20th Annual Congress of the European Business History Association 2016 / 1st World Congress on Business
History (August 25 - 27, Bergen, Norway)
French and German firms’ participation in Spanish nuclear program,
c. 1950s-1980s*
Esther M. Sánchez Sánchez, University of Salamanca
([email protected])
Gloria Sanz Lafuente, Public University of Navarra
([email protected])
Work in progress.
Do not quote without authors´ permission
The Franco dictatorship (1939-75) made enormous efforts to develop a strong nuclear
industry in Spain (De la Torre and Rubio, 2015). Given the country’s disadvantages in terms of
technology and financial resources, the government and business leaders turned to foreign
assistance. The United States (US) was the main nuclear partner. Among the 40 nuclear
reactors planned in Spain, and the 10 finally connected to the grid, there were only four nonUS projects: one was performed with France (Vandellos I in Catalonia) and three with Germany
(Trillo I and II in Castilla and Regodola in Galicia). Thus, France and the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG) broke North America’s nuclear monopoly in Spain.
The literature on nuclear history has highlighted the importance of political and
military factors in decisions regarding economic and scientific-technical issues such as the
choice of reactor type (Radkau, 1983; Cohn, 1990; Doel, 1997; Hecht, 2004; Krige and Barth,
2006; Turchetti and Roberts, 2014; Hanel, 2015). In Spain, political and economic dynamics
1
were also both essential (Sánchez Ron, 2007; Romero, 2012). The Francoist elite viewed
nuclear technology as a tool for simultaneously promoting industrial development and
bestowing international prestige on a peripheral, autarchic and dictatorial country that still
bore the stigma of its collaboration with the Axis powers (Martínez Lillo, 1985; Dulphy, 2002;
Hualde, 2016). Spain’s nuclear sector convened a wide variety of actors (ministers, diplomats,
military personnel, engineers, technicians, businessmen, and bankers) who, from the 1940s
onwards, made intensive efforts towards internationalization.1 In the mid-1950s, Spain signed
its first collaboration agreements for the peaceful use of nuclear energy with the United States
(1955) and France (1956), and initiated contacts and negotiations with the FRG that would
culminate in a 1973 agreement. 2 Meanwhile, Spain also joined the chief international
organizations addressing atomic energy, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), the European Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA) and the European Atomic Forum
(Foratom). The public-private link was established amid high investment costs and security
risks that were not always well defined. At the beginning, the reins of the Spanish nuclear
venture were held by the Nuclear Energy Council (JEN), the National Institute for Industry (INI),
and Economic and Defence Ministries. However, since the 1970s, coinciding with the
implementation of a more liberal economic policy, private business has gradually been
winning out over the State. Nuclear energy became one of the few scientific and industrial
arenas in which Spain could compete internationally, though at the cost of great foreign debt
and dependency.3
*Research for this paper is supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (project
HAR2014-53825-R).
1
The foreign travel and contacts of the military physicist José María Otero Navascués are well known. See
Villena (1983); Presas (2000, 2005); Romero (2000); Sánchez Ron (2002); De Andrés (2005); and Pérez (2012).
2
However, this did not dampen the desire among Francoist leaders to possess the atomic bomb. Presas
(2005), p. 200. A series of newspaper articles on this topic can be found in Vilanova (2011).
3
Regarding the history of nuclear energy in Spain, we refer to Caro et al. (1995); Ordóñez and Sánchez Ron
(1996); Sánchez Ron (2000); Romero and Sánchez Ron (2001); and Barca (2010).
2
The objective of this work is to examine the participation of French and German
companies in Spanish nuclear programme, from its beginnings in the 1950s to the nuclear
moratorium declared in the early 1980s. To that end, we identify the key players and their
interests, analyse the negotiation processes and the comparative advantages of France and
West Germany compared to the United States, and examine the main outcomes of Spanish
cooperation with France and the FRG.
State and Business in the French and German Nuclear Programmes
Given the high cost of nuclear projects, the global dominance of American companies,
and the need for continual inter-company and inter-governmental relations, it is difficult to
speak in terms of national nuclear programmes. Indeed, the alliances, agreements, and
shareholder participation enmeshed in this process often overstepped the strictly national
framework, as demonstrated by the cases of Vandellos I and Trillo I projects in Spain.
From its beginnings, the French nuclear programme combined civil and military
elements. Nuclear energy and the atomic bomb were the chief aspirations for the
governments of the Fourth and Fifth Republics, as indicated by their indicative planning policy.
In 1945, as France was still recovering from the World War II, the provisional government of
General De Gaulle created the Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (CEA) to “promote and
coordinate nuclear research in all areas of science, industry, and national defence.”4 A few
years later, the first experimental reactor, named Zoé, began to function, in addition to the
reactors of the Marcoule complex (G1, G2, and G3), which were dedicated to the production
of military plutonium. In 1960, with De Gaulle once again at the helm of the executive, France
4
“Ordonnance n° 45-2563 du 18 octobre 1945 instituant un Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique,” Journal
Officiel de la République Française, September 31, 1945.
3
gained entry into the select club of nations possessing the atomic bomb, after the United
States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.
Meanwhile, the first plants dedicated to producing civil nuclear power for electricity
were connected to the grid: Chinon (1963), Chooz (1967), and Saint Laurent des Eaux (1972).
They were owned and managed by the large public company Électricité de France (EdF),
which, since its nationalization in 1946, centralized the generation, transportation,
distribution, and sale of electricity in France. 5 To successfully perform the grand nuclear
project, the CEA and EdF promoted the creation of large industrial groups, including Indatom
(1955), France-Atome (1956), and the Groupement Atomique Alsacienne-Atlantique (1959),
which were composed of numerous champions nationaux, both public and private, related
directly or indirectly to atomic energy (for example, Péchiney, Air Liquide, Saint Gobain
Nucléaire, Babcock & Wilcox, Fives-Lille-Cail, Stein & Robaix, Alsthom, Thomson-Houston, and
the Compagnie Générale d’Électricité).
For nearly two decades, two rival technologies vied for control of the market for French
nuclear reactors: the process developed (with some variations) by France and Great Britain,
which was fuelled with natural uranium metal, graphite-moderated and cooled with carbon
dioxide (Uranium Naturel Graphite Gaz, UNGG); and the system patented by the U.S. firm
Westinghouse and licensed by France’s Framatome (of the Schneider group), fuelled by
enriched uranium and moderated and cooled with pressurized water (Pressurized Water
Reactor, PWR).6
5
The history of EdF can be found in Morsel (1996).
Leclercq (1986); Lamiral (1988); Soutou (1991); Carle (1993); Hecht (2004); Dänzer-Kantof and Torres (2013).
There are two different types of light water reactors that use enriched uranium for fuel and water as a
moderator: Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) and Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). Both originated in the United
States.
6
4
The UNGG technology had the support of De Gaulle and the CEA, which were ironclad
proponents of national independence through the natural uranium that was available in
metropolitan and overseas France. 7 Indeed, until the mid-1970s, uranium enrichment
remained under the duopoly of the United States and the Soviet Union, which exported the
final product to their respective allies at high prices, for strictly civil purposes and under close
monitoring. De Gaulle and the CEA also valued the capacity of the UNGG reactors to irradiate
large quantities of plutonium (P239), which could replace highly enriched uranium (U235) as the
raw material for making atomic bombs.8
On the other side of the scale, the American PWR technology was defended by EdF and
other large companies such as Schneider and Alsthom, which prioritized the economic
profitability of plants that use enriched uranium over the national independence and
Grandeur exalted by the Gaullists.9 The event that bridged the divide was the public tender in
1967 of the new French plant at Fessenheim using UNGG technology, which garnered a
negative response from EdF, major construction companies, and even some prominent
members of the CEA such as Jules Horowitz. That same year, the isotope separation plant of
Pierrelatte produced its first ingot of enriched uranium. One year later, France successfully
tested the hydrogen bomb, which barely used plutonium. The tipping point came in 1969,
when Pompidou replaced De Gaulle at the helm of the Fifth Republic, causing greater
rapprochement with NATO. As a result of all these developments, the Fessenheim plant,
which began construction in 1971, used PWR technology,10 what was going to become the
7
Hecht (2012).
Vaïsse 1998, p. 47. Dänzel-Kantof and Torres (2013).
9
The raw material, natural uranium, was cheaper than enriched uranium. However, the costs of construction
and exploitation of the French plants (still in prototype) were higher than in American plants (already in the
industrial phase).
10
Fessenheim is currently the country’s oldest plant.
8
5
most widespread technology in the world and the one adopted to equip the entire French
nuclear facilities. After nine UNGG reactors (one of them in Spain), France definitively
renounced its filière nationale, recognizing the greater economic (though not technological)
competitiveness of the rival US technologies.
France currently has 58 reactors operating at 19 plants, which provide 75% of the energy
consumed in the country. All of these reactors employ PWR technology, with the exception of
the Superphénix fast breeder reactor. The nuclear industry has continuously maintained close
ties with the State through ministries, research agencies, public or para-public companies, and
a powerful corps of government officials (the so-called nucleocrats11). It has also enjoyed
explicit or implicit support from the majority of French citizens, which today consider this
industry a symbol of independence, technological modernity, and energy stability.12
German nuclear history comprises a series of well-differentiated phases. During World
War II, the Wehrmacht focused its efforts on using nuclear fission for military purposes (the
uranium project or Uranprojekt 13 ). Between 1946 and 1955, the allies banned nuclear
research, 14 tremendously limiting the FRG’s potential 15 in terms of science, technology,
industry, and international exchange.16 However, during the Cold War, unofficial movements
and domestic and foreign relations favouring nuclear technology emerged.17 Although not all
of them persisted, there was significant continuity among the group of scientists who
launched the German nuclear reactor programme. The public-private-scientific axis was
11
The journalist Philippe Dimmonot was the first to use the term in his book Les nucléocrates (Paris, PU
Grenoble, 1978).
12
Dänzel-Kantof and Torres (2013), p. 25.
13
Radkau (1983); Walker (1990); Kaiser (1992); and Hanel (2015).
14
Kontrollratsgesetz 25, 29 April 1946; Gesetz 22, 2 März 1950. Knoll (2012), p. 210.
15
We focus on the case of the FRG and not the GDR.
16
Hanel (2015), p. 36; Feldenkirchen (2003), p. 120; Müller (1990, 1996).
17
Kollert (1994).
6
present during the war, with the State serving as its main promoter, and restarted in the postwar period, bolstered by existing business links within and outside Germany.
In the context of prohibition and the limitations to organizing an official nuclear
infrastructure, nuclear scientists, political representatives from Adenauer’s Foreign Ministry,
ministers, and businesses forged relationships in unofficial gathering spaces such as the
Physialische Studiengesellschaft (PSG), founded in 1954.18 Its president was Karl Winnacker,
who previously served as president of Hoechst AG from 1952 to 1960 and as president of the
German Atomic Forum from 1959 to 1973. In the cradle of this entity emerged the intersectoral diversifications derived from the use of nuclear plant construction technologies.19 For
its part, the Adenauer government expressed great interest in nuclear energy from the start.
By 1955, it had created a Ministry for Nuclear Issues (Atoministerium), which directed the
various phases of the nuclear programme, from obtaining test reactors to conducting
research. 20 The first nuclear programme (Eltwiller Programm) was designed based on
independence and national autonomy to the detriment of the foreign model, as in France,
though German businesses sought domestic and transnational cooperation and combined the
search for national technologies with the acquisition of technologies from abroad in their
productive processes. Alongside electric companies such as Heinrich Mandel’s RWE, it was
chemicals that showed the strongest and earliest interest in nuclear development, promoting
ties between businesses in this sector and others.21
Siemens and AEG, the two major electrical plant builders, led the electro-technical
sector participation in nuclear reactor technology. In 1957, the former broadened its earlier
18
Radkau and Hahn (2013), p. 35; Hanel (2015), pp. 96-97.
Hanel (2015), pp. 97 and 99.
20
Hilger (2004), p. 66.
21
Marx (2015), pp. 3-4; Radkau and Hahn (2013), p. 35; Stepanhy (2005), pp. 24 and subsequent pages; Knoll
(2012), pp. 213-220 and 225.
19
7
agreement that it had signed with Westinghouse in 1954, enabling the transfer of US licenses
and know-how. Unlike AEG, Siemens sought a reactor moderated with heavy water or
graphite to take advantage of the lower price of natural uranium. 22 In 1969, the reactor
departments of Siemens and AEG merged into Kraftwerk Unión (KWU),23 which became the
property of Siemens in 1975. 24 The rise of nuclear energy occurred amid growing social
mobilization against nuclear plants. By 1973, nuclear program and their high costs were
beginning to be debated in parliament.
KWU’s first foreign contract was for the Atucha I nuclear plant in Argentina, initiated in
1968 (Atucha II in 1980), which signalled emancipation from the US model with the use of
heavy water. Atucha I marked not only the dawn of nuclear energy in Latin America but also
the use of financing mechanisms that were similar to those of the United States (long-term
co-financing from KfW and Hermes-Burgschaften).25 However, KWU would go on to focus not
on heavy water reactors but instead PWRs.26 Hence, in 1972, Siemens ended its relationship
with Westinghouse and began working with a company called Combustion Engineering (CE),
seeking PWRs and opportunities for greater financing. 27 It was precisely this cooperation
mechanism that allowed the KWU to increase its international presence, though it lagged far
behind US companies.28 Outside Europe, there were projects in Brazil (Angra II) and in Iran
(Buschehr). Within Europe, there were the KWU projects: Borssele in the Netherlands, Gösgen
in Switzerland, and the Zwentendorf plant in Austria, which ultimately was not built. Spain
was the country in which KWU came to have the most projects, with a total of three. Of these,
22
Radkau (1983), p. 108; Hilger (2004), p. 68.
Hilger (2004), pp. 65-67; Hanel (215), pp. 100-101.
24
Thomas (1988), p. 162.
25
Radkau (1983).
26
Radkau (1978), pp. 197 and subsequent pages.
27
Hilger (2004), p. 71.
28
Hilger (2004), p. 73.
23
8
only Trillo I, which was built in the 1970s and began functioning in 1988, was connected to the
grid. Regodola (slated to be built in Lugo, Galicia) and Trillo II were not built.
On June 30, 2011, a wide majority of the Federal Parliament voted in favour of the
gradual dismantling of German nuclear facilities by 2022. Seventeen commercial nuclear
plants existed throughout the country (11 pressurized water and six boiling water plants),
representing 17% of national energy production. The share had been far greater in prior years,
reaching 30% in 1997. By that same year, Siemens was exiting the business of nuclear plants,
and in the following year, RWE ceased to be interested in their construction.29
French and German Nuclear Operations in Spain: Vandellos I and Trillo I
The Vandellos I nuclear power plant, located in the province of Tarragona, marked the
last instance of the use of French UNGG technology and the first and only time this technology
was exported. Built in 1972, it was the third nuclear plant constructed in Spain, after Zorita
(1969) and Santa María de Garoña (1971). Ownership of the plant and the energy it produced
was divided equally between EdF and the Spanish companies FECSA (private), HECSA (private),
and ENHER (public). Ties between these producers had been forged in the 1950s as part of a
series of bilateral exchange agreements in hydroelectric energy. 30 Since the 1956 nuclear
accord, the CEA and the JEN had maintained a constant exchange of information and
specialists, bringing many Spanish experts to France to train at research centres in Saclay,
Orsay and Cadarache, and at the plants in Marcoule, Chinon and Saint Laurent des Eaux.31
Claude Colin, the scientific and technical attaché at the French Embassy in Spain, was the main
29
Radkau (2013), p. 409; Statistisches Bundesamt. Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie.
More details can be found in Sánchez (2010) and Viguié (2014).
31
The reports are in the Historical Archives of EdF (hereafter AEDF), Direction de l’Équipement (DE), box 283.
30
9
promoter of these training trips.32 Ministers, diplomats and high ranking military officers also
collaborated, including JEN President José María Otero Navascués, Spanish Ambassador to
France José María de Areilza, Spanish Industry Minister Gregorio López Bravo, and the French
Ministers of Scientific Research and Atomic and Space Issues Gaston Palewski and Alain
Peyrefitte.33
The company charged with overseeing the construction of the plant was HispanoFrancesa de Energía Nuclear (HIFRENSA), founded in Barcelona in 1966. Based on the premise
that they would “beat the Spaniards by handing them the glory of operation,”34 the French
installed Catalan businessman Pere Duran Farell as president of HIFRENSA, leaving the vice
presidency in the hands of EdF General Director Pierre Ailleret. Shortly after it was created,
HIFRENSA launched a public offering for the turnkey project to build the plant, which was won
by the only participant: a group of 25 French builders gathered at the Société pour l'Industrie
Atomique-SOCIA (created for the occasion). Convinced of the limited commercial life of UNGG
reactors, the French companies declined to participate along with the State in the financing
of Vandellos I. However, they took the opportunity to sell their goods and services, and also
perform a useful exercise of “learning-by-doing”35 in the neighbouring country. In addition to
the French companies, SOCIA subcontracted more than 50 Spanish companies, primarily for
the civil works, supplying electrical and mechanical equipment, and building the reactor’s
concrete pressure vessel. The Spanish firms that received the main contracts were large
construction companies such as Entrecanales y Tavora, La Maquinista, Constructora Pirenaica,
Entrepose, Degrémont, and Schwartz-Hautmont (many of them being subsidiaries or
32
Carpio (2012).
The negotiation process is described in Marty and Sánchez (2000) and Sánchez (2010).
34
Letter from EdF engineer G. Lamiral, s.f. AEDF, DE, box 283.
35
De la Torre and Rubio (forthcoming).
33
10
technological partners of French multinationals). Besides, work for the plant was also
undertaken by dozens of small and medium-sized local businesses, some of them born in the
heat of the nuclear industry, others simply adapting to it by diversifying and modernizing their
production.36
The construction of the Vandellos plant stretched out over five years, with several
months of delays based on the initial timeframe.37 The plant functioned (at 480 MW of power)
for only 17 of the 40 years that were originally projected. In 1989, a fire in the turbine area
led to the plant’s closure in 1990 and steps to it in 1991.
As all the studies foresaw, the cost of Vandellos I far surpassed that of its predecessors:
88.017 million pesetas, compared to 31.309 million for Zorita (153 MW of power using PWR
technology owned by Westinghouse) and 50.072 million for Garoña (300 MW, General
Electric’s BWP). Why, then, did the French project go forward? To begin with, the De Gaulle
government, clinging to UNGG technology, wanted to demonstrate its viability in foreign
markets and considered Spain an ideal destination, given its geographic and cultural
proximity, its industrial needs, and its historically strong relations with France.
38
Consequently, French leaders performed an intensive campaign to sell the advantages of the
UNGG option for Spain, advantages that were highly valued by their Spanish counterparts,
who gave the project the green light. These advantages consisted of the following:
36
A complete list of Spanish companies can be found in Sánchez (2010), p. 128.
About the evolution of the project, readers can consult the Bulletins of HIFRENSA: Central nuclear de
Vandellós, nos. 1 a 13, 1968-1969.
38
“Conclusion actuelle de la négociation franco-espagnole sur la centrale nucléaire de Catalogne,
30/12/1965.” AEDF, DE, box 283. Regarding economic relations between France and Spain, see Sánchez (2006)
and Castro (2010).
37
11
1) The use of natural uranium from Spain. This usage would permit reduced dependence
on the United States for supplies of enriched uranium and promote the development of
Spanish national uranium companies.
2) Favourable financing conditions. The French government committed to defraying the
entire cost of the plant through loans with 3-5% interest rates amortized over 10-15 years.39
In this manner, it would match and, in some phases, exceed the financing terms established
with the US Export-Import Bank for Zorita and Garoña.40
3) Industrial compensation, consisting of high percentages of participation (a minimum
of 50%) for domestic industries in the construction of the plant. The Spanish would be in
charge of all of the civil works, but also could be involved in more advanced technological
operations, given that Vandellos I would be nearly an exact replica of Saint Laurent des Eaux
in France.
4) Political compensation, read as stronger support for Spain’s entry into the European
Economic Community, which the Spanish government had sought since 1962.
5) Ownership over part of the irradiated plutonium, previously treated in France, free
from US or AIEA control (though not that of the CEA).41
In spite of themselves, the French leaders would not perform another major operation
with the Spanish nuclear programme. It cooperated with the Spanish government and
businesses in bilateral and multilateral projects, including the exploitation of natural uranium
in Niger (ENUSA, INI-COGEMA and CEA’s agreement) and the enrichment of uranium under
39
Government loans were structured in three areas: the supply of goods, services, and personnel; the
installation and assembly of the plant; and the first load for the reactor. Subsequently, an inter-bank loan was
added, led by Crédit Commercial de France. Meanwhile, Vandellos had financial support from the members of
HIFRENSA.
40
De la Torre and Rubio (2015), ch. 5.
41
The desire to possess the atomic bomb led Spain to avoid signing—despite North American pressure—the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. Spain eventually joined it in 1987 (and France in 1992).
12
the umbrella of the European consortium Eurodif.42 However, second- and third-generation
Spanish reactors evaded French industry and were attributed instead to the United States (as
with Vandellos II and III) or Germany (Trillo I).
Trillo I was the last nuclear plant to be connected to the grid in Spain (in 1988) and the
only project performed in the country by KWU, through its subsidiary, Siemens España. The
project to build two nuclear plants in the municipality of Trillo (Guadalajara, some 80 km from
Madrid) began to materialize in 1967, when Unión Eléctrica S.A (UESA) requested
administrative authorization to enlarge Zorita (Zorita II), with expansion for a second group of
500-600 MW demanded in 1970. In 1972, the company requested authorization from the
delegation of the Ministry of Industry in Guadalajara to build two groups with a unit capacity
of 1000 MW each. Two years later, UESA presented a new project, justifying this increase
based on new technological advances and other changes in the facility due to the canalization
of water resources from the Tajo river to Segura river. Eléctricas Reunidas de Zaragoza (ERZSA
20%) and Energía e Industrias Aragonesas S.A (EIASA, 20%) were in the project in 1975 too.
According to records, the first unit was expected to begin functioning in 1982 and the second
in 1986. The site was chosen based on its proximity to the main centre of energy consumption
(Madrid) and the availability of power lines and refrigeration for the cooling towers.43 The new
democratic government authorized UESA to build the first unit of the plant in August of 1979
and the second unit in November of 1980.44 One year earlier, Spain and the FRG had signed a
42
“Coopération nucléaire avec l’Espagne” note from the Direction Générale des Relations Culturelles,
Scientifiques et Techniques,” Paris, January 28, 1976, Archive of the French Foreign Affairs Ministry, Europe,
Spain 1971-76, vol. 421.
43
Atomwirtschaft (atw) Jahrgang XVI/Nº3, März 1971, p. 149. AMT. Unión Eléctrica S.A. Anteproyecto... 1974.
C. 87, pp. 6-7. Atomwirtschaft (atw) Jahrgang XVI/Nº3, März 1971
44
Boletín Oficial del Estado, August 1979-November 1980. “La buena marcha de las obras de la central un
año después” in Flores y Abejas October 28, 1980; Flores y Abejas October 22, 1980.
13
cooperation agreement in Bonn regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the second on
this issue (after the 1973 agreement).
Nuclear ties with the FRG have had a long trajectory. First, it is important to note the
presence of German electrical engineering firms in Spain with links to Spanish electricity
companies before the 1930s, and the forging of these relationships prior to nuclear
development. 45 Second, JEN President Otero Navascués made contact early on with Karl
Wirtz,
46
who in 1973 would be named the “coordinator of Spanish and German
collaboration.”47 Third, Franz Josef Strauss, FRG Nuclear Affairs Minister, made an official visit
to Spain in July of 1956; the previous year, he made an unofficial trip to address military issues
and the possibility of acquiring uranium from Spain. 48 Fourth, two Spanish ministers had
connections with the project. Antonio María Aguirre Gonzalo worked for the Embassy in Berlin
from 1939 to 1942 and occupied the post of Ambassador in Bonn from 1950 to 1959. José
María Aguirre Gonzalo served as president of Siemens in Spain until 1969. His successor at the
Embassy in Bonn, Luis Urquijo and Landecho, Marquis of Bolarque, was a major promoter of
economic relations with the FRG, and was also involved in the group created around the
Urquijo Bank, which conducted business with UESA. Finally, Spanish industry and KWU had
regularly cooperated in supplying parts and components for various conventional electrical
plants.
Financing for the construction work and fuel cycle represented more than 65% in the
project of 1974. 49 Regarding the Trillo project, it is interesting to note the presence of a
45
Regarding the presence of AEG and Siemens España and their relationship to Compañía Madrileña de
Electricidad and Compañía Sevillana de Electricidad, see, among others, Loscertales (2002), p. 155 and
subsequent pages.
46
Presas (2000), pp. 527-602; (2005), pp. 197-218.
47
Hanel (2015), pp. 88-89
48
Aschmann (1999), p. 231.
49
ABC 3071-1975. AMT. Unión Eléctrica S.A. Anteproyecto... 1974. C8, p. 2
14
network of Spanish businesses with prior experience in building plants (Empresarios
Agrupados), such as Entrecanales y Távora and ETOCEA. Among the long list of participants
are Siemens España, Empresa Nacional Bazán de Construcciones Militares, Equipos Nucleares,
Sociedad Metalúrgica Duró Felguera, Auxitrol Ibérica, and GEOCISA.50
The Trillo I plant possessed the following particularities:
1) The fuel utilized was enriched uranium, which involved high transportation and
processing costs, as foreseen in the pre-project and project by UESA.
2) In the wake of the Atucha I project in Argentina, the KfW granted an export credit
agreement in 1975 in the amount of 500 DM million for UESA (60%), ERZSA (20%) and EIASA
(20%)51.
3) The participation of Spanish firms in the plant’s construction reached 80%, which was
far more than at Vandellos I. KWU’s promotional materials described the plant as “German
design and Spanish manufacturing.” Spanish participation was focused on the building of the
facility (79%), whereas the steam supply system and turbogroup were mainly imported (87%
and 65%, respectively).52
After Trillo I, although far outpaced by US companies, the FRG continued its international
activities in the field of nuclear technology: in 1986, KWU was building four plants
simultaneously in four different countries. However, no additional nuclear projects were
performed in Spain. In the mid-1980s, the socialist government halted the construction of new
plants, initiating a nuclear moratorium that would remain in place into the present.
Paradoxically, this period saw the connection to the grid of many projects that had been
50
Not to be disregarded is the existence of equity stakes shared between the Spanish and French companies
that were tied to the project, which, to date, have not been studied.
51
Kfw. Historisches Konzernarchiv 3042/1. 18.11.1975.
52
AMT. Unión Eléctrica S.A. Anteproyecto... 1974.C. 87. p
15
planned, approved, and initiated during the final administrations of the dictatorship and the
first democratic governments.
***
Access to capital and technological resources from France and the FRG allowed Spain to
diversify its economic and foreign policy options, reducing its heavy dependency on the United
States and paving the way towards greater interrelations with European governments and
businesses. This significantly broadened the roster of national and international companies
that participated in the Spanish nuclear programme, a tremendously ambitious task for a
country still far from achieving the levels of development enjoyed by large Western powers.
Regardless of the future of nuclear energy (paralyzed and marginal in Spain and Germany,
dominant in France), the Spanish nuclear programme greatly broadened channels for
collaboration among Spanish, French, and German businesses, both at the bilateral level and
in the multilateral European context.
References
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