingencies of the
modern world and open up the space
for an existential hermeneutic approach
to these practices.
Project Management and the
Disruption of Failure
From the time when a project was some
monumental feat of construction, such
as the Hoover Dam or the Great Wall of
China, it now seems that every activity,
no matter how insignificant, can be conceived of as a project. If there is a piece
of work to be done in a corporation that
does not fit within the classification of
an existing process, it will invariably be
called a project. Some estimates suggest
that “projects” constitute more than
50% of work undertaken within the contemporary corporate sector (Flyvbjerg,
2012). Many companies, including IBM,
have made project management the
focus of their operating model (Zwikael
& Smyrk, 2011). Surprisingly, for such a
ubiquitous method of organizing work,
“project management” as a formal discipline did not come into existence
until the 1950s (Cicmil & Hodgson,
2006a). It was during this period that
extremely large and complex projects
were undertaken by the U.S. Department of Defense, including the Polaris
submarine and Apollo moon programs.
It was in support of these programs
that a number of new techniques, primarily in the area of scheduling, were
developed. Principal among these techniques was program evaluation and
review technique (PERT), which offered
a probabilistic method for determining
the likely duration of a project schedule
(Weaver, 2007). Although the actual
effectiveness of such techniques on
the Polaris and Apollo programs is still
debated (Koskela & Howell, 2008), they
quickly became popular to the extent
that their utilization is now more or less
identified with the practice of project
management itself (Cicmil & Hodgson,
2006a). These practices have become,
in terms of the philosophy discussed
above, familiar and conventional.
Despite such a wide utilization of
project management and a method
that promises an effective and efficient
delivery, a significant and increasing
rate of project failure has been reported
in contemporary practice across sectors. The Standish Group noted in their
CHAOS summary report on IT industry
projects that, effective 2009, there was
a marked decrease in project success rates,
with 32% of all projects succeeding which
are delivered on time, on budget, with
required features and functions. 44% were
challenged which are late, over budget,
and/or with less than the required features and functions and 24% failed which
are cancelled prior to completion or
delivered and never used. (The Standish
Group, 2009)
A joint study by McKinsey and the
BT Centre for Major Program Management at the University of Oxford, on
5,400 IT projects across a wide range
of industries, found similarly disturbing results. Fifty percent of projects
with a budget of US$15 million or over
ran at least 45% over budget, and they
were delivered 7% behind schedule and
delivered 56% less functionality than
originally specified (Bloch, Blumberg,
& Laartz, 2012). However, reports on
significant project failures measured
against project management terms (the
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so-called iron triangle of delivery of
cost, time, and quality) do not seem
to be isolated to IT. In the research
into large construction projects in over
20 countries, Flyvbjerg (2012) observed
that “nine out of ten projects have cost
overruns. Overruns of over 50% are
common, while overruns of over 100%
are not uncommon.” Most significantly,
Flyvbjerg noted: “Overruns have been
constant for the seventy years for which
data are available, indicating that no
improvements in estimating and managing costs have been made over time”
(pp. 104–105).
As the philosopher Alasdair
MacIntyre (1984) noted, when there
is a clear and expanding distinction
between what the practice claims to be
able to do and what it actually achieves,
then the practice can reasonably be said
to be in crisis:
The expert’s claim to status and reward
is fatally undermined when we recognise
that he possesses no sound stock of lawlike generalisations and when we realise
how weak the predictive powers available
to him are. (1984, p. 106)
What then, as “experts,” are project
management practitioners trying to
predict? The “iron triangle” of time,
cost, and quality serves to define the
parameters by which existing project
management practice measures itself.
These parameters are defined in the
very early stages of the project life cycle
and constitute a “prediction” against
which the project and project manager
are ultimately measured (Atkinson,
1999). If we accept the project management practitioner’s claim of predictive
capacity in terms of this “iron triangle,” then his or her expertise is fatally
undermined by the high rate of failure
in achieving those predictions (Hartley, 2009; Kerzner, 2001; Lewis, 1999).
An analogy to this situation would be
a medical practice such as surgery
where, despite the existence of a uniform and consistently applied method,
the majority of patients died after surgery. Eventually, a point of crisis is
reached where the inherent inadequacy
of the practice can no longer be ignored.
As Koskela and Howell (2008) observe:
“It is no exaggeration to claim that project management as a discipline is in
crisis, and that a paradigm change, long
overdue, has to be realised” (p. 297).
We will revisit the disruption of
project failure and its existential nature
in a subsequent section of this article.
Paradigm Crises as the
Condition for Philosophy in
Project Management
The philosopher of science, Thomas
Kuhn (1996), observed that all paradigms are built upon earlier ones. Our
understanding is preconditioned by
prior bodies of understanding that have
evolved over generations. Understanding is therefore historically situated and
it is only through an examination of the
history of our present paradigms that
contradictions within it can be revealed
(Kuhn, 1996, pp. 1–9). In this, Kuhn
shares the view of Heidegger that we are
“always already” situated in a given context and that it is only through reflection
on our existing ways of thinking and
being that we can hope to change them.
However, current forms of reflection on project management practice
actually do so from an ahistorical perspective that assumes the universality of present practices. In this form
of research, existing project management methods may be conceived of as
independent of historical forces and
therefore immune to the contingencies
of the past (Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006a).
Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) argue that
there are two ways in which research
can reinforce existing practices. The
first way is “presentism,” whereby “the
historian takes a model, a concept, an
institution, a feeling, or a symbol from
his present, and attempts—almost by
definition unwittingly—to find that it
had a parallel meaning in the past”
(p. 118). The second way is “finalism,” which “tries to find the foundations of the present in some distant
times, and analyse history as a finalized
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process that necessarily leads from that
point to the present” (Lenfle, 2012,
pp. 4–5).
Presentism
In his historical treatment of ancient
projects, Y.C. Chiu (2011) examines significant construction projects undertaken throughout the ancient world
over approximately 3,500 years. From
the building of the Great Ziggurat of
Ur (circa 2100 BC) to the construction
of the Pantheon (118–126 AD), Chiu
poses the hypothesis that “there are
circumstances in different historical
periods that affect the development of
the areas of expertise and their application to project activities” (p. 14). In
exploring the construction of these significant works, Chiu achieves the stated
aim to “increase understanding and
appreciation of the profession of project
management and situate it historically”
(p. 11). There are, however, limitations
to this kind of enquiry. The presentism
of Chiu’s enquiry is explicit, as it views
history through a contemporary perspective and, in so doing, imposes the
assumptions and premises of existing
project management practices onto earlier ones. As Chiu (2011) puts it: “All concepts or analytical categories applied
to history arise out of a contemporary
standpoint. While the historical data
must stand for themselves, the ideas
used to organize them can appropriately
come from present modes of understanding project management” (p. 9).
In the examination of the construction
of the Roman Colosseum between 75 AD
and 82 AD, Chiu argues, “The Romans
must have utilized disciplined and scientific project management to achieve
their building aims” (p. 3) [our italics].
Chiu concludes from this, and other
similarly impressive projects in the
ancient world, that “ancient civilizations
practised the ‘science’ of project management” and that although “project
management did not yet claim a technical definition during those ancient projects, the ancient builders understood
and carried out the principles of project
management in practice” (p. 3). Chiu
(2011) maintains: “Much of contemporary project management theory and
practice lacks a historically conscious
foundation, an awareness of how project
management has developed throughout history” (p. 4). To this end, Chiu’s
work serves admirably to heighten the
historical awareness of project management. Nonetheless, there is still the
issue of the perspective through which
the enquiry is conducted. As a normative historical enquiry, it serves to
explain past events by situating them in
contemporary practices, which in this
case are modern project management
techniques predicated on the language
of science. In this sense, Chiu’s research
is explanatory rather than critical.
Finalism
Kozak-Holland’s (2011) equally impressive work provides an example of finalism in historical enquiry. Kozak-Holland
argues that “a close analysis of these
[ancient] projects highlights that supposedly recent project management disciplines were actively used in all these
projects” (Kozak-Holland, 2011, p. 7). The
implication of Kozak-Holland’s (2011)
point of view is that current project
management methods are not a function of their historical background but
represent instead the discovery of a universal method for doing any kind of
work. The previous history of project
management is treated as a progressive uncovering of an already existing
truth, the culmination of which is the
articulation of that truth in contemporary project management practices. As
Whitty and Shulz (2007) remark: “Some
regard it [project management] as common-sense thinking and the natural outcome of logical reasoning and how work
should be done” (p. 15) rather than the
historical accident that it was.
Chiu and Kozak-Holland’s research
is powerful in that it informs current
project management practices via
the richness of past project experiences; however, it remains wedded to
existing project management practices.
By projecting existing project management methods and practices back onto
past projects, it seeks to explain those
projects in terms of the present understanding or, alternatively, it seeks to
consolidate the present paradigm by
elaborating past practices as a steady,
logical progression toward the present,
fully realized practice. In either case,
the existing project management practice remains unchallenged.
While Chiu and Kozak-Holland
make the explanatory nature of their
analysis explicit, it is limited to a discussion of project management in the
context of existing practice. To that end,
their work is invaluable in providing
project managers with a perspective on
their current practices through reflection on earlier projects. The objective
of research through such a perspective
is normative in the sense that it “asserts
that project management deserves and
requires relevant historical exploration to fill the gaps in our knowledge,”
and the aim is not to challenge existing methods but to further consolidate
them by “grounding it retrospectively in
a trajectory that begins in ancient civilizations” (Kozak-Holland, 2011, p. 4).
The purpose of this criticism is not to
dismiss the validity of traditional historical enquiry. Chiu and Kozak-Holland’s
work serve an important purpose within
the context of normal project management practice. The limitation of this
kind of approach, however, is that the
enquiry is conducted through the prism
of contemporary project management
practice. As such, the research assumes
a privileged position in the examination
that is superior to, and therefore independent of, the broader project management narrative. Such an approach
serves to consolidate the existing, dominant project management language by
retrospectively applying it to projects
throughout history. Accordingly, previous ways of managing projects are
viewed only as either more or less
sophisticated examples of current project management practice (Hodgson &
Cicmil, 2007).
If we accept the argument that project management, as currently theorized
and practiced, is in a state of crisis, then
what alternative ways of thinking about
practice are available to us? If we are to
escape the confines of the normative
research approaches outlined above,
then the first challenge is to accept the
possibility of other perspectives on practice. Kuhn (1996) argues that when the
anomalies within a practice increase,
their impact on the stated aims of the
practice can become so significant that
they can no longer be accommodated
within the confines of normal practice
(pp. 23–35). To highlight his point, Kuhn
used the example of astronomy. By the
late 19th century, astronomers were
regularly observing stars and planets
in the “wrong place,” at least according to where Newtonian theory said
they should be. In the normal practice of astronomy, such an anomaly was
treated as a misapplication of technique.
Celestial bodies simply do not appear in
the wrong place; they move according
to Newtonian laws that yield extraordinarily accurate predictions. In this
event, “poor astronomical observation
technique” might be the characterization of the cause of the anomaly.
And if exactly the same observation
by other astronomers did not yield
the same anomaly, the assumption of
poor technique would be a reasonable
conclusion. What if, however, a large
number of other astronomers begin to
observe the same anomaly? Stars are not
appearing exactly where they should,
and planets are not behaving exactly
as predicted. What then? Kuhn points
out that to assume poor technique from
all of them is irrational (pp. 81–83).
When following a technique predicated
upon a practice’s fundamental principles consistently fails to yield a result
the practice predicts, the practice is not
internally consistent. Nor can such a
problem be resolved by the normal techniques of the practice, because those
techniques depend on the coherence
of the practice for their efficacy (Kuhn,
1996, pp. 73–76).
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In Heideggerian terms, the practice,
and the practitioners themselves, now
face more than an instrumental disruption to their activities. It may have
begun as a failure of the tools and methods of the practice to deliver results, but
the repeated failure of those tools has
led to the practice itself being called
into question. A practitioner’s “way of
being” in his or her practice is no longer
on solid ground, and he or she is facing an existential disruption. And, as
Heidegger points out, such disruption
requires a different kind of questioning
than a mere examination of tools.
Kuhn argues that clear evidence of
such disruption is a proliferation of theories attempting to resolve the anomalies being experienced, yet at the same
time remaining within the context of
existing practices (pp. 77–80). Over the
last 20 years, several alternative theories that seek to resolve the anomaly of
persistent project failure have emerged
in project management practice, particularly within the IT sector. Various
project management methods, including rapid, agile, extreme, and radical
(Thomsett, 2002; Wysocki, 2009) have
been promoted as alternative theories
better able to deal with the contemporary IT environment. These alternatives have achieved a degree of success
in parts of the sector (predominantly
software development; DeCarlo, 2004;
Morris, 2008; Perrin, 2008; Thomsett,
2002; Wysocki, 2009). As Kuhn (1996)
observes, though, when new methods
are generated within the space of a practice to deal with a crisis to the practice,
they are invariably tightly constrained
and therefore work only under highly
specific circumstances (pp. 77–80). The
project management approach called
agile, for example, addresses a specific
issue, pointed out as problematic in
the successful delivery of software projects by a number of authors, namely,
“unclear requirements” (Highsmith,
2010; Wysocki, 2009). Agile deals with
unclear requirements by advocating a
cyclical project approach, in which an
immediate set of limited requirements is
identified and the software development
done to deliver it is within a 6- to 8-week
timeframe. The cycle is then repeated
with the next identified set of requirements (Highsmith, 2010). This method
has proved very effective in dealing with
the specific cause of unclear requirements by focusing on them one limited
set at a time. This also has a flow-on
effect into other causes of project failure, such as poor estimating and scope
creep. By radically reducing the effective
scope of the work, the parameters of
time, cost, and specification are far easier to control (Wysocki, 2009). Although
agile can be very effective in smaller,
decentralized software projects where
it is possible to deal with specific business requirements one at a time, this is
not the case with large IT infrastructure
projects. In these projects, requirements
need to be considered holistically for
an overall solution to be devised. There
are also problems with being unable to
compare competing bids in a competitive tendering process and insufficient
recourse to legal remedy in the event
that anything goes wrong. In such project environments, agile remains problematic at best and has not been proven
to be any more successful than more
traditional methods (Ballard, 2011).
While the proliferation of alternative approaches, such as agile, within
a practice may serve to extend the life
of the paradigm on which the practice
is based, they do not resolve the internal contradictions (Kuhn, 1996); they
represent anomalies that practitioners
cannot ignore. When the causes of project failure highlighted above are treated
as symptoms of internal contradiction
within the practice instead of deviations from good practice, an opportunity for different questioning—an
existential questioning—offers itself. As
Kuhn observes, “Crises are a necessary pre-condition for the emergence of
novel theories” (1996, p. 77). By revealing the internal contradictions, opportunities for revision to the practice that
had previously gone unobserved may
present themselves.
54 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
The Disruption of Project
Failure as Existential
Disruption
It is against this background of a practice in crisis that project management
operates. What the existing approaches
to project management practice are
unable to encapsulate is that project
management is a situated and contextual activity deeply imbued with
meaning (Fincham, 2002). They cannot
capture, nor deal with, the singular and
intense existential disruption to practice that the constant failures outlined
above are likely to generate among those
who experience them. Traditional project management techniques attempt to
provide answers to the questions posed
by projects; however, in moments of disruption, there is frequently no specific
question to be answered and, instead, a
project practitioner finds him or herself
“in question” as the everyday activities
he or she conducts no longer carry the
meaning they once had (Smith, 2006).
As Heidegger observes, this goes much
further than a mere suspicion that the
tools of practice are failing, such as a
carpenter might view a saw that he suspects is not cutting straight, or a hammer in which the head keeps slipping
off. This is an existential suspicion, a
questioning of the very “way of being”
that a project manager is engaged in is
somehow “not right.” It is in this space
that the existential hermeneutic of Martin Heidegger (1993) operates.
Rather than focus on specific problems within the practice, an existential
hermeneutic treats the disruption itself
as a legitimate area of concern. Existential forms of disruption imply something other than a simple problem to be
resolved. A problem is a piece of wood
jamming a door and preventing it from
opening. Forcing the piece of wood out
of the door and using another door are
the possible solutions to this problem.
Existential disruption is not like this.
Existential disruption occurs when the
relationship we have with our everyday activities no longer makes sense.
Existential disruption tests something
far more significant than our intellect
or our skills—it tests our way of being in
the world (Heidegger, 1993). This is the
manner in which many project management professionals experience their
practice—not as a problem demanding
a solution in the traditional sense but as
a problem with his or her way of being a
project manager.
So dominant are formal project
management methods in the execution of projects that project managers
can remain largely unaware of other
ways of thinking or being in project
management (Bresnen, 2006). Despite
the repeated failures commented on
earlier, project managers continue to
utilize tools and techniques derived
from principles whose philosophical
justifications remain relatively unchallenged (Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006b). As
such, the existing project management
methods can become accepted as “the”
way in which projects are delivered,
rather than as simply one set of methods
among the many required to successfully deliver a project (Ackroyd, 1994).
The effect has been to limit the possibilities for project managers striving
to deliver projects for the organizations
they serve.
Kuhn’s (1996) critique of practice
offers a way forward for project management. As Kuhn points out, it was in
the space of disruption to the practice
of physics that Albert Einstein was able
to account for the anomaly of celestial
bodies in the wrong place. Rather than
accept the fundamental premises of
the existing Newtonian theory, Einstein
challenged concepts such as the
“fixed” nature of time and space itself.3
Einstein’s critique ultimately led to a
revised practice of physics, which incorporated both the existing Newtonian
laws and an extension to those laws that
accounted for the observed anomalies
(Kuhn, 1996, pp. 98–99).
3Further information regarding the challenge to the model
of classical physics in the early 20th century can be found in
Einstein. (1961). Relativity: The special and the general theory.
New York, NY: Three Rivers Press.
We argue that a similar revision
is required for the premise on which
the practice of project management is
based. The observed anomalies of project failure, particularly of IT projects,
have reached the point where they are
too pervasive to be ignored. No longer can such failures be understood
within a simplistic cause-and-effect
model, which assumes the current standard of practice. Both practitioners and
researchers alike need to face the challenge of project failure by exploring
ways of being that do not view the present contradictions as something to be
resolved but rather as a starting point
for a different kind of practice.
Several researchers have already
taken issue with the mainstream project
management approaches to qualifying
IT projects as successful or failed in
practice: from questioning the legitimacy of the traditional project management iron triangle (time, cost, and
quality criteria) as an evaluation framework (Atkinson, 1999), to exploring
the use of declaratory powers to narratively redescribe a failing project as
success (Fincham, 2002), to exposing
the existential and behavioral effects of
the failing project management science
(Smith, 2006), to illuminating a resulting paradox in the possibility of linking the contemporary economic success
and growth with the very “failure” of
major IT projects (Cicmil & Braddon,
2012; Lindahl & Rehn, 2007).
In the next section, we will focus
on the role of redescription as a philosophical practice essential for a project manager, because project managers
are constantly working through disruptions of conventions to open up new
possibilities.
A Redescription of Project
Management
The existing conceptualisation of project management is a profession whose
tools and techniques are founded
on principles of natural science.
Yet, in the evaluation of that profession (and therefore in “the measure”
of its professionals), we clearly invoke
principles of a different kind. It can certainly be argued, and has been, that this
does not matter and that project managers typically understand the distinction between their practice and science
(Morris, 2006). In this sense, project
management principles can be viewed
not as natural laws but simply as useful
guidelines for getting a project “funded”
or “set up” before another, more suitable practice is adopted to achieve and
measure “success.” This point of view
certainly has merit, though it begs the
question, however, as to what other,
more adequate project management
practices there could be? And why can
we not encompass both the criteria for
action and the criteria for judgment
within the same language? As noted earlier in this article, MacIntyre (1988) has
observed that no community of practice
or profession can consistently fail on its
own terms and expect to survive. The
principle suggestion to be developed in
this section is that project management
practitioners undertake what Rorty calls
a “redescription.” As Rorty states in
“Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity:”
All human beings carry about a set of
words which they employ to justify their
actions, their beliefs, and their lives.
These are the words in which we formulate praise for our friends and contempt
for our enemies, our long-term projects,
our deepest self-doubts and our highest
hopes. They are the words in which we
tell, sometimes prospectively and sometimes retrospectively, the story of our lives.
I shall call these words a person’s “final
vocabulary.”(1989, p. 73)
The recognition that we carry with
us in this “final vocabulary,” not just
the words for the attribution of success and failure but also the criteria
on which we judge them, provides the
project manager with the possibility of
adopting what Rorty calls the stance of
the “ironist,” for whom “anything can
be made to look good or bad by being
redescribed” (1989, p. 73). Without the
weight of the final vocabulary of the
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project management metanarrative—
and its universal, abstracted, and contradictory search for knowledge—the
project manager can instead see his or
her role as negotiating the vast array
of narratives that constitute the corporate world, each one carrying its own
justification for truth, and for a brief
moment, redescribing a small part of
that world long enough to create something of value for the society he or she
serves.
Rorty’s contribution to understanding why project management is conducted the way it is and therefore the
key to redescribing it is to understand
that the practices that constitute project management might have been different and that many contemporary
techniques and tools are actually the
echoes of metaphors initiated in the
scientific practices of the past and promulgated through to the present. These
metaphors, applied inappropriately,
have served to create a contradictory
discourse that undermines the field
of project management. By uncovering these metaphors and making them
explicit, there is hope it will provide
the possibility of alternative discourses
to the project manager other than the
success/failure dichotomy borrowed
from the natural sciences and so inadequate for the business context within
which projects actually operate. Rorty’s
practice of redescription is offered not
as an alternative discourse in itself but
as a means by which new discourse can
be created.
Redescription: Coming to Terms With
Language-Games
A project manager can learn to recognize that the various practices within
a company constitute what Rorty des­
cribes as a “language game” (1982,
pp. 166–169). Practices are a languagegame by virtue of the fact that the terms
contained within them mean what they
mean by the consensus of the practitioners, rather than by any correspondence of those terms to something
transcendental. In other words, there
are no referents outside of a practice
(i.e., the “game”) to which the terms of
a practice correspond. The terms of a
practice achieve their meaning through
reference to each other, and if removed
from the context of the practice, they
may change their meaning or be lost
entirely. This applies to all the terms
in the practice, regardless of how fundamental they are to its constitution
(Rorty, 1989). To successfully recognize organizational language-games, a
project manager cultivates an attitude
of what Rorty calls “ironism” (1989, p.
73). An ironist recognizes that the various languages we use in our day-to-day
practices are a game. An ironist sees
that our values, beliefs, and ways of
doing things are not rooted in nature
itself but are conventions shaped by
the history of a practice. The history
of our practices determines which
terms are used within them and which
have fallen by the wayside over the
course of time. It is therefore the history of our practices that determines
our current ways of understanding our
work (Rorty, 1989).
The attitude of the ironist reflected
in that enquiry can be contrasted with
those of us who feel the terms in which
our work practices are inscribed are
not a game but do indeed correspond
with something eternal and immutable. For these people, Rorty argues,
the language of their practice is a final
vocabulary, the terms of which cannot
be argued about, and their meaning not
debated (Rorty, 1989, p. 73). In making this contrast, there is no wish to
disparage those of us for whom our language terms, and thus our beliefs, are
somehow transcendental because, as
Rorty points out, this is nearly all of us.
The perfect ironist is as difficult to find
as the perfect fundamentalist (Rorty,
1999). We all have some terms in our
language we are willing to debate and
others we are not. Ironism, therefore,
is a question of degree (Rorty, 1989).
How far are we prepared to go, Rorty
asks, in challenging the existing terms
of our language?
56 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
This section argues that a project
management practitioner needs to go
further than most. Projects (especially
large IT ones) can be inherently destabilizing to the organizations that create
them; in fact, this is often a necessary
condition for the changes that a project is charged with implementing
(Thomsett, 2002). In such a time of
organizational instability, the project
manager needs to be cognizant that
there are a multitude of language games
clamouring for dominance within the
organization, none of which can yet
lay claim to it (Bresnen, 2006). In these
circumstances, the project will become
a vehicle for the realization of one or
more competing organizational narratives (Fincham, 2002). Negotiating these
multiple competing languages is a critical competency for the project management practitioner and one that the
philosophical tool of ironism can assist
in facilitating.
Rorty’s philosophical stance of iron­
ism argues against its universal best practice application. An ironist recognizes
that languages evolve over time as the
kinds of problems they face evolve; yet,
he or she also recognizes there are languages that do not change and that do
lay claim to being applicable in all situations at all times. Rorty describes these
kinds of languages as “metalanguages”
and they represent a particular challenge to the growth of human practices
(Rorty, 1989, p. 122). We argued above
that existing, formal project management methods could be characterized
as a metalanguage. The purpose of the
project management metalanguage, in
this context, is to provide an overarching frame of reference for all problems
within the organization. As such, the
metalanguage attempts to subsume all
other specialist languages into it. The
development of project management as
a practice has been made extremely difficult by the existing formal project management metalanguage, which seeks to
ignore ambiguity of meaning between
practices by imposing a language-game
of its own (Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006a).
The Metalanguage of Formal Project
Management Practice
The approach of the metalanguage, in
the form of formal project management
practices, may be contrasted with the
approach of an existential hermeneutic
practitioner, who, through attunement
to disruption and a reflective, nondefensive attitude, is able to recognize
that attempting to marginalize other
specialist languages, more often than
not, leads to disharmony and failure (Ivory, Alderman, McLoughlin, &
Vaughan, 2006). Rather, an ironic disposition to language allows the existential hermeneutic project manager to
recognize the necessity of the multiple
language-games in operation and work
at the intersections between them. It is
argued that one of the critical aspects
of project management practice is to
recognize the ambiguity of meanings
brought about by the multiple specialist languages in operation in any large,
contemporary organization (Ackroyd,
1994). As Linehan and Kavanagh (2006)
observe, the concept of project management as a universalized practice
able to transcend countries, cultures,
organizations, and departments is
very powerful. They believe that one
of the reasons why the more formal
project management metalanguage
has “flourished” is because of the “‘silo’
mentality in organizations wherein
there are perceived communications
barriers between departments or functional units” (p. 56). Individual business
units are, they argue, “isomorphic,” with
their own “distinct languages—hence
we have a sales language, a production language, an accounting language
and so on” (p. 56). They note: “Project
management has been proffered as a
potent integrating mechanism to counter the (linguistic) fragmentation that
is rampant in the contemporary organisational setting” (p. 56). What Linehan
and Kavanagh find most ironic in this
solution is that it seeks to impose “yet
another language into the mix, namely
the language of project management,
with its vocabulary of bar charts,
resource histograms, work breakdown
structure, project life cycle balanced
matrix, project risk analysis, critical
path method and so on” (Linehan &
Kavanagh, 2006, p. 56).
For language-games other than the
natural sciences, the dispute has been
whether any of the terms they deploy
can refer externally, or whether our
languages are entirely self-referential
(Rorty, 1979). Rorty sees that we, as
human beings, have a deep-seated
desire to view the “noises and marks”
that constitute our verbal and nonverbal
communications as being “at one” with
the world around us (Rorty, 1989, p. 37).
Rorty (1979) argues that, most of the
time, when we talk or write about something, we think we are talking or writing
about the world “as it is.” This leads us to
think that, given enough time, we could
describe anything with such detail that
further description would be redundant and a different description would
be impossible. Rorty claims that this is
simply an idea, one our society did not
always have, and one we can do without. He argues that we should abandon
our propensity for adopting languages
heavily invested in notions of truth and
adopt languages invested in notions of
what works (Rorty, 1979).
The privilege of the overarching
metalanguage, or what Rorty (1979)
refers to as “nature’s own vocabulary”
(p. 23), is a myth. An ironic stance
toward project management practice
would grant one language no more,
or less, privilege than any other. During periods of disruption, existential
threats, or crisis, there will be innumerable specialist languages at play in
an organization, each encompassing its
own notions of truth and its own criteria
for success or failure (Reedy, 2008). A
project management practitioner gains
considerably from recognizing each of
these languages and also recognizes
that genuine progress occurs between
them. In playing between languages,
where the terms of one language-game
do not necessarily translate meaningfully into another, for the project
manager to seek a common standard
of ground would actually be irrational
(Arnold & Fischer, 1994). Scott Berkun
(2005) takes up this point in The Art of
Project Management:
It’s not surprising then that the planningrelated books in the corner of my office
disagree heavily with each other. Some
focus on business strategy, others on
engineering and scheduling processes
(the traditional focus of project planning), and a few on understanding and
designing for customers. But more distressing than their disagreements is that
these books fail to acknowledge that
other approaches even exist. This is odd
because none of these perspectives—
business, technology, customer—can
ever exist without the others. More so,
I’m convinced that success in project
planning occurs at the intersections in
these different points of view. Any manager who can see those intersections has
a large advantage over those who can’t.
(p. 52)
As previously outlined, existing
project management methods generally seek to achieve success through the
application of the overarching metalanguage of formal project management
practice. In doing so, the metalanguage
of project management aims to render
commensurable the disagreements to
which Berkun (2005) refers. An existential hermeneutic approach of ironic
redescription helps a project practitioner avoid granting one language
primacy over another, recognizing the
legitimacy of each of them in providing
what Bolman and Deal referred to earlier in this article as frames of understanding the organization. For Bolman
and Deal, a frame is a “mental model—
a set of ideas and assumptions—that
you carry in your head to help you
understand and negotiate a particular
‘territory’” (p. 14). They argue: “A good
frame makes it easier to know what you
are up against and, ultimately, what
you can do about it” (p. 16). A frame
can also limit our ability to master
complex situations. Utilizing a Heideggerian motif, they observe: “Managers
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who master the hammer and expect
all problems to behave like nails find
life at work confusing and frustrating”
(p. 27). They also argue that advanced
managers deliberately “reframe” complex problems in order to challenge
the assumptions in which the problem is based. “The wise manager,” they
observe, “wants at hand a diverse collection of high quality implements.
Experienced managers also understand
the difference between possessing a
tool and knowing how and when to use
it” (Bolman & Deal, 2013, p. 27).
Similarly, Rorty (1979) presents redescription as a deliberate activity that
renders existing terms within a languagegame unfamiliar through their juxtaposition and/or contradiction with other
terms within the same or different languages. The difference between Rorty’s
redescription and the tool of “reframing”
offered by Bolman and Deal is that Bolman and Deal offer only four kinds of
frames. In these four frames, they “consolidate major schools of organizational
thought and research into a comprehensive framework encompassing four distinct perspectives . . . structural, human
resource, political, and symbolic” (2013,
p. 35). Each of the frames Bolman and
Deal describes has fundamental axioms
and principles that coincide with what
Rorty refers to as a final vocabulary. However, rather than limit our understanding
of final vocabularies as belonging to one
of only four perspectives, Rorty sees every
human practice having its own unique
frame.
Rorty’s view of language-games provides a far more nuanced and powerful perspective on the importance of
language as a tool. A language-game
is constituted by what Rorty refers to
as “an agreed upon set of conventions
about what counts as a relevant contribution, what counts as answering a
question, what counts as having a good
argument for that answer or a good
criticism of it” (Rorty, 1979, p. 320). In
Rorty’s perspective, anywhere, human
beings find it necessary to work with
one another; they will generate their
own language-game, one that is both
parasitic on broader social languages,
but also unique in its own particular deployment of linguistic terms
(Rorty, 1989).
Heidegger (1996) suggests that we
are what we practice and that practice
is determined by the language we grew
up with or were “thrown” into, and we
never got the chance to choose that
language (p. 183). Rorty builds on this
and describes an “ironist” as someone dissatisfied with the terms of his
or her language-game and as wanting
to “get out from under their inherited
vocabulary” (Rorty, 1989, p. 74). An
ironist is someone ruefully aware that
he or she has no final vocabulary (i.e.,
fixed and unarguable belief system),
yet he or she recognizes he or she cannot get along without one because he
or she has to deal with people who
do not share his or her same sense of
contingency (Rorty, 1989, p. 74). Language, for Rorty, consists entirely of
terms in a transition between one of two
states: metaphor and dead metaphor
(or literalness). A metaphor is simply
the use of old words in unfamiliar ways,
and it is the unfamiliarity of the usage
that gives the expression its transformational power (Rorty, 1989). Sometimes,
Rorty explains, an unfamiliar expression catches on and falls into general
use. The expression becomes a familiar
one and the metaphorical nature of it
dies. It is now literal or “dead.” Rorty
uses the example of the “mouth of a
river” to highlight his point. When first
used, it must have seemed a strange
expression, for only animals actually
“had” mouths, but something about the
usage of it appealed; the imagery it
excited stayed in our consciousness,
and we now speak literally of the mouth
of a river (Rorty, 1989). Although this
linguistic process is itself well understood (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003), what
is critical in Rorty’s conception of it
is how it applies to all our linguistic
terms. Every expression we have in our
language originated as a metaphor and,
through the contingencies and vagaries
58 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
of our history, the ones we use have
settled into literalness (Rorty, 1989).
Ironism, for Rorty, is the recognition
of the metaphorical nature of our language and the ever-present possibility
of redescription. The disruptive effect
of using old terms in new and unfamiliar ways is what the ironist seeks and
sees as necessary in his or her personal
projects of self-creation (Rorty, 1989).
Frazier calls redescription the “engine
of self-creation” and sees Rorty’s ironist
as wanting to “relate autonomously to
their inherited vocabularies” by “getting
out from under them” (Frazier, 2006,
p. 462). Rorty’s notion of self is therefore
the product of the vocabulary we have
available to us through chance, and we
are free to play with that vocabulary
and extend it by finding new terms. The
alternative is to see some expressions
in our vocabulary as permanently fixed
and constant, as cohering to something outside of language and making a redescription of it nonsensical.
The refusal to accept such expressions
as only metaphors is to submit to the
final vocabulary about which no further
discussion can take place (Rorty, 1991,
pp. 160–163).
The tension in Rorty’s concept of
redescription is the ironist’s effort to
transcend his or her final vocabulary,
while at the same time acknowledging that it is not possible (or even, one
could argue, desirable) to completely
ignore it. As Rorty states: “Being is what
final [emphasis added] vocabularies are
about. A final vocabulary is one we cannot help using, for when we reach it our
spade is turned. We cannot undercut it
because we have no metavocabulary in
which to phrase criticisms of it” (Rorty,
1991, p. 37). Another way of putting
it is to say who we are right now is
defined by what we take for granted in
our vocabulary. Who we might become
depends on what we are prepared to
“play” with: “Historical narratives about
social and intellectual movements are
the best tools to use in tinkering with
ourselves, for such narratives suggest
vocabularies of moral deliberation in
which to spin coherent narratives about
our individual lives” (Rorty, 1991, p.
163).
The notion of spinning coherent
narratives serves to highlight one of
the principal activities of redescription
in the context of project management
practice: the opening up of creative
possibility within the project space
through continual dialogue (Rorty,
1979). This contrasts sharply with the
traditional view of conversation within
more formal project management
practices, which in many cases, seek
to answer questions and close down
dialogue through the application of
a single, correct perspective. Todres
(2007) points out that conversation
should not be seen as providing “final
and conclusive law-like absolutes” but
rather provide “possibilities around
which unique variations and actualities
can occur” (p. 74).
In elaborating on conversation as
the basis of an existential hermeneutic,
Rorty (1979) offers the view that
to see keeping a conversation going as a
sufficient aim of philosophy, to see wisdom as consisting in the ability to sustain
a conversation, is to see human beings as
generators of new descriptions rather than
beings one hopes to be able to describe
accurately. (p. 378)
This article argues that if one were
to replace the word “philosophy” in
this quote with project management,
it would surely be a suitable aim for
project management practice.
Conclusion
With reference to the works of Heidegger and Rorty, we have shown that
being philosophical can provide a
framework within which project managers can work with disruptions to
develop their own and their clients’
practices. To be philosophical is to work
within the space of existential disruptions. Existential disruptions are those
kinds of disruptions in which we can
no longer take our fundamental conventions or assumptions for granted.
The philosophical dimension of being a
project manager includes the art of conversations for redescription in the space
of disruption. Historically, the scientific
ways in which project management has
been conceived is to attempt to control
for disruption.
For the project manager charged
with the responsibility of delivering
the aims of the project, the universal
language of formal project management is meant to provide an overarching framework within which the terms
of control can be established, and the
corresponding terms of success and
failure can be attributed. For the project team members assigned from their
various core disciplines to the “virtual
and semi-permanent structure of the
project,” the language of formal project
management is meant to provide “a single coherent framework” within which
all the terms previously deployed in different areas can now be rendered commensurable with one another (Ivory
et al., 2006, p. 331). The notion of the
“universal metalanguage” and the control it is perceived to provide is a significant operating principle of project
management practice and, this article
argues, a significant weakness. The concept of the universal project management metalanguage has its foundation
in the rational framework of the natural
sciences. The perceived success of the
natural sciences in the centuries since
the scientific method became popular
has seen the word “scientific” become
analogous to “truth” and any practice derived from scientific principles
as sharing in this truthfulness (Rorty,
1979). The problem remains that the scientific language on which formal project
management methods are largely based
uses individual terms to refer externally to physical objects, and it is that
reference that is assumed to provide
science with its objectivity. In order for
the language of science to operate successfully, all aspects of the environment
need to be reduced to quantifiable,
measurable natural objects, or scientific language has no basis on which
to operate (Chalmers, 1976). However,
this kind of disinterested objectivity has
little bearing on the embodied issues
that project managers regularly face.
Project management practice typically
confronts issues of meaning that has
individual human beings as the external
referents rather than inanimate objects.
As noted earlier by Heidegger, reflection
on our ways of being in practice are not
the same as reflection on the objects of
scientific enquiry.
A successful project manager, this
article argues, would resemble an ironist,
insofar as he or she shares with the
ironist the lingering feeling he or she
was born into the “wrong language
game” and thus tends to refer to the
language of formal project management with terms such as “game,” “perspective,” and “conceptual framework”
(Rorty, 1989, p. 75). The awareness of
the contingency of his or her vocabulary provides the ironic project manager with the opportunity to redescribe
his or her language-games. This view
can be contrasted with the more traditional practitioner, who does not want
to redescribe the language-game of
project management he or she simply
wants it “accepted as it is” (Rorty, 1989,
pp. 73–75). The existential hermeneutic
philosophical approach outlined here
allows project managers to view disruption as an opportunity to disclose ways
of reframing or redescribing a project.
What Einstein once said of a scientific
problem can also be said of a project
problem: The problem is never solved
in the terms in which it is formulated.
The resolution of a problem or project
requires a new way of seeing things.
As we have indicated in this article,
one way this can occur is through the
practice of redescription, which occurs
in moments of existential disruption.
Project management as a discipline
is going through such an existential
disruption. The traditional scientific
models are no longer a sufficient condition for effective practice and for
establishing trust in ways of practicing.
As project managers, not only would we
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An Existential Hermeneutic Philosophical Approach to Project Management
gain from becoming more philosophical but we also gain from exploring
philosophy as an opportunity for working through the existential disruptions
to our own underlying conventions and
assumptions.
Chalmers, A. (1976). What is this thing
called science? St. Lucia, Queensland:
University of Queensland Press.
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Bradley Rolfe, PhD, MBA, has over 20 years of
experience in the delivery of technologically diverse,
multipartner, and multimillion dollar enterprise-wide
infrastructure projects and programs of work across
the banking and finance, IT and telecommunications,
and government sectors. In addition to his MBA, he
recently completed a doctoral thesis on the theory
of project management at the Macquarie Graduate
School of Management. In his spare time, he lectures
on project management for the MBA programs at
the University of Sydney Business School and the
Macquarie Graduate School of Management. He has
also published and presented papers on project management and philosophy for a number of international
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edu.au
Nietzsche, F. (1969). On the geneology of
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Steven Segal PhD, MA, BA Hons., is a Senior
Lecturer at the Macquarie Graduate School of
Management. He lectures across a range of subjects,
including philosophy of management, leading with
a global mindset, executive coaching, managerial
psychology, entrepreneurship and existentialism,
leadership, and motivation. He is the author of several books, including Business Feel: Leading in the
Context of Organisational Paradigm Transformations
(Palgrave) and Managerial Inquiry in the Context
of Creative Destruction (Gower). He is a registered
psychologist and is recognized internationally as a
pioneer in the field of philosophical practice. His
prime area of interest is the relationship between
existential philosophy and professional development.
He can be contacted at [email protected]
Perrin, R. (2008). Real world project management: Beyond conventional wisdom,
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Svetlana Cicmil, PhD, MBA, BSc Civ Eng, is Director
of Doctoral Research in Business and Law at University
of the West of England, Bristol, United Kingdom.
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Svetlana’s career has been rich and varied.
A civil engineer by training, she worked in
the construction industry before joining the
international academic environment as a researcher
and executive management educator two decades
ago. Svetlana’s professorship is in the studies of
project-based work and management in a global
context, informed by critical phenomenological
approaches and complexity thinking. Although
she may be best known for her involvement in
pioneering the intellectual movement known as
Making Projects Critical with Damian Hodgson
(Manchester Business School, University of
Manchester), her widely published international
scholarly portfolio also includes developments of
pedagogy for responsible management education,
the pursuit of advanced understandings of the
global sustainability agenda, and engagements
with practitioners and global communities.
Svetlana has held a number of strategic roles and
visiting scholarly appointments, which include
institutional representation at and memberships
62 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
with U.N. Global Forum principles for responsible
leadership and management education (PRME),
Project of Management Institute’s (PMI’s) academic
advisory board, Global Network for Human Rights
and the Environment (GNHRE), and professorial
appointments with U.N. University for Peace–
European Centre for Peace and Development (ECPD)
in the Balkans, Johannes Kepler Universitaet, Linz,
Austria, and University of Vaasa, Finland, and the
Bristol Leadership Centre. She can be contacted at
[email protected]
PAPERS
Let’s Discuss Aesthetics for Projects
Bronte van der Hoorn, University of Southern Queensland, Australia
Jon Whitty, University of Southern Queensland, Australia
ABSTRACT ■
Introduction
Aesthetics is concerned with the knowledge
and affects related to sensory experience and
corporeality (the body). While there has been
an increase in the literature based on nonpositivist foundations and focusing on the
“lived experience” of projects, there remains
a need to recognize aesthetic factors—for
example: dress, office layout, and body
language—in the project experience. Aesthetics enable us to access facets of the project
experience that are beyond the rational and
analytic. This article uses Heideggerian concepts to explore this “missing mass” in project management and proposes the need for
further research and education in this area.
esthetics are at the heart of a “missing mass” in our exploration
of the experience of project work. Cases of project failure are in
abundance and the number of prescriptions for improving project
outcomes continues to grow. Dominating these prescriptions,
however, are recommendations focused on the rational aspects of project
management (budget management, scheduling, planning and control, and
so forth) (for example, please refer to the Knowledge Areas discussed in
A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide) –
Fifth Edition [Project Management Institute, 2013]). We propose that such
rationally based prescriptions are not sufficient because there is more
than utility and rationality at play in the experience of project work. We
acknowledge, as does Pollack (2007), that there has been growing attention
to such aspects in the discourse on the soft aspects of project management.
We believe, however, that this can be further expanded through considering
aesthetics as a “missing mass” at the core of project phenomena. We propose
the need for a research agenda that explores aesthetics in the experience of
project work.
Aesthetics can be contrasted to rational, cognitive, and utilitarian concepts (Bazin, 2013; Piras, 2007) and is concerned with the experience and
effects of stimuli through the senses (Bowie, 2003). In practical terms, we are
referring to the (as yet generally) unrecognized impact of factors—such as
dress, body language, presentation of information, office layouts, and meeting
locations—on those involved with project work. In this discussion, we highlight that we are referring to the aesthetics of the project experience rather
than the aesthetics of project deliverables (products or services), which has
received some coverage in previous literature.
In this conceptual discussion, we propose that aesthetics are a “missing
mass” permeating how we experience projects that has not yet been given
due recognition for its influence. We propose that aesthetics are a catalyst
to many aspects of project management; hence, it is necessary to undertake further inquiry into their existing use and effect and potential further
application.
We begin by discussing the concept of a “missing mass” in projects,
which is then followed by an exploration of the concept of aesthetics, and
the limited reference to aesthetics within existing project literature but
more significant coverage in broader organizational literature. We then
argue why aesthetics is part of this “missing mass” through discussion of
two empirical studies and linking these with related literature. Finally,
Heideggerian concepts from Being and Time (1962), such as equipmental
totality and worlds and the physical sciences concept of catalysts, are used
to derive three key implications. The first implication is associated with aesthetics as an integrative lens in the soft versus hard paradigms discourse.
The second implication is that aesthetics is an area for further research
in this discipline. The third implication is the need for project management education to include aesthetics. We note that, although we draw on
KEYWORDS: theory of project
management; aesthetics; lived experience
of projects; Heidegger; continental
philosophy
Project Management Journal, Vol. 47, No. 3, 63–76
© 2016 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
A
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Let’s Discuss Aesthetics for Projects
Heideggerian concepts in this discussion, we are not specifically using a
“Heideggerian Aesthetics” lens. Such
an exploration is beyond the scope
of this article; it is potentially a subperspective of the broader aesthetics
agenda we propose here.
The “Missing Masses”
In the 1930s, astrophysicist Fritz Zwicky
identified that there was significantly
greater gravity in the cosmos than could
be attributed to known objects such as
stars and galaxies (Tyson, 2003). This
discrepancy was coined the “missing
masses.” These “missing masses” were
‘something’ that was clearly there—it
was causing an effect—but that ‘something’ had not yet been identified. In the
1970s, this concept was again observed
by Vera Rubin and W. Kent Ford (Riess,
2015). Subsequently, the term “dark
matter” superseded “missing masses”
(Riess, 2015). Dark matter has been
suggested to be about five times more
prevalent than the cosmological objects
(matter) that we are familiar with. The
quest for the nature of this dark matter
continues today (Stockholm University,
2015).
Latour (1992) draws on this concept when discussing the actor network
approach that argues that artefacts are
an important element in replacing, constraining, and shaping human action. He
suggests (1992, p. 152) that sociologists
were “constantly looking, somewhat desperately, for social links sturdy enough
to tie all of us together or for moral laws
that would be inflexible enough to make
us behave properly.” Similar to the astrophysicists and their inability to ‘balance’
their understanding of the cosmos, sociologists were missing ‘something’ in their
arithmetic of society. Obviously, Latour
posits, it was in ‘non-humans’ that this
“missing mass” could be found.
We would argue that the discipline
of project management is similarly
struggling with identifying a “missing
mass.” Prior to the mid-2000s, there was
a strong positivist underpinning to project management theory and practice.
Bredillet (2004, p. 2) commented at this
time:
“Historically, the tools, techniques and
methods of project management have
involved a conceptual approach, based
on a specific paradigm, which was mostly,
a positivist one. We need to question
whether this is the appropriate paradigm for the kind of project management
which claims to be able to deal with complex problems that do not have clear or
straightforward solutions.”
In 2006, the Rethinking Project Management network (Winter et al., 2006)
was a notable turning point for project research. The purpose of the network was to “develop a research agenda
aimed at extending and enriching
mainstream project management ideas
in relation to the developing [project]
practice” (Winter & Smith, 2006, p. 3).
The outcomes of the network were a call
for new approaches to project research,
particularly the need for a practice
focus. We suggest this represents an
initial recognition of a “missing mass”
in the project literature. We argue that
the network’s agenda of aligning more
with practice was acknowledging that,
within the project literature at that time,
there was an imbalance in what actually occurs and what had been previously identified as being the knowledge
(literature) of project management.
Over the subsequent ten years we
have seen some diversification in the
exploration of projects. There has been
discussion of alternative foundational
approaches (for example, a Heideggerian paradigm), calls to focus on project
actuality or the “lived experience,” and
for new research methodologies and
methods (for examples, refer to Cicmil,
Williams, Thomas, & Hodgson, 2006;
Drouin, Muller, & Sankaran 2013; van
der Hoorn & Whitty, 2015). In terms
of definition, the “lived experience”
agenda is described by Cicmil et al.
(2006) as focusing on what occurs in
the concrete practice of project managing. In our use of this term in this
article, we are particularly interested in
64 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
the experience of individuals involved
in a project. There has also been discussion of the dominance of the hard
aspects of project management versus
the soft aspects (Pollack, 2007). Despite
this, Svejvig and Andersen (2015) have
acknowledged that, since 2006, there
continues to be a comparative lack of
discourse reflecting the research agenda
that the network proposed.
The Rethinking Project Management contributions are obviously valuable and begin to provide balance to the
dominant positivist foundations of the
literature. This literature provides more
appropriate methodological grounding
and research methods for exploration
of the “lived experience” or actually
capturing the perceived experience of
project work. There remains an opportunity to conceptualize the foundational
nature of some of the insights (the “missing mass”), which is emerging from such
discourse. We would suggest that many
of these Rethinking Project Management perspectives suggest a particular
“missing mass” in project management.
We propose that some of this “missing mass” in the project literature is the
concept of aesthetics. Specifically, we
are proposing that there are numerous
aesthetic factors at play in the “lived
experience” of project work and that
these aren’t receiving sufficient coverage in project research. We argue that
much of the holistic practice focus
(“lived experience”) research reveals
(and could further reveal) that the phenomena of project work includes aesthetic characteristics rather than being
grounded in pure utility. Yet, much of
the dominant project management literature has a strong utilitarian essence:
it is characterized by rationality and
instrumentality and maximizing efficiency. Simply consider the dominant concept of critical success factors
(Cooke-Davies, 2002; White & Fortune,
2002). Broader organizational literature
also suffered from this lack of discourse
on aesthetics until the mid-1980s;
since then, however, there has been an
increasing discussion of their influence
(examples are provided in the Aesthetics in General Organizational Literature
section that follows). Aesthetics can be
contrasted to utility in that it recognizes
that we perceive stimuli through our
senses and that we can have responses
that are beyond a concern with maximizing efficiency or are purely rational.
Aesthetics
Before proceeding with our argument
of aesthetics as part of the “missing
masses” of project managing, it is pertinent to define the concept of aesthetics;
to highlight the mode of the enquiry; to
contrast aesthetics to existing lines of
enquiry; and to provide examples of its
application in relevant disciplines and
within project management.
Defining Aesthetics
The term aesthetics has its root in the
Greek term for sensory, ‘aisthánesthai,’
or ‘perceive sensuously’ (Bowie, 2003).
We highlight this, because in common
usage it is often linked with a narrower
focus on beauty. Strati (1996) states that
aesthetics in the context of organizational studies is not limited to beautiful,
but also refers to the ugly, grotesque,
and sublime.
Specific conceptions of aesthetics
includes Levinson’s (2009) description of aesthetic properties being those
Part A (i)
that are perceptual or observable (i.e.,
through our senses) and that can be
directly experienced. Levinson (2009,
Sec. 1.2) highlights that such properties
can often be characterized as:
“having gestalt character; requiring taste
for discernment; having an evaluative
aspect; affording pleasure or displeasure in
mere contemplation; being non-condition
governed; being emergent on lower-level
perceptual properties; requiring imagination for attribution; requiring metaphorical thought for attribution; being notably a
focus of aesthetic experience; being notably present in works of art.”
We highlight Levinson’s (2009) noting of a gestalt character being associated with aesthetics. A foundational
principle associated with gestalt thinking, is that the whole is different than the
sum of the parts (Sabar, 2013). There is
a recognition of the interaction between
components of a whole (Ellis, 1967;
Wenger, 1997); that is, individual components should not be considered in
isolation, because it is the configuration
of these components and their relationships (often dynamic) that create the
reality of the whole. This gestalt characteristic in aesthetics is illustrated in
Figure 1. Specifically, that aesthetic is
often not in a single item or in content,
but rather in form or structure and there
is an impact based on the interrelationships of the parts.
Strati (1999, p. 7) proposes that
aesthetics is central to the difference
between “rational and analytical analysis” of organizations and the “actual and
ideal.” Specifically, he suggests that aesthetics seeks to grasp the “lived experience of people as they act” (Strati, 1999,
p. 7). Taylor and Hansen (2005, p. 1212)
state that “aesthetics is concerned with
knowledge that is created from our sensory experiences. It also includes how
our thoughts and feelings and reasoning
around them inform our cognitions.”
Figure 2 highlights the influence of aesthetics in permeating our thoughts and
actions. We cannot understand why a
person is thinking or acting in a certain manner through purely rational
consideration.
If we consider the history of aesthetics we observe that, since Parmenides,
Western philosophy has favored an
intellectual approach to enquiry rather
than individuals’ sense-derived knowledge (Bowie, 2003). Subsequently, and
aligned with the continental–analytical philosophical divide, the modern
exploration of aesthetics (in a philosophical sense) has primarily been the
domain of the continental philosophers, such as Nietzsche and Heidegger
(Bowie, 2003; Taylor & Hansen, 2005).
Part B (ii)
Figure 1: Aesthetics have a gestalt quality. Contrast the mood/environment created through these different images. Part A (i) has many
elements (chairs, walls, soft furnishings, painting, ceiling height, and so forth) that are consistently focused on a single aesthetic. Part B (ii) has
the antique chair but lacks the same aesthetic because it has fewer and less consistent elements directed toward the same aesthetic.
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Let’s Discuss Aesthetics for Projects
Figure 2: The influence of aesthetics. Our responses to a situation are influenced by aesthetics—often these may be characteristics of the
experience that may be perceived irrelevant to the actual task at hand.
The foundations for modern aesthetics
can be attributed to eighteenth-century German philosopher, Alexander
Baumgarten, who defined aesthetics as
“the science of how things are cognitive by means of the senses” (Levinson,
2009, Sec 2.1).
Mode of Enquiry
Given the agreement within the literature that aesthetics are tightly coupled
with sense perception, it is inherent
that aesthetic enquiry is subjective and
interpretive by nature (Strati, 1996;
Taylor & Hansen, 2005; Toadvine, 2010).
It directs us toward the different insights
that can emerge from such a lens rather
than those of the traditionally dominant
positivist and functional foundations or
lenses. From a theoretical perspective,
it highlights that aesthetic perspectives
are unlikely to derive universal, summative findings. For practice, it highlights
that aesthetic effect and manipulation
cannot be distilled to rules.
Corporeality
The sensory emphasis of an aesthetic
perspective also draws our attention to
corporeality. Merleau-Ponty strongly
advocated for an alternative perspective to mind–body dualism (Matthews,
2009; Merleau-Ponty, 2004). He highlights the interrelatedness of the physi-
cal body (corporeality) and the mind
and this is fundamental to his continental philosophical position, in particular,
his concept that neither an empirical
or intellectual approach is sufficient
(Macann, 1993; Matthews, 2009). This
inescapability of our corporeality is an
important foundation to our argument.
If we see the mind and body as referential and coupled, the futility of a
purely rationale (mind-based) approach
becomes evident. We have bodies with
senses, and therefore stimuli perceived
through these senses affect us in various
ways. When we enter the workplace we
do not leave our bodies behind; our corporeality is part of our work experience.
descriptions of organizational routines
by putting senses, reflexes and emotions
as starting points of the analysis (Bazin
2013, p. 391).” Linstead and Hopfl (2000)
argue that aesthetics are distinct from
rationality and intellectual knowledge.
Taylor (2002, p. 838) summarizes the
gap that aesthetic inquiry and perspectives can fulfill: “[it] make[s] it legitimate
to have conversations about how it feels
to be in an organization. It will allow us
to draw on our full range of understanding and reason as humans rather than
just our rational/cognitive/intellectual
understanding and reasoning.”
Contrasting Aesthetic and Standard
Perspectives
Prior to arguing the criticality of aesthetics to project inquiry (that it is part of
the “missing mass”), we will review the
existing references regarding aesthetics
in the broader organizational literature
and then existing discourse on projects
and aesthetics. Key references relating
to organizational aesthetics and empirical examples of exploration of aesthetics
in organizations are shown in Table 1.
The following are examples of work
regarding aesthetics in the organizational literature; they highlight that an
aesthetic lens assists in providing a
perspective on experiences in organizations that rational methods will not
Although we hope not to present a
straw man against which aesthetics are
posed as opposite, there is value in
considering how utility can highlight
the qualities of aesthetics. For example,
Piras (2007) proposes that Baumgarten
viewed aesthetics as a form of knowing
that is distinct to dominant Cartesian
rationality. Bazin (2013, p. 391) suggests that aesthetic perspectives (such
as the study of gestures) enable us to
move beyond the “scientific organization” and standardization. It challenges
the “classical, cognitive and rationalist
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Aesthetics in General Organizational
Literature
Reference
Type
Key Concepts/Findings
Implication/Argument
(Strati,
1996)
Theoretical/ Argues for the use of an aesthetics lens to view
conceptual organizations: defines the use of aesthetics in the study
of organizations and how aesthetics can enhance our
understanding organizations.
(Strati,
1999)
Theoretical/ Argues that things that have an aesthetic effect do impact Classical organizational research assumes that
conceptual organizations/organizational life through human beings
when a human being enters the organization, he or
who are sensory.
she leaves his or her corporeality behind—this is
not the case. Consequently, the effect of aesthetics
cannot be ignored.
(Linstead &
Hopfl, 2000)
Theoretical/ Sets an agenda for the research of aesthetics in
Organizational research beyond the classical
conceptual organizations; defining key concepts and providing
paradigm (rationalism) is required.
examples of the use of the aesthetic lens in organizations.
(Taylor,
2002)
Theoretical/
conceptual
(with some
application)
Argues for considering the aesthetic experience
from the participants’ perspective, rather than using
the researchers’ aesthetic lens to view a situation.
However, it highlights that this can be difficult because,
traditionally, we (human beings) are not accomplished
in representing or communicating about our aesthetic
(feeling/sensorial) experiences.
The difficulties in designing research that will illicit
participants’ aesthetic experiences. Will require
development of new research methodologies/
methods.
(Connellan,
2013)
Theoretical/ Discusses the impact of using white (the ‘color’) in
conceptual buildings/spaces (including: churches, government
buildings, prisons, universities, and hospitals. Links are
made between the use of white and power. It is found
that the effect of white varies across these institutions.
Conceptual demonstration of new areas of
exploration (i.e., color) in terms of concepts such as
power.
(King &
Vickery, 2013)
Theoretical/ Proposes the need for exploration of our fashioning of
conceptual appearance as part of organizational life: a research
agenda ‘organizational fashion’ is set.
Conceptual demonstration of new areas of
exploration (i.e., fashion) in organizational literature.
Aesthetics enable access to intuitive knowledge.
(Witz, Warhurst, & Application
Nickson, 2003)
Offers a definition of ‘aesthetic labor:’ manipulating
the embodiment of employees (e.g., dress, deportment,
grooming) to be part of a particular service. This is then
demonstrated in two case studies.
In some organizational contexts, the aesthetic
characteristics of human beings are actively
leveraged as part of service delivery.
(Morrison, Gan,
Dubelaar, &
Oppewal, 2011)
Application
Undertakes and examines empirical research regarding
the effects of music and smell on in-store consumer
behavior.
Discloses the impacts of sensorial stimuli on
behavior.
(Piras,
2007)
Application
Explores the military experience through an
aesthetics lens.
Discloses characteristics of the experience
of military life that are only accessible when
considering sensorial impact.
(Bazin,
2013)
Application
Explores worker gestures (and artefacts used in bodily
movement) in a car factory (through secondary sources).
Recognizes an aesthetic element to routine practices—
not just utility.
Even in areas where we would consider efficiency,
rationalism, and efficiency to dominate, there
are aesthetic and corporeal characteristics to be
considered and/or examined.
(Martin,
2002)
Application
Uses an aesthetic perspective to explore aged care
facilities in the United Kingdom.
Discloses aspects of the experience of being in
an aged care facility that is not evident through
traditional analysis: smells, bodily sensations, and
so forth.
(Ewenstein &
Whyte, 2007)
Application
Exploration of aesthetic knowledge and how it is
generated and used through a case study of an
architectural firm.
Discloses organizational knowledge of an
alternative form.
Table 1: Key literature relating to organizations and aesthetics.
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disclose. Martin (2002) provides an aesthetic perspective of aged-care facilities in the United Kingdom and she
discusses the smell, sight, touch, and
sound sensations experienced by those
in the facilities. Martin (2002, p. 878)
contrasts this study to her previous
work, which has a positivist lens, finding that:
“. . . . . tasks, job descriptions, and mission
statements (among other formal qualities)
are only part of the story. Sensory experiences, judgments, and emotional reactions
permeate the social relations and practices
of residential organizations for the elderly.
Representations that omit them are partial
at best and misleading or false at worst.”
An aesthetics perspective is used by
Witz, Warhurst, and Nickson (2003) to
explore the control of body regimes of
shop assistants in a stylish retail store
and a hotel. They discuss the organization’s expectations of personal
grooming, instruction on reading body
language, and the concept of scripted
performance. They argue that “aesthetics and organization are inseparable
(Witz, Warhurst, & Nickson 2003, p. 41)”
and that they are fundamental to the
identity of an organization. We would
suggest that this highlights the power of
aesthetics both within an organization
(or profession) and for those interacting
with the organization (or individual).
Piras (2007) adopts an aesthetic lens
to explore the military. There is a focus
on artefacts within the discussion, highlighting their pathos and how they are
infused with meaning, emotions and
are perceived through the senses. The
value of the aesthetic lens is shown in
statements such as the following:
“The sensory or aesthetic experience is
an ineffable and elusive one. It escapes
rational definition and can only be understood by means of empathy, ‘standing in
someone else’s shoes,’ as the saying goes.
My understanding of the uneasiness felt
by the soldiers obliged to wear greasy camouflage on their face on a hot and sunny
May morning cannot be fully explained in
rational terms (Piras, 2007, p. 154).”
An architectural firm is the focus
of aesthetic inquiry by Ewenstein and
Whyte (2007), who explore the knowledge in symbols and signs and also
the experiences (feelings and embodied
experiences) of knowledge use. They
find that aesthetic knowledge goes
beyond words, and includes symbols
and experiences and propose that these
point to a new research agenda.
Morrison et al. (2011) discuss the
significant extant literature on the ability of store atmospherics to influence
the senses and therefore impact consumer behavior.
These atmospherics are aesthetic
elements, including music (auditory
stimulus) and aroma (smell). Their
empirical study in a fashion retail
setting found that music and aroma
affected the emotional states of shoppers, and hence their behavior.
Bazin (2013) contributes to corporeal and aesthetic perspectives on
organizations through exploration of
gestures and embodied artefacts by
workers in car factories. Bazin (2013)
highlights that a Taylorian attempt to
standardize body movements and strict
cognitive approaches have been superseded and that understanding gesture
in organizations through alternative
lenses is essential. Through focusing on
gesture, the study finds that becoming
a practitioner is not only about learning expert knowledge but also learning
about the sensorial, aesthetic, and corporal elements.
The effect of color is discussed by
Connellan (2013) in her exploration of
white space in organizations, particularly in terms of power. She explores
the use of white in buildings, such as
churches, the Parliament, prisons, universities, and mental-health institutions
and finds it is not possible to definitively
identify the effect of white. Rather, its
effect is contextual and dependent on
the structures and symbolism of the
broader environment.
Finally, King and Vickery (2013) explore
organizational fashion (employee dress) as
a heuristic in understanding some forms
68 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
of organizational knowledge and highlight
that clothing affects the wearer and those
in contact with the wearer. It is highlighted
that there is a connection between organizations and their locations through fashion,
and an opportunity for further exploration
of fashion in organizational studies.
In summary, existing references
related to organizations and aesthetics
highlight that organizations are social
and collective constructs and do not
simply derive knowledge from cognition
(rationality), but rather from all human
senses (Strati, 2000). Consequently,
studies that adopt an aesthetics lens can
provide a more complete understanding of the experience of being in organizations than that provided by traditional
(rational) lenses.
Aesthetics in the Project Literature
The most specific references to aesthetic elements in projects, as we are
discussing here, is a discussion by
Whitty and Schulz (2006) regarding
project management memes and Yue
and Liang’s (2011) discussion of workspace in project-based organizations.
Whitty and Schulz (2006) draw on the
concept of impression motivation and
impression construction and propose
“projects as theatre” (Whitty & Schulz,
2006, p. 468). They discuss project managers’ clothes, props, and scripts and
indicate how project managers leverage
these aesthetic elements to influence
and build identity. It provides grounding for further exploration of this use of
aesthetic elements as part of the phenomena of projects.
Yue and Liang (2011) focus on the
effect of physical office layout on innovation and communication in projectbased organizations. They determined
that office layout does have an effect on
communication, innovation, and efficiency; however, there are no ‘rules’ on
what will work best in a given situation.
A variety of contextual and personal
factors are influential. Flyvbjerg (2014)
also references aesthetics in projects.
His perspective is in reference to the
pleasure that designers and others
receive from creating beautiful and
iconic project deliverables.
The concept of product aesthetics has also been of interest to project
management researchers. For example,
Yu, Flett, and Bowers’ (2005) conceptual discussion of a value-centered
approach to project success, and the
use of the concept of a net product
operational value in this assessment,
highlight that net product operational
value does include the product’s aesthetic value to the user(s). Pons (2008)
discusses the intersection between
project management and new product development. Within this discussion there is discourse on the need to
include aesthetics in the required quality characteristics of new products. Pons
(2008) highlights that determining and
designing for aesthetic qualities can be
challenging because they are subjective and subject to change over time.
Also of a similar argument, Martinsuo
and Killen (2014) discuss value management in project portfolios and the need
to consider non-commercial aspects.
In their review of studies on strategic
value in single projects, they highlight
Luchs, Brower, and Chitturi’s (2012)
study, which found that the aesthetics
of project product(s) can be a determinant of value in certain circumstances.
We highlight that in this article we are
focusing on the aesthetics of the unfolding project experience, rather than the
aesthetics of the product or service a
project delivers.
This scanning of the existing literature highlights the growing exploration
of aesthetics and organizations. However, in contrast to broader organizational studies, the aesthetic perspective
has not yet permeated (to any notable
extent) project literature. It is evident
that there is a significant breadth of
opportunities available for exploration
of aesthetics in organizational settings
(i.e., including projects); for example,
clothing, body language, color, office
space layout, props, sounds, smells,
and gestures (as evidenced by existing
organizational aesthetics literature). It
is also reiterated that a common theme
in the literature reviewed is that the
aesthetic perspective provides us with
insights that cannot be derived from
more traditional research perspectives.
We now explore why aesthetics are
some of the “missing masses” in our
current understanding of projects.
Aesthetics as Part of the “Missing Mass”
in Project Managing
It has been established that aesthetics are a necessary complement (part
of the “missing mass”) to the dominant utility and cognitive knowledge
of organizational phenomena (refer to
Table 1). It is now necessary to discuss
aesthetics as the “missing mass” in
projects.
Empirical Support for an Aesthetic
Perspective of Projects
In making our argument of aesthetics as
part of the “missing mass” of projects,
we will draw from two empirical studies.
The first (study A) was undertaken at a
project management conference in Australia. The participants (self-selected as
project managers) were asked to draw
from their experience on managing a
project and then to explain it to the
researcher. This study was based on
a similar study by Whitty (2010). The
second study (study B) was an activity
held during a workshop with 16 project
managers from the researchers’ professional networks, in which the experience of project managing was explored
through a series of individual and group
activities. The aim of the workshop was
to get an ‘inside glimpse’ into project
managing. We have discussed extant
literature (in broader organizational
studies) that demonstrates how an
aesthetics lens discloses various nonrationality based insights regarding the
experience of being in organizations.
As such, the following empirical studies
are drawn upon to support the need to
expand this discussion to the project
context, rather than to be a standalone
or universal proof of aesthetics as part
of the experience of project managing.
Study A: Drawings
Study A had 37 self-selected participants who identified themselves as
project managers. They were asked to
recall an experience of managing a particular project and then to draw from
that experience. Although we wish to
avoid the tendency to universalize the
experiences of project managers (we
would argue that the phenomenon is
largely subjective), there is a strong pattern in the drawings of corporal representations or sense-related experience.
The Findings of Study A
Three participants drew on the feeling
of unpredictable or wildness of weather
(refer to Figure 3); for example, being
in a tornado, or whether changing from
sunny to stormy on any given day. Ten
participants drew images (refer to Figure
4 for sample) associated with motion,
moving forward and backward (not in
a straight linear direction), and being
plummeted up and down or pulling
in different directions. One participant
Figure 3: Project managing experienced like weather.
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Figure 4: Project managing experienced as ‘ups and downs’ and ‘backs and forths.’
• Making people do what they may not
want to do in the required timeframes
• Moving stakeholders from disagreement to agreement
• Conductor of time, people, data,
communication
• Walk the talk
• Influencer
Discussion
Figure 5: Project managing experienced as ‘falling weight.’
Although the participants in the workshop were not asked to specifically
describe what means they used when
undertaking list 2 activities, we propose
that additional empirical enquiry would
find that leveraging aesthetic elements
would be a key part of the skill in these
activities. We base this proposition on
the extant literature that associates aesthetics elements with list 2–type activities in other disciplines.
Body Language and Dress
drew someone juggling, and two participants drew weights falling on them
(refer to Figure 5).
Discussion
Corporeality
We would argue that drawings such as
these highlight that there is a corporeal
and sensory experience associated with
project managing. The activity of project managing is not purely cognitive.
The drawings of weight indicate feelings
of heaviness on the body (sensory experience), and the motion drawings suggest the experience of the body in space
and the variations in this experience
(being pulled/tension; the challenge in
moving forward, and so forth). Juggling
is clearly a reference to a task that can
only be done corporeally (and arguable
through tacit knowledge). The weather
is experienced through our bodies; for
example, dampness from rain, heat, and
cold. In summary, the findings of this
study support that there are corporal
and sensory aspects to the experience
of project managing. As such, there is
legitimacy in considering the discipline
from an aesthetic (as well as utility or
cognitive) perspective.
Study B: Project Managing List
A key outcome of study B was that the
participants (in small groups) developed
two lists. List 1 noted the activities that
they perceived were the ‘accepted’ or the
taught aspects of project management
(words noted in list 1 included: “process,” “tools,” “governance,” “standards,”
“compliance,” “reporting,” “Gantt,” “PMP,”
“templates,” and “methodologies”); list
2 noted the activities that are not necessarily traditionally associated (in a textbook sense) with project managing but
were fundamental to their work as project
managers.
The Findings of Study B
When we took an aggregated view of the
lists, list 2 activities had alignment with
the ‘soft skills’ (see Pollack, 2007, regarding soft skills) associated with projects
and some participants explicitly called
out this distinction to the hard skills.
The phrases/words in list 2 included:
•
•
•
•
Emotional intelligence
Building relationships
Build and use influence
Creating a positive environment and
outcome
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For example, the extant literature highlights that exerting influence and negotiating can be strongly affected by the
use of body and voice mimicry to build
connection (for example, Phipps, 2012).
We also propose that project managers,
to support their management of relationships, leverage dress (and accessories). Witz, Warhurst, and Nickon’s (2003)
study suggests evidence of this in a retail
setting. Rafaeli, Dutton, Harquail, and
Mackie-Lewis (1997) discuss how female
administrators in a university setting use
dress as part of the execution of their role.
Whitty’s (2010) findings provide support
for these propositions in the project
context. For example, one participant in
his study commented: “Well you’ve got
to at least look the part haven’t you?
You’ve got to at least look as if you can
deliver” (Whitty, 2010, p. 33). Another
commented: “I think project managers
should be like doctors in some ways. You
have to ooze confidence in what you’re
saying, even if deep down you don’t really
believe it yourself” (Whitty 2010, p. 33).
Environment
Given the matrix structures within which
projects often take place (Gardiner, 2005)
and the subsequent formal power challenges that project managers may have
(Kerzner, 2006), we propose that project managers use sensorial techniques
to influence behavior (through informal power). This might include taking
stakeholders or team members to coffee
rather than meeting in the office meeting room or corresponding via email.
It may be quicker and easier to use the
latter technique, but the project manager is using the aesthetics of the environments (i.e., the coffee shop versus
the meeting room) to impact the conversation. There is evidence of the link
between environment and behavior in
the extant literature in other disciplines.
For example, Hemer (2012) discusses
the use of ‘meeting over coffee’ in postgraduate supervisor–candidate relationships. Elwood and Martin (2000) discuss
how location affects the power and positionality of those participating in interviews and the nature of interactions.
Furthermore, Oldenburg and Brissett
(1982), in discussing ‘third places,’ highlights that locations outside the home
or workplace are associated with informality, equality, and happy gatherings
and that they can undercut traditional
power relationships. We propose that
some project managers (consciously or
unconsciously) are aware of such linkages and use this to their advantage.
Communication/Information Design
We also expect that project managers may present information in different ways to affect the way a message
is received and therefore subsequent
action. Color may be used (consider
red, amber, green traffic light report) to
invoke a specific action. For example,
Lamptey and Fayek (2012) discuss the
incorporation of traffic light reporting in
dashboard report design. Project documentation may have a different style
or branding than that of the broader
organization to highlight that the initiative is special or different and therefore
can be treated in a different way. Project
managers may also design and alter
their desks or office spaces to invoke
certain corporeal or sensory experiences. For example, they may have
additional chairs located in their office
(or next to their desk) for people to stop
by and chat informally or a round table
to encourage equity in conversation.
As introduced by Vilnai-Yavetz, Rafaeli,
and Yaacov (2005), there is a significant
body of literature linking office space
design to behavior; and it is necessary
to consider the instrumental, aesthetic,
and symbolism in office design. We propose that project managers may also
post project-related photographs, diagrams, or tables in their office as visual
reminders to what is being achieved.
The Art of Project Management
We also believe the findings of this study
align with references in the project
literature to the ‘art of project management’ (as opposed to a purely scientific approach) (for example, Belzer,
2001; Berkun, 2005; Morris, Crawford,
Hodgson, Shepherd, & Thomas, 2006;
Turner, 1996; Winter, Smith, Morris, &
Cicmil, 2006). Such literature suggests
that there are elements of project managing that are not explicit and cannot
be understood in terms of a rules-base
or pure cognition. There is a degree of
mastery (which is not reliant on rules)
that is required in project managing. Of
a similar view are discussions regarding the tacit or praxis components of
project managing and improvisation
in projects (Blomquist, Hällgen, Nilsson, & Söderholm, 2010; Bredillet, 2005;
Cicmil et al., 2006; Leybourne & SadlerSmith, 2006). For example, the advanced
interpersonal skills that are needed for
undertaking the activities noted in list 2
are not purely cognitive and they rely on
the ability to perceive through various
senses the feelings of another person
and to use one’s own corporeality to
respond appropriately.
The outcomes of these studies and
our subsequent discussion are not proposed to provide universal validation
of the use of aesthetics by project managers. They do, however, suggest that
this proposition is likely, and given the
findings in the broader organizational
literature, that further enquiry is warranted to explore aesthetics for projects.
A Cautionary Word on Categorizing as
Aesthetics or Utility
It is important to highlight that we are
not arguing that any given object or
activity in project managing is utilitarian
or aesthetic; rather, we do believe that it
is necessary to consider both aspects in
our exploration of projects. We will take
the Gantt chart as an example. There are
contrasting perspectives in the literature regarding the use of a Gantt chart.
Classical textbook perspectives see it
as a tool for planning, managing, and
control of the schedule (Project Management Institute, 2013). An alternative
perspective is that project managers do
not actually use it for this purpose but
rather for managing upward (Whitty,
2011) or because it is the thing to do
(Whitty, 2010). If we take the former
perspective, we may see the tool from a
purely utilitarian perspective; it is being
argued as an ‘efficient’ best-practice tool
for managing a project’s schedule. We do
not subscribe that the Gantt chart is universally sound for managing a project’s
schedule, but make the proposition for
illustrative purposes. If we take the latter perspective, we would argue that the
tool’s aesthetic qualities are being used
to create some affect (appeasing management, looking organized; see Whitty,
2010), the document has a certain presentation style, and this is visually perceived and preferred by management
who associates this with sound project
management. In this sense it is effective;
it has utility through its aesthetic, even
though it may not have utility (i.e., be
maximally efficient) in planning or managing the project’s schedule.
As another example, we would
argue that our understanding of premeetings before board meetings can be
better understood when we consider
both the aesthetic and utility perspectives. From a purely utilitarian (maximum efficiency) perspective, one could
question the benefits in holding a series
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of meetings prior to the main board
meeting. Simply, it can take significant
time; if we consider aesthetics, though,
we can reveal an alternative perspective. Personalized pre-meetings can
enable the project manager through
aesthetics (i.e., tailoring messages and
delivery to the board member’s sensory preferences) to increase the chance
of the desired outcomes at the board
meeting. This concept of pre-establishment of consensus is known as nemawashi in Japanese (Fetters, 1995). Rees
and Christine (1998) in a discussion of
employee engagement also disclose the
use of pre-meetings before the “official meeting” to determine the positions to be taken at the “official activity.”
Returning to project management, at
the board meeting, it may not be possible to address the sensory preferences
of all board members simultaneously;
as such, the pre-meetings can be seen
to have utility due to the leveraging of
aesthetics. In summary, we argue that
through considering the sensory perspective (aesthetics) we can increase
our holistic understanding of the experience and practice of project managing.
Implications for an Aesthetic
Perspective of Project
Managing
We have argued that aesthetics is part of
the “missing mass” in the phenomenon
of projects. To derive implications from
this argument, we now leverage concepts from the Heideggerian paradigm
of projects and the physical sciences.
We identify three key implications: a
change in conceptualization of the soft
versus hard aspects of project managing, implications for research, and
implications for education.
The Heideggerian Paradigm Disclosing
Aesthetics as Part of Project Managing
Equipment
The Heideggerian paradigm of projects
(based on Being and Time, 1962) discusses the concept of equipmental totality and worlds (van der Hoorn & Whitty,
2015). For Heidegger, an equipmental
totality is a group of things and people
that confer meaning on one another
(Heidegger, 1962). A particular equipmental totality is a world (Greaves,
2010). For example, the kitchen in a
house would be an equipmental totality.
The objects (equipment) in that room
make sense in that space and with the
purpose with which it is used. A kettle makes sense in that equipmental
totality because food and beverages are
prepared in that area. The same kettle
would not make sense placed in the garden (a different equipmental totality).
As human beings, we move between
many of these equipmental totalities or
worlds, and, in many cases, the equipment we associate with different worlds
is not mutually exclusive.
van der Hoorn and Whitty (2015)
propose that there is the world of each
individual project, a world of project
management, and a world of projects
with equipment (this can be artefacts,
processes, and so forth) both overlapping
and being unique to each of these worlds.
For example, Gantt charts may be part
of the world of an individual project
(because the project manager uses one),
and the world of project management
(the equipmental totality associated with
the norms of project managing). A particular construction process, however,
may be part of the world of an individual
project but it is not part of the world of
project management.
The Heideggerian paradigm also
highlights that equipment within these
worlds can be ready-to-hand or unreadyto-hand, which means that particular
processes or methods or tools can either
be effective or ineffective for a given
world. We would argue that aesthetic
characteristics of equipment are equally
part of these worlds as utility characteristics of equipment, and they can equally
enable or constrain the achievement
of outcomes in those worlds. They can
enable or constrain thoughts and behaviors aligned with the project objectives
or otherwise. Dress, office layouts,
design of project artefacts, and so forth
have been identified above as examples
72 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
of equipment embodying aesthetic qualities; for simplicity in nomenclature, we
now term these as aesthetic equipment.
This is not to exclude them from also
being utility equipment; rather, it highlights that they may serve a function
beyond pure utility.
The Concept of Catalysts as Disclosing
the Amplifying Effect of Aesthetics in
Project Managing
Within the physical sciences, we have
the concept of catalysts. Catalysts are
chemicals that amplify chemical reaction rates (Encyclopaedia Britannica,
2015). If we link back to the Heideggerian paradigm, we would state that
catalysts amplify elements within the
equipmental totality. Examples of this
catalytic effect include how a series
of metronomes that are out-of-sync
can eventually become synchronous
through a particular catalyst, in this
case a particular board upon which they
are sitting, which couples the metronomes toward synchronicity (Monlinear
Dynamic Systems, 2012).
We would suggest that within the
various worlds of projects it is equipment with aesthetic qualities that can
be catalysts for much of the phenomena
or behavior that we observe. Those in
these worlds may leverage this equipment, which has aesthetic characteristics consciously or unconsciously. If
we link back to the “missing mass” concept we highlight that, to date, we have
seen some behaviors or outcomes in our
worlds of projects without generally recognizing that it is the aesthetic characteristic in particular equipment that was
the catalyst for these phenomena. That
is, certain observed or experienced phenomena cannot be explained in pure
utilitarian terms.
We now discuss the implications
of aesthetics as the “missing mass” in
project management.
Implications for the Soft Versus Hard
Aspects of Project Managing
The first implication is the potential use
of aesthetics to enhance the discussion
of soft versus hard aspects currently
adopted in some project discourse.
Examples of the soft aspects of project
management are negotiation, change
management, and facilitation (Karrbom
Gustavsson & Hallin, 2014). Examples of
the hard aspects are contracting, technical performance, and risk analysis (Karrbom Gustavsson & Hallin, 2014). We
propose that aesthetics can provide an
integrative perspective to this discussion.
As highlighted earlier, we are not
arguing that a particular piece of equipment is purely of a utility or aesthetic
nature. However, we would argue that
in the current use of the term, the soft
aspects of project managing are where
aesthetic components have been identified as being more visible (although
not necessarily in these terms), and the
hard aspects are where utility is currently perceived to dominate over the
aesthetic. We propose that aesthetics
can provide us with a new language to
discuss facets of all elements of project
managing equipment. It allows us to
recognize not only a utility function,
but also the aesthetic in any tool, technique, or situation. Currently, we distinguish between the soft and hard aspects
of project managing and divide skills,
tools, or knowledge areas into these
areas. With a recognition and understanding of aesthetics, we can recognize
the multiple purposes and varying types
of impacts (including the aesthetic) of
all project managing equipment.
For example, we might traditionally
associate reporting with a hard aspect
of project managing; however, when we
recognize aesthetics, our awareness of
layout, design, and color in reporting is
increased. Similarly, we might recognize
how our elicitation methods (for example,
hallway conversation, email, and meeting
with peers) of gaining information from
team members may have varying effects.
Further Research in the Aesthetics
of Project Managing and the Project
Experience
As suggested previously, we are not arguing that the empirical studies introduced
in this article provide comprehensive
proof of the significance of aesthetics
in project managing. However, in association with the extant literature from
broader organizational studies and the
conceptual discussions provided, we
believe that aesthetics in project managing is justified as worthy of further
research. Research questions could
focus on aesthetic elements such as project managers’ attire and personal affects,
office layout and design, project management documentation design, and
body language. We suggest that suitable
research methods would include ethnographic case studies, action research
(where aesthetic variations are the intervention), or semi-structured interviews.
Ethnography and action research are
strongly recommended, because they
would capture ‘in-situ’ perspectives.
Comparisons of different project managers’ use of aesthetic elements may be
particularly insightful. Overall, we suggest that such a research agenda would
seek to understand facets of the project experience beyond that commonly
associated with rationality and pure utility. The goal would be to increase the
practitioners’ awareness of aesthetics in
their work. We would propose that the
research findings associated with aesthetics are likely to be contingent on the
situation and people involved. As such,
we suggest that the tendency to over
generalize the effect of aesthetics must
be avoided.
Awareness of and Educating Project
Managers in Aesthetics
Our third implication is that there is
an opportunity to more consciously
harness aesthetics in contextualized
project managing education. As proposed previously, there are innumerable instances in which aesthetics are
‘at play’ in the worlds of projects; for
example, in the conduct of meetings,
in reporting, in office layout and in
project management attire and persona.
We suggest that there is the potential
to move beyond observation of this
aesthetic element in project practice
toward an intentional leveraging of aesthetic to different affects (for example,
dress, gestures, meeting locations) to
achieve a particular outcome when
project managers are going about their
work. We anticipate that some project
managers are already acutely aware of
aesthetic components and use this to
achieve their objectives. However, they
are unlikely to associate this practice
with the term aesthetics and more likely
to associate such characteristics with
the soft aspects of project management.
Subsequently, we suggest that it is
necessary to include aesthetics in project management education. We have
proposed that aesthetic elements have
an influence on the thoughts and behaviors of those involved in project work.
However, as indicated previously, these
aesthetic elements are subjective; consequently, education in the leveraging
of these elements cannot be rules based.
Taking a disgruntled stakeholder to coffee may work in 90% of cases, but project
managers need to be equally attuned
to those stakeholders for whom this is
an unpleasant environment or experience. To use Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ (2008)
stages of skill acquisition, it requires
‘expertise’; that is, it relies on intuition
and an involved commitment. Heidegger
reflects this sentiment through the primacy he gives to phronesis or practical
wisdom (gained through our concrete
experiences) rather than to theoretical
understanding (i.e., Sophia) (Gillespie,
2006).
We suggest, therefore, that resorting
to rules-based education for aesthetics
is incongruent with the foundations of
the concept—aesthetics are, by nature,
subjective. To distill aesthetics to rules
is to move back toward rational or cognitive perspectives, suggesting that the
acquisition of skills to respond to and
leverage aesthetics is cultivated through
experience and contextualized educational opportunities.
Conclusion
We have argued that part of the “missing
mass” in our understanding of project
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 73
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Let’s Discuss Aesthetics for Projects
work is aesthetics. First we highlighted
the nature of aesthetics, its strong links
to our corporeality, and how an aesthetics lens can disclose different aspects
of our experiences from a utility perspective. Specifically, we have argued
that aesthetic elements go beyond logic
and rational knowledge (that we argue
dominate current project discourse)
and allow us to access how we affect
others and are affected through our
senses. A review of the extant literature highlighted that, while the broader
organizational literature has explored
the implications of aesthetics in organizations, similar detailed discourse has
not permeated the project management
literature.
We then drew on a small sample
of empirical work that, when coupled
with extant project and organizational
literature, further supports the concept
of aesthetics as a “missing mass” in our
understanding of projects. Corporeality,
body language, dress, environment, communication/information design, and the
‘art of project managing’ have been discussed. Drawing on Heideggerian concepts (particularly, equipmental totality
and worlds) and the concept of catalysts
from the physical sciences, we propose
that aesthetics are part of the equipment
in the various worlds of projects and we
need to build our understanding of their
effect on the project experience.
Three implications are derived
from this discussion. Our first implication is that aesthetics can provide
an integrative understanding of equipment within the world of a project.
Previously, within the project management discourse, we recognized that
there are elements of project managing that seem to lack rules and cannot be explained in purely rational or
logical terms (for example, in the use
of the term ‘soft’ aspects). But it is in
the recognition of aesthetics that we
begin to see that such categorization
can prevent us from seeing the aesthetic element across all facets of project experience (including what have
traditionally be coined ‘hard’ aspects).
In summary, while there has previously been some recognition that there
is something more (beyond logic and
rationality) in projects, our current
perspectives perhaps limit our understanding of the extent of aesthetics permeation of all facts of the experience of
project work (including what we would
traditionally coin ‘hard’ aspects and
associated with utility).
Second, we have suggested that
the identification of aesthetics as part
of the “missing mass” sets a research
agenda for further exploration of how
aesthetics affect the project experience,
how they are currently used, and how
project managers could better leverage aesthetic factors in their work.
Such research can see us expanding
our focus to elements that we may
not traditionally identify as having a
purpose in terms of project success
or the dominant knowledge areas, but
may have significant impacts on such
factors.
Our third implication is that there
is an opportunity to increase an awareness of the aesthetic in project managing through education. We propose that
including such elements in the education of project managers will provide
them with the knowledge and skills that
are needed when working in a world
that cannot be fully understood or dealt
with optimally through adopting only a
utility perspective.
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Bronte van der Hoorn has worked in the
private and public sectors in project and change
management roles and now works in a consulting
capacity. In addition to her project experience,
Bronte develops visual representations of qualitative
concepts to increase the accessibility of important
messages. She is currently a PhD candidate at the
University of Southern Queensland, Australia, where
she focuses on project work through a continental
philosophical lens. She can be contacted at
[email protected]
Dr. Jon Whitty enjoys looking at projects and
their management through alternative lenses,
such as evolutionary theory, complexity science
and philosophy and enjoys ruminating on the new
insights that emerge. He has published journal
articles and book chapters on these topics and
delights in the opportunity to talk about them. He’s
currently Associate Professor in Project Management
at the University of Southern Queensland, Australia,
and has a pioneering group of PhD students and
industry focused research projects that are bringing
new and interesting understandings to light. He can
be contacted at [email protected]
PAPERS
Why Distinctions Matter: What Does
Philosophical Analysis Have to Do with
Project Management?
José Idler, District of Columbia Courts, Washington, DC, USA
ABSTRACT ■
This article explores the conceptual nature
of project management and argues that
making distinctions, as seen in the analytic
philosophical method, is a powerful tool for
optimizing project outcomes. Project management relies on conceptual analysis, and
further understanding this form of analysis
can help project managers gain a clearer
understanding of what an expected project
outcome is and how to judge whether the
outcome has been achieved.
KEYWORDS: philosophy; conceptual
analysis; project management; distinctions;
project outcome
INTRODUCTION
I
n this article, I will argue that the process of making distinctions is a
powerful tool for project management. In this sense, project management
can draw extensively from the philosophical method of analysis, although
the relationship has been thus far implicit and largely unexplored.
Making the relationship explicit can help establish a clear connection
between project management and this philosophical method, and thus
open the door for further exploring and highlighting the value of philosophy
for project management. Philosophy has a number of useful applications
for project management. Broadly speaking, philosophy can shed light on
the epistemic backgrounds and contexts in which presuppositions serve as
building blocks for worldviews and decision-making processes. In this article,
I will take a narrower scope and focus on one specific aspect of philosophy,
or more specifically, one specific approach within philosophy. I will focus on
one of the philosophical methods related to conceptual analysis and explore
the connection with project management.
I will proceed in four sections. First, I will make some general remarks
on what project management is and the different aspects of project management, thus creating a context for explaining the conceptual nature of project
management. Second, I will explain what I mean by the analytic philosophical
method and its core attribute of making distinctions. In the third section, I will
argue that the process of making distinctions is a necessary condition for the
delivery of an intended result, product, or service. Finally, I will discuss some
implications with practitioners in mind deriving from the conceptual dimension of project management. A key point will be that further understanding
and applying the analytic method can serve to optimize project management
processes and outcomes.
Project Management: Social, Practical, Conceptual
Project Management Journal, Vol. 47, No. 3, 77–85
© 2016 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
In order to formulate our argument, we must begin with the most basic definition of what a project is: “a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique
product, service or result” (Project Management Institute, 2013, p. 3). A project
goes through a deliberate process geared toward achieving a specific outcome. A
project may end because of lack of resources or because it is no longer necessary.
Throughout this article, however, I will assume that project completion constitutes achieving the outcome that the project was designed to achieve. In light of
this premise, the statement referring to the “successful completion of a project”
is somewhat redundant. A project has been completed if and only if the outcome
that was planned has been achieved. So, if the outcome is not as intended, in a
sense the project, strictly speaking, has not been completed. I will, however, occasionally refer to “successful” outcomes, completion, or deliverables to remind the
reader that this is the proposition I have in mind.
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 77
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Why Distinctions Matter
If a project, then, presumes a given
set of operations designed to deliver a
new product, service, or result, project
management is the activity and process
whereby this new outcome and change
is created (Jarocki, 2011). Project management is the deliberate “application
of knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques to project activities to meet the
project requirements” (Project Management Institute, 2015). The distinction
between process and product is a significant one because often when we
refer to, say, project success or failure,
we are really referring to a property
that belongs to the process leading to
the outcome. So, for instance, more
often than not it is more precise to
speak of success or failure in the project management process. The argument
throughout this article will focus on this
process.
This process is interdisciplinary and
inhabits various spaces of which I will
briefly highlight three. Project management is inherently a social, behavioral,
and interactive activity. Negotiation and
understanding has to occur between
stakeholders, agreements and shared
understandings have to be reached, and
people have to work together in order
to perform tasks, make decisions, and
achieve goals and objectives. Generally speaking, a great deal of research
regarding project management has
been done in this space (Ahsan, Ho, &
Khan, 2013; Dietrich, Kujala, & Artto,
2013; Kloppenborg, Tesch, & Manolis,
2014; Konstantinou, 2015; Wiewiora,
Murphy, Trigunarsyah, & Brown, 2014)
and a high level of insight can be gained
by looking at fields such as, for example,
decision theory (Kahneman, 2011).
Additionally, projects and project management inhabit the practical
space. I refer to the practical space in
an Aristotelian sense, glossing over a
set of distinctions made by Aristotle
(1941) and interpreted by Heidegger
(Taminiaux, 1991). These distinctions
can be organized into two sets: the first
between theoria, techne, and phronesis; and the second between poiesis
and praxis. As discussed in Book VI of
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics (1941),
there are two kinds of knowledge,
one scientific and the other practical.
Broadly speaking, theoria consists of
scientific knowledge whereby the main
purpose is to discover truth. On the side
of practical knowledge, techne is the
kind of knowledge needed to make an
object—for instance, a table. Phronesis
is the process of deliberating with an
eye toward good action—for instance,
ethical actions. Furthermore, poiesis is
the process whereby someone brings
change or creates something that did
not exist before—for instance, a house,
a work of art, or a new work process.
Praxis entails the set of actions that lead
to doing the good and leading a good
life. We can see from these brief distinctions that phronesis and praxis are
related, whereas techne and poiesis are
also related. When I claim that project
management belongs in the practical
space, it is the latter two categories
that I have in mind: techne and poiesis.
Project management certainly requires
ethical choices and conduct, but those
choices occur under what’s eminently a
practical activity, one that entails a body
of knowledge for good planning with
the purpose of creating a result. Techne
is the kind of “reasoning that develops
plans for the production of artifacts,” or
creating anything that entails change
(Polkinghorne, 2004, p. 115). Poiesis is
the art or craft of making aesthetic or
useful objects, yielding a “product or
result that is separate from the person
who made it and is available to others for
their use and evaluation” (p. 115). These
two categories describe eloquently two
critical elements for project management: a certain type of knowledge and
the creation of a new result, product, or
service (Project Management Institute,
2013). Project management is part of
a production process, which aims to
create a product and derives its value
from the product it creates (Ross, 1996).
Unlike ethical action, where the action
is valuable in and of itself, project management is tied to the product and thus
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its value is instrumental. Moreover, this
process of value creation is one that
requires knowledge of certain principles and techniques and hence entails
craftsmanship in an Aristotelian sense.
The gap between theory and practice is not always a clear one. In fact,
proposals have been put forward to help
us think about how the gap operates
and how it can be reconciled in project management (Bredillet, Tywoniak,
& Dwivedula, 2015). For the sake of
clarity, however, I will make a broad distinction here between the practical and
conceptual spaces. We already saw what
it means for project management to be
practical. By conceptual, I have in mind
the kinds of labels we use in our thinking and language in order to describe
objects, phenomena, and processes. So,
for instance, when I say that a given
project will have the goal of creating a
new database for an organization, what
I describe as a “database” is a concept.
It will presumably be materialized in
a set of technology processes that will
constitute and be referred to as a “database.” But, in our context, the central
point is that it’s a concept. Consider
that when I denote the database, I use
a label intended to summarize a group
of attributes or components (Jabareen,
2009) that, clustered together, create
the concept; a database is a product
that has properties and attributes that
include, for instance, compiling information, classifying the information in a
set of fields, arranging the information
in recognizable patterns, and so forth.
The understanding and nature of
concepts has been the subject of much
philosophical debate (Russell, 2008)
and is a discussion that can venture into
more complex arenas fairly quickly (Gracia, 1999). The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (2011) makes the point that
concepts are the constituents of thought
and “are crucial to such psychological
processes as categorization, inference,
memory, learning, and decision-making.”
It goes on to observe that “this much is
relatively uncontroversial. But the nature
of concepts—the kind of things concepts
are—and the constraints that govern a
theory of concepts have been the subject
of much debate” (para. 1). For purposes of
this article, such debates will be beyond
the realm of the discussion. My interest
lies, rather, in the process of conceptual
thinking and how it can shed light and
add value to project management. To further my argument, it should suffice to
have a working definition such that concepts are labels we use in our language to
combine sets of attributes to make sense
of the world.
Making Distinctions and
the Philosophical Method of
Analysis
Before I turn more deeply to this conceptual dimension and attempt to show
how distinctions work and why they
matter in project management, I shall
say a few words about the philosophical
method I have in mind. The question
of method almost immediately leads
to the question of which philosophical
method. Speaking of philosophy and
its method, Wittgenstein (1997) puts it
this way: “There is not a philosophical
method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies” (p. 51). In
this context, the method I refer to has to
do with concepts and, more specifically,
the analysis of the way we use those
concepts.
Wilson (1966) observes that philosophy could be understood as being
directly “concerned with a way of life
and the truth about reality.” In this view,
someone’s philosophy is connected
with motives, behaviors, and values
(p. 126). According to another view,
the philosopher is an “analyst of language, concerned with the verification
and meaning of statements and with
the logical use of words” (p. 128). The
latter approach is commonly associated
with the tradition of analytic philosophy. Although defining methodological
labels is beyond the scope of this article,
the method I have in mind broadly consists of what Wilson (1966) describes as
the analysis of concepts—an exercise
“designed to handle and clarify concepts
in a particular way” (p. vii). More specifically, the method I have in mind refers
to an approach whereby one examines a
process, phenomenon, or subject matter by querying and making distinctions
in order to reach a new insight and gain
a deeper understanding of the matter.
In a paper regarding this type of
philosophical method, Sokolowski
(1998) aims to clarify what a certain
approach to philosophy is by taking a
closer look at its method. The claim is
that philosophy does not simply address
definitions and discussions about topics as varied as, say, human freedom,
science, knowledge, ethics, and so on.
It also purports to shed light and provide a deeper understating through an
examination that consists to a very large
extent of making distinctions. So, this
approach to philosophy does not simply investigate propositions and states
of affairs; it also clarifies distinctions
between those propositions and states
of affairs to move beyond simply making claims. “Philosophy does not just
make claims; it makes claims based
on distinctions that provide the argument for the claims” (p. 517). An important observation made by Sokolowski is
that distinctions are at play in our conclusions, whether we realize it or not.
When we draw conclusions, our attention tends to focus on this outcome,
but it relies on several premises and a
whole series of distinctions that have
been “functioning in the background”
(p. 517). The philosopher’s task, in this
arena and to a large extent, is to bring
these distinctions to the foreground,
examine them, clarify, and make further distinctions in order to shed light
on an argument, thus deepening our
knowledge of a certain matter. This may,
at times, give the impression that the
philosopher’s analysis states the obvious, but the process at stake is one of
turning to propositions that are latent
and perhaps vague and making them
explicit by acknowledging and making
further distinctions. In this manner,
philosophical analysis consists of shifting our attention from the conclusion
or inference and turning to the distinctions that “permit the things and
states of affairs we are concerned with
to appear” (p. 518).
As an example of the analytic
method I have in mind, let’s first turn
to Socrates, who is commonly associated with an approach (Benson, 2000)
often referred to as the Socratic or
dialectic method. This method often
evokes images of questions and answers
through which different beliefs and
opinions are scrutinized and potentially discarded once contradictions are
detected. Indeed, what we know about
Socrates’ approach occurs through dialogues such as the Euthyphro, Apology,
Crito, Meno, and Phaedo, as recorded by
Plato (1997, 2002).
In his encounter with Euthyphro, for
instance, Socrates initiates a dialogue
aiming to define piety or what it means
to perform a right action. The approach
is one of definition and division,
whereby Socrates asks for a definition
and then, through questions, identifies
what’s contradictory or unsatisfactory
about a given definition first provided
by Euthyphro. So, for instance, in a
first attempt, Euthyphro defines piety or
right action as that which is approved
by the gods (Plato, 2002). Socrates then
observes that the gods don’t agree
among themselves, so this doesn’t provide a satisfactory criterion for determining what a right action is. By moving
through definitions, the dialogue is at
the same time moving through a set of
distinctions in search of an answer. The
first obvious distinction is between a
right action and wrongdoing. In fact,
the purpose of the dialogue is to make
that distinction clear. Other important
distinctions include what is loved by the
gods and what isn’t (Plato, 2002), giving
rise to the famous Euthyphro dilemma:
whether something is right because it
is loved by the gods, or whether the
gods love something because it is right
in and of itself. Note that the dilemma
consists of a distinction. There are also
distinctions between genus and species,
as in the distinction between piety and
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justice. The point here is that these
are two classes of difference, one being
larger and subsuming the other. The
question lies in what the nature of the
larger class is, because the smaller subset belongs to the larger set. By understanding the larger set, then inferences
can be made about the smaller set. “If
the pious is part of the just, we must it
seems, find out what part of the just it
is” (Plato, 2002, p. 16).
Kant provides another conspicuous
example of how the analytic philosophical method is applied by way of making distinctions. In his famous Critique
of Pure Reason (1998), for instance,
he sets out to explore the relationship
between knowledge and experience.
According to Kant, “all our cognition
begins with experience,” but it does not
all arise from experience, because we
have a conceptual framework independent from experience that is integral to
the cognitive process (p. 136). Mathematics provides a good example of this
kind of conceptual framework. Kant
then begins with a distinction between
a priori knowledge—that which occurs
without experience—and a posteriori
knowledge, which results from experience. Another important distinction in
his work is between analytic and synthetic judgments. Analytic judgments
are those that occur at the conceptual level, independent from empirical
knowledge. For instance, I can say that
“all bodies are extended” and verify
the validity because “I do not need to
go beyond the concept that I combine
with the body in order to find that
extension is connected with it” (Kant,
1998, p. 141). I can ascertain the statement by analyzing the concept. Synthetic judgments, on the other hand,
are judgments of experience. In order
to verify that all bodies are heavy, I
need to draw on experience because
the notion of weight, unlike extension,
is not necessarily contained within the
concept of body. So, through experience, “I find that weight is also always
connected” with body, and I then add
“this synthetically as predicate to that
concept”—hence, the term synthetic
judgment (Kant, 1998, p. 142). The
question that Kant wishes to answer is:
How are synthetic judgments a priori
possible? In other words, and roughly
speaking, there is, according to Kant
(1998), a certain kind of knowledge that
belongs in the empirical space but is
also known a priori—that is, independent from experience. The question
is: What are the epistemic conditions
that make this knowledge possible
(Allison, 1983)?
For purposes of our illustration,
note that Kant identifies and defines the
problem by building on a set of distinctions. Moreover, he goes on to make an
attempt to solve the problem by creating multiple distinctions related to the
principles and categories of knowledge.
As Verene (1997) insightfully points out,
“Kant’s philosophy is an encyclopedia
of distinctions with a term for each. The
essence of Kant’s philosophy is making
distinctions. In the first Critique, Kant
simply begins by making distinctions
and never stops, continuing the process
through the next two Critiques.” (p. 65)
Making Distinctions and
Optimizing Project Outcomes
We have seen that project management
has some connection with the conceptual space. I now wish to further explore
the conceptual nature of project management and argue that project delivery
depends on the process of making distinctions. This seemingly simple point
will lead us to explore the way in which
we make judgments and perform the
conceptual operations that are essential
to project management. These conceptual operations are generally assumed
but are rarely made explicit. In a philosophical vein, the task will be to bring
to the forefront what is often in the
background.
The first step in the argument is to
highlight the fact that a given outcome
depends on a specific set of criteria.
Take, for example, the creation of a new
technology product. In order for the
new technology product to be fulfilled
80 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
as an outcome, there must have been a
set of presumed attributes and conditions, such that when those attributes
and conditions are met, it can be said
that the new technology product was
created. In other words, the new technology product will have, for instance,
attributes A, B, and C. If attributes A and
B are displayed in the new product, but
not attribute C, it cannot be said that
the outcome has been achieved. If only
attribute C is displayed, but not attributes B and C, then the outcome has not
been achieved, and so on and so forth.
The point is that for the new technology
product in our example to come about,
it must be the case that a set of given
attributes is displayed.
This relationship between attributes
and outcomes presupposes that there
are necessary and contingent attributes.
In our case of attributes A, B, and C,
these were necessary attributes, without
which the outcome cannot be said to be
achieved. But, in reality, the relationship is more complex: An outcome is
hardly ever the mirror realization of precisely predefined conditions. In actual
projects, scopes can change, resources
can change, and intended deliverables
can be somewhat different from what
was originally intended. Here, then, it
is necessary to draw on the distinction between essential and contingent
attributes. If attributes A, B, and C were
essential traits to be exhibited in our
example of a new technology product,
then it’s also important to acknowledge
that attributes D, E, and F may have
been part of the original scope, but
their realization is not essential to the
outcome. In the myriad of attributes to
be realized in the achievement of the
outcome, some will be essential and
some will be contingent. Suppose, then,
that attributes A, D, and F are displayed
in the new product—the outcome has
not been achieved. Something similar
occurs if attributes B, C, D, and F are
displayed, and so forth. Again, outcome
achievement will occur with the realization of certain attributes and conditions.
As stated in our example, the outcome is
achieved if and only if attributes A, B,
and C are displayed.
To carry our example further, suppose that a new technology product in a
given organization consists of an online
system for reporting employee time and
attendance. The product will simply be
referred to as a Time and Attendance
System (TAS). For TAS to be realized,
the following attributes and conditions
must be met. Suppose that a simple
list of sample attributes consists of the
following:
A1: TAS will have an interface with
functions F1, F2, and F3.
A2: TAS will be compatible with the
existing database, such that the
integrity of the records will be
preserved.
Further suppose that a simple list of
conditions consists of the following:
C1: TAS will be completed and
operational by X date.
C2: TAS will be completed under budget Y.
Following our line of thought, TAS
will be realized if and only if A1 and
A2, as well as C1 and C2, are met. But,
as mentioned previously, to any project manager who has delivered reasonably complex projects, this tight set
of criteria may come across as somewhat excessive. Projects do not always
get delivered on time, on budget, or
with the exact specifications as originally described. At this point, we must
contend with the question of whether
a project delivered in such a fashion
was indeed delivered successfully. We
must also contend with the question of
whether, given the gap between documentation and reality, the criteria we
have set up for outcome achievement
are too rigorous.
On the point of rigor, it is indeed
reasonable to allow for some degree of
vagueness so as not to trap the argument in an unnecessary straitjacket.
As pointed out by Lakoff (1973), natural language concepts sometimes have
“vague boundaries and fuzzy edges”
(p. 458). But two points are crucial at
this juncture. The first is that the closer
the outcome is to the specified attributes and conditions, the more validity
can be granted to the statement that a
given outcome has been achieved. The
second point is that regardless of the
degree of vagueness, outcomes—and
our assessment of those outcomes—
will always depend on a specific set of
criteria.
To illustrate the first point, regarding the relationship between outcomes,
attributes and grounds for claiming that
an outcome has been achieved, suppose an attribute is added to the system
in the example above. In this scenario,
two attributes in the deliverable are
displayed—for instance, A1—and additionally, suppose that the system is well
designed so that it exhibits another new
attribute. Let’s say:
A3: TAS is user-friendly.
Under a second scenario, however,
A1 and A2 are displayed but not A3.
According to our criteria above, TAS
represents a successful outcome if and
only if both A1 and A2 are achieved.
Hence, these are the two essential attributes that the project must exhibit. A3,
although perhaps valuable, is not an
essential but rather a contingent attribute, because it is not part of the original set of criteria. The criteria, of course,
are context-sensitive and will depend,
for any given project, on the scope of the
project and the expected outcome.
Returning to our specific example
and the context we have set up for it,
which scenario will warrant the claim
that the outcome has been achieved?
The first scenario in which A1 and A3
are displayed? Or the second scenario
in which A1 and A2 are displayed?
Because the context dictates that A1
and A2 are essential attributes, only in
the second scenario has the outcome
been achieved. We must constantly
bear in mind that displaying attributes
and meeting conditions is sometimes
a matter of degree and not always and
necessarily an excluded middle. Even if
we allow, however, for a gradual continuum and some level of vagueness, the
closer the outcome is to the specified
attributes and conditions, according to
the context, the more validity can be
granted to the claim that a given outcome has been achieved.
The second point mentioned above
is that regardless of the degree of
vagueness allowed, the outcome, and
our assessment of such outcome, will
always depend on a specific set of criteria. We do not have to precisely settle
the question of when an outcome has
been achieved. Will a given outcome be
achieved if A1, A2, C1, but only part of
C2 have been met? How do we determine the partial nature of C2? If C2, has,
say, ten properties, and properties one
through eight are present, but properties nine and ten are missing, has C2
not been met? At what point can we
legitimately say that C2 has been met?
The level of precision can be exhausting and futile at some point. Moreover,
for the purposes of our argument, we
do not need to settle these questions
at such a granular level—allowing, as
suggested before, for a certain level of
indeterminacy and vagueness. What we
need to show is that the degree of correspondence between criteria and outcome is directly related to the degree of
validation as to whether the outcome
has been achieved. This relationship
is a robust one, such that the crux is a
rather simple but crucial point in the
argument so far: A given outcome is
dependent on a given set of criteria.
A further step in the argument
will have us show that these criteria
are expressed and determined by the
process of making distinctions. Any
observer may have noticed that this
dynamic has actually been at play in our
argument so far. Note, for example, that
the very act of defining a deliverable
implies a set of distinctions as to what
the deliverable will be and, at the same
time, will not be. In the process of laying
out deliverable D, we also distinguish
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it from not-D. This distinction pertains
to the way a certain deliverable or outcome will look and the sorts of characteristics it will have. We have also
made distinctions between attributes
themselves, as well as necessary and
contingent attributes, and so forth.
The point we need to make, however, is rather more focused. A certain
outcome will only become a distinguishable event if the outcome relies
on criteria whereby the outcome can be
identified and judged as such. Suppose
I make the judgment that the object in
front of me is a table. Once the object
is individuated as a table, I also realize
that it is not a non-table. But what is
the process whereby the object can be
individuated and identified as a table?
I must first realize what the criteria are
for determining that a given object is
a table. The criteria may include attributes such as having four legs, being
made of a solid material, and providing
certain functionality. These criteria are
only possible if we proceed in a manner such that we make distinctions. The
example of the table is a deceptively
simple one in which it is ostensibly
possible to identify and judge what a
table is. We must be careful, however,
because as pointed out earlier, concepts
in the natural language often have vague
boundaries and the criteria can become
murky, thus generating disagreement
as to whether a given object is indeed
a table or not. But what we must constantly bear in mind is that there is
always some set of criteria whereby a
given object or event can be identified
as such and thus be distinguished from
other objects and events. Suppose that
two people observe an object and a
disagreement arises as to whether the
object is indeed a “table” or not. The
disagreement arises probably not as to
whether the object is a table; rather,
the disagreement lies in the criteria
whereby a given object will be identified as a table. These criteria, which
differentiate among attributes, will then
make it possible to identify the object in
front of the observers.
Let us postulate, then, that a criterion constitutes a standard according to
which we will make and validate a certain judgment. These criteria operate
on the basis of distinctions such that a
criterion creates boundaries as to what
is and what is not. So, for example, one
criterion for determining whether an
object is a table consists of the attribute
of having four legs. Under this criterion,
objects without the attribute of having
four legs—say, objects with two legs,
20 legs, or no legs—are not deemed to
be tables. One can debate, of course,
whether the criterion is fair: Is an object
with 20 legs a table, say, by virtue of the
fact that it has legs? But the crucial point
for our purposes is that the criterion
has been established on the basis of
distinctions.
As we discuss criteria and distinctions, we must point out that these criteria are not private; they are rather public
and social affairs. Wittgenstein (1997)
makes the argument in his Philosophical Investigations by examining how we
learn and use language and by introducing the notion of language-games. Concepts are learned through language, and
languages have sets of rules attached to
them—like games— that help us create meaning. These rules are created
and learned in interactive contexts. And
although the topic is beyond the scope
of our essay, it is important to point out
that this public and social nature of language also has implications for how we
ground our judgments (Wittgenstein,
1972). The insight is worth pointing out,
even if in passing, because it has implications for cross-cultural communication and project management.
We have seen, then, that the act
of delineating and setting up criteria
necessitates the very act of making distinctions. We are not prepared to make
the point that the intended outcome of a
certain project will be contingent upon
a given set of distinctions. As Sokolowski
(1998) explains, “a distinction is a difference that is explicitly displayed” (Italics
in original, p. 521). Distinctions can
pertain to many things, physical objects,
82 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
emotions, outcomes and deliverables,
and so on. The kinds of distinctions I
have spoken about are directly concerned with the criteria whereby we
identify and judge project outcomes.
As we have seen, these criteria depend
on the very process of making distinctions to, first of all, make the criteria
explicit, and secondly, to be able to
classify what meets the standard and
what does not. This operation is crucial
to project delivery. A project can only
be successfully delivered if it displays
certain attributes and meets certain
conditions, and these attributes and
conditions constitute criteria that stem
from and enable us to make the necessary distinctions, so as to identify and
judge the manner in which a project has
been delivered. Identifying and judging
project outcomes would not be possible
without a previous set of distinctions
that lead to the inferences we make.
What Difference Does It Make?
If the argument we have made sounds
like it leads to an obvious conclusion,
then it has been successful. Hopefully,
we have brought to the foreground
something that is often in the background but is present nonetheless
(Sokolowski, 1998). Now, the question
that arises is whether the recognition
of how crucial the process of making
distinctions is to project delivery will
have any practical impact. It seems to
me that the question must be answered
in the affirmative, because the potential
impact is a significant one.
Project managers have long been
concerned about project failure. It is
well known that one of the reasons why
projects fail has to do with gaps in the
planning process. Black (1996) made the
point succinctly almost ten years ago:
“The most important key to a project’s success may be planning. While it is unlikely
that project planners have knowledge of
all activities and resources needed to effect
successful project operations, it is imperative that they understand as much about
the project goals and objectives as possible
before project launch.” (para. 6)
Lack of understanding and precision with regard to project goals and
objectives will often lead to failure.
Project failure can come about if
a project is not completed or when a
project is completed but with significant gaps in expectation between the
initial understanding and the actual
outcome. It is the second sort of failure that I particularly have in mind.
When failures of this kind occur, it is
immediately necessary to examine the
planning processes. These processes
“are performed to establish the total
scope of the effort, define and refine
the objective, and develop the course
of action required to attain those objectives” (Project Management Institute,
2013, p. 55). Defining elements such as
goals, objectives, and scope are necessary conditions for project success. It
may be the case, however, that these
elements are not sufficiently understood, even if they have been nominally
defined. If we approach the planning
processes through the lens of making
distinctions, and defining and laying
out criteria, then the likelihood of a
common understanding among stakeholders increases.
A question worth asking is: What
is the quality of the distinctions we
make at the outset of a project? It is my
observation that poorly made distinctions and unspecified criteria will tend
to lead to poor project planning and,
hence, delivery. Understanding what
a deliverable will be can be greatly
enhanced by going through the exercise
of making and refining distinctions. So,
for instance, project P will achieve outcome O, to be distinguished from X, Y,
and Z. At the same time, O will display
attributes A1, A2, and A3, in distinction to A4, A5, A6, and so forth. We
will define A1 as A1a and distinguish
it from A1b and A1g. From this set of
attributes, a certain list of attributes
will be essential, whereas others will
be contingent, and so on. The goal is
to conduct a conceptual exercise that
will assist both project managers and
stakeholders.
As a practitioner of project management, I have witnessed the difference
that these conceptual exercises can
make in optimizing the delivery process. In a practical vein, various organizational development projects come to
mind. In one particular project, the goal
was to promote culture change through
the adoption of new vision and mission
philosophies. These kinds of projects
in particular can be very challenging
because of the inherent vagueness of
the outcome. The planning phase of this
particular project included an inquisitive phase in which focused questions
were asked—questions such as: How
do we define culture? What kinds of
behaviors demonstrate that culture?
What do we mean by adopting a vision?
What is the desired outcome and what
will it look like? How do we measure
the outcome? The process yielded a
set of definitions that created a common understanding among stakeholders and, at the same time, allowed for
making crucial distinctions as to what
was essential to the project and what
was not.
The exercise, designed to create a
catalog of shared concepts with key
distinctions, proved useful in two ways.
First, the project was a multiyear affair
and, as is common in many projects,
it became easy during the execution
phase to lose sight of what the desired
outcome was and, more important, what
the defining traits of that outcome were.
Having a catalog of concepts and distinctions was extremely helpful in keeping the project focused and being able
to monitor and communicate updates.
Part of the key to success was not only
to document the initial discussions
but also to review the content of those
discussions regularly to be constantly
reminded of the definitions and criteria
by which we would evaluate the project.
The second useful application of this
exercise had to do with an ongoing habit
of asking questions and making distinctions. More than an initial exercise,
the act of asking pertinent questions
and making distinctions became a way
of approaching the project during its
execution. One of the ways in which the
project was periodically assessed in an
informal way was through the review of
the original definitions and scope. The
criteria and distinctions that were originally documented were instrumental
in keeping the project focused, making
pertinent changes during the execution
phase, and eventually delivering the
project in accordance with the original
criteria.
The analytic approach can be useful not only in projects and instances
that entail outcomes that are hard to
define and abstract processes. Even
projects with seemingly concrete outcomes, such as a new building or software, can be derailed if the criteria and
definitions are not clearly identified.
Additionally, an analytic approach can
be extremely helpful when using agile
methodologies that embrace change as
the project evolves in an interactive
environment. The value of setting out
criteria, definitions, and distinctions in
an agile context is not so much to keep
the project focused on the initial scope,
because the scope changes as the project evolves, but rather to make sure the
project is evolving in the right direction.
The suggestion is that projects make
use of the analytic method in order to
gain a clearer understanding of what
is to be achieved in the outcome and
how to judge whether the outcome has
indeed been achieved. I do not suggest
turning every project into a philosophical investigation, which would perhaps contravene the practical nature of
project management mentioned in the
first section. Rather, the philosophical
method I have described is a tool in the
project manager’s toolbox that serves a
purpose—gaining a better understanding of what an outcome will be. It is a
tool that can be greatly beneficial if used
skillfully. It is also a tool that can be
particularly powerful when applied by
asking questions that, even if not always
precisely answered, will yield a clearer
understanding of the project and the
delivery process.
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Why Distinctions Matter
Project managers trained in conceptual thinking and analysis will not
only be more sensitive to distinctions
and have a clearer understanding of
what the project entails but will also
presumably be better communicators.
The type of analysis I have been discussing equips one to isolate issues,
distinguish attributes, and keep the
boundaries of the project scope clear.
The process of doing this could be
instrumental in enabling clearer and
better communication. As Wilson
(1966) observes, “the analysis of concepts is a rather sophisticated form of
communication” (p. 20).
Freely paraphrasing Thomas Aquinas, it can be said that just as philosophy was thought to be the handmaiden
of theology (Lehrberger, 2004), philosophy is also to some extent the
handmaiden of project management.
Or, more precisely, philosophy is one
of the handmaidens because project
management relies on wide array of
disciplines that range from economics and mathematics to management
theory and social sciences. By including
philosophical analysis in the spectrum,
what seems to be at first a rather foreign
and perhaps awkward relationship—
philosophy and project management—
becomes much closer. This is possible
once we realize the degree to which
project management relies on conceptual operations and can benefit from the
analytic method.
Further research is necessary to
identify best practices in the application
of conceptual analysis within project
management. I have described experiential evidence, but from an empirical
point of view, a study analyzing the correlation between conceptual analysis
and project failure may yield interesting results. Does conceptual analysis,
as described in this article, serve to
prevent or mitigate project failure?
Moreover, assuming that conceptual
analysis does indeed increase project
success, other questions remain: How
is conceptual analysis to be conducted
in order to create value? What are the
templates and best practices that may
lead to project success? I have argued
that the analytic method provides a
powerful tool for optimizing project
outcomes. I hope the argument serves
as a first step for further research in
the area.
Sensing the uncomfortable connection between early Christianity and the
surrounding context, Tertullian (2015)
famously asked: What does Athens have
to do with Jerusalem? Transposing the
question, we may very well ask: What
does philosophy, and particularly the
analytic method, have to do with project management? I hope this article has
helped shed light on the fact that a relationship that may at first seem strange is
not so strange and may be very beneficial after all.
References
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84 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
Gracia, J. J. E. (1999). Metaphysics and its
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José Idler, PhD, obtained his PhD in philosophy at
the University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland,
USA and then pursued a career as a policy analyst,
strategic communications professional, and project
manager. He has worked in both small and largescale international organizations, spanning the
public and private sectors. As a practitioner with
an academic background, his lifelong interest has
been to integrate research and theoretical insights
into practical applications. He teaches as an adjunct
instructor at the Washington Center for Internships
and Academic Seminars and currently holds the
position of communications program manager in the
District of Columbia courts. He can be contacted at
[email protected]
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The Metaphysical Questions Every
Project Practitioner Should Ask
Lavagnon A. Ika, Telfer School of Management, University of Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
Christophe N. Bredillet, Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières (UQTR), Quebec, Canada
ABSTRACT ■
INTRODUCTION
Project practitioners become so familiar with
the word project that they think about it
more in terms of how it is used, and less in
terms of what it really is. But is there such a
thing as the project being managed? What’s
most real in the project? What’s a project?
We raise these questions to contribute a
subtler understanding of project management, and to help project practitioners see
that their metaphysical stance informs their
project management style: A thing-based
understanding leads to a planned project
management style, and a process-based
understanding leads to an emergent management style.
The Reality of What We Name “Project” Matters
KEYWORDS: philosophy; metaphysics;
ontology; project reality; project
management practice
The vision statements put forth by the two main professional bodies in project
management are as follows:
“Worldwide, organizations will embrace, value, and utilize project management and
attribute their success to it.” (The PMI Envisioned Goal)
“Promoting competence throughout society to enable a world in which all projects
succeed.” (Retrieved from http://blog.ipma.ch/ipma-moving-fast-forward-with-newstrategy-2020/)
Both of these statements make an assumption about the reality of something named a “project.” For project practitioners, organizations, stakeholders, and society in general, this raises a fundamental question: What is a
project? We wish to make it clear that when Hodgson and Cicmil (2007) state,
“Rather than asking ‘what is a project?’ we should pose the question in these
terms: ‘what do we do when we call something a project?’” they still assume
the existence and reality of something called a “project” (p. 432).
The question about the reality of a project is important, because one of the
most common reasons a project doesn’t deliver the expected results relates to
stakeholders not understanding and not agreeing on what the project really is
(e.g., Morris, 2013). Indeed, a project can be seen as a product, a purpose, a
goal (technical, individual, collective, existential), a process, a change, a concept, a story, an organizing device, a problem-solving approach, a practice,
a set of tasks, a cost, an anticipation (temporal or spatial) of the future, and/
or any combination of these (Bredillet, 2004). As acknowledged by Boutinet
(2001), a project is a polysemic concept, a reality with multiple intertwined
facets. Yet, project practitioners are often unaware of the polysemic nature
of the word project and the plurality of “realities” it covers. Regrettably, this
leads to misunderstandings that carry with them significant socio-politicoeconomic consequences, such as perceived magnitude of failure.
Critical Questions
Project Management Journal, Vol. 47, No. 3, 86–100
© 2016 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
86 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
Most project practitioners would admit that their motto is: “just do it.” Yet they
can’t afford to rush headlong into a project. Indeed, they know that projects
are complex to manage, and that the shortest line between two points is not
always the “best” route. To get off to a good start, they may begin by asking
why; by more clearly articulating the reasons the project came into being in
the first place, they hope to improve their chances of success. Other compelling yet simple questions are also worth asking, but their answers are not
simple at all: Is there such a thing as the project being managed? What’s most
real in the project? What’s a project anyway? Philosophers call these questions “metaphysical.” Getting answers to them is critical. Indeed, just as it is
hard to see the forest for the trees, there
is the need to go beyond the multiple
forms of the project’s physical realities
as we perceive them, and consider the
project’s metaphysics.
The Potential Usefulness of
Metaphysical Questions . . . and
Answers
In philosophy, as Jaspers (1883–1969)
argues, questions are more important than answers, and every answer
becomes a question. Russell (1912/1997)
also warns: “Utility does not belong to
philosophy” (p. 153). Furthermore, philosophers such as Hume (1711–1776),
Kant (1724–1804), and recently Ayer
(1910–1989) have severely criticized
metaphysics as being futile and overly
vague (e.g., Hight, 2008).
We argue that metaphysics can help
clarify our underlying ideas about the
world or the universe. We submit that
metaphysical questions are important,
even in project management practice.
If project practitioners don’t know what
a project really is, how can they make
sense of it? How can they understand it?
How can they explain it? How can they
know what makes it a success or a failure? And above all, how can they create
“theories” about it, learn from the past,
and better manage upcoming projects
in the future?
Considering what philosophers say
about the importance of the nature of
reality, we contend that the metaphysical stance of project practitioners is not
limited to “their opinion”; it is also part
of the way they “live” the project, and
the foundation of everything they do in
the project (Solomon & Higgins, 2010).
In other words, their metaphysical stance
matters a good deal in their project management practice (e.g., Whitty, 2013).
Back to the metaphysical questions.
Is there such a thing as the project being
managed? Project practitioners may not
have contemplated this metaphysical
question, but if they do, they will be
faced with the classical philosophical
puzzle that Quine (1948) nicknames
Plato’s Beard: “Nonbeing must in some
sense be, otherwise what is it that there
is not?” (p. 21). Applying this to project management, if their project is not
a project, practitioners should not be
dealing with it. Or should they? If the
answer is yes, what, then, is the project?
Most project management practitioners think they know what a project
is and what it is not, in the same way
that they know what is in and out of the
project’s scope. Project management
textbooks often pin this down right
at the beginning, or discuss it when
speculating about project characteristics. Thus, project management practitioners are likely to read that a project
is “a temporary endeavor undertaken
to create a unique product, service or
result” (PMI, 2013, p. 3), or “a time and
cost constrained operation to realise a
set of defined deliverables (the scope
to fulfil the project’s objectives) up to
quality standards and requirements”
(IPMA, 2006, p. 13), or “a unique set
of processes consisting of coordinated
and controlled activities with start and
end dates, performed to achieve project
objectives” (ISO 21500, 2012, p. 3). But
are such taken-for-granted and unquestioned definitions of the polysemic and
chameleon-like word project enough to
avoid confusion, ambiguity, and mediocrity in professional practice?
Many observers remain skeptical
(Weaver & Bourne, 2002). Paraphrasing
Pinker (2014) about what he aptly calls
the “curse of knowledge” (p. 71) and,
in this case the underlying cognitive
bias of functional fixity, project practitioners may have become so familiar
with the word project that they think
about it more in terms of how they
use it and less in terms of what the
project looks like and what it is made
of. So, we ask: What is a project really?
Is the project really what it looks like?
Is there any difference between what it
seems to be and what it really is (Russell,
1912/1997)? And what is most real in the
project? In this context, we encourage
project practitioners to take the time
to uncover what lies underneath the
“project” label (Gauthier & Ika, 2012;
Linehan & Kavanagh, 2006; van der
Hoorn & Whitty, 2015). In addressing
the above-mentioned questions, this
article seeks to contribute a subtler
understanding of project management
practice, and hopes to inspire project
practitioners to understand how their
metaphysical stance influences their
project management style.
To that end, we take a pluralistic
view of the theory and practice of project management (Morris, 2013) as a
blessing in disguise. Hence, the article
focuses not on one particular philosophical contribution, but rather ranges
across many because it gives us an
opportunity to shed light on metaphysical questions pertaining to projects by
fully embracing the diversity, variety,
and richness of a number of insights
from pre-Socratic to Enlightenment philosophers. In so doing, we hope to see
the forest, and not the trees, of project
metaphysics. But this methodological
choice comes at a cost. We cannot dissect and expose at length the specific
contribution of any particular philosopher, nor can we discuss the merits
and demerits of each philosopher’s
metaphysical thoughts. Still, this loss
of depth is offset by a gain in breadth.
Thus, project practitioners and, perhaps, researchers can learn a good deal,
although in a cursory manner, from
a particular philosopher’s standpoint,
about the breadth of metaphysical
considerations worthy of attention in
project settings. So much for a word
of caution. What is the outline of this
article?
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, we define metaphysics and consider some of the main
metaphysical problems that can pertain
to projects. Second, we briefly go back
to the roots of the polysemic concept of
a “project.” Third, we explore the principles and reality of projects. Fourth, we
discuss the emergence and existence
of distinct realities for projects (project
ontologies), showing how two contrasting metaphysical worldviews of projects
relate to different logics of action. Fifth,
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The Metaphysical Questions Every Project Practitioner Should Ask
and finally, in light of the above, we suggest some metaphysical insights about
projects and their implications for project management practitioners.
What Do We Mean by
Metaphysics and What Are Its
Main Problems?
The word metaphysics originates from
the Greek, Ta meta ta phusika, which
can be translated as “the ones after the
physical ones.” Hence, it means going
beyond physics. Metaphysics—a broad
area of philosophy—is the attempt to
study the nature of reality or “being and/
or existence as such,” which includes the
first causes and immutable principles
of things (Craig, 1998; van Inwagen &
­Sullivan, 2015). As such, it explores two
main questions: (1) Are there principles
that apply to everything that is real, to all
that is? and (2) What is most real?
Thus, metaphysics and ontology
(the study of what there is and its nature)
are very closely related—just as the two
main metaphysical questions are inherently linked (Craig, 1998). Indeed, metaphysics seeks to understand the essence
and existence of things, and the types
of distinct things that fundamentally
exist. This article not only addresses the
essence and existence of projects, and
the emergence and existence of distinct
types (perceptions) of projects or project ontologies (Bredillet 2010; Craig,
1998; Gauthier & Ika, 2012; Solomon &
Higgins, 2010; Whitty, 2013), but it also
questions what is most real in projects
or what is ultimately a project.
Overall, the point of metaphysics is
to discover what is most real, what is
most basic, and what is to be accounted
for in terms of “what” (Solomon &
­Higgins, 2010; Whitty, 2013). However,
we are aware that the word ­metaphysics
is not easy to define and that it has
become a catchall concept today that
includes topics such as the relation of
mind and body and the freedom of the
will or personal identity across time.
These are ideas that Aristotle and the
medievals saw as belonging to physics
(van Inwagen & Sullivan, 2015).
Among the main metaphysical problems mentioned by multiple authors
(e.g., Craig, 1998; Mastin, 2008; Seibt,
2013; van Inwagen & Sullivan, 2015),
the following are of particular relevance
to “projects,” as we shall see later and in
Table 2 in particular:
• The nature of being (Parmenides,
539–492 bce; Heraclitus, 536–470 bce),
and the contrast between existence and
essence (Aristotle, 384–322 bce).
• Objects (physical such as materials, and abstract such as emotions
and numbers) and their attributes or
properties (universals existing outside of space and time, outside their
instantiation—Plato, 427–347 bce).
• Causation, determinism, and freedom. Determinism holds that nothing happens that has not already been
determined. The principal consequence of the deterministic claim is
that it poses a challenge to the existence of freedom. The problem of freedom is whether rational agents exercise
control over their own actions and
decisions (see, for example, Aristotle,
Leibniz, 1646–1716).
• Mind and matter (mental and physical).
The idea of matter and the problem of
the nature of matter was introduced
by Aristotle. Early debates centered on
identifying a single underlying principle
of matter. Water was claimed by Thales
(624–546 bce), air by Anaximenes
(585–528 bce), Apeiron (the Boundless) by Anaximander (610–546 bce),
and fire by Heraclitus. Democritus
(460–371, bce) developed an atomic
theory many centuries before it was
accepted by modern science.
• Identity and change. Parmenides denied
that change occurs at all, while Heraclitus thought change was ubiquitous:
“You cannot step into the same river
twice.”
• Space and time. A traditional realist
position in ontology is that time and
space exist apart from the human mind.
Idealists claim that space and time
are mental constructs used to organize perceptions. Leibniz believed that
88 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
without physical objects, “space” would
be meaningless because space is the
framework upon which we understand
how physical objects are related to one
another. In ancient times Parmenides
denied the flow of time. Today, fundamental laws are seen as time-reversible,
and the arrow of time is thought of as an
“emergent” phenomenon that may be
explained by a statistical understanding
of thermodynamic entropy.
The Roots of the Polysemic
Concept of Project
The concept of “project” comes from
various roots, making its meaning and
reality particularly complex to grasp
(Boutinet, 2001). The Latin language
has no word project, and the best corresponding substantive is propositum
(although it comes from a different etymology). In fact, Latins used periphrases such as quid cogitant (what they
think), quid mente agitavi (what I am
concerned with), or mihi est propositum
(my purpose is). Ancient Greeks had no
equivalent either, and the closest words
can be found in the opposition between
moral choice (proairesis) and choice
related to a defined purpose (boulèsis).
The concept of “project” was inconsistently used until the 20th century;
here are some examples. During the
15th century, the word was used in two
forms of ancient French: pourjet and
project. The words had a spatial meaning
linked to the Latin etymology progicio
(throw forward, throw out). In the world
of architecture and, more specifically,
the Quattrocento period, Brunelleschi
(1377–1446) separated the architectural
design from the execution of the work:
The architect became responsible for
the project and the choice of techniques
used to execute it.
In the 17th and 18th centuries, the
term project was sometimes linked
to social progress, as found in Rousseau’s essay (1750) Un jugement sur
le projet de paix perpétuelle (Judgment on Perpetual Peace) and in Kant’s
opuscule (1795) Zum ewigen Frieden.
Ein philosophischer Entwurf (Perpetual
Peace: A Philosophical Sketch), where
the German word entwurf is associated
with the word purpose.
Principles and Reality of a
Project: Some Metaphysical
Considerations
Plato’s Allegory of the Cave
What is ultimately a project? To gain
insight into this question, we tap into the
wisdom of the Allegory of the Cave, written by one of the greatest philosophers
of all time, Plato (427–347 bce) in his
famous book, The Republic. Its fictional
dialogue between Plato’s teacher Socrates
and Plato’s brother Glaucon is well known
and full of insights for this article.
For project management, Plato’s
allegory teaches us two important
things: (1) that there are different ways
of seeing or not seeing a project, in
other words, the contrast between Metaphysical Worldviews of Being Versus
Becoming; and (2) that the project consists of both the physical or material
elements and the eternal or immaterial elements that Plato calls “forms”
(­
S olomon & Higgins, 2010), in other
words, the contrast of Ancient Materialism Versus Ancient Immaterialism.
Project practitioners may focus on
the physical or material elements of the
project that are experienced through the
senses: inputs such as money, time, and
resources; project artifacts such as charter, scope statement, and plan; and outputs such as car, phone, or skyscraper.
In so doing, they spend much of their
time in the ordinary material world, the
world of “shadows,” what Heraclitus
(536–470 bce) calls the world of “becoming” and Bertrand Russell (1912/1997)
calls the “world of existence”: “The world
of existence is fleeting, vague, without
sharp boundaries, without any clear
plan or arrangement, but it contains all
thoughts and feelings, all the data of
sense, and all physical objects, everything that can do either good or harm,
everything that makes any difference to
the value of life and the world” (p. 100).
Things in this world tend to emerge,
change, die, or disappear. That’s the
case of inputs that turn into outputs
throughout the project. To illustrate this
point, we make an analogy between the
project plan and hand-drawing a triangle in an attempt to prove a theorem
of Euclidian geometry about triangles:
Much like one cannot draw a true triangle with straight exact lines and angles,
project practitioners cannot mistake the
plan for the true project. As Plato contends, the perfect project, if there is one,
does not exist anywhere in the material
world. Indeed, in such a diachronic
world, project practitioners deal only
with images of the project, never with
the reality that lies behind it.
Project management practitioners
may wonder where the “perfect” project
exists. Plato would say that it is found in
another world that is more real than the
material world; it is a world that is pure,
eternal, and immaterial, and can only
be known through reason, not through
experience. Parmenides (539–492 bce)
would call it a “being,” permanent, synchronic, and unchanging world. “The
world of being is unchangeable, rigid,
exact, delightful to the mathematician,
the logician, the builder of metaphysical systems, and all who love perfection more than life” (Russell, 1912/1997,
p. 100). Which of the two worlds do
today’s project practitioners prefer?
According to our temperaments, we shall
prefer the contemplation of one or of the
other. The one we do not prefer will probably seem to us a pale shadow of the one we
prefer, and hardly worthy to be regarded
as in any sense real. But the truth is that
both have the same claim on our impartial attention, both are real, and both are
important to the metaphysician. (Russell,
1912/1997, p. 100)
Plato’s Allegory of the Cave brilliantly
and creatively ties together the Greek
and pre-Socratic views of both ancient
materialism that sees the project as consisting of purely stable, physical, or material elements (e.g., Thales, 624–546 bce;
Democritus, 460–371 bce), and ancient
immaterialism that sees the project as
nothing more than numbers, minds, or
spirits (e.g., Pythagoras, 571–497 bce;
Parmenides 539–492 bce; Heraclitus
536–470 bce). Like Pythagoras, who considers numbers more important than
trees and tables, Plato gives primacy
to eternal principles. Like Parmenides,
Plato purports that things in our dayto-day experience are not truly real
(for example, the project plan), and yet
like Heraclitus, he appreciates the notion
of constant change and its underlying
logic, which Plato captures in what he
calls “form” (Solomon & Higgins, 2010).
Plato’s Allegory of the Cave also illustrates the difference between what the
project appears to be and what the project
really is; this is what Russell (1912/1997)
sees as “one of the distinctions that cause
most trouble in philosophy.” (p. 9) In
this context, the more real project (if it
is real at all) is not the project plan, nor
is it something practitioners can sense.
Rather, with experience, project practitioners can construct and shape a project
from the elements they can see, including an artifact like the project plan.
Here we have already the beginning of
one of the distinctions that cause the
most trouble in philosophy—the distinction between “appearance” and “reality”,
between what things seem to be and what
they are. The painter wants to know what
things seem to be, the practical man and
the philosopher want to know what they
are. (Russell, 1912/1997, p. 9)
Plato’s Universals: Implications for
Projects and Project Management
We can take away another lesson from
Plato’s “theory of ideas,”1 which contends
that particulars such as red roses, pens,
and shirts can have things in common—
like “redness” (Quine, 1948), or that there
is a “chairiness” in the idea of a pure
and universal form of a chair (Whitty,
2013). For project management, this
suggests that projects can share some
characteristic—let’s call it “project-ness”
(Quine, 1948). This project-ness includes
1Although Plato sees universals as “ideas,” one cannot consider them ideas in the mind because the notion of “mind”
was not recognized by early philosophers (Russell, 1912/1997).
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properties, characteristics, or “predicates” (as philosophers call them), such
as having needs, objectives, scope, constraints, deliverables, milestones, budget,
time-duration, resources, risks, organization structures, roles and responsibilities for project stakeholders, schedules,
and tracking measures. Moreover, “the
more real or perfect project” is also a
universal, a form.
Because project-ness and the more
real project—to name but a few universals—
are not particulars, they cannot exist
in our day-to-day world (“the world of
existence”); “they are things other than
particular things, which particular things
partake of and have characteristics of”
(Russell, 1912/1997, pp. 92–93). The Platonic universals are very influential in
project management.
There is much Platonic thinking in the
world of project management. Most if not
all drawings of project management processes in project management journals
and textbooks such as the PMBOK Guide
are of universal forms. . . . Perhaps like
Plato, we feel that if we identify the universal forms that comprise projects and
project management, we will in some way
come to know more about the reality of
project and project management. (Whitty,
2013, pp. 99–100)
Aristotle: The Everyday Project World Is
the Real One
Common-sense thinker Aristotle (384–
322 bce) does not reject the all-important
distinction between appearances and
reality, but he strongly disagrees with
his teacher Plato’s two-worldview and,
in a sense, brings Plato down to earth.
From the Aristotelian perspective, the
everyday project world is the real one
and there is no other. He believed that
“formal principles or universals that
form things into what they are could
be found in the substance of the thing
itself and not apart from it” (Whitty,
2013, p. 100). Taking this viewpoint,
the project plan is just a small part of
the project, yet it is the real thing—“the
substance or a thing that exists in its
own right.”
An early, extremely influential view about
reality seen in its most general light is that
it consists of things and their properties—
individual things, often called particulars,
and properties, often called universals that
can belong to many such individuals. . . .
Very closely allied to this notion of an individual is the concept of substance, that in
which properties “inhere.” (van Inwagen &
Sullivan, 2015, p. 16)
However, just because we understand that small part does not necessarily mean that we grasp the whole
project—“the essence.” Much of project
management today is grounded in
Aristotelian thinking.
Project management processes and practices (the essential cause of a project) give
the project its identifiable “life-cycle” form.
So the essence of the project, that is to say
those features that make an experience
a project, are inextricable from the practices and process that are recognizable
as project management. A point to take
from this line of reasoning is that we do
not apply project management to projects,
but rather a body of work is identifiable
as a project because project management
is applied to it. It is project management,
the implementation of particular practices
and processes that cause the form of work
to be identifiable as a project. (Whitty,
2013, p. 103)
who deeply believe that the mind or consciousness is the whole answer, whether
it is an individual’s mind or that of God.
“The word ‘idealism’ is used by different philosophers in somewhat different
senses. We shall understand by it the
doctrine that whatever exists, or at any
rate whatever can be known to exist,
must be in some sense mental” (Russell,
1912/1997, p. 37).
Inspired by Descartes’s argument
(1596–1650) that our ideas are the only
things we can know directly, idealists
would posit that ideas define the project.
If Leibniz (1646–1716) were to consider a
specific project, he would see it as a community of souls. Berkeley (1685–1753), a
bishop and theistic idealist, would say
the project is simply an idea in the mind
of God and that there is no such thing as
matter at all. In his worldview, the project
consists of nothing but minds (and their
ideas), which “perceive” the matter in the
project. Thus, the project exists because
practitioners experience it in the mind,
as they think and perceive it. His viewpoint has merit for project management,
because ideas are clearly important in
projects. Table 1 summarizes what is
most real in the universe and in a project.
Emergence and Existence of
Distinct Realities for Projects
In this light, there are two starting
points to explore the question about
what a project ultimately is. Project
practitioners may espouse Plato’s view
that the project is something other than
the day-to-day project things, or they
may accept Aristotle’s view that the
project really is what they can see as a
substance of the daily life of it, such as
the project plan (Solomon & Higgins,
2010). But do these two post-Socratic
metaphysical views tell the whole story?
What do project researchers tell us about
a “project” and about what a “project”
really is? Apart from taken-for-granted
acceptations of the word project, how is
a project ultimately defined in the project management literature? Ever since
the pre-Socratic philosophers, the ontological views have been presented in an
either/or manner. Project management
literature is no exception.
Berkeley, Leibniz, and Enlightenment
Idealists: Ideas Are the Most Real Part
of a Project
Much has been written about the
Parmenidean-inspired Democritean,
synchronic, being, thing ontology of an
unchanging and stable reality versus a
Heraclitean, diachronic, becoming, process ontology of a changing and emerging
reality (Chia, 2013; Gauthier & Ika, 2012;
Some might insist that the “mind” should
at least be part of the answer to the question about what a project ultimately is.
This is the case for Idealist philosophers
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A Being Versus Becoming Project
Ontology
Philosopher
Nature of Reality: What Is Most Real?
Nature of a Project: What Is Most Real?
Pre-Socratic Era
Ancient materialism: Reality ultimately consists of physical or material elements.
Thales
(624–546 bce)
Reality is ultimately water.
A project is ultimately inputs.
Anaximander
(610–546 bce)
Reality is made of some basic “stuff” that we may not
experience as such.
A project is ultimately some basic “stuff” that we
may not experience as such.
Democritus
(460–371 bce)
Reality consists of tiny atoms.
A project consists of building blocks.
Ancient immaterialism: Reality ultimately consists of eternal or immaterial elements.
Pythagoras
(571–497 bce)
Reality is ultimately numbers.
A project is ultimately numbers (e.g., time, cost).
Parmenides
(539–492 bce)
Reality is unchanging and unknown to us (the world of being).
A project is ultimately unchanging and unknown to us
(the being in the project).
Heraclitus
(536–470 bce)
Reality is change, but with an underlying logic (the world of
becoming).
A project is ultimately change, but with an underlying
logic (the becoming in the project).
Post-Socratic Era
Plato
(427–347 bce)
Reality is the eternal, immaterial and being world of pure
forms.
A project is ultimately the eternal, immaterial, and
being part of it.
Aristotle
(384–322 bce)
Reality is the everyday world of “substances:” things, trees,
people, and so forth.
A project is ultimately “substances.”
Enlightenment Idealists: Reality is ultimately mind or consciousness.
Leibniz
(ce 1646–1716)
Reality is a community of souls.
A project is ultimately a community of souls.
Berkeley
(ce 1685–1753)
Reality is an idea in the mind of God.
A project is ultimately an idea in the mind of God.
Table 1: Metaphysical views of the nature of reality: What is “most real” in the universe and in a project?
Koskela & Kagioglou, 2006; Linehan &
Kavanagh, 2006). Here is what Linehan
and Kavanagh (2006) have to say about a
being versus becoming project ontology:
In this worldview, primacy is given to
objects, things, states, events and nouns.
In the context of projects, a being ontology
leads us to talk and think about organisation structure in an objectified manner.
In other words, our descriptions privilege
static accounts of group structuring—for
instance, the common discussion in project management texts and practice about
the taxonomic distinctions between functional, weak matrix, balanced matrix,
strong matrix and projectised structures.
Moreover, these are seen as planned elements of the project organisation, preexisting the actual activities of the project
group. This style of thinking leads us to
consider project organisations as things,
akin to elephants and other organisms,
with functions, parts and structure, and
relationships with similar entities in the
“environment” be they parent organisations, client organisations, subcontractors
or state institutions. (Linehan & Kavanagh,
2006, pp. 52–53)
In a being ontological worldview,
then, a project consists of isolatable,
stable, and atomistic entities2 that
can simply be located in space-time
(Chia, 2013). This has been the dominant viewpoint in project management.
In contrast, there is the less common
becoming project ontology:
The becoming ontology emphasises process, verbs, activity and the construction
of entities. With respect to structure and
2This
is the proper term for “things” in philosophy.
organisation, it calls attention to the
dynamics of how such structural and
procedural issues are made relevant and
played out within specific project contexts. It focuses our attentions on situations in which members negotiate their
use of governing principles and structural
arrangements in actual practice. Thus,
rather than speaking about structure and
roles, we instead speak about structuring
and sense-making. (Linehan & Kavanagh,
2006, pp. 54–55)
A Realist Versus Nominalist Project
Ontology
A realist ontology focuses on an objective project reality that consists of
hard, concrete, and real entities external to the individual and independent
from the observer; this is in opposition to a nominalist (or conventionalist)
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ontology of a project reality external
to the individual but made of nothing
more than conventions (that is, names,
concepts, labels), which we use as tools
to make sense of the project (Burrell &
Morgan, 1979; Gauthier & Ika, 2012).
The thesis that universals exist—or at any
rate “subsist” or “have being” is variously
called “realism” or “Platonic realism” or
“platonism”. . . . The thesis that universals
do not exist—do not so much subsist; have
no being of any sort—is generally called
“nominalism.” (van Inwagen & Sullivan,
2015, p. 9)
As Burrell and Morgan (1979) state
with respect to realism:
Realism, (. . .) postulates that the social
world external to individual cognition is a
real world made up of hard, tangible, and
relatively immutable structures. Whether
or not we label and perceive these structures, the realists maintain they still exist
as empirical entities. We may not even be
aware of the existence of certain crucial
structures and therefore have no “names”
or concepts to articulate them. For the
realist, the social world exists independently of an individual’s appreciation of it.
The individual is seen as being born into
and living within a social world, which
has a reality of its own. It is not something
which the individual creates—it exists
“out there”: ontologically it is prior to the
existence and consciousness of any single
human being. For the realist, the social
world has an existence, which is as hard
and concrete as the natural world. (p. 4)
Here is the description of nominalism, according to Burrell and Morgan
(1979):
The nominalism position revolves around
the assumption that the social world external to individual cognition is made up of
nothing more than names, concepts and
labels, which are used to structure reality.
The nominalist does not admit to there
being any “real” structure to the world,
which these concepts are used to describe.
The “names” used are regarded as artificial
creations whose utility is based upon their
convenience as tools for describing, making sense of and negotiating the external
world. Nominalism is often equated with
conventionalism, and we will make no distinction between them. (p. 4; italics added)
For nominalists, then, projects are
conventions and, thus, different from
the organization, project settings, and
individual perspectives.
A Materialist Versus Idealist Project
Ontology
Materialism and idealism are two major
historical metaphysical traditions. Both
are ancient. However, though idealism
has held more sway in modern times
(especially in the 19th century), materialism has been on the rise since the second half of the 20th century (Craig, 1998).
Both realists and nominalists argue for a
social world external to individual cognition, so they may be called “materialists”
in a true ancient materialist tradition. If
asked what’s real in a project, materialists would name the physical and material inputs and outputs.
In contrast, like Blomquist and
Lundin (2010), the idealists would ask:
“Are projects real or virtual?” Hence,
some researchers argue that both realists and nominalists are wrong: They
reject the idea that the project is outside
the mind or consciousness, and believe
it to be the fruit of the mind instead
(e.g., Pellegrinelli, 2011). This is idealist
project ontology, in a true Enlightenment idealist tradition.
Thus, a project manager may either
opt for a materialist ontology or an idealist ontology. Adapting the words of
Russell (1912/1997), we may ask: Is there
a project that has a certain intrinsic
nature and continues to exist when you
are not managing it, or is it a dreamproject in a very prolonged dream or a
mere product of your imagination?
Summary: Two Metaphysical
Worldviews and Related Logics of
Action
Interestingly, two metaphysical worldviews underpin all four main project
ontologies (being, becoming, materialist,
and idealist): a Parmenidean-inspired
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Democritean thing (or substance) metaphysics and a Heraclitean process metaphysics (Chia, 2013; Gauthier & Ika,
2012; Koskela & Kagioglou, 2005, 2006;
Linehan & Kavanagh, 2006; Rescher,
1996: Seibt, 2013).
We also note that these distinct types
of project realities can be related to specific goals and logics of action (Kilduff,
Mehra, & Dunn, 2011). For example, the
following logics of action are related to
ontologies rooted in thing metaphysics (that is, being, realism, nominalism,
materialism, idealism):
• Structural Realist: Discover the fundamental structure of the universe
through pure research.
• Strong Paradigm: Create a scientific
paradigm and exploit its implications.
• Critical Realist: Emancipate people
from prevailing structures of power
and oppression (Kilduff et al., 2011).
• Pragmatist: Experience the world
through abductive fallible inquiry with
ethical ends-in-view (Martela, 2015).
In contrast, the following logics of
action are related to ontologies rooted
in process metaphysics:
• Foundationalist: Find hidden patterns
in data through induction.
• Instrumentalist: Rely (or use) on Truthindependent problem solving.
• Critical Realist: Emancipate people
from prevailing structures of power
and oppression.
• Pragmatist: Experience the world
through abductive fallible inquiry
with ethical ends-in-view.
The particular characteristics of critical realism and pragmatism—integrating,
for instance, pattern finding—make these
logics of action suitable for the types of
realities rooted in both thing and process
metaphysics. In light of the central metaphysical problems pertaining to projects,
Table 2 contrasts a thing-based understanding where the project is seen as a
“thing,” with a process-based understanding where the project is seen as a “process.”
Example of Related General Project/
Project Management Aspects
Main Problems
Thing Metaphysics
Process Metaphysics
Nature of being,
and the contrast
between existence
and essence
Reality is unchanging being
(Parmenides)
Essence: what something is
Existence: that something is
Being is dynamic (Heraclitus)
Process or dynamicity is an explanatory
feature; it is not only something
to be explained (as an “object” of
investigation), but it can also carry
explanations and sensemaking
processes form organizational
units and occur in a quantitatively
measurable and ordered fashion.
Dynamic transitions, or alterations and
dynamic permanence, are two basic
forms of dynamicity to be contrasted
What a project is: a thing or process
What project management is:
• people are seen as things, i.e., resources,
intellectual capital, intelligent decision
makers in interaction rather than simple
“numbers” or “resources”
• people with mind influencing process
• centralized management, distributed
management
Objects and their
attributes or
properties
Static, time invariant entities
(material or immaterial, concrete or
abstract)
The problem of universals changes
as it gives up “the substancemetaphysical principle that concrete
entities are fully determinate while
general or indeterminate entities are
abstract” (Seibt, 2013, p. 22)
Dynamic sameness, patterns
What the composition and characteristics of
a project are
Causation,
determinism, and
freedom
Determinism holds that every
event, including human cognition,
decision, and action, is causally
determined by an unbroken chain
of prior occurrences. Nothing
happens that has not already been
determined.
Regarding the problem of freedom,
i.e., whether rational agents
exercise control over their own
actions and decisions, determinism
tries to understand the relationship
between freedom and causation,
and whether laws of the considered
reality are causally deterministic.
The main consequence of the
deterministic claim is that it
challenges the existence of
freedom, and vice versa
The determinism versus freedom issue
is blurred. For instance, contrasted
views can be considered:
• Teleological view: toward a positive
specific goal/end, pre-established
purposefulness
• Naturalistic view: inner dynamicity
without any directedness toward a
specifiable goal/end, randomness
(Seibt, 2013), mechanism versus
emergence
Function of project management
Purpose of project management
Project success (definition, criteria)
Causes of success and failure
Mind and matter
The nature of matter was
questioned in early philosophy, and
the goal was to identify a single
underlying principle. Debate about
the relation between the mind (or
soul) and the body led to opposing
conceptions, such as: substance
dualism, where the mind and
body are essentially different but
interact, versus unity of substance,
where they are seen as a single
principle (the stance of idealists
as they tend to favor the mental
aspect in their monism)
The mind versus body or mental
versus physical problem disappears
“if all basic constituents of reality are
short-lived processes of information
transfer that exhibit both ‘mental’
and ‘physical’ aspects in different
accentuations according to context”
(Seibt, 2013, p. 22)
What is project management (people equal
things, or people with mind influencing
process)
(continued)
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Example of Related General Project/
Project Management Aspects
Main Problems
Thing Metaphysics
Process Metaphysics
Identity and
change
Persistence/change and identity
(whatever makes an entity
definable and recognizable, in
order to exist; an entity that exists
must have an identity): perdurance
(a thing has distinct temporal
parts throughout existence) versus
endurance (a thing is wholly
present at every moment of its
existence)
Two approaches to the problem of
persistence are offered: “1—by taking
persistent entities to be ‘enduring’
patterns of processes; 2—by
questioning that ‘perdurance’ versus
‘endurance’ accounts of persistence
form a theoretically necessary
exclusive dichotomy” (Seibt, 2013,
p. 23)
Style of project management: discontinuous,
abrupt changes between two areas of
stability, planned or continuous, emergent
Persistence of the project: perdurance (the
project takes distinct temporal forms over
time) or endurance (the project is the same
all the way through)
Space and time
The primary entities of reality
(substances) must be static: They
must be what they are at any
instant in time, what is there
(Seibt, 2013).
In the realist lens, space and
time exist apart from the mind;
idealists see them as mental
constructs. The existence of
space is the framework upon
which we can understand how
material entities relate to one
another (Leibniz). The absolute
versus relative debate applies
to both space and time. The
questions of time’s arrow as an
emergent phenomenon, and the
reversibility and symmetry of
time, are subject to debate (e.g.,
the flow of time is denied by
Parmenides). Contrasted views
are also exemplified by the
debate about perdurance versus
endurance
The process view focuses on becoming
and what is occurring as well as ways
of occurring.
There are two types of processes:
• Some are “postulated as ‘temporal
developments’ that can be analysed
as temporally structured sequences
of stages of an occurrence, with
each such stage being numerically
and qualitatively different from any
other.”
• Others are “temporal but nondevelopmental occurrences like
activities, or non-spatiotemporal
occurrences that realize themselves
in a developmental manner and
thereby constitute the directionality
of time” (Seibt, 2013, p. 3)
What the composition and characteristics of
a project are.
Function/role of project management:
discontinuous, the plan is seen as a
succession of events, a continuous
emergence
Irreversibility versus reversibility—for
instance, the use of standard project finance
versus real options approaches
Ontology (distinct
types of realities)
Being
Realism
Nominalism
Materialism
Idealism
Becoming
Constructivism
Idealism
Underlying paradigm
Distinct logics of
action
Structural Realist
Strong Paradigm
Critical Realist
Pragmatist
Foundationalist
Instrumentalist
Critical Realist
Pragmatist
Style of thinking about the project and
project management: atomistic, material
versus immaterial, analytical versus
relational, dynamic patterns, holistic
Examples of the
key philosophers
Thales (624–546 bce)
Anaximander (610–546 bce)
Democritus (460–371 bce)
Pythagoras (571–497 bce)
Parmenides (539–492 bce)
Plato (427–347 bce)
Aristotle (384–322 bce)
Berkeley (ce 1685–1753)
Heraclitus (536–470 bce)
Aristotle (384–322 bce)
Leibniz (ce 1646–1716)
Whitehead (ce 1861–1947)
Table 2: Contrasting assumptions in project management: Thing versus process metaphysics.
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Metaphysical Insights About
Projects and Implications for
Practitioners
In light of the previous discussions, the
question about what is most real in
a project might trigger very different
responses according to the espoused
or in-use metaphysical perspective, be
it thing or process. Table 3 offers a
summary of the key aspects introduced
above, for projects/project management, according to the two perspectives
of metaphysics, thing and process.
A Thing-Based Understanding of
Projects and Project Management
In thing metaphysics, projects are fundamentally seen as a constellation of
“things”: intrinsically enduring and concrete substances and entities that exist
independently of other things. The “thingness” in the project is all there is—that is,
that which endures through change and
does not require anything other than itself
to exist. If that’s what project practitioners
believe projects fundamentally are, then
they think in much the same way as the
pre-Socratic Greek philosopher Democritus did.
Taking Democritus’s view, a project
consists of stable, small, basic particles
or building blocks. Although their underlying nature does not change, things and
their properties might change in space
or time (Solomon & Higgins, 2010).
Here’s an analogy with the smartphone:
It can be broken into pieces but the
inputs from which it was made cannot
be destroyed. Indeed, the sapphire crystal used to produce scratch-proof screen
displays is an extremely hard and nearly
indestructible material.
Thanks to Aristotle and respected
physicists such as Newton, thing metaphysics has dominated thinking for
more than 2,000 years, particularly in
the West. The same holds true in the
world of project management. Similar to the way physicists think of the
world’s building blocks as quarks—
or a few decades ago as protons, electrons, and neutrons—this Aristotelian
Democritean-inspired kind of thingbased understanding has led us to
Aspects of Projects/
Project Management
Relation to Main Problems
of Metaphysics
Thing Metaphysics
What a project is
Nature of being, and the contrast Projects are fundamentally things
between existence and essence
Projects are fundamentally processes
What project management is
Nature of being, and the contrast Planning
between existence and essence
Engaging context, including
stakeholders
What the composition and/or
characteristics of a project are
Objects and their attributes or
properties
Space and time
Inputs, outputs, structures; scopes,
models
Concepts, names or labels;
assumptions; expectations; flux of
things; events; occasions of experience
Function of project management
Causation, determinism,
and freedom
‘Management-as-planned’
philosophy
‘Managing and organizing’ philosophy
Purpose of project management
Causation, determinism,
and freedom
Getting things done
Making the best of the evolving context
Project success (definition, criteria) Causation, determinism,
and freedom
Time, cost, specifications
Symbolic and rhetorical assessments of
a project by stakeholders
Success and failure causes
Causation, determinism,
and freedom
‘Weak links,’ poor planning, poor
implementation, inadequate
resources, etc.
‘Missed opportunities,’ chance,
happenstance, unintended
consequences
What is project management
Mind and matter
Planning
Engaging context including
stakeholders
Style of project management
Identity and change
Planned
Emergent
Function/role of project
management
Space and time
Logico-scientific mode, variance
models (plan, uncertainty
reduction, optimization, first-order
complexity) (Tsoukas & Hatch,
2001)
Narrative mode, qualitative accounts
(initial conditions and emergence,
understanding patterns, holistic
understanding, second-order
complexity)
Underlying paradigm
Ontology (distinct types of
realities)
Efficiency, rationality, objectivity,
stability, transformation,
reductionism, planning
Uncertainty, complexity, politics,
change, improvisation, creativity,
managing
Style of thinking about project and
project management
Distinct logics of action
Analytical thinking
Holistic thinking
Process Metaphysics
Table 3: Contrasting perspectives for projects and project management: Thing versus process metaphysics.
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consider projects as inputs, outputs,
structures, scopes, and models. Let’s
imagine how this might look for the
iPhone project: Inputs are the things
such as the sapphire crystal, the budget, and the engineers; outputs are the
screen and the iPhone itself; a structure
is the staff that is 100% dedicated to the
project; the scope is the total amount of
work needed to complete the project;
and the models could include a project
plan and a Gantt chart.
In a thing-based understanding of
project management, the project is a
thing, a concrete entity. It has a specific, external, stable, and consensual
objective: to create an output that will
meet a need within the constraints of
cost, time, and quality. The objective
of project management is thus getting
the job done. If the inputs, project,
and outputs are things, project management is then the transformation of
inputs into outputs—that is, things into
things. “Transformation, as defined in
economics, is a relationship between
input and output. Both input and output are usually understood as things
or matter. The transformation itself is a
black box, except that we decompose it
into further transformations” (Koskela
& Kagioglou, 2005, p. 38). Hence, the
rule of decomposition is quintessential
in thing-based project management.
Here is how Descartes (1967, p. 11)
describes this rule: “The second (was
to) to divide each of the difficulties that
I was examining into as many parts
as might be possible and necessary in
order to best solve it.”
If there is one project management
tool that embodies the rule of decomposition, it is the famous work breakdown structure (WBS), which many
consider the single most important tool
(see Koskela & Kagioglou, 2005 for example). Indeed, the WBS logically decomposes and subdivides project work into
small and manageable chunks and, thus,
creates an organized picture via an outline of the project scope. This is analytical thinking at its best because it focuses
on putting things into categories. No one
can downplay the importance of the
WBS; without it, project managers would
not be able to develop sound time, cost,
and quality estimates, nor would they
be able to plan and track the project,
which is why planning is considered the
essence of project management. Project
management is the life-cycle management of the project (that is, the planning, executing, and controlling of the
project), with a focus on both planning
and outputs. Thus, a “management-asplanned” philosophy underlies project
management (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007).
A typical planned style dominates in a
thing-based understanding of project
management (Lewis, Welsh, Dehler, &
Green, 2002).
Two metaphysical assumptions that
are part of a thing-based understanding of project management are worth
noting: Project activities are considered
similar by essence, and activities are
assumed to be nearly independent and,
thus, they can be predicted.
There are two related assumptions playing
an important role in connection to decomposition: similarity and independence
of decomposed elements or parts. The
similarity assumption takes it for granted
that the parts are, by nature, similar to
the whole and thus are mutually similar.
The assumption of the independence of
parts follows from the similarity assumptions. Namely if our unit of analysis is an
idea, problem or thing in itself, so will all
decomposed parts also be ideas, problems or things in themselves. (Koskela &
Kagioglou, 2005, p. 38)
Not surprisingly, three practical con­
sequences emerge from these metaphysical assumptions. First, project
management is built around a rational
and reductionist perspective that tends
to focus on what should be rather than
what is, thus emphasizing the best way
to deliver the project. Second, efficiency
prevails in project management and,
hence, project success can be measured
objectively; this could mean delivering the project on time, within budget, and to specifications (“the triple
96 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
constraint”). When a project fails, it is
because of “weak links” (such as poor
planning, poor implementation, inadequacy of resources, and so forth), and
not because of the standard project
management approach. Third, projects
are the same and one size fits all, meaning that you can follow standard project
management procedures, achieve success, and “replicate” it in other projects
and project settings. That’s the traditional project management approach
at its best!
In this context, in a thing-based
understanding of project management, projects are, by definition, seen
as a collection of unique processes in
which “a process is a structure of activities that produces an identifiable output” (Zwikael & Smyrk, 2011, p. 11).
However, these are merely transformation processes. Things such as inputs,
structures, scopes, models, or even the
whole project may change (for example,
Steve Jobs asked the project team to
change the iPhone screen well after
they started the project). Both “issues”
and “opportunities” might arise that
can lead to change in a project. Change
here means something that happens to
things, and they only happen at certain
points.
Specifically, transformation is related
to change and becoming, but let’s take
a closer look. . . . [T]he transformation
model overcomes the difficulty of representing change by jumping over it, from
one instance of time, represented by a set
of things, to another instance of time, represented by another set of things. (Koskela
& Kagioglou, 2005, p. 40)
In contrast, in a process-based
understanding of project management,
change is not merely something that
happens to things, not a mere alteration
in the properties of enduring things in
the project, but rather a sequence of
states, with much internal coherence
to give us the impression of one continuous thing (Craig, 1998). We turn to
this metaphysical worldview in the next
section.
A Process-Based Understanding of
Project and Project Management
In process metaphysics, projects are
fundamentally a constellation of processes, not things. A project is ultimately that which emerges, flows,
develops, grows, and changes. Process metaphysics began in the preSocratic era and, more specifically,
with Heraclitus. From Heraclitus’s
perspective, a project consists of ongoing, fluctuating, changing, flowing,
fleeting, and interacting processes.
A project is ultimately more like fire,
always changing and never the same;
what’s most real is that which actually
changes, that which is constantly in
flux. “Process is fundamental: the river
is not an object but an ever-changing
flow; the sun is not a thing, but a flaming fire. Everything in nature is a matter of process, of activity, of change.”
(Rescher, 1996, p. 10) For Heraclitus,
then, nothing in the project remains
constant, and it is brought into being
as it changes. “Into the same river you
could not step twice, for other ‘and still
other’ waters are flowing.” (Heraclitus,
Patrick, & Bywater, 1969, p. 94)
Order, stability, and identity are but precariously arrested moments in the relentless flux that is reality. In his view, conflict,
struggles and temporary reconciliations
are unavoidably the very stuff of life. Were
this not the case, all of life as we experience it would not be as it is. Thus, the
universe flows along its own accord, shaping its own destiny regardless of human
intentions. Human actions and interventions are therefore accorded less causal
significance than our egos would have us
believe. (Chia, 2013, p. 41)
Heraclitus is the founder of process metaphysics and he inspired many
philosophers, including Leibniz and
Whitehead (1861–1947), and modern
physicists such as Einstein, Bohm, and
Prigogine. Process metaphysics has
gained attention recently in management (e.g., Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas,
& Van de Ven, 2013) and in project
management (e.g., Koskinen, 2012;
Packendorff, Crevani, & Lindgren, 2014).
In a Heraclitean-type view of project
management, projects are seen as concepts, labels, or names; assumptions;
expectations; events or occasions of
experience; and changing things.
In a process-based understanding
of project management, the project is
not a set of things but ultimately the
flux of things in a context of change,
ambiguity, complexity, uncertainty,
or chaos. Here, things are not stable,
permanent, and ordered entities, but
rather categories or abstractions that
are used and reused in an attempt to
create order out of disorder and make
sense of the fluid, dense, and complex
project context (Chia, 2013; Koskinen,
2012; Packendorff et al., 2014; Rescher,
1996). In the very way that no project
exists in and of itself, everything in the
project is constantly in the making. The
project is nothing but process; it is in a
continual state of becoming. The project presents itself to team members and
other stakeholders in the form of actual
“occasions of experience,” which make
up the ultimate version of project reality (Whitehead, as cited by Solomon &
Higgins, 2010).
A process-based understanding of
project management, thus, focuses on
how processes emerge, develop, grow,
and terminate, or in other words, how
they unfold over time (Langley et al.,
2013). In this context, time, change,
and becoming are ineluctable features of projects; so, rather than focusing on projects and their structures,
project practitioners should concentrate on “everyday practical coping
actions,” “sense-making efforts,” and the
“coming-into-being” of the project as a
whole (Chia, 2013, p. 48). Thus, these
critical questions should be asked by
project practitioners: What’s happening in the project over time? What’s
happening in the project at a particular time? What are the interactions
between activities, people, and technology (Koskela & Kagioglou, 2005)?
Here, there is no single, specific,
stable, self-evident, clear, and precise
objective that would reflect the reality of the project. There are, however,
many unclear, conflicting, or contradictory objectives. The project needs, for
example, may not be fully known in
advance to create a complete and reliable project plan—thus, the success of
agile project management approaches,
which favor a process-based understanding of projects, in the IT industry
sector.
Project stakeholders have differing
expectations and they tend to construct
project reality through their individual and collective actions. The essence
of project management, here, shifts to
understanding the context from both
the project team and stakeholder points
of view.
Consequently, the project should
meet the expectations of stakeholders.
To assess project success is to dig into
the stories they tell about the project
in order to understand their underlying symbolic and rhetorical meanings.
The objective of project management
is no longer just about getting the job
done but about making the best of
the project’s larger process: the context. Project management is no longer
merely life-cycle management but constantly coping with a plurality of objectives, needs, expectations, rationales,
uncertainties, complexities, urgencies,
chaos, and emerging context. In other
words, it is the ongoing process of
managing (Mintzberg, 2009; Weick,
1969); thus, the process of “managing”
replaces “project management” (Chia,
2013).
Breaking down the project into parts
might help make sense of it, but this “labyrinth of decomposition” as Mintzberg
(2009, p. 164) would call it, makes project
management more complex. Indeed, that
which has been broken down into parts
must ultimately be put back together into
a coherent whole. In this case, it is not
analytical thinking that dominates, but
rather holistic thinking. “It is easy to see
that ‘analytical’ thinking is subscribing to
the thing ontology and ‘holistical’ to the
process ontology” (Koskela & Kagioglou,
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 97
PAPERS
The Metaphysical Questions Every Project Practitioner Should Ask
2006, p. 3), which is why “managing”
is badly needed and why intuition and
improvisation matter in the process of
managing. A “managing and organizing” philosophy (Mintzberg, 2009; Weick,
1969) and an emergent project management style (Lewis et al., 2002) emphasizing participative approach, improvisation,
experiential learning, and sensemaking
dominate in a process-based understanding of project management. Here, project
management fundamentally includes the
critical roles that team members play
in a project, and leadership cannot be
reduced to snapshot images of a strong,
heroic, omnipotent project manager and
a project sponsor’s traits, styles, actions,
and competencies (Packendorff et al.,
2014).
From a process philosophical viewpoint, project success or failure should
not be solely attributed to “either the
heroism or incompetence of leaders or,
alternatively, to the munificence or perniciousness of a pre-existing external
environment.” (p. 47) Instead, project
practitioners should credit “eventualities to the unexpected turns of circumstances brought about through ongoing
interactions that ultimately influence
the fortune and survival of a social unit.
Hence, success or failure, survival or
demise cannot be wholly attributed to
individual decisions made or to preexisting environmental forces.” (p. 47)
It is important to acknowledge that
“chance, happenstance and unintended
consequences have much to say in
shaping individual and organizational
destinies.” (Chia, 2013, p. 47) So, success
and failure are intertwined in meaning
and action, and when a project fails (if it
ever fails), it is likely that missed opportunities and unintended consequences
took their toll on it.
Conclusion
Metaphysical questions are compelling
yet simple questions in project management practice. But their answers
are far from simple. If one asks project
practitioners if there is such a thing
as the project they are working on,
in a true Plato’s Beard tradition they
would likely say that if this were not the
case, they would not be dealing with it
(Quine, 1948).
One may insist and ask them: Is the
project really what it looks like (Russell,
1912/1997)? Some will say that the real
project is an everyday project artifact,
such as a project plan, in a true Aristotelian tradition. Others will disagree,
making the Platonic argument that the
real project is not what it looks like.
Then, one may push even further:
What’s most real in their project? What
is a project? Some will let one believe
that the label “project,” as Nietzsche
(1982) would put it, is incomparably
more important than what a project is.
Others might echo project management
literature, suggesting that a project
either consists of stable and unchanging things (“being”), as espoused in
traditional project management, or
it is ultimately a “becoming,” changing, and flowing reality, as often is the
case in agile project management. Still
others will stick to ready-made definitions such as a project as “a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a
unique product, service or result.” (PMI,
2013, p.3).
These kinds of metaphysical questions have been part of philosophical
thinking for over 2,600 years (Solomon
& Higgins, 2010), and using them to
help project practitioners understand
the strengths and weaknesses of their
management style can improve project
management practices. However, for
these age-old questions to be useful, the
project management practitioner needs
to dig to find the deeper truths.
This article deals with the “subtler”
picture or “inner” reality of the project
that will allow practitioners to make
sense of it and discover the wonder
lying just below the surface by showing
the familiar project figure in an unfamiliar aspect (Russell, 1912/1997, p. 16
and p. 157). Paraphrasing Whitehead
(as cited in Koskela & Kagioglou, 2005),
we contend that metaphysics matters in
project management practice, and proj-
98 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
ect practitioners can benefit from understanding their metaphysical stance: No
practice can be more secure than the
unconscious metaphysics which tacitly
it presupposes.3 And, if project practitioners want to know which one of
the two metaphysical worldviews is the
“best,” we encourage them to believe
in the metaphysics of their best project
management practice.
Furthermore, whatever their metaphysical position, project practitioners
cannot avoid the other end of the spectrum. Indeed, “if we subscribe to one
metaphysical position, the other anyway tends to emerge for filling the gaps
left by that one” (Koskela & Kagioglou,
2005, p. 39). Thus, the challenge is to
transcend one’s metaphysical stance
and manage the tensions that often
occur in projects between Apollonian
order and Dionysian disorder, certainty
and uncertainty, control and improvisation, plan and emergence, stability
and change, being and becoming, traditional versus agile project management,
and so on.
Ultimately, we suggest that the
above-mentioned awareness can allow
project practitioners to play with the two
metaphysical worldviews: for instance,
embracing a process and becoming view
during the project front end, where the
future is invented, and then shifting to
a thing and being view during the project execution (see, e.g., Morris, 2013),
acknowledging that it is more a matter
of relative importance than an “either/
or” alternative.
All in all, paraphrasing Socrates,
we submit that “unexamined project
work is not worth doing”4 and, thus,
we challenge project practitioners and
researchers to examine the influence
of metaphysics on project management
practice.
3“No science can be more secure than the unconscious
metaphysics which tacitly it presupposes.” (Whitehead, 1933,
p. 183)
4“The unexamined life is not worth living” (attributed to
Socrates).
Acknowledgments
The authors express their profound gratitude to Vincent Bergeron, Professor of
Philosophy at the University of Ottawa
for his great insights. They also extend
their thanks to the guest editor and the
reviewers for their helpful comments.
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Lavagnon A. Ika, MSc, PhD, is Associate
Professor of Project Management at the Telfer
School of Management, University of Ottawa. He
holds an MSc in project management from UQO and
a PhD in business administration with specialization in international development project management from the Université du Québec à Montréal, a
Montreal-based joint doctoral program with McGill,
Concordia, and HEC universities. Over the past 16
years, he has taught project management at the
undergraduate and graduate levels in both French
and English, mainly in Canada but also in Europe,
Africa, and the Middle East. He has supervised a
dozen MSc students and has sat on many MSc and
PhD committees all over the world.
Professor Ika’s research topics include what makes
projects complex; what makes projects successful;
why projects fail and what can be done about it;
and the roles of project strategy, supervision, and
management in project success/failure. In addition
to his works on international development projects, Professor Ika has a genuine interest in the
100 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
foundations of project management research. He is
the author of close to 20 papers in peer-reviewed
journals and more than 20 conference proceedings.
Professor Ika’s work has been published in many
journals, including the Project Management Journal ®,
International Journal of Project Management,
International Journal of Managing Projects in
Business, International Journal of Project Organization
and Management, and Journal of African Business.
He recently received the Emerald Literati Network
2011 Award for Excellence (Highly Commended
Paper Award Winner) and the IPMA Research
Contribution of a Young Researcher Award in 2012.
He can be contacted at [email protected]
Professor Christophe N. Bredillet, PhD, DSc,
is Professor of Organizational Project Management
at Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières (UQTR). He
is Director of the University of Quebec network of
postgraduate (masters) programs in project management. He is the Scientific Director, Société Française
pour l’avancement du Management de Projet (SMaP)
and Adjunct Professor at Queensland University of
Technology (QUT) Project Management Academy. He
specializes in the fields of portfolio, program, and
project management (P3M). From 2012 to 2015, he
was the Director of the QUT Project Management
Academy. Before joining QUT, he was senior
consultant at the World Bank and from 1992 to 2010
he was the Dean of Postgraduate Programs and
Professor of Strategic Management and P3M at ESC
Lille. His main interests and research activities are
in the field of philosophy of science and practice in
P3M, including dynamic evolution of the field, bodies
of knowledge, standards, and their link with capability development, capacity building, governance, and
performance. In 2012, he received the prestigious
Manfred Saynish Foundation for Project Management
(MSPM)—Project Management Innovation Award
for his contribution to a philosophy of science with
respect to complex project management. He can be
contacted at [email protected].
PAPERS
Living With the Unknown Unknown:
Uncertainty in Projects
Øyvind Kvalnes, Department of Leadership and Organizational Behaviour, BI Norwegian
Business School, Oslo, Norway
ABSTRACT ■
INTRODUCTION
In this article, I explore how the traditional
understanding of uncertainty in project management can be revised in light of the philosophical input from Kierkegaard, Dewey,
and Wittgenstein. Planning models of projects tend to view uncertainty as a threat
to successful project implementation. An
alternative approach can emerge from a
philosophical investigation of the potentials
embedded in surprising turns of events.
It is possible to retain a planning orientation to projects while also embracing uncertainty as a potentially energizing dimension
of projects—one that can activate positive
personal and collective drama in project
management.
he main aim of this article is to identify and explore the positive
dimensions of uncertainty in project management. A common
approach to uncertainty, both in project management practice and
research, has been to see it as a threat and as something that should, if
possible, be neutralized and reduced. This article draws on philosophical ideas
about uncertainty to highlight its constructive potential in projects and suggests
ways in which project management can embrace rather than feel threatened by
the basic fact that the future is unknown in various unknown ways.
KEYWORDS: epistemology; uncertainty;
philosophy; project management
Project Management Journal, Vol. 47, No. 3, 101–108
© 2016 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
T
“The Fly and the Fly-Bottle”
Ludwig Wittgenstein famously likened philosophy to the activity of showing
“the fly the way out of the fly-bottle” (Wittgenstein, 1958/2009, paragraph 81);
his idea was that the fly can see the world around it, yet cannot access it. Rather,
it keeps on buzzing about and continuously hits the walls of its glass prison, not
understanding the nature of the barriers to its own existence. The senses appear
to reveal so much, yet they reveal nothing at all; they tell part of the truth of the
real world but not our relation to it. The senses do not reveal the way out of the
prison of the senses. They do not show the paths to understanding and knowledge. In this article, I explore the idea that project management theory and
practice can similarly be a prisoner within a fly-bottle in its relation to uncertainty. A typical planning approach to projects identifies uncertainty as a threat
to successful execution and welcomes any move to reduce it. In some contexts,
as in the projects in safety-critical industries, it is understandable that one aims
for uncertainty reduction (Saunders, Gale, & Sherry, 2015), whereas in others,
uncertainty can open up new and exciting possibilities. When we see projects as
human dramas, the lack of certainty adds to the thrill of contributing to the processes and releases energies other than the ones associated with careful and systematic planning in an ordered environment (Carlsen, Clegg, & Gjersvik, 2012).
The frustrated philosopher who is seeking release from uncertainty and
wants to discover a stable foundation for knowledge is, in Wittgenstein’s eyes,
similar to the fly trapped in the bottle—so close to the truth, yet separated
from it by glass walls. This philosopher needs therapy, and Wittgenstein is
there to offer it—in the shape of an invitation to reflect on the relation between
language and reality, meaning, and practice. Once we understand the workings of our concepts, and how their meanings are inseparable from their uses
in everyday settings, anxiety over the lack of certainty disappears. The fly can
leave the fly-bottle, and appreciate the richness of the world outside it.
Uncertainty in Project Management:
The Unknown Unknown
Studies and discussions of uncertainty are prevalent in the project management literature (see, for example, De Meyer, Loch, & Pich, 2002; Ward
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 101
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Living With the Unknown Unknown: Uncertainty in Projects
& Chapman, 2003; Olsson, 2006; Loch,
De Meyer, & Pich, 2006; Perminova,
­Gustafsson, & Wikstrom, 2008; Cleden,
2009; Meredith & Mantel, 2010). The
dominant perspective in these contributions is to find ways to reduce and minimize uncertainty. Turner and Cochrane
(1993) provided an early recognition of
the challenge of uncertainty in projects.
The so-called agile approaches to project management (Moran, 2015) aim to
be more open to change and surprising
turns of events, demanding a high degree
of stakeholder flexibility and involvement. The classical project management
model, as described in A Guide to the
Project Management Body of Knowledge
(PMBOK® Guide) – Fifth Edition (Project Management Institute, 2013) and
elsewhere, remains uncomfortable with
uncertainty and identifies it as a threat
to the project, since it undermines the
desired flow of the five-step procedure
of initiating, planning, executing, monitoring, and terminating the project. The
literature distinguishes between risk
(known unknowns) and uncertainty
(unknown unknowns), where both pose
a challenge to project implementation,
but the latter in a more dramatic sense,
throwing the doubly unknown into the
project world (Lechler, Edington, & Gao,
2012). The planning model sees any
initiative to reduce or neutralize uncertainty to be positive because it increases
the likelihood that the project will go
according to plan.
In adopting this stance toward
uncertainty, project management cuts
itself off from the positive and energizing aspects of living with the unknown
unknown, and from identifying the
opportunities of heading into the future
being open to surprising turns of events,
not knowing in advance how things will
unfold. The best possible overall outcome may not be that the project goes
according to plan, because at any point
there may occur surprising opportunities that are even better than the ones
envisaged during the initiation phase.
There has been considerable criticism
of the classical model in the project
management research but the resistance to uncertainty remains. The fly
continues to hit the glass walls of its
own prison, even though the escape
route is well within reach.
One significant way that project
management can benefit from embracing uncertainty is making activities
attractive and meaningful for potential
and actual project participants. Carlsen
(2008, p. 58) explored how exposure
to trials, risks, and uncertainties can
become the input to “positive dramas
as enacted self-adventures, dynamic
structures of meaning and emotional
engagement that mediate the formation of individual and collective life
stories.” We can see uncertainty as an
integral part of the human drama that is
idea work and innovative involvement
in projects. Encountering the unknown
unknown in projects can create energy
and engagement and pave the way for
personal and collective growth. Carlsen
et al. (2012) have identified concrete
ways in which drama can be activated
in projects; I will return to their findings in the latter part of the article, after
a philosophical account of the role of
uncertainty in human endeavors.
The Role of Uncertainty in
Human Endeavors
Wittgenstein’s suggestion that philosophy should seek release from foundational ambitions regarding human
inquiry also received the attention of
the contemporary philosophers of science. Karl Popper dismissed it outright
as a misconception of what goes on
in science: “Wittgenstein very fittingly
compares a certain type of philosopher
with a fly in a bottle, going on and on,
buzzing about. And he says it is the task
of his philosophy to show the fly the
way out of the bottle. But I think it is
Wittgenstein himself who is in the bottle
and never finds his way out of it; and I
certainly don’t think he has shown anybody else the way out.” (Popper, 1971)
The dismissal is a sign that Popper is
committed to a foundational attitude
toward science and learning, one in
102 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
which the accumulation of knowledge
and the gradual removal of uncertainty
is the way forward.
Uncertainty has caught the attention
of philosophers from a range of traditions. The Danish philosopher, Søren
Kierkegaard (1844/1980), suggested
that uncertainty is a source of creativity
rather than a hindrance to it. He views
anxiety as a response to human freedom and to the dizzying realization that
the self has opportunities to develop
and grow out of the status quo. Uncertainty can trigger this both frightening and potent insight. The pragmatist
philosopher John Dewey (1916/1960,
1939) develops it further by emphasizing uncertainty as an integral part of
human exploration. Dewey criticizes the
traditional epistemology of empiricism,
which understands the human subject
as a passive receiver of more or less
reliable sense data, rather than as an
active and engaged seeker of knowledge
whose intentions affect the outcomes.
The planning approach to projects
appears to have adopted the empiricist notion that uncertainty negatively
affects human endeavors to understand
the world. I suggest that Dewey’s arguments against the traditional model are
also relevant in the context of projects
and that they offer insights that can
be utilized to develop a more fruitful
attitude to uncertainty in projects. The
final source of philosophical input that
I will turn to is that of Wittgenstein’s
writings on certainty (1972), in which he
addresses the concerns raised by G. E.
Moore (1939) and other epistemologists
regarding the lack of proof of the claims
we take to be true about the world.
Even this contribution points to a more
relaxed and open attitude to the threat
posed by uncertainty. The philosophical sources I draw on in this article offer
overlapping suggestions regarding how
uncertainty can power human exploration, rather than stand in its way; as
such, they also provide project management practice and research with ideas
to generate a shift in the attitude toward
the unknown unknown.
The discussion of how project
management deals with uncertainty
belongs under the research heading of
“what goes on in projects” (Lindkvist
& Söderlund, 2002), since it focuses
on activities and practices in projects
and the assumptions about knowledge
that are embedded in them. Both in the
research literature and concrete project
settings, uncertainty often has the status
of being an unwanted entity that reduces
the chances of reaching the defined
project goals, thus generating anxiety
and despair among the members of the
project team. The emotional aspects—
its thrills and pains—of project work is
also a research field in the ascendancy
(Lindgren, Packendorff, & Sergi, 2014).
The negative connotations regarding uncertainty stem from a rationalistic
account of the project process, in which
the basic assumption is that the successful planning and execution of a project
rest on a high degree of certainty about
goals, resources, methods, and other factors that can affect the project life cycle.
Without certainty, the project manager
and his or her team members are in the
dark about the purpose and direction of
their activities. The planning-oriented
project literature views reduction of
uncertainty as an integral part of a rational and goal-oriented project process.
The lower the amount of uncertainty,
the higher the chance of realizing the
project ambitions. With an increase in
knowledge and a corresponding reduction of uncertainty come clarity and
light to the project.
The dominant discourse of project management focuses on the planning and controlling for the successful
implementation of unique and exceptional tasks (Lindgren et al., 2014,
p. 1385). Each project is construed to
have a life cycle that passes from initiation, through development and planning to implementation, execution, and
monitoring, before the termination and
closing of the project. The underlying
assumption of this understanding of
the project life cycle is that the success
of the project depends upon the careful
and concise definition of operational
goals and specification of activities,
preparing for smooth implementation
by the project members (Lindkvist &
Söderlund, 2002. It is within this framework that uncertainty is an unwelcome
feature of the project’s circumstances.
Uncertainty can be a dimension of
a project in different guises. Lechler
et al. (2012) identifies six categories of
uncertainty in projects: contextual turbulence, stakeholder uncertainty, technological uncertainty, organizational
uncertainty, project uncertainty, and
malpractice. Their common feature is
that they introduce elements into the
project work, which are impossible to
fully take into account in advance, as
part of the plan. They are the surprises—
the unforeseen events that force project
managers and members of the project
team to reconsider and reschedule.
Within the project literature, the
planning paradigm has come under criticism for not mirroring sufficiently the
action orientation of concrete projects
(Lundin & Söderholm, 1995; Lindkvist &
Söderlund, 2002). Contextual uncertainty
turns projects into much more open processes, where surprises occur and perspectives change during the project life
cycles (Christensen & Kreiner, 1991).
An action approach to projects has the
potential to accommodate uncertainty in
a more constructive way than the planning model, by opening up for an understanding where unexpected events can
also be opportunities rather than threats
to project implementation. The approach
may retain the five-step assumption, but
loosen it up and view the project processes in a more flexible manner. Uncertainty creates new possibilities, ones that
may take the people involved in the projects to new levels of insight and achievement. Action orientation in projects can
be more dynamic than the classical orientation and lead to a more effective
identification of the possibilities that lie
in the unknown unknowns.
Lechler et al. (2012) have also challenged the prevailing notion in classical
project management that uncertainty
is always an enemy. Uncertainty and
unforeseeable project situations do not
necessarily lead to a negative consequence. A project manager who automatically seeks to reduce possible
sources of uncertainty may inadvertently also close off and neglect business
opportunities. Uncertainty can release
new possibilities, and loyalty to the project plan and resistance to change may
block their implementation:
Once a situation of uncertainty is identified, opportunities should be created or
discovered leading to an increased value
proposition for the project and the enterprise. The discovery and development of
opportunities is not an obvious process.
It requires creativity and the analysis of
potential solutions beyond the project’s
constraints. This cannot be achieved by
following the classic risk management
technique of simply minimizing variation
from the baseline. (p. 67)
The suggestion, then, is that a slackening of project discipline may be called
for in order to reap the benefits and
opportunities created by uncertainty.
Despite the misgivings within project management research about the
five-step planning conception of projects, the reluctance to see uncertainty
as anything but a threat appears to have
survived in project settings. Researchers
have called for a shift in attention from
risk management to opportunity management (Olsson, 2007) and from a focus on
probability to an emphasis on possibility
(Pender, 2001), but the traditional risk
management approach for projects, as
presented in the PMBOK ® Guide, remains
more or less unaffected by these contributions. In the remainder of this article, we
will point to philosophical sources that
can strengthen the efforts to develop a
broader understanding of uncertainty in
projects.
Developing a Broader
Understanding of Uncertainty
in Projects
We can connect project management’s
uneasy relationship with uncertainty to
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Living With the Unknown Unknown: Uncertainty in Projects
the anxiety that can occur when individuals contemplate the possibility of
surprises. Anxiety is another concept that
evokes negative connotations because
it is typically associated with individual suffering and powerlessness. Søren
Kierkegaard, however, describes anxiety
as an experience that can power creativity and lift the individual out of passivity
and despair. In The Concept of Anxiety
(1844/1980), Kierkgaard presents anxiety
as the dizzying effect of freedom and the
experience of paralyzing possibility. The
fly realizes that there is a world outside
the fly-bottle; it can react to that insight by
becoming paralyzed within the bottle, or
by taking flight from the glass prison and
engaging more directly with the world.
The existential psychologist Rollo
May (1950) further explored the challenge of taking Kierkegaard’s ideas concerning anxiety into practical settings,
where they make a difference in how we
actually live. He emphasizes how a shift
in one’s attitude toward uncertainty and
surprises will indicate a break with past
scripts and patterns of behavior:
Now creating, actualizing one’s possibilities, always involves negative as well as
positive aspects. It always involves destroying the status quo, destroying old patterns
within oneself, progressively destroying
what one has clung to from childhood on,
and creating new and original forms and
ways of living. If one does not do this, one
is refusing to grow, refusing to avail himself of his possibilities; one is shirking his
responsibility to himself. (May, 1950, p. 39)
Applied to a project setting, we can similarly acknowledge that a move away from
the classical planning model of understanding projects, to an action-oriented
one in which uncertainty is also seen as
a source of possibility, requires destruction of old patterns of thinking and doing.
Like any kind of growth, it is bound to
involve some form of pain in letting go of
integral dimensions of the old self.
Positive connotations regarding
uncertainty are present in pragmatist
philosophy, as developed by Charles
Sanders Pierce (1877), William James
(1907/1981), and John Dewey (1916;
1939) in the late nineteenth century,
and revitalized by Richard Rorty (1979;
1982) and others during the last decades.
The pragmatist philosophers call for an
acceptance of uncertainty as a dimension of any human endeavor to understand reality, rather than a hindrance to
that process. They claim that we should
embrace uncertainty in tandem with fallibility as a precondition for exploring
the world and finding out new things
about it. In doing so, they reject attempts
to create a permanent and stable epistemological foundation for human endeavors. As the pragmatists see it, knowledge
and understanding are always situated
in particular contexts, where we make
assumptions that may turn out to be
false. Applied to projects, this means
that we should accept uncertainty as an
integral part of the working conditions,
and that project managers and team
members should learn to become energized rather than frustrated by it.
Pragmatists are skeptical about any
philosophical quest to establish a secure
foundation for knowledge and learning,
transcending uncertainty, since they see
human inquiry as a fallible ­enterprise.
Our endeavors to understand the world
do not start and finish; they are continuous processes of revision where knowledge is never immutable, but fluid and
context dependent (Nash, p. 254). In
the epistemic tradition of David Hume
(1740/1976), uncertainty is a deficiency
and problem, something one should
attempt to reduce or eliminate. The
planning model of project management
belongs to this tradition, and keeps alive
the assumption that the reduction of
uncertainty is always desirable. The
pragmatic approach, on the other hand,
embraces uncertainty as a prerequisite
for understanding reality, rather than
rejecting it as an obstacle to it.
Linking the Planning and
Pragmatist Approaches to
Uncertainty: The Five Points
In his 1916 essay “The Need for a
Recovery of Philosophy,” John Dewey
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identifies five concrete ways of contrasting a foundationalist and pragmatist
approach to knowledge and uncertainty.
Nash (2003) explored these five points to
establish a link between the pragmatist’s
outlook and Knight’s understanding of
uncertainty; I suggest that the five differences can also clarify what distinguishes
a planning approach to uncertainty in
project from a pragmatist one.
1. Knowledge as intention and reality
Dewey rejects the empiricist assumption that human knowledge develops
through passive reception of external
stimuli, and instead claims that we
actively interpret the world with the aim
of realizing future intentions: “In the
orthodox view, experience is regarded
primarily as a knowledge-affair. But to
eyes not looking through ancient spectacles, it assuredly appears as an affair
of the intercourse of a living being with
its physical and social environment.”
(Dewey, 1916, p. 7) What we seek out
and notice when we explore the world
will depend on our interests, desires,
and intentions. Uncertainty is a feature
both on the side of who we are as knowledge seekers, and on the side of what the
world contributes to our understanding.
In pragmatism, intention and empirical
reality become fused (Nash, p. 254), and
in contrast to what we can see in the
project planning approach, the ensuing
uncertainty is primarily associated with
possibility and hope rather than threats.
2. Context dependency of knowledge
The pragmatist outlook also contrasts
with the dualist assumptions in both
Cartesian metaphysics and British
empiricism. These philosophical traditions define a dualism between mind
and body, and between knowledge and
experience. Since we cannot trust the
body’s sense perceptions and the mind’s
processing of those perceptions, we are
doubly exposed to uncertainty, leading to a situation where “knowledge
is a somewhat disparate collection of
possibly faulty perceptions” (Nash,
p. 256). Dewey challenges this outlook,
and claims that the mind–body distinction is irrelevant to human endeavors to
understand and seek knowledge, and an
example of the pseudo-problems preoccupying philosophy. “According to tradition experience is (at least primarily)
a psychical thing, infected throughout
by “subjectivity” What experience suggests about itself is a genuinely objective world which enters into the actions
and sufferings of men and undergoes
modifications through their responses.”
(Dewey, 1916, p. 7) On this view, knowledge is genuinely context dependent,
as it hinges on the interests and orientations of the persons seeking to
understand more of reality. We are not
passively receiving signals from an outer
world but interact with reality in ways
that can expand our understanding of it.
A pragmatist perspective on projects will
similarly identify the active and engaged
aspects of project work, and distance
itself from the idea that our knowledge is
somehow infected by uncertainty due to
the unreliability of body and mind.
3. Future as the revelation of intention
A planning approach to projects seeks
to make predictions about future events
as precise as possible, and looks to
the past for guidance regarding the
shape of things to come. Uncertainty
about what has happened previously
is a cause for concern in this mindset because it gives us limited material
with which to make predictions. From
the pragmatist perspective outlined by
Dewey, human intention can significantly affect future outcomes and make
ideas become real, since “experience in
its vital form is experimental, an effort
to change the given; it is characterized
by projection, by reaching forward into
the unknown; connection with a future
is its salient trait.” (Dewey, 1916, p. 14)
This approach is essentially future oriented, and more so than the traditional
approach, although it also keeps an eye
on historical events:
Imaginative recovery of the bygone is
indispensable to successful invasion of the
future, but its status is that of an instrument. To ignore its import is the sign of
an undisciplined agent; but to isolate the
past, dwelling upon it for its own sake and
giving it the eulogistic name of knowledge, is to substitute the reminiscence of
old-age for effective intelligence. (Dewey,
1916, p. 14)
In line with the pragmatist way of thinking, people who are involved in projects
should not despair over the lack of patterns and structures they can detect in
the past as material for guiding principles
for the future. Instead, they should try to
adopt the rather more optimistic attitude
that humanity has the capacity to successfully explore the world and intentionally make beneficial changes to it.
4. Uncertainty and disentanglement
The empirical tradition to which the
planning model of projects belongs is
committed to what Dewey calls ‘particularism,’ the idea that we can separate experiences from each other into
atomic entities. According to this view,
experiences are a series of discrete and
separable perceptions that can also be
disentangled from the observer (Nash,
p. 257). The alternative pragmatist view
is that knowledge is created where
intention and reality meet. The connections and overlaps between experiences
are what matter, not their separations.
The enterprise of insolating individual
experiences is overtly reductionist on
this view, since it fails to acknowledge
the complexities and richness of our
encounters with aspects of reality. Experience is interaction and “is temporally
and spatially more extensive and more
internally complex than a single thing
like a stone, or a single quality like red.
For no living thing could survive, save
by sheer accident, if its experiences had
no more reach, scope and content, than
the traditional particularistic empiricism provided for. ” (Dewey, 1939, p. 544)
5. Experience and intelligence
The final contrast Dewey outlines
between the traditional approach to
experience and knowledge and the
pragmatist one, has to do with the
apparent tension between experience
and thought. The assumption he criticizes is the assumption that reduces
experiences to be the material for thinking and intelligent analysis. We have
first passively received the stimuli and
can now engage in the rational processing. This view again downplays
the active and engaged element of
human inquiry, and the connectedness between the human faculties: “In
the traditional notion, experience and
thought are antithetical terms. Inference, so far as it is other than a revival
of what has been given in the past, goes
beyond experience; hence it is either
invalid, or else a measure of desperation
by which, using experience as a springboard, we jump out to a world of stable
things and other selves. But experience,
taken free of the restrictions imposed
by the older concept, is full of inference.
There is, apparently, no conscious experience without inference; reflection is
native and constant.” (Dewey 1916, p. 8)
A core assumption in the thinking
of Dewey and other pragmatists is that
a decision maker is rarely indifferent
to the situation. He or she is not an
impartial observer of the situation, but
intimately and intentionally involved
in it. This makes a difference in how we
should view uncertainty, as it points to
the need to become comfortable with
the unknown unknown as a constant
dimension of reality. In order to engage
actively and fruitfully with the world, in
projects and other settings, we should
tackle uncertainty head on and identify
the possibilities it offers rather than let
it paralyze us.
Skepticism: The Philosophical
Challenge
As we have seen, Dewey sought to liberate thinking and practice from a rather
pessimistic epistemological perspective from which the chances of gaining reliable knowledge appeared to be
slim. A related project preoccupied
Ludwig Wittgenstein in his final years;
he dedicated his time to addressing
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the traditional philosophical challenge
posed by skepticism: To what extent
can we really know anything about the
world? Are we ever in a position to claim
that our assumptions and beliefs about
some particular states of affairs are
beyond doubt? In his book, On Certainty
(1972), Wittgenstein enters traditional
philosophical territory but explores it
by enigmatically posing questions and
laying out metaphors, rather than doing
systematic philosophy.
On Certainty is a collection of provisional notes and aphorisms, written
down by Ludwig Wittgenstein in the
last year and a half of his life. The book
has been interpreted as the author’s
reluctant acceptance of philosophy’s
legitimacy as an enterprise (Grayling,
2001). In previous works, Wittgenstein
had reduced philosophy to be about
clarifying the meaning of words and
concepts—an activity that could bring
peace to thinkers who had initially
thought that they were dealing with
deep and profound questions, but who
were really just entangled in semantical
confusion. On Certainty constitutes a
shift in perspective, since it addresses
a classical philosophical problem, that
of skepticism and knowledge. How can
we justify our beliefs about reality? How
can we meet the skeptical challenge
that knowledge is uncertain and always
open to doubt? Showing the fly the
way out of the fly-bottle may require a
more dedicated philosophical response
than Wittgenstein originally thought.
His attempts to deal with the questions
regarding the foundations for knowledge also have relevance for how to
view the role of unknown unknowns in
projects, and the tension between the
rationalistic and pragmatist perspectives on uncertainty.
Wittgenstein’s point of departure is
G. E. Moore’s alleged refutation of skepticism. The English philosopher set out
to demonstrate the existence of external
objects, and believed he could do it:
How? By holding up my two hands, and
saying, as I make a certain gesture with the
right hand, ‘Here is one hand,’ and adding,
as I make a certain gesture with the left,
‘and here is another’ (Moore, 1939).
Moore considers the hand experiment to be a demonstration that external objects exist, but not that we can
have reliable knowledge about external
objects, which is a claim that would need
another kind of proof. Wittgenstein criticizes Moore for giving an inadequate
response to skepticism about the existence of the external world:
When Moore says he knows such and
such, he is really enumerating a lot of
empirical propositions which we affirm
without special testing; propositions, that
is, which have a peculiar logical role in
the system of our empirical propositions
(Wittgenstein, 1972, paragraph 136).
Wittgenstein proceeds to draw a distinction between propositions, which
we consider fallible and reasonable
subjects of doubt and propositions we
take for granted, since they constitute
“our frame of reference.” (1972, paragraph 88) When we seek evidence for
the latter, as Moore and others do, we
fail to adequately distinguish between
testable empirical propositions and the
propositions that we take for granted in
order to do the testing.
Wittgenstein addresses the duality of propositions and its significance
for doubt and skepticism in a range of
paragraphs:
94. I did not get my picture of the world by
satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do
I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No; it is the inherited background
against which I distinguish between true
and false.
105. All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place
already within a system . . . The system
is not so much the point of departure, as
the element in which our arguments have
their life.
162. I have a world picture. Is it true or
false? Above all, it is the substratum of all
my enquiring and asserting.
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341. The questions that we raise and our
doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it
were like hinges upon which those turn.
With these, and similar expressions,
Wittgenstein attempts to establish an
alternative to the foundational thinking
of empiricism and rationalism, one that
reduces the unease associated with uncertainty and doubt. In line with Dewey’s
pragmatist perspective, he proposes a
logic of exploration and knowledge that
neutralizes the initial misgivings of living
with the unknown unknown.
One of the most powerful metaphors in On Certainty is one in which
Wittgenstein likens propositions in
language and the extent to which we
can doubt their validity to a river running through and being supported by
a ­riverbed:
And the bank of the river consists partly of
hard rock, subject to no alteration or only
to an imperceptible one, partly of sand,
which now in one place now in another
gets washed away, or deposited. (1972,
paragraph 99)
The flow of the water, stones, and sand
depends on the firmness of the riverbed,
and similarly the propositions we doubt,
test, and are uncertain about depend on
some propositions that are at least temporarily stable and exempt from doubt.
The status of the propositions may shift.
One of the candidates he brought forward as exempt from doubt was that
no man has ever set foot on the moon
(1972, paragraph 106). When Wittgenstein
wrote it just before his death in 1951, this
proposition was part of the firm riverbed,
as an element in a frame of reference
making inquiry and testing of other proposition possible. That has changed since
then, and new propositions have taken
its place in the framework for distinguishing between true and false propositions
about the state of the world.
Final Thoughts on Uncertainty
The philosophical approaches to uncertainty that can be found in the thinking
Types of Drama What is at Stake
How it is Activated
The Battle
To compete, to dominate, and win By identification of worthy enemies and
battles/competitions
The Mission
To do good, to convert
nonbelievers
By identification of worthy causes and
uniqueness in ideology
The Mystery
To solve puzzles and explore new
disciplinary/scientific ground
By identification of worthy puzzles or
mystery
The Other
To enable positive personal
development in other individuals
By assigned role and/or by
identification of needing individuals
The Treasure Hunt
To find and seize valuable
resources
By identification of resource prospects
(and/or needs)
The Cathedral
To design/build constructions of
great symbolical and historical
significance
A combination of impact,
newsworthiness, technological
challenges, and lasting legacy
Table 1: The six types of human drama in idea and project work.
of Kierkegaard, the pragmatism represented by Dewey and Wittgenstein’s
alternative epistemology offer openings
for project management research and
practice to become more comfortable
with uncertainty. The planning model
of projects appears to assume that the
unknown unknown is always a threat
to projects and as such fails to identify
the rich possibilities that can lie in the
occurrences of surprises and unforeseen events. In this article, I have identified philosophical resources that can
be useful in attempts to generate shifts
in the ways in which project management views uncertainty. Inspired by the
suggestions in Kierkegaard’s thinking
on despair and anxiety, we can become
more aware of the energizing aspects
of uncertainty and view them as a push
toward a rethinking of personal and
common attitudes toward the unknown
dimensions of existence. It is likely that
uncertainty can power positive change,
leading to more explorative perspectives on projects as well. Dewey’s ideas
about the limitations of traditional
epistemology are similarly relevant to
understanding why people have perceived uncertainty as a hindrance and
also demonstrate that there can be a
concrete and plausible philosophical alternative. Finally, Wittgenstein’s
reflections on certainty can have a calming effect on those who get anxious at
the thought of the unfounded assumptions we make in everyday settings.
A philosophy of uncertainty in projects can serve to explain why and how
positive human drama can be a significant dimension in project work. Carlsen
et al. (2012, p. 111) have identified six
types of human drama in idea work and
related project work and all illustrate
the potential embedded in embracing
uncertainty rather than always seeking
ways to reduce it (Table 1).
We can activate drama by inviting
individuals and groups to enter uncertain territory and explore it together.
Reducing the unknown unknowns can
make it less attractive to join the project
and mobilize one’s resources to participate in it. The six types of human drama
involve uncertainty in varying degrees,
and further research into concrete project processes can explore the degrees
to which their activation depend on,
embracing the fact that significant
dimensions of the reality in which the
project will take place are unknown.
To say that the proponents of a planning perspective on projects are similar
to the confused flies stuck inside a flybottle may seem like an unreasonable
comparison—and an underestimation
of competent individuals, communities,
and work environments—but changes
in the perspective on uncertainty
have the potential to enrich project
management, both in practical settings
and research. Embracing uncertainty
does not demand a break with the traditional way of thinking about a project
cycle going through stages of initiation,
planning, execution, monitoring, and
termination. Rather, the pragmatic perspective supplements this approach, by
loosening it up and making it less fundamental. It can also be a challenge in
concrete cases to distinguish between
welcome and unwelcome uncertainty.
Surely, there will be kinds of uncertainty that it will be wise to reduce,
as in safety-critical projects where the
reduction of uncertainty can mean a
reduced probability of unfortunate
outcomes and events. Malpractice is a
source of uncertainty, and reducing the
chances of it occurring in project is a
plus. How to draw the line between the
kinds of uncertainty that project managers and others should embrace and
the kinds of uncertainty they should
attempt to minimize, is a challenge for
further explorations in the philosophy
of project management, and a practical and concrete challenge in projects.
The current contribution builds on the
idea that an action-oriented, pragmatist
approach to projects provides a more
realistic account of what goes on when
people join forces to engage in smallscale and large-scale project work and
provides a more adequate account of the
human drama that enfolds in projects.
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Dr. Øyvind Kvalnes is an Associate Professor
at BI Norwegian Business School, Department of
Leadership and Organizational Behaviour, Oslo,
Norway. He has a PhD in philosophy on the topic
of moral luck from the University of Oslo. For many
years, he has facilitated dialogue processes in public
and private organizations, focusing on ethical challenges and dilemmas in the workplace. His research
interests are in the areas of business ethics, moral
psychology, communication climates, and excellence in organizations. At BI he designed a course
in applied business ethics, which is compulsory for
all Master of Science degree students. He can be
contacted at [email protected].
PAPERS
Root Metaphors for the
Management of Projects:
Toward a Knowledge-Based View
Terence Ahern, Dublin City University Business School, Dublin City University, Glasnevin,
Dublin, Ireland
P. J. Byrne, Dublin City University Business School, Dublin City University, Glasnevin,
Dublin, Ireland
Brian Leavy, Dublin City University Business School, Dublin City University, Glasnevin,
Dublin, Ireland
ABSTRACT ■
In traditional project management, knowledge integration assumes upfront plans as
explicit knowledge. For complex projects that
cannot be fully specified in advance, however,
knowledge integration requires emergent
learning in situated contexts (Lindkvist), which
involves explicit knowledge (know-that) and
experiential knowledge (know-how).
To expand the knowledge boundaries
of traditional project management, the
root-metaphor perspectives of American
philosopher Stephen Pepper (1942) are interpreted as a project management framework,
focusing on Mechanism for traditional project management and Contextualism for situated approaches. Using this root-metaphor
framework, explicit knowledge and experiential knowledge are mutually complementary
when projects are viewed as modes of organizing and learning for temporary undertakings, which encompasses process and task.
The implications for research and practice
include using the framework for situated
research, where Contextualism has greater
explanatory power, and for the management
of project diversity—traditional, complex,
portfolio, and program projects.
KEYWORDS: project management; root
metaphors; knowledge formation; mode of
organizing and learning (MOL)
Project Management Journal, Vol. 47, No. 3, 109–123
© 2016 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
INTRODUCTION
I
n 1959, project management became the focus of academic interest in
the management literature when the first article on project management
appeared in the Harvard Business Review by Gaddis (1959), entitled “The
Project Manager.” This article highlighted the underlying tension between
the different views of project management—whether traditional project
management as an applied science grounded in technical rationality; situated
approaches to project management as a social science that facilitates the
construction and interpretation of project boundaries by project stakeholders;
or a combination of both (Cooke-Davies, 2002; Winter, Smith, Morris, &
Cicmil, 2006). This lack of theoretical clarity regarding the nature of projects
(ontology) and how to obtain knowledge about them (epistemology) was not
merely a question of academic interest but of practical importance to wider
society as well. Few could argue with the growing evidence that the applied
science approach of traditional project management was often seriously
deficient in delivering the key success parameters of scope, budget, and
timescale for capital projects in both the private and government sectors
(Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2003; Hall, 1980; Morris & Hough, 1987;
Standish Group, 2003). In contrast to traditional project management,
situated or contextual project management as a social science views project
management as a social process involving stakeholder actors, who collectively
enact the process of delivering a project over its life cycle (Engwall, 1998;
Packendorff, 1995). In this approach, projects are often viewed as temporary
organizations that are embedded in their context with project management
as a project-specific practice, rather than projects as tasks that are context
independent under traditional project management as an applied science
(Engwall, 2003; Lundin & Söderholm, 1995; Winter et al., 2006).
However, because project research is relatively young, with underdeveloped theory, the role of learning and knowledge integration processes in
both traditional and contextual project management is also underdeveloped
in the literature. This is largely due to the centrality of the planning paradigm
in traditional project management (Lenfle & Loch, 2010), which is practitioner driven, and the associated view of project knowledge integration that
downplays learning. Essentially, if a task cannot be planned for integration
in advance, it is generally not considered a project (Association for Project
Management [APM], 2012; Project Management Institute [PMI], 2013).
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Root Metaphors for the Management of Projects: Toward a Knowledge-Based View
Even when complex projects cannot
be completely specified and planned
in advance, such as defense systems,
the normative planning expectation of
funding agencies requires the appearance of project planning and integration processes through management
control based on technical rationality
(Sapolsky, 1972).
As a result of this planning culture
in project management, upfront knowledge is required as raw material for the
planning process, which generates a
‘plan’ for delivering a project as the
integration of prior knowledge. In this
view, the need for learning in project
management through problem solving
is often regarded as an inconvenience
that implies poor planning rather than a
key innovation process that demarcates
project management from other management disciplines in more stable operational settings. Not surprisingly, this
planning integration approach in traditional project management privileges
explicit ‘known’ knowledge (plans, etc.)
over experiential ‘knowing’ knowledge
(know-how, etc.), which is more emergent and contextual.
The aim of this article is to contribute to project management theory
development by discussing the limitations of current research on project
knowledge integration and to elaborate and present a broader theoretical
framework to advance the debate in this
important area (Engwall, 1992, 1998,
2002; Lindkvist, 2005, 2011; Lindkvist,
Söderlund, & Tell, 1998). These limitations revolve around two key aspects
of knowledge and learning that need to
be accommodated: first, the complementary but distinct nature of explicit
knowledge (plans, etc.) and experiential knowledge (know-how, etc.); and,
second, the opposing tendencies in
learning between dispersion and integration activities. By viewing projects
not as tasks but as modes of organizing and learning (MOL), this article
will argue that learning involves dispersion and integration activities based on
the ancient Greek dialectic of antithesis
and synthesis for solving problems.
This method is often presented as variation (antithesis), selection (synthesis),
and retention, which involves identifying the problem, exploring various
tentative solutions, selecting a solution,
and then implementation and retention. In addition, knowledge formation
involves the ‘interplay’ between explicit
knowledge and experiential knowledge
through their common tacit dimension
(Ahern, Leavy, & Byrne, 2014a).
Following this introduction, the
next section will discuss the limitations
of knowledge integration perspectives
in project research, in which traditional
project management emphasizes explicit
‘known’ knowledge, and contextual project management includes experiential
‘knowing’ knowledge. The subsequent
section will elaborate the root-metaphor
perspectives of American philosopher
Stephen Pepper (1935, 1942)—Mechanism, Contextualism, Organicism, and
Formism. Using a knowledge-based
view, this article will then discuss the
correspondence of traditional project
management with Mechanism and contextual project management with Contextualism. In addition, project portfolio
management is aligned with Organicism
and project program management with
Formism. Finally, the conclusions will
discuss how the different approaches to
knowledge in traditional project management and contextual project management are mutually complementary
when projects are viewed as modes of
organizing and learning for temporary
undertakings (Ahern et al., 2014a). The
implications of the article’s knowledgebased view for project management
research and practice are also outlined.
Project Knowledge Integration
Perspectives
The purpose of this section is to discuss
the limitations of both the traditional
and contextual approaches to project
research in terms of knowledge integration and learning. This discussion
will focus on the knowledge approach
of traditional project management as
110 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
an applied science based on technical
rationality and the knowledge approach
of contextual project management as a
social science based on the social construction of projects, including viewing
projects as temporary organizations. In
both cases, knowledge is largely viewed
as explicit ‘known’ knowledge (plans,
etc.), which is static, reversible, and
at rest, although contextual project
management also includes experiential
‘knowing’ knowledge (know-how, etc.),
which is dynamic, irreversible, and “in
flight” (Pettigrew, 1990, p. 268).
Knowledge Integration Perspectives in
Traditional Project Management
In traditional project management,
which reflects the linear model (March,
2006), knowledge revolves around plans,
which are implemented by competent
team members to achieve predetermined targets, such as cost, time, and
scope. In this approach, project knowledge is available up-front as explicit
‘known’ knowledge (plans, etc.) and,
then, assembled to the plan with little
learning anticipated beyond the integration of prior knowledge, in other words,
projects as ‘being,’ or objects, or commodities (Table 1). This approach is
reflected in its definition of project management by the Project Management
Institute (PMI) as “the application of
knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques
to project activities to meet the project
requirements” (PMI, 2013, p. 5, italics
added). This kind of explicit ‘known’
knowledge (plans, etc.) is context independent and can be documented and
transferred without difficulty between
knowing subjects (Popper, 1979; 2007). In
traditional project management terms,
which mirrors the Cartesian mind–body
separation, the project team (subject)
endeavors to manage a separate project
plan (object) as a documented knowledge artifact, which is fully specified in
advance, in order to successfully deliver
a project as a task (Cooke-Davies, 2002;
Leybourne & Sadler-Smith, 2006; Smyth
& Morris, 2007). However, as courts
of law bear witness from the earliest
Traditional Project
Management
Contextual Project
Management
Metaphor
Machine
Live Event
Philosophical Orientation
Positivism
Pragmatism
Ontology
Objective
Object
Being
Task
Objective and Subjective
Actor
Becoming
Process
Epistemology
Objective
Planned
Application
Plan-Execution
Known
Know-That
Explicit
Project Team
Anywhere
Means-End
Emergent
Practice
Problem-Solving
Knowing
Know-How
Experiential
Temporary Organization
Here (context)
Project Types
Exploitation
Predictable
Linear
Exploration
Novel
Complex
Table 1: Project research perspectives.
times, plans and rules can seldom be
fully specified in advance, because even
explicit contracts, laws, and so forth are
inherently incomplete and rely on tacit
presuppositions for their understanding and implementation (Polanyi, 1967;
Wittgenstein, 1988).
Using Table 1 as a summary, the
metaphor of ‘machine’ is appropriate for
traditional project management under
a Positivist philosophical approach
where project ontology—or the nature
of projects—revolves around projects
as objective tasks that are brought into
being by the project team through
goals and plans. In terms of project
epistemology—or how we obtain knowledge about projects—traditional project management emphasizes explicit
‘known’ knowledge as propositional
‘know-that’ knowledge that is context
independent and can be harnessed into
plans for delivering predictable projects
as the integration of prior knowledge,
such as Lego blocks. To the extent that
project plans are comprehensive, problem solving and, hence, learning are
minimal under traditional project management for delivering projects as solutions to objective client specifications.
Coordination among project team members is hierarchical and goal-driven
through project plans. While few would
argue with the conceptual usefulness
of the traditional project management
planning paradigm, this is based on the
availability of upfront explicit ‘known’
knowledge as raw material, which has
become a boundary constraint for the
practice and research of complex projects that cannot be fully specified in
advance. Throughout the project life
cycle, complex projects require distributed learning and knowledge formation for the explicit ‘known’ knowledge
that is missing at the outset along with
the experiential ‘knowing’ knowledge,
which is always emergent and that can
never be converted into explicit plans.
Knowledge Integration Perspectives in
Contextual Project Management
In contextual project management, projects are viewed as temporary undertakings in a specific context involving
project stakeholders as actors, where
the latter organize physical and social
resources to deliver projects over the economic life cycle, in other words, projects
as ‘becoming,’ or actors (Engwall, 1998;
Linehan & Kavanagh, 2006). According
to this view, project knowledge is not ‘out
there’ and pre-given at the start of the
project in project plans awaiting integration, rather it is an emergent knowledge
solution to the challenge of delivering
the project as a hidden reality through
its plans and associated artifacts, which
can never be fully specified in advance
(Hayek, 1945). In effect, knowledge is ‘in
here,’ with the knowing subject as the
crucial agent that integrates two kinds of
knowledge—known knowledge (plans,
etc.) and knowing knowledge (knowhow, etc.), (see Table 1) through their
common tacit dimension (Polanyi, 1967).
Viewing projects as phenomena that
are ‘actors/becoming’ implies a processual approach (Pettigrew, 1990, 1997,
2012), which emphasizes dwelling in the
world through ‘knowing,’ enacting, and
organizing and learning through problem solving (Dewey, 1966; Orlikowski,
1996; Schön, 1983; Tsoukas, 1996; Weick,
1979, 1995). This knowledge consists
of what Pettigrew (2012) calls “howto” knowledge (p. 1324) that complements “what-is” knowledge (p. 1325),
which this article refers to as ‘knowing’
and ‘known’ knowledge, respectively.
Under this practice-oriented approach,
project knowledge integration emerges
from the enactment of the project
through the engagement of project actors
with the organizing activities of delivering the project (Bragd, 2002; Dougherty,
2001; Engwall, 2002, 2003; Koskinen,
2000, 2004; Lindkvist, 2005; Newell,
Bresnen, Edelman, Scarbrough, & Swan,
2006). In the management literature, the
practice-­oriented approach is an older
tradition that informs a process approach
to research (Blackler, 1995; Daft & Weick,
1984; Gherardi, 2006; Nicolini, Gherardi,
& Yanow, 2003; Orlikowski, 2006; Pettigrew, 2012; Schatzki, Knorr Cettina, &
von Savigny, 2001; Schön, 1983; Tsoukas,
2009). Crucially, in a practice-oriented
approach, learning is an intrinsic part of
practice and, as Wenger (2001) insightfully observes: “One reason they [practitioners] do not think of their job as
learning is that what they learn is their
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 111
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Root Metaphors for the Management of Projects: Toward a Knowledge-Based View
practice” (p. 95, original italics). Paraphrasing this insight for project settings,
one reason project management practitioners do not think of problem solving
as learning is that solving problems ‘is’
their job (i.e., their practice).
In the research on temporary organizations, Packendorff (1995) advocates
an enactivist approach to projects, in
terms of project team actors delivering a
project processually as an organizational
form, rather than as an object that is
gradually integrated using the project as
a toolkit. In this contextual approach to
project management, projects are viewed
as temporary organizational forms in
an embedded social context (Engwall,
2003; Lundin & Söderholm, 1995), where
uncertainty and ambiguity are acknowledged as inherent characteristics of
projects (Engwall, 1992; Kreiner, 1995).
The key attributes of projects as temporary organizations are “time, task, team
and transition” (Lundin & Söderholm,
1995, p. 439). Projects as ‘organizational
forms’ are open systems that are embedded in their context, where uncertainty
and ambiguity lead to emergent knowledge formation and integration. Under
this view, knowledge uncertainty over
the project life cycle gives rise to organizing and learning through “ongoing
trial-and-error, interactive problem
solving, and a frequent cross-functional
interaction” (Engwall, Steinthórsson, &
Söderholm, 2003, p. 121). Furthermore,
in this socio-technical perspective that
emphasizes the ‘actor’ over the ‘object,’
“a project cannot be defined solely by its
technical content. Rather, the project is
constructed . . . by actors through more
or less deliberate acts” (ibid., p. 116, italics added). The situated context of actors
in temporary organizations is emphasized in a recent publication by Bakker
(2010), who reviews the literature on
temporary organizations under the four
themes of time, task, team, and context.
This overlaps with the earlier characterization of projects as temporary organizations by Lundin and Söderholm (1995)
under the themes of time, task, team,
and transition.
Using Table 1 again as a summary,
the metaphor of ‘live event’ is appropriate for contextual project management under a Pragmatist philosophy,
which includes the social construction
of projects. Pragmatism is a broad tradition, with views ranging from the empirical leanings of James to the means–end
approaches of Peirce, Dewey, and Rorty,
which are favored by the authors of this
article (Dewey, 1966, 1991; Rorty, 1999a,
1999b). With an emphasis on results as
the main criteria for truth and knowledge, there has always been tension
in Pragmatism between objectivism
and subjectivism. According to Rorty
(1999b), we should abandon the Realist
idea of knowledge as a representation of
reality and view inquiry under Pragmatism as a way of using reality. In an earlier work, Rorty (1999a) depicts Realism
as “solidarity in objectivity” (p. 22) in
contrast to Pragmatism, where objectivity is achieved through “solidarity”
with a social group. Furthermore, Rorty
(1999a) observes that: “This attitude
toward truth, in which the consensus of
a community rather than a relation to a
nonhuman reality is taken as central, is
associated not only with the American
pragmatic tradition but with the work
of Popper and Habermas” (p. 23, n.1,
italics added). Thus, Peirce’s idea under
Pragmatism of the long-term convergence of a social group on the “real” as
“truth” (O’Shea, 2011, p. 220) is broadly
similar to Karl Popper’s (2007) idea
under Realism of the growth of scientific knowledge through ‘conjectures
and refutations’ among a peer community. While Realism downplays the
role of the knower in knowledge, this is
central for Pragmatism and, with this,
the admissibility of the subjective and
objective aspects of reality (ontology)
and how we obtain knowledge about
it (epistemology).
Under Contextualism, the nature of
projects, or ontology, revolves around a
project as a ‘process’ that is both objective and subjective and is in a state
of becoming over the project life cycle
through a consensus of the project team.
112 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
In this view, a project is like an actor
rather than a tool under traditional project management and is bound up with
the personalities of its stakeholders.
In terms of how we obtain knowledge
about projects, or epistemology, contextual project management is means-end
and this involves experiential ‘knowing’
knowledge (‘know-how’), which is subjective and context dependent, as well as
traditional explicit knowledge, which is
more objective and independent. However, ‘knowing’ knowledge as procedural
knowledge cannot be planned in advance
but is emergent through learning and
knowledge formation based on meansend problem solving over the project
life cycle. In this contextual approach,
project management is a practice with
intrinsic learning where coordination
among project actors as a temporary
organization is better achieved through
distributed organizing than by hierarchical control (Hedlund, 1994). However,
while contextual project management
includes experiential ‘knowing’ knowledge (know-how, etc.) as an intrinsic
part of the construction of the form of
a project in its embedded context, this
approach does not adequately accommodate the strengths of explicit ‘known’
knowledge (plans, etc.) that underpins
traditional project management.
Project Logic Perspectives on
Project Knowledge Integration
In his work on the integration of project
knowledge, Lindkvist (2011) proposes
a contingency typology of project logics based on two bipolar dimensions
that builds on the earlier work of Lindkvist et al. (1998) and Lindkvist (2005).
The first of these bipolar dimensions
relates to the degree of novelty in projects as a tension between exploitation
and exploration, which is presented
as the difference in problem solving
approaches between error-detection
(exploitation) and more complex errordiagnostics (exploration), as illustrated
in Figure 1. The second dimension of
Lindkvist’s (2011) typology relates to
whether the project environment is
Degree of Novelty
Analyzable
Exploration
Exploitation
Separating
Scheduling
Type of
Complexity
Unanalyzable
4 1
3 2
Semi-Coupling
Coupling
Figure 1: Project logics. (Adapted from
Lindkvist et al. [1998, p. 943] and Lindkvist
[2011, p. 468]).
analyzable and projects can be fully
planned under traditional assumptions, or whether the environment is
unanalyzable and complex projects
cannot be fully specified in advance
(see Figure 1).
Using these two bipolar dimensions,
Lindkvist’s (2011) typology provides four
project logics for knowledge integration.
The first of these (Figure 1, No. 1), is
‘scheduling,’ which is traditional project management under assumptions of
normative project management planning, work breakdown structures, and
efficient error-detection processes for
optimal project delivery. When errordetection is more complicated, because
projects are more complex or unanalyzable (see Figure 1, No. 2) a ‘coupling’
logic involves new knowledge formation
through problem solving to a limited
degree. In Lindkvist’s (2011) typology,
the exploitation group uses existing
knowledge for generating raw data for
problem solving through error-detection
to deliver successful project outcomes.
This requires “well-­
connectedness of
knowledge bases” (p. 464) among specialized project personnel for applying
prior knowledge that has been planned
in advance.
With the exploration group of projects, two additional knowledge integration logics are outlined by Lindkvist
et al. (1998) based on error-diagnostics
as a problem solving methodology,
which is deeper than error-detection
in the previous exploitation projects.
As an exploration logic, ‘semi-coupling’
allows for creativity and innovation
when projects cannot be fully specified
in advance (as shown in Figure 1, No. 3).
In this exploration mode for complex
projects in specific embedded contexts, distributed learning among team
members over the project life cycle is
anticipated. With ‘semi-coupling,’ problem solving through error-diagnostics
seems to require ‘slow learning’ that
benefits from “knowledge base similarity” (Lindkvist, 2011, p. 464). However,
while this may be found in long-term
communities of practice, Lindkvist’s
research (2005) points to short-term collectivities of practice with interlocking
databases as more appropriate for projects. In the second exploration logic of
‘separating,’ (Figure 1, No. 4), the project
environment is deemed analyzable but
more complicated than a ‘scheduling’
logic with error detection. By ‘separating’ modules in these kinds of projects,
complexity is reduced and deeper
problem solving achieved through
error-diagnostics, but this learning is
more ad hoc than with ‘semi-coupling.’
The broad assumption of the ‘separating’ logic is the feasibility of organic
knowledge integration for successful
project delivery.
While Lindkvist’s (2011) research
sheds light on key issues in project
knowledge integration, such as problem
solving approaches (error-detection and
error-diagnostics) and environmental
intelligibility (analyzable and unanalyzable), there are certain limitations
that relate to how project knowledge is
conceptualized. First, Lindkvist’s (2011)
typology of project logics does not
highlight the different kinds of knowledge that are found in exploitative and
exploration approaches. This article
argues that traditional project management, with a tendency to exploitation,
assumes that knowledge is explicit and
separate from the knower, and can be
stored in designs and plans for future
use as ‘known’ knowledge. On the other
hand, exploration logics also involve
experiential ‘knowing’ knowledge that
is emergent and the tacit dimension of
knowledge (Polanyi, 1967).
In terms of project processes,
whether analyzable or unanalyzable,
Lindkvist’s (2011) typology seems to
assume that projects are ‘tasks’ and that
project knowledge is also a ‘thing’ that
needs to be integrated as a commodity
rather than viewing a project as a
‘process,’ where emergent learning and
knowledge formation ‘is’ the integration.
Building on earlier work (Ahern et al.,
2014a), this article argues for a ‘process’ approach to projects as modes of
organizing for temporary undertakings
with intrinsic learning rather than ad
hoc learning. This mode of organizing
and learning (MOL) approach accommodates the learning tendencies of
dispersion (unanalyzable) and integration (analyzable), and, also, explicit and
experiential knowledge in the process of
knowledge formation.
Creating Space for Project
Management Theories
As a relatively young discipline, project management theory is underdeveloped, and project management
practice revolves around the linear
planning paradigm, which is reflected
in the ‘plan-then-execute’ approach of
the books of knowledge from the project
management professional bodies (APM,
2012; PMI, 2013). This lack of theory
is recognized by project management
scholars and is the subject of ongoing
debate, ranging from Morris’s (2002)
view that “there will never be an overall
theory of project management. Indeed,
the very notion is mistaken.” (p. 82),
to contingent approaches, such as the
project management ‘schools’ approach
of Söderlund (2002) and Bredillet
(2008). In contextual project management, projects have been researched as
‘actors’ and as temporary organizations
(Engwall, 1998; Lundin & Söderholm,
1995, 2013). However, because of the
dominance of the project management planning paradigm and the long
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Root Metaphors for the Management of Projects: Toward a Knowledge-Based View
shadow it casts, theory development in
project management is essential for creating theoretical space for diverse project management research perspectives
that facilitate excellence in practice.
In the discussion thus far on the
project logics of Lindkvist (2011) for
knowledge integration, certain limitations were identified in relation to
two key aspects of project knowledge.
First, the project logics do not associate
explicit ‘known’ knowledge with exploitation approaches and experiential
‘knowing’ knowledge with exploration
approaches. Second, they do not associate problem solving tendencies toward
integration (analyzable) and dispersion
(unanalyzable) as learning responses to
project environments with varying levels of intelligibility. In order to address
these limitations and to contribute to
project management theory, this section
will elaborate on the root-metaphor perspectives of philosopher Stephen Pepper
(1935, 1942) and interpret them as a
framework for project management theory, primarily Mechanism for traditional
project management and Contextualism for contextual project management.
In addition, Pepper’s (1942) Organicism is suggested for project portfolio
management and Formism for project
program management, although the following discussion will focus on Mechanism and Contextualism as the two
major strands in project management
literature. The remainder of the article
will argue that Mechanism and Contextualism are complementary from a
knowledge-based view rather than either
being dominant over the other, although
Contextualism is described in more
detail as a less-developed perspective.
World Hypotheses as Root-Metaphor
Perspectives
In his seminal book, World Hypotheses,
the American philosopher Stephen
Pepper (1942) outlines four philosophical perspectives on truth based
on a critical refinement of common
sense knowledge about the world—
Mechanism, Contextualism, Organicism,
Synthetic Theories
Analytic Theories
Integrative
Theories
Organicism
Philosophy: Objective Idealism
Metaphor: Organism
Truth: Coherence
Mechanism
Philosophy: Realism/Positivism
Metaphor: Machine
Truth: Causal-Adjustment
Dispensive
Theories
Contextualism
Philosophy: Pragmatism
Metaphor: Historic Event
Truth: Operationalism
Formism
Philosophy: Platonic Idealism
Metaphor: Similarity
Truth: Correspondence
Figure 2: World hypotheses as root-metaphor perspectives. (Adapted from Pepper [1942, p. 146]).
and Formism (Figure 2). Importantly,
the four main world perspectives resist
combination and are regarded by
Pepper as incommensurate with each
other, although each perspective can
have similar knowledge characteristics
with other perspectives in the vertical and horizontal groups shown in
Figure 2. Moreover, Pepper’s (1942) perspectives are sustained by two forms of
corroboration that are present in common sense knowledge—multiplicative
and structural—which underpin his
perspectives as two vertical groups of
analytic theories (multiplicative) and
synthetic theories (structural) (Figure 2).
These forms of corroboration reflect
the first tendency in common sense
knowledge, which revolves around the
tension between analysis (multiplicative)
and synthesis (structural) as processes
of knowledge refinement. Thus, analytic
theories like Mechanism and Formism
are similar in using facts such as elements and factors as raw material, where
synthesis is a derivative through multiplicative corroboration that leads to
synthetic generalizations (e.g., statistical
generalizations). Multiplicative corroboration derives it strength from repetition
and, in particular, the agreement of other
people regarding corroboration. In this
sense, it is corroboration of “man with
man” (Pepper, 1942, p. 321) and is conspicuously social. In contrast, synthetic
114 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
theories, such as Organicism and Contextualism, are similar in using facts such as
contexts, complexes, and case studies as
raw material, which are already synthesized, in order to derive analysis through
structural corroboration that leads to
analytic generalizations (e.g., organizational strategy is ‘emergent’). Structural
corroboration comes from a build-up
of observations by individuals of “fact
with fact” (ibid., p. 321) through personal
evidence that is not peculiarly social in
character, although needing implicit peer
approval for broader acceptance. While
both forms of corroboration are present
in all four world perspectives, multiplicative corroboration seems more prevalent
in Mechanism, whereas structural corroboration is more prevalent in Contextualism (Pepper, 1942).
According to Pepper (1942), the
second tendency in common sense
knowledge revolves around the tension
between integration and dispersion
as processes of knowledge refinement
(see Figure 2). These two horizontal
groups of integration–dispersion overlay
with the two vertical groups representing
the first tendency of analysis–synthesis.
This gives four groups in total—two
vertical and two horizontal—with each
perspective part of two groups with
other perspectives that are distinct but
similar in underlying knowledge characteristics. Thus, integrative theories,
such as Organicism and Mechanism,
are similar in viewing the world as a
consistent whole that is constituted in a
pre-determined fashion and amenable
to prediction. This means that Organicism and Mechanism are stronger in
terms of scope and breadth but correspondingly weaker in respect of precision and detail. On the other hand,
dispersive theories, such as Contextualism and Formism, are similar in
viewing the world as indeterminate, or
only loosely determined. In these world
views, chance and unpredictability are
integral components, whereas they are
downplayed in Organicism and Mechanism. Therefore, in a contrary manner,
Contextualism and Formism are stronger in terms of description but weaker
in terms of generalizability.
For the analytic theories of Mechanism and Formism, in which synthesis
is a derivative, generalization is more
desirable than granulation and this
makes Mechanism the stronger of
the two. In contrast, for the synthetic
theories of Organicism and Contextualism, in which analysis is a derivative, description is more desirable than
integration and this makes Contextualism the stronger of the two. Thus,
Mechanism is the stronger analytic theory and Contextualism is the stronger
synthetic theory (Pepper, 1942, p. 148).
This means that the two-by-two framework shown in Figure 2 has a major axis
along Mechanism–Contextualism (highlighted in gray and represent the main
focus of this article) and a minor axis
along Organicism–Formism. According
to the knowledge-based view of this
article, Mechanism and Contextualism
are seen as complementary rather than
one being dominant over the other.
Root-Metaphor Perspectives as
Knowledge Perspectives
From a knowledge perspective, Karl
Popper’s (1979, 2007) idea of ‘objective
knowledge’ under Realism that is separate from the knower, which underpins
Mechanism as an analytic theory, relies
heavily on multiplicative corroboration
as a social force. Ironically, this depends
on other knowers through a communal
process of conjectures and refutations.
In contrast, Stephen Pepper’s (1942)
Contextualism under Pragmatism,
which is a synthetic theory that relies on
structural corroboration, is associated
by Pettigrew (2012) with experiential
“how-to” knowledge (p. 1324). Overall,
this suggests that the analytic theories
of Mechanism and Formism emphasize
objective and explicit ‘known’ knowledge (plans, etc.) and the synthetic
theories of Organicism and Contextualism emphasize experiential ‘knowing’
knowledge (know-how, etc.).
This emphasis on different kinds
of knowledge between analytic and
synthetic theories is better understood when Pepper’s (1942) typology
is viewed as a simplified model of the
hemispheres of the brain of a person
looking out from the page toward the
reader as shown in Figure 2. In this analogy, the left hemisphere of the brain,
which is more active with structured
grammar in language, aligns with the
analytic theories or the explicit ‘known’
side of Figure 2, including Mechanism
as traditional project management. The
right brain hemisphere, in contrast,
which is more active with aspects of
language that cannot be fully codified in
grammar—rhythm, intonation—aligns
with the synthetic theories or the experiential ‘knowing’ side of Figure 2, including contextual project management.
Mechanism—Traditional Project
Management
Paraphrasing Pepper (1942), Mechanism
is associated with the philosophical traditions of Positivism and Realism (Galileo,
Descartes, Newton, Locke, and Hume),
the root metaphor of ‘machine,’ and
the validation of truth through causaladjustment (see Figure 2). This root–
metaphor perspective corresponds to the
normative approach of traditional project management, which views projects
as objects that can be filled with various
‘content’ using generic project management techniques (Engwall et al., 2003).
When projects are viewed as organizational interpretation systems, Mechanism is equivalent to Daft and Weick’s
(1984) ‘conditioned viewing,’ which
assumes that project environment is
analyzable within conventional boundaries using routine formal data. With predictability under Mechanism, projects
can be planned repetitively to exploit
business opportunities as an exercise
in optimization (Brady & Davies, 2004;
Lindkvist et al., 1998). In project research,
Mechanism underpins traditional project management with an emphasis
on explicit ‘known’ knowledge in the
form of plans, which are then implemented over the project life cycle as an
applied science through error detection,
with little learning anticipated.
With this view of project knowledge, experiential ‘knowing’ knowledge
(know-how, etc.) is downplayed, as
well as the tacit dimension of knowledge (Polanyi, 1967) and, because these
kinds of knowledge are largely enacted
and not amenable to advance planning,
the planning paradigm is not seen as
deficient with their absence. In addition, under assumptions of ‘total’ planning, which accompany Mechanism as a
deterministic perspective, learning, if it
occurs, is largely confined to the design
stage with project execution regarded
as the application of designs as prior
knowledge. Using Mechanism as a root–
metaphor perspective, with a tendency
toward integration that emphasizes
scope and breadth, it is easy to understand the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach of
the bodies of knowledge of the project management professional bodies
(APM, 2012; PMI, 2013). However, this
emphasis on generality under Mechanism as an analytic-integrative theory
also means that it is weaker in terms
of precision and detail compared with
Formism, an analytic theory with a tendency toward dispersion (see Figure 2).
Contextualism–Contextual Project
Management
Pepper (1942) associates Contextualism
with the philosophical tradition of
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Pragmatism (Peirce, James, and Dewey),
the root metaphor of a ‘live historic
event,’ and validation of truth through
pragmatic operationalism (see Figure 2).
In this theory, change and novelty are
regarded as “fundamental presuppositions” (Pepper, 1942, p. 236). Of the
two synthetic theories, Contextualism is
regarded by Pepper (1942) as stronger
than Organicism, because descriptive
detail is more desirable than integration when analyzing facts such as complexes and case studies that are already
synthesized. In project management,
Contextualism as a root–metaphor
perspective seems well suited to the
emerging research tradition that views
projects as specific social endeavors
that are embedded in their context. This
is what Engwall et al. (2003) regard as
a descriptive-form approach with projects as temporary organizational forms,
which emphasizes the themes of project
goals, project embeddedness, project
uncertainty, and the social construction
of project boundaries.
Using Daft and Weick’s (1984) complementary framework to view projects
as temporary organizational interpretation systems, Contextualism is equivalent to an ‘enacting’ mode for projects.
In this view, the project environment
is viewed as difficult to fully specify
in advance and is better approached
through exploration and learning-bydoing. In the management literature,
Pettigrew (1997) embraces Pepper’s
Contextualism as an underpinning for
his processual approach to research,
which highlights experiential ‘knowing’
knowledge (know-how, etc. ) as well as
explicit ‘known’ knowledge (know-that,
plans, etc.). The latter kind of knowledge is more prominent in the analytic
theories of Mechanism and Formism,
in which elements and factors are used
as raw material. Importantly, Contextualism as a synthetic theory with a
dispersive tendency is comfortable with
the notion that the project environment
may be indeterminate and unanalyzable and, thus, easily adopts a practice
approach to project management and
complexity, where learning through
solving problems ‘is’ the practice.
Organicism—Project Portfolio
Management
Organicism is the second of Pepper’s
(1942) synthetic theories but is weaker
than Contextualism because of its tendency toward integration, which is less
desirable for analyzing facts such as
complexes and case studies that are
already synthesized. It is associated with
the philosophical tradition of objective
idealism (Schelling, Hegel, and Whitehead), the root metaphor of ‘organism,’
and validation of truth through coherence (Figure 2). This makes Organicism
suitable as a root metaphor perspective for project portfolio management,
which manages unrelated projects and
programs for diverse strategic organizational objectives (PMI, 2013).
Formism—Project Program Management
Like Mechanism, Formism is an analytic theory that relies on multiplicative corroboration using elements and
factors as raw materials for deriving
synthetic generalizations. It is associated with the philosophical tradition
of Realism (Plato, Aristotle), the root
metaphor of ‘similarity,’ and validation of truth through correspondence
(see Figure 2). Unlike Mechanism with
a tendency toward integration, Formism
leans toward dispersion. This makes
Formism a suitable root–metaphor
perspective for project program management, which coordinates related
projects to achieve combined objectives
(PMI, 2013).
Root–Metaphor Perspectives on
Project Knowledge Integration
Using the above project root–metaphor
perspectives based on the work of Pepper
(1942), we can now further elaborate on
a knowledge-based view of the typology
of Lindkvist (2011) on knowledge integration (Figure 3). Using Pepper’s (1942)
modes of corroboration, Lindkvist’s
(2011) first bipolar dimension between
exploitation and exploration projects is
116 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
essentially the difference between multiplicative corroboration (exploitation,
error detection) and structural corroboration (exploration, error diagnostics).
Thus, as an analytic approach, exploitation projects (error detection) use
elements and factors and synthetic generalization is a derivative. In contrast,
exploration projects (error diagnostics)
as a synthetic approach use contexts,
complexes, and case studies, which are
already synthesized, and analytic generalization is a derivative. The second
bipolar dimension of Lindkvist’s (2011)
typology also parallels the project root–
metaphor perspectives, in the sense
that projects that are considered analyzable promote an integrated centralized approach to planning and delivery,
whereas those that are more unanalyzable favor a distributed or dispersive
approach(see Figure 3).
The one-to-one correspondence
shown in Figure 3 between the typologies of Pepper (1942) and Lindkvist
(2011) is mutually reinforcing and
explicates why traditional project management approaches to knowledge
integration have limitations for project management research and practice. Traditional project management
under Mechanism is based on the linear
model, which relies on explicit ‘known’
knowledge (plans, etc.) as raw material
for planning in advance using a ‘scheduling’ logic. However, many projects
are inherently complex because they
cannot be fully specified in advance,
which favors an enactivist approach
under Contextualism that anticipates
emergent and distributed knowledge
formation over the project life cycle
using a ‘semi-coupling’ logic. The correspondence shown in Figure 3 also
highlights the limitations of Organicism and Formism as perspectives for
project research and practice, because
Organicism is a weaker synthetic theory
than Contextualism, and Formism is a
weaker analytic theory than Mechanism
(Pepper, 1942).
In addition to positioning project
knowledge integration in a broader
Degree of Novelty
Synthetic Theories
Integrative
Theories
Analytic Theories
Organicism
Mechanism
Project Portfolio Management
Traditional Project Management
Exploitation
Separating
Scheduling
Type of
Complexity
4 1
3 2
Dispersive
Theories
Analyzable
Exploration
Contextualism
Formism
Contextual Project Management
Project Program Management
Unanalyzable
(a)
4 1
3 2
Semi-Coupling
Coupling
(b)
Figure 3: (a) Project root–metaphor perspectives; (b) project logics. (a. Adapted from Pepper [1942, p. 146]; b. Adapted from Lindkvist et al.
[1998, p. 943] & Lindkvist [2011, p. 468])
philosophical context, the correspondence of typologies shown in Figure 3
also suggests that the two main aspects
of knowledge integration require a reassessment of how we view a project,
whether as a task or a process, and also
project management, whether viewed
as an applied science or a practice. First,
this article argues that traditional project management as an analytic theory is
underpinned by explicit ‘known’ knowledge as hard left-hemisphere logic of
the brain, whereas contextual project
management as a synthetic theory
includes experiential ‘knowing’ knowledge as softer right-hemisphere logic.
Second, these kinds of knowledge have
tendencies toward dispersion and integration as adaptive learning responses
to environments that can vary from
unanalyzable (dispersion) to analyzable (integration). With assumptions of
projects as tasks and project management as an applied science, traditional
project management represents a lefthemisphere view of project knowledge.
In contrast, contextual project management includes right-hemisphere project
knowledge by viewing projects as organizational forms whose boundaries are
constructed by stakeholder actors. In
the concluding next section, this article
will argue for a third way of viewing
projects as modes of organizing and
learning (MOL), which accommodates
the tendencies toward dispersion and
integration as inherent learning activities, as well as ‘known’ and ‘knowing’
knowledge as complementary knowledge components. In this integrated
MOL approach, project management is
considered an organizational competence, or practice, with intrinsic learning rather than an applied science with
little learning anticipated.
Discussion and Conclusions
This article has interpreted the work
of philosopher Stephen Pepper (1942)
to present a project root–metaphor
framework as a contribution to project
management theory development, primarily Mechanism for traditional project management and Contextualism for
contextual project management but,
also, Organicism for project portfolio
management and Formism for project
program management. This framework
can be used to inform project research
perspectives and to shed light on the
current debates between traditional
project management and contextual
approaches. This parallels the debate
in the management literature between
‘planned’ and ‘emergent’ strategy, some
of which has been informed by Pepper’s
root metaphors (Tsoukas, 1994). This
article has found support for the root–
metaphor framework in the project
logic typologies of Lindkvist et al. (1998)
and Lindkvist (2011). Additional support for Mechanism and Contextualism was found in Engwall et al.’s (2003)
typology of project literatures, and in
Daft and Weick’s (1984) typology of
organizational interpretation modes
in the management literature. Further,
by grounding project knowledge in a
broader philosophical perspective, the
limitations of earlier research in relation
to two key aspects of project knowledge
integration have also been highlighted
(Lindkvist, 2011). First, explicit knowledge is distinguished from experiential
knowledge, where explicit knowledge
underpins analytic approaches (exploitation) and synthetic approaches
(exploration) also include experiential
knowledge. In addition, the tendencies
toward integration (analyzable) and dispersion (unanalyzable) are viewed as
adaptive learning responses to project
environments of variable intelligibility.
Bridging Project Knowledge
Perspectives as a Third Way
Although the project management literature accepts the limitations of traditional project management, there is
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Root Metaphors for the Management of Projects: Toward a Knowledge-Based View
no new consensus on the nature of
projects and how we can obtain knowledge about them (Drouin, Müller, &
Sankaran, 2013). Unless projects can be
delivered without human involvement,
project delivery will always be bound up
with the agency and, hence, the knowledgeability of project personnel as they
project forward and make manifest in
delivered projects the hidden reality of
original plans. This difficulty of separating the subject from the object in projects is put more eloquently by the poet
W.B. Yeats, when he asks: “How can
we know the dancer from the dance?”1
In contextual project management, the
creative tension between projects as
both subject and object informs much
research using enactivist and constructivist perspectives.
In contrast, traditional project management focuses on the dance as an
object, like a project, over the dancer
as a subject and considers each of them
as separate. In this view, a project is a
temporary task that reassembles prior
knowledge from a plan into a replica
knowledge artifact through enabling
human agency that is regarded as
mechanical and neutral (PMI, 2013).
This is analogous to modeling the incubation of an egg primarily on the egg
yolk as the object with the egg white as
neutral, rather than a creative fusion of
both the yolk and the white. Thus, in
order to make progress toward a new
consensus, the dual character of projects as knowledge artifacts and products of human knowledgeability needs
to be recognized. For this, two kinds of
knowledge need to be accommodated—
explicit ‘known’ and experiential
‘knowing. In addition, two tendencies
in corroboration as a process of learning
also need accommodation—dispersion
and integration.
Using a sensemaking perspective,
Ahern et al. (2014a) tentatively reconceptualize a project as ‘a mode of
organizing to accomplish a temporary
1Last
line of the poem, “Among School Children”
undertaking’ and project management
as ‘an organizational competence in
organizing to accomplish temporary
undertakings.’ This view of projects
accommodates projects as tasks (or
undertakings), and also projects as
process (or modes of organizing). Also
included in this combined view are the
key project characteristics of the ‘life
cycle,’ representing a phased timeline
for managing the organization of project
work; ‘organizing,’ as a learning activity in a situated context; and ‘team,’ as
an organizing unit for delivering projects. Moreover, this is an integrated
practice view of projects and project
management as modes of organizing
and learning (MOL), where organizing and learning are mutually constituted through problem solving based on
antithesis and synthesis, or dispersion
and integration, respectively (Ahern,
Byrne, & Leavy, 2015).
In this practice approach to learning through problem solving, knowledge formation is based on an interplay
between experiential ‘knowing’ knowledge and explicit ‘known’ knowledge
through their common tacit dimension
(Polanyi, 1967), which resonates with
the experiential learning approach of
Kolb (1984). This project learning can
vary from single-loop learning under
the linear model of traditional project
management, in which little learning
is expected, to double-loop and openloop learning for complex projects
under conditions of incomplete knowledge in contextual project management
(Argyris, 1977; Nightingale & Brady,
2011). In this way, a mode of organizing and learning (MOL) approach
extends and bridges project knowledge
perspectives between explicit ‘planned’
knowledge in traditional project management and experiential ‘know-how’
knowledge in contextual project management (Cook & Brown, 1999).
Modes of Organizing and Learning as
Distributed Knowledge Formation
The MOL approach of this article represents a meta-perspective of Pepper’s
118 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
(1942) root–metaphor framework, when
this is interpreted from a knowledgebased view using the works of Popper
(1979) on problem-solving learning,
Pettigrew (2012) on process research,
and Polanyi (1967) on the tacit dimension of knowledge. To refresh, Pepper’s
(1942) framework shown in Figure 2
is based on two bipolar dimensions,
dispersion–integration and analysis–
synthesis, which can be interpreted
as aspects of emergent learning and
knowledge formation. As the first of
these bipolar dimensions in Figure 2,
the opposing tendencies of knowledge
refinement in an up-down direction
toward dispersion and integration can
be understood as a manifestation of
interactive antithesis–synthesis for
problem-­
s olving learning based on
the work of Karl Popper (1979, 2007).
Whereas Stephen Pepper (1942) views
dispersion and integration activities
as largely separate in different perspectives, this article views them as
interactive within perspectives but
without mixing different perspectives.
For example, even with interactive
antithesis–­
s ynthesis within perspectives, some subjects, such as economics,
remain more dispersed than integrated
ones, such as arithmetic, because of the
varying intelligibility of their respective
domains.
The second bipolar dimension of
analysis–synthesis (shown in Figure 2),
while also mirroring the same problem-­
solving dialectic, elaborates on the
kinds of knowledge that are used as raw
materials in two forms of corroboration as modes of knowledge formation.
Based on multiplicative corroboration,
analytic theories, such as Mechanism,
use elements and factors as explicit
knowledge raw material. In contrast,
synthetic theories, such as Contextualism, are based on structural corroboration, which uses complexes and wholes
as both explicit and experiential knowledge raw materials (Pettigrew, 1990,
1997, 2012). Using Polanyi’s (1967) crucial insight into the tacit dimension
as a component of all knowledge, this
article views knowledge formation as
a dynamic ‘interplay’ between explicit
knowledge (multiplicative corroboration) and experiential knowledge
(structural corroboration) through their
common tacit dimension. This sideto-side interplay is reinforced by the
up–down interaction of dispersion and
integration shown in Figure 2. With
dynamic ‘interplay,’ explicit knowledge
and experiential knowledge are complementary while retaining their separate
character as multiplicative corroboration (explicit) and structural corroboration (experiential). This avoids mixing
root–metaphor perspectives, which are
incommensurate in Pepper’s (1942)
view. In contrast, the knowledge creation approach of Nonaka and Takeuchi
(1995) based on ‘conversion’ involves
continuous conversion cycles of explicit
knowledge into tacit knowledge and
vice versa, during which the distinctive
nature of each is lost until later reconversion. This conversion approach
implies mixing and un-mixing root
metaphors.
Thus, by incorporating the two
bipolar dimensions of Pepper’s (1942)
framework as intrinsic aspects of emergent learning and knowledge formation, a mode of organizing and learning
(MOL) approach reflects the potential
synergy of the four root-metaphor perspectives, especially Mechanism and
Contextualism as the major axis, while
maintaining their distinctive characteristics. This supports Pepper’s original view about the world perspectives
being incommensurate, while showing that an interaction between their
underlying knowledge characteristics
can be constructive. The MOL approach
draws inspiration from the sensemaking approach of Weick (1979, 1995),
which emphasizes that organizations are essentially about organiz-ing
rather than organized; plan-ning rather
than plans. Using a MOL approach
as a shared theoretical construct for
project research and management
research, organizations can be viewed
as modes of organizing and learning for
accomplishing undertakings, whether
temporary or permanent.
Implications for Project Management
Research and Practice
The main implication of this article’s
project management root-metaphor
framework for research and practice is
to highlight the fundamental philosophical differences between traditional and
situated approaches to the management
of projects. Using this framework with a
knowledge-based view, the article has
drawn attention to the different kinds
of project knowledge in each of these
main project management approaches—
upfront planned knowledge in traditional
project management and emergent
learning with knowledge formation in
contextual project management. For
project theory, the root-metaphor framework can facilitate the conceptual development of projects beyond existing views
of projects based on physical resources
and routines (tasks), or human resources
(temporary organizations), to enable
projects to be viewed as arenas of intrinsic innovation and knowledge formation
through problem-solving learning.
For project researchers, the rootmetaphor framework can be used to
support situated approaches for complex settings, which are already evident
in empirical studies but with little theoretical underpinning. For these novel
and complex projects that cannot be
fully specified in advance, a deeper
understanding of the theoretical limitations of traditional project management
assumptions would guard against their
instinctive adoption with predictable
disappointing results. An important
insight for project management practitioners in framing and leading projects is the need to manage complex
projects under Contextualism for emergent knowledge formation over the life
cycle rather than framing complex projects as just very ‘complicated’ projects
under Mechanism with poor results. For
general project management practice,
the root-metaphor framework can be
used for managing diversity between
different projects, such as traditional
(Mechanism) and complex (Contextualism), as well as projects in portfolios
(Organicism) and programs (Formism).
When using the framework for
managing diversity ‘within’ projects,
however, one should guard against the
temptation of eclecticism 2 by combining or mixing root-metaphor perspectives, which Pepper (1942, p. 106)
regards as “sterile and confusing.” In
their development of Pepper’s theories,
Hayes, Hayes, and Reese (1988) insightfully observe that, because Pragmatism
has a means-end approach to truth,
Contextualism is an exception that can
adopt Mechanism, Formism, or Organicism in given situations without being
philosophically eclectic, if this is “useful
toward some end” (p. 101). In complex
settings, this flexible use of Contextualism does not imply combining the
underlying root metaphors, which
should be stated up front to avoid confusion. Also, the framework can be used
to investigate diversity ‘within’ projects over the life cycle; for example, in
phases that are more contextual, such as
feasibility, design, and handover, as well
as phases that are more traditional, such
as the execution phase. In addition, the
framework can underpin research on
agile project management methodologies, such as Scrum, which adopt a flexible planning approach to traditional
project management under Mechanism
(Conforto, Salum, Amaral, da Silva, & de
Almeida, 2014; Schwaber, 2004) but suffer from similar conceptual limitations
for knowledge formation. These agile
methodologies can be further advanced
by using the framework and the modes
of organizing and learning (MOL) metaperspective, which is based on emergent
knowledge formation through problemsolving learning and where dynamic
learning is the primary core competence rather than flexible planning
under traditional project management.
2 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting
Pepper’s views about ‘eclecticism’ with root metaphors.
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 119
PAPERS
Root Metaphors for the Management of Projects: Toward a Knowledge-Based View
Because a mode of organizing and
learning (MOL) approach to projects
and project management accommodates Mechanism and Contextualism,
it can be used for traditional project
management with little learning as well
as for complex projects with intrinsic
learning, because the latter cannot be
fully specified in advance. For complex
projects, knowledge uncertainty under
‘bounded’ planning, along with emergent learning and knowledge formation,
become key characteristics of the journey through the project life cycle in contrast to knowledge certainty with little
learning under ‘total’ planning in traditional project management (Engwall,
2002; Lundin & Midler, 1998). In this
way, a MOL approach contributes to
the idea of organizations and modes
of organizing as systems of distributed
knowledge rather than centralized
knowledge (Orlikowski, 1996; Tsoukas,
1996). However, a distributed approach
needs a coordinating mechanism, such
as Lindblom’s (1959) ‘mutual adjustment’ or Polanyi’s (1967) parallel idea
of ‘mutual control’ as a collective tacit
dimension, based on the twin principles of self-discipline by mutual authority and self-coordination by mutual
adjustment. This kind of irreducible
self-organizing in complex projects can
be further investigated for methods
of entrainment around project goals
and pacing by the project life cycle
(Söderlund, 2010) through a ‘common
will of mutual interest’ (Ahern, Leavy, &
Byrne, 2014b).
With a MOL approach, the key
process of knowledge integration can
be viewed as the distributed management of emergent learning and
knowledge formation rather than the
centralized management of knowledge as a commodity (Newell et al.,
2006). In this MOL approach, leadership in projects is more about mentoring team members to ‘learn’ projects
over the life cycle as a community
of learners rather than facilitating
a group of skilled technicians in the
assembly of projects as pre-planned
knowledge artifacts by integrating project plans like Lego blocks. This requires
a communal commitment to continuous
reflective learning ‘in’ projects as a creative interplay with the upfront preflective learning of plans ‘before’ projects,
rather than the latter on its own. Using a
MOL approach, which includes explicit
and experiential knowledge, the idea of
project management as a ‘collectivity
of practice’ (Lindkvist, 2005), based
largely on integrating explicit databases between project management
specialists, can be further developed
as a community of project practice, an
organizational competence. In the latter
capability approach, project management is a community of learners where
explicit and experiential knowledge are
mutually complementary components
of knowledge formation in learning a
project as a ‘process,’ which involves
continuous problem-solving activities
of dispersion and integration (Ahern
et al., 2015).
Finally, because a MOL approach
accommodates explicit and experiential knowledge, a community of project
practice can be managed with different styles of learning between core and
peripheral members. In project-based
organizations and project management
offices, for example, core members of
a community of project practice can
embody the deep learning of master
practitioners based on ‘knowledge
base similarity’; peripheral members
can embody the tactical learning of
less experienced practitioners based
on ‘well-connectedness’ of databases
(Lindkvist, 2005; Wenger, 2001). Further,
as there is growing evidence that much
work in projects takes place by individuals working alone (Enberg, Lindkvist,
& Tell, 2006), a community of project
practice may be a useful construct for
researching this kind of project participation diversity, which has implications
for leadership, teams, and knowledge
integration over the life cycle. Lastly,
by viewing projects and project management as modes of organizing with
intrinsic learning, future research can
120 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
investigate how project ‘knowledgeability’ can be transferred rather than
project ‘knowledge.’ This involves transferring project management as a capability to organize and learn rather than
transferring explicit knowledge on its
own, with mixed results, under traditional project management.
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Dr. Terence Ahern is based in the infrastructure
division of Iarnród Éireann/Irish Rail in Dublin,
Ireland, and recently completed a PhD at Dublin City
University Business School (DCUBS) in the area of
complex project management. His research interests
include complex projects, organizational capabilities,
organizational learning, and knowledge management.
He can be contacted at [email protected]
Dr. P. J. Byrne is an Associate Professor in
Management in Dublin City University Business
School (DCUBS) and is former head of the
Management Group in the School. Prior to this, he
worked as a Senior Research Fellow in the Enterprise
Research Centre in the University of Limerick.
Professor Byrne has an extensive track record in
industrial-based research and is a founding member
of the Modelling and Simulation Research Group
in DCUBS. He is currently a Principal Investigator
for a number of national and international research
projects and has been successful with his research
team in attracting significant levels of research
funding, primarily in the area of discrete event
simulation and its application in manufacturing,
services, and healthcare process improvement.
Professor Byrne’s primary research interests include
supply chain design, analysis and optimization,
cloud-based simulation, discrete event simulation,
industrial applications of simulation modeling for the
manufacturing and services sectors, and business
process optimization. He can be contacted at
[email protected]
Dr. Brian Leavy is a Professor in Strategy in Dublin
City University Business School (DCUBS). Prior to his
academic career, he spent eight years as an engineer
with Digital Equipment Corporation, now part of
Hewlett Packard. Professor Leavy’s teaching and
research interests center on strategic leadership,
competitive analysis, and strategy innovation;
he has published over 100 articles, chapters,
and book reviews on these topics, nationally and
internationally. He is the author/co-author of
four books: Strategy and Leadership, with David
Wilson (Routledge, 1994); Strategy and General
Management, with James S. Walsh (Oak Tree Press,
1995); Key Processes in Strategy (Thomson Learning,
1996); and Strategic Leadership: Governance and
Renewal, with Peter McKiernan (Palgrave, 2009).
He is a contributing editor to Strategy & Leadership
and serves on the editorial board of Journal of
Strategy and Management. He can be contacted at
[email protected]
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 123
PAPERS
Project Management Between
Will and Representation
Serghei Floricel, Department of Management and Technology, School of Management,
University of Quebec in Montreal, Montreal, Canada
Sorin Piperca, Department of Management and Technology, School of Management, University
of Quebec in Montreal, Montreal, Canada
ABSTRACT ■
INTRODUCTION ■
This article challenges some deep-rooted
assumptions of project management.
Inspired by the work of the German philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer, it calls for
looking at projects through two complementary lenses: one that accounts for cognitive and representational aspects and one
that accounts for material and volitional
aspects. Understanding the many ways in
which these aspects transpire and interact in projects sheds new light on project organizations, as imperfect and fragile
representations that chase a shifting nexus
of intractable human, social, technical, and
material processes. This, in turn, can bring
about a new grasp of notions such as value,
knowledge, complexity, and risk.
rom building transportation infrastructures, such as bridges and
airports, to designing airplanes and dispatching exploration missions
in space; from creating information and communication systems to
editing video games and other software products; and from developing
new medical drugs to organizing vaccination programs, complex projects are
an essential part of advanced economies and societies. Yet many complex
projects are not implemented fully or end half-way through execution. They
are plagued by conflicts, litigations, and scandals; significant cost and schedule
overruns; widespread dissatisfaction with their activities, final form, functions
and benefits; and sometimes by accidents with catastrophic consequences for
people, nature, and societies. The project management discipline has seized
upon various perspectives and developed new approaches in an attempt to
explain and address deviations from what it considers the normal course of
a project. These attempts have recently produced a deep reconceptualization
of project processes, knowledge production, stakeholder management,
contractual design, risk management, as well as organizational governance,
flexibility, and reliability.
One problem with these attempts is their low integration; each relies on
different assumptions and they often produce recommendations that contradict each other and the basic tenets of project management. For example,
some recommended contractual designs create problems with knowledge
production and organizational flexibility, whereas others hamper cost control and organizational governance (Floricel & Miller, 2001). Researchers
have tried various ways of bringing these approaches to a common denominator, by conceptualizing projects as organizations in their own right or,
more recently, by adopting a practice perspective on project management.
But these integration efforts are themselves plagued by heterogeneous
assumptions and methodological foci (Floricel, Bonneau, Aubry, & Sergi,
2014), producing polyphony rather than dialogue and slowing down theory
development.
This article attempts to provide a common ground for the efforts to reconceptualize project management by seeking inspiration in the philosophy
of Arthur Schopenhauer (1821/1966) in order to reassess some deep-seated
assumptions of the discipline. In essence, traditional assumptions depict
project management as using knowledge about user needs, natural environments, technical objects, and human behavior in order to produce, through
rational selection, decision, problem-solving and optimization processes, a
series of prospective representations of project form (architectural and design
depictions, technical drawings, site maps, production flowcharts, and so
forth); resources and activities (goals, development processes, Gantt charts,
KEYWORDS: complexity; knowledge;
value; goals; materiality; planning; risk;
governance
Project Management Journal, Vol. 47, No. 3, 124–138
© 2016 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
F
124 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
budgets, risk matrices, and so forth);
and organization (hierarchical charts,
contracts, rules, and procedures, and
so forth). These representations then
become a teleological engine (Van de
Ven & Poole, 1995) that drives implementation activities; managing projects
amounts to monitoring and correcting deviations from these prospective representations (Floricel, Banik, &
Piperca, 2013).
Our inquiry originated in the incongruence we felt between this depiction and the reality we perceived while
studying complex projects, characterized by multiple iterations, deceptive
embellishments, or even Machiavellian
manipulations of representations. In
addition, there were conflicts, heated
debates, and tentative commitments
between participants, which along with
events that appeared as unexpected
in light of participants’ representations, produced endless changes in
project form, organization, and activities. These observations suggested to
us that representations do not drive
projects; they are merely a temporary
truce under pressure from a heterogeneous and constantly shifting nexus
of interests and forces. Following
Schopenhauer, we term this nexus ‘will’
and argue that the current thinking
in project management misinterprets
its nature and underestimates its role.
Inspired again by Schopenhauer, we
also argue that representations are not
mirror depictions of surrounding realities and future projects; rather, they are
constructed at various levels, including
in manipulative ways, and are used
strategically to advance interests and
activities. This enables us to argue
that project management is the process of bringing and keeping together
numerous heterogeneous and evolving
strands of ‘will’ and ‘representation,’
and attempting to master the wildly
emergent, rather than teleological,
nature of this process.
We hope that by clarifying the
complementary categories of ‘will’ and
‘representation’ in relation to issues
encountered in complex projects, we
provide an explicit worldview and a parsimonious set of fundamental concepts
around which project management
scholars could articulate their theorizing efforts. The specific contribution we expect is to help integrate a
series of fundamental concerns of project management researchers, starting
with the understanding of complexity
and processes (Cooke-Davies, Cicmil,
Crawford, & Richardson, 2007; Whitty
& Maylor, 2009), and ending with the
recent interest in practice and actornetworks, including the renewed interest in the role of materiality and the calls
for a symmetric treatment of human
and nonhuman ‘actors’ (Latour, 1991;
Barad, 2003; Orlikowski, 2007). In turn,
this will hopefully enable the integration of various applied and practical
developments to which we alluded
above.
We begin this conceptual development by introducing, in the next section,
the concepts of will and representation
as reflected in Schopenhauer’s philosophical works, and by showing how
these concepts can be viewed as extending, directly or indirectly, into some
current thinking in organization theory
and the project management field. The
last section of the article discusses the
implications for project management
research and practice.
Understanding ‘Will’ and
‘Representation’
In 1818, German philosopher Arthur
Schopenhauer published a book whose
title is most often translated into English as The World as Will and Representation (Schopenhauer, 1966). The book
sought to answer questions about our
relation to the world, which date back
at least to the time of Plato and Aristotle. In particular, Schopenhauer argued
that our subjective relation to the world
is, on the one hand, a ‘representation’
constructed by our cognitive faculties,
and, on the other hand, a ‘will’ that
works through our inner desires and
sentiments. Rather than proposing a
new dualism, he saw these two aspects
as intertwined. In fact, the main reason we return almost 200 years back
in time to rediscover Schopenhauer’s
work is that subsequent philosophical works emphasized one aspect at
the expense of the other. On the one
hand, phenomenology (Husserl, 1913/­
1931; Heidegger, 1927/1962) and logical
empiricism (Bunge, 1996) seem equally
concerned with the ‘representation’
side of being in the world; whereas, on
the other hand, Nietzsche, existentialists, and even materialists appear to
emphasize ‘will,’ be it as freedom or as
necessity. We sought a perspective that
balances these two aspects because we
came to the conclusion that they are
inextricably linked and play an equal
role in projects. With such a perspective we hope to overcome a certain
disconnect between these aspects in the
project management field. Although the
official project management discourse,
backed by literatures rooted in decision
theory, economics, and optimization
(Winch 1989; Chapman & Ward, 1996;
Brucker, Drexl, Möhring, Neumann, &
Pesch, 1999), emphasizes the rational
construction and embodiment of systemic and structural representations,
the informal, everyday discourse of
managers, with some support in the
literature on the “human side of project management” (House, 1988), often
strays into discussing volitional and
emotional aspects and the interpersonal efforts needed to keep the project
alive and enable effective action.
Schopenhauer’s ideas suggest not
just a path toward restoring the balance
and enabling the integration of these
aspects, but also a parsimonious set of
distinctions, which, with proper interpretation and actualization, could provide a conceptual kernel for rethinking
the nature of project management. We
begin by discussing the ‘representation’
aspect, before clarifying the particular
meaning of the term ‘will.’ The section
ends with a discussion of the interaction between ‘will’ and ‘representation.’
In each subsection, we outline recent
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Project Management Between Will and Representation
developments that echo Schopenhauer’s
views as well as implications for the
understanding of project management.
Representation
Following Kant, Schopenhauer argues
that our representation of the world
presupposes certain a priori cognitive
faculties, the most basic of which are
the capacities to represent time, space,
and causality. Because of this, while
admitting that there is a reality out there
(a “thing” in itself ) and that representations are an immediate correlate of this
reality, Schopenhauer argues that the
constructed nature of representations
precludes us from knowing the true
nature of this reality based on our perceptual sensations or on our abstract
ideas. In particular, we cannot assume
that this reality has the same properties
of space, time, and causality inherent
in our representations of the world as a
priori forms of our sensibility. The constructed nature of representation concerns the immediate perception of the
world, but even more so other representations, in particular abstract conceptualizations, which are all conditioned by
the immediate perception.
Subsequent inquiries into the
nature of immediate perception support
the idea of a constructed representation of reality. Physics-inspired thinkers
were intrigued by our perception of the
world. Of particular interest were time
and space, namely why introspection
into the way we perceive the world tells
us that space should be represented
with three dimensions and time should
be considered a separate dimension,
even as physical theories and mathematical formalisms could add any number of dimensions and consider time
as one among them. Poincaré (1912)
argued that the ‘normal’ structure stems
from the biological structure of our cognitive apparatus, but also surmised the
existence of a faculty that enables us to
construct physical and mathematical
continuums as well as ‘spaces’ with a
different number and configuration of
dimensions. Rashevsky (1935, p. 75), the
founder of a field called mathematical
biophysics, even attempted to imagine
“what the physico-chemical structure of
organisms must be so that they would
choose for their frames of reference
our three-dimensional space and onedimensional time,” warning that “this
structure must itself be described in
non-spatial and non-temporal terms.”
Biology-inspired thinkers extended this
line of thought to argue that such innate
‘distortions’ are adaptations that ensure
our survival, among others, by focusing our attention on certain aspects of
reality and excluding others. Maturana
and Varela (1980) proposed the concept
of autopoiesis, as the tendency of some
systems to reproduce the relations that
sustain their existence. The ‘perception’
of autopoietic systems refers to the
system itself, by selecting only those
external features that are of interest in
relation to system survival. For example,
unaided human perception only represents a range of wavelengths in the
electromagnetic or sound spectrums, as
well as objects and processes in a limited range of size, proximity, and speed.
In other words, we construct a world of
our ‘size’ and ‘likeness,’ which, among
others, translates into safety and ergonomic concerns for project site equipment operation and for the design of
projects from military aircraft to information systems (Shneiderman, 1979).
Psychologists and neural scientists
provide more evidence in support of
the constructed nature of our representations. For example, they found
a powerful ability to set apart objects
from the ground or to discern the features and expressions of other people.
For gestalt psychologists and neurobiologists, these abilities amount to an
active construction of the world by our
brain (Köhler, 1938; Wertheimer, 1938;
Maunsell, 1995; Zeki, 1992). A first
operation involved in “seeing with the
brain” enables us to spontaneously see
objects as an instantiation of a category. Many such categories, including
social ones, point to the function of an
object or to the way it affects the subject
126 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
(Polanyi, 1966; Dreyfus, 1991; Rosch,
1978). Perceiving objects directly as
meaningful, for example, as a friend or
a foe, is an adaptation that enables us to
react more quickly to dangers. A second
constructive “distortion” that our brain
performs almost automatically is putting objects in relation (Anderson, 1980;
Damasio, 1989), such as apprehending their relative position, sequence,
movement, or causal influence. The two
operations are not only basic, but also
independent, as suggested by the fact
that our brain uses separate neural circuits to perform them (Kandel, 2006).
According to Schopenhauer, our
representation of the world also involves
the ability to create and operate with
abstract categories. In line with the
rational views mentioned above, this
uniquely human ability to “withdraw
into reflection,” in a “sphere of calm
deliberation” away from the “storms of
reality” (Schopenhauer, 1966, p. 85) is
the key to planning future actions and
increasing our control over the world.
He also argues, however, that abstract
concepts are rooted in our perception of
the world and, hence, are conditioned
by the operations that construct this
perception. Furthermore, while perception gives us a direct and, in some sense,
infallible grasp of the world, abstract
representations are prone to errors with
regard to the meanings of concepts and
the relations between them. These ideas
are echoed by epistemological perspectives that see only a loose correspondence between abstract constructs and
the reality “out there.” These range from
views insisting on the primacy of the logical structure of a network of concepts
over its correspondence with the sensations we get from reality (Bunge, 1996),
to those observing that conceptual nets
“impinge on reality only at the margins”
(Quine, 1951), or not at all, as concepts
derive meaning from their relations to
each other (Wittgenstein, 1953).
Such debates are paralleled in the
literature on technology by discussions
on the role of abstract knowledge—such
as scientific formulas—in representing
and guiding the design concrete artifacts, for example, in innovation projects. While some authors (Bunge, 1967;
Sorenson & Fleming, 2004) maintain
that abstract knowledge plays an important inspiring and guiding role, others (Vincenti, 1990; Nightingale, 1998)
argue that abstractions have a hard
time capturing the complex forms of
technical objects and may even be
counterproductive (Kline, 1987). The
alternative is developing an intuitive
understanding of the operation and
“affordances” (Gibson, 1977) of relevant
concrete objects, through immediate
perception and practical experience,
such as that obtained through repeated
prototype trials. A similar debate, with
relevance for project selection activities, ensued in psychology and decision
theory from the finding that decision
makers systematically deviate from
the norms of “substantive rationality”
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). A more
adaptive behavior seems to be interacting repeatedly with the concrete reality
and iteratively improving the representation of the situation rather than seeking an optimal decision scheme from
the outset (Simon, 1978; Einhorn &
Hogarth, 1981). These findings are, perhaps, echoed in the growing popularity
of iterative, as opposed to linear, project
processes, including Scrum (Boehm,
1988; Schwaber, 1997; Shenhar, 2001).
Human limitations and abilities also
explain the widespread production of
representations on external, material
supports, such as paper and computer
screens, in the forms of symbolic formulas, drawings, imagery, and videos. Some
of these representations, such as those
provided by an electronic microscope
or a particle detector, enable us to overcome perceptual limits. Yet the means
by which they are produced add another
thick constructive layer, via the theoretical assumptions incorporated into the
design of the relevant devices and practices, even simple ones such as optical
microscopes (Hacking, 1981; Pickering,
1981). Similar constructive distortions
operate in the devices investigating
soil conditions for a hydroelectric dam
project, the size of an oilfield for a drilling platform project, or the biological
processes that justify a new drug development project.
Other benefits of external representations are the possibility of preserving
impressions and abstractions to overcome memory limitations and of
conveying them in time and space to
overcome the limitations of presence.
Moreover, external representations also
provide feedback on imagined objects
by letting us glance at their concrete
form in the world and manipulate them
in ways mental abilities do not allow.
This is particularly useful for architects,
engineers, and industrial designers
who, in essence, construct project representations by relying on nonverbal
thought (Ferguson, 1977; Visser, 2006).
Like constructing mental representations, constructing external ones
involves selection, accentuation, meaning attribution, and relational configuration (Lynch, 1988). These distortions,
however, are combined with processes
of materialization and preservation on
external media, which impose their own
set of constraints (Latour, 1986). In some
cases, the process also involves representational conventions that abstract
in a particular directive way from the
richness of perceptual representations
(Henderson, 1991; Zasso, 1996). These
insights into the nature of mental and
external representations suggest that
knowledge production and representation practices in projects do not just
passively enhance correspondence with
a reality out there, but actively construct a reality, via multilayered, partially implicit processes of perception,
conceptualization, codification, and
embodiment. Construction seems even
less anchored and more active when
prospective representations, such as
project plans and drawings, are being
produced. Results may differ, depending on the specific actors, tools, and
operations involved in these processes,
and hence may channel projects on
quite different action paths.
Social processes add another distortive layer to the process of representation construction. Theories about the
social construction of reality (Berger &
Luckmann, 1966; Bourdieu, 1977), in
particular the sociology of science, technology, and risk (Fleck, 1979; Hughes,
1983; Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982), imply that rather elaborate processes of collective selecting,
amplifying, forgetting, and legitimizing are enmeshed in the construction
of concepts and causal attributions
used in practice and science. In turn,
these influence individual perception
and action. These theories can help us
understand the practices through which
the ‘myth’ of project viability and worth
is built and maintained; the strategic
practices that encourage or limit the
access and influence of possible participants in the process; or impact decisions by setting the discussion agenda,
framing the key issues, legitimating, and
otherwise structuring the field of possible action (Foucault, 1982; Dutton &
Jackson, 1987; McCombs & Shaw, 1993).
Representations on external, material support play a key role in these processes—first as vehicles for conveying
internal representations, such as project
visions or personal and tacit knowledge,
to other actors, present in the same
room, or located farther away in space
and time. Studies of engineering design
and innovation projects suggest that a
multitude of representations are used,
some to synthesize, convey, and legitimate knowledge, either existing or produced in the course of project activities;
whereas others are used to represent
requirements, functions, architectures,
artefact forms, and schedules that guide
execution. The nature of representations seems to evolve from abstract and
simple to concrete and complex as the
project advances (Floricel, Michela, &
George, 2011; Chandrasegaran et al.,
2013). The research on external representation practices traced sequences or
networks of representations that converge toward a definitive “inscription”
which legitimizes the project myth
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Project Management Between Will and Representation
(Henderson, 1999; Latour, 1986), and
also elucidated how external representations are used to enable collaboration. As “boundary objects” (Star &
Griesemer, 1989; Carlile, 2002), they
enable the coordination of planning
activities across organizational and
departmental boundaries by helping
create a shared vocabulary and meaning,
while as “epistemic objects” (Ewenstein
& Whyte, 2009; Knorr Cetina, 1997),
their joint construction helps integrate
the contributions of planners working
together. A key condition for collaboration seems to be the flexibility allowed
by various forms of embodiment, for
example by a pencil and paper sketch
compared with an electronic database
(Henderson, 1991).
External representations can also be
a vehicle for “translating” the project in
an attempt to attract, tame, or repel other
actors or to create a “screen” that projects the needed image for stakeholders
(Callon, 1986). Their morphologic, figurative and symbolic structures, as well as
their dynamic properties, convey meaning by interacting with actors’ innate
perceptual and conceptual abilities as
discussed above. The study of practices
involving such representations—from
written slogans and graphic materials
to final artifacts—can illuminate their
use as “discursive instruments” for
influencing others actors (Deetz, Tracy,
& Simpson, 2000). The selection and
active manipulation of representations
are also used to project the competence,
probity, diligence, and reliability of the
actors that produced them, and hence,
to augment their status, legitimacy,
credibility, and, ultimately, their potential influence on other actors (Floricel,
Michela, & George, 2011). For example,
during the Polaris system development,
PERT charts served, among others, to
demonstrate the use of modern management practices and hence keep public bureaucrats from interfering with the
project (Sapolsky, 1972).
The above discussion reveals that
representations could be viewed differently compared with the assumptions
of the rational paradigm in project
management. Rather than being knowledge that reflects, albeit imperfectly,
the reality surrounding a project, they
are distortions resulting from biological, psychological, and social processes;
instead of providing objective justifications for projects, they are used as tools
for convincing and manipulating. But
even if this richer, albeit not unusual
view, is adopted, our understanding
of projects may suffer from the overemphasis on representations imported
from the social and organization theories that inform project research. These
theories have been dominated by phenomenology-inspired views regarding
the social construction of reality and
the various forms of institutionalization
of structures and practices (Berger &
Luckmann, 1966; Giddens, 1984; Meyer
& Rowan, 1977). These views had multiple echoes in organization theory—
from the information-processing view
(March & Simon, 1958; Stinchcombe,
1990); to an emphasis on tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994), routines (Nelson
& Winter, 1982; Feldman & Pentland,
2003), sensemaking, identity, and heedful behavior (Weick, 1979; Gioia &
Chittipeddi, 1991); and even on ‘practice’ as a corpus of accepted ways of
doing things (Jarzabkowski, Balogun, &
Seidl, 2007). Project management has
followed the same trend (Blomquist,
Hällgren, Nilsson, & Söderholm, 2010).
Only recently have these fields started
to pay attention to external representations and their organizational roles as
boundary or epistemic objects (Scarbrough, Panourgias, & Nandhakumar,
2015). Also recently, currents such as
actor–network theory, activity theory,
socio-materiality, and the practice
view (Latour, 2005; Engeström, 2001;
Orlikowski, 2007; Nicolini, Mengis, &
Swan, 2012) have started to explore
the ways in which social interactions
are intertwined with various material
aspects of the world. We believe that
Schopenhauer’s concept of ‘will,’ discussed in the next section, opens an
avenue for better understanding the
128 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
volitional and material aspects of project management, as well as for their
rebalancing and integration with the
representational aspects.
Will
This second aspect of our relation to
the world, which Schopenhauer puts
forward, is related to inner sensations
such as pain, pleasure, emotion, desire,
and urges to act. Schopenhauer views
these sensations as vehicles through
which a fundamental ‘will’ present in
the world expresses itself. For him, the
intuition of these inner states, unencumbered by words and concepts, is
a way of glimpsing into the intrinsic
nature of the world—a holistic eternal
force that manifests itself through a
multitude of subjects in particular times
and places. Another expression of ‘will’
is the never-ending struggle for domination between subjects, including that
between human and non-human subjects, or with non-living forces. Simply put: a multiplicity of subjects are
vehicles, at specific places and times,
of this universal force. Subjects cannot
represent this force as an object, but
it acts through their bodies and can
be glimpsed via introspection. Contrary
to Nietzschean or existentialist views
that emphasize the autonomy of individual volition, Schopenhauer argues
that the feeling of individual free will in
human subjects is an illusion, enabled
by the higher levels of organization of
the human body.
Schopenhauer’s vision of ‘will’
appears to have been influenced by
Hinduism (Nichols, 1999; White, 2010).
Other possible influences are ancient
mystical notions, such as Dionysian or
Bacchic cults in ancient Greece and
Rome, which opposed the rational cult
of Sun’s god Apollo, and whose ceremonies, by diminishing actors’ restraint,
let followers express and connect with
the irrational forces that ruled them.
These ideas made Schopenhauer a preferred philosopher of Romanticism,
an intellectual current that—in reaction to the Age of Enlightenment with
its emphasis on knowledge, individual
freedom and rationality—rediscovered
ancient Nordic myths and their beliefs
that occult magical forces rule the world
(Williamson, 2004).
Despite these sources, Schopenhauer’s view is surprisingly compatible with modern scientific views of a
material world. Thus, Schopenhauer’s
always unsatisfied ‘will’ is akin to the
impetus present in the universe since,
say, the ‘Big Bang,’ whose nature and
origins still elude our ability to understand it as a fully representable object.
One of the many diffuse consequences
of this impetus is the development of
living organisms, including the human
species. Each organism can be seen as a
temporary nexus of processes in the vast
network of transformations that this
impetus generates in the world. Its particular form is an echo of transformations, such as evolutionary adaptation,
that follow obscure logics, perhaps as
strange as that supposed by Dawkins’s
(1976) “selfish gene” hypothesis. The
peculiarities of this form, including
the a priori representational abilities
and the sensations it produces in subjects, are geared toward the survival of
the body and the reproduction of its
species.
The idea of a magic underground
that influences phenomena in the world
in intractable ways is also echoed in
modern scientific views. Scientists are
still debating the fundamental properties of space, time, energy, and matter,
as well as the nature of subatomic particles and the processes involving them.
Current thinking about them includes
notions that call into question the traditional conceptions of space, time,
and causality, such as relativity, intrinsic randomness (rather than lack of
knowledge), and limits to observation.
Yet, even with these assumptions, the
world cannot be explained using a parsimonious set of concepts related in simple ways. Streams of thought attempting
such explanations—for example string
theory—make strange assumptions, so
strange that no mathematical apparatus
is available to work out any testable
hypotheses (Greene, 1999). Among others, they postulate entities that lack normal dimensionality and spaces with
many additional hidden dimensions.
What Romantics viewed as occult, telluric forces, is now the almost infinite
potential for surprising discoveries in
what Feynman (1960) called “plenty of
room at the bottom.”
But the idea of intractable influences beyond our representation and
abstraction abilities is also relevant
at a more macro, everyday level, and
transpires in the debates on complexity, emergence, and process ontologies. Of the various views on complexity
(Biggiero, 2001), closer to the concept
of ‘will’ appears to be the one focusing
on the fact that interactions between
entities at a lower level of organization,
and/or between their properties, lead to
unexpected properties in higher-level
objects. System philosophers call this
possibility ‘emergence’ and argue that
it gives higher-level entities a distinct
ontological status; emergent entities
exist in their own right (Bunge, 1979;
Simon, 1981). Complexity in this sense
increases with the extent that component aggregation is non-additive, and
emergent properties cannot be reduced
to the properties of component entities and of their interactions. In other
words, we cannot represent the origin and the impetus for many entities that we observe in the world. The
nature of emergence and non-additivity
itself is still the object of heated debate
(Wimsatt, 2006). All this gives phenomena, including project-relevant ones,
such as those related to materials, air
or fluid dynamics, and soil, an aura of
‘magic’ despite spectacular advances
in science and technology in the two
centuries since the publication of
Schopenhauer’s book.
Additional complexity of this type
comes from the ‘downward conditioning’ (Kontopoulos, 1993) that higher
levels of organization exert over their
components, especially in the sense
of maintaining the relations that led
to their emergence in the first place.
Upward from molecules, biological entities have been characterized by multiple interactions between up to nine
emergent levels of organization (Kohl &
Noble, 2009, p. 3). The failure to explain
and especially to predict these phenomena by focusing on components such as
genes and proteins has led to calls for
abandoning the prevalent reductionist
stance in biology and adopting a more
systemic, cross-level approach (Mayr,
2000; Sauer, Heinemann, & Zamboni,
2007; Noble, 2010). In practical terms,
this failure, relevant for pharmaceutical,
biotechnology, and biomedical projects,
seems to account for the extremely low
percentage of successful projects, for
the low level of success of ‘rational drug
design’ approaches; and hence, for the
continuing prevalence of massive trial
and error approaches that seek to find a
way of tricking the ‘magic underground’
to do what project participants want
it to do (Nightingale & Martin, 2004;
Mandal, Moudgil, & Mandal, 2009).
The ideas of emergence and downward conditioning have also characterized the efforts to account for the
complexity of social reality. Researchers
set apart several aggregation levels: individuals, teams, organizations (including
projects), sectors, nations, and global
systems. Yet they struggle to understand
how these interact. Although some
scholars, particularly economists, try
to explain the properties of higher-level
systems by looking at the interactions
between lower-level entities (Axelrod,
1984; Coleman, 1966), others emphasize the influence of higher levels on the
organization of lower levels (Parsons,
1960; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Luhmann,
1995), whereas a third group stresses
the mutual influences between the various levels (Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens,
1984). The diversity of possible interactions may account for the fact that project organizations do not obey the tenets
of rational design; their emergence from
multiple types of relations between various types of human and nonhuman
entities adds layers of complexity in
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addition to those attributable to intractable interactions in their material and
biological substrate.
Another stream of thought that
supports the inscrutable and dynamic
nature of ‘will’ concerns natural and
social processes. According to Prigogine
(1997, p. 55), we live in a world in which
“we discover fluctuations, bifurcations,
and instabilities at all levels.” One line
of inquiry into processes still considers
entities as real and focuses on the conditions and mechanisms that produce
highly non-linear or chaotic dynamics
in the systems of interests (Van de Ven
& Poole, 1995; Dooley & Van de Ven,
1999). Of particular interest are conditions and mechanisms through which
small, imperceptible differences in initial conditions lead to wildly different
outcomes; for example, for competing innovation projects (Arthur, 1989).
On the other hand, however, the proponents of so called ‘process ontologies’
consider that entities are artifacts of our
perception, and that events, which make
a difference in the world and connect to
each other to form processes, are the
essential elements of the world (Hernes,
2008, p. 45, referring to the work of
Alfred North Whitehead). Processes
are detectable strands of events in a
world in continual becoming (Hernes
& Weik, 2007). Organization scholars
influenced by this ontology argue that
continual becoming is the normal state
of organizations and the only way to
influence its course is by interacting in
order to reweave some of the processes
(Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). This process
view provides strong arguments against
the rational ‘practice’ of attempting to
‘freeze’ project deliverables and organizations up front, through plans, organizational charts, and contracts; in fact, it
suggests that to manage projects is not
to sanction deviations but to embrace
and perhaps stimulate continuous
change processes.
Schopenhauer’s argument that perception is conditioned by innate structures, and that we perhaps get a more
direct access to ‘will’ through bodily
sensations, such as emotions, has also
been supported by subsequent developments. The discovery of unconscious
sources of human behavior (Freud,
1953), some of which may be deep
structures shared across the human
species (Jung, 1965; Schein, 1985); the
mapping of cognitive functions and
subjective sensations on specific areas
and processes in the brain, nervous,
and other somatic systems (Changeux &
Dehaene, 1989; Le Doux, 1995; Cabeza
& Nyberg, 2000; Kandel, 2006); as well
as studies in evolutionary psychology
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Pinker, 1999)
all seem to support the idea that representations and emotions are the results
of the lines of force that express the
original impulse working through the
body. Rather than producing a “mirror”
or “true” representation of some external reality, evolution developed living
forms that harmonize with these lines
of force by constructing biochemical
and physiological ‘representations’ and
perceptual sensations and by triggering
actions, which, despite their seeming
irrationality, are crucial for maintaining
the relations that ensure the survival
of individuals and species (Maturana
& Varela, 1980). The implications of
these findings for project management
research and practice go well beyond
the tenets of the ‘human side of project
management’ current, which opposes a
view of project actors as malleable and
rational executants that can be managed mechanically (Block, 1983; House,
1988). While relying on psychology,
ergonomics, and political science to
suggest a more nuanced understanding
of actors, the ‘human side’ perspective
still aims to subsume any complications
to the ‘rational’ project management
view, by identifying relevant stimulusresponse regularities; and, from a cognitive perspective, by accounting for
intervening biases and distortions.
Rather, the new views, which correspond better to Schopenhauer’s ‘will,’
de-center away from humans by stressing their complex and multifaceted
material and biological roots and by
130 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
treating human and nonhuman entities
in a symmetric and inextricably related
manner (Latour, 1991).
The relevance of the ‘concept of will’
for project management is echoed by
recent trends in research and practice.
In a sense, the unpredictable and always
becoming nature of the world is already
captured by the interest in risk, in particular in unforeseen events (Floricel &
Miller, 2001; Sommer & Loch, 2004) and
complexity (Shenhar, 2001; Williams,
1999). Research on complexity in project management has taken two paths
(Geraldi, Maylor, & Williams, 2011). One
path aims to take a deeper look at the
nature of project complexity to enable
a critical reassessment of prescribed
project management methods (Whitty &
Maylor, 2009), whereas the other prefers
the more practical approach of mapping the vast diversity of factors that
increase project complexity (BoschRekveldt, Jongkind, Mooi, Bakker, &
Verbraeck, 2011). These studies can be
further divided into two strands—one
static and the other dynamic—a distinction similar to the one we made above
(Benbya & McKelvey, 2006). In terms of
substantive areas, the inquiry included
technical aspects (Kim & Wilemon,
2003; Lu & Suh, 2009) as well as the
market, social, and political environment; the networks of contractors and
stakeholders; the nature of organizations and teams, and so forth (Floricel,
Piperca, & Banik, 2011).
We believe, however, that the concept of ‘will’ can improve our understanding of the forces at work in project
management to a much larger extent
than the research on complexity has
been able to do thus far. First, it can help
us take a fresh look at the broad range of
intractable and dynamic ways in which
materiality intertwines with projects,
as suggested by researchers interested
in sociality with objects (Knorr Cetina,
1997), actor-networks (Callon, 1986),
and sociomateriality (Barad, 2003;
Orlikowski, 2007). In our own research
we repeatedly found that, despite the
availability of statistical knowledge
and advanced technical means, project
managers had to confront unforeseen
soil and weather conditions. Situations
in which the support of a bridge or the
base of a dam could not reach solid
rock because they fell on a surprisingly
deep geological deposit or even on a
tectonic fault line are common. Echoing
the occult telluric forces of Romanticism, it seems that complex projects
regularly encounter ‘black swans’ that
reveal the fragility of past statistical
knowledge (Taleb, 2007). Thus, even
more common are occurrences of biological processes that block the action
of drugs for reasons that are impossible
to predict or even understand, of unsuspected responses of living organisms
and ecosystems involved in or affected
by projects, as well as of artifacts that
stubbornly refuse to behave as designers intended. Failures during execution
and exploitation, often having severe
consequences, or even the inability
to separate and coordinate work and
traffic flows on construction sites are
other frequent examples. These situations have inspired some thinkers to
argue that a constant risk of technical catastrophes and major unintended
consequences of innovation and other
complex projects is the normal state of
affairs in modern societies (Beck, 1992;
Kenway, Bullen, & Fahey, 2006). Echoing the Romantic-era vision of a magic
underground, Perrow (1984, p. 11)
argued, after studying the Three Mile
Island accident that “socio-technical
systems have become so complicated
that we cannot anticipate all the possible interactions of the inevitable failures; we add safety devices that are
deceived or avoided or defeated by hidden paths in the system.”
Given the vast network of material
and logical interactions that constitute a
project today and the abundance of surprising events, the project management
field has started emphasizing practices
such as the gradual or iterative definition of scope and requirements (MacCormack, Verganti, & Iansiti, 2001),
the lean (just-in-time, moderately in
advance) planning of activities (Ballard
& Tommelein, 2012), and the agile or
improvisational execution (Conforto,
Salum, Amaral, da Silva, & de Almeida,
2014; Leybourne, 2009); to seek ways
to detect early warning signs of project failure (Kappelman, McKeeman,
& Zhang, 2006); and to increase the
response capacity of project organizations (Floricel, Piperca, & Banik, 2011).
Others have insisted that reducing the
chances of such events relies on the
development of network coordination capabilities (Brusoni, Prencipe, &
Pavitt, 2001) and even on a total reshaping of the institutional framework that
surrounds the development, execution,
and exploitation of projects (Leveson,
Dulac, Marais, & Carroll, 2009). Even for
projects such as software, information,
and communication systems in which
designers assume that material aspects
are under control, and only deal with
representations, such as strings of bits,
they have become concerned with the
complexity of representations themselves (Tergaden, Sheetz, & Monarchi,
1995; Katina, Keating, & Jaradat, 2014).
Experts struggle to define and quantify
the static complexity of such virtual
systems, often conceptualizing it as the
difficulty of representing system regularities in a simplified manner, along
with the computational effort required
for retrieving its form with a given
degree of precision (Kolmogorov, 1965;
Gell-Mann & Lloyd, 1996).
The concept of ‘will’ can also be
used to better understand the roles
and behaviors of human actors, going
beyond the view of selfish opportunism
‘with a guile’ (Williamson, 1981), but
still calculating and utility maximizing,
which economists propose, toward a
much broader range of rational and
non-rational behavior, driven by urges
stemming from actors’ material and
biological nature. This view can accommodate behavior affected by greed,
libido, resentment, fatigue, stress, disease, mental illness, and the use of
alcohol and drugs. Our own research on
complex projects has revealed frequent
conflicts not only with stakeholders
such as pressure groups and trade
unions, but often between participants.
These conflicts were often based on
personal animosity, sometimes led
to threats, violence, and other types
of criminal behavior, and often could
be resolved only by removing some of
those involved from the project. We
also observed how this kind of conflict was exacerbated by unexpected
problems related to project environment and artefacts. Of course this view
can also account for seemingly ‘random’ creativity, entrepreneurial brilliance, and energy as well as altruism,
solidarity, and heroism in dangerous
situations. Despite the recent importance that organization theorists are
beginning to attach to emotions (Huy,
1999), neural micro-foundations of
organizational behavior (Hodgkinson
& Healey, 2011), and even criminal
behavior (Crane, 2013), this range of
non-rational behavior is still rarely
considered in project management
research (Müller et al., 2013).
All these aspects, uncovered by
using the concept of ‘will,’ also enable
a rethinking of the impetus for initiating and carrying forward projects as
a diversity of processes conditioned
by their material substrate. This latter
condition puts human and non-human
beings as well as project artifacts and
natural surroundings on an equal epistemological footing; they all become
actors of sorts (Latour, 1991; Law, 2004).
Indeed, participants’ and stakeholders’
needs, desires, intentions, fears, urges
to act and dominate, as well as underlying natural processes in artifacts
and soil, are all expressions of ‘will’
through different vehicles. In rational
views, some of these expressions translate into goals, functions, value, or utility, whereas others are interpreted as
costs, constraints, and risks. Yet, these
translations operate on processes that
can hardly be understood and represented, such as those that work through
the body to ensure survival or those
that work in project surroundings to
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Project Management Between Will and Representation
produce earthquakes and hurricanes.
As a result, goals and value are bound
to be arbitrary in light of any representation of the world, as expressed in
such observations as “rules of morality
[...], are not conclusions of our reason,”
(Hume, 1739, p. 457), and “nothing that
ought to be can be deduced by knowing
what is” (Polanyi, 1966, p. 44, italics in
the original).
A corollary of having such a shaky
base is that goals and value assessments
by different project participants are
likely to be in conflict, even when they
are rooted in altruistic urges or when
surrogates of causal representation—
such as cultural values, social norms,
and traditions—serve as justifications
(Habermas, 1968). Conflicts force project participants and stakeholders to
change positions or induce other actors
to change theirs. Besides, while a current assessment may reflect fundamental forces and longstanding traditions,
the dynamic components of survivaloriented bodily processes constantly
react to changing stimuli. In particular,
the impetus that works through nonhuman and inanimate material substrates will produce events that will
be perceived as unexpected by project
participants (Luhmann, 1993). This will
trigger reactions in some actors, which
will change their goals and assessments of value and induce other actors
to change their desires accordingly.
Therefore, project goals or technical
specifications that “fix” these assessments of value can only be taken as
temporary representations of untamed
and poorly understood expressions of
‘will’ through subjects. This also means
that the teleological engine and the
linear unfolding patterns—implicit in
the dominant plan-then-execute paradigm for project management—are not
a valid description of project processes,
and should be replaced, perhaps by
dialectic or evolutionary engines and
by continuous becoming processes, as
well as by practices that constantly
reassess the context and participants’
goals and attempt to continually
rebuild the nexus of commitments to
the project.
The Relation Between ‘Will’ and
‘Representation’
In Schopenhauer’s view, ‘will’ and ‘representation’ are two sides of the same
coin, which amounts to an automatic
link between the two. Hence, he stresses
the importance of representations in the
form of “intuitive, immediate apprehension,” by arguing that “abstract concepts
of reason can only serve to handle what
is immediately understood [...] but never
to bring about understanding itself ”
(1966, p. 21). In turn, apprehension is
conditioned by the innate manifestations of ‘will.’ Theories of evolutionary cognition and autopoietic systems,
which we mentioned before, as well as
pragmatism (Simpson, 2009), situated
action (Suchman, 1987), and activity
theory (Leont’ev, 1978), connect ‘will’ to
‘representation’ via the argument that
the latter is oriented internally, toward
inner states and activities that ensure
the survival and maintenance of the
body or other relevant systems. This link
is supported by evidence from psychology and neurobiology research on the
importance of emotions—an expression
of ‘will’ in subjects—for regulating cognition and adaptive behavior (Zajonc,
1984; Damasio, 1989; Storbeck & Clore,
2007). Additional support comes from
the importance that scientists, including famous physicists such as Einstein
and Pauli, place on introspection when
attempting to understand the world
(Miller, 2009). Evidence even shows that
“bioregulatory signals, including those
that constitute feeling and emotion,
provide the principal guide for decisions” (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio,
2000, p. 307). This may also explain the
crucial role of volition, together with
perceptual abilities and experience, in
constructing representations of useful
artificial objects, for example, inventing
new operating principles or designing
new projects (Mitcham, 1994).
In turn, perceptual representations of the world and their cognitive
132 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
processing interact with subjects’ volition, triggering evaluative and emotional
reactions, and sometimes becoming
an impetus for action, such as initiating a project. Externalized representations become objects in the world
and have a similar effect by interacting
with subjects’ perceptual and understanding abilities. For example, the fact
that subjects have a visceral reaction
to certain types of material stimuli is
well known and exploited by marketing experts (Zaltman & Coulter, 1995),
but subjects also appear to evaluate
emotionally abstract representations,
such as expected values and probability distributions. Hence, in decision
experiments, subjects express inordinate preference for alternatives that
are certain or for menus of alternatives
with known probability distributions,
as opposed to more uncertain distributions (Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961).
Shifting a representation of prospective
action outcomes from an achievement
that falls short of the subject’s aspirations to a possible demise of the subject
is accompanied by an emotional shift
“between hope and fear” (Lopes, 1987).
In addition, studies of managerial decision making in natural settings show
that subjects react to risk as they react
to dangers; they do not engage in calculations of variance and probabilities
and focus only on the extreme values of
the outcome, rather than the entire distribution (Shapira, 1995; MacCrimmon
& Wehrung, 1986). The project management domain is just starting to pay
attention to this interaction in order
to identify the kinds of representations
that can be used to introduce a project to stakeholders and to structure
public hearings and decisional debates
(Lehmann & Motulsky, 2013).
As a consequence of (1) the constructed nature of representations
about the project, its context and its viability and the additional construction
and possible manipulation involved in
the production of external representations; (2) the unstable expressions of
‘will’ in human and nonhuman actors;
and, (3) the many possible interactions
between representations and expressions of ‘will,’ such as goals and perceptions of value, projects are not likely to
converge toward a static equilibrium of
actors’ positions, as assumed implicitly
by rational theories, but will advance
through a constant repositioning and
rebuilding process. We argue, however,
that visibility in the social arena stabilizes some project representational
elements. Such elements include both
input assumptions and output representations, such as studies, designs,
plans, and contracts, which are available to most participants, as well as initial positions and, especially, resulting
commitments, which were made public
and are considered to be the tamed
or regulated aspect of the participant’s
volition. Because these elements result
from lengthy discussions and negotiations and changing them sends strong
signals about the respective actors and
interferes with implementation activities, elements in the social arena are
likely to remain stable for a certain
time. Though, behind this screen of
stability participants’ representations
and expressions of will are constantly
shifting and the accumulated tensions
are always ready to disrupt the apparent
stability. As a result, outside observers
will likely perceive the redefinitions that
take place in planning as a punctuated
equilibrium process.
Instead of Conclusions:
If Schopenhauer Were a
Project Manager Today ...
Some may perceive the preceding discussion as a call for returning to old
romantic myths about the world and
importing them into project management. However, we hope that the arguments we provide suggest quite the
contrary, namely taking a more lucid
look at the reality of project management, one that is informed by the latest discoveries in a whole range of
sciences—from physics and biology to
social sciences—and includes a much
broader range of relevant aspects. In the
process, it may well become evident that,
in fact, the current rational-normative
approaches to project management are
based on no more than a myth (Meyer &
Rowan, 1977). We used Schopenhauer’s
discussion of the world as ‘will’ and ‘representation’ as the kernel that not only
enabled us to articulate all these discoveries in an integrated and parsimonious framework, but also to rebalance
what we saw as an excess of attention to
cognitive and representational aspects
at the expense of material and volitional aspects. In more concrete terms,
we believe that this framework enables
reconsidering various aspects of project
management from new perspectives.
First, this framework allows for
rethinking project organizations in a
way that includes a much broader range
of ways in which people are connected,
by including not only rules, charts,
and plans, or routines and interaction
scripts, but also physical attraction,
repulsion, threats, and force. These
ways to connect would also emphasize material objects, from forms to be
filled out and information systems that
embody power differentials through
pre-set access rights; to surveillance
systems, alleys, walls, and fences that
constrain, warn, or isolate people; and
tools that embody past experience and
convey it across time and space.
Second, the framework enables a
rethinking of the role of representations, in particular of those on external
supports, in their various hypostases:
from project ‘translations’ that convince and ‘attract’ actors to projects,
securing convergence and commitment, inspiring and guiding action; to
distorted constructions that mislead
and cause problems; and to artefacts
that can be manipulated for illicit gain
and used for window-dressing to fend
off surveillance. From this perspective,
planning can no longer be viewed as
the construction of an objective and
integrated, albeit evolving, representation of the future project. Instead, it is
a distributed process of bricolage that
struggles to accommodate opposing
interests, conflicting institutional logics,
and disparate sensemaking strands, to
create some sort of assemblage, often
from accidental, marginal and reused
components, and to hold it together by
way of narratives and rhetoric (Baker &
Nelson, 2005; Suddaby & Greenwood,
2005; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Weick,
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005).
Third, this framework argues squarely
that project participants are biological
and material beings, evolving in a material world that acts in ways that cannot be
totally understood, and that conditions
their urges, perceptions, and cognitions
in significant yet not completely tractable ways. This would perhaps enable
the inclusion of a much broader array
of desires, behaviors, and actions in the
range of the normal (which does not
mean that all of them are condoned), and
hence develop theories that enable managers to better prepare for their occurrence rather than relegating them to the
category of problems and unexpected
events. This would also call for considering multiple levels at which the various
aspects of the world interact with and
condition each other.
Fourth, this framework suggests
that our thinking of projects should be
much more dynamic, in fact, extremely
dynamic. As mentioned above, projects
are a more or less connected nexus of
processes, in which a variety of manifestations of ‘will’ connect and collide in
multiple ways. Stabilizing elements are
scant, and over-enforcing them is probably counterproductive, as constantly
shifting stimuli and volitions may cause
the outburst of accumulating tensions.
Projects are thus better seen as continually changing or becoming. Some
groups of representations and associated manipulations and rhetoric may
play a temporary stabilizing role, which
would enable advances in planning and
execution in ways that are somewhat
under control. But such representations
more likely amount to ill-assembled
rafts floating on the agitated sea of ‘will.’
As a consequence, our vision of project
management should shift from that of
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Project Management Between Will and Representation
maintaining a straight line—like a liner
would do on an ocean by correcting
deviations from the preset trajectory—
toward one of a collective struggle of
maintaining convergence and advancement, while dealing with representational inconsistencies and aberrations,
as well as with the constant shifts and
conflicts in the manifold manifestations
of ‘will.’
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Project Management Between Will and Representation
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Serghei Floricel is a Professor at the University
of Quebec in Montreal, Canada, where he teaches
138 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
project feasibility and innovation project management. His research focuses on the planning and
organizing of complex projects and innovation
processes. He has published in, among others,
International Journal of Project Management, R&D
Management, Research-Technology Management,
International Journal of Innovation Management, and
Academy of Management Best Papers Proceedings.
He is the lead author of two monographs published by the Project Management Institute (PMI):
“Increasing Project Flexibility” and “Refining the
Knowledge Production Plan,” and co-author of The
Strategic Management of Large Engineering Projects
(MIT Press, 2001). He was Research Director for
the Managing Innovation in the New Economy
(MINE) program, and Principal Investigator for five
other research projects. He holds a PhD in Business
Administration and an MBA from the University
of Quebec in Montreal, and a bachelor’s degree
in engineering from the Faculty of Technological
Equipment, Technical University of Civil Engineering
of Bucharest, Romania. He can be contacted at
[email protected]
Sorin Piperca is a PhD candidate in Business
Administration at the University of Quebec in
Montreal, Canada. His research focuses on structuring processes, project management, and interorganizational collaborations. He co-authored one
monograph published by the Project Management
Institute (PMI) and various other books, book
chapters, and articles. He has also presented papers
in many prestigious conferences, including those
organized by the Academy of Management (AoM),
European Group for Organizational Studies (EGOS),
and European Academy of Management (EURAM).
He holds a master’s degree in Quality Management
and a bachelor’s degree in Management in Electrical
Engineerering from the University “Politehnica”
of Bucharest, Romania. He also holds a bachelor’s
degree in sociology from the University of Bucharest,
Romania. He can be contacted at piperca.sorin_
[email protected]
PAPERS
The Open Secret of Values:
The Roles of Values and Axiology
in Project Research
Thomas Biedenbach, Umeå School of Business and Economics, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden
Mattias Jacobsson, Umeå School of Business and Economics, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden
ABSTRACT ■
The purpose of this article is to explore the
roles and potential benefits of axiology and
value theory in project research. This is done
through (1) an exploration of the essentials
of axiology and value theory; (2) a review
focused on how values have been used in
project research; and (3) a reflection based
on the historical–logical development of—
and paradigmatic influences on—projects
and their management. It is concluded that
project research would benefit from a more
encompassing philosophical treatment of
axiology beyond merely acknowledging values as a thematic concept or as part of a
project management methodology.
KEYWORDS: epistemology; ontology;
value theory; axiology; paradigm
Introduction
A
central question throughout human history has been: What is
actually desirable and/or good? The hedonist response would
probably be ‘pleasure’; the pragmatist would be ‘solving the
problem’; and the followers of Immanuel Kant, something along
the line of ‘a good will.’ But what is, or has been, perceived as desirable and
‘good’ in project research? And is it fruitful, or even possible, to consider
such question(s) beyond the mere quality of the production of research
itself? Also, would there be benefits from more encompassing treatment and
understanding of values and value theory in project research? In this article
we will explore these and other related issues in our quest to take stock of the
roles of values and axiology in the field of project research.
Considering the research on projects as one broad field, it is clear that
development over the last decades has brought about ever-increasing methodological, epistemological, and ontological variations (Smyth & Morris, 2007;
Biedenbach & Müller, 2011; Bredillet, 2010), as well as extensive diversity in
both the rationale and types of empirical phenomena under study (Morris,
2010; Jacobsson & Söderholm, 2011; Söderlund, 2011). It is also well known
that the existing knowledge base has been co-developed through concurrent insights from academics, consultants, practitioners, and strong professional associations (Turner, Pinter, & Bredillet, 2011). These influences, taken
together, have created a pluralistic and strong field where various scientific
approaches are both infused into the bulk of knowledge and represented in a
variety of publications, which arguably illustrates the vibrancy and increasing
maturity of the field (Söderlund, 2011). Despite this, in many ways striking
progression, axiology, value theory, and the role values play in research, are
rarely explicitly addressed, even if scholars have recognized the roles philosophy of science, in general, play in project research (see, e.g., Mingers, 2003;
Gauthier & Ika, 2012). A more general and indirect recognition of values has
nevertheless been visible through recent contributions in the Special Issue on
Ethics in Project Management (International Journal of Managing Projects in
Business, Vol. 7, Issue 4), and through research on sustainability and projects
(see, e.g., Abidin & Pasquire, 2007; Edum-Fotwe & Price, 2009). Still, based on
the lack of explicit focus on value-related issues,1 following the contemporary
societal development in which both policymakers and organizations alike are
increasingly concerned with values for educating an ethical and sustainable
responsible workforce, here we attempt to take stock of the current treatment
of values and axiology in the field of project research. Ultimately, the purpose
Project Management Journal, Vol. 47, No. 3, 139–155
© 2016 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
1For
some notable exceptions see Helgadóttir, 2008; Corvellec & Macheridis, 2010; Bredillet, Tywoniak, Dwivedula, 2015.
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 139
PAPERS
The Open Secret of Values: The Roles of Values and Axiology in Project Research
is to explore the role and potential benefits of axiology and value theory in project research. We hereby hope to spur a
well-needed discussion with regard to
the future of project management and
the role of the philosophy of sciences
within the project research field.
In our article we combine a review
with a conceptual approach to achieve
this quest in three interrelated steps.
As a starting point we will outline some
essentials of the philosophy of science,
axiology, and value theory as it has been
conceptualized by both researchers in
other fields and by philosophers with
an interest in value theory per se. Thereafter, we will undertake a review of the
project research field, with a focus on
how values have been used in a broad
sense. As a third step, complementing
the review, we will provide a short historical–logical overview, outlining the
premodern–, modern–, postmodern–,
and hypermodern project management
perspectives (Gauthier & Ika, 2012),
and juxtapose these with various value
approaches. Through these three steps,
we provide a multidimensional snapshot of the current state of the field
with regard to how values are (and
have been) used and not used. Taken
together, we not only report on the state
of the field but also show how values—
despite what is sometimes claimed—are
already implicitly present as a part of,
for example, the underlying philosophical assumptions and discuss the consequences thereof. We conclude that
being more explicit about values and
what is valued by researchers, is important for the development of the field,
because it is based on and takes pride
in, the diverse sources of contribution,
all implicitly instilled in various value
types. A central argument of philosophical relevance here is the closeness to
practitioners and the often-present consequentialist rationale, where claims of
‘good’ or ‘bad’ in research outcomes
implicitly have a bearing on what ought
to be (or not be) done in practice.
Without the proper understanding and
reflection (from the researchers’ points
of view) of values and why something
is valued positively or not, the practical implications given could just as
well encourage malpractice as desired
practice. We end with a reflection and a
few suggestions for how future studies
might be able to incorporate axiology in
general and value theory, specifically,
for the generation of promising new
research endeavors and debates encompassing philosophy in project research.
The Philosophy of Science
The philosophy of science, or research
philosophy, refers to the belief system
and basic assumptions that serve as the
underpinning in the creation of knowledge (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill,
2016). In essence, it involves all steps
and considerations that researchers
make when developing new insights
within a particular field of research.
Philosophy of science thus comprises
conscious and unconscious assumptions and considerations, regarding the
nature of reality (ontology), the creation of knowledge and understanding (epistemology), as well as the role
of values and their influences on the
knowledge creation process (axiology).
In practice, such philosophical attention is of central importance to both the
research process and implications of
all scientific inquiry, since the quality
of research comes from the reflective
relationship between the researchers’
philosophical positioning and how the
research is undertaken (Alvesson &
Sköldberg, 2009). Central to philosophy
of science—even if often disregarded—
we thus have the core concepts of this
article; in other words, axiology and
value theory.
Axiology and Value Theory
The word ‘axiology’ originates from
two Greek roots, axios and logos—
axios bearing the meaning of ‘worth’
or ‘value’ and logos the meaning of
‘logic’ or ‘theory.’ Combined, we have
the notion of ‘a theory of value.’ The use
of the term first appeared in research in
the beginning of the twentieth century
140 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
(Hart, 1971), but as exemplified in the
initial vignette of this article, the underlying questions addressed are as old as
mankind. Or, as eloquently put by Hart
(1971, p. 29): “the notions of good and
bad, right and wrong, beautiful and
ugly are as old as the real and apparent.” The emergence of the term ‘axiology’ thus represents an attempt to bring
together, and critically examine, a wide
variety of already existing and overlapping questions related to the essence
of goodness, right conduct, value, and
obligation (Hiles, 2008). In other words,
axiology addresses questions related to
what is valued and considered to be
desirable or ‘good’ for humans and society. In this article, some of these ideas
and concepts are applied to the project
research domain.
There are of course many ways to
approach and understand values, but
given the limitations of this research
article we can explore only a few of them
(for the interested reader, see, for example, Allchin, 1998 or Edwards, 2014, for
more extensive discussions on various
approaches). One often used classification is outlined by Rescher (1969), who
divides values into eight basic types:
material and physical value; economic
value; moral value; social value; political value; aesthetic value; religious
value; and intellectual value. Even if this
categorization provides a good empirical overview of what is in various ways
valued in society, it does not help us to
determine what (for example) different
values have in common. A way to do
this, however, would be to distinguish
between what is intrinsic and instrumental good—‘intrinsic’ meaning good
due to the nature, the latter referring to
effective means to attain the intrinsic
goods (Pojman & Fieser, 2011). Similar distinctions between intrinsic and
instrumental values have been around
since the time of Aristotle and Plato.
Often used and building on this classical
categorization of ‘good,’ Hartman (1961,
1962, 1967; Mueller, 1969) argued for
three axiological dimensions: intrinsic,
extrinsic, and systemic values. Each of
these dimensions represents not only a
different type of value, but also different
ways to value something. In our assessment of the world (where for us, science
is a central part), Hartman (1967) argues
that humans value everything in accordance to one, or a combination, of these
three dimensions; consequently, they
overlap with the empirically closer categories used by Rescher (1969). Before
delving into how values have been used
in project research, and discussing the
consequences thereof, a further exploration of the three different value types
is in order, starting with intrinsic value.
Intrinsic Value
Intrinsic value is to be defined as the
actual or pure value of something. It is
often described as the value an object
(someone or something) has “in itself ”
or “in its own right”—whether it be an
experience, a person, an act, or nature.
Intrinsic value is consequently not
derived from, or related to, the fulfillment of certain criteria or concepts,
but rather it is universal; therefore, it
is closely related to moral/value absolutism (as opposed to moral or value
relativism), in the sense that value is
inherent in the ‘something’ and not
only a result of cultures or perspectives
(Hartman, 2014). In the case of humans,
intrinsic value consequently arises from
the essence and integral totality of all
personal attributes, namely the value of
the character or personality. The goodness of a person, in terms of intrinsic
value, is thus not based on a membership to a certain class of group.
Exemplifying with research on for
example environmental sustainability,
it is often stressed that nature has an
intrinsic value. That is, value beyond
being an economic resource, a basis
for economic growth, or even potentially providing an opportunity for ecotourism (O’Neill, 1992; Zimmerman,
2001). Nature consequently has a value
“in itself,” compared to, for example,
money. Most people would still agree
that money is valuable, but only few
would say that money is intrinsically
good; rather, money is supposed to
be good because it may lead to other
good things. Going back to the ‘hedonist’ example in the introduction of
this article, a hedonist would consider
‘pleasure’ as something of intrinsic
value, but having a lot of money may
still be important for the hedonist, as
it can be used as a means to generate
pleasure and happiness.
Extrinsic Value
The easiest way to describe “extrinsic
value” is that it is value that is not intrinsic. It is consequently not the value
an object (someone or something) has
“in itself,” “for its own sake,” or “in its
own right,” but rather for the sake of
something else to which it is related
to—as for example money and pleasure.
Anything of extrinsic value is therefore,
according to Hartman, (2014, p. 14)
“ . . . not supposed to be good in itself but
in its function”.
Hartman (2014) further describes
extrinsic values in terms of ‘extensional
goodness’ (i.e., that goodness arises
from an extension of a certain concept),
referring to something outside such as
the relation between ‘the thing’ and
the class/category. Something being
of extrinsic value thus requires that it
belongs to a certain class or category
(Hartman, 2014). In this respect, the
extrinsic value of something is connected to the functionality it has in a
specific context, or expectations related
to the association of belonging to a
certain class or category. This is not to
say that something with an extrinsic
value cannot have an intrinsic value.
Returning to the example of humans:
their extrinsic value—or lack of value—
would be due to their function as, for
example, a teacher, project manager,
or politician and their contributions
to something (or someone) else. Here,
often-discussed issues with the notion
of extrinsic value are the questions:
(1) What sort of relation must exist
between the intrinsic and extrinsic?
And (2) How close does this relation
between the two need to be?
Following up on these issues, one
could say that intrinsic value comes
first, before extrinsic value, because
in order for extrinsic value to make
sense, intrinsic value needs to be taken
into consideration (Hartman, 2014).
This does not mean that one value type
determines the other, because being, for
example, a (good) person, and being a
‘valued function in a system’ are different things. Something can therefore be
extrinsically valuable, but not intrinsically or vice versa. In terms of projects,
someone can consequently be a good
person but a bad project manager, or
a ‘bad’ person but still a good project
manager.
Systemic Value
Beyond intrinsic and extrinsic values,
there is also a logical or systemic value
(Hartman, 2014). According to Hartman
(1961, p. 391), a systemic value is “the
formal pattern of systemic valuation”;
meaning that, for something to have
such a value it has to follow (or fulfill)
the logical structure set up for that specific ‘something.’ There is consequently
no room for degrees of value, but rather
it affirms to a digital understanding—
either belonging (i.e., being valued), or
not belonging (i.e., not being valued).
Because the systemic valued ‘something’ is purely made up by its own
characteristics, the ‘something’ cannot
fail to have a systemic value as long as it
is what it is (Edwards, 2014).
Hartman (1961) argues that all valuation of this kind reduces the valued
‘something’ to an element in a system
and exemplifies it with a marriage in a
specific legal system—either two individuals are legally married, or they are
not. There is no in-between, and it all
depends on the fulfillment of the specific criteria within that specific logical
structure. Being legally married in ‘a
specific system,’ however, should not
be confused with any type of marriage
(or relationship), because each empirical phenomenon has overlapping systems. Hartman (1961, p. 392) states:
“ . . . any ordinary empirical thing, event
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The Open Secret of Values: The Roles of Values and Axiology in Project Research
or situation has its systemic counterpart
with which it must not be confused.” The
‘systemic value’ is consequently closer
related to moral- or value relativism,
because the assessment is based on an
outside and manmade system, which is
culturally dependent. What is valued,
or not valued, consequently changes
depending on the specific system.
Research Approach
Having presented some basics of value
theory and outlined the three axiological dimensions of value (Hartman
1961, 1962, 1967, 2014), as the next
step, we will assess the use of value(s),
and value-related concepts, in the field
of project research. Similar to Turner
et al., (2011) and Cameron, Sankaran,
& Scales, (2015) we have reviewed the
three main journals that have an explicit
focus on project research, as well as two
more recent (project-oriented) journals to gain a comprehensive overview
of the contemporary field. Even if the
review is structured and methodical in
its approach, it should be acknowledged
that it is not conducted as ‘a systematic
review’ in the strict sense (cf. Tranfield,
Denyer, & Smart, 2003). The journals
included in the review (in alphabetical
order) are:
• IEEE Transactions on Engineering
Management (IEEE-TEM),
• International Journal of Managing
Projects in Business (IJMPB),
• International Journal of Project Management (IJPM),
• International Journal of Project Organisation and Management (IJPOM), and
• Project Management Journal® (PMJ).
With the review not being systematic in the strict sense, we have thus
thoroughly described the review process and the steps undertaken. The
review and analysis are based on all
publications from each journal, which
were available online as digital copy, up
until May 2015: IEEE-TEM = 52 years,
IJMPB = 7 years, IJPM = 32 years, IJPOM
= 7 years, and PMJ = 18 years, for a
total of 116 volumes. In order to establish a comprehensive overview of how
value(s), directly or indirectly, has(have)
been used in published papers, a total
of 33 search terms have been iteratively
generated based on: (1) an assessment
of existing conceptualizations of axiology and value theory (see e.g., Hartman,
1967; Hart, 1971; Mingers, 2003; Olson,
2005); (2) by reading value related
research in the field (see e.g., Helgadóttir, 2008; Corvellec & Macheridis, 2010;
Bredillet et al., 2015); and (3) by including additional search terms that emerge
from search hits as suitable concepts.
The complete list of search terms used
in our review is presented in alphabetical order in Table 1.
Furthermore, in line with Cameron
et al. (2015), the review was conducted
primarily using the publisher’s search
engines for each specific journal, which
are: IEEE Xplore for IEEE-TEM articles
since its first issue under the new name
in 1963 (Vol. 10, Issue 1) until 2015
(Vol. 62, Issue 2); Science Direct for IJPM
articles from 1983 (Vol. 1, Issue 1) until
2015 (Vol. 33, Issue 5); EBSCO using
Business Source Premier for PMJ articles from 1997 (Vol. 28, Issue 2) until
2015 (Vol. 46, Issue 2); Emerald Insight
for IJMPB articles since its foundation in
2008 (Vol. 1, Issue 1) until 2015 (Vol. 8,
Issue 3); and Inderscience Search for
IJPOM articles since its foundation in
2008 (Vol. 1, Issue 1) until 2015 (Vol. 7,
Issue 2). The decision of which search
engines to use for the review was determined by the following criteria: first,
to maximize the searchable range of
publications throughout the years, and
second, the search functionality. It was
unfortunately not possible to use the
same search engine (such as EBSCO)
across all journals without strongly
limiting the years of publications (e.g.,
from 1994 onward instead of 1963 for
IEEE-TEM). However, EBSCO was the
preferred search engine for PMJ (compared with the publisher’s own search
engine), because of the limited access
through our university library (Wiley
Online has only been accessible since
2007). Overall, the search functionalities are still comparable; thus, a wider
range of publication years was judged
as more important for the purpose of
conducting a simple but extensive content search within article titles, keywords, and abstracts over the years.
With the focus on the key sections of
the articles, we ensure getting hits only
where the value-related search terms
are a dominating theme. In contrast,
with a full text search we would also
get hits when the term is only occasionally used, which would require specific
consideration.
Looking at the search terms presented in Table 1 more closely, there
Search Terms
Axiological
Evaluating
Net present value
Axiology
[…] Evaluation
PERT
Earned quality method
Extrinsic motivation
[environmental] sustainability
Earned value analysis
Extrinsic reward
[environmentally] sustainable […]
Earned value management
Extrinsic value
Systemic value
Earned value methodology
Instrumental value
[…] Value […]
Ethic
Intrinsic motivation
Value analysis
[…] Ethics
Intrinsic reward
Value creation
Ethical […]
Intrinsic value
Value outcome
Ethical value
Moral […]
Value theory
Evaluate
Morality
Valuing
Table 1: Review search terms.
142 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
are three issues that should be noted.
First, as indicated by “[ . . . ],” some of
the search terms can come in many different combinations and specifications.
Rather than searching for all different
varieties, we focus on the search terms
of the compound noun that relates to
the value terminology (i.e., instead of,
for example, searching for “business
ethics” and “industry ethics,” we search
for “ethics”). Second, there is a certain overlap between the basic forms
of some words, for example “value,”
which is included in many specific
search terms, such as “value analysis.”
In Table 2, however, we present the hits
for the particular search term, despite
the mentioned irregularities. Later on,
we will aggregate these into a number
of different categories, where value will
be an overarching aggregate across the
different categories. Third, some search
words may have various meanings
depending on the context, for example:
“sustainability” where environmental
sustainability relates to values, whereas
a sustained or sustainable performance
does not. Therefore, only articles that
address environmental sustainability
were counted for the frequencies.
When running the different queries
we have consistently used the same
procedure for specifying the resulting frequencies. In the initial step, we
selected the particular journal and a
certain time period; then we entered a
search term and searched for hits, first
within the article’s title, then within its
keywords; and last, within its abstract.
In the second step we evaluated the
resulting number of hits for their appropriateness and excluded, for example,
book reviews, corrections to published
articles, calls for papers, and editorials,
which were not counted for the frequencies. Articles in press were also not
included because they are not indexed
in the same way as the other articles,
and our aim was to limit our review
to publications up to May 2015. When
an article indicated additional relevant
search terms that were not among our
initial search terms, in an additional
step, we added those terms in order to
gain a more comprehensive overview of
the project field. In a final and concluding step, we inductively categorized the
results into five distinct value categories:
where value is used within the research
process, as a thematic concept, according to value theory, as an outcome, or as
project management methodology. The
five categories consequently represent
different ways in which values are used
within published research.
The aggregated categories have
enabled us to explain how values are
treated in published research over the
years on a distinct but aggregated level.
For mapping the treatment of values
over time, we have broken down the
years between 1963 and 2015 into three
periods. The distinction of the time
periods is based on the emergence of
research streams that have had a major
impact on the project field with new
perspectives. First, in 1995, the conceptualization of projects as temporary
organizations (Lundin & Söderholm,
1995; Packendorff, 1995; Hällgren
et al., 2012); and, second, the initiative
of critical project management studies
and rethinking effort in 2006 (Cicmil,
Williams, Thomas, & Hodgson, 2006;
Hodgson & Cicmil 2006), which both
have had distinctive influences on the
field (Jacobsson, Lundin, & Söderholm,
2015, 2016). Therefore, those years have
been used for establishing the three different time periods with the emergence
of new value-related perspectives.
A Review of the Assessment
of Value in Project Studies
An overview of the total frequencies on
the different search terms across the different journals is presented in Table 2.
Value is highlighted as a separate row,
and can be seen as a key aggregate
due to its overlap with search terms
across several value categories. This
table only visualizes the search terms
that have received hits in the article
title/keywords/abstract query; hence,
from the 33 search terms in Table 1
only 29 search terms remain in Table 2.
The search terms that did not provide
any hits were axiology, value theory,
extrinsic value, and systemic value. Note,
that the table just shows the frequencies
of the queries within the article section
separately. Thus, 1/1/1 on a search term
could mean that it was one article that
included the term in the title, keywords,
as well as in the abstract, but it could
also be—although less likely—that the
term was used in two or even three
articles, each contributing to either the
title, keyword, or abstract count.
Furthermore, the search terms are
inductively grouped together in the
five value categories; after each set of
search terms, we present the totals per
journal for each value category. The
content and implications of these categories will be discussed later. For better
readability, 0/0/0 is replaced by a dash
(–) in the table. In two of the journals
some queries are impossible to specify
and thus marked NA. In IJMPB, the
articles include a structured abstract
that contains a section on originality/
value; therefore, each article receives a
hit in the “value” query, and the efforts
in gaining a specific number by going
through each abstract manually are
not within a reasonable scope for a
simple but comprehensive review. In
IJPOM, the Inderscience Search features do not allow any queries within
article abstracts; however, a full text
search has been conducted in order
to conclude from the abstracts when
possible. Papers that have received too
many hits in the full text search (i.e.,
value [128 hits], evaluating [44 hits],
and evaluation [99 hits]) are designated
with NA for the same practical reasons
as those in the IJMPB.
Throughout the reviews of all five
journals, we found only one article that
explicitly addresses the terms axiological, intrinsic value, ethical value, value
outcome, earned quality method, and
earned value methodology. Whereas
other search terms are present, although
with varying emphases, across all journals, including ethics, evaluating, evaluation, earned value management, PERT,
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The Open Secret of Values: The Roles of Values and Axiology in Project Research
Search Terms and Hits
(Title/Keywords/Abstract)
IEEE-TEM
1963–2015
IJPM
1983–2015
PMJ
1997–2015
IJMPB
2008–2015
IJPOM
2008–2015
Axiological
–
–
–
0/0/1
–
Total research process
–
–
–
0/0/1
–
[…] Value […]
35/13/162
50/71/221
25/24/59
4/6/NA
3/4/NA
Ethic
0/0/1
0/1/3
–
–
–
[…] ethics
0/1/1
2/7/10
4/4/5
1/4/3
0/1/1
Ethical […]
2/1/3
6/4/8
0/1/6
3/1/4
–
Evaluate
1/0/65
1/1/108
0/0/15
1/0/14
–
Evaluating
17/0/58
16/0/47
3/0/5
2/0/3
2/0/NA
[…] evaluation
54/12/142
51/59/139
9/8/18
4/12/16
3/9/NA
Extrinsic motivation
–
0/1/1
0/1/1
–
0/0/1
Extrinsic reward
0/0/1
–
1/0/1
–
–
Intrinsic motivation
0/0/1
–
0/1/1
0/0/1
–
Intrinsic reward
0/0/2
–
1/0/1
–
–
Moral […]
0/1/1
1/0/3
–
0/1/5
–
Morality
1/1/1
0/0/1
–
–
–
[environmental] sustainability
4/6/4
2/5/3
1/2/1
2/0/0
–
[environmentally] sustainable […]
4/2/7
2/3/6
1/0/2
3/3/5
–
Valuing
1/0/1
0/0/1
0/0/1
–
–
Total thematic concept
84/24/288
81/81/330
20/17/57
16/21/51
5/10/2
Ethical value
1/1/1
–
–
–
–
Instrumental value
0/0/1
–
0/0/1
–
–
Intrinsic value
0/0/1
–
–
–
–
Total value theory
1/1/3
–
0/0/1
–
–
Value analysis
2/0/0
0/2/2
–
0/1/0
0/0/1
Value creation
0/0/4
4/3/11
1/0/1
0/1/1
–
Value outcome
–
–
–
0/0/1
–
Total value outcome
2/0/4
4/5/13
1/0/1
0/2/2
0/0/1
Earned quality method
1/0/1
–
–
–
–
Earned value analysis
–
0/1/3
–
–
0/1/1
Earned value management
0/1/3
3/8/12
3/2/4
1/0/2
2/2/1
Earned value methodology
–
0/0/1
–
–
–
Net present value
1/0/4
1/2/9
1/2/2
–
0/0/1
PERT
11/2/19
8/15/27
2/3/3
1/0/1
2/3/3
Total project management
methodology
13/3/27
12/26/52
6/7/9
2/0/3
4/6/6
Table 2: Frequencies by search terms.
144 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
and of course, value representing the
aggregated key concept.
Apart from the general observation
that ‘value and value-related terms’ are
only rarely used a number of initial ‘general’ observations can be made from
this part of the review. First, it can easily
be concluded that some of the journals
seem to be more open to value topics
(here IJPM stands out), whereas other
journals do not seem to have values as
a regular topic of inquiry (for example,
IJPOM). Within IJPM’s journal aims and
scope, the description of three exemplified covered topics—namely, project
evaluation, quality assurance, and motivation and incentives—may contribute
to the large number of value-related
articles. In contrast, IJPOM’s journal
scope does not provide any particular explanation for the low numbers of
value-related articles despite presenting a vast number of covered topics.
Reflecting a bit further on the journals
presented in Table 2, it also becomes
evident that IEEE-TEM has the broadest
coverage of value-related terms and categories of all the reviewed journals. PMJ
seems to address value mostly as a value
aggregate, whereas IJMPB is a promising
young journal that already contributes
to various value categories, except for
the value theory category. Furthermore,
IJPOM is a new journal, which thus
far has emphasized contributing to the
thematic concept and project management methodology categories. Another
general observation that can be made is
that the basis value theory/axiological
categories (previously presented in this
article) are rarely used. In addition, axiology/axiological as a concept is almost
never used (see the exception of one
article using axiological in IJMPB). One
plausible explanation is that this terminology is also fairly new in general
management even if the notion and
discussion of the consequences thereof
are prospering.
To move beyond these initial and ‘general’ observations we have inductively,
based on the way that value and valueassociated concepts are used, clustered
the search terms into five categories (see
Table 3). These categories are: (1) articles
in which value terms appear as a part of
the research process; (2) articles in which
value (and value-related concepts) are
used in a thematic way; (3) articles that
have used value theory as a basis or as a
part of the analysis; (4) articles in which
value is treated as an outcome; and (5)
articles in which value is part of the project management methodology.
These categories are developed
mainly for two reasons. First, through
the categories we are able to schematically track the advance of various valuerelated aspects over time, and second,
we are able to discuss the results of
the review on a more aggregated level,
rather than solely focusing on each
term. Even if a discussion/review of
each search term might have been possible (given that it would have been the
entire focus of this article), we believe
that the understanding would have
become very scattered and not have
provided a better understanding of the
role of values per se. We also want to
stress that the categories should not be
interpreted as ‘schools’ or ‘structured
streams of research’ with similar goals,
but rather as areas in which project
studies seem to have—or potentially
have—an overlapping interest, or utilize similar inquiries related to values
(i.e., the categories represent common
ways that value and value-related concepts have been used).
Before we discuss the content and
describe the evolution of each category, a few restrictive circumstances
need to be highlighted. Concerning the
review, it is important to note that IJPM
has increased its issue numbers over
the years included in the review—from
four issues (until 1994) to six issues
(1995–2000) and eight issues after 2001
through 2015. The frequencies, therefore, must be put in relation to the
total number of papers published during each time period. Also, the number
of available or reviewed journals per
time period and year range differ; in
the first period of 31 years, two journals
were included; in the second period
of 11 years it was three journals; and
the third period comprised of approximately 9.5 years, with all five journals
included. Despite this, and compared
with the first time period before 1995,
ethics and values became a regular
debate. In terms of project management
methodology, both PERT and earned
value management, have a long history,
but play a lesser role than the thematic
concepts relating to value, ethics, and
sustainability. Within each value category we have identified the dominating
search term that has received the most
hits across all journals, commented on
terms that are rarely used, and reflected
on the sum of each category across the
different journals.
Value in the Research Process
The first category consists, as mentioned, of the papers in which value
terms appear as parts of the research
process. In this category we searched
for axiology-related terms that describe
the role values play in the research process. When looking at the frequencies it
becomes obvious that, overall, researchers are silent about axiology. The
‘research process’ category is only represented by one single article in IJMPB,
in which the concept axiological has
been used. However, within our review
we can only spot papers that explicitly refer to axiology as a philosophical term, whereas implicitly reflections
and statements are impossible to spot
with the design we have chosen for the
review. The very limited presence might
thus also, to some extent, be explained
by the fact that the research approach
described in abstracts avoids description of the philosophical underpinnings
and that findings are summarized without their philosophical frame. By that,
it could be argued that our findings are
constrained in their interpretive power.
Value as a Thematic Concept
The second category contains papers
in which value (and value-related
concepts) is used in a thematic way.
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Looking at the results of the review,
we identify evaluation as the dominating search term within the thematic
concept category. What is surprising is
that despite the current and upcoming
societal debates on ethics, morals, and
sustainability, these concepts/areas are
not represented in high frequencies in
the review. Among these three areas,
environmental sustainability is the
most commonly used area. The different journals seem to complement each
other in the thematic category, where
gaps on search terms within one journal
are filled by one or more other journals.
Overall, this is the value category that
is the most widely represented in published research and also visible through
the large number of partly inductively
emerging search terms. The total within
the thematic concept category is dominated by IEEE-TEM and IJPM, which
both largely contribute with high frequencies; this strong dominance can
however not be explained purely by
the largest number of volumes in the
review. From a philosophical perspective, the selection of one value concept
over the other or a specific definition of a
value concept makes a difference. Such
choices are influenced by the researchers’ situatedness in a certain research
community and previous experiences
in the project field. Questions such as,
‘Is there a common understanding of
a value theme?’ or ‘Is the way of applying value concepts rather fragmented
across the project domain?’ are thus
philosophically relevant issues for the
project field to address.
Value Theory
The third category of studies we have
identified covers papers that have used
value theory as a basis or as a part of the
analysis. This category is thus strongly
influential for the study findings because
it applies a certain value perspective.
It is a way to infuse value theory to
the core of a study, which means that
value becomes emphasized throughout the study, reaching a philosophical
relevance for interpretation. Our review
clearly shows that value-related terms
are hardly used in any articles across
the journals. This observation is underlined further by the fact that three out of
the four search terms without any hits
were from the value theory category. In
this category, we only received very few
hits overall and there is no search term
that really sticks out. The total in the
value theory category is only sourced
with papers primarily from IEEE-TEM
and one hit from PMJ on the subject of
instrumental value.
Value Outcome
The fourth category consists of the
papers in which value is treated as an
outcome. This group is represented by
three search terms that capture articles
on a project’s value creation and its
analysis. Value creation has been the
most frequently used term in this value
outcome category although, compared
with other value categories, it is still
rarely used. Although value creation has
been a theme in four of five journals,
our review indicates that it has received
the most attention in IJPM publications as presented in the row on the
total of value outcome. IJMPB, although
being a young journal, contributes with
comparable frequencies compared with
the long-established IEEE-TEM, which
adds only a few hits in relation to the
range of publication years. Emphasizing
value outcomes is a direct way to show
the relevance and contribution of the
project field. Thus, showing the value
of project management in a transparent and reflective way also requires a
good understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of what we accept
as indicators of “favorable,” “good,” or
“valuable” outcomes.
Values in Project Management
Methodology
The fifth and final category is the one
in which values are a central part of
the project management methodology;
examples thereof are the commonly
used concepts of net present value,
earned value management, and PERT.
146 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
At the same time, these were the most
frequently used terms within the project
management methodology category,
with PERT clearly dominating in its frequency. Earned value management and
PERT affirm this observation by having
hits across all five journals. The search
terms with lower hits in this category
are often related to the three most common terms. For example, earned value
methodology and earned value analysis
are closely related to the established
notion of earned value management.
The inclusion of such related search
terms arises from inductively adding
search terms, where unless a query has
been conducted, it cannot be known
how common or uncommon they are
in advance. The totals of the category
‘project management methodology’
(see Table 2) highlight the main contributors of IEEE-TEM and IJPM and also
show that in IJPOM, as a young journal,
there seems to be an ongoing debate.
IJPOM shows similar frequencies compared with the long established PMJ,
thus indicating that in value-related
terms, IJPOM papers emphasize rather
practical methodologies rather than
value theories. Furthermore, the selection of the project management methodology has a philosophical dimension
to it. Depending on the researcher’s
standpoint or dominating position of
the project community concerning
scheduling, controlling, or risk management, a certain methodology is followed
in the study. The selection of one framework over the other is in its essence
a philosophical choice although it is
hardly discussed or reflected upon.
The choice of a particular methodology
represents one perspective on project
management, which emphasizes certain elements and fits to certain project
contexts while leaving out the “reality”
beyond those assumptions.
Value Categories Over Time
Having looked at the frequencies
of search terms across the different
journals (Table 2) and provided shorter
reflections on these results, now we take
Frequency in
Title/Keywords/Abstract
Period 1
1963–1994
Period 2
1995–2005
Period 3
2006–2015
TOTAL
1963–2015
[…] Value […]
13/3/65
29/24/120
75/91/257
117/118/442
Value in the research process
0/0/0
0/0/0
0/0/1
0/0/1
Value as a thematic concept
48/11/185
48/29/188
110/113/355
206/153/728
Value theory
0/0/2
0/0/0
1/1/2
1/1/4
Value outcome
2/0/0
0/1/1
5/6/20
7/7/21
Value in project management methodology
13/3/28
12/17/28
12/22/41
37/42/97
Table 3: Treatment of values over time.
a look at the treatment of values over
time. Hereby, we group the total frequencies for the different time periods
by including the publications from the
available journals within the particular
time period (see Table 3).
The row on value represents a category in itself because it overlaps across
the five different categories. Nevertheless, as the key concept it provides us
with valuable insights on an aggregated
level and shows that there is such a
strong increase in the publications
using the value term within the third
period (2006–2015) that cannot be fully
explained with the number of journals
available. From this observation, it can
be argued that there seems to be an
ongoing general trend toward more
value-related articles.
There are three value categories that
specifically characterize the treatment
of values over time. First, concerning
the category of value as a thematic concept, there seems to be a continuous
trend toward increasingly using such
topics in research. Although periods
one and two are comparable in absolute
numbers, the second period contains
much fewer journal volumes, whereas
the third period shows a strong increase
even when considering the number of
journals. Second, value in project management methodology has been rather
stable in absolute numbers. Even when
considering the availability of journals
and papers throughout the three time
periods, it seems that the number of
articles per year has increased from
period one to two and thereafter has
stabilized at a certain level, indicating
that it is an ongoing common topic
within project research. Value outcome
is the third category in which we can
observe trends over time. Although
value outcome is rarely used, there
seems to be an emergence in the third
period, whereas in earlier periods it was
hardly addressed at all.
As observed in Table 3, the use of
value (and value concepts) as a part of
both the research process and basis on
value theory is close to non-existing;
during the third time period (2006–
2015), however, there are a few exceptions. This observed plausible lack of
treatment needs further exploration
before any clear conclusions can be
drawn.
Paradigmatic and Historical
Influences on Values
Based on the three initially presented
value dimensions (Hartman, 1961, 1962,
1967, 2014), the next step in our quest
to take stock of values is to explore the
above identified ‘lack of treatment,’ and
thus if the identified categories in some
way (on a more aggregated level) are
reflected in the historical development
of—or perspectives on—projects and
their management.
Even if most historical descriptions
of projects take their starting points
from the U.S. military industry complex prior to (and around) World War
II, some attempts have been made to
go even further back in time. Because
we are interested in the characteristics of and values embodied in the
understanding of projects, we have chosen to follow the proposed categorization by Gauthier and Ika (2012) into four
historical perspectives of premodern-,
modern-, postmodern-, and hypermodern project management. It should be
noted, however, that there have been
many other attempts to outline the history and development or parts thereof
(see, e.g., Engwall, 1995, 2012; Pinney,
2002; Geraldi & Lechter, 2012), but none
of these provides such an interrelated
and focused discussion on ontological
and epistemological issues as Gauthier
and Ika (2012). To further extend the
historical–logical analysis, we have
opted to also utilize the revised conceptualization of research paradigms,
provided by Lincoln, Lynham, and Guba
(2011). Following the extensive critique
by Heron and Reason (1997), the notion
of axiology and the role of value were
recently added to the often-used overview (Lincoln et al., 2011) and consequently overlap with the subject of this
article. With our extension, we are thus
able to provide a more complete characterization of the modernity perspectives
in terms of the philosophies in project
management.
Values in the Premodern Perspective of
Projects and Their Management
The first historical phase outlined by
Gauthier and Ika (2012, p. 12) is the socalled ‘premodern perspective on projects,’ where the project is seen as, and
represented by, “a creation of human
beings that serves gods and, as such,
deserves the respect of human beings”.
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The Open Secret of Values: The Roles of Values and Axiology in Project Research
This perspective on projects is furthermore characterized by the management
of projects being an activity “. . . that
follows the laws of gods,” which Gauthier
and Ika (2012) explain with a project, at
that time, not being designed to serve
progress as today, but rather honor certain goods such as, for example, the
erections of temples. The project manager figure, from this perspective, is
described as a priest.
Given the description by Gauthier
and Ika (2012), projects from the ‘premodern perspective’ clearly represent
something intrinsically good because
the management of projects was not an
issue per se, but rather the focus was
on the universal fulfillment of societal
needs. With projects being an activity “. . . that follows the laws of gods,”
both the outcome and the project per
se would thus be good “in itself ” and
“in its own right.” From such a perspective, it was thus the sole outcome
that was counted. Even if this perspective predates the structured research on
projects, one could argue that the role
(and view) related to value were intrinsic; still, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to draw any conclusion regarding the
major paradigmatic influences or ontological orientation of this era.
Values in the Modern Perspective of
Projects and Their Management
The second phase presented by Gauthier and Ika (2012, p. 12) is the so-called
‘modern perspective on projects.’ From
this perspective it is suggested that the
project is to be seen as “. . . a temporary endeavor undertaken to create
a unique product and service and is
designed to serve progress.” Project management is furthermore acknowledged
as a “. . . technocratic, instrumentalist, and rationalist approach” following
the tradition of the scientific management. It is furthermore described that
it is central to “capitalism, industrialism, and military growth” and the
management aims to provide controllability. From the ‘modern perspective
on projects’ the project manager figure
is portrayed as an architect (Gauthier &
Ika, 2012, p. 12).
Following the arguments by Lincoln et al. (2011), the technocratic and
rationalist approach put forward by
Gauthier and Ika (2012), characterizing
the ‘modern perspective on projects,’ is
closely related to a positivist, or postpositivistic, perspective that primarily
employs an extrinsic understanding of
values. As initially described, following
the need of belonging to a certain class
or category, extrinsic values are connected to a specific functionality, which
is in line with a rationalist approach. In
the research process, value influences
are mostly denied, but as highlighted
by Hiles (2008, p. 55) when values are
considered from such a perspective, it
is often relying on “ethical codes, ethics
committees, and the accepted standards
of good practice.” The strong reliance
on “standards of good practices” is also
visible in a lot of the prospering literature from the 1980s and beginning
of the 1990s. Project outcomes were,
for example, often solely evaluated in
a systemic way, meaning a valuation
based purely on a few characteristics;
either the project met the characteristics set up and was a success, or it
didn’t meet the characteristics and
was a failure. Such instrumental and
dichotomous understanding was one
of the many critiques that served as
the basis for the new type of project
research that came out of the Scandinavian countries with a start in the
mid-1990s (Packendorff, 1995; Hällgren,
Jacobsson, & Söderholm, 2012). Following Lincoln et al. (2011), the major ontological orientation of this perspective
would also be a ‘being ontology’ that is
external from cognition.
Values in the Postmodern Perspective of
Projects and Their Management
The third phase outlined by Gauthier
and Ika (2012, p. 12) is the so-called
‘postmodern perspective,’ in which “. . .
the project is a discourse of legitimation,
and an arena of social and power plays;
it serves the interests of the powerful
148 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
stakeholders.” In this phase, project
management is “neither a practice nor
a tool but a rallying rhetoric in a context
of power play, domination, and control.”
According to Gauthier and Ika (2012,
p. 12) there is thus no good or bad forms
of project management, “. . . because
uncontrollability, absence of meaning,
multiplicity, ambivalence, and fragmentation/pluralism characterize project
management.” Instead of the project
manager figure being a priest or an
architect—as represented in the previous two examples—here it is a “rhetor”
(Gauthier & Ika, 2012, p. 12).
In the transition from a modern to
a postmodern perspective of projects
and their management, Pollack (2007)
found that research had incrementally
shifted direction from a predominance
of hard (operations) issues investigating
critical success factors, to softer (behavioral) issues, such as human resource
management (Bredin & Söderlund,
2006), project teams (Chiocchio &
Hobbs, 2014; Shelley & Maqsood, 2014),
and relational coordination (Jacobsson,
2011). Interesting to note in the conceptualization by Gauthier and Ika (2012,
p. 12) is that they state that projects—
from a postmodern perspective—are
“neither a practice nor a tool.”
Following the arguments by Given
(2008, p. 55), researchers with a postmodern perspective on p
­ rojects—where
the major paradigmatic influences would
be critical theory and c­ onstructivism—
would thus “. . . accept the established
codes of ethically sound practice but goes
farther by striving toward a transparency
of values [. . .] and also applies a “process
ethics” to the forms of knowing that the
specific context of the inquiry requires.”
This means that a postmodern perspective on projects adheres to values being
of systemic character, which could further be exemplified by the discourses
and pluralism from the making projects
critical movement, which takes a wider
stand and integrates scientific inquiries
to being an element in a system. This
broader, or more inclusive, perspective
on projects also seems to be well ­covered
with the thematic concept category (see
Tables 2 and 3), and its search terms on
ethics, moral, sustainability, reward, and
motivation. The major ontological orientation would thus also be a becoming
ontology, cognitive, and hermeneutic
(cf. Lincoln et al., 2011), in which the
understanding of values in the research
process is included and formative.
Values in the Hypermodern Perspective
of Projects and Their Management
The fourth and final phase described
by Gauthier and Ika (2012) is the socalled ‘hypermodern perspective,’ in
which “the project is a network of actors
embedded in a social context and in
constant transformation.” The project
is considered as a work in progress and
the “project management is a reflexive
practice.” From a hypermodern perspective, the project manager figure is no
longer a rhetor but instead described
as a reflexive agent (Gauthier & Ika,
2012, p. 12).
Assessing the conceptualization
of the hypermodern perspective, it
mainly corresponds to values being
understood as logical, systemic, and
formative in their character. The major
paradigmatic influences would thus
also be critical theory and participatory
approaches, with project management
not only being considered a “reflexive
practice,” but also the project figure as a
reflexive agent. With the hypermodern
society (and by that, the hypermodern
perspective of projects and their management), building on the notion of
society as a network of reflexive individuals (Gauthier & Ika, 2012), an extrinsic
understanding of values might come
into play, because reflexivity needs
consideration in relation to the functionality in a specific system. For the
hypermodern perspective to really take
off, there would thus be (as we believe)
a need to bring in more value theory
and develop a better understanding of
the role of value in the research process
in order to be reflexive within the wider
system.
As discussed above and summarized in Table 4, each of the perspectives on projects and their management
also encompass some major paradigmatic influences, specific ontological
orientations, and thereof axiological
configurations (Gauthier & Ika, 2012;
Lincoln et al., 2011). Based on Lincoln
et al. (2011) and their comparison of
the basic beliefs of different paradigms
(i.e., positivism, post-positivism, critical theory, constructivism, and participatory approaches), we have also
attempted to assess the interrelated
treatment of values, which varies from
‘intrinsic’ in the premodern perspective; via ‘extrinsic, with value influences denied in the research process’
in the modern perspective; to being
‘systemic, included, and formative’ on
the postmodern perspective. In terms
of the hypermodern perspective, the
treatment of values is somewhat in
the future, but following Lincoln et al.
(2011), it would seem to be central to
the quest and formative.
Discussion: The Roles of
Values in Project Research
Bringing together the results from
our reading of the axiology and value
theory literature, with our review, and
the more qualitative historical–logical
assessment of research paradigms and
value influences, we have—beyond the
already presented value categories as
shown in Table 3—been able to outline
a framework consisting of four different
Premodern
Perspective
Modern
Perspective
Postmodern
Perspective
Hypermodern
Perspective
Project metaphor
(Gauthier & Ika, 2012, p. 12)
“… a creation of human
beings that serves gods
and, as such, deserves the
respect of human beings”
“… a temporary endeavor
undertaken to create a
unique product and service
and is designed to serve
progress”
“… a discourse of
legitimation, and an
arena of social and
power plays; it serves
the interests of the
powerful stakeholders”
“… a network of actors
embedded in a social
context and in constant
transformation. The project is
a work in progress”
Project management figure
(Gauthier & Ika, 2012, p. 12)
Priest
Architect
Rhetor
Practitioner as a reflexive
agent
Major paradigmatic influences N/A
Positivism and postpositivism
Critical theory and
constructivism
Critical theory and
Participatory approaches
Ontological orientation
N/A
Being ontology, external
from cognition
Becoming ontology,
cognitive and
hermeneutic
A practice or becoming
ontology, cognitive
Axiology (nature, and role of
value)
Intrinsic
Extrinsic, and value
influences in process
denied
Systemic, included and
formative
Both systemic and extrinsic,
central to the quest and
formative
Table 4: Foundations and roles of values in projects over time.
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ways in which ‘values’ and (project)
research intersect:
1. First, we can observe an intersection
where values are present through the
focus of the scientific inquiry itself,
both in terms of values (a valuerelated terminology) being a ‘thematic concept,’ and a part of ‘project
management methodology.’
This type of influence is clearly identifiable in the review (see Tables 2 and 3)
and probably also the most easily recognized, least questioned, type of value
intersection within project research.
Looking closely at the review, it is also
clear that this type of value intersection is well represented both in terms of
absolute numbers and frequency over
time. It also, to a large extent, represents
an externalized treatment of values
present in all the historical perspectives (Gauthier & Ika, 2012) where, for
example, influences from value assessments in economic theory are observable. It should be noted that the use of
values in this first type of intersection,
however, does not say anything about
the research process or the mindset of
the researcher, apart from an (probable) interest in the assessed terminology such as ‘earned value management,’
‘value outcome,’ or lately ‘ethics.’
Moving beyond this type of externalized treatment, one could argue
that researchers should not focus on
the type of ‘subjective questions’ that a
more engaged treatment would imply.
Following the classical ideals central
to the ‘modern perspective of projects
and their management’ (Gauthier & Ika,
2012), researchers are taught that science should be objective and valuefree, and researchers should act in a
rational and unbiased way (Lincoln
et al., 2011). But the true existence of
totally value-free, or value neutral science is, according to Hiles (2008, p. 53)
“little better than a myth.” The reason,
he argues, is that research is always
based on a wide variety of choices and
assumptions, which inevitably are value
based. We can exemplify this by looking at the starting point of this article.
Our basic assumption has been that
axiology and value theory are important for project research (otherwise we
would not have explored this issue);
we have chosen to limit the review to
five peer-review journals based on our
understanding of publication history
in relation to the audience (the latter
of which we have no control over); we
assume that the future readers of this
article are somewhat familiar with the
premises of project research (but we
don’t know this for certain); and we
have chosen to follow the arguments by
Mingers (2003) insomuch as the writing
of this article has been undertaken from
a pluralistic perspective—consequently
adhering to the assumption (and belief )
that pluralism extends not only to
ontology, epistemology, methodology,
but also to axiology. A different set of
researchers would probably have valued other aspects and made different
choices; hence, we thus adhere to the
argument that values are a central part
of the scientific inquiry per se.
2. The second type of intersection is
therefore represented by the type of
‘personal’ values that—consciously or
unconsciously—guide the individual
researcher in the research process.
This type of intersection is thus
broader than the first type and manifests itself in, for example: the choice of
research problem, choice of theoretical
framework, choice of data-gathering,
and choice of data-analytic method
(Hartman 1961, 1962, 1967; Lincoln
et al., 2011, p. 116). This is also reflected
in what is seen as important, who is to
‘benefit’ from a study, and what type of
value is added to the existing knowledge
base (see, e.g., Mingers, 2003, for further
discussion).
Looking at the review, it can be
concluded, however, that an explicit
treatment of this type of value (i.e., ‘values in the research process’ and ‘value
theory’) is almost non-existent. Despite
150 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
not being recognized (or at least not
explicitly discussed or mentioned) in
the abstracts, the fact that values feed
into the inquiry process is consequently
neither a new observation, nor limited to project research. Paraphrasing
Hiles (2008, p. 53), as scientific inquiry
leads to knowledge; knowledge, in turn,
leads to the imposition of some type of
ordering in the world. This ‘ordering’
consequently involves issues of value.2
Statements along the line of ‘science
is objective, values are not’ may offer
comfort to some scientists who want to
see themselves detached from questions
such as the role of values in research (cf.
Table 4, “nature and role of value in positivism and post-positivism”). However,
it can be concluded that such statements
do not reflect the existing pluralism
in contemporary project research and
is neither central to the postmodernnor the hypermodern perspective of
project management (Gauthier & Ika,
2012). Important to note in this regard
is also that the selected method implicitly brings out certain aspects of the
world, whereas other interpretations
or characteristics are simultaneously
put into the shadows. As stressed by
Mingers (2003, p. 562), this does not
necessarily imply that the existence of
other interpretations, characteristics, or
dimensions are denied, but rather “the
method simply makes no reference to
them.” With the observed lack of explicit
treatment in the reviewed literature,
one might rhetorically ask: What else is
still hiding in the shadows?
3. Third, we can observe an intersection
related to the types of values (and
value propositions) that emerge as a
result of the scientific inquiry and—
often in a dutiful way—are redistributed into society through, for example,
managerial and policy implications.
2Verbatim: “Moreover, inquiry leads to knowledge, and
knowledge leads to the imposition of some type of order or
structure on the world—and this always involves issues of
value” (Hiles, 2008, p. 53).
This third type of intersection is
not easily traced in its conceptual use,
and thus rarely acknowledged as values
per se, but rather seems to be central
to the raison d’être of the project field.
However, it reflects in some sense, the
paradigmatic influences of the modern perspective on projects, where the
project is considered as “. . . a temporary endeavor undertaken to create
a unique product and service and is
designed to serve progress” (Gauthier &
Ika, 2012, p. 12). Thus, with a focus on
the creation of “a unique product and
service” it clearly entails an emphasis on
material, physical, and economic value
(Rescher, 1969), rather than, for example, social or environmental values (Silvius & Schipper, 2014). The value of the
research from ‘a modern perspective
on projects’ is given by the project as
such—the creation of a unique product
or service.
Connected to this observation and
taking into consideration the historical roots of project management—and
thereby the closeness to practitioners—
there often seems to be a consequentialist rationale (or logic) in project
research. This logic means that research
results are transformed in a ‘value independent’ way into managerial implications, in which ‘good’ or ‘bad’ implicitly
have a bearing on what ought to be done
(or not done) in practice. In a sense, this
might be a reflection of the strong positivism and post-positivism influences
in the modern perspective (Gauthier &
Ika, 2012), with a priori given parameters of what a good project is. Here,
the role of time becomes an important parameter, where short-, medium-,
and long-term orientations (of project
objectives and outcomes) emerge as
important queries in relation to what
is to be valued as an outcome. Potentially, this is reflected in the growth
of for example environmental sustainability, which often brings about such a
perspective (Silvius & Schipper, 2014).
Consequently, this third type of intersection is also related to the former
second type, because the question of
what the outcome is, is related to who
is to ‘benefit’ from it—both important
philosophical questions that researchers need to seriously consider in their
research.
4. Fourth and final, drawing on the
paradigmatic influences (Lincoln
et al., 2011; Heron & Reason, 2007)
and the historical–logical development (Gauthier & Ika, 2012), we can
further conclude that values intersect
with projects in the form of ‘epistemic
values.’
This type of value intersection is
inherent in the research paradigms
that different perspectives and traditions convey and researchers adhere to
(see Table 4). Epistemic values are thus
related to the two previously described
intersections, but exist on a more aggregated level with reference to researchers’ embeddedness in a certain research
community. Looking at the review, it
can be concluded that an axiological
discussion reflecting this situatedness is
non-existent (at least under the assessed
terminology). The paradigmatic influences on epistemic values can however
be broadly captured with the question
of: What type of research is to be, or has
been valued? This is a question where
the answer is of a systemic character
rather than an extrinsic (or intrinsic)
one and is also dependent on the power
and competing worldviews or ‘paradigms.’ From an historical point of view
(Packendorff, 1995; Söderlund, 2004;
Pollack, 2007; Gauthier & Ika, 2012),
we can observe a collision between (at
least) two value systems—an economics
and engineering (as the application of
systemic and extrinsic value to things)
and an organizational behavior/sociology (as the application of extrinsic value
to humans and society). Reflecting on
the hypermodern perspective of projects and their management, yet another
collision might be heading toward the
project research community in the near
future. With projects (from a hypermodern perspective) being considered
based on their systemic character, the
phenomena would thus be connected
to the functionality it is supposed to
have in a specific context (Hartman,
2014). Consequently, projects need to
be considered in their extended context,
also taking long-term goals and consequences into consideration—potentially
also questioning the raison d’être.
It should be noted that all research
involves a great variety of epistemic values indirectly influencing the research
practice. As stressed by Allchin (1998),
this isn’t all bad because it also helps
in governing the productions of knowledge through, for example, regulating
research quality.
Conclusions
The rationale for this article was based
on the need to take stock of values
and axiology in project research.
Following—among others—the contemporary societal development in
which policymakers and organizations
alike are increasingly concerned with
values for educating an ethical and
responsible workforce, the purpose was
to explore the role and potential benefits
of axiology and value theory in project
research. This quest was approached
in three interrelated steps. First, we
outlined the essentials of axiology and
value theory. Second, we undertook a
review with a focus on how values—in
a broad sense—have been used in project research. Third, we juxtaposed the
premodern-, modern-, postmodern-,
and hypermodern project management
perspectives—as representations of the
field development along with the various value approaches. Through these
steps we have attempted to both outline
the current use of values and value
concepts in project research, and discuss the more implicit, less tangible and
holistic role of values.
From the study, we can first and
foremost conclude that value(s), and
value-related concepts are clearly present in the form of thematic concepts
and project management methodology;
however, axiology, value theory, and the
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role values play in research, are rarely
discussed even if scholars have recognized their importance and potential to
enrich research. Furthermore, projects
are not (from either a modern-, postmodern-, or hypermodern perspective)
viewed as having intrinsic value even if
project researchers sometimes tend to
treat projects as a phenomenon that is
‘good’ in its own right.
Based on these initial observations, and following other researchers’ observations of the importance to
also acknowledge the less tangible role
of values (see, e.g., Heron & Reason,
2007; Lincoln et al., 2011; Gauthier &
Ika, 2012; Hartman, 2014), we outlined
a framework of four different ways in
which values intersect with project
research: (1) an intersection where
values are present through the focus
of the scientific inquiry itself; (2) an
intersection represented by the type of
‘personal’ values that guide the individual researcher in the research process; (3) an intersection related to the
type of value propositions that emerges
also as a result of the scientific inquiry;
and (4) an intersection in the form of
‘epistemic values’ inherited in different
research paradigms. When reflecting on
these four intersections, it is obvious
that they all (in different ways) have a
clear impact on the research process
and outcome, and thus calls for philosophical considerations. From the perspective of the individual researcher,
the intersections thus imply consideration of the following questions:
• In what context is the research situated
(paradigmatic influences)?
• What are the philosophical values chosen and why (guiding the inquiry)?
• Why is a specific inquiry chosen (focus
of research)? and,
• Which claims are made (and suggestions to practitioners)?
At the core of these intersections consequently lies the importance of value reflexivity and value
consideration.
Thus, it is clear that values—despite
what is sometimes claimed—are constantly present through researchers’
underlying assumptions and choices of
topics. Here it is important to point out
that our main argument with regard
to these intersections is not that there
is a problem with researchers making
choices and having assumptions, per se,
but rather that a problem arises when
researchers are ignorant to the consequences thereof. Or, in an unreflective way take their assumptions—and
thereby their values—for granted. Following Lincoln et al. (2011), we therefore
propose that a sufficient understanding
and reflection on axiology and values is
equally as important for the outcome
as for the understanding and reflection
on methodological-, ontological- and
epistemological issues—upon which
importance most researchers agree. If
researchers would be more explicit in
describing their philosophical/axiological standpoints, it would also allow the
project research community to take part
in philosophical debates that may challenge assumptions that remain unquestioned and are taken for granted. We
conclude that being more explicit about
values is important, as the field is both
based on and takes its pride in the
diverse sources of contribution. A central argument to bring forward here is
the closeness to practitioners and the
often-present consequentialist rationale
among researchers, in which claims of
‘good’ or ‘bad’ implicitly have a bearing on what ought to be done (or not
done) in practice. The question: “Good
for what?” consequently becomes relevant. Or as Heron and Reason (1997,
p. 277) write: “. . . the axiological question asks what is intrinsically valuable
in human life, in particular what sort of
knowledge, if any, is intrinsically valuable”—following this, we suggest that
researchers interested in projects bring
this question to the top of their agendas.
Moving beyond the individual
researcher, it is thus possible to argue
that axiology per se, is the lens needed
to understand projects on an in-depth
152 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
level. Following the call for this Special
Issue, where it was stated that: “we must
first care for the perspective/philosophy
from which projects are seen and analyzed in academia,” it is clear that axiology is one important dimension to it.
The general understanding of axiology
and value theory also provides the basis
for the scientific community to be able
to address and discuss core philosophical questions, such as: What should be
or ought to be the purpose of managing
projects? What are the moral-, social-,
economical rights and obligations of
the project manager, project sponsors,
or other stakeholders? Without a proper
understanding of values and why something is valued, these questions are
impossible to address. Consequently,
there is an abundance of unanswered
questions—both on an individual and
collective level—to which axiology and
value theory can be used when trying
to answer. In order to propel the field of
project research forward, we therefore
suggest that axiology should be established as a central theme in both teaching and research. This would not only
enable the evolution of project management research and practice, but also
provide an opportunity to strengthen
the legitimacy of the research field as
such.
To summarize, our contribution
with this article is threefold. First, we
provided a basic understanding of
how values are used within the project research field and the roles they
play in research’s philosophical underpinning. Second, we made an initial
attempt to establish a framework in
relations to which the value of projects
and project research can be discussed.
Third, we provided suggestions for
how both individual researchers and
the research community can progress
via (among others) enabling reflexivity and philosophical reflections
in a more fundamental way. Using
the words of Bredillet, Tywoniak and
Dwivedula (2015, p. 10): “The knower
and the known always relate to each
other.”
Limitations and Future Directions
Similar to most articles, this one also
has limitations that favourably can be
recognized and addressed in future
studies. First, with our article building
on a simple but comprehensive review
of articles published in five journals
between 1963 and 2015, it is constrained
by the fact that we have only assessed
the key sections of the articles (i.e.,
titles, keywords, and abstracts) for queries with value-related terms. Although
this approach is appropriate in order to
cover articles with value-related terms
as a central theme, it can’t capture the
implicit treatment and meaning of values and its related concepts. Further
research could preferably be designed
as an in-depth content analysis of one of
the major project management journals
to differentiate between the implicit
and explicit use of values in contemporary project research; or, address
which value concepts are favored and/
or neglected in project management
methodologies, and explain why that is.
Second, when conducting our review,
we also used a list of search terms we
identified as being at the core of capturing the axiology and value-relevant
concepts in project research. Rather
than using an excessive and ‘complete’
list containing all possible search terms
and overlapping combinations thereof,
our intention was to capture the field’s
pluralism by including all the publications from the five main project management journals and use its results for
our analysis and conceptual reflection.
Further research could thus also conduct, for example, an in-depth analysis
of the specific search terms in a specific
journal.
References
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Allchin, D. (1998). Values in science and
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Alvesson, M., & Sköldberg, K. (2009).
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Biedenbach, T., & Müller, R. (2011).
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Bredillet, C. N. (2010). Blowing hot and
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Bredillet, C., Tywoniak, S., & Dwivedula,
R. (2015). What is a good project
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Bredillet, C., Tywoniak, S., & Dwivedula,
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Bredin, K., & Söderlund, J. (2006).
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Cameron, R., Sankaran, S., & Scales,
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Hodgson, D. (2006). Rethinking project
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June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 153
PAPERS
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Söderholm, A. (2016). Towards a
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Olson, J. (2005). Axiological investigations. PhD thesis. Department of
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154 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
Shelley, A. W. & Maqsood, T. (2014).
Metaphor as a means to constructively
influence behavioural interactions in
project teams. International Journal
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Silvius, A. J., & Schipper, R. P., (2014).
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Smyth, H. J., & Morris, P. W. (2007). An
epistemological evaluation of research
into projects and their management:
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423–436.
Söderlund, J. (2004). On the broadening scope of the research on
projects: A review and a model for
analysis. International Journal of Project
Management, 22(8), 655–667.
Söderlund, J. (2011). Pluralism in project
management: Navigating the crossroads
of specialization and fragmentation.
International Journal of Management
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Tranfield, D. R., Denyer, D., & Smart,
P. (2003). Towards a methodology for
developing evidence-informed management knowledge by means of systematic
review. British Journal of Management,
14(3), 207–222.
Turner, J. R., Pinto, J. K., & Bredillet,
C. N. (2011). The evolution of project
management research. In P. W. Morris,
J. K. Pinto, & J. Söderlund (Eds.) (2011).
The Oxford handbook of project management. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford
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Zimmerman, M. J. (2001). The nature of
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Thomas Biedenbach, PhD, is an Assistant
Professor at Umeå School of Business and
Economics, Umeå University, Sweden. His research
interests focus on projects and temporary forms of
organizing, capability-based organization studies,
and research methodology. He has published his
work in journals, including the Project Management
Journal ®, the International Journal of Project
Management, and the International Journal of
Managing Projects in Business. Recently, he
contributed with a chapter on the paradigm as a
steering mechanism for new research endeavors to
the edited book, Designs, Methods and Practices
for Research of Project Management published by
Gower. He can be contacted at thomas.biedenbach@
usbe.umu.se
Mattias Jacobsson, PhD, is an Associate
Professor at Umeå School of Business and
Economics, Umeå University, Sweden. His main
research interest is in projects, practice, and
temporary organizations and, on dual occasions, he
was a prizewinner at the Emerald Literati Network
Awards for Excellence. His work has been published
in journals, including Management Decision,
Project Management Journal ®, Services Marketing
Quarterly, the International Journal of Managing
Projects in Business, and Construction Management
and Economics. He can be contacted at mattias
[email protected]
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 155
June 2016
Coming Events Calendar
JUNE
10 June
PMI Michigan Huron Valley Chapter
Professional Development Day Ann
Arbor, Michigan, USA. This year’s
theme is “From Good Project Manager to Great Leader.” Join our educational workshop to earn 7 PDUs. Our
featured speaker is David Barrett from
the Schulich School of Business, York
University in Toronto. pmi-hvc.org.
22–25 June
PMI Mexico Chapter PMTOUR Mexico
2016 Mexico City, Mexico. The event
will feature four full days with keynote
speakers, conferences, workshops, training sessions, vendors and networking
opportunities. Day one will feature workshop sessions, training and a free beginners’ conference; days two and three are
highlighted with keynote speakers and
paper presentations. The fourth day is
PMTOUR Kids, with a workshop for children and keynote speakers about PMIEF.
pmichapters-mexico.org/PMTOUR.
AUGUST
6 August
PMI Central Mississippi Chapter
Central Mississippi Professional
Development Day Jackson, Mississippi, USA. The theme for the event
is “Everything is a Project,” as there
are individuals who lead or manage
things, yet are never called project
managers. This event is designed to
develop a way of thinking and a structure that makes it easier to advance
decisions and increase the likelihood
for success. It will also provide continuing education for certified project
managers. The day features more than
10 speakers representing the public
and private sectors. pmicms.org.
30 August–1 September
PMI Ghana Chapter 2016 PMI Africa
Conference Accra, Ghana. The second PMI Africa Conference will focus
on achieving greater business results
through project management. More
than 700 delegates are expected
from all over Africa and the world.
Come join attendees from industry,
government and academia who are
determined to advance Africa as an
emerging global economy through
project deliveries and initiatives.
pmiafricaconference.com.
SEPTEMBER
8 September
PMI Honolulu, Hawaii Chapter Professional Development Day Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. Themed “Rock the
PMI Talent Triangle ,” tracks will be
organized by leadership, strategic
and business management, technical
project management, business analysis and career development. Featured
keynote speakers are Jeff Tobe, M.Ed.,
CSP, on “Coloring Outside the Lines,”
and Andy Crowe, PMP, PgMP, on
“Managing Your Own Talent.” sites.
g o o g le.c om/a/pmihnl.org/p dd/
home/2016pdd.
™
10 September
PMI Orange County Chapter Building Leaders for Business Anaheim,
Project Management Journal, Vol. 47, No. 3
© 2016 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ
156 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
California, USA. PMI Orange County
Chapter presents its 2016 conference,
“Building Leaders for Business.” This
event will expose, inform, educate and
bring together practitioners to learn
about PMI Talent Triangle -aligned
topics. pmi-oc.org/conference.
™
Upcoming PMI® Global
Congresses and Events
PMI® Global Congress 2016—North
America San Diego, California, USA •
25–27 September 2016 • congresses
.pmi.org/northamerica2016
SeminarsWorld® Events
Leading subject matter experts share
their experience and deep knowledge on a variety of emerging topics.
Whether you are looking to build your
leadership skills, work on soft skills
such as communications and collaboration, or delve deeper into agile,
these events provide unique opportunities to learn and connect with the
project management community.
DateLocation
27–30 JuneMega SeminarsWorld
Orlando, Florida,
USA
18–21 JulyPortland, Oregon,
USA
8–11 AugustBaltimore, Maryland,
USA
Learn more about SeminarsWorld
courses being held in these locations
and throughout the world. Use PMI’s
search tool for project management
training matched to your specific
needs. Visit learning.PMI.org.
Project Management Journal ®
Author Guidelines
Project Management Journal® publishes research relevant
to researchers, reflective practitioners, and organizations
from the project, program, and portfolio management
fields. Project Management Journal® seeks papers that are
of interest to a broad audience.
Due to the integrative and interdisciplinary nature of
these fields, Project Management Journal® publishes the
best papers from a number of other disciplines, including,
but not limited to, organizational behavior and theory,
strategic management, marketing, accounting, finance,
operations research, technology and innovation management, entrepreneurship, economics, political science, history, sociology, psychology, information science, decision
science, systems theory, and communication theory.
Project Management Journal® publishes qualitative
papers as well as quantitative works and purely conceptual or theoretical papers, including diverse research
methods and approaches. Our aim is to integrate the various types of project, program, and portfolio management
research.
Project Management Journal® neither approves nor
disapproves, nor does it guarantee the validity or accuracy of any data, claim, opinion, or conclusion presented
in either editorial content, articles, From the Editor, or
advertisements.
Project Management Journal® is a journal to disseminate and discuss project management research. It is not
a platform to discuss the content or quality of PMI standards, credentials, or certifications, and those of other
standard-setting organizations.
Authors’ Guidelines
Papers published in Project Management Journal® must
relate to research and provide new contributions to project
management theory and/or project management practices. Each paper should contain clear research questions,
which the author should be able to state in one paragraph. Authors are expected to describe the knowledge
and foundations underlying their research approach, and
theoretical concepts that give meaning to data or to proposed decision support methods, and to demonstrate how
they are relevant to organizations in the realm of project
management. Papers that speculate beyond current thinking are more desirable than papers that use tried-and-true
methods to study routine problems, or papers motivated
strictly by data collection and analysis.
Authors should strive to be original, insightful, and
theoretically bold; demonstration of a significant valueadded advance to the understanding of an issue or topic
is crucial to acceptance for publication. Multiple-study
papers that feature diverse methodological approaches
may be more likely to make such contributions.
Authors should make contributions of specialized
research to project, program, and portfolio ­management
theory and to the theory of the project-oriented
­organization or project network. They should define any
specialized terms and analytic techniques used. Papers
should be well argued and well written, avoiding jargon
at all times. Project Management Journal® does not prefer
subjects of study, as long as they are in the project, program, or portfolio management field, or in the field of the
project-oriented organization or project network, nor do
we attach a greater significance to one methodological
style than another does.
Avoid Use of Commercialism
Papers should be balanced, objective assessments that
contribute to the project management profession or provide a constructive review of the methodology. Papers
that are commercial in nature (e.g., those that endorse or
disparage specific products) will not be published.
Editing the Paper
Make sure papers adhere to the theme or question to be
answered. Write in clear and concise English, using active
rather than passive voice. Manuscripts should not exceed
12,000 words, inclusive of figures, tables, and references.
Count each figure and table as 300 words.
Manuscript Format/Style
All manuscripts submitted for consideration should meet
the following guidelines:
• All papers must be written in the English language (American spelling).
• Title page of the manuscript should only include the title
of the paper.
• To permit objective double blind reviews by two referees, the abstract, first page and text must not reveal
the author(s) and/or affiliation(s). When authors cite
their own work, they should refer to themselves in the
third person. Any papers not adhering to this will be
returned.
Formatting the Paper
Papers must be formatted in an electronic format using
a current version Microsoft Word. For Mac users, convert
the file to a Windows format. If the conversion does not
work, Mac users should save files as Word (.doc) files.
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 157
Author Guidelines
Fonts
Use a 12-point Times or Times New Roman font for the text.
You may use bold and italics in the text, but do not underline.
Use 10-point Helvetica or Arial font for text within tables and
graphics.
Margins
Papers should be double-spaced and in a single-column format. All margins should be 1 inch.
Headings
Use 1st, 2nd, and 3rd-level headings only. Do not number
headings.
References, Footnotes, Tables, Figures, and
Appendices
Always acknowledge the work of others used to advance a
point in your paper. For questions regarding reference format, refer to the current edition of Publication Manual of the
American Psychological Association. Identify text citations
with the author name and publication date in parentheses,
(e.g., Cleland & King, 1983), and listed in alphabetical order
as references at the end of the manuscript. Include page numbers for all quotations (page numbers should be separated by
an en dash, not a hyphen).
Follow the formats in the examples shown below:
Baker, B. (1993). The project manager and the media: Some
lessons from the stealth bomber program. Project Manage­
ment Journal, 24(3), 11–14.
Cleland, D. I., & King, W. R. (1983). Systems analysis and
project management. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Hartley, J. R. (1992). Concurrent engineering. Cambridge,
MA: Productivity Press.
It is the author´s responsibility to obtain permission to
include (or quote) copyrighted material, unless the author
owns the copyright. Use the Wiley permission form, which is
available at the Manuscript Central site.
Graphics and Illustrations
Be sure to number tables and figures with Arabic numerals,
include titles for each, and insert them in their preferred location within the body of the text. In addition, provide artwork
in 300-dpi jpg, tiff, or PowerPoint formats.
Tips for creating graphics:
• Provide only the essential details (too much information can
be difficult to display).
• Color graphics are acceptable for submission, although
Project Management Journal® is published in grayscale.
158 June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal
• Helvetica or Arial font should be used for text within the
graphics and tables.
• Figure numbers and titles are centered and appear in boldface
type below the figure.
• Table numbers and titles are centered and appear in boldface
type above the table.
• Figures and tables should be cited and numbered
­consecutively in the order in which they appear in the text.
• Tables with lines separating columns and rows are ­acceptable.
Use an appendix to provide more detailed information,
when necessary.
Submission Policy
Submit manuscripts electronically using Project Management
Journal® ’s Manuscript Central site.
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pmj
Manuscript Central is a web-based peer review system
(a product of ScholarOne). Authors will be asked to create
an account (unless one already exists) prior to submitting
a paper. Step-by-step instructions are provided online. The
progress of the review process can be obtained via Manuscript
Central.
Manuscripts should include the following in the order
listed:
• Title page. Include only the title of the manuscript (do not
include authors’ names).
• Abstract. Outline the purpose, scope, and conclusions of the
manuscript in 100 words or less.
• Keywords. Select 4 to 8 keywords.
• Headings. Use 1st, 2nd, and 3rd-level, unnumbered ­headings.
• Text. To permit objective reviews by two referees, the abstract,
first page and the rest of the text should not reveal the authors
and/or affiliations.
• References. Use author-date format.
• Illustrations and tables. These should be titled, numbered (in
Arabic numerals), and placed on a separate sheet, with the
preferred location indicated within the body of the text.
• Biographical details for each author. Upon manuscript
­acceptance, authors must also provide a signed copyright
agreement.
By submitting a manuscript, the author certifies that it is
not under consideration by any other publication; that neither the manuscript nor any portion of it is copyrighted; and
that it has not been published elsewhere. Exceptions must be
noted at the time of submission.
Authors using their own previously published or submitted material as the basis for a new submission are required
to cite the previous work and explain how the new submission differs from the previously published work. Any potential data overlap with previous studies should be noted and
described in the letter to the Editor. The editorial team makes
software-supported checks for identifying plagiarism and
self-plagiarism.
Accepted manuscripts become the property of PMI, which
holds the copyright for materials that it publishes. Material published in Project Management Journal® may not be
reprinted or published elsewhere, in whole or part, without
the written permission of PMI.
Accepted manuscripts may be subject to editorial changes
made by the Editor. The author is solely responsible for all
statements made in his or her work, including changes made
by the editor. Submitted manuscripts are not returned to the
author; however, reviewer comments will be furnished.
Review Process
The reputation of Project Management Journal® and contribution to the field depend upon our attracting and publishing
the best research. Project Management Journal® competes
for the best available manuscripts by having the largest and
widest readership among all project management journals.
Equally important, we also compete by offering high-quality
feedback. The timeliness and quality of our review process
reflect well upon all who participate in it.
Developmental Reviews
It is important that authors learn from the reviews and feel
that they have benefited from the Project Management Jour­
nal® review process. Therefore, reviewers will strive to:
• Be Specific. Reviewers point out the positives about the paper,
possible problems, and how any problems can be addressed.
Specific comments, reactions, and suggestions are required.
• Be Constructive. In the event that problems cannot be fixed
in the current study, suggestions are made to authors on how
to improve the paper on their next attempt. Reviewers document as to whether the issue is with the underlying research,
the research conclusions, or the way the information is being
communicated in the submission.
• Identify Strengths. One of the most important tasks for a
reviewer is to identify the portions of the paper that can be
improved in a revision. Reviewers strive to help an author
shape a mediocre manuscript into an insightful contribution.
• Consider the Contribution of the Manuscript. Technical correctness and theoretical coherence are obvious issues for a
review, but the overall contribution that the paper offers is
also considered. Papers will not be accepted if the contribution it offers is not meaningful or interesting. Reviewers will
address uncertainties in the paper by checking facts; therefore, review comments will be as accurate as possible.
• Consider Submissions from Authors Whose Native Language
Is Not English. Reviewers will distinguish between the quality
of the writing, which may be fixable, and the quality of the
ideas that the writing conveys.
Respectful Reviews
PMI recognizes that authors have spent a great deal of time
and effort on every submission. Reviewers will always treat an
author’s work with respect, even when the reviewer disagrees
or finds fault with what has been written.
Double-Blind Reviews
Submissions are subjected to a double-blind review, whereby
the identity of the reviewer and the author are not disclosed.
In the event that a reviewer is unable to be objective about
a specific paper, another reviewer will be selected for that
paper. Reviewers will not discuss any manuscript with anyone (other than the Project Management Journal® Editor) at
any time.
Pointers on the Substance of the Review Theory
• Does the paper have a well-articulated theory that provides
conceptual insight and guides hypotheses formulation?
• Does the study inform or improve our understanding of that
theory?
• Are the concepts clearly defined?
• Does the paper cite appropriate literature and provide proper
credit to existing work on the topic? Has the author offered
critical references? Does the paper contain an appropriate
number of references?
• Do the sample, measures, methods, observations, procedures,
and statistical analyses ensure internal and external validity?
Are the statistical procedures used correctly and appropriately? Are the author’s major assumptions reasonable?
• Does the empirical study provide a good test of the theory
and hypotheses? Is the method chosen appropriate for the
research question and theory?
• Does the paper make a new and meaningful contribution
to the management literature in terms of theory, empirical
knowledge, and management practice?
• Has the author given proper citation to the original source of
all information given in the work or in others’ work that was
cited?
Adherence to the Spirit of the Guidelines
Papers that severely violate the spirit of the guidelines (e.g.,
papers that are single-spaced, papers that use footnotes
rather than conventional referencing formats, papers that
greatly exceed 40 pages), or which do not clearly fit the mission of the Journal will be returned to authors without being
reviewed.
June/July 2016 ■ Project Management Journal 159
Give your students real job potential!
Project Management
Curriculum and Resources
By faculty, for faculty
Give your graduates the skills
that employers demand
More and more employers are seeking candidates
with project management knowledge and skills.
By offering coursework in this area, colleges and
universities can equip students for success.
Project Management Institute (PMI) has
collaborated with faculty around the globe to
develop project management curriculum
guidelines along with a foundational course and
supplementary teaching materials. Qualified
faculty members are now able to introduce a
project management course more expeditiously
at their institution by drawing on this newly
available body of information.
What do the guidelines offer?
Instructional materials for one comprehensive entry-level course in project management,
including a syllabus, mini-case studies, course projects, and activities
30 essential knowledge modules
Instructional outlines for additional courses in project management with specific
learning outcomes
Guidance for enhancing existing courses
An online open-source forum for faculty to share relevant content
How can faculty use the guidelines?
To create a new foundational project management course at your academic institution
To enhance an existing course in an allied discipline
To create a sequence of project management courses
To augment or benchmark an existing project management course
Materials are available to university educators who register through
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Download the materials at no charge at PMITeach.org
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