Subjects: English and History
24 October, 1962
Washington, District of Columbia
“The Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm), headed by
President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, is Called to Rule Upon the Emergency Crisis
pertaining to Russia’s Intention to Potentially engage in a Nuclear War with the
United States from Cuban Soil”
6 VWO, Simulation Project (March 2 – 16, 2016)
Simulation developed by: Aart Bogers and Jeroen Van Hilten
6 VWO, Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
Page 1
I
Purpose and Introduction
Today it is October 24, 1962. After careful inspection of U2 airplane pictures taken above Cuba
on October 14, our CIA-intelligence (led by Air force Major Richard S Heyser and Director of
the Photographic Interpretation Center, Arthur Lundahl) has revealed that there are IRBMs
(intermediate range
ballistic missiles)
stationed on Cuban soil.
It is the US’s firm
conviction that it was
Russia that placed the
missiles there with the
sole intent to engage in
a nuclear war with America.
If these missiles are launched, it will wreak havoc on the entire Atlantic coast, subsequently
leading to a global nuclear war. Millions of people will perish. The ExComm self-evidently
cannot allow this to happen. We need to come up with a way to help resolve this matter. What
should we do? Attack Cuba and Russia? Or talk to them? Appease them? Come up with a
compromise? Apply diplomacy or carry a big stick?
As a class we are going to find out, by simulating, what we, The Executive Committee of the
National Security Council, would have done in that unbelievably tense situation…..
Learner objectives and competences for our students
After this project, the student can/will be/should be/must be:
-able to explain to others what the Cuban Missile Crisis is and why we were on the brink of all
out global destruction.
-able to put himself/herself in the position of a historical figure and then, based on research into
character traits, facts, analyses and interpretations, come up with an assessment of the crisis that
is historically credible and translate that to live role-playing by looking at the situation through
someone else’s glasses (i.e. intercultural education).
-reflect on his/her own performance during the simulation and the preparatory process.
-find, consult and paraphrase sources in order to add reliability to his/her argumentation.
-use English as a second language to discuss and debate political matters (in a tense arena).
6 VWO, Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
Page 2
II.
Background Information and Perspective
The rapid change with which international relations had shifted in favor of the American cause in
the period between 1865 and 1962 was largely the result of the two World Wars. It had left the
European continent destroyed,
scattered and devastated. Not
only did America receive an
enormous economic boost due to
World War II, it was also able to
garner more general political
power in the international arena.
Western-Europe became
increasingly more dependent on
America for its security and
protection against communism,
which even further enhanced the
power of America to dictate the pace in Western-Europe.
Hence, the position of America on the world stage had drastically changed in a time span of just
one hundred years. America had become the most powerful player in foreign affairs, particularly
after the Americans had demonstrated the strength and capabilities of its scientific program
through the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945. The unipolar moment
would not last long though.
Scientist Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, who had been working on the atomic bomb project at Los
Alamos, committed espionage and leaked important information to the USSR, enabling it to
create its own bomb in 1949.
That year symbolizes the start of the bi-polar relations (i.e. cold war) in foreign policy. Not only
did America lose relative power, it also became gradually aware of the fact that a new policy
regarding the Soviet-Union was necessary in order to prevent the spread of the communist
ideology (i.e. a communist world revolution). “Red scare” started to dominate the political scene.
When Chiang Kai Shek was subsequently unable to eradicate the Chinese communists, the world
saw an immense broadening of political power for communism on the world stage. Mao Zedong
6 VWO, Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
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proclaimed the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949, just a month after the USSR got
the Atomic bomb (first tested on August 29, 1949).
‘Who then had lost China?’ was the major question prevailing in the hallways of the
governmental buildings in America’s Capital. At all costs, America was now prepared to counter
and contain any significant growth of communism, starting with the Korean War, and followed
by numerous covert actions in the 1950s.
The first head-on confrontation between the United States and the USSR took place in the fall of
1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis, which, because of its obvious nuclear implications, cast a
dark shadow over the future of humanity. But, in this renewed context of international relations,
how then did America’s President, John F. Kennedy, respond to this delicate situation? Did he
possess the required tools as the President to resolve the crisis?
The Cuban Missile Crisis
When President Kennedy learned on October
14, 1962 that the Soviet-Union was deploying
and building up missiles on Cuba, America
knew that its response would have to be well
thought-through, discrete and balanced. At any
rate, whatever constituted a threat to the
American nation in such a strongly polarized
situation had to be either preventively or
preemptively responded to.
Kennedy was not sure though about the exact
measures he could use in order to prevent the realization of the ultimate threat that confronted
America, nuclear warfare between the two most powerful nations on planet earth.
In other words, Kennedy was torn between the desire of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to showcase the
American ability to flex the muscles (the hawks) against communism (i.e. perhaps engage in a
war), while on the other hand, keeping open a diplomatic solution (the doves). Kenedy felt
blinded by his inability to oversee the exact consequences an attack would have on American
homeland security, let alone the impact of an all-out war on countries in Europe, and Asia.
6 VWO, Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
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How then could Kennedy and his ExComm (your class in this case) most appropriately deal with
this situation? Should this be done via the use of diplomacy or pre-emptive warfare (i.e. an
invasion in Cuba)? The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided a very straightforward and one-sided
answer to that question as they believed that – after the massive arms build-up under the
Eisenhower-administration (19521960) – America had the required
power to take on communism in
Cuba.
Another important decision Kennedy
needed to make was whether he was
going to “pursue public or private
avenues of discussion.” From scratch,
Kennedy looked to strive for a public
response to the crisis, underlining the
necessity of transparency to deal
appropriately with the situation. At its
turn, this has been one of the most
frequently criticized elements of the
President’s policy during the crisis. It
would perhaps, according to scholars
and historians, have been more
constructive had the President settled
a private diplomatic agreement with the Soviet Union. Even though in hindsight this might
indeed have been more effective, Kennedy did show his desire to prevent the use of secrecy in a
crisis that was of such utmost importance to humanity. Kennedy and his Executive Committee of
the National Security Council assembled shortly after their failed intelligence had finally been
able to track the installment of IRBMs on Cuban soil by the USSR Government.
Based on the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, Kennedy understood that he had to steer
his policy in a different direction (i.e. he had to polish his reputation). He and Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara consulted history and potential solutions to the crisis. Today we are
gathered to touch upon and discuss these.
6 VWO, Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
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III. The Situation
Today, October 24, 1962 we will hear the members of the National Security Council and various
other political advisors to the President in order to determine the best possible ‘way-out’ of this
crisis.
Upon the proceedings today, the ExComm will come to a final decision concerning the best
possible solution to the dilemma caused by Russia and Cuba.
In the end we need to come up with at least three possible solutions on which we will have to
vote. We need a minimum 60% majority (on a 27 factor vote: see roles). If we cannot agree on
any solutions, this means we don’t have one. Inactivity is ill-advised. We need to deal with this
matter as soon as possible so as to avoid the aforementioned all-out nuclear destruction.
The Cuban Crisis in Popular Culture
6 VWO, Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
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IV. Specific roles
The National Security Council:
John F Kennedy, President of The United States of America – Vote factor 5
C Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury – Vote factor 1
Robert F Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States of America – Vote factor 4
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State – Vote factor 1
McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor – Vote factor 1
John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence – Vote factor 2
General Maxwell D Taylor, US Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – Vote factor 3
Robert S McNamara, Secretary of Defense – Vote factor 4
---Other Members present:
General Walter Sweeney, Commander in Chief of the Tactical Air Command – Vote Factor 2
----Advisers:
Arthur Lundahl, Director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center – Vote factor 1
Charles Bohlen, US expert on Soviet Affairs – Vote factor 3
6 VWO, Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
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V.
Selection of Thoughts and Sources
1*
“Had there been no Bay of Pigs, Operation Mongoose, no assassination plots and no
program of diplomatic and economic isolation against Cuba, there would have been no Missile
Crisis.” (A People and a Nation)
2*
“President Kennedy was disturbed by [the military chiefs’] inability to look beyond the
limited military field. When we talked about this later, he said we had to remember that they were
trained to fight and to wage war- that was their life. Perhaps we would feel more concerned if
they were always opposed to using arms or military means…But this experience pointed out for
us all the importance of civilian direction and control and the importance of raising probing
questions to military recommendations.” (Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the
Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1969)
3*
“The Secretary of Defense reported that, based on information which became available
during the night, it now appears that there is equipment in Cuba for approximately 40 MRBM
and 36 IRBM launchers. The location of the sites for 36 of these launchers is known. 32 of the 36
known sites appear to have sufficient equipment on them to be included in any air strike directed
against Cuba’s missile capability.” (Notes on October 21 ExComm Meeting on Cuba Situation)
4*
“President John F. Kennedy was informed about the deployment of Soviet medium-range
missiles on Cuba shortly after 8 a.m. on the morning of Tuesday, Oct. 16, 1962. His first reaction
on hearing the news from National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy was to accuse the Soviet
leader Nikita S. Khrushchev of a double-cross. ‘He can’t do this to me,’ he sputtered.” (NY
Times)
5*
“Khrushchev also had more personal reasons for wanting to get even with Kennedy,
whom he regarded as an inexperienced leader young enough to be his son. The United States had
stationed medium-range Jupiter missiles in Turkey, across the Black Sea from Khrushchev’s
summer retreat in Sochi. Complaining that there were ‘U.S. missiles aimed at my dacha,’ the
6 VWO, Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
Page 8
Soviet premier thought it was ‘high time America learned what it feels like to have her own land
and her own people threatened.’” (NY Times)
6*
“Kennedy's close associate, historian Arthur Schlesinger, described the events as ‘the
most dangerous moment in human history’. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara wondered
aloud whether he ‘would live to see another Saturday night’, and later recognized that ‘we lucked
out’ – barely.” (The Guardian)
7*
“The President directed that we be prepared to carry out the air strike Monday morning or
any time thereafter during the remainder of the week. The President recognized that the Secretary
of Defense was opposed to the air strike Monday morning, and that General Sweeney favored it.
He asked the Attorney General and Mr McCone for their opinions:
-The Attorney General stated he was opposed to such a strike because it (1) would be a
Pearl Harbor type of attack and (2) lead to unpredictable military responses by the Soviet
Union […].
-Mr McCone agreed with the Attorney General, but emphasized he believed we should be
prepared for an air strike and thereafter an invasion.”
8*
“Perhaps the most disastrous consequence of the Bays of Pigs, however, was that
Kennedy failed to learn the lesson. Instead, those who had warned against the invasion before it
happened, or who expressed concern, afterward, were castigated as ‘soft, unmanly, and not tough
enough to be counted on in a crunch’”. (Chafe, The Unfinished Journey)
9*
A Congressional Resolution: “The United States is determined: (1) to prevent by
whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in
Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any
part of this hemisphere; (2) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported
military capability endangering the security of the United States; and (3) to work with the
Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of
the Cuban people for self-determination.
6 VWO, Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
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The Monroe Doctrine in 1823, declared that the United States would consider any attempt on the
part of European powers “to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous
to our peace and safety.
The present Government of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist- Leninist
ideology, has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine, and
accepts military assistance from extra continental Communist powers, including even the threat
of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet Union.
In the Rio Treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that “an armed attack by any State against an
American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States, and,
consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in
the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51
of the Charter of the United Nations.”
Approved October 3,1962. Joint Resolution of the Senate and the House of Representatives of
October 3, 1962. Joint Resolution expressing the determination of the United States with
respect to the situation in Cuba.
10*
“During the early days of the discussion, the vast majority of the ExComm members
rallied behind proposals for direct military action.” (Chafe, The Unfinished Journey)
11*
Robert McNamara weighs in on a naval blockade:
Disadvantages:
1. It would take a long time to achieve the objective of eliminating strategic missiles from
Cuba.
2. It would result in serious political trouble in the United States.
3. The world position of the United States might appear to be weakening.
Advantages:
1. It would cause us the least trouble with our allies.
2. It avoids any surprise air attack on Cuba, which is contrary to our tradition.
3. It is the only military course of action compatible with our position as a leader of the
free world.
4. It avoids a sudden military move which might provoke a response from the USSR
which could result in escalating actions leading to general war.
12*
Adlai Stevenson writes (October 17, 1962): Because an attack would very likely result in
Soviet reprisals somewhere--Turkey, Berlin, etc.--it is most important that we have as much of
6 VWO, Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
Page 10
the world with us as possible. To start or risk starting a nuclear war is bound to be divisive at best
and the judgments of history seldom coincide with the tempers of the moment […]Our position,
then, is that we can't negotiate with a gun at our head, a gun that imperils the innocent, helpless
Cuban people as much as it does the U.S., and that if they won't remove the missiles and restore
the status quo ante we will have to do it ourselves--and then we will be ready to discuss bases in
the context of a disarmament treaty or anything else with them. In short it is they, not the U.S.,
that have upset the balance and created this situation of such peril to the whole world.
13*
Some historical facts to consider:
-America has installed IRBMs in Turkey
-There are still Cubans willing to fight against Castro, even after the failed Bay of Pigs.
-Sending additional U2 planes to take extra pictures might raise suspicion.
-When we enter a war with Russia, this will have a terrible impact on our western allied forces in
Europe who are still in a process of rebuilding after WW II.
14*
CIA Memorandum (October 27, 1962): “The mobilization of Cuban military forces
continues at high rate. However, they remain under orders not to take any hostile action unless
attacked.”
15*
CIA Memorandum (October 27, 1962): “Khrushchev noted that ‘we have anti-aircraft
missiles and we have ballistic missiles with both nuclear and high explosive warheads already’ in
Cuba. In an effort to reassure the West, he stressed they were under strict Soviet control and
would so remain. He avowed that he would never fire these missiles except in defense of Cuba or
the Soviet Union. He also stated that he would not be the first to fire a nuclear weapon.”
16*
Louie Gohmert, Republican Representative, on Kennedy and the crisis: “Most people give
Kennedy a passing grade, a good grade on the Cuban Missile Crisis handling, but what they don't
realize, if he had had strength, if he had showed strength before, there would never have been a
Cuban Missile Crisis.”
6 VWO, Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
Page 11
VI. Questions
The Soviet Approach
1a.What could have been the most legitimate reason for Khrushchev to openly take on the
American military giant, provoke the US if you will?
1b. How can we use the answer to question 1a as a core ingredient to help shape our Sovietapproach?
John F Kennedy’s Reputation
2a. Earlier during his presidency, John F Kennedy had ordered a failed Bay of Pigs invasion.
How did this impact his decision making during the thirteen days of the Cuba Crisis?
2b. To what extent did that invasion failure influence the hawkish Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Diplomacy as an option
3a. Sensing Russia’s willingness to provoke America in this way, how far should the door be
opened for a diplomatic solution?
3b. How should the ExComm communicate its decision making to the public (if that is what we
deem necessary)?
Potential solutions
4a. Overseeing the entire crisis, which was hard enough as it was, can you sum up what potential
solutions there are for this conflict?
4b. Can you analyze the repercussions and consequences of all solutions for the short and longterm future of the US primarily and the world?
Who is Khrushchev exactly?
5a. What type of man is Khrushchev? Can you give a (detailed) character description?
5b. Based on question 5a, what are the odds Khrushchev will indeed use the IRBMs installed on
Cuba to attack the US?
5c. Depending on your answer to 5b, how does that influence your decision making today
(October 24, 1962)?
6 VWO, Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
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America as a superpower
6a. To what extent are you concerned about America’s reputation as a world superpower if we
don’t go on the offensive against Cuba and Russia?
6b. If you are concerned, then would our reputation in foreign affairs be reason enough to go
through with a plan to annihilate Cuba?
6c. If you are not concerned, can you put into words why not?
The Europe Conundrum
7. With Russia knocking on the door in Berlin and Europe in general, how does this crisis and
your solution impact our ‘brothers in arms’ in Western-Europe?
6 VWO, Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
Page 13
VII Reflection Report
Directly after the simulation session, we ask you to reflect on your role and participation in this
project.
Write between 500 and 800 (English) words. Add a title and use historical sources whenever
you feel the need. At a minimum, answer the following questions by reflecting on:
-the preparation process for your role during the simulation. What did you do to prepare yourself?
What sources did you consult? (How) did you cooperate with other classmates?
-your active participation during the simulation. What was your biggest success? Where, perhaps,
did you fall short? What would/could you have done differently? What made this exercise
challenging for you?
-the impact the simulation has had on your general historical awareness but also in terms of the
Cuban Missile Crisis itself;
-what changes could be made to the simulation to make it more effective and even playful
perhaps?
6 VWO, Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
Page 14
VIII EVALUATION CRITERIA ‘Cuban Missile Crisis-Project’
Excellent (4)
De leerling doet
amper mee aan de
discussies die
worden gevoerd
of weet niet goed
hoe en wanneer
welke inbreng in
de discussie
gepast is. De rol
van de leerling eist
meer deelname.
De leerling stemt
wel.
De leerling doet mee
tijdens de discussies en
brengt ook waardevolle
opmerkingen in die het
debat rijker maken. Op
basis van de inbreng van
de leerling is het ook
meteen duidelijk hoe
hij/zij stemt tijdens de
eindresolutie die door
de ExComm naar voren
zal worden gebracht.
De leerling doet actief
mee tijdens de
discussies. De inbreng is
doordacht en
stuurt/verandert de
aard van de discussie.
De leerling is in staat het
gesprek te beïnvloeden
en te laten kantelen.
Vanuit de analogie die
wordt toegepast is het
geheel transparant hoe
dit tot een bepaald
stemgedrag leidt.
Deelname Simulatie
Voldoende (3)
De leerling doet niet mee
aan de simulatie. Er wordt
op geen enkele wijze een
kritische inbreng van de
leerling waargenomen
waardoor de rol die hij/zij
moet spelen in het conflict
geheel genegeerd wordt
en in het eindoordeel niet
wordt meegenomen. De
leerling stemt alleen mee
in de eindresolutie.
Gespreksvaardigheid
Matig (2)
De leerling doet
mee maar heeft
moeite om
zijn/haar
gedachtes
De leerling spreekt amper
vloeiend te
waardoor het onmogelijk is
vertalen naar het
om de
Engels waardoor
gespreksvaardigheid van
het invloed heeft
de leerling te toetsen.
op de vorm van
het gesproken
woord en
daarmee ook de
inhoud.
De leerling spreekt
enthousiast,
De leerling spreekt
overtuigend en uiterst
vloeiend in het Engels
vlot in het Engels. De
en heeft vrijwel geen
leerling kan op haarfijne
moeite om zijn/haar
wijze een gedachtegoed
kritische gedachten te
vertalen naar het Engels.
vertalen naar het Engels.
De vorm en de inhoud
Zowel vorm als inhoud
van het gesproken
zijn op orde.
woord sluiten feilloos op
elkaar aan.
Voorbereiding
Onvoldoende (1)
Op basis van de
lessen die zijn
Op basis van de lessen die gegeven voor de
zijn gegeven voor de
simulatie en de
simulatie en de deelname deelname aan de
aan de simulatie zelf, laat
simulatie zelf, laat
de leerling een zeer
de leerling zien
gebrekkige voorbereiding
zich te hebben
zien. De leerling heeft geen voorbereid maar
verdieping gevonden en/of vrijwel geen
willen vinden om dit
enkele wijze de
project in goede banen te diepte geraakt in
leiden,
hoe met het
project is
omgegaan.
Op basis van de lessen
die zijn gegeven voor de
simulatie en de
deelname aan de
simulatie zelf, laat de
leerling zien actief mee
te hebben gedaan. De
leerling heeft voldoende
verdieping gevonden en
geboden in kop, romp
en staart van het
project.
6 VWO, Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
Score
Op basis van de lessen
die zijn gegeven voor de
simulatie en de
deelname aan de
simulatie zelf, laat de
leerling zien eigenaar te
zijn geweest van de
toegewezen rol. De
leerling is volledig
geabsorbeerd door
zijn/haar rol in kop,
romp en staart.
Page 15
Historisch Empathie
Verslaglegging
De leerling is op geen
enkele wijze in staat om
middels historisch
bewustzijn zich te
verplaatsen in een ander.
De leerling heeft zich
De leerling is in
verdiept in de gekozen
staat om een
rol en toont vervolgens
historische rol na in de uitwerking de
te spelen op basis nodige historische
van de informatie empathie. De leerling
die voorhanden is kan zijn eigen belangen
maar de
wegstrepen en eigenaar
vertaalslag naar
worden van een ander
historisch
op basis van (karakter)
inlevingsvermogen eigenschappen,
wordt niet altijd
historische feiten en
zichtbaar gelegd.
andere interculturele
componenten.
De leerling heeft
maar deels
De leerling heeft niet
voldaan aan de
voldaan aan de
randvoorwaarden
randvoorwaarden van het
van het verslag.
reflectieverslag. De
De woorden zijn in
woorden die op papier
vorm en inhoud
staan zijn zowel in vorm als
bijzonder matig
inhoud ruim onvoldoende
omdat er maar
omdat er niet genoeg
beperkt
wordt gereflecteerd op
gereflecteerd
product (simulatie) en
wordt op de
proces (voorbereiding).
deelname aan het
Het is voor de docent
project voor zowel
volledig onduidelijk hoe de
product als
leerling dit project heeft
proces. Het is voor
doorlopen omdat er op
de docent lastig
geen enkele manier
om in te schatten
inzichtelijk wordt gemaakt
hoe de leerling het
welke (denk)stappen er
project heeft
zijn gezet om tot een
doorlopen. De
goede uitvoering van de
leerling komt met
rol te komen. De leerling
verbeter- punten
komt niet met
voor de docent
verbeterpunten(tups/tops)
maar de
voor de docent.
opbrengst van de
reflectie is mager.
0 Eind:
6 VWO, Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
De leerling heeft zich
aan de
randvoorwaarden van
het verslag gehouden.
De woorden zijn qua
inhoud en vorm helder
om te volgen voor de
docent. De leerling linkt
zijn of haar ervaringen
binnen dit project aan
zowel proces als product
en verbindt dit af en toe
aan historische bronnen.
Het is voor de docent
goed te volgen welke
(denk)stappen er door
de leerling zijn gezet
tijdens het project. De
leerling komt vervolgens
ook met een aantal
overdraagbare tips/tops
voor de docenten om
het project voor volgend
jaar verder aan te
kunnen scherpen.
De leerling heeft zich
grondig verdiept in de
gekozen rol en toont
vervolgens een stevige
dosis historische
empathie. De leerling is
goed in staat om zich
voor de volle 100% te
verplaatsen in een ander
en diens rol op basis van
(karakter)
eigenschappen,
historische feiten en
andere interculturele
componenten.
De leerling heeft zich
aan de
randvoorwaarden van
het verslag gehouden.
De woorden zijn qua
vorm en inhoud zeer
helder te volgen. De
leerling linkt zijn of haar
ervaringen aan zowel
product als proces met
een duidelijk
onderscheid tussen kop,
romp en staart. De
leerling gebruikt
bronnen en parafraseert
in het verslag zodat het
zijn/haar bevindingen
nog krachtiger maakt.
Het is voor de docent
volledig helder welke
(denk)stappen de
leerling heeft gezet om
dit project tot een goed
einde te brengen. De
leerling komt met
uitermate goede en
overdraagbare tips en
tops om het project nog
strakker neer te kunnen
zetten.
0,0
Page 16
IX
Suggested Bibliography
Alter, Karen. Resolving or exacerbating disputes? The WTO’s new dispute resolution system.
International Affairs, 2003/4, pp. 783-800.
Andeson, Dwight. Power, Rhethoric, and the State: A Theory of Presidential Legitamcy. The
Review of Politics. Volume 50, Number 2 (Spring, 1988) p 198-214
Chafe, William. The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II. Oxford University Press
(New York, 2003)
Corwin, Edward. The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1984. (New York, 1984)
David, Thelen. Making History and Making the United States. Journal of American Studies.
Volume 32 (1998), p.373-397.
Dietze, Gottfried. America’s Political Dilemma: From Limited to Unlimited Democracy.
Baltimore, 1968).
Dobson, Allan; Marsh, Steve. U.S. Foreign Policy since 1945: Making of the Contemporary
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