EVALUATION REPORTS
The German Civil Peace Service
Case Study of Cambodia
ii
The German Civil Peace Service
Case Study of Cambodia
Jörn Dosch, Doung Virorth and Kim Sedara
The following report has been commissioned by the Evaluation and Audit Division of the Federal
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany. The opinions presented in this study
are those of independent external experts and do not necessarily reflect the views of BMZ or the
people consulted. A summary version of the Synthesis Report is available on the BMZ website
(http://www.bmz.de/de/publikationen/reihen/index.html#evaluierungen).
This report should be cited as: Dosch, J.; Viroth, D.; Sedara, K. (2011): The German Civil Peace
Service: Case Study of Cambodia. Unpublished evalution report. Bonn: Bundesministerium für
wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung.
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany (BMZ)
Dahlmannstraße 4
53113 Bonn, Germany
www.bmz.de/en
[email protected]
April 2011
iii
Acknowledgments
The evaluation team would like to thank everyone involved in this evaluation. We received
tremendous support from all stakeholders to make this evaluation a joint learning experience.
Special thanks go to all who helped to prepare and implement the mission in Cambodia by
providing documents, by managing the logistics and by dedicating time to prepare and attend
workshops, interviews and group discussions.
Many thanks go to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ),
the headquarters of the German Development Service (DED) and the Church Development
Service (EED) in Germany and particularly to the DED country office in Phnom Penh, as well
as to the CPS partners, CPS experts and many others consulted. A special word of gratitude
goes to the CPS coordinator in Cambodia, Andreas Selmeci, and to DED country director
Wolfgang Möllers for their excellent cooperation, great flexibility and ongoing support to the
mission. Thanks also to Thania Paffenholz for her exceptional guidance and feedback
throughout the evaluation and to the entire team of the Centre on Conflict, Development and
Peacebuilding at the Graduate Institute in Geneva for helping whenever needed.
Jörn Dosch, Doung Virorth and Kim Sedara
iv
Contents
Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................... iv
Abbreviations and acronyms .......................................................................................... ix
Executive summary ........................................................................................................ xi
1. Background and introduction ....................................................................................... 1
1.1 Objective and purpose ................................................................................................ 1
1.2 General introduction to the CPS country programme Cambodia ........................................... 2
1.3 Evaluation design, methodology and process ................................................................... 2
1.4 Team....................................................................................................................... 6
1.5 Constraints ............................................................................................................... 6
2. Country context ........................................................................................................... 7
2.1 General country profile .................................................................................................................7
2.2 Causes of conflicts in Cambodia ..................................................................................................8
2.3 Gender relations and gender-based violence ............................................................................. 10
2.4 Peacebuilding initiatives .............................................................................................................11
2.5 Civil society context ...................................................................................................................13
3. CPS involvement ....................................................................................................... 14
3.1 German Development Cooperation ............................................................................................14
3.2 CPS portfolio .............................................................................................................................15
3.2.1 DED-CPS ................................................................................................................ 15
3.2.2 EED-CPS ................................................................................................................ 17
4. Main findings along evaluation criteria ....................................................................... 18
4.1 Relevance..................................................................................................................................18
4.1.1 Are CPS activities addressing the main needs for peacebuilding in Cambodia?................. 18
4.1.2 Do CPS activities adapt to changing conflict contexts? ...................................................... 19
4.1.3 Do activities under the CPS programme in Cambodia correspond with the overall CPS
strategies? ................................................................................................................................. 21
4.1.4 How relevant are the CPS partners for peacebuilding? ...................................................... 21
4.1.5 How relevant is the sending of European CPS experts? .................................................... 23
4.1.6 What would partner organisations do if the CPS did not exist? .......................................... 23
4.2 Effectiveness .............................................................................................................................25
4.2.1 What are the theories of change?...................................................................................... 25
4.2.2 How are theories of change translated into objectives and project designs? ...................... 28
4.2.3 Assessing Outcome 1: What are the main changes within CPS partner organisations that
can be attributed to the work of the CPS experts? ...................................................................... 29
4.2.4 Assessing Outcome 2: How have project activities under the CPS programme supported
the ECCC in their contribution to the establishment of the truth about the Khmer Rouge regime
and given impulses for the development of the rule of law? ........................................................ 33
v
4.2.5. Assessing Outcome 3: How have project activities under the CPS programme helped
survivors and the following generations to come to terms with the atrocities committed during
the Khmer Rouge regime? ......................................................................................................... 35
4.2.6 What are the differences in effectiveness with regard to different partners? ....................... 39
4.2.7 In which phases of conflict are activities most effective?.................................................... 39
4.3 Impact .......................................................................................................................................39
4.3.1 What is the impact of projects under the CPS programme? ............................................... 39
4.3.2 How does the CPS programme in Cambodia conceptualise impact? ................................. 39
4.4 Efficiency ...................................................................................................................................40
4.4.1 How efficient are the CPS’s administrative, financial, monitoring and learning
instruments? .............................................................................................................................. 40
4.4.2 How efficient is the establishment of posts of CPS coordinators? ...................................... 43
4.4.3 How does CPS align with the subsidiary principle and how cost-efficient would be
alternatives? .............................................................................................................................. 44
4.5 Sustainability .............................................................................................................................44
4.5.1 What are experiences of sustainability after the CPS expert leaves projects and
activities? .................................................................................................................................. 44
4.5.2 How are issues of sustainability integrated into the planning of CPS activities from the
beginning of a project? How has this process (and its milestones) been monitored? .................. 45
4.5.3 How does the CPS ensure that local expertise is not sidelined or downplayed by
European CPS experts? ............................................................................................................ 46
4.6 Coherence, coordination, complementarity................................................................................. 47
4.6.1 Coherence ........................................................................................................................ 47
4.6.2 External complementarity .................................................................................................. 47
4.6.3 Internal complementarity ................................................................................................... 48
4.6.4 Coordination ..................................................................................................................... 48
4.7 Cross cutting issues ...................................................................................................................49
4.7.1 How is the gender dimension addressed by the programme? ............................................ 49
4.7.2 How effective are the CPS activities in incorporating issues of conflict sensitivity? ............. 50
5. Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 50
5.1 Overall strengths........................................................................................................................50
5.2 Overall weaknesses ...................................................................................................................51
6. Recommendations ..................................................................................................... 53
6.1 To the BMZ ................................................................................................................................53
6.2 To DED headquarters ................................................................................................................53
6.3 To the DED country office Cambodia ......................................................................................... 53
6.4 To EED headquarters ................................................................................................................54
6.5 To partner organisations ............................................................................................................54
7. Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 55
vi
Annexes:
Annex 1: Maps of Cambodia ..................................................................................................................57
Annex 2: Detailed evaluation questions for the Cambodia evaluation...................................................... 59
Annex 3: List of DED-CPS projects 2001–2006 and 2007–2010 ............................................................. 61
Annex 4: CPS evaluation schedule Cambodia, January/February 2010 .................................................. 65
Annex 5: List of persons met by evaluation team .................................................................................... 67
Annex 6: Debriefing Note .......................................................................................................................69
Annex 7: Interview guide CPS evaluation Cambodia case study ............................................................. 78
List of figures and tables
Table 1: Summary of DED-CPS Programme ‘Justice and Reconciliation in Cambodia’,
2007-2010 ...... ...............................................................................:................................…....…...16
Table 2: Outputs and Outcomes of Programme Dimensions, 2007-2010............................................. ..... 27
Table 3: Projects of the 2001-2006 CPS Phase..........................................................:........................... ...61
Table 4: Projects of the ‘Justice and reconciliation in Cambodia’ programme (2007-2010)..................... ..63
Figure 1: Comparison of Theories of Change, DED-CPS Programme 2002-2006 and 2007-2010..... ..... .26
Figure 2: Project Results Chain: Youth for Justice and Reconciliation..............................….…......... .... ...30
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Abbreviations and acronyms
ADHOC
Cambodian Association for Human Rights and Development
AusAid
Australian Aid
BMZ
Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung
(German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)
CAMBOW
Cambodian Committee of Women
CCHR
Cambodian Center for Human Rights
CDP
Cambodian Defenders Project
CHRAC
Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee
CIDSE
International Alliance of Catholic Development Agencies
CIM
Centrum für internationale Migration und Entwicklung
(Centre for International Migration and Development)
CJR
Center for Justice and Reconciliation
CPS
Civil Peace Service (Ziviler Friedensdienst)
CPS Group
Group of CPS executing agencies
(English term for Konsortium Ziviler Friedensdienst)
CS/CSO
Civil society/Civil society organisation
CSD
Center for Social Development
DAAD
Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst
(German Academic Exchange Service)
DED1
Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst
DMC
Department for Media and Communication
DP
Department of Psychology
DWHH
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe
EC
European Commission
ECCC
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
EED
Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst (Church Development Service)
EFK
Einheimische Fachkraft (local expert)
EO
Einheimische Organisation (local organisation)
FA
Finanzielle Assistenz (financial assistance)
GBV
Gender-based violence
GTZ 1
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
ICCO
Netherlands
Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation of the
Netherlands
IFA
Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen
1
DED, GTZ and InWEnt were merged into Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
(GIZ) on 1 January 2011. As this evaluation was conducted in 2009 and 2010, the then names are
used in this report.
ix
IRI
International Republican Institute
IFA/Zivik
IFA Zivile Konfliktbearbeiting (IFA Civil Conflict Resolution)
KAS
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
KID
Khmer Institute of Democracy
KRT
Khmer Rouge Tribunal
Maryknoll
Overseas Mission Activity of the U.S. Catholic Church
Misereor
Overseas Development Agency of the Catholic Church in Germany
NDI
National Democratic Institute
NED
National Endowment for Democracy
NGO
Non-governmental organisation
PO
Partner organisation
PT
Projektträger (project grant holder)
RUPP
Royal University of Phnom Penh
TA
Technische Assistenz (technical assistance)
TPO
Transcultural Psychosocial Organization (Cambodia)
UN
United Nations
UNDP
United Nation Development Programme
VU
Victims Unit
WMC
Women’s Media Center
YFP
Youth for Peace
x
Executive summary
property of individuals or groups (instead
of state institutions).
1. Background
Even today, a broad range of problems
caused by the civil war and the Khmer
Rouge regime still affects the country. The
Khmer Rouge regime was the most
destructive period in recent Khmer history.
It was followed by regular armed conflict in
the 1980s and 1990s. The traces of these
violent experiences are visible in today’s
society and peacebuilding and
reconciliation are still in progress. There is
a continuing potential of violence, as can
be observed in contemporary land
disputes. Moreover, social integration of
former combatants and de-mining have
not yet been fully completed. The capacity
of the public sector and civil society to
respond effectively to the emerging social
issues remains limited, jeopardised by
poor governance such as corruption and
lack of transparency, weak state
performance and responsiveness.
The evaluation of the German Civil Peace
Service (CPS) in Cambodia is part of a
global evaluation of the CPS, which took
place from June 2009 to January 2011.
The CPS was founded in 1999 as an
instrument of the German Federal Ministry
for Economic Cooperation and
Development for advancing civil society
peacebuilding.
The objectives of the CPS evaluation in
Cambodia were
•
to acquire insights into the functioning
of the CPS in Cambodia;
•
to assess the results of the CPS’s
contribution; and
•
to make recommendations for the
further development of CPS
programmes and projects.
Context
The CPS in Cambodia
The past decades of Cambodia’s history
have been characterised by protracted
conflict. From the early 1970s to 1993,
Cambodia underwent several political and
economic transitions. Politically, it
experienced monarchy, republican rule,
genocide, Stalinist communism, and more
recently, democratic governance.
Economically, in the 1980s, Cambodia
adopted a centralised command economy
and later switched to a free market
economy, which, however, like the
democratisation of the political system has
so far only been imperfectly realised.
The German Development Service’s
(DED) 2 CPS programme started in 2001
and can be divided into two phases:
The country has found it difficult to achieve
peaceful transitions of power from one
regime to another. Power transitions have
usually been accomplished by fierce
fighting and bloodshed. In Cambodia’s
political culture, power is not seen as a
shared good, but rather as an absolutist
•
Phase 1 (2001 to 2006) followed a
heterogeneous approach and focused
on interventions in the areas of small
arms reduction, peaceful conflict
resolution, the rule of law and
democracy, gender-based violence,
civil society participation in political
decision-making, etc.
•
Phase 2 (2007 to 2010) concentrates
on “Justice and Reconciliation in
Cambodia” and is entirely focussed on
interventions linked to the
2
DED, GTZ and InWEnt were merged into
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) on 1 January 2011. As
this evaluation was conducted in 2009 and
2010, the then names are used in this report.
xi
(which in turn contributes to
reconciliation); and
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia (ECCC), also known as
the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT).
•
•
Since 2001, DED has deployed 28
CPS experts and three CPS
coordinators in Cambodia. The
average total project budget before
2007 was about 75,000 euros per
year. Since 2007, the annual average
budget has been 320,000 euros. From
this amount, DED has funded between
20 and 30 projects of its partner
organisations (Projektträger and
Einheimische Organisationen) each
year. All projects have been related to
the ECCC.
2. Key findings and conclusions
Relevance: The programme in Cambodia
is highly relevant, because the ECCC is
seen as central to the peacebuilding
agenda; DED-CPS is known and
respected for a high level of expertise
based on the ‘German experience’. Of the
four ECCC-linked focal areas – outreach,
victims participation, mental health and
remembrance (‘memory culture’) – the last
three may not have been addressed
without the involvement of the CPS,
because DED was among the main
advocates for their inclusion as donorfunded projects in support of the ECCC’s
work. However, the relevance of victim
support and ‘memory culture’ could be
further strengthened if more donors got
involved. Sending European CPS experts
(as compared to other instruments and
strategies) is still highly relevant in the
Cambodian context. Although the
expertise and capacity of Cambodian
NGO workers has markedly increased
over the past years, for the foreseeable
future, CPS experts are needed for
capacity building and skills transfer and
cannot yet be replaced by local experts or
other instruments on a large scale. On the
one hand, project ownership of partner
organisations – due to increasing local
capacity and expertise – is growing. On
the other hand, at least for the time being,
project initiation and strategic planning is
still predominantly CPS-driven. Most
NGOs respond to donor interests and do
not take pro-active approaches to the
planning of interventions.
The Church Development Service (EED)
deployed two CPS experts at the nongovernmental organisation (NGO) Star
Kampuchea from 2005 to 2009; one CPS
expert worked at the Khmer Institute of
Democracy (KID) from 2002 to 2004
together with a DED CPS expert. The
EED’s support of these two civil society
organisations focused broadly on
management, advocacy, capacity building,
strengthening civil society, democracy,
good governance, the rule of law and
human rights.
While the evaluation also addresses the
first phase of the DED-CPS programme
and mentions the comparatively small
EED-CPS, it mainly concentrates on the
DED-CPS programme from 2007 to 2010.
DED’s current CPS programme in
Cambodia is a larger intervention with
several Cambodian partners that all work
around the ECCC. The main contribution
to peacebuilding lies in
•
strengthening the accountability
process of the ECCC and the legal
legacy of the Court;
•
supporting victims to participate in the
legal proceedings and thus giving key
beneficiaries of this process a voice
disseminating information about the
Khmer Rouge period and the ECCC to
different target audiences, such as
young and old people; and providing
psycho-social support to those in
need.
xii
Effectiveness: The general theory of
change that underpins the entire current
CPS programme in Cambodia (“Justice
and Reconciliation in Cambodia”) is based
on the proposition that reconciliation and
an effective approach to coping with the
Khmer Rouge past is the precondition for
sustained national and societal peace and
stability. Related to the programme’s
theory of change are four theories of
change for the programme components or
dimensions. These are very clearly
developed and presented in programme
documents.
and remembrance in a broader way that
goes beyond the ECCC proceedings also
contribute to achieving outcomes in line
with the theories of change. Yet, it is more
difficult to prove their immediately
measureable effectiveness.
Impact: The DED-CPS programme wants
to make a strong contribution to national
reconciliation and an effective approach to
coping with the Khmer Rouge past. This in
turn is seen as a precondition for
sustained peace and stability in
Cambodia. However, both are still
unrealised objectives. Clear
advancements towards achieving
programme and project outcomes have
provided an important input towards
reaching the impact level. At the same
time, the conceptualisation of impact is
somewhat hampered by the fact that DED
(generally and not just in Cambodia) works
with a terminology that is different from the
one used by the OECD’s Development
Assistance Committee (DAC).
Across the programme, the most important
changes regarding the CPS partner
organisations are
•
the strengthening of internal
procedures and mechanisms in the
fields of project implementation,
monitoring and participatory decisionmaking;
•
advances in the professionalisation of
capacity building;
•
a stronger emphasis on network
building among partner organisations
and national, international and
transnational civil society organisations
respectively; and
•
advances in the introduction and
application of specific peacebuilding
concepts and tools.
Efficiency: The CPS programme in
Cambodia is well managed and
administered. There can be little doubt
about the strong leadership and vision of
both the CPS coordinator and the DED
country director. The vast majority of CPS
experts and partner organisations
appreciate the clear, efficient and
straightforward administrative procedures,
guidelines and requirements for DED-CPS
projects, especially when compared to the
more complex rules and procedures of
other donors.
Since all projects or implementation
processes are based on strong theories of
change and well-developed results chains,
they tend to have a high outcome
likelihood. Projects directly supporting the
ECCC, particularly on victims support,
assistance to civil parties and the ECCC’s
outreach, have so far been at the forefront
of achieving immediate tangible outcomes,
because they have clear and very specific
target indicators that can be easily
measured (and are regularly monitored)
using surveys. There is strong indication
that projects which promote reconciliation
All current CPS experts are well qualified
for their specific tasks. Occasional
problems surfaced in the past but were
very small overall. In addition, there is a
good match between the expertise of CPS
experts and the training and development
needs of partner organisations. In
particular, CPS experts are well aware of
the cultural context in which they operate
and activities are characterised by a high
level of “cultural embeddedness”. There
xiii
Complementarity, coordination, and
coherence
are generally no attempts at “one size fits
all” model transfers in the peacebuilding
process.
Coherence: The evaluators are not aware
of any policy incoherence between the
CPS programme and other policies.
The current CPS programme puts strong
emphasis on an anticipatory and joint
learning approach which is based on
regular joint CPS experts/partner
organisations lessons learned and
monitoring workshops that facilitate an
exchange of best practices, generate
recommendations for improvements of
existing activities and serve capacity
building needs.
External complementarity: The current
programme is highly complementary with
other donors’ support for the ECCC as it
was the first – and still is the core –
intervention that addresses victims support
as well as remembrance and memory
culture. The DED-CPS programme is fully
complementary with the interventions of
other German organisations (Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Centre for
International Migration and Development
(CIM), InWEnt Capacity Building
International and Konrad-AdenauerStiftung (KAS)).
Sustainability: Occasionally, partner
organisations have demonstrated
capacities and capabilities to continue
activities on their own without further CPS
support. However, this applies only to the
largest NGOs and only in exceptional
cases. Generally, sustainability of the
current DED-CPS phase is weak. For
example, while the CPS tries to prevent
the sidelining or downplaying of local
expertise by European experts, CPS
experts often unwillingly find themselves in
a leadership, decision-making or senior
management position, because the
partner organisation wants them to play
such a role. This is a hurdle in the process
of strengthening local ownership.
Internal complementarity: The CPS
programmes of DED and EED have been
complementary in their approach to
strengthening the peacebuilding capacities
and capabilities of NGOs. However, there
is currently no EED CPS expert in
Cambodia.
Coordination: Coordination among
German implementing agencies is
facilitated through frequent meetings
among the country officers and senior
project officers (including the CPS
coordinator) of DED, GTZ, InWEnt (all
three have their offices in the same
building) and KAS. The evaluators did not
find any evidence for formal coordination
between DED and EED on the CPS in
Cambodia in recent years. At the same
time, the EED’s share has been very small
and the need for coordination was
minimal.
Most crucially, no systematic and
institutionalised approach has so far been
put in place to achieve and increase the
sustainability of interventions. When the
funding ceases, NGOs usually move on to
the next donor-driven project. While the
current ECCC interventions offer a good
chance for sustainability due to a) the
integration of individual projects into a
coherent programme and b) the strong
coalition of donors and NGOs that has
been created under the leadership of
DED, an explicit post-ECCC strategy does
not exist.
Cross-cutting issues
Gender relations and Gender-based
violence (GBV) are key issues in
Cambodia’s post-conflict setting. The
gender dimension is explicitly and
xiv
between junior and senior experts is
often not clear.
prominently addressed in many projects
and the systematic inclusion of gender as
a cross-cutting issue is a main
characteristic of all current CPS-funded
projects in Cambodia.
Conflict sensitivity: CPS experts and
partner organisations are very aware of
the context they are working in and this
awareness is thoroughly reflected in all
project documents (proposals, reports and
other documentation).
•
The role and status of local experts
should be clarified. Unlike in other
country contexts (for example Latin
America), in Cambodia, they seldom
work as the CPS expert’s direct
counterpart. Their status ranges from
project assistants to programme
managers.
•
A standardised model for results
chains and the assessment of outputs,
outcomes and impact should be
developed. When planning and
designing projects, outputs, outcomes
and impact should be distinguished
more clearly and DAC terminology
should be used.
Recommendations
To the BMZ
•
Overall recommendation: The CPS
programme should be continued in
Cambodia.
•
The new practice of allowing higher
CPS country budgets at the beginning
of a fiscal year (based on
substantiated needs) should be
continued.
•
To the DED country office Cambodia
More reporting in English should be
considered for the sake of the partner
organisation and international monitors
and evaluators. The option of
switching to a ‘reporting in English
only’ system would also avoid some
duplication in terms of CPS experts
having to report the same subject
matters in both German and English.
To DED headquarters
•
Stronger participatory approach in
CPS-partner relations: partner
organisations should be more involved
in the profiling and selection of the
CPS expert.
•
Junior experts should get the same
preparatory training as senior CPS
experts (Friedensfachkräfte) as they
are effectively doing a very similar job
and need to be as familiar with cultural
contexts and peacebuilding strategies
as their more senior colleagues. To
partner organisations the difference
xv
•
Risk should be considered more
explicitly and comprehensively during
project planning, particularly
concerning sustainability.
•
Knowledge management: a website for
CPS stakeholders (as a one stop
resource centre) and a more general
website for beneficiaries should be
created. It will only be a matter of time
before most people in Cambodia will
have access to the internet. An
informal discussion forum with partner
organisations and other implementing
agencies on a post-ECCC strategy
should be set up or encouraged.
Future options for the CPS programme
in Cambodia should be urgently
addressed especially since donors are
already eying an ECCC exit strategy.
As DED is not a donor itself, it cannot
be asked to initiate a formal donor
dialogue on this issue. However, DED
might want to consider asking partner
organisations (or a small group of
current partner organisations) to lead
this informal deliberation process to
increase ownership and encourage
To partner organisations
partner organisations to give
sustainability more prominent thought.
•
Disseminators (teachers, councillors
etc.) should be more specifically
targeted in different activities. The
involvement of monks would be a good
start. More initiatives and materials for
outreach to the grassroots level and
the general population should be
created.
•
The establishment of formal
procedures for capacity building (in
coordination with DED headquarters)
should be considered to replace
current ad hoc arrangements (e.g. x
per cent of the budget should be
allocated to capacity building of
partner as a matter of course).
Because capacity building takes place
only on an informal basis, it should be
clarified in relations between DEDCPS and partner organisations that the
latter share the responsibility for
providing appropriate training for local
experts.
•
The specific mission, role and tasks of
CPS experts in communication with
partner organisations should be
clarified in order to avoid sometimes
unrealistic expectations of partner
organisations.
To EED headquarters
•
The establishment of a coordination
mechanism with DED should be
discussed if the EED-CPS programme
is resumed in Cambodia.
xvi
•
Partner organisations should develop
their own strategies for capacity
building. This cannot and should not
be the sole duty of the CPS. Existing
knowledge among own local staff
should be used for capacity building. In
this regard, there is no need for a total
reliance on donors anymore.
•
Cooperation and coordination
mechanisms should be strengthened
as competition among NGOs for grants
is an obstacle for a higher level of
coordination and cooperation among
local stakeholders.
•
DED should be lobbied for
participation in the selection process of
CPS experts. A solution could be for
partner organisations to provide their
feedback on shortlisted candidates,
based on CVs, application letters,
diplomas and references.
•
Partner organisations should engage
with the DED country office in an open
discussion of the role of CPS experts
and local experts prior to project
commencement to clarify the scope of
tasks, duties and obligations.
1. Background and introduction
1.1 Objective and purpose
The evaluation of the German Civil Peace Service (CPS) in Cambodia is part of the global
evaluation of the CPS (see Inception Report) which took place from June 2009 to January
2011.
The CPS was founded in 1999 as an instrument of the German Federal Ministry for
Economic Cooperation and Development for advancing civil society peacebuilding. The CPS
has a number of features that make it a unique instrument, unavailable in other countries.
Since its inception, the CPS has been a joint project by governmental and non-governmental
organisations involved in peacebuilding and development project activities. The CPS focuses
on crisis prevention, violence reduction, as well as peacebuilding efforts undertaken in the
aftermath of large scale violence. The CPS mainly functions around sending European
experts (Friedensfachkräfte – FFKs3) to cooperate with partner organisations in conflictaffected countries. This is based on an understanding that the CPS expert brings
qualifications, knowledge and resources that are not available locally, thereby contributing to
intercultural learning with his/her personal working habits, creativity and solidarity.
Furthermore, the CPS expert uses his/her status as an outsider to the conflict to provide
credibility, legitimacy, impartiality and protection (see CPS group, Standards zum Zivilen
Friedensdienst 2008). As of the end of 2009, the CPS had granted 583 CPS positions in 50
countries (BMZ, Sachstand Ziviler Friedensdienst, 6.1.2010). An initial evaluation of the CPS
was undertaken in 2002, leading to important insights with regard to the establishment of the
CPS and the continuation of its programme. As the CPS has now existed for ten years, the
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) commissioned
a new independent external evaluation. The Centre on Conflict, Development and
Peacebuilding (CCDP) at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in
Geneva, Switzerland, responded to the public tendering procedure and obtained the
mandate for the evaluation.
The evaluation of the CPS is taking place both in Germany and in eight selected conflict
contexts (Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Guatemala, Israel/Palestinian Territories, Niger,
Serbia and Uganda). The objective of the overall evaluation is to highlight measures of
accountability for the CPS programme and recommendations in the light of future projects.
The objectives of the CPS evaluation in Cambodia were:
•
to acquire insights into the functioning of the CPS in Cambodia;
•
to assess the results of the CPS’s contribution; and
•
to make recommendations for the further development of CPS programmes and
projects.
3
It has to be acknowledged that CPS partner organisations in Cambodia mainly use the terms ‘peace
experts’ or ‘European experts’ when they refer to CPS experts. We use ‘CPS experts’ throughout the
report.
1
1.2 General introduction to the CPS country programme Cambodia
The DED-CPS programme started in 2001 and can be divided into two phases:
•
Phase 1 (2001–2006) followed a heterogeneous approach and focused on
interventions in the areas of small arms reduction, peaceful conflict resolution, the
rule of law and democracy, gender-based violence, civil society participation in
political decision-making, etc.
•
Phase 2 (2007–2010) concentrates on “Justice and Reconciliation in Cambodia” and
is entirely focussed on interventions linked to the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), also known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT). Since
ECCC is the official name, this abbreviation will be used throughout the report.
DED does not officially cluster its CPS programme into two different phases; this distinction
was introduced by the evaluators to differentiate the current focus on the ECCC from earlier
approaches.
According to programme documents and information provided by the CPS coordinator in
Cambodia, since 2001, DED has deployed 28 CPS experts and three CPS coordinators in
Cambodia. The average total project budget before 2007 was about 75,000 euros per year.
Since 2007, the annual average budget has been 320,000 euros. From this amount, between
20 and 30 projects of the partner organisations (Projektträger and Einheimische
Organisationen) have been funded per year. All projects have been related to the ECCC.
EED deployed two CPS experts at the NGO Star Kampuchea from 2005 to 2009; one CPS
expert worked at the Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID) from 2002 to 2004 together with a
DED CPS expert. The EED support of these two civil society organisations focused broadly
on management, advocacy, capacity building, strengthening civil society, democracy, good
governance, the rule of law and human rights.
1.3 Evaluation design, methodology and process
The CCDP developed a comprehensive evaluation framework for the CPS programme that
allows for a systematic comparison of data across cases (see methodological details in
Inception Report). The methodology in the evaluation of Cambodia follows the one of the
Uganda pilot study to allow for comparability, e.g. the amended evaluation questions of the
Uganda report were also used for the Cambodia case study (see Annex 2). An interview
guide (see Annex 7) operating with core questions was used during interviews, group
discussions and meetings. Data were triangulated through comparing the different data sets
received within the various dimensions of the evaluation project:
•
the overall CPS programme;
•
the Cambodia programme, project documents and reports;
•
the self-evaluations of DED and EED and partners;
•
the interviews and group discussions conducted with CPS experts, the CPS
coordinator, EFKs, other German development actors, partners, wider stakeholders
as well as beneficiaries (see Annex 5); and
•
the results from research on the role of civil society in peacebuilding.
2
Since Cambodia was not included in the 2002 CPS evaluation, we could not draw on any
previous evaluation results.
In Cambodia, a self evaluation of CPS projects took place from October 2009 to January
2010; mission preparation, a meeting with the BMZ desk officer for Cambodia, and document
study were conducted in December 2009 and January 2010. From the very beginning of the
preparatory phase, the DED country director and CPS coordinator were very cooperative,
and communication between DED and the evaluation team (both international and local
evaluators) was exemplary. Requested documents were supplied without delay and logistical
matters were dealt with in a very efficient and effective way. The local evaluators prepared
and organised the mission very well. Contact with all relevant stakeholders had been
established and most meetings had been scheduled prior to the start of the mission. This
allowed a smooth conduct of the mission from a logistical point of view.
The mission took place from 28 January to 9 February 2010. The briefing workshop with
CPS stakeholders and the briefing at the German Embassy were followed by data collection
in Phnom Penh and Svay Rieng, two lessons learnt stakeholder workshops (on the thematic
core focal areas of the current CPS programme “Justice and Reconciliation in Cambodia”,
“Outreach and Memory Culture” and “Victims Participation and Mental Health”) and the
debriefing workshop with CPS stakeholders as well as the debriefing of the German
Embassy.
The evaluation team conducted about 50 individual interviews as well as group meetings and
focus group discussions with the DED country director and CPS coordinator, all current CPS
experts, most current EFKs, heads or deputy heads of all current and most former partner
organisations of DED and EED, other local staff of partner organisations as well as broader
constituencies and beneficiaries (victims/survivors, participants of CPS-funded activities). A
detailed schedule of the field mission is enclosed in Annex 4.
As the CPS is a complex instrument, we tried to harmonise the use of key terms relevant for
the evaluation: When we talk about instrument we mean the overall CPS programme while
we refer to implementation modalities of the CPS when we talk about different ways of
supporting partners, i.e. sending CPS experts, funding local staff (EFKs) or project activities
implemented by partners with or without CPS experts. When CPS experts support partners
directly with training or institutional support we talk about CPS expert activities; however,
when partners (with or without CPS experts) implement project activities under the CPS
programme we talk about project activities. We are aware that project activities can also
include CPS expert activities.
The evaluation of relevance is based on a ‘peacebuilding needs assessment’ (see
Paffenholz/Reychler, 2008) that compares the main activity lines implemented by the CPS
Cambodia programmes with the peacebuilding needs in the country and the CPS strategy
documents, while also assessing the ability of the partners to adapt projects to changing
conflict contexts, and analysing the roles, strengths and weaknesses of partner
organisations. In this line of thought, what is being assessed against the partners’ needs are
both the implementation modality of sending CPS experts and the overall value of the CPS
programmes in Cambodia. The aim of the assessment is to know whether or not partners
achieve their goals better with the help of CPS experts.
The evaluation of effectiveness is based on a reconstruction of the theories of change and
the way these are translated into objectives and programme or project designs. We looked at
3
the kinds of changes that had occurred or could occur. The reconstruction of the overall logic
of intervention is presented in figure 1 (see 4.2.1) with reference to both the pre-2007 and the
post-2007 programme.
Our assessment of the contribution of CPS experts was based both on the theories of
change as spelled out in the document of the CPS group ‘Standards für den ZFD’ of 2008
and the reconstructed theories of change for the CPS programme in Cambodia. We tried to
assess the contribution of the CPS experts to the achievement of desired processes of
change within the partner organisation (outcome 1), how CPS projects had supported the
ECCC in contributing to the establishment of the truth about the Khmer Rouge regime and
given impulses for the development of the rule of law (outcome 2) and how projects had
helped survivors and the following generations to come to terms with the atrocities committed
during the Khmer Rouge (outcome 3). While outcome 3 logically builds on outcome 2 in the
sense that the theory of change sees the ECCC as the starting point for, and the most
important contribution to any meaningful approach to dealing with the Khmer Rouge past, the
CPS projects target both outcome levels in parallel. In other words, project results chains are
based on the assumption that the effectiveness of projects directed at outcome 2 can only be
achieved and lead to outcome 3 if strengthened and enhanced through project activities that
embed the work and mission of the ECCC (the actual trials) to a broad societal approach to
reconciliation, remembrance and mental health.
While the distinction between the contributions of CPS experts and those of the partners was
clear on the outcome 1 level, it was less straightforward on the outcome 2 level. With regard
to outcome levels 2 and 3, we grouped the assessment of project activities along the
framework spelled out in the Inception Report. To this end, we used a set of peacebuilding
functions (protection, monitoring, advocacy, socialisation, social cohesion, facilitation and
service delivery)4 as a means to facilitate the comparison of findings across cases.
These findings, like the synthesised findings for the programme as a whole, are based on a
triangulation of project documents, the self-evaluation interviews, interviews conducted by
the evaluators, surveys and group discussions.
The Inception Report elaborated on the use of four evaluation approaches for the case
studies:
•
theory-based: comparing the project designs and processes with the results of
peacebuilding research along the identified theories of changes;
•
results-based: analysing the theories of change of the involved actors and the
degree of result achievement;
•
outcome-oriented: analysing the perceived outcomes among stakeholders groups;
and
•
process-oriented: analysing the kind of process that has been initiated in order to
achieve outcomes
4
See Inception Report and for more details Paffenholz, Thanja (2009): Civil Society and
Peacebuilding. Summary of the Results for a Comprehensive Research Project. CCDP Working
Paper, The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, No.4, available at
http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/ccdp/shared/6305/CCDP-Working-Paper-4-Civil-Society.pdf
[accessed April 2010]; Paffenholz, Thanja (2010): Civil Society and Peacebuilding. A Critical
Assessment. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
4
These were applied in the Cambodian case as follows:
The application of the results-based approach was not possible for the first CPS phase in
Cambodia (2001–2006) due to the absence of clearly defined indicators developed in past
programmes. However, a results-based approach was applicable in the case of the 2007–
2010 phase thanks to the availability of programme/project logical frameworks, baselines,
targets and indicators. In addition, the evaluation team applied an outcome-oriented
approach. This approach tried to identify achievements toward expected programme and
project outcomes as perceived by the involved stakeholders using data from interviews,
group discussions, the self evaluations, as well as programme documents. The research’s
main valid outcome hypotheses are spelled out along peacebuilding functions and are
subject to comparison with the design and process (process-oriented) of the project
activities.
According to the Cambodia documents, reconciliation and an effective approach to coping
with the Khmer Rouge past are seen as a precondition for sustained national and societal
peace and stability. The latter is defined as the CPS’s objectives in Cambodia or the highly
aggregated development impact. As the attribution of a specific programme is very difficult
and due to the lack of indicators beyond the outcome level, we concentrated on the outcome
level for this evaluation and did not assess the impact of the programme. We instead present
a short review of how impact is dealt with in the case of the CPS programme in Cambodia.
The efficiency section assesses the CPS programme’s procedures (administrative, financial,
institutional, monitoring, reporting and learning) as well as the cost-benefit relation of the
programme. We tried, as much as we could, to make a clear distinction between the global
procedures under the CPS programme as defined by the BMZ, the general procedures, rules
and regulations of DED, and the specificities of implementation in Cambodia.
The sustainability section assesses whether procedures and institutional frameworks
introduced by former CPS experts were still used, and whether the outcomes of project
activities supported by the CPS programme were visible. For existing projects we assessed
how issues of sustainability were included into the project designs.
Coherence, coordination and complementarity: Coherence assesses to what extent the
effectiveness of the CPS programme was influenced by other fields of policy. External
complementarity assesses linkages with other programmes and players (e.g. German
bilateral development cooperation, projects from the CPS member organisations’ core
programmes, other international NGOs or multilateral institutions) and achieved synergy
effects. Internal complementarity assesses to what extent the CPS member organisations
work hand in hand in Cambodia. Coordination assesses which mechanisms and procedures
help to promote complementarity and the formation of synergies among CPS member
organisations and between the CPS and other players in Germany and in the field.
A summarizing concluding section can be found at the end of the document, along with a
recommendations section. The recommendations address the main CPS stakeholders,
namely the BMZ, DED and EED as well as partner organisations. The projects supported
under the CPS programme in Cambodia thereby served as examples to evaluate the CPS as
an instrument.
In general terms, while the evaluation also addresses the first phase of the DED-CPS (2001–
2006) and gives mentioning to the EED-CPS, it mainly concentrates on the 2007–2010 DEDCPS programme for two reasons: First, the clear thematic shift which coincided with the
5
arrival of a new DED country director in Cambodia meant that lessons of the previous
programme had been learned. There would be little value in extensively evaluating an
approach that was discontinued. Second, EED-CPS interventions were very small; at the
time of the evaluation, there was neither an EED representation in Cambodia nor an EED
CPS expert.
1.4 Team
Prof Dr Jörn Dosch (international evaluator) is director of the Department of East Asian
Studies at the University of Leeds, UK. He has published some 70 books and articles on
Southeast Asian politics and the region’s international relations, with a strong focus on
development studies and relations between Southeast Asia and Europe. Since 1994, he has
also worked as a consultant and evaluator for the European Commission, the BMZ, UNDP
Vietnam, InWEnt and several NGOs in Europe, Asia and North America. In 2003, he was
lead evaluator of the BMZ evaluation of Germany’s development cooperation with Cambodia
in the area of democracy and good governance. He is also responsible for InWEnt’s online
web portal (Landesinformations-Portal) on Cambodia.
Dr Kim Sedara (local co-evaluator) earned his PhD in Political Science/Development from
the School of Global Studies, Gothenburg University, Sweden. Since 2001, he has been
senior researcher and programme manager (Democratic Governance since 2006) at the
Cambodia Development Resource Institution (CDRI). He is an experienced researcher,
consultant and evaluator and has worked with, inter alia, the Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the UK Department for International Development
(DFID), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), AusAid and the Rockefeller Foundation.
Dr Sedara has published widely on contemporary Cambodia.
Mr Doung Virorth (local co-evaluator) is currently research coordinator at the Social
Development Unit of the Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI). He holds an
M.A. of International Studies (Peace and Conflict Resolution) from the University of
Queensland, Australia, under the Rotary World Peace Fellowship. He has a strong track
record in research on post-conflict peacebuilding, democracy and electoral politics in
Cambodia.
Both local co-evaluators participated in the evaluation in their private capacity and not as
employees of CDRI.
1.5 Constraints
The evaluation was not constrained by any major factors. However, participants of the
briefing workshop stressed the limited value of the self-evaluation process in the specific
context of Cambodia. Given both the strong dependence of CSO on donor funding and the
existence of strong cultural norms on the avoidance of open criticism (unlike in Africa and
Latin America), the self-evaluation was never likely to generate any comprehensive, critical
analysis of the role and work of the CPS experts. However, participants agreed that the selfevaluation was nevertheless useful as an exercise in joint learning and exchange of ideas.
Some stakeholders thought that the questionnaires were too strongly directed to a macro
level of the CPS programme and did not give them the opportunity to elaborate much on their
specific project-related experiences. Although CPS interventions in the current phase are
6
based on results chains, most did not understand the term and concept of “theories of
change” and, consequently, did not answer the question. Furthermore, questions addressing
the coherence and complementarity of CPS activities with “BMZ country strategies and
priorities” or requiring the interviewee to draw comparisons with other countries were
unsuitable for the representatives of local partner organisation.
Despite these shortcomings the questionnaires were an important and comprehensive
source of information for the evaluators.
If there was any shortcoming it was the fact that little time was available for meetings with
beneficiaries of CPS projects. Considering the large number of current and former partner
organisations and CPS experts, the necessity of giving priority to meetings/interviews with
CPS stakeholders left the evaluators with only very limited time to talk to beneficiaries.
However, opportunities for such meetings were taken whenever possible and the team
managed to interview, inter alia, Khmer Rouge victims, representatives of newly emerging
victims associations, a former child soldier and high school students (who took part in a YFP
project).
2. Country context
2.1 General country profile
Cambodia has a total population of 13.4 million of which 51.36 per cent are female. The
urban population has increased 2.21 per cent from 2.1 million in 1998 to 2.6 million in 2008,
while the rural population has increased 1.38 per cent from 9.34 million in 1998 to 10.78
million in 2008. Children from 0 to 14 years of age account for 33.7 per cent in 2008 while
young adults (15 to 24 years of age) constitute 22.31 per cent of the whole population. The
poverty estimates indicate that the overall poverty line for Cambodia decreased from 34.8
per cent in 2004 to 32.0 per cent in 2007 (SES, 2007). The life expectancy at birth for males
in Cambodia was up substantially from 52 in 1998 to 60 years in 2004, and stood at 65 years
for females, also up substantially from 56 in 1998 (UNDP, 2007). The infant mortality rate
reported by the Demographic Health Survey 2005 suggests that the number of infant deaths
has reduced from 95 to 65 deaths per 1,000 live births between 2000 and 2005.
Cambodia’s location to the west of Vietnam and to the east of Thailand has been an
important factor in a turbulent and painful political experience since effective independence
from French rule in 1953. Cambodia was drawn into the Vietnam War at the end of which, in
April 1975, the country descended into barbarism under the murderous rule of the Khmer
Rouge. The exact number of people who died as a result of the Khmer Rouge's policies is
debated, as is the cause of their death. Most commonly, it is estimated that between 1.4
million and 2.2 million people died, half of them being executed, and the rest having passed
away from starvation and disease. The regime was overturned through an invasion by
Vietnam in December 1978, which established a client government that ended with the
withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces in 1989.
Following the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC) cleared the way for the first national elections in 1993. A coalition
government was formed and Cambodia was opened to the global fold through reforms
toward political and economic liberalisation with international assistance. Since then
Cambodia has attained political stability and peace. Almost all sectors – economy, education,
7
agriculture, media – have seen progresses in rebuilding and development. The Cambodian
economy has achieved an impressive annual GDP growth of 8.2 per cent on average for the
past decade, among the highest in Asia (CDRI, 2008; Um, 2008). Increase in the textile and
tourism sectors has contributed to this economic growth, in addition to the growing
agriculture industry. In turn, construction and employment have noticeably increased on top
of real estate and banking transactions (Chheang, 2008; Hughes, 2009) enhancing the rising
income per capita from 285 US-dollars in 1997 to 593 US-dollars in 2007 (World Bank,
2009).
The driving forces for this economic growth can be traced to many factors including
•
political and economic stability;
•
openness to free trade; and
•
regional and international integration (CDRI, 2008; World Bank, 2009) with
international development aid (Ear, 2007; Richmond and Franks, 2007).
The government’s launching of a stock exchange in partnership with South Korea continues
to draw attention from investors (EIC, 2008: 14). Additionally, the Cambodian prospects for
oil and gas exploitation has generated interest from major countries for investment
opportunity (Um, 2008: 110). The revenue from oil resources is predicted to be up to 1.7
billion US-dollars per year after 2021, equalling three times the amount of current
international development aid (Hughes, 2008). This economic growth in turn contributes to
reducing the poverty rate (CDRI, 2008; World Bank, 2009). There is a general
acknowledgement that the speed of revitalisation of the political and economic institutions is
slow but seems to be moving in the right direction. The reform towards decentralisation and
de-concentration is considered a vital step to promote genuine civic participation and the
consolidation of democracy (Kim & Ojendal, 2007).
While Cambodia’s economic growth has been impressive, there are persisting concerns. The
benefit of this economic growth has not reached everyone (CDRI, 2008, 2009; Hughes,
2009). There is a rising inequality because of disproportional growth distribution, widening
the gap between rich and poor (CDRI, 2008; World Bank, 2007). As a result, poverty remains
considerable, especially within rural areas. Such challenges have become major concerns to
human security in Cambodia. Recent studies by CDRI on Moving Out of Poverty (MOPS)
and Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) in 2007 indicated that among the poor
especially Cambodian villagers remain insecure. Poverty, migration out for employment,
violence against women, youth gang violence, land conflict and water and forestry conflicts
remain the emerging issues facing Cambodian people. These disadvantages leave those
who already suffer from social inequality and inability to meet their basic needs for survival
even more marginalised and unable to move out of the circle of poverty if there is no
adequate intervention from government institutions and civil society. The current global
financial crisis has severely worsened Cambodian livelihoods especially among the urban
and rural poor communities (CDRI, 2009).
2.2 Causes of conflicts in Cambodia
The past decades of Cambodia’s history have been characterised by protracted conflict.
From the early 1970s to 1993, Cambodia underwent several political and economic
transitions. Politically, it experienced monarchy, republican rule, genocide, Stalinist
8
communism and more recently, democratic government. Economically, in the 1980s,
Cambodia adopted a centralised command economy and later switched to a free market
economy, which, however, as the democratisation of the political system in the early 1990s,
has only been imperfectly realised.
The country has found it difficult to achieve peaceful transitions of power from one regime to
another. Power transitions have usually been accomplished by fierce fighting and bloodshed.
In Cambodia’s political culture, power is not seen as a shared good, but rather as an
absolutist property of individuals or groups – instead of state institutions (Kim, 2007). This
historical context reveals that Cambodia has been affected by two primary consequences:
firstly, the country has experienced many different political regimes and parties with differing
and competitive theories and ideologies over a short period of time. Secondly, the country
has been unable to achieve peaceful transformation of power from one regime to another
based on democratic principles. Political regimes have not been transformed by democratic
power but instead been overthrown quickly. These serious historical interruptions have held
back the development of state institutions and created difficulty in building trust and
legitimacy between ruled and rulers. Cambodia still suffers from the civil war and the Khmer
Rouge regime, there is still a broad range of problems left. The Khmer Rouge regime was
the most destructive period in recent Khmer history. It was followed by regular armed conflict
in the 1980s and 1990s. The traces of these violent experiences are visible in today’s
society, which still has to address peacebuilding and reconciliation. There remains a potential
of violence, as can be observed in contemporary land disputes. Moreover, social integration
of former combatants and de-mining have not yet been fully completed.
The capacity of the public sector and civil society to respond effectively to the emerging
social issues remains limited and is jeopardised by poor governance such as corruption and
lack of transparency, weak state performance and responsiveness (CDRI, 2000). Most
observers consider the democratisation process in post-conflict Cambodia as slow or
unconsolidated (Peou, 2009; UN, 2008), or static (Ojendal and Lilja, 2009; Kim and Ojendal,
2009). The lack of consolidated democracy as well as the prevalence of patronage and
patron-client relations in politics has contributed to an institutionalisation of corruption. Such
institutional corruption, in turn, greatly hinders attempts at strengthening the rule of law and
respect of human rights. The persistence and strength of patronage politics also breeds
political and economic insecurity among political dissidents and the poor (Un, 2008). Some
scholars question the effectiveness of the implementation of political and economic
liberalisation concepts towards democracy. Without proper intervention mechanisms, the
result can be radicalised political division, manipulation of human insecurity and grievances,
which in turn can lead to renewed violence, human rights abuses and conflict (Burton, 1997;
Lederach, 1997), the main threats to human security (Ogata and Sen, 2003).
Access to justice remains elusive for poor people especially in rural areas. The judicial
system is considered frail, corrupt and biased 5. It is used to advance political agendas,
silence critics, perpetuate impunity for state actors and their cronies and to strip people of
5
Licadho Report (2006 and 2007): Legal and Judicial Reform in Cambodia; Oliver Richmond and
Jason Franks (2007): ‘Liberal Hubris? Virtual Peace in Cambodia’. In Security Dialogue, Vol. 38, No.1,
pp. 27-48; Yash Ghai (2008): Report of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for
Human Rights in Cambodia; International Center for Transitional Justice (2009): Report submitted to
Universal Periodical Review of the UN Human Rights Council; World Bank (2007): Cambodia Sharing
Growth: Equity and Development in Cambodia; World Bank (2009): Sustaining Rapid Growth in
Challenging Environment.
9
their land (Richmond and Franks, 2007: 40 and Ghai, 2008: 7). The prospect of getting
justice and fairness in response to conflict is rare for the majority of Cambodian people. The
chance to get fair treatment will be even less if the conflict is asymmetrical. 6 This context of
unfair treatment by the judicial system encourages Cambodian people, especially those who
are oppressed and cannot afford to pay bribes, to resort to other means to resolve conflict,
such as turning to village elders or local leaders. This tradition remains deeply rooted and
popular in rural areas of Cambodia (UNDP, 2007 and World Bank, 2006). 7
Overall, Cambodia remains protracted with a post-conflict or post communist dilemma:
Poverty, weak state institution, weak governance/corruption, lack of trust between state and
society, lack of civilian control of the armed forces, domestic violence, lack of political
tolerance, politicisation of civil society, personalised power, elite self-enrichment etc. are the
legacies of decades of war, civil war and communist rule.
A particular problem is youth crime. The rapid urbanisation and deterioration of social and
economic urban conditions combined with increasing proportions of children and young
people, especially among the urban poor, have all contributed to providing fertile ground for
the recruitment of young people into groups and gangs engaged in local crime and violence.
The growth of transnational organised crime, manifested in the trafficking of small arms,
drugs and persons, has facilitated recruitment for and exacerbated associated crimes. The
majority of perpetrators and victims of urban crime and violence are young people who are
between 15 and 25 years old (GAP/C, 2004).
A survey by GAD/C in 2004 indicates that 32 per cent of the population had experienced
youth crime and violence through threat, assault and robbery while more than 62 per cent
had witnessed crime and violence committed by youth. Concern about youth crime and
violence revolves around a number of factors including the use of alcohol and drugs, access
to small arms, links with more organised gangs, and youth fighting.
2.3 Gender relations and gender-based violence
Gender inequalities continue to persist in Cambodia reflecting deeply embedded cultural
norms and traditions. Examples include unequal access to education and health services,
unequal access to and control of assets and opportunities for income generation, fear of
rape, sexual harassment and domestic violence and unequal opportunities to influence
decision making (MoWA, 2008).
Violence against women in Cambodia is widely prevalent (MoWA, 2008). The incidence of
domestic violence has remained static over the past decade, while rape has increased.
Following three decades of civil war, violence has been normalised as a way to dealing with
and resolving any conflicts (MoWA, 2005). Gender inequality – including traditional attitudes
that treat women and children as having lesser status and rights than men, and which prize
women’s chastity, obedience and respects for their husbands and punish women who
6
Asymmetric conflicts happen when conflicting parties are not in similar status, capacity or position.
For example, land conflicts between powerful elites and poor people. (Ramsbotham, Oliver,
Woodhouse, Tom, and Miall, Hugh (2005): Contemporary conflict resolution: Terror and Global
Justice. 2nd edition, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 21.
7
See UNDP (2007): Feasibility study on the establishment Justice for Peace; World Bank (2006):
Justice for the Poor? An Exploratory Study on Collective Grievance over land and local governance in
Cambodia.
10
appear to be more sexually open – reinforce and support violence against women (MoWA,
2005). Women are supposed to support family, take care of siblings and husbands, support
family business, whether it is a farm or another business.
The above tradition and perception has a serious affect on women. First, the tradition and
perception prevents women from participating in public and social affairs as women are more
responsible for the household burden. Second, the practice of normalising violence and
criminal acts against women as a means to resolve conflict has motivated even more violent
acts. Third, women are fearful to enjoy social cohesion through participating in community
activities and pursuing higher education due to their fear of violence. Finally, when crime and
violence happens to any family member, whether women themselves or male family
members, women are the ones who bear the burden of care and spend less time outside the
household.
2.4 Peacebuilding initiatives
Given Cambodia’s past of violence and internal strife in the country, people’s perception of
peace is the absence of war. Attempts to stabilise the country and to prevent the reemergence of internal violence date back to UNTAC. At its height, the operation involved
over 20,000 UN personnel in Cambodia. UNTAC's mandate (from October 1991 onwards)
was to
•
ensure the cease-fire, disarmament and demobilisation of armed forces of the four
factions;
•
repatriate 350,000 refugees from Thai camps;
•
promote human rights;
•
encourage elimination of mines; and
•
create a neutral political environment necessary to conduct and supervise free and
fair elections for a constituent assembly that would prepare a new constitution.
While UNTAC did not succeed in establishing a neutral political environment, most other
objectives were achieved. Since then, a myriad of donor-funded interventions have
addressed the manifestations of conflict and violence, as described under 2.2 and 2.3, and
their root causes as well as governance, decentralisation, rural development, education and
other agendas broadly related to peacebuilding. The EU donors’ programmes (European
Commission and member states) are in education, health, HIV/AIDS, rural development, deconcentration and decentralisation, public financial management, legal and judicial reform,
trade and private sector development. Recognising that “The European Consensus on
Development” of November 2005 states that the EU takes a lead role in implementing the
Paris Declaration commitments on aid delivery and that the EU will advance coordination,
harmonisation and alignment, which encourages partner countries to lead their own
development process and supports a broad donor-wide engagement in national
harmonisation agendas.
Japan’s priority areas include good governance (administrative, financial and judicial
reform), economic promotion, infrastructure improvement, enhanced food and agricultural
production, education and human resource development, health and natural resource
management. Australia is another significant bilateral donor and currently supports demining, governance, research and development and legal and judicial reform.
11
USAID is working in the areas of good governance and democratic institutions, HIV/AIDS
and family health, and education.
UNDP’s activities concentrate on the strengthening of governing institutions, poverty
reduction and monitoring and the management of natural resources. The World Bank
prioritises five types of activities in Cambodia: (1) supporting good governance; (2) building
physical infrastructure; (3) rebuilding human capital; (4) facilitating private sector
development; and (5) disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). Its core
projects/activities include support to the forestry sector, governance, legal and judicial
reform, de-mining, trade facilitation and implementation of WTO requirements, and
assistance with the development of the Cambodian Government’s Private Sector Growth
Strategy. The Asian Development Bank strategy for Cambodia has two prime focal points:
economic growth and poverty reduction. ADB activities support broad-based rural
development through the promotion of water resource management, decentralisation, natural
resource management and agriculture sector reform. ADB also assists human and social
development, via sector-wide initiatives in education and health and complementary support
in water supply. 8
The establishment of the ECCC has been a central matter to both Cambodians and the
international community in terms of a long-term peacebuilding strategy. In 2001, the
Cambodian National Assembly passed a law to create a court to try serious crimes
committed during the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975 to 1979. This court is officially called
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes
Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (Extraordinary Chambers or ECCC).
The government of Cambodia insisted that, for the sake of the Cambodian people, the trial
must be held in Cambodia using Cambodian staff and judges together with foreign
personnel. Cambodia invited international participation due to the weakness of the
Cambodian legal system and the international nature of the crimes, and to help in meeting
international standards of justice. An agreement with the UN was ultimately reached in June
2003 detailing how the international community would assist and participate in the
Extraordinary Chambers. 9
The ECCC was finally established in 2006. The first proceeding of the tribunal against the
former director of S-21 prison Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch) began on 30 March 2009. Final
arguments ended in November and a verdict is expected after April 2010. The closing order
for the second pre-trial against the former Khmer Rouge leaders ended in December 2009.
Locating the ECCC inside Cambodia is publicly recognised as essential from both a
Cambodian and the international perspective. The main reason is its closer proximity to the
evidence and witnesses and better accessibility for victims. Such accessibility allows victims
and their families to witness the processes in which their former tormentors are brought to
account.
While controversies over the sovereignty and credibility of the court initially caused some
delays, the UN and the Cambodian government eventually agreed on establishing a criminal
court under Cambodian law with the involvement from international judges. Five former
Khmer Rouge leaders were indicted and put under custody. Duch was the first of the indicted
8
European Commission: Cambodia - European Community Strategy Paper for the period 2007- 2013,
http://www.delkhm.ec.europa.eu/en/country_strategy/2007-2013csp.pdf. [Last accessed: April 2011]
9
See http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/about-eccc [Last accessed: April 2011]
12
to be put on trial. The proceedings against Duch have to be considered a major step forward
for those seeking justice and the reconciliation process in general. The subsequent hearings
to reject legal requests for the release from detention of the other four suspects represented
a strong commitment of the ECCC. Cambodian victims and the international community have
applauded the trial and expressed strong hope that justice will be served and a culture of
impunity will be replaced by a culture of accountability and that finally the rule of law will be
attained. Evidence given by Duch revealed some partial truth of how the Khmer Rouge
regime organised the mass murder of Cambodian people during the second half of the
1970s.
Equally important, the Internal Rules of the ECCC allow victims to participate extensively as
civil parties in the proceedings; a dedicated Victim Unit was created. The ECCC will also
offer ‘moral and collective reparation’ following the verdict. The Victim Unit within the ECCC
has already proved to be a positive development within the Cambodian legal framework and
also a precedent for other internationally-assisted courts. In addition, NGOs play active roles
in both encouraging victims to participate in the ECCC process as well as disseminating
information on the prosecution process to a wider audience.
2.5 Civil society context
As outlined, the nature of governance in Cambodia is embedded in informal traditional
customs such as hierarchy, political loyalty, kinship, patron-clientelism and rent-seeking.
History shows that prominent Cambodian leaders have had strong tendencies in building
their own dynasties, one after another. Studies demonstrate that the leadership style shows
strong personalisation of power and the importance of personal loyalty of clients to the
patrons. These types of traditional customs remain the main building blocks of Khmer society
and are intertwined in the leadership of contemporary Cambodia. These persisting structures
also impact on civil society. Cambodian NGOs are top-down, urban based organisations.
The rise of NGOs has not been accompanied by the enlargement of political space in rural
areas. And very often, the NGO's own organisational structures, operations, and internal
governance fall short of being democratic.10
Historically, Cambodia does not have a strong tradition of civic engagement or civil society;
the social fabric is based on informal organisation such as Wat (Pagoda) committees and
social interaction takes place within kinship and patronage networks. Cambodians are not
used to, or experienced with, liberal democratic principles or active participatory interaction
with the state. In a hybrid political system, power relations between state officials and
civilians are generally characterised as a ‘steep power difference’ which prohibits the ability
of citizens to claim rights and freedom in the face of ‘official highhandedness’ (Kim and
Ojendal, 2007: 5). In a bid to narrow the widening gap of power relations between the state
and its citizens, civil society has been created, developed and expanded since UNTAC
(Richmond and Franks, 2007: 32).
The Cambodian NGO sector, compared to the Cambodian Government, has been the most
effective sector in the delivery of public services and the promotion of various public goods,
including those associated with citizenship and democratic rights. NGOs, especially those in
Phnom Penh, are generally well organised, and have active cooperative network
10
Un, Kheang (2005): Democratization Without Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia 1993-2004.
PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science, Northern Illinois University, Dekalb, Illinois.
13
organisations. These organisations have substantial connections to the international NGO
community and derive their resources from a variety of donors. However, it would be difficult
to describe these organisations as constituting civil society, as understood in western social
science. Rather it is a superstructure of primarily service delivery organisations almost totally
dependent on foreign funding along with guidance, training, and ‘protection’ to some major
extent.
Changes have been occurring that promote a more effective relationship between the Phnom
Penh-based NGOs and the broader Cambodian society. Lead NGOs have moved beyond
‘educating’ the population through top-down programmes toward the fostering of
partnerships more supportive of local leadership and responsive to local concerns. Nowhere
is this more true than in the rising level of activism in Cambodia in response to land grabbing
and dislocations of ‘by right’ settlements, often in urban areas (USAID, 2008: 51-52).
3. CPS involvement
3.1 German Development Cooperation
In its ‘Rectangular Strategy of July 2004, the Cambodian Government defines good
governance as the centrepiece of, and precondition for, achieving the country’s development
goals. Focus is being placed on
•
corruption control;
•
reform of the legislation and justice;
•
the public administration and decentralisation; and on
•
the reform of the military and demobilisation.
The ‘Cambodian Millennium Development Goals’ adapted at the local level where gender
equality and the promotion of women are defined as third out of nine goals, constitute the
umbrella for the development strategy.11
Germany’s development cooperation with Cambodia is in line with the Government’s national
strategy and the MDGs. Germany pursues the principle of division of labour among the
development partners engaged in Cambodia, based on the Paris Declaration.
Diplomatic relations between Cambodia and the Federal Republic of Germany were
suspended between 1969 and 1992. During this period, and again in 1997 and 1998, no
development cooperation was undertaken due to the high level of political instability affecting
Cambodia. From 1969 to 1975, however, and from 1979 until German reunification,
Cambodia maintained diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic.
Cooperation between Cambodia and Germany currently focuses on the following priority
areas:
•
Rural development (land reform and regional economic development); and
•
Health sector development (quality assurance for health services and the
establishment of a social health insurance scheme).
11
See http://www.un.org.kh/undp/CMDGs/What-are-the-Cambodia-Millennium-DevelopmentGoals.html [Last accessed April 2011].
14
'Democracy, civil society, public administration and good governance' is a cross-cutting
theme in the work of the German Government in Cambodia, which means that these issues
are addressed in all ongoing programmes. A few programmes are also specifically designed
to improve public administration and strengthen democracy. At the government negotiations
in October 2009, Germany pledged continued financial support of 34 million euros to
Cambodia for the two-year period 2009/2010.12
GTZ, DED, CIM, KfW and InWEnt are active on behalf of the BMZ. GTZ is engaged with
long-term advisory projects mostly at the level of the national government and the provinces.
DED cooperates mainly with community administrations and local non-governmental
organisations. One special priority area is the reconciliation work connected with the Khmer
Rouge Tribunal. Furthermore, CIM places experts as employees in public and private
institutions of the partner country.
Non-governmental institutions such as political foundations are active in the field of
enhancing democracy, improving the human rights situation and the political participation of
the people. As a rule, partners of the foundations mostly come from the non-governmental
sector, although there is no clear-cut delineation; rather, partner structures at the
governmental and non-governmental level interlock in their activities. Political foundations
are not bound to directives, but act on their own mandate. Non-governmental organisations
are also active in the democratisation process. Thus, the Deutsche Welthungerhilfe supports
the participation of Cambodia's civil society in political processes.
Support of the cross-sectional task ‘Democracy, civil society, public administration’ in
Cambodia is based on various governmental and non-governmental institutions cooperating
closely in the three fields of action by dovetailing their activities.13
3.2 CPS portfolio
DED has been the main CPS stakeholder in Cambodia since 2001. There was also a small
EED-CPS programme from 2002 to 2009.
3.2.1 DED-CPS
The DED-CPS programme in Cambodia started in 2001 and can be divided into two phases:
Phase 1 (2001–2006) followed a heterogeneous approach and focused on interventions in
the areas of small arms reduction, peaceful conflict resolution, the rule of law and
democracy, gender-based violence, civil society participation in political decision-making, etc.
Projects were implemented under the thematic umbrella of peaceful conflict management,
the rule of law and social integration. Local partner organisations comprised both leading
NGOs, such as Silaka, Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID), and Cambodian Center for
Human Rights (CCHR) as well as government stakeholder such as the Ministry for Women
and Veteran Affairs. The main CPS expert activities and other project activities were mainly
directed at capacity building for NGO staff and public servants, network-building,
12
See http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/countries_regions/asien/kambodscha/zusammenarbeit.html
[Last accessed: April 2011].
13
BMZ (2007): Cambodian-German Development Cooperation, Strategic framework for crosssectional assignment "Democracy, Civil Society and Public Administration" – Good Governance. 17
October 2007.
15
dissemination of information, training events, public events, creation of a monitoring systems,
and advocacy work (see Annex 3).
Phase 2 (2007–2010) concentrates on ‘Justice and Reconciliation in Cambodia’ and is
entirely focussed on interventions linked to the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT) (for a
table of all projects, partner organisations and number of CPS experts involved see
Annex 3).
Table 1: Summary of DED-CPS Programme ‘Justice and Reconciliation in Cambodia’,
2007–2010
Target groups
Intended
programme
outcomes
Intended
programme
component
outcomes
•
Beneficiaries: surviving victims and perpetrators of the KR crimes, youth, the
whole population of Cambodia (as far as it can be reached by NGO radio),
local and international media.
•
Intermediaries: staff of NGOs working on KRT outreach and of the ECCC,
monks, university lecturers and students.
•
Others: The Cambodian Government and authorities including the judiciary
and the public health system, representatives of the international community.
•
The ECCC have contributed to the establishment of the truth about the Khmer
Rouge regime and given impulses for the development of the rule of law in
Cambodia.
•
Survivors and the following generations have come to terms with the atrocities
committed during the Khmer Rouge regime.
•
The Cambodian state and civil society build peace and carry out their duty to
prevent war and genocide.
•
Outreach: Cambodian citizens express well-informed opinions about the KR
regime, the ECCC and their impacts on the process of social reconstruction.
•
Victims participation: A majority of the surviving victims of the KR regime,
including marginalised groups, feel acknowledged by the ECCC. They feel
satisfied with the final judgments of the trials against the remaining lead
perpetrators and the collective moral reparations ordered by the judges.
•
Mental health: Survivors of the KR regime and the following generations are
able to develop better coping mechanisms with traumatic experiences and
their aftermath. They receive support from their social network. Their
interactions with others grow more confident and successful.
•
Remembrance: All social groups show understanding for the diverse
experiences during the civil war in Cambodia. There is a consensus that state
and society shall keep the memory of the KR crimes alive.
The CPS programme is based on the preposition that only with the active participation of
surviving victims and perpetrators will it be possible to spread the message of justice and
reconciliation within the Cambodian society. At the ECCC, for the first time in the history of
international criminal justice, survivors can participate as civil parties. They have the
opportunity to demand collective, moral reparations. DED-CPS was instrumental in lobbying
for the recognition and participation of Khmer Rouge victims as civil parties in the court’s
proceedings.
The DED-CPS programme in Cambodia is a larger intervention with several Cambodian
partners that all work around the ECCC. The main contribution to peacebuilding lies in
16
•
strengthening the accountability process of the ECCC and legal legacy of the Court;
•
supporting victims to participate in the legal proceedings and thus giving key
beneficiaries of this process a voice (which in turn contributes to reconciliation);
•
disseminating information about the Khmer Rouge period and the ECCC to different
target audiences, such as young and old people; and
•
providing psycho-social support to those in need.
Compared to other countries, the funding by DED-CPS in Cambodia is generous. This is due
to three facts:
•
The BMZ und DED agreed that sizable funding for the ECCC itself and civil society
activities around the court are important to ensure its impact.
•
With a total pledged grant amount of 6.8 million euros for the period 2006–2010
provided by the BMZ and the Federal Foreign Office (the BMZ’s total share was 4.5
million euros; 1.5 million euros in 2006/2007 and 3 million euros in 2009/2010),
Germany is one of the main donors for ECCC-related projects. DED-CPS is the main
implementing agency, with CIM, InWEnt and GTZ also being involved.
•
Germany is a member of the Tribunal’s steering committee in New York.14
Other donors did not come in or withdrew because of negative news about the ECCC. The
tribunal, which is financed by both the Cambodian Government and international donors, has
faced a myriad of problems since it began its work in 2006. These have included various
corruption and mismanagement allegations, and scarce funding as the estimated costs of the
tribunal have sky rocketed. While this is also due to additional cases taken on board, the
main reason behind ballooning costs is alleged to be the Cambodian inefficient judiciary and
political interference that delayed the first trial of Duch. Continuing international funding is
however decisive as dealing with its civil war past holds an immense importance to
Cambodian society. Both the German Government and DED have recognised this.
Due to their long-standing experience in cooperating with international donors, the larger
Cambodian civil society organisations can generally absorb money and properly account for
it.
3.2.2 EED-CPS
EED deployed two CPS experts at the NGO Star Kampuchea (2005–2009) who broadly
supported the local partner in the areas of management, advocacy, capacity building,
strengthening civil society, democracy, good governance, the rule of law and human rights.
From 2002 to 2004 one EED-CPS expert worked at the Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID)
(2002–2004) together with a DED CPS expert. Being a judge and a lawyer, they were both
involved with the Legal Programme of KID and assisted the executive director train KID staff
on the rule of law and international human rights. The two advisors found a way to share and
divide responsibilities. The main tasks of the CPS experts were to:
14
BMZ, Referat 200, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit Kambodscha. Deutscher Beitrag zu
Demokratisierung und Good Governance; e-mail conversation with Kerstin Henke, BMZ country officer
for Cambodia, 17 June 2010.
17
•
provide legal advice in matter to human rights, the rule of law and democracy
from various cases sent by KID partners;
•
give seminars and legal lectures both in Phnom Penh and in the provinces;
•
comment on draft laws;
•
support the development methods for the observation of the legislative
process especially under the aspects of human rights and building up
contacts to the respective institutions of legislative; and
•
assist in the elaboration of reports and newsletters with regard to legal
and judicial matters such as court observation, comment on judicial reform
undertaken by the government.
Other donors of KID at the time included the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, the Asia Foundation,
and NDI.
According to EED, its CPS concept is based on a partner approach (“partner autonomy”) and
thus different from DED-CPS. However, the empirical basis of just two CPS experts at one
NGO (Star Kampuchea) is too small for any meaningful elaboration on the concept of partner
autonomy and comparisons with DED. In the case of KID, the evaluators did come across
any significant differences in the way EED and DED worked with the partner organisation.
4. Main findings along evaluation criteria
4.1 Relevance
4.1.1 Are CPS activities addressing the main needs for peacebuilding in Cambodia?
The previous CPS programme (2001–2006) had a holistic approach by addressing a multiple
set of challenges to peacebuilding. While most, if not all, interventions were relevant to the
country context, the CPS’s value added to the management or resolution of the specific
conflict area was not always clear and individual CPS experts/interventions were not well
linked up. The significance to the first phase of CPS support was to lay out the foundation for
peacebuilding and bred the peacebuilding activities in various formats. For example, many
NGOs adopted and integrated peacebuilding concepts into their development programmes
and some even established organisations focusing on peacebuilding.
Probably one of the most important aspects of the 2001–2006 phase in terms of relevance
was the way it addressed gender-based violence. Areas such as women's rights or domestic
violence were no longer considered separate from general conflicts, but treated as part of
peacebuilding needs and were mainstreamed into several projects.
In the current programme (2007–2010), the ECCC is a very suitable entry point for the CPS.
National reconciliation is a key mechanism for peacebuilding. Cambodians will have
reconciled once they trust each other again. At the moment, however, people in general and
different state and non-state stakeholder groups are still very suspicious of each other. With
trust, people can start forgiving each other. Activities that are organised in support of, and as
an extension to, the mission and work of the ECCC are currently the main strategy towards
reconciliation in Cambodia.
18
While the CPS in Cambodia clearly fills a gap that is not covered by technical assistance
(TA) and financial assistance (FA) in development cooperation, the exclusive focus on the
ECCC prevents the CPS from getting involved in (or continuing working on) other pressing
issues such as land conflict, gender-based violence in the general Cambodian context (not
just related to the Khmer Rouge regime), governance, anti-corruption, etc. that are not
related to the ECCC. However, this is an either-or decision. The current clear focus is still
better than a more diverse spectrum of activities, and despite the strong concentration a
good diversity of activities within the focus area has been achieved. Besides, DED covers
other conflict areas, such as land conflict, in its main programme.
As far as it is possible to make this judgement, given the very small size of the EED-CPS
programme, the overall relevance of EED-CPS is less clear compared to DED-CPS.
According to EED’s 2005 proposal for funding of a project with STAR Kampuchea, the
overall objective was defined as ‘strengthening of the rule of law, support of local
governance, capacity-building for advocacy on conflict resolution’. 15 While all these topics are
generally relevant in the peacebuilding context of Cambodia, it is difficult to see how a sole
CPS expert at one NGO would be able to make a significant contribution to the
achievements of all these objectives at once. There is no doubt about the fact that both CPS
experts at STAR Kampuchea greatly helped and assisted the NGO with several
peacebuilding initiatives, but an established, large NGO such as STAR Kampuchea has now
moved beyond the stage of general capacity building needs.
There is currently no EED CPS expert in Cambodia. However, if EED considers getting
involved in Cambodia again, its CPS approach should be more focused and concentrate on
a specially defined area of relevance that provides a clear value added to the already
existing conflict resolution and peacebuilding interventions of other donors, particularly DEDCPS.
4.1.2 Do CPS activities adapt to changing conflict contexts?
In Cambodia, the conflict context (e.g. the post-conflict setting) has remained unchanged
since the beginning of the CPS programme. Hence, the question addresses the extent to
which the CPS sets the right priorities in the context of the country’s peacebuilding needs.
Based on the ‘peacebuilding needs assessment’ that compares the main activity lines
implemented by the CPS Cambodia programmes with the peacebuilding needs in the
country (and the triangulation of the assessment’s results with stakeholder interviews, e.g.
CPS experts, partner organisations, beneficiaries group discussions etc.), we can clearly
conclude that the CPS programme in Cambodia is highly relevant regarding Cambodia’s
peacebuilding needs in the current post-conflict context because the ECCC is seen as
central to the peacebuilding agenda. From the German government’s point of view, which is
shared by the evaluators, there is no doubt about the relevance of the ECCC in the
Cambodian peacebuilding process. According to Günter Nooke, the then Federal
Government Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid at the Federal
Foreign Office, “in the German Government's view the Khmer Rouge Tribunal is making a
15
EED, Dienste in Übersee, Antrag zur Förderung im Rahmen des Friedensdienstes, Land:
Kambodscha; Ort: Phnom Penh; Partnerorganisation: STAR Kampuchea, 2005.
19
crucial contribution to prosecuting and exposing the full truth about the extremely grave
violations of human rights that took place in Cambodia.” 16
CPS is known and respected for a high level of expertise based on the ‘German
experience’. While acknowledging the difficulties in comparing the Holocaust in Germany
with the genocide in Cambodia, the vast majority of Cambodian stakeholders interviewed
noted how important it is for Cambodians to learn how Germany has dealt with its past.
Jewish-German reconciliation is not necessarily seen as a model for Cambodia but a useful
example that may help Cambodians to come to terms with their Khmer Rouge past. The
Holocaust Memorial in Berlin was frequently mentioned as an exemplary approach to
remembrance. Some 80 Cambodian genocide memorials already exist and dozens are being
planned, but so far, they are very little known. However, they are a hotly debated issue
among Cambodian civil society organisations. At a more general level, peacebuilding is a
new concept to Cambodia. Based on Buddhist culture, people consider peace to be merely
calmness or silence or generally the absence of war. Justice as a part of peace is a new
concept in Cambodia and this is again an area where German stakeholders enjoy respect
and legitimacy as advisors.
Of the four ECCC-linked focal points – outreach, victims participation, mental health,
remembrance (‘memory culture’) – the last three may not have been addressed without the
involvement of the CPS, because DED was among the main advocates for their inclusion as
donor-funded projects in support of the ECCC’s work. The Victims Unit is a case in point.
According to statistics which were distributed by the Victims Support Section (VSS) of the
ECCC (formally called Victims Unit) in early February 2010 and published in the media, a
total of 8,190 Victims Information Forms (VIF) were received by the VSS until the end of
January 2010. 4,004 of these VIFs were civil party applications. According to informal
information received from the VSS, more than 55 per cent of the VIFs have been handed in
by partners of DED-CPS. This figure corresponds to the count conducted by the Cambodian
Human Rights Action Committee (CHRAC), a CPS partner organisation.17 This is clear
indication of the strong interest and desire of victims to actively participate in the legal
proceedings and to make full use of their rights. Furthermore, 93 civil parties participated in
the Court’s first trial against Kaing Guek Eav, and more than 180 civil parties had been
admitted by the Office of Co-Investigating Judges (OCIJ) by October 2009.18
The relevance of victim support and ‘memory culture’ could be further strengthened if more
donors got involved. However, donors differ in their perception of the relevance and specific
significance of the ECCC. For example, church organisations are almost completely absent
in this specific field of cooperation. Other international stakeholders see the ECCC mainly
from the perspective of international law and try to establish it as a model for a specific legal
system in the competitive situation between Civil Law (Roman Law) and Common Law.
16
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2009/090216NookeKhmerRouge.html [Last accessed: April 2011].
17
See for example Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee, "CHRAC Urges ECCC to Consider
Victims' Rights with Care". Press Release, 1 February 2010.
18
See Oeung, Jeudy and Christoph Sperfeldt (eds.) (2009): Victim Participation in the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), Second CHRAC Monitoring Report, 11 December
2009.
20
4.1.3 Do activities under the CPS programme in Cambodia correspond with the overall
CPS strategies?
The aim of the CPS is to contain the outbreak of violence without resorting to arms, in doing
so reinforcing civil structures for peaceful conflict resolution. The three key objectives are (a)
preventing violent conflicts from erupting, (b) resolving conflicts peacefully, and (c) building
structures following conflicts which help to secure peace in the long-term. The related
strategies are:
•
building structures for cooperation and dialogue across lines of conflict (in doing so
also strengthening traditional conflict resolution);
•
creating meeting points and secure spaces where parties to a conflict can meet;
•
strengthening information and communication structures which trace the causes and
consequences of violent conflicts (this includes the promotion of peace journalism,
the integration of peacebuilding organisations, and monitoring the course of conflicts);
•
providing assistance to groups particularly affected by violence, and ease their
reintegration into society (e.g. by providing psychological and social support or by
working with traumatised survivors);
•
providing advice and training on methods and concepts of civil conflict resolution; and
•
peace education and dismantling enemy stereotypes, restoring confidence in local
law and order, and campaigning for human rights.19
The first phase of the DED-CPS in Cambodia had a focus on both, objective (b) including
interventions targeted at the reduction of violence and establishment of conflict resolution
mechanism in multiple spheres of society such as tackling domestic violence, and the state)
and objective (c) with a strong project focus on human rights, the rule of law and peace
education. With the exception of the second strategic focus all CPS focal areas were
addressed in Cambodia with particular emphasis on strategies 1, 5 and 6.
The post-2007 phase is prominently directed at c) as all ECCC centred activities are
expected to significantly strengthen the formally institutionalised and informal structures and
mechanisms as a major contribution to sustained peacebuilding and the future prevention of
war and genocide. Focal areas 3 and 4 are most strongly addressed.
4.1.4 How relevant are the CPS partners for peacebuilding?
While the previous CPS phase had an explicit focus on including the Cambodian
Government in interventions – for example the Ministry for Women and Veteran Affairs as a
partner – the current phase cooperates with large, well established, NGOs which all have a
good reputation for being capable of implementing donor-funded projects efficiently and
effectively. However, government stakeholders – the Victims Unit (now called Victims
Support Section) of the ECCC and the two departments of Psychology and Media and
Communication at The Royal University of Phnom Penh are still prominently involved in the
cooperation programme.
19
Ziviler Friedensdienst, http://www.ziviler-friedensdienst.org/The-Civil-Peace-Service.23.0.html?&L=1
[Last accessed: April 2011].
21
The Victims Support Section (VSS), formally Victims Unit (VU), of the ECCC accepts
complaints of surviving victims and applications for participation as a civil party. The
documents are preceded and remitted to prosecution or the co-investigative judges. The
Victims Unit supports acknowledged civil parties and their lawyers and provides a network for
coordination amongst them.
The Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee (CHRAC) is Cambodia’s most
important human rights network. It facilitates the coordination among its members and their
activities around the Khmer Rouge tribunal. CHRAC also supports active and democratic
participation of civil parties to the ECCC. It broadcasts radio programmes about the course of
the proceedings and monitors the trials in collaboration with its international partner
organisations.
The Cambodian Association for Development and Human Rights (ADHOC) organises
seminars about the Khmer Rouge tribunal in Cambodian provinces and supports surviving
victims in their application to participate as a civil party. The DED-CPS expert who is advising
ADHOC is at the same time the first international lawyer for civil parties. ADHOC also lobbies
the Cambodian Government to change the national criminal law to conform to international
standards.
The Cambodian Committee of Women (CAMBOW) is a coalition of 33 Cambodian NGOs
which work to advance the cause of women in Cambodia and addresses issues like
domestic violence.
Another CPS partner organisation works in the area of psychosocial support and education
about trauma is the Trans-Cultural Psychosocial Organization (TPO). It offers
psychological care to witnesses and civil parties before, during and after the proceedings at
the ECCC and is advised by a DED-CPS expert.
The Department of Psychology (DP) at the Royal University of Phnom Penh provides
educational training for individuals who want to alleviate social and mental problems.
Graduates can work as counsellors at mental health and community clinics, schools,
rehabilitation centres, non-government organisations, and some other government
institutions. In February 2010, a DED-CPS expert started to work at the DP as a lecturer on
trauma and coping.
The Center for Justice and Reconciliation (CJR) organises public forums in Cambodian
provinces to inform about the work of the ECCC. On the occasion of the public forums
surviving victims and perpetrators are informed about the proceedings and they have the
opportunity to talk in public about their personal experiences. A special team which is
advised by a DED-CPS expert offers emotional support for the participants to better cope
with trauma.
A radio programme made by the Women's Media Center (WMC) informs about the Khmer
Rouge regime and the proceedings at the ECCC. The programme is broadcast over large
areas of Cambodia. Seminars for journalists and media students teach how to report
responsibly on the tribunal.
Youth for Peace (YFP) realises village dialogues in seven provinces in Cambodia and is
advised by a DED expert. In the course of the village dialogues, surviving victims and
perpetrators are talking to young people about their experiences with the Khmer Rouge past.
22
The adolescents are encouraged by Youth for Peace to commit themselves to national
reconciliation and a democratic development in Cambodia.
At the Department for Media and Communication (DMC) of the Royal University of Phnom
Penh, one DED expert trains journalism students and teachers in the area of radio and
audiovisual media. The main topic of the classes is the media dealing with the Khmer Rouge
past and a responsible reporting about the tribunal.
These partner organisations – and the civil society sector in general – are highly relevant for
Cambodia’s peacebuilding needs and traumatised individuals form part of the wider
community. The prevalence of dysfunctional relationships between individuals and groups in
the community – as the consequence of trauma related to the Khmer Rouge atrocities – has
the potential to cause instability if the roots of the problems are not dealt with properly. In a
divided society where there is deep, long-term fear and direct experience of violence that
sustain an image of the enemy, people are extremely vulnerable and easily manipulated. A
recent study suggests that the majority of victims who suffered trauma wish to seek revenge.
Without any proper mechanism to address the hidden anger, latent conflict could easily erupt
into violence. However, so far the state has neither been willing nor capable to address the
pressing issues of reconciliation, dealing with trauma and remembrance beyond the general
acceptance of the crucial role of the ECCC for the intra-societal peacebuilding process.
Currently, only CSOs are in the position to fulfil these urgent tasks.
4.1.5 How relevant is the sending of European CPS experts?
Sending European CPS experts (as compared to other implementation modalities) is still
highly relevant in the Cambodian context. According to a typical local stakeholder, “without
the CPS expert's expertise the project would not have been conducted. Although information
about mediation and conflict management can be obtained from books and the internet, an
expert was needed to help achieving a high level of knowledge and know-how.” Almost all
current and former partner organisations expressed this or a very similar view. Although the
expertise and capacity of national Cambodian NGO workers has markedly increased over
the past years, for the foreseeable future, CPS experts are needed for capacity building and
skills transfer and cannot yet be replaced by local experts or other modalities on a large
scale.
Cambodian society still acts in the tradition of a conflict society. Fights and problems are
preferably solved by violence. This is the main reason for domestic violence, neighbour
conflicts, generation conflicts, and other conflict manners. The country itself does not have
enough experience yet in peacebuilding techniques. External peace workers bring methods
and the funding to strengthen this process. Equally important, they are neutral as they are
not involved in the conflict. Local institutions and their personnel often still tend to be biased
by their experience during the Khmer Rouge regime.
4.1.6 What would partner organisations do if the CPS did not exist?
Partner organisations are highly dependent on the CPS. In 2003, a DED-CPS report stated:
“Apart from SILAKA all NGOs we work with are highly dependent on foreign funding
both in terms of project activities and all associated running costs. This is not only the
situation of our project partners but applies to local NGOs in general. Traditional
donors finance almost exclusively projects and do only contribute to the respective
23
NGO’s general operating costs (salaries, rent, electricity, phone etc.) to some extent.
[…]This indirectly also narrows the scope of DED projects. In situations of crisis this
can lead to a temporary standstill of all NGO work if funding gaps are not immediately
filled by new sponors. At the same time, the dependence on external funding tempts
NGOs into rapidly accepting new ideas and project proposals of donors and
employing and equally firing personal (once a project is terminated after two to three
years) without giving any consideration to the principles of sustainability.”20
This assessment is still valid today to a large extent and was confirmed by most stakeholders
who were interviewed for this evaluation. If the CPS did not exist (or seized to exist) current
partner organisations would have to look for alternative external funding to sustain their work.
At the same time, none of the partner organisations works exclusively with the CPS; all are
internationally well connected and funded by a multitude of donors at any given point in time.
As a general observation that applies to the entire Cambodian CSO sector and not just CPS
partner organisations, CSOs tend to follow the donor agenda. It is not usually the individual
NGO that approaches a donor with a project concept but the donor/implementing agency
who commissions an NGO with the implementation of a project in line with the donor’s
interests and strategies. However, there is some indication that individual NGOs have taken
a more pro-active approach towards DED-CPS during (and particularly at the beginning) of
the current ECCC-focused programme. According to the DED country office,
“In 2006, when DED met CSD, ADHOC, TPO, WMC and YFP, these organisations
had a strong will and an intrinsic motivation to implement programmes related to the
KRT. The same is the case for KID which hosted a CPS expert before and became
again an EO within the intervention. Many of these CSOs have larger numbers of
surviving victims of the Khmer Rouge regime in their constituency, so there is a kind
of grassroots movement for the support of the KRT. ADHOC and KID got funding for
their KRT programmes from the EU. One might claim that this shows a donor agenda
but there is evidence that the Cambodian civil society lobbied the EU to earmark
funds for civil society activities related to the KRT. The fact that DED-CPS has a
programme on the KRT does not mean that we force partners to have such a
programme as well. There are some organisations that took strategic decisions not to
work on the KR past but on present human rights violations. This was always
appreciated by representatives of the DED-CPS. If there are some organisations that
were somehow ‘commissioned by DED-CPS’ – for example CDP and LAC that
provide lawyers for civil parties – this is not the case for all partner organisations.” 21
Overall, the question as to what would happen if the CPS did not exist is not so much an
issue of survival but more one of agenda-setting. Despite the large number of donors and
implementing organisations that are active in Cambodia, the CPS as an instrument is unique
within the donor landscape due to
•
the CPS expert system which – according to stakeholder interviews – provides value
added to the work and professionalisation of Cambodian NGOs to an extent no other
instrument is able to achieve with the same degree of efficiency and effectiveness
(given the CPS’s focus on both capacity building and project implementation) and
•
the CPS’s thematic approach in Cambodia which, at least in the current phase,
addresses a key area of the peacebuilding process which is not covered by any other
donor/implementing agency in a comparable systematic and comprehensive way.
20
Kristina Chhim (2003): Fortschrittsbericht, Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (ded), Ziviler
Friedensdienst, 13 March 2003, p. 7 (The quote is a translation of the German original).
21
Written feedback on an earlier draft of this report by the DED country office Cambodia.
24
Simply put: without the CPS most project activities centred on and around the ECCC would
not take place. Any termination of the CPS in Cambodia would create an agenda void in the
peacebuilding process that could not be easily filled by other donors and their instruments.
4.2 Effectiveness
4.2.1 What are the theories of change?
The reconstruction of the 2002–2006 theory of change is based on programme documents
(mainly ‘Strategische Planung für den DED KHM im Bereich Friedensförderung und Zivile
Konfliktbearbeitung 2003 – 2010‘ March 2003) and interviews with a former DED-CPS
coordinator in Cambodia, former partner organisations and other stakeholders.
Reconstructing the current, post-2007 theory of change was more straightforward as it is
spelled out in several programme documents and was presented in power point
presentations at various workshops and other events. Unlike for the 2002–2006 phase,
theories of change for most of the project activities under the current CPS programme in
Cambodia are also clearly formulated in DED documents. CPS expert projects are based on
results chains (although DED documents normally refer to them as intervention logics and
impact chains). They are generally well aligned with the master intervention logic (theory of
change of the programme). In addition, interviews with local experts and partner
organisations, group discussions, and standard theories of change for similar types of project
activities were used to reconstruct the intervention logic. The two ‘stakeholder lessons
learned workshops’ left the evaluators with no doubts that the DED-CPS partner
organisations have a good understanding of the theories of change and are intimately
familiar with the related intervention logics. However, it should be noted while local partners
are able to describe the theories of change that guide the DED-CPS programme, many were
previously unfamiliar with the term ‘theories of change’. Most first came in touch with the term
as the result of the evaluation. This is not considered a weakness, though, as it is just an
issue of wording and not a problem with the concept as such. Due to the very small size of
the EED-CPS programme in Cambodia – only three CPS experts were deployed between
2004 and 2009 (see 3.2.2) – it was not possible to construct theories of change for EED-CPS
or even compare theories of change for DED and EED.
In a nutshell, the general theory of change that underpins the entire ‘Justice and
Reconciliation in Cambodia’ programme is based on the preposition that reconciliation and
an effective approach to coping with the Khmer Rouge past is the precondition for sustained
national and societal peace and stability. Related to the programme theory of change are
four theories of change for the programme components or dimensions. These are very
clearly developed and presented in programme documents and neatly summarised in a
power point presentation by the DED-CPS coordinator that the DED uses as an introduction
to workshops with partner organisations and also to inform other stakeholders. 22 For each
programme dimension the outputs and three outcome levels, which logically build on each
other, are presented. However, DED uses a different terminology than the one applied in this
evaluation: the term ‘activities’ is used for outputs; the first outcome level is called ‘expected
22
Different versions of this presentation exist. The most recent and detailed one at the time of writing
was: The Civil Peace Service of DED in Cambodia, Peace and Development Intervention: Justice and
Reconciliation in Cambodia 2007-2010, by Andreas Selmeci, Version February 2010.
25
outputs’; the second outcome level is referred to as ‘expected use of outputs’ and the third
outcome level is known as ‘expected benefits’.
Figure 1: Comparison of theories of change, DED-CPS programme 2002–2006 and
2007–2010
Theory of change
2001–2006
2007–2010
Peaceful conflict management:
Citizens enjoy unrestricted
access to political and societal
decision-making processes
Reconciliation and effective
approach to coping with the Khmer
Rouge past as precondition for
sustained national and societal
peace and stability
Outcome 3
Violence as a means of
conflict resolution has been
reduced
Survivors and the following
generations have come to terms
with the atrocities committed
during the Khmer Rouge regime
Outcome 2
Capacity for participatory
conflict management has
been established,
particularly at the local level
The ECCC have contributed to
the establishment of the truth
about the Khmer Rouge regime
and given impulses for the
development of rule of law
Outcome 1
Intra-societal dialogue
mechanisms have been
established and sustained
Organizational + networking
capacity of partners enhanced;
Outsider perspective and
intercultural learning gives new
perspectives for work
Outputs
Training, capacity building,
networking, fund raising,
facilitation, etc. have taken
place to support partners
Training, capacity building,
networking, facilitation, etc. have
taken place to support partners
CPS expert provides
services to partners and/or
supports partners in ongoing
activities
CPS expert provides services to
partners and/or supports
partners in ongoing activities
CPS expert + funds for
activities, equipment and
local staff
CPS expert + funds for activities,
equipment and local staff
Highly
aggregated
development
impact
CPS expert
activities
Inputs
It should also be noted that outcome 2 (‘The ECCC have contributed to the establishment of
the truth about the Khmer Rouge regime and given impulses for the development of the rule
of law’) does not require all outcomes of the programme dimensions to be narrowly and
exclusively targeted at the ECCC. The ECCC would not be able to contribute to the
establishment of truth without a certain degree of embeddedness in a broader institutional
context of victims support, trauma counselling, creating structures for remembrance etc. In
other words, outcome 2 describes the achievements of the ECCC as well as structures,
stakeholders and processes related to, and interlinked with, the ECCC.
26
Table 2: Outputs and outcomes of programme dimensions, 2007–2010
Dimension
Output 
Outcome 1 
Outcome 2 
Outcome 3
Outreach
Outreach by
ECCC; public
forums; village
dialogues; video
and radio
productions
The participants and
recipients of activities
of DED-CPS
partners gain greater
knowledge about the
history of Cambodia
under the KR regime
and the ECCC.
Surviving victims
know about the
possibilities to
actively participate in
the trials.
The target groups of
the DED-CPS partners
share their knowledge
about the KR and
about the ECCC
actively within their
communities as well
as publicly. The quality
of the publicly
available information
on the KR and the
ECCC is improved.
Cambodian
citizens express
well-informed
opinions about the
KR regime, the
ECCC and their
impacts on the
process of social
reconstruction.
Support of
victims
participation
Research on
trauma; Master
course; training
of counsellors
etc.; providing
psychosocial
counselling;
radio
programme and
brochures;
advocacy work.
etc.
Qualified and willing
surviving victims of
the KR regime
actively participate in
the trials before the
ECCC by filing a
complaint, being
ready to testify as
witnesses or
applying to become
civil parties.
The civil parties at the
ECCC are
empowered. They can
influence the
investigations, be
present and testify in
the main trials,
question the accused
and witnesses,
demand collective
moral reparations.
A majority of the
surviving victims
of the KR regime,
including
marginalised
groups, feel
acknowledged by
the ECCC. They
feel satisfied with
the judgments of
the trials against
the remaining lead
perpetrators and
the collective
moral reparations
ordered by the
judges.
Trauma, coping
and mental
health
Outreach, processing of
applications and
legal support;
advocacy work
(conferences,
workshops etc.),
collection of
complaints and
civil party applications; legal
representation
for marginalised
victims;
psychosocial
counselling;
interviews, etc.
Survivors of the KR
regime and their
social environment
can recognise
symptoms of trauma,
relate them to civil
war experiences and
seek counselling
when needed.
Psychosocial services
like counselling,
hotline etc. are
increased and more
frequently used and
recommended by
trauma patients. Selfhelp groups constitute
themselves
spontaneously. The
profession of a
counsellor becomes
more established in
Cambodia. Trauma
research conducted by
Cambodians is
recognised by the
international
community.
Survivors of the
KR regime and
the following
generations are
able to develop
better coping
mechanisms with
traumatic
experiences and
their aftermath.
They receive
support from their
social network.
Their interactions
with others grow
more confident
and are more
successful.
Specific
research on
trauma and
coping in
Cambodia
Master Course
on Psychology
27
Dimension
Output 
Outcome 1 
Outcome 2 
Outcome 3
Remembrance
and
reconciliation
Public forums,
village dialogues
and panel
discussions;
trips to Tuol
Sleng prison;
research on
crime sites and
memorials;
involvement of
Buddhist monks
in teaching
about KR
crimes;
reconciliation
dialogues; study
tour to Germany
etc.
Members of all social
and political groups
participate in debates
on remembrance and
national
reconciliation in
Cambodia.
The dialogues on
national reconciliation
become more and
more differentiated.
New topics are coming
up. New groups that
were formerly silent
speak out.
All social groups
show
understanding for
the diverse
experiences
during the civil
war in Cambodia.
Many surviving
victims will say
that they have
forgiven. State
and civil society
keep the memory
of the KR crimes
alive.
Theories of change in the context of DED-CPS in Cambodia are understood as the basis and
backbone of the country programme and all its related CPS expert activities and project
activities. These country/programme-specific theories of change have to be seen in
conjunction with the Theory of Change for CPS expert activities (inputs to outcomes) as
expressed by the CPS group in its standards for the CPS (2008): The CPS expert brings
qualifications, knowledge and resources that are not available locally to this extend; the CPS
expert also uses his/her status as an outsider to the conflict situation to provide credibility,
legitimacy, impartiality and protection and contributes to intercultural learning with his/her
personnel working style, creativity and solidarity. We can identify three underlying theories of
change here that define the role of and the change potential for CPS experts as seen by the
CPS group:
•
CPS expert as facilitator of know-how to support the organisation in its work;
•
CPS expert as external facilitator who provides a different perspective and hence
opportunities for dialogue, networking within the organisation, between the
organisation and others as well as between different target groups; and
•
Intercultural learning through the presence of an outsider.
These theories are at least implicitly reflected in the country programme or project
documents which all in one way or another factor into the role of the CPS experts.
4.2.2 How are theories of change translated into objectives and project designs?
Based on a comprehensive review of project documents the evaluators are satisfied that the
design of all current projects is explicitly linked to the overall theory of change of the CPS
programme. Expected project outcomes are consistent with the expected programme
outcomes and geared towards the expected programme impact. Theories of change are
translated into clearly defined objectives with the help of detailed intervention logics and/or
impact/results chains in all cases. There do not seem to be any significant logical gaps as far
as links between the input and output levels and between outputs and outcomes are
concerned. However, so far, DED has not developed or devised a unified or standardised
28
model/template for logical frameworks/results chains. The approaches differ and so does the
terminology (for example, ‘use of outputs’ and ‘benefits’ instead of ‘outcomes’) which is not in
line with BMZ and DAC terms. Figure 2 provides a good example for a comprehensive
project results chain.
4.2.3 Assessing Outcome 1: What are the main changes within CPS partner
organisations that can be attributed to the work of the CPS experts?
The following quote from one of the self-evaluation interviews perfectly summarises the
general view held among partner organisations on the role of the CPS expert in these
organisations. “In our view, change should come from inside our society not being imposed
from outside as this was often the case in the recent Cambodian history. Therefore, we need
an advisor who takes a modest and at the same time very strong position: Somebody who
asks the right questions at the right time, somebody who encourages reflection of what we
are doing and what we are and what we want to become.”
The CPS in Cambodia is based on a project approach. Projects are implemented by partner
organisations with the support, assistance and expertise of CPS experts. Usually, the
contribution of an individual CPS expert ranges from facilitator, capacity builder, sector
expert, and overall project advisor to de facto project manager. While it is clear from
programme and project documents and interviews conducted with current and former CPS
experts that neither the design of CPS projects nor the CPS experts’ perception of his/her
own role sees the CPS expert primarily and explicitly as an agent of change within the
partner organisation, change takes nevertheless place. In other words: While the CPS focus
includes the capacity building and training needs of partner organisations, projects never
lose sight of intended beneficiaries, e.g. surviving victims and perpetrators of the Khmer
Rouge crimes, youth, and generally the whole population of Cambodia (as far as it can be
reached by NGO radio) as well as local and international media (see table in Annex 3). The
one direct attempt on record by a CPS expert (in the case EED) to reform the decision
making procedures within the partner organisation (KID) towards a more participatory and
transparent approach – aiming at improving the structures for more effectiveness – ended in
a major conflict between the CPS expert and the partner organisation and tarnished the
reputation of KID among the donor community (see also under 4.5.3), according to reports of
both the CPS expert and KID and interviews. However, this was an exception. Changes that
are attributable to the CPS experts have taken place in the process of project implementation
and are positive overall. Across the programme, the most important changes regard a) the
strengthening of internal procedures and mechanisms in the fields of project implementation,
monitoring and participatory decision-making; b) advances in the professionalisation of
capacity building; c) a stronger emphasis on network building among partner organisations
and national, international and transnational CSO respectively; and d) advances in the
introduction and application of specific peacebuilding concepts and tools. Thus, the first two
CPS expert-specific theories of change (CPS expert as facilitator of know how to support the
organisation in its work; and CPS expert as external facilitator who provides a different
perspective and hence opportunities for dialogue, networking within the organisation,
between the organisation and others as well as between different target groups) are strongly
supported in the case of Cambodia.
29
Figure 2: Project results chain: Youth for Justice and Reconciliation
Source: Youth for Peace, Youth for Justice and Reconciliation Project, Impact chain 2009/2010, Update 19/03/09
30
In the following, we summarise the main changes within individual former and current CPS
partner organisations that can be attributed to the work of CPS experts. These findings, like
the synthesised findings for the programme as a whole, are mainly based on a combination
of a theory-based, results-based and outcome-based approach (with some emphasis on the
process-based approach as far as the assessment of outcome level 3 is concerned) and
were triangulated using project documents, surveys, the self-evaluation interviews, interviews
conducted by the evaluators and group discussions.
Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee (CHRAC): The advisory role of the CPS expert
was complementary to the financial support the partner received from other donors. The CPS
expert strongly contributed to improvements in the areas of knowledge transfer, project
planning and capacity building. Particularly positive changes were achieved regarding the
effectiveness (see assessment of outcome 2 in the next section) of the partner’s approach to
peacebuilding, human rights, transitional justice and international justice mechanisms. The
CPS expert facilitated contact to other international organisations which helped CHRAC to
enlarge its network and the reach of activities.
Women’s Media Center (WMC): As a result of the CPS expert’s involvement, THE TRUTH
programme (a popular radio show that deals with the Khmer Rouge past) gained profile.
According to stakeholder interviews (including media experts), training conducted by the
CPS expert had a significant effect on capacity building of the radio station’s journalists as
WMC is considered the only radio station with professional journalistic staff in line with
international standards.
Khmer Youth Association (KYA): Before being assisted by the CPS expert, there had been
little knowledge about how to achieve peace and what tools are needed for peace work
which was restricted to the dissemination of information on human rights and women's rights
only. Due to the CPS expert’s involvement KYA staff learned how to assess peacebuilding
processes and which tools to use in the process. Furthermore, issues such as women's
rights or domestic violence are no longer considered separate from general conflicts, but are
treated as part of peacebuilding needs. All KYA projects are now integrated into a coherent
peacebuilding concept. The CPS expert was instrumental in setting up a network between
the NGO and governmental organisations and training high school teachers in peace
education. As the result of the CPS expert’s involvement, KYA introduced a systematic and
well-managed approach to time-management, drawing up work plans, project
implementation and monitoring. “Dry runs and preparation rehearsals are conducted before a
project is carried out, and a reflection of the work is done. Thus, according to an interviewee,
the implementation effectiveness is enhanced.
Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR): Before the CPS expert came, CCHR had
been lead top down. “Even members of the management committee hardly dared to make
suggestions and to express ideas of their own,” as an interviewee put it. The presence of the
CPS expert helped CCHR to extend the boundaries of internal discussion and participation in
decision making. Another interviewee added, “this was probably the first time that a hiring
decision was taken on the basis of capacity and potential rather than because of proven or
presumed loyalty to the President”.
Center for Social Development/ Center for Justice and Reconciliation (CJR): The CPS expert
contributed to the standardisation of the NGO structure according to international standards,
introduced a new management culture of open communication and democratic participation
31
within the NGO, thus encouraging NGO staff to take their own initiatives; and with regards to
projects strengthened the credibility, recognition and accountability of activities.
Department of Media & Communication (DMC) at the Royal University of Phnom Penh: The
CPS expert had a strong effect on increasing the standard of training and capacity building
as well as sharing and applying best practice in journalism.
Silaka: The CPS expert brought in a new perspective at the time when the local perspective
had got stuck in conflict traditions. The new perspective also helped to enhance the local
expertise in peacebuilding processes and modern conflict management tools. Furthermore,
the CPS expert helped Silaka to link up with other institutions outside the country to enhance
Silaka’s services. According to Silaka’s director, “the CPS expert changed SILAKA. The
result is satisfying. The process of learning by doing was of benefit for SILAKA. Since the
cooperation with DED had started, peace and reconciliation were included in SILAKA's vision
and mission. The changes within SILAKA consist in the awareness of peace and
reconciliation mechanisms.”
Cambodian Defenders Project (CDP): The CPS expert markedly contributed to strategy and
programme development. As a result of training conducted by the CPS expert, CDP staff feel
more knowledgeable and capable and better prepared for their work in the fields of trauma
counselling and transitional justice. The CPS expert’s networking activities strengthened the
NGO’s cooperation with other CSOs, especially human rights organisations, as well as the
ECCC. Supervision mechanisms were also enhanced.
Cambodian Association for Human Rights and Development (ADHOC): The CPS expert who
is technically attached to ADHOC is the international lawyer for civil parties at the ECCC.
There has also been a junior advisor (“Entwicklungsstipendiat”) who is funded under the CPS
main programme (“Stammprogramm”). This junior advisor contributed to improvements
regarding project management, proposal and logframe writing and monitoring.
Youth for Peace (YFP): CPS expert-induced changes within the organisation resulted in a
more flexible environment, higher workflow, strong motivation of staff to work effectively, and
overall influenced the dynamic within the team in a positive way. More specifically, the CPS
expert introduced different new participatory methods and artistic ways in how to deal with
the past, e.g. public exhibitions, awareness of public relations, setting up a media team,
producing different kind of publications, etc.
Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID): A peacebuilding unit was set up on the initiative of the
CPS expert and the promotion of gender issues was enhanced (e.g. special emphasis was
given to the role of women in the peacebuilding process). The partner organisation gained
insight into the international concept of peacebuilding and its implementation, including
monitoring and evaluation.
Star Kampuchea: The CPS expert strengthened the organisational development of the NGO
and made a significant contribution to the improvement of monitoring systems, knowledge
transfer mechanisms and approaches to advocacy work.
Interestingly, intercultural cooperation (the third theories of change for CPS experts as
identified by the CPS group) was at best only mentioned in passing by partners and also not
by CPS experts. However, intercultural hurdles and barriers were often mentioned as the
main challenge to the role of CPS experts in partner organisations at the beginning of his/her
work. Statements such as “both parties had to learn about the other's way of thinking and
32
had to learn how to respect each other's thinking”; “the challenges stemmed from
intercultural differences”; or “local experts have better knowledge of the possibilities of a
training and more technical know-how. International experts have more theoretical
knowledge of solving conflicts. This different model of perception is essential” were
frequently made. Partly related are communication barriers due to a lack of language
proficiency (CPS experts who do not speak sufficient Khmer; local staff who speak no or only
very limited English).
One interviewee who has substantial and long-term experience in Cambodia questioned the
overall concept of the CPS expert without, however, challenging the qualifications of CPS
experts as such: “From what I have been able to observe, CPS experts don't come as peace
experts, but as experts in their own fields of professionalism. It's not known to their partner
organisations what kind of peace training or education they have. I don’t see CPS experts in
Cambodia actually presenting a peace profile. ‘Peace expert’ would therefore seem to be a
misnomer.”
Overall, both partner organisations and CPS experts themselves agreed that they were well
qualified for their specific tasks and that there was a good match of expertise of CPS experts
and the training and development needs of partner organisations. In particular, CPS experts
are well aware of the cultural context in which they operate and activities are characterised
by a high level of “cultural embeddedness”. There are generally no attempts at ‘one size fits
all’ model transfers in the peacebuilding process. Yet, some CPS experts mentioned that
more emphasis should be given to intercultural learning during the preparation phase. A
junior expert mentioned that it would be helpful if junior experts got the same preparatory
training as senior CPS experts as they were effectively doing a very similar job and needed
to be as familiar with cultural contexts and peacebuilding strategies as their more senior
colleagues. To partner organisations, the difference between junior and senior experts is
often not clear as the interviews clearly demonstrated.
4.2.4 Assessing Outcome 2: How have project activities under the CPS programme
supported the ECCC in their contribution to the establishment of the truth about the
Khmer Rouge regime and given impulses for the development of the rule of law?
Before we assess outcome 2 of the current theory of change a few remarks on outcome
assessment of the previous CPS phase are useful. The main focus of the 2002–2006
programme was on socialising multipliers (NGO staff, government officials) for the values of
peace, democracy and the rule of law, through various training and capacity building
initiatives; monitoring and advocacy mainly on issues of human rights, land conflicts and anticorruption as well as small arms reduction through i) the creation of a monitoring system for
the reduction of small arms and control; ii) information dissemination and awareness raising
for the reduction of small arms as a part of peace education and iii) trainings for NGO staff
and officials on small arms reduction; and protection based on a project to implement the
Law on the Prevention of Domestic Violence and the Protection of the Victims. Social
cohesion between conflicting groups; the use of service delivery as an entry point for
peacebuilding and facilitation to solve local problems had not been at the centre of
implemented projects.
Due to the CPS’s heterogeneous approach to peacebuilding in the 2001–2006 phase, it is
impossible to assess the overall effectiveness of the programme due to a) the lack of
33
systematic monitoring and evaluation and b) the involvement of a multitude of donors in each
intervention area which makes it impossible to isolate the specific CPS contribution.
Yet, the evaluation was still able to find evidence of effectiveness in some specific cases for
the 2001–2006 phase based mainly on stakeholder interviews. For example, the handbook
on ‘Critical Legal Thinking’ – developed as part of the intervention with the same title at the
Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID) during the project phase between August 2002 and June
2004 – is considered the authoritative source for legal training in Cambodia and has been
adopted as the standard textbook for the training of lawyers. Thus, the project made an
important contribution to increasing the ‘capacity for participatory conflict management’
through socialising and advocacy with some emphasis on service delivery.
The assessment of effectiveness of the post-2007 phase with regard to both the expected
programme outcomes (figure 1) and outcomes of the four programme dimensions (table 2) is
unproblematic due to regular, well developed and well documented monitoring on the part of
the DED and partner organisations (see under efficiency). DED’s and partner organisations’
monitoring results were triangulated with stakeholders’ (project staff, CPS experts,
coordinator, direct beneficiaries and other stakeholders) views and programme/project
reports.
It is important to mention that while outcome 3 (‘Survivors and the following generations have
come to terms with the atrocities committed during the Khmer Rouge’) logically builds on
outcome 2 (‘The ECCC have contributed to the establishment of the truth about the Khmer
Rouge regime and given impulses for the development of the rule of law’) in the sense that
the theory of change rightly sees the ECCC as the starting point for, and the most important
contribution to any meaningful approach to dealing with the Khmer Rouge past, the CPS
projects target both outcome levels in parallel. In other words, project results chains are
based on the assumption that the effectiveness of projects directed at outcome 2 can only be
achieved and lead to outcome 3 if strengthened and enhanced through project activities that
embed the work and mission of the ECCC (the actual trials) to a broad societal approach to
reconciliation, remembrance and mental health.
The following examples of measurable contributions (based on a results-based approach) to
the achievement of outcomes can be clustered into the specific civil society functions as
outlined in the Inception Report.
Facilitation and Monitoring (with a strong emphasis on monitoring the work of the ECCC, for
example ‘Critical monitoring and advocacy work against corruption and political interference
at the ECCC’) are part of all projects. Particularly the contributions of CHRAC should be
mentioned here. CHRAC does not only coordinate the activities of member organisations
with regard to part-facilitating the ECCC’s outreach programme and providing support to civil
parties but also makes an important contribution to the monitoring of the ECCC. These
activities and their outputs are well documented on CHRAC’s website
(http://www.chrac.org/eng/).
Social Cohesion does not play a central role. Protection and advocacy are most directly
related to support of the ECCC in a narrow sense, e.g. in terms of direct contributions to the
court proceedings, while socialisation is a function primarily associated with outcome 3.
Service delivery is crucial for both outcome levels.
Service Delivery: Unlike the previous phase, the current one has a strong focus on service
delivery. For example, the psychological care to witnesses and civil parties before, during
34
and after the proceedings at the ECCC that the Trans-Cultural Psychosocial Organization
(TPO) is offering is unique in Cambodia. According to interviews conducted by the Berkeley
Human Rights Center (BHRC) in November 2009 many civil party applicants expressed that
the psychosocial counselling provided by TPO helped them to cope with post-traumatic
stress and to participate or even testify in the Case 1 hearings.23 This achievement is directly
attributable to the CPS project as the foundation of TPO’s work.
The CPS project at the Department of Media and Communication (DMC) of the Royal
University of Phnom Penh made an important contribution to the professionalisation of
journalism in Cambodia, particularly in the area of conflict sensitive reporting and legal
reporting on issues related to the ECCC and generally the Khmer Rouge past. Printed news
items, video documentaries and radio programmes written and produced by DMC trained
journalists (graduates and current students) clearly show that these contributions have raised
the bar of the quality of reporting in Cambodia.
Protection: According to interviews at the ECCC, without the support of DED-CPS, The
Victims Unit at the ECCC would not have been able to do its work and achieve important
results with regard to outreach to surviving victims; reception of complaints and civil party
applications; processing of complaints and applications and submission to co-prosecutors
and co-investigative judges; coordination of legal representation for civil parties; and
participation in the design for policies and strategies related to victims participation.
Advocacy: The project on gender-based violence (GBV) under the KR regime – implemented
by the Cambodian Defenders Project CDP – that aims at outreach and awareness raising on
GBV collects complaints and civil party applications from victims and witnesses of GBV and
advocates for the inclusion of GBV into the investigations of the ECCC. Until February 2010,
CDP received 76 civil parties applications related to GBV. The project is closely associated
with the work of the CPS expert who represents victims of gender-based crimes. The CPS
expert was the first and for a long time the only international lawyer at the ECCC who
represents victims of the Khmer Rouge regime. Until now, she is the only international lawyer
that is continuously present in Cambodia and permanently available for consultations with
the clients. 24 The CPS project is the only of its kind in the country and there would not have
been a consideration of GBV at the ECCC without it. Surveys and feedback from NGOs and
stakeholder interviews show that the Cambodian people are better informed on genderbased crimes under the Khmer Rouge regime and the proceedings before the ECCC as a
result of CPS interventions.
4.2.5. Assessing Outcome 3: How have project activities under the CPS programme
helped survivors and the following generations to come to terms with the atrocities
committed during the Khmer Rouge regime?
When it comes to outcome 3 we found that the following examples of project activities under
the CPS programme directly contributed to a strengthening of societal mechanisms of
dealing with the Khmer Rouge past beyond contributions to the immediate work and mission
of the ECCC.
23
The study has not been published yet. Information is based on interviews with the DED CPS
coordinator and a BHRC researcher.
24
See for example http://www.khmernews.com/view/silke-studzinsky-only-foreign-lawyer-to-representvictims-of-the-khmer-rouge-genocide-victims/2580/; and
http://www.amnesty.ch/de/aktuell/magazin/58/massenhochzeiten [Last accessed: April 2011].
35
Service Delivery: The excellently written and designed handbook “Understanding Trauma in
Cambodia: Basic Psychological Concepts”, which was developed in a project with the DEDCPS partner organisation Center for Social Development (CSD), is the first of its kind in
Cambodia and was adopted at the Royal University of Phnom Penh – the oldest and largest
University in Cambodia – as an authoritative textbook for the training of psychologists and
psychiatrists at M.A. level. Moreover, this book made the highly sensitive issue of postconflict trauma accessible to civil society organisations and the general public. It is not an
exaggeration to say that the handbook opened the debate – and lifted the taboo – on trauma
in Cambodia. It made a significant contribution to the Cambodian society’s attempts at
coming to terms with the Khmer Rouge past by introducing people to the necessary concepts
and vocabulary to cope with trauma. 25 The work is continued by another CPS expert who
recently started her work.
Socialisation: As part of the outreach activities on the ECCC, ADHOC organised more than
1,068 training sessions with an average of 120 persons per session. As a result, more than
110,000 people were reached. This output made a contribution to the intended outcome that
Cambodian citizens are aware and well informed about the ECCC and have realistic
expectations as to what the trials can achieve. Furthermore, Cambodians have more trust in
their judicial system and have the courage to join criminal proceedings at the domestic level
as civil parties. According to the latest International Republican Institute (IRI) survey of
July/August 2009 among the Cambodian population, the awareness of the ECCC has grown
to 82 per cent, up from 71 per cent according to the previous survey of January/February
2008. By that, the figure is already approaching the CPS’s indicator for outreach
effectiveness: ‘More than 90 per cent of the Cambodian adult population are “aware” of the
KRT (ECCC)’. The strong ECCC focus of the current CPS phase and the initiator/leadership
role of DED-CPS on victims participation and remembrance make it probable that these
achievements can – to a sizable degree – be attributed to CPS interventions.
Youth for Peace’s village dialogues in seven provinces that bring together surviving victims,
perpetrators, young people and in many cases monks to exchange views on the Khmer
Rouge past have made a very important contribution to opening the debate within
Cambodia’s society. Very often these dialogues are held in Pagodas, which increases the
legitimacy of the dialogue process. This is often the first opportunity for younger Cambodians
to enter into a dialogue on this topic, and for the older generations the first chance to share
the experiences they had lived through. According to YFP’s own assessment, “these
dialogues will not be presented as older community members teaching youth historical facts,
but rather an opportunity for youth to be exposed to the diversity of historical narratives and
perceptions among rural Cambodians. They also discuss about expectations and
perceptions of the [...] Khmer Rouge tribunal, and receive basic knowledge on the purpose,
history, means and mandate of the tribunal.” 26 The evaluators observed such as village
dialogue for a whole day in Thlork (Svay Rieng) and also found that it is indeed often the first
time that Cambodian adolescents are able to get reliable information on the atrocities
25
The handbook is downloadable at
http://www.ded.de/fileadmin/scripts/download.php?path=fileadmin/Redaktion/Arbeitsfelder/Zivile_Konfl
iktbearbeitung_und_Friedensf%C3%B6rderung/PDF/KHM_Trauma_Book.pdf&PHPSESSID=dfaa438
2cae9adad8379a097d86ad3b8 [Last accessed: April 2011]
For a brief summary see http://mcnnews.wordpress.com/2007/12/18/understanding-trauma-incambodia/ [Last accessed: April 2011].
26
http://www.yfpcambodia.org/index.php?page=project-3 [Last accessed: April 2011]
36
committed by the Khmer Rouge and – equally important – how to deal with this information.
This was confirmed by group discussions with about 30 high school students and several
survivors and other participants and that the evaluators conducted at the village dialogue in
Thlork. As one participant put it, “I learned here how the Khmer Rouge came to power, what
their ideology was and why they killed. This helps me to talk about the Khmer Rouge past in
my own family and with friends”. Another high school student said: “It is very good that
victims and perpetrators come together at the village dialogues. We need to hear both sides
to understand our past”. The evaluators’ findings also correspond with the feedback of
participants that is regularly collected and documented by YFP, 27 and also video
documentaries that the CPS-funded media project at the DMC 28 produced on the topic of
village dialogues. Overall the YFP village forums are an important stepping stone on the way
to national reconciliation because the provision of information on the atrocities and the
possibility for meaningful and constructive dialogue between the younger and older
generations as well as victims and perpetrators is a central contribution towards – and
indeed the pre-condition for – achieving reconciliation.
The project at the Women’s Media Center (WMC), Radio FM 102 – the largest independent
radio station in Cambodia – that produces a weekly radio programme on the Khmer Rouge
history and the ECCC reaches a large audience in most parts of the country. The programme
has achieved crucial results in the way Cambodians deal with the Khmer Rouge past,
especially in terms of encouraging listeners to call in and talk about themselves, something
Cambodian still find difficult to do. The show has an average of 35 callers per programme,
significantly more than any other radio programme on Khmer Rouge-related issues. Most
crucially perhaps, both victims and perpetrators call in. Radio is the most important medium
in Cambodia and the project has almost revolutionised the journalistic approach to coping
with the country’s past, remembrance and reconciliation. A WMC survey shows that listeners
to “The Truth” radio programme are far better informed about the ECCC than the average of
the population.
The Berkeley Study29 (part-funded by CPS) and the IRI Survey30 that survey Cambodian
public opinion on peacebuilding, conflict resolution and the ECCC (both surveys were used
for triangulation of findings) provide sound empirical evidence that progress has already
been made towards achieving the stated objectives, both overall and regarding the four
programme focal points (outreach, victims participation, mental health and remembrance).
The programme’s effectiveness is good with regard to the second programme outcome (The
ECCC have contributed to the establishment of the truth about the Khmer Rouge regime and
given impulses for the development of the rule of law) and progress has already been made
towards achieving the third outcome (Survivors and the following generations have come to
terms with the atrocities committed during the Khmer Rouge regime). As for the four
27
See for example http://www.yfpcambodia.org/index.php?page=results [Last accessed: April 2011].
Department of Media and Communication, Royal University of Phnom Penh, Looking Back, Locking
Ahead 1 and 2 (20 mini-documentaries on Khmer Rouge history and reconciliation, 2007-2008
(2 DVDs).
29
Human Rights Center, University of California Berkeley (2009): So We will Never Forget. A
population-based Survey on Attitudes about Social Reconstruction and the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia, January 2009.OF CAODIA
30
International Republican Institute, Survey of Cambodian Public Opinion, January 27 – February 26,
2008; and July 31-August 26, 2009.
28
37
programme dimensions, at least the first outcome level and partially the second one have
been achieved in all cases.
As already mentioned, output and outcome indicators are well-defined in DED-CPS
programme and project documents, and in several cases achievements towards outcomes
can directly be attributed to the CPS. This can be exemplified by the indicator “By the end of
2009 more than 4,000 surviving victims of the KR regime have filed complete information
forms to the Victims Unit (VU) of the ECCC”. The planned output was achieved. Of the
roughly 8,190 victims, information forms that were handed over to the Victims Support
Section of the ECCC by the end of January 2010 (see also under 4.1.2), more than 55 per
cent were collected by DED partners such as ADHOC and KID. In some other cases, while
there is probability that results are indeed somehow attributable to CPS, there is still a certain
‘attribution gap’ because other donors are involved at the ECCC and in ECCC-related
activities, too. For example, this is evident with regard to the programme component on
outreach because of the ECCC’s own outreach and the contribution of the mass media.
At the same time DED does not claim sole ownership of outcome achievements but there is
awareness among CPS stakeholders that while the programme makes a strong contribution
to realising the theories of change, it takes coordinated donor efforts to fully achieve the
envisioned outcomes and ultimately the desired impact.
With regards to the plausibility on effectiveness at outcome level 3, we can conclude that the
likelihood of producing change (as for outcome 2) is linked to a) the design of the project
activities, b) the process of implementation and c) the way the project activities manage to
address the relevant context variables. We find the following trends: Since all projects or
implementation processes are based on strong theories of change and well developed
results chains, across the board projects have high outcome likelihood. At the same time,
projects in direct and immediate support of the ECCC (mainly outcome 2), particularly on
victims support, assistance to civil parties and the ECCC’s outreach tend to have the highest
likelihood of achieving immediate tangible outcomes. This is due to the fact that these
projects have clear and very specific target indicators that can easily be measured (and are
regularly monitored) using the above mentioned and other surveys. Indicators include
‘Throughout the trials, more than 66 per cent say that the KRT (ECCC) can help to establish
the truth about the KR regime and that the trials will be fair’ (for outreach projects); ‘Civil
parties that actively participated in the trials voice in follow up surveys that they have
benefited and did not experience lasting re-traumatisation’ (victims participation) or ‘All
surviving victims with clinically diagnosed trauma symptoms before and during the trials
report improvement in symptoms after the trials’ (mental health). Among the projects that try
to promote reconciliation and remembrance in a broader way that goes beyond the ECCC
proceedings and are therefore mainly targeted at outcome level 3, the WMC’s radio project
probably stands out as being most effective. which is a large number for such a show. Most
importantly “The Truth” is the only radio show of its kind that does not differentiate between
victims and perpetrators but promotes the message that reconciliation is only possible if the
process involves both victims and perpetrators. As a result, the show attracts a growing
number of former Khmer Rouge who calls in to talk about their feelings. This is a major result
regarding the promoting intra-societal debates that demonstrates effectiveness towards
achieving outcome 3. The DMC’s journalism programme, CJR’s public forums, YFP’s
educational programmes or ADHOC’s advocacy activities and similar programmes aim in the
same direction but are based on longer term processes of generating change and, while
38
certainly contributing to achieving outcomes in line with the theories of change, are thus less
likely to produce immediately measureable effectiveness.
4.2.6 What are the differences in effectiveness with regard to different partners?
The evaluators did not come across any particular factors that would indicate differences in
the effectiveness of respective partners, e.g. NGOs versus government stakeholders.
4.2.7 In which phases of conflict are activities most effective?
This question is not relevant for Cambodia as there is no ground for comparison yet. CPS
interventions started in the post-conflict phase which continues. While it is true that conflict
prevention forms part of the DED-CPS theory of change, the Cambodian nation as a whole is
still trying to come to terms with its conflictive and violent past and not ready yet to move on
the prevention phase on a large scale. DED, like all donors/implementing organisations in
Cambodia, constantly monitors the country’s situation (all major reports of DED, DED-CPS
and the DED country director detailed country context sections).
4.3 Impact
4.3.1 What is the impact of projects under the CPS programme?
The highly aggregated development impact level of the first CPS phase was ‘Sustained
national and societal peace and stability’; the second phase aims slightly lower by wanting to
achieve ‘Reconciliation and effective approach to coping with the Khmer Rouge past as a
precondition for sustained national and societal peace and stability”. In the strict sense of
impact assessment, e.g. the ascription of a causal link between observed (or at least
expected) changes in Cambodia’s development and the specific intervention of the CPS
instrument, the envisioned impact has not been achieved yet. Simply put, reconciliation and
an effective approach to coping with the Khmer Rouge past are still unrealised objectives.
However, as the previous section has shown, clear advancements towards achieving
programme and project outcomes have made a significant contribution in the process of
reaching the impact level.
4.3.2 How does the CPS programme in Cambodia conceptualise impact?
The conceptualisation of impact in the case of the CPS programme in Cambodia is not
straightforward because – as already mentioned – DED (generally, not just in Cambodia)
works with a terminology that is different from the one used by the DAC. This terminology
was introduced by DED headquarters in 2007 and distinguishes between “output”, “use of
output”, “benefit” and “impact”. Most DED-CPS programme and project documents in
Cambodia refer to ‘intended long-term impacts” which, however, take more the form of
outcomes (in the DAC sense) than ‘highly aggregated development impact’. However,
regardless of the specific terminology used, programme/project documents do not refer to
any indicators to access impact. With regard to the reconstructed impact in the theory of
change (“Reconciliation and effective approach to coping with the Khmer Rouge past as a
precondition for sustained national and societal peace and stability”), it is interesting to note
39
that – while indicators have not been developed by the programme itself – risks to outcome
and impact realisation are clearly stated:
•
The ECCC and/or the intermediary NGOs are running out of funds;
•
The Cambodian Government interferes with the proceedings at the ECCC;
•
Freedom of expression is more curtailed in Cambodia so that outreach activities and
the participation of victims are negatively affected; and
•
Re-traumatisation and frustration of victims, burnout of intermediary staff.31
4.4 Efficiency
4.4.1 How efficient are the CPS’s administrative, financial, monitoring and learning
instruments?
Based on stakeholder interviews, we conclude that the CPS programme is well managed
and administered in Cambodia. There can be little doubt about the strong leadership and
vision of both the CPS coordinator and the DED country director.
However, despite growing project ownership of partner organisations – due to increasing
local capacity and expertise – project initiation and strategic planning is still predominantly
DED-driven. Most NGOs respond to donor interests and do not take pro-active approaches
to the planning of interventions. The predominantly ‘donor-driven’ peacebuilding process
limits the degree of local ownership of both the general thrust and direction of peacebuilding
(or in the more specific case of the CPS: reconciliation, remembrance and justice) and
individual interventions. Generally, CSOs follow the donor interest and agenda. This is quite
common in the Cambodian situation. Cambodia remains ‘donor-trapped’. Although there are
thousands of NGOs registered with the Ministry of Interior, only around 400 NGOs are
operationalised and they are strongly dependent on aid from donors.
As interviews with CPS experts and partner organisations revealed, the main challenge for
CPS experts in terms of the efficiency of project implementation is the frequent existence of
different role expectations of DED-CPS on the one hand and partner organisations on the
other. While CPS experts are expected to be advisors to their partner organisations
according to their DED-CPS job descriptions, they are often pushed into decision-making
roles by their respective host partner organisation and sometimes enjoy a higher level of
authority than the NGO director. This is partly because foreign experts generally enjoy a high
degree of authority in Cambodia and partly because they are supposedly neutral and
unbiased in their preferences in cases of complex and complicated decisions. In interviews,
most CPS experts expressed their concern about the local partner organisations’ perception
and expectation vis-à-vis the specific role of a foreign peace expert in the CPS programme. It
seems necessary that more clarity about the mission, role and tasks of CPS experts is
achieved in communication between DED and partner organisations.
While there is some participation of partner organisations in the selection of the CPS expert
(this is generally the case for DED and not specific to Cambodia), there is nevertheless a
certain risk of a mismatch between the DED-selected CPS expert and the specific needs of
31
Andreas Selmeci (2010): The Civil Peace Service of DED in Cambodia, Peace and Development
Intervention: Justice and Reconciliation in Cambodia 2007-2010, version February 2010.
40
the partner organisation (however, this does not currently seem to be the case) and
constraints the participatory credo of the CPS. More specifically, partner organisations
participate in the drafting of the job description and profile of the CPS expert. Later, they
receive the CV of the applicant who prevailed in the assessment centre for either approval or
rejection. However, partners are not involved in the shortlisting of candidates. Yet, some
interviewees saw the latter as a lack of involvement of partner organisations which limits the
participatory approach of the CPS in general. As one stakeholder put it
“There should be more involvement by the partner organisation in the profiling and
selection of the person. Bringing people who don't have much previous knowledge
about the country to come into sensitive situations can be problematic. In case of the
ECCC, this is a very specific situation. Knowledge about the background of the
project could be helpful. ... Speaking generally – sometimes there seems to be a
mismatch between the qualifications of the persons sent and the job that they might
be expected to do.”
Another efficiency issue that frequently came up in interviews – this time mainly with partner
organisations – is reporting. While English reports from partner organisations are available
for all projects, most CPS reporting is conducted in German and therefore inaccessible for
partner organisations. As one interviewee commented, “We did not have full insight in the
whole planning, monitoring and evaluation procedure of DED-CPS. For example, our advisor
wrote long reports in German that were not translated into English.” This is especially a
problem if CPS expert/DED reports are critical of partner organisations and partners are not
given the opportunity to respond and tell their side of the story. However, this does not apply
to EED whose partner organisations were given the opportunity to submit detailed final
reports on CPS interventions in response to any critical remarks of the CPS experts. In
interviews, many CPS experts expressed a preference for generally writing reports only in
English.
There is yet no centralised documentation system (for example a website) for all
documentation on CPS interventions that allow CPS experts and partner organisations
instant access to information (particularly in provinces) and contributes to the strengthening
of coherence of the CPS programme.
Four points in the context of financial instruments are worth mentioning: First, a recent
internal DED audit of the DED country office in Cambodia concluded that the accounting of
the CPS was impeccable. The audit looked at 2008 expenses and payments and found that
receipts were complete and in good order in all cases. The auditors noted that partner
organisations processed claims/receipts “very professionally”. They stressed, however, that
the Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) between CPS and partner organisations were not
sufficiently comprehensive as they lacked a clause on the BMZ’s and BRT’s
(Bundesrechnungshof) right of inspection (“Prüfrecht des Bundes”). 32
The second point refers to project funding. Until 2008 projects were mainly funded with
remaining money from the CPS fund. The budgets at the beginning of the year were very low
and were only increased in several steps throughout the year. Many partner organisations
had to wait until mid-year until they could apply for project funding. After that they had to
hurry spending approved funds until the end of December. Since 2009 more money for
project funding has been allocated in the initial budget (for DED-CPS in Cambodia: 357,000
32
DED, Prüfungsbericht über die Revision des DED Büro in Phnom Penh/Kambodscha, in der Zeit
vom 14.09.2009 bis 18.09.2009.
41
euros in 2010). However, the "vorläufige Haushaltsführung", i.e. the restrictions for DED to
spend money until the final budgetary decision of the German Government, lead to a
situation where sums approved at the beginning of the year could only be disbursed in small
shares and often with delays. These delays in the disbursement of funds and transfer of
funds by instalments have caused delays in the implementation of projects and negatively
impacted on staff motivation at partner organisations.
Third, due to existing ceilings on the salary for EFKs there is insufficient flexibility to award
highly qualified and/or high performing EFKs and prevent them from leaving a partner
organisation (sometimes in the middle of a project). An increasing mismatch between the
required level of qualification and the CPS pay level of EFKs is also evident. Unlike in the
cases of CPS programmes in Latin America and possibly also some African countries, the
ideal of having CPS experts and EFKs of equal status who cooperate “at the same eye
level”, CPS experts and EFKs in Cambodia are more likely to have a mentor-assistant
relationship. This is acceptable within the Cambodian context with its persistent high demand
for capacity building. Many EFKs have received valuable experience, training and
qualifications within CPS projects. However, there is now a growing number of well-qualified
national experts, particularly at some of the larger NGOs, and a maximum salary of 400 USdollars (the real pay is lower in most cases) is unlikely to attract top national peace experts to
CPS projects. While the evaluators believe that the salary issue needs to be addressed, they
appreciate the fact that DED faces a dual dilemma. First, salaries for local CPS experts are
already higher than for local experts in other DED programmes; second, to some extent
salary levels for local experts need to be coordinated with other donors and implementing
agencies to avoid salary cost spiralling out of control. However, the second point should not
be used as an argument to keep salaries for national experts artificially low for the
convenience of donors.
Fourth, there are no formally institutionalised procedures in place for the funding of capacity
building at partner organisations. Current arrangements are based on ad hoc decisions. In
April 2009, DED-CPS in Cambodia decided to earmark 5,000 US-dollars from the budget for
funding partner activities for capacity building for EFK and other local counterparts.
A high level of efficiency has been achieved on monitoring. Theories of change are
translated into well-defined objectives, results and – in most cases – a process design.
Indicator-based monitoring/surveys takes place regularly at output level (deliverables to
beneficiaries) and partly at the outcome level. However, explicitly outlined theories of
change/results chains did not exist during the early stages of the 2001–2006 phase and have
not been used by EED either.
While the process of designing results chains and monitoring effectiveness and impact are
predominantly DED-driven and facilitated by the CPS coordinator and FFKs, the local partner
organisations are prominently involved too, albeit to varied degrees depending on the
specific NGO. Overall, local ownership of monitoring has grown as the result of regular CPSfacilitated monitoring and lessons learned workshops for partner organisations. It is important
to note that these workshops are not organised and conducted in a top-down approach but
based on a joint learning concept.
While the evaluation found evidence of an advanced approach to results-based monitoring
(jointly with partner organisations), there is continuous need for capacity building on
monitoring. However, there have been no formal structures and procedures in place yet to
fund capacity building. It is assumed that this happens informally almost as a matter of
42
course as the result of a FFKs involvement with a partner organisation. This does not only
apply to capacity building on monitoring but also to other areas such as grant proposal
writing, report writing, fundraising etc.
Methodologically sound planning, including the widespread use and application of results
chains, and indicator-based monitoring is evident – to varied degrees – for all CPS projects
of the current programme but was not systematically the case for pre-2007 activities. This
became evident when the evaluators looked through project documents, such as project
proposals, project and mid-term review reports, and listened to presentations of the CPS
coordinator at workshops conducted during the evaluation.
Yet, although all CPS projects are based on results chains and are continuously monitored,
there is no standardised model for the design of theories of change and the assessment of
outputs, outcomes and impact and, as already mentioned, different terminologies are used to
refer to outputs and outcomes.
The current CPS programme puts strong emphasis on an anticipatory and joint learning
approach which is based on regular joint CPS experts/partner organisations ‘lessons learned’
and monitoring workshops that facilitate an exchange of best practices, generate
recommendations for improvements of existing activities and serve capacity building needs.
For example a ‘Workshop on Impact Oriented Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation’ in Phnom
Penh, in February 2008, which was organised jointly with SILAKA, focused on
•
the basic understanding of the concepts and key ideas of impact oriented
development interventions;
•
the integration of impact orientation into Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E)
procedures according to the new DED PM&E Standard; and
•
discussion of impact orientation with partners.33
4.4.2 How efficient is the establishment of posts of CPS coordinators?
The vast majority of CPS experts and partner organisations appreciate the clear, efficient
and straightforward administrative procedures, guidelines and requirements for DED-CPS
projects, especially when compared to the more complex rules and procedures of other
donors, above all the European Commission. In Cambodia, among both CPS experts and
partner organisations, the efficiency of the administrative procedures is prominently
associated with the role of the CPS coordinator. Interviewees stressed the advantage of
having “short ways of communication” due to the presence of a CPS coordinator in town,
who could always be approached for advice and help on both project application and
implementation. Both CPS experts and partner organisations also positively mentioned
DED’s flexibility in project implementation which allowed for amendments to project
proposals in cases that structural changes required changes to the original project design.
This flexibility is mainly facilitated by the coordinator. It is difficult to imagine that a large
programme of the CPS in Cambodia could be efficiently managed without a coordinator.
33
See DED (2008): Workshop Documentation, Training on “Impact Oriented Planning, Monitoring and
Evaluation in DED” for DED rural development sector experts in Cambodia, 18 – 20 February, 2008
Silaka, Phnom Penh.
43
4.4.3 How does CPS align with the subsidiary principle and how cost-efficient would
be alternatives?
If we take the subsidiary principle at face value 34, it only partly exists in the case of the CPS,
judged from the Cambodian angle. The DED country office has now some decentralised
autonomy in the disbursement of project funds (see under 4.4.1) and generally in steering
the country CPS programme, but is otherwise firmly integrated in a top-down decisionmaking chain with the BMZ at the top and DED headquarters in the middle. Examples are
the already mentioned disbursements of funds to the country office or the often stressed (in
interviews) problem of the big time gap between the request and arrival of CPS experts
which is related to BMZ/CPS procedures. When a partner organisation requests the support
under CPS it can take up to two years until the CPS expert arrives and for the project to start.
The reasons are to be found in the current procedures of the CPS that allow only for project
proposals to be submitted once a year; the often long recruitment period and the long
training of the CPS experts in Germany.
If the question is mainly meant to address subsidiary in relations between the CPS and
partner organisations, the picture slightly changes. Partner organisations have a duty and
responsibility for the efficient, transparent, accountable and results-oriented management of
CPS-funded projects. There is a well implemented system of supervision and audit but
partners enjoy a fair amount of independent decision-making authority. This is also the
reason why more cost-efficient alternatives are currently not feasible in Cambodia. Scenarios
for more cost-efficient alternatives to the current CPS expert system were discussed
extensively with both DED-CPS stakeholders and partner organisations. The outcome was
always the same: even the most advanced NGOs perceive the continued need for the
involvement of CPS experts to guarantee efficient project implementation. Local stakeholders
feel that they do not possess the capacities and expertise yet to operate at the same level of
professionalism without the participation of external advisors. One also has to keep in mind
that the CPS is already one of the most cost effective development cooperation programmes
(if one takes those that deploy personnel only) – certainly in Cambodia, but probably also
elsewhere – given the low salary levels of CPS expert as compared to other ‘development
workers’ and particularly consultants. Since both DED and partner organisations agree that
external advice in the implementation of projects is still needed in Cambodia, the only
alternative to the current CPS experts under the CPS would be more expensive system of
contracting short- and long-term consultants.
4.5 Sustainability
4.5.1 What are experiences of sustainability after the CPS expert leaves projects and
activities?
Occasionally, partner organisations have demonstrated capacities and capabilities to
continue activities on their own without further CPS support. However, this applies only to the
largest NGOs and only in exceptional cases, such as SILAKA which continues to offer
capacity building for NGO staff and public servants on peacebuilding, the rule of law,
advocacy and lobby work – a project that was originally supported by the CPS between 2001
34
Decisions are made at the most decentralised level, in which a centralised decision-making body
would not take action unless it is more effective than action taken at a lower level.
44
and 2004. Even NGOs such as TPO which offer a ‘professional product’ – in this case
psychological support and counselling for Khmer Rouge Victims – and might be in the
position to commercialise some of its services would find it extremely difficult to continue with
its work if CPS funding seized. Approximately 70 per cent of TPO’s customers are poor and
would not be able to pay for TPO’s services.
The general finding is that projects cannot sustain themselves once the CPS expert leaves
and the CPS funding seizes. It is not a usual practice for CPS projects in Cambodia that
grants are given to fund EFKs without CPS experts.
4.5.2 How are issues of sustainability integrated into the planning of CPS activities
from the beginning of a project? How has this process (and its milestones) been
monitored?
DED-CPS tries to improve the sustainability of the ECCC-focused project through a more
prominent involvement of multipliers among target groups and beneficiaries. The targeting of
multipliers has not been an explicit strategy so far but various initiatives are planned, centred
on the Tuol Sleng torture centre, local government offices and school teachers. The
involvement of monks in an initiative on “Buddhist healing”, which is already part of the
project activities of YFP, is a good start. A further option to increase sustainability would be
the transfer of conflict resolution/management mechanisms as developed in current CPS
projects to other areas of conflict not yet covered by the CPS: for example stress
management in land conflicts.
However, no systematic and institutionalised approach to achieving and increasing the
sustainability of interventions has so far been put in place. The general observation is, “when
the funding seizes, the NGOs move on the next donor-driven project”. The current ECCC
interventions offer a good chance for sustainability due to a) the integration of individual
projects into a coherent programme and b) the strong coalition of donors and NGOs that has
been created under the leadership of DED. Victims associations – which are currently being
established in a bottom-up, grassroots approach – may contribute to sustainability.``
Most crucially, there is no explicit post-ECCC strategy. What happens to the psycho-social
support of Khmer Rouge victims and Cambodia’s memory culture once the ECCC’s mandate
has ended and/or donor support seizes? DED-CPS has made some contributions towards
achieving sustainability through, inter alia, providing a CPS expert as a lecturer on trauma
and counselling for the Department of Psychology who acts as a multiplier and thus
contributes to the sustainability of the programme. The many advocacy initiatives of CHRAC
that have resulted in symbolic and collective reparations by the ECCC should also be
mentioned here. Yet, most NGOs themselves do not have a strong post-ECCC vision. The
majority of interviewees at partner organisations were hoping that funding for ECCC-related
interventions continued but had not yet developed any plans if donors decided to move on to
a different area of interest.
This is particularly relevant as donors have already started thinking about an exit strategy. In
February 2010 international donors endorsed the 2010 and 2011 budget for the ECCC and
assigned 42 million US-dollars for 2010 and 43 million US-dollars for 2011 to the tribunal, as
the court expects to see increased activity levels as the Pre-Trial Chamber is set to function
on a full-time basis. Plans are in place to commence three different processes in the near
future that would run at the same time. These include an appeal of Duch; a joint trial of four
45
other regime leaders; and a trial of further suspects not yet brought into custody. 35 However,
financial support beyond 2011 is uncertain. The ECCC itself “expects to wrap up its work by
2015, with a peak of activity expected in early 2011 but with reductions in annual spending
and the progressive closure of offices beginning in 2012”. 36
Any discussion of a post-ECCC strategy should also include donor-partner deliberations on
the pro and cons of a truth commission. The necessity of a truth commission was stressed by
many Cambodian interviewees. In short, according to this view, organising a truth
commission would complement the current ECCC and better respond to the victims’ needs.
The ECCC alone cannot answer the needs of millions of Cambodian victims. Some
interviewees suggested organising a form of community-based public forum based on
Buddhist principles with involvement of Buddhist monks. This community-based public forum
would involve victims to a larger extent than the ECCC and with full support from the
government. Organising community-based public forums would give victims the opportunity
to experience relief and possibly even closure when their suffering is officially heard, their
dignity is respected through remorse from the perpetrators, broken relationships are
restored, truth is sought and the young generations are able to participate and learn from the
forums.
4.5.3 How does the CPS ensure that local expertise is not sidelined or downplayed by
European CPS experts?
While the CPS tries to prevent the sidelining or downplaying of local expertise by European
experts, CPS experts often unwillingly find themselves in a leadership, decision-making or
senior management position because the partner organisation wants them to play such a
role. According to one interviewee of a partner organisation, “partners see the CPS expert as
a representative of the donor, so they put the CPS expert in charge because they want to
know what the donor expects of the partner”. At the same time, CPS experts are often looked
up to because there is still no widespread confidence of local stakeholders in their own
knowledge and skills. This is – at least partly – the result of the total donor dependence of
NGOs and contradicts all efforts of creating sustainability. However, such complete
dependence on foreign experts might no longer be necessary in all sectors. For example,
local staff at WMC or CDP is seen as being very capable of implementing projects with little
or no need for external advice anymore. The same does not necessarily apply to other
NGOs.
The danger of sidelining and downplaying local expertise was often mentioned in interviews,
group discussions and the workshops that the evaluators attended. All CPS experts, the
coordinator and the DED country director are clearly aware of it; yet there are no formal,
institutionalised mechanisms in place to counter this challenge. It should be stressed,
though, that it might be impossible to establish firm safeguarding procedures as the interplay
between local and international stakeholders and expertise is always also a matter of
personalities and the specific circumstances of inter-personal relations.
35
Patrikainen, Maria (2010): ‘International Donors Approve 85 Million US-dollar Khmer Rouge Tribunal
Budget for 2010-11’. In: World Markets Research Center, Global Insight, 26 February 2010.
36
The Cambodian Daily, 4 February 2010: 1, “KRT Donors offered a 2015 exit strategy”.
46
4.6 Coherence, coordination, complementarity
4.6.1 Coherence
To what extent is the effectiveness of the CPS interventions influenced by other fields of
policy?
Policy incoherence between the CPS programme and other policies were not mentioned by
interviewees.
4.6.2 External complementarity
What linkages are there with other programmes / players (e.g. German bilateral development
cooperation, projects from the CPS member organisations’ core programmes, other
international NGOs or multilateral institutions)? What synergy effects are achieved here?
The current programme is highly complementary with other donors’ support for the ECCC as
it was the first – and still is the core – intervention that addresses victim support and
remembrance/memory culture. The DED-CPS programme is fully complementary with the
interventions of other German organisations (GTZ, CIM, InWEnt and KAS).
More specifically, the KAS programmes on journalist training at the Department of Media and
Communication, Royal University of Phnom Penh and with GTZ, CIM and InWEnt
respectively on ECCC interventions are complementary with the CPS projects.
InWEnt implemented the “Cambodian Khmer Rouge Tribunal Fellowship Pilot Programme”
between October 2007 and December 2008. Thirteen participants completed the
programme. Through the enhancement of the qualification of six junior judges and
prosecutors of the Royal Academy for Judicial Professions (RAJP) and seven staff members
of different non-governmental organisations (NGO) the programme aimed to support the
ECCC and the process of reconciliation and dealing with the past in Cambodia. The
programme focused on legal aspects in particular on international criminal law, methods of
outreach as well as reconciliation and coming to terms with the past.
The clear focus of the 2007–2010 programme has resulted in strong complementarities and
synergies among interventions which are also due to the coordination and cooperation efforts
among CPS experts. TPO’s cooperation with other CPS partners is a good example in this
regard. TPO cooperated with
•
Women’s Media Center, Department for Media Communication on the development
of a new radio programme and established a weekly Radio-Call-in-Show;
•
ADHOC, CDP, KID, Youth for Peace, Victims Unit of the ECCC on outreach activities
and with regard to the transfer of victims to TPO;
•
ADHOC and KID on advocacy for reparations and the establishment of victims
associations;
•
Witness and Expert Support Unit on preparation of witnesses for their participation in
ECCC cases; and
•
KID on the development of a participatory film project on coping with the past
All partners were trained on trauma and trauma counselling by TPO.
47
RAJP, KID, CSD, TPO, WMC and DMC allowed their students and staff members to
participate in the KRT fellowship programme. This variety of different backgrounds of the
fellows such as law, journalism, psychology and pedagogy enriched the programme,
supported the networking between the different NGOs, and thereby created important
synergies with the DED-CPS programmes. The fellows of the programme participated in a
two-week training course in Cambodia and a two-week study tour in Germany, where they
were visiting museums, for instance the concentration camp Dachau, memorial sites, dealing
with the German history of the Nazi regime, and centres for traumatised people. While the
legal students and lawyers from the NGOs visited the International Criminal Court (ICC) and
International Criminal Tribunal of former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Netherlands, the fellows
from the NGOs visited special museums and institutions dealing with the past in Berlin.
During a one to four months traineeship at different departments of the ECCC the
participants could apply the newly gained knowledge to support the work of the ECCC. A five
day follow-up workshop at the end concluded the programme in Cambodia. 37 The
programme was extended until 2012.
4.6.3 Internal complementarity
To what extent do the CPS member organisations work hand in hand in one country? What
factors are conducive to forming synergies or hamper this process and how can they be
strengthened or minimised in the future?
The CPS programmes of DED and EED have been complementary in their approach to
strengthening the peacebuilding capacities and capabilities of NGOs. However, there is
currently no EED CPS expert in Cambodia.
4.6.4 Coordination
Do established coordination mechanisms and procedures help to promote complementarity
and the formation of synergies among CPS member organisations and between the CPS
and other players in Germany and in the field? Are enough people and funds available for
consultation and coordination and are they being used efficiently?
Coordination among German implementing agencies is facilitated through frequent meetings
among the country officers and senior project officers (including the CPS coordinator) of
DED, GTZ, InWEnt (all three have their offices in the same building) and KAS.
Some problems have recently occurred in coordination between DED and IFA regarding one
partner organisation (YFP) when IFA changed its funding priorities and an anticipated large
grant for the partner organisation did not materialise.
The evaluators did not find any evidence for formal coordination between DED and EED on
the CPS in Cambodia in recent years. At the same time, the EED share has been very small
and the need for coordination was minimal. From 2002 to 2004, DED and EED had one CPS
37
For background see: http://www.phnompenh.diplo.de/contentblob/2038496/Daten/239312/PE_10102008_KRT_InWent_DownloadDatei.pdf ;
and http://www.phnompenh.diplo.de/contentblob/1873268/Daten/153520/PE040408_DownloadDatei.pdf . [Last accessed:
April 2011]
48
expert each at the Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID) within the context of the same
intervention who largely tried to coordinate themselves. According to KID, the approach did
not work very well. However, this is the only example of a conflict – or severe disagreement –
between CPS and a partner organisation the evaluators have come across.
The current DED-CPS programme has strengthened coordination and cooperation among
the NGOs that are involved with DED-CPS as partner organisations through joint workshops
and other activities. However, the scope of cooperation among NGOs is limited by the fact
that they all compete for donor funding, including CPS support. This competition among
NGOs for grants is an obstacle for a higher level of coordination and cooperation among
local stakeholders. NGOs in Cambodia do not engage much in inter-institution cooperation,
but primarily compete with each other for funding and create an upward accountability
towards the donors. In some cases NGOs are politicised.
A further occasional stumbling block lays in the strong personalities of some NGO leaders
who have a tendency of running their organisations like little empires based on personal
interest and power. The role of American Cambodians as NGO leaders is ambivalent in this
context. While some have ambitious agendas for peace building and try to act in the best
interest of their country, their approaches to leadership are sometimes at odds with cultural
traditions in Cambodia. Occasionally, this creates conflicts with local senior NGO staff.
However, this is a generic problem that cannot be resolved through the instrument of the
CPS.
4.7 Cross cutting issues
4.7.1 How is the gender dimension addressed by the programme?
Gender relations and gender-based violence are key issues in Cambodia’s post-conflict
setting. The gender dimension is explicitly and prominently addressed, for example, through
•
the project on gender-based violence under the KR regime – implemented by the
Cambodian Defenders Project CDP – that aims at outreach and awareness raising on
GBV; it collects complaints and civil party applications from victims and witnesses of
GBV and advocates for the inclusion of GBV into the investigations of the ECCC.
Until February 2010 CDP received 76 civil parties applications related to GBV;
•
the work of a CPS expert who represents victims of gender-based crimes. This CPS
expert was the first and for a long time only international lawyer at the ECCC who
represents victims of the Khmer Rouge regime. Until now, she is the only international
lawyer who is permanently based in Cambodia and available for the clients; 38
•
the programme ‘Capacity Building of Youth’ in the fields of local peace building and
promotion of democracy – implemented by Youth for Peace – that has a strong focus
on gender issues and the encouragement of women.
Generally speaking, the systematic inclusion of gender as a cross-cutting issue is a main
characteristic of all current CPS-funded projects in Cambodia.
38
See for example http://www.khmernews.com/view/silke-studzinsky-only-foreign-lawyer-to-representvictims-of-the-khmer-rouge-genocide-victims/2580/; and
http://www.amnesty.ch/de/aktuell/magazin/58/massenhochzeiten [Last accessed: April 2011].
49
4.7.2 How effective are the CPS activities in incorporating issues of conflict
sensitivity?
Conflict sensitivity refers to how the CPS experts and partners have incorporated the conflict
context into their work to ensure not to enhance existing conflicts with their activities. In the
case of Cambodia CPS experts and partner organisations are very aware of the context they
are working in and this awareness is thoroughly reflected in all project documents (proposals,
reports and other documentation).
5. Conclusions
5.1 Overall strengths
CPS interventions are highly relevant for conflict resolution and peace building in Cambodia.
This applies to both phases 2001–2006 and 2007–2010. However, the current programme
(2007–2010) is much better focussed and coherent than its predecessor because all
activities are related to the ECCC. As one interviewee put it, “the ECCC is a court of law as
much as it is a core of public opinion. That is why it is so important to support the tribunal”.
The current programme is characterised by good visibility and value added both regarding
individual interventions and collectively. For example, interventions on
remembrance/memory culture and victim support would not have happened without the CPS.
DED-CPS was the original instrument – and still is the leading one – that has linked the
ECCC to a broader societal debate on the Khmer Rouge past and the genocide and the
necessity of providing support to victims. As stated in the ECCC Internal Rules, the victims
have been given special privileges to become witness and civil parties during the proceeding.
The victims will be offered the collective and symbolic reparation when verdict is released.
The support of DED-CPS to promote victims participation is very crucial to the process as
there are not many donors committed to their support.
All CPS experts are well qualified for their specific tasks and there is a good match of
expertise of CPS experts and the training and development needs of partner organisations.
In particular, CPS experts are well aware of the cultural context in which they operate and
activities are characterised by a high level of “cultural embeddedness”. There are generally
no attempts at “one size fits all” model transfers in the peace building process.
Methodologically sound planning (widespread use and application of results chains) and
indicator-based monitoring is evident – to varied degrees – for all CPS interventions of the
current programme (but was not systematically the case for pre-2007 activities). This is
evident when the evaluators looked through the project documents such proposals with
logical framework, reports, mid-term review and presentation of CPS coordinator during the
evaluation workshop.
The current CPS programme puts strong emphasis on an anticipatory and joint learning
approach which is based on regular joint CPS experts/partner organisations ‘lessons learned’
and monitoring workshops that facility an exchange of best practices, generate
recommendations for improvements of existing activities and serve capacity building needs.
The evaluation found clear evidence of outcomes in many areas, e.g. training handbooks
that have been adopted at the Royal University and other training institutions, such as the
authoritative textbook on trauma, legal matters etc., transfer of skills in training/education and
50
media sectors, crucial (and measurable) contributions to public discourses on reconciliation
etc.
Gender relations and gender-based violence are key issues in Cambodia’s post-conflict
setting. The gender dimension is explicitly and prominently addressed in many projects and
the systematic inclusion of gender as a cross-cutting issue is a main characteristic of all
current CPS-funded projects in Cambodia.
The procedures and guidelines from DED-CPS are acknowledged as straightforward and
easy to follow compared to the more complex rules and procedures of other donors and
proved effective for local partners.
Overall, the CPS is supporting civil society organisations and NGOs in the right way, e.g.
engaging civil society in a ‘soft-democratic’ building process (democratic education) suitable
for the furthering of a democratic culture in the country. It has been acknowledged that NGOs
are zooming in recent decades focusing on various activities to promote democracy, human
rights, the rule of law and governance for the people. The concerted efforts by all donors and
stakeholders contributed to these successes and DED-CPS had been particularly recognised
as a major stakeholder in enhancing such a success in Cambodia.
5.2 Overall weaknesses
The almost total aid dependence of NGOs also affects the CPS programme and has resulted
in a predominantly ‘donor-driven’ peacebuilding process which limits the degree of local
ownership of both the general thrust and direction of peace building (or in the more specific
case of the CPS: reconciliation, remembrance and justice) and individual interventions.
Generally, CSO follow the donor interest and agenda. This is quite common in the
Cambodian situation. Although there are thousands of NGOs registered with Ministry of
Interior, only around 400 NGOs are operationalised and they are strongly dependent on aid
from donors.
The evaluation found some good examples for the empowerment of local stakeholders but
no systematic approach of working towards sustainability of CS interventions beyond the
donor involvement. Most NGOs that are supported by DED-CPS do not have long-term
strategic plans for their activities. Their projects are designed based on emerging
issues/needs and do not address long-term goals.
While DED-CPS tries to improve the sustainability of the ECCC-focused project through
more involvement of multipliers among target groups and beneficiaries, the targeting of
multipliers has not been part of an explicit strategy so far.
There is no explicit post-ECCC strategy. What happens to the psycho-social support of
Khmer Rouge victims and Cambodia’s memory culture once the ECCC’s mandate has
ended and/or donor support seizes? NGOs themselves do not have a strong post-ECCC
vision either. Most interviewees at partner organisations were hoping that funding for ECCCrelated interventions continued but had not yet developed any plans if donors decided to
move on to a different area of interest.
Despite important achievements in network building among partner organisations,
competition among NGOs for grants is an obstacle for a higher level of coordination and
cooperation among local stakeholders. NGOs in Cambodia do not engage much in inter-
51
institution cooperation—but primarily compete amongst them for funding and create an
upward accountability towards the donors. In some cases NGOs are politicised.
While CPS experts are expected to be advisors to their partner organisations according to
their DED-CPS job descriptions, they are often pushed into decision-making roles by their
respective host partner organisation and sometimes enjoy a higher level of authority than the
NGO director. This is partly because CPS experts generally enjoy a high degree of authority
in Cambodia and partly because they are supposedly neutral and unbiased in their
preferences in cases of complex and complicated decisions. In interviews most CPS experts
expressed their concern about the local partner organisations’ perception and expectation
vis-à-vis the specific role of a foreign peace expert in the CPS programme.
Given the limited participation of partner organisations in the selection of the CPS expert,
there is a certain risk of a mismatch between the DED-selected CPS expert and the specific
needs of the partner organisation (however, this does not currently seem to be the case) and
constraints the participatory credo of the CPS.
Until 2008, projects were mainly funded with remaining money from the CPS fund. The
budgets at the beginning of the year were very low and were only increased in several
steps throughout the year. Many partner organisations had to wait until mid-year until they
could apply for project funding. After that they had to hurry spending approved funds until the
end of December. Since 2009 more money for project funding has been allocated in the
initial budget. However, the "vorläufige Haushaltsführung", i.e. the restrictions for DED to
spend money until the final budgetary decision of the German Government, lead to a
situation where sums approved at the beginning of the year could only be disbursed in small
shares and often with delays.
Due to existing ceilings on the salary for EFKs there is insufficient flexibility to award highly
qualified and/or high performing EFKs and prevent them from leaving a partner organisation
(sometimes in the middle of a project). An increasing mismatch between the required level of
qualification and the CPS pay level for EFKs is also evident.
Junior experts in the DED-CPS programme do not currently get the same comprehensive
preparatory training as senior CPS experts. However, their roles, tasks and duties are very
similar to those of senior CPS experts. Hence, they need to achieve the same level of
familiarity with the cultural contexts and peace building strategies to do their job efficiently
and effectively.
Some problems have recently occurred in coordination between DED and IFA regarding one
partner organisation (YFP) when IFA changed its funding priorities and an anticipated large
grant for the partner organisation did not materialise. While the evaluators did not look at this
specific issue in detail (because IFA was not covered by the evaluation) it is generally
important that donors/implementing agencies are transparent with regard to their funding
decisions in relations with partner organisations.
There are no formal structure and procedure in place yet to fund capacity building in
Cambodia. This happens informally as a matter of course as the result of a CPS experts
involvement with a partner organisation
Although all CPS projects are based on well defined theories of change and are continuously
monitored, there is no standardised model yet for the design of theories of change and
52
assessment of outputs, outcome and impact. DED-CPS does not use standard DAC
terminology.
While English reports from partner organisations are available for all projects, overall most
CPS reporting is conducted in German and therefore inaccessible for partner organisations.
This is especially a problem if DED CPS expert reports are critical of partner organisations
and the partner is not given the opportunity to respond and tell their side of the story.
However, this does not apply to EED whose partner organisations had been given the
opportunity to submit detailed final reports on CPS interventions in response to any critical
remarks of the CPS experts.
There is currently no centralised documentation system (for example a website) for all
documents on DED-CPS interventions that allow CPS experts and partner organisations
instant access to information (particularly in provinces).
6. Recommendations
6.1 To the BMZ
•
Overall recommendation: CPS should be continued in Cambodia
•
The new practice of allowing higher CPS country budgets at the beginning of a fiscal
year (based on substantiated needs) should be continued.
•
More reporting in English (for the sake of the partner organisation and international
monitors and evaluators). Consider the option of switching to a ‘reporting in English
only’ system which would also avoid some duplication in terms of CPS experts having
to report the same subject matters in both German and English.
6.2 To DED headquarters
•
Stronger participatory approach in CPS-partner relations: more involvement by the
partner organisation in the profiling and selection of the CPS expert.
•
Junior experts should get the same preparatory training as senior CPS experts as
they are effectively doing a very similar job and need to be as familiar with cultural
contexts and peace building strategies as their more senior colleagues. To partner
organisations the difference between junior and senior experts is often not clear.
•
Clarify the role and status of EFKs. Unlike in other country contexts (for example Latin
America), in Cambodia they seldom work as the CPS expert’s direct counterpart.
Their status ranges from project assistants to programme managers.
•
Develop a standardised model for results chains and the assessment of outputs,
outcomes and impact. Distinguish more clearly between outputs, outcomes and
impact in project planning and design (results chains); use DAC terminology.
6.3 To the DED country office Cambodia
•
More explicit and comprehensive consideration of risk in project planning, particularly
concerning sustainability.
53
•
‘Knowledge management’: set up a website for CPS stakeholders (as a one stop
resource centre) and a more general website for beneficiaries (it will only be a matter
of time before most people in Cambodia will have access to the internet.Set up – or
encourage the establishment of – an informal discussion forum with partner
organisations and other implementing agencies on a post-ECCC strategy. Future
options for the CPS programme in Cambodia should be urgently addressed
especially since donors are already eying an ECCC exit strategy. As DED is not a
donor itself it cannot be asked to initiate a formal donor dialogue on this issue.
However, DED might want to consider asking partner organisations (or a small group
of current POs) to lead this informal deliberation process to increase ownership and
encourage POs to give sustainability more prominent thought.
•
More targeting of multipliers in activities: teachers, councillors etc. (involvement of
monks is a good start); create more initiatives and materials for outreach to the
grassroots level and the general population
•
Consider establishing formal procedures for capacity building (in coordination with
DED headquarters) to replace current ad hoc arrangements (e.g. x per cent of the
budget should be allocated to capacity building of partner as a matter of course).
Because capacity building takes place but on an informal basis, it should also be
clarified in relations between DED-CPS and partner organisations that the latter share
the responsibility for providing appropriate training for EFKs.
•
Clarify the specific mission, role and tasks of CPS experts in communication with
partner organisations to avoid – sometimes – unrealistic expectations of partner
organisations.
6.4 To EED headquarters
•
Discuss setting up coordination mechanism with DED if EED-CPS is resumed in
Cambodia.
6.5 To partner organisations
•
Develop own strategies for capacity building, which cannot and should not be the sole
duty of CPS. Use existing knowledge among own local staff for capacity building: In
this regards, there is no need for a total reliance on donors anymore.
•
Strengthen cooperation and coordination mechanisms as competition among NGOs
for grants is an obstacle for a higher level of coordination and cooperation among
local stakeholders.
•
Lobby DED for participation in the selection process of CPS experts. A solution could
be for partner organisations to provide their feedback on shortlisted candidates,
based on CVs, application letters, diplomas and references.
•
Engage with the DED country office in an open discussion of the role of CPS experts
and EFKs prior to project commencement to clarify the scope of tasks, duties and
obligations.
54
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Beitrag zu Demokratisierung und Good Governance. Internal document.
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______ (2008). Annual Development Review 2007–2008. Phnom Penh: CDRI.
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______ (2007). Participatory Poverty Assessment of the Tonle Sap. Phnom Penh: CDRI.
Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defence of Human Rights (Licadho) (2009).
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______ (2008a). Attacks and Threats against Human Rights Defenders in Cambodia. A
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______ (2008). Reading between the lines: How Politics, Money and Fear Control of Media.
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Chheang, Vannarith (2008). ‘Political Economy of Tourism in Cambodia’. In Asia Pacific
Journal of Tourism Research. Vol. 13, No.3, pp. 281-297.
Economic Institute of Cambodia (2008). Cambodia Economic Watch. Phnom Penh.
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Gender and Development for Cambodia (2004). Paupers and Princelings: Youth Attitudes
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Hughes, Caroline (2009). ‘Cambodia in 2008: Consolidation in the Midst of Crisis’. In Asian
Survey. Vol. 49, Issue 1, pp. 206-212.
______ (2008). ‘Cambodia in 2007: Development and Dispossession’. In Asian Survey. Vol.
48, Issue 1, pp. 69-74.
Kim, Sedara and Ojendal, Joakim (2009). Decentralization as a Strategy for State
Reconstruction in Cambodia. In: Ojendal, Joakim and Lilja, Mona (ed.). Beyond
Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Society.
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______ (2007). Where Decentralization Meets Democracy: Civil Society, Local Government,
and Accountability in Cambodia. Working paper No. 35. Phnom Penh: CDRI.
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Democratization. Political Studies Association, available at
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Ministry of Woman Affairs (2008). A Fair Share for Women: Cambodia Gender Assessment.
Phnom Penh: Ministry of Woman Affairs.
_____ (2005). Violence Against Women: A baseline survey, Final Report. Phnom Penh:
Ministry of Woman Affairs.
National Institute of Statistics (2009). General Population Census of Cambodia 2008. Phnom
Penh: Ministry of Planning.
Ojendal, Joakim and Lilja, Mona (Eds) (2009). Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political
Reconstruction in a Post-conflict Society. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.
Ojendal, Joakim and Kim, Sedara (2006). ‘Korob, Kaud, Klach: In Search of Agency in Rural
Cambodia’. In Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. Vol. 37, No 3, pp. 507-526.
Paris, Roland (2004). At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Paffenholz, Thanja (2005). Evaluation von Interventionen ziviler Friedensförderung. Vortrag
für die Konferenz ′Evaluation in der zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung’. Evangelische Akademie
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______ (2009). Civil Society and Peacebuilding. Summary of the Results for a
Comprehensive Research Project. CCDP Working Paper, The Graduate Institute of
International and Development Studies, No.4, available at http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/
site/ccdp/shared/6305/CCDP-Working-Paper-4-Civil-Society.pdf. [Last accessed: April 2011]
______ (2010). Civil Society and Peacebuilding, A Critical Assessment. Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers.
Paffenholz, Thanja and Luc Reychler (2008). Aid for Peace: A Guide to Planning and
Evaluation for Conflict Zones. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Peou, Sorpong (2009). ‘The limits of collaborative action on international criminal court in
East Asia’. In Human Security in East Asia. Ed. Peou, Sorporng. London: Routledge.
Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse, Tom and Miall, Hugh (2005). Contemporary conflict
resolution: Terror and Global Justice. 2nd ed, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Richmond, Oliver P. And Jason Franks (2007). ‘Liberal Hubris? Virtual Peace in Cambodia’.
In Security Dialogue. Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 27-48.
______ (2006). ‘The Problem of Peace: Understanding the ‘Liberal Peace’. In Conflict,
Security and Development. Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 291-314.
Un, Kheang (2009). The Judicial System and Democratization in Post Conflict Cambodia, In
Beyond Democracy In Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post Conflict Society.
Eds. Jaokim Ojendal and Lilji, Mona. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.
______ (2005). ‘Patronage Politics and Hybrid Democracy: Political Change in Cambodia,
1993-2003’. In Asian Perspectives. Vol. 29, No 2, pp. 203-230.
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USAID Cambodia (2008). Political Competitiveness and Civil Society Assessment, 22
September – 7 December.
United Nation (2009). Youth Situation Analysis in Cambodia, Phnom Penh: CDRI &UNCT.
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2007: Expanding Choices for Rural People. Phnom Penh: Ministry of Planning and
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World Bank (2009). ‘Sustaining Rapid Growth in Challenging Environment’.
56
Annex 1: Maps of Cambodia
Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/cambodia.pdf
57
Source: http://mydiscussion.files.wordpress.com/2009/09/cambodia-map-provinces.jpg
58
Annex 2: Detailed evaluation questions for the Cambodia evaluation
Relevance
•
Are CPS activities addressing the main needs for peacebuilding in Cambodia?
•
Do activities under CPS adapt to changing conflict contexts?
•
Do activities under the CPS programme in Cambodia correspond with the overall
CPS strategies?
•
How relevant are the CPS partners for peacebuilding?
•
How relevant is sending European CPS experts?
•
What would partner organisations do if the CPS did not exist?
Effectiveness
•
What are the theories of change?
•
How are theories of change translated into objectives and project designs?
•
Assessing Outcome 1: What are the main changes within CPS partner organisations
that can be attributed to the work of the CPS experts?
•
Assessing Outcome 2: How have project activities under the CPS programme
supported the ECCC in their contribution to the establishment of the truth about the
Khmer Rouge regime and given impulses for the development of the rule of law?
•
Assessing Outcome 3: How have project activities under the CPS programme helped
survivors and the following generations to come to terms with the atrocities committed
during the Khmer Rouge regime?
•
What are the differences in effectiveness with regard to different partners?
•
In which phases of conflict are project activities most effective?
Impact
•
What is the impact of projects under the CPS programme?
•
How does the CPS programme in Cambodia conceptualise impact?
Efficiency
•
How efficient are the CPS’s administrative, financial, monitoring and learning
procedures?
•
How efficient is the establishment of posts of CPS coordinators?
•
How does CPS align with the subsidiary principle and how cost-efficient would be
alternatives?
Sustainability
•
What are experiences of sustainability after the CPS expert leaves projects and
activities?
59
•
How are issues of sustainability been integrated into the planning of CPS activities
from the beginning of a project? How has this process (and its milestones) been
monitored?
•
How does the CPS ensure that local expertise is not sidelined or downplayed by
European CPS experts?
Coherence, Coordination, Complementarity
•
Coherence:
To what extent is the effectiveness of the CPS interventions influenced by other fields
of policy?
•
Complementarity:
External: What linkages are there with other programmes / players (e.g. German
bilateral development cooperation, projects from the CPS member organisations’ core
programmes, other international NGOs or multilateral institutions)? What synergy
effects are achieved here?
Internal: To what extent do the CPS member organisations work hand in hand in one
country? What factors are conducive to forming synergies or hamper this process and how
can they be strengthened or minimised in the future?
•
Coordination:
Do established coordination mechanisms and procedures help to promote
complementarity and the formation of synergies among CPS member organisations
and between the CPS and other players in Germany and in the field? Are enough
people and funds available for consultation and coordination and are they being used
efficiently?
Cross cutting Issues
•
How is the gender dimension addressed by the programme?
•
How effective are the CPS activities in incorporating issues of conflict sensitivity?
60
Annex 3: List of DED-CPS projects 2001–2006 and 2007–2010
Table 3: Projects of the 2001–2006 CPS Phase
Name of
Intervention
Project
duration
(approved)
Name of
local
partner
Main activities
Project
location
Other
donors of
local
partner
Konfliktbearbeitung,
Rechtsstaatlichkeit
und soziale
Integration
(Conflict
management, the
rule of law and
social integration)
10/2001 –
12/2004
Silaka
Capacity building for
NGO staff and public
servants on peace
building, the rule of
law, advocacy and
lobby work, project
PM&E
Phnom
Penh and
provinces
USAID,
UNDP,
GTZ
Konfliktbearbeitung,
Rechtsstaatlichkeit
und soziale
Integration
08/2002 –
06/2004
Khmer
Institute of
Democracy
(KID)
Phnom
Penh and
activities
in 10
provinces
KonradAdenauerStiftung
Konfliktbearbeitung,
Rechtsstaatlichkeit
und soziale
Integration
04/2002 –
04/2004
Ministry for
Women
and
Veteran
Affairs
Support in the
strategic planning of
NGOs
Setting up of
networks and forums
for the exchange of
knowledge and
experience
Promotion of human
rights, the rule of law
and democratic
values by
publications, public
events and a
network of about 120
“citizens advisors”.
Project: Critical
Legal Thinking
Project to implement
the Law on the
Prevention of
Domestic Violence
and the Protection of
the Victims:
Production and
dissemination of
information and
training material for
civil society and lawenforcing agencies
Trainings for
members of law
enforcing agencies
(judges, lawyers,
police) and NGOs
Monitoring and
intervention on
precedent cases
according to the new
legal procedures
61
Phnom
Penh and
provinces
DED
CPS
expert/
local
staff
(EFK)
funded
by DEDCPS
1/2
1/1
1/0
Name of
Intervention
Project
duration
(approved)
Name of
local
partner
Main activities
Project
location
Other
donors of
local
partner
Konfliktbearbeitung,
Rechtsstaatlichkeit
und soziale
Integration
10/2002 –
10/2006
Khmer
Youth
Association
(KYA)
Capacity building of
youth in the fields of
local peace building,
promotion of
democracy
In the cooperation a
special weight was
given to gender
issues and the
encouragement of
women
Phnom
Penh and
activities
in 10
provinces
CIDSE,
IFA
Konfliktbearbeitung,
Rechtsstaatlichkeit
und soziale
Integration
06/2002 –
02/2006
Working
Group for
Weapons
Reduction,
WGWR
Creation of a
monitoring system
for the reduction and
control of small
arms.
Information
dissemination and
awareness raising
for the reduction of
small arms as a part
of peace education.
Trainings for NGO
staff and officials on
small arms
reduction.
Advocacy work
towards the
Cambodian
Government for the
reduction of small
arms.
Phnom
Penh and
provinces
American
Friends
Services
Committee
(AFSC),
Mennonite
Central
Committee
(MCC), EC
3/2
Gewaltfreie
Konfliktbearbeitung
und Stärkung der
Rechtsstaatlichkeit
10/2005 –
05/2007
Cambodian
Center for
Human
Rights
(CCHR)
National/international
advocacy and
networking for
specific human rights
issues such as
freedom of
expression, anticorruption and land
conflicts
Phnom
Penh and
activities
in all
provinces
USAID, UK
Embassy,
EC
1/1
62
DED
CPS
expert/
local
staff
(EFK)
funded
by DEDCPS
1/1
Table 4: Projects of the ‘Justice and reconciliation in Cambodia’ programme (2007–2010)
Project
duration
(approv
ed)
Local partner
Main activities
01/200712/2010
Cambodian
Association for
Human Rights
and
Development
(ADHOC)
Cambodian
Committee of
Women
CAMBOW
(applicant),
implemented by
Cambodian
Defenders
Project CDP
•
•
01/200912/2011
01/200912/2011
Cambodian
Human Rights
Action
Committee
(CHRAC)
01/200712/2010
Center for Social
Development
(CSD), split-off
remained in
Center for
Justice and
Reconciliation
(CJR)
Department of
Media and
Communication
(DMC) of the
Royal University
of Phnom Penh
01/200512/2010
07/200912/2010
Department of
Psychology (DP)
of the Royal
University of
Phnom Penh
01/200812/2010
Extraordinary
Chambers in the
Courts of
Cambodia
(ECCC), Victims
Unit (VU)
•
Outreach on the ECCC
Collection of civil party applications and
support for civil parties
Critical monitoring and advocacy work
Legal Representation of civil parties at the
ECCC
•
Providing Cambodian lawyers for civil
parties and applicants at the ECCC, in
cooperation with the international lawyer
and CPS expert provided by DED
•
Project on gender-based violence under
the KR regime
•
Specific outreach and awareness raising
on GBV
•
Collection of complaints and civil party
applications from victims and witnesses
of GBV
•
Advocacy for the inclusion of GBV into
the investigations of the ECCC
KRT project
•
Coordination of ECCC related work of
CHRAC members
•
Outreach on ECCC issues (radio
programme and newsletter)
•
Critical monitoring and advocacy on
ECCC
•
Advocacy work on meaningful
victims/civil party participation
Justice and Reconciliation Program
•
Public Forum and conferences on the
ECCC and its implications for
Cambodia, aired on radio Voice of
Justice
•
Emotional support/trauma research
•
support for special victims groups such
as orphans, widows
Support of curriculum development and
lecturing in the 4 years bachelor course on
media management of the DMC
•
Media ethics
•
Conflict sensitive reporting
•
Legal reporting, particularly on the topic
of the ECCC.
Support of curriculum development, lecturing
and capacity building in the 2 years master
course on clinical psychology and
counselling with a strong focus on
traumatherapy.
•
small research on trauma issues
•
advocacy work on knowledge and
reputation of psychology
Support for victims participation in the ECCC
•
Specific outreach to surviving victims in
cooperation with public affairs
•
Reception of complaints and civil party
applications
•
Processing of complaints and
63
Project
location
Other
donors of
local
partner
No of
CPS
epert
s/
EFK
1/1
Phnom Penh
and activities
in all
provinces
Oxfam
Novib, EU
Phnom
Penh,
activities in
various
provinces
UN
Voluntary
Fund for
Torture
Victims
(legal
support) and
IFA/Zivik
(outreach),
both from
2010 on.
1/1
Phnom
Penh,
activities in
all provinces
NED (until
2008)
1
Phnom
Penh,
activities
(public
forum) in all
provinces
Diakonia
Sweden
(SIDA)
1/1
Phnom Penh
KonradAdenauerStiftung,
DAAD
2/2
Phnom Penh
Maryknoll,
British
Council,
Fullbright
1/2
Phnom
Penh,
activities in
all provinces
General UN
budget for
ECCC,
German
Foreign
Office,
1/0
Project
duration
(approv
ed)
Local partner
Main activities
•
•
01/200712/2010
Transcultural
Psychosocial
Organization
(TPO)
01/200712/2010
Women’s Media
Center (WMC),
Radio FM 102
01/200712/2010
Youth for Peace
(YFP)
Project
location
applications, submission to CoProsecutors and Co-Investigative
Judges
Coordination of Legal representation for
CPs
Participation in the design for policies
and strategies related to victims
participation
Psychosocial Counselling for civil parties
at the ECCC (onsite and via hotline)
Trainings on counselling and coping with
the stress for NGO and ECCC staff
Radio programme on mental health and
trauma
Ceremonial therapy
Small research projects on trauma
Other
donors of
local
partner
channelled
via GTZ
No of
CPS
epert
s/
EFK
Phnom Penh
and activities
in four
provinces
ICCO
Netherlands,
AusAid, EC
1/1
The Truth Radio Program: Weekly radio
programme on KR history and the ECCC
Radio
coverage for
the most
populated
provinces
½
Programme “Youth for Justice and
Reconciliation” with
•
Workshops on KR and ECCC for youth
•
Village dialogues between youth and KR
survivors
•
National/international youth conferences
•
Culture of Memory project
•
Monks training
•
Youth radio, visits to mass killing places,
art projects/exhibitions, perpetrator/child
soldier oriented, missing publication,
Phnom Penh
and activities
in nine
provinces
Open
Society
Institute,
Rosa
Luxemburg
Stiftung
CIDSE,
Misereor,
IFA/Zivik
•
•
•
•
•
64
½
Annex 4: CPS evaluation schedule Cambodia, January/February
2010
Day
No
1
Date
Name
28/01/10
2
29/01/10
Arrival Jörn Dosch
Evaluation team meeting
Meeting with Wolfgang Möllers, Country Director DED
Meeting with Andreas Selmeci, DED-CPS coordinator
Briefing at German Embassy with Hady Riad,
Counsellor Development Cooperation
3
4
30/01/10
31/01/10
5
01/02/10
01/02/10
01/02/10
6
7
01/02/10
01/02/10
02/02/10
03/02/10
03/02/10
03/02/10
03/02/10
8
9
03/02/10
04/02/10
04/02/10
04/02/10
04/02/10
04/02/10
05/02/10
NGOs
Briefing Workshop, German Centre, Phnom Penh
Document study and preparation of interviews
Field visit in Svay Rieng, Thlork village on Memory
Culture and Youth
Interview with Khet Long, Nou Va, Chhit Muny, Sin
Sotheary, Cheng, Andreas Selmeci (CPS coordinator),
Chhounni Synan, two young female trainers, and CPS
expert Kerstin Kastenholz. The evaluators also meet a
group of students from a secondary school (both girls
and boys) to talk about why they are interested in this
workshop, what they have learnt and what they would
like to do next after the workshop.
Meeting with four KRT staff (two men and two women)
Meeting with Kristina Chhim, former CPS coordinator,
independent consultant/researcher
Meeting with Andreas Grigo and Tieng Vichea, deputy
head
Meeting with Keng Dinyn and Tanja Schunert
Meeting with Christoph Sperfeldt and Jeudy Oeung
Workshop on outreach and memory culture, SILAKA,
meeting with Kassie Neou (coordinator of Outreach,
Victims Unit of ECCC)
Meeting with Im Sophea and Seng Daravuth
Meeting with Hang Chhaya (former counterpart of DED
and EED)
Meeting with Muny Sothara
Meeting with Chet Charya (former counterpart of EED)
Meeting with Ou Virak
Meeting with Keat Bophal (former head of Victims Unit)
Meeting with Reach Sambath (Outreach Unit)
Meeting with Seng Theary (Chair of Board of Directors)
Meeting with HuN Yim (former counterpart of DED)
Meeting with Khus Thida (former counterpart of DED)
Workshop on victims participation and trauma
Meeting with Chum Sirath (Vice President of Victim
Association)
65
YFP
TPO
DED
DMC
DP
CHRAC
DED and local
counterparts
CJR
KID
TPO
Star
Kampuchea
CCHR
ECCC
ECCC
CJR
KYA
SILAKA
DED & local
counterpart
Day
No
10
11
Date
Name
NGOs
06/02/10
06/02/10
07/02/10
08/02/10
08/02/10
Meeting with Stefan Kiesel
Meeting with Constanze Oehlrich
Preparation of debriefing workshop
Meeting with Jurgen Schilling (Country Director)
Meeting with Susanne Alck and Tive Sundaneth
(production director)
Meeting with Rabea Brauer (Country Director)
Meeting with Beini Ye and SoK Sam Oeun (KRT team)
Meeting with Nadine Kirchenbauer and Latt Ky
(KRT/ICC coordinator)
Meeting with Silke Studzinsky (international lawyer)
Meeting with Andreas Selmeci (CPS coordinator)
Debriefing Workshop with DED and local counterparts
in Phnom Penh
CSD/CJR
ECCC
08/02/10
08/02/10
08/02/10
12
08/02/10
08/02/10
09/02/10
GTZ
WMC
KAS
CDP
ADHOC
ADHOC
DED
Debriefing at German Embassy with Hady Riad,
Counsellor Development Cooperation
Depature Jörn Dosch
A meeting with Kerstin Henke, BMZ country officer for Cambodia and Laos, took place on
27 December 2009 in Bonn.
66
Annex 5: List of persons met by evaluation team
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
Alck, Susanne, CPS expert
Brauer, Rabea, KAS Country Director
Chet Charya, Executive Director, Star Kampuchea
Chhaya Hang, Executive Director and Chair of CHRAC
Chhim, Kristina, former CPS coordinator, independent consultant/researcher
Chhit Muny, YFP
Chhounni Synan, YFP
Chum Sirath, Managing Director, Victims Association Net 1
Dim Sovannarom, Press Officer, ECCC
Diung Savorn, Project Coordinator, Cambodian Defenders Project
Selmeci, Andreas, CPS coordinator, Cambodia
Grigo, Andreas, CPS expert
Henke, Kerstin, BMZ country officer for Cambodia and Laos
Hun Yim, Vice President, Khmer Youth Association
Im Sophea, National Co-Director, Reconciliation Programs, CJR
Kassie Neou, Coordinator of Outreach, Victims Unit of ECCC
Kastenholz, Kerstin, CPS expert
Keat Bophal, former Head of Victims Unit, ECCC
Keng Dinyn, Programme Coordinator of Master Programme in Psychology, Master of
Clinical Psychology and Counselling, Royal University of Phnom Penh
Khet Long, YFP
Khus Thida, Executive Director Silaka
Kiesel, Stefan, CPS expert
Kirchenbauer, Nadine, CPS expert
Latt Ky, KRT/ICC coordinator
Möllers, Wolfgang, Country Director DED
Muny Sothara, Psychiatrist and technical consultant for TPO
Neou Kassie, Outreach Coordinator, Victims Unit, ECCC
Nhet Sok Neng, TV/Radio Officer, ECCC
Nou Va, YFP
Oehlrich, Constanze, CPS expert
Oeung Jeudy, KRT Programme Officer, ADHOC
Ou Virak, President, Cambodian Center for Human Rights
Reach Sambath, Chief of Public Affair Section, ECCC
Riad, Hady, Counsellor Development Cooperation, German Embassy Phnom Penh
Sar Sophyradu, Project Assistant, Cambodian Defenders Project
Schilling, Heinrich-Jürgen, GTZ Country Director Cambodia
Schunert, Tanja, CPS expert
Seng, Daravuth J.D., International Co-Director, Justice Programs, CJR
Seng, Theary C., Chair, Board of Directors, CJR
Sin Sotheary, Cheng, YFP
Sok Sam Oeun, KRT team
Sperfeldt, Christoph, CPS expert
Studzinsky, Silke, CPS expert
Suon Sareth, Executive Secretary, ADHOC
67
45.
46.
47.
48.
Tieng Vichea, CRAC (Deputy Head
Tive Sundaneth, Production Director, Radio & Television, WMC
Vichea S. Tieng, Acting Head, DMC & CCI
Ye, Beini, CPS expert
Group discussions
Svay Rieng, Thlork village, on Memory Culture and Youth: YFP trainers, victims, survivors,
KRT staff, secondary school students
Workshop on outreach and memory culture (at SILAKA)
Workshop on victims participation and trauma (at SILAKA)
68
Annex 6: Debriefing Note
CPS Evaluation Cambodia
Lessons Learned/Debriefing Note
Jörn Dosch
International evaluator Cambodia
with
Doung Virorth and Kim Sedara
Local evaluators
15 February 2010
69
Mission Preparation and Deployment
In Cambodia, the self evaluation phase took place from October 2009 to January 2010; the
mission’s preparation and document studies were conducted in December 2009 and January
2010. From the very beginning of the preparatory phase, the DED country director and CPS
coordinator were very cooperative, and communication between DED and the evaluation
team (both international and local evaluators) were exemplary. Requested documents were
supplied without delay and logistical matters were dealt with in a very efficient and effective
way. The local evaluators prepared and organised the mission very well. Contacts with all
relevant stakeholders had been established and most meetings had been scheduled prior to
the start of the mission. This allowed a smooth conduct of the mission from a logistical point
of view.
The mission took place from 28 January to 9 February 2010. The briefing workshop and the
briefing at the German Embassy were followed by data collection in Phnom Penh and Svay
Rieng, two lessons learnt stakeholder workshops (on the thematic core focal points of the
current CPS programme “Justice and Reconciliation in Cambodia”: “Outreach and Memory
Culture” and “Victims Participation and Mental Health” and the debriefing workshop and the
debriefing at the German Embassy.
The evaluation team conducted 48 individual interviews, group meetings and focus group
discussions with the DED country director and CPS coordinator, all current CPS experts,
most current EFKs, heads or deputy heads of all current and most former partner
organisations of DED and EED, other local staff of partner organisations as well as broader
constituencies and beneficiaries (victims/survivors, participants of CPS-funded activities).
Context
Cambodia remains protracted with a post-conflict or post-communist dilemma: poverty, weak
state institution, weak governance/corruption, lack of trust between state and society, lack of
civilian control of the armed forces, domestic violence, lack of political tolerance, politicisation
of civil society, personalised power, elite self-enrichment etc. are the legacies of decades of
war, civil war and communist rule.
The civil society is young and weak, marked by upward accountability toward donors, internal
problems, and competition among NGOs. Most of today’s NGOs were established in the
early 1990s by international agencies to respond to emergency needs in the rebuilding and
democratisation of the Cambodian state in the aftermath of the Vietnamese occupation.
Historically, Cambodia has not developed a strong tradition of civic engagement or civil
society; the social fabric is based on informal organisation such as Wat (Pagoda) committees
and social interaction takes place within kinship and patronage networks. Cambodians are
not used to or experienced with liberal democratic principles or active participatory interaction
with the state.
Given Cambodia’s history of violence and internal strife in the country, people’s perception of
peace is the absence of war.
The establishment of the ECCC (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia or
better known as Khmer Rouge Tribunal/KRT) has been a central matter to both Cambodians
and the international community. Locating the ECCC inside Cambodia is publicly recognised
as essential from both a Cambodian and the international perspective. The main reason is its
closer proximity to the evidence and witnesses and being more accessible to victims. Such
accessibility allows victims and their families to witness the processes in which their former
tormentors are brought to account.
70
The CPS in Cambodia
The DED-CPS programme started in 2001 and can be divided into two phases:
•
Phase 1 (2001–2006) followed a heterogeneous approach and focused on interventions
in the areas of reduction of small arms, peaceful conflict resolution, the rule of law and
democracy, gender-based violence, civil society participation in political decision-making,
etc.
•
Phase 2 (2007–2010) concentrates on “Justice and Reconciliation
in Cambodia” and is entirely focussed on intervention linked to the Khmer Rouge
Tribunal/KRT.
Since 2001, DED has deployed 28 CPS experts and 3 CPS coordinators in Cambodia. The
average total project budget before 2007 was about Euro 75.000 per year. Since 2007 the
annual average is Euro 320.000. From this amount between 20 and 30 projects of the
partner organisations (Projektträger and Einheimische Organisationen) have been funded
per year. All projects were related to the KRT.
EED deployed two CPS experts at the NGO Star Kampuchea (2005–2009); one CPS expert
worked at Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID) (2002–2004) together with a DED CPS
expert. The EED support of the two civil society organisations has focused broadly on
management, advocacy, capacity building, strengthening civil society, democracy, good
governance, the rule of law, human rights.
Compared to other countries, the funding by DED -CPS in Cambodia is generous. This is
due to three facts:
• The BMZ und DED agreed that civil society activities around the KRT are important to
ensure its impact;
• other donors did not come in or withdrew because of bad news about the ECCC
(corruption allegations)
• Cambodian organisations can absorb money and properly account for it.
Feedback on the Self Evaluation
Participants of the Briefing Workshop stressed the limited value of the self-evaluation
process in the specific context of Cambodia. Given both the strong dependence of CSO on
donor funding and the existence of strong cultural norms on the avoidance of open criticism
(unlike in Africa and Latin America), the self-evaluation was never likely to generate any
comprehensive, critical analysis of the role and work of the CPS experts. However,
participants agreed the self-evaluation was nevertheless useful as an exercise in joint
learning and exchange of ideas.
Some stakeholders thought that the questionnaires were too much directed to a macro level
of the CPS programme and did not give them the opportunity to elaborate much on their
specific project-related experiences. Although CPS interventions in the current phase are
based on results chains, most did not understand the term and concept of “theories of
change” and, consequently, did not answer the question. Furthermore, questions addressing
the coherence and complementarity of CPS activities with “BMZ country strategies and
priorities” or requiring the interviewee to draw comparisons with other countries were
unsuitable for the representatives of local partner organisation.
Despite these shortcomings, the questionnaires were nevertheless a very useful, important
and comprehensive source of information for the evaluators.
General Preliminary Findings: Strengths
CPS interventions are highly relevant for conflict resolution and peace building in Cambodia.
This applies to both phases: 2001–2006 and 2007–2010. However, the current programme
71
(2007–2010) is much better focussed and coherent than its predecessor because all
activities are related to the KRT. The current programme is characterised by good visibility
and value added both regarding individual interventions and collectively. For example,
interventions on remembrance/memory culture and victim support would not have happened
without the CPS. DED-CPS was the original donor – and still is the lead donor – that has
linked the KRT to a broader societal debate on the Khmer Rouge past and the genocide and
the necessity of providing support to victims.
All CPS experts are well qualified for their specific tasks and there is a good match of
expertise of CPS experts and the training and development needs of partner organisations.
In particular, CPS experts are well aware of the cultural context in which they operate and
activities are characterised by a high level of “cultural embeddedness”. There are generally
no attempts at “one size fits all” model transfers in the peace building process.
Methodologically sound planning (widespread use and application of results chains) and
indicator-based monitoring is evident – to varied degrees – for all CPS interventions of the
current programme but was not systematically the case for pre-2007 activities.
The current CPS programme puts strong emphasis on an anticipatory and joint learning
approach which is based on regular joint CPS experts/partner organisations ‘lessons learnt”
and monitoring workshops that facility an exchange of best practices, generate
recommendations for improvements of existing activities and serve capacity building needs.
The evaluation found clear evidence of outcomes in many areas, i.e. training handbooks that
have been adopted at the Royal University and other training institutions as the authoritative
textbook on trauma, legal matters etc., transfer of skills in training/education and media
sectors, learning from study tours etc.)
Overall, the CPS is supporting civil society organisations and NGOs in the right way, e.g.
engaging civil society in a ‘soft-democratic’ building process (democratic education) suitable
for the furthering of a democratic culture in the country.
General Preliminary Findings: Weaknesses
The almost total aid dependence of NGOs also affects the CPS programme and has resulted
in a predominantly ‘donor-driven’ peacebuilding process which limits the degree of local
ownership of both the general thrust and direction of peacebuilding (or in the more specific
case of the CPS: reconciliation, remembrance and justice) and individual interventions.
Generally, CSO follow the donor interest and agenda.
The evaluation found some good examples for the empowerment of local stakeholders but
no systematic approach of working towards sustainability of CS interventions beyond the
donor involvement.
Despite important achievements in network building among partner organisations,
competition among NGOs for grants is an obstacle for a higher level of coordination and
cooperation among local stakeholders. NGOs/CSOs in Cambodia do not engage much in
inter-institution cooperation—but primarily compete amongst them for funding and create an
upward accountability towards the donors. In some cases NGOs are politicised.
Since there is no participation of partner organisations in the selection of the CPS expert,
there is a certain risk of a mismatch between the DED-selected CPS expert and the specific
needs of the partner organisation (however, this does not currently seem to be the case) and
constraints the participatory credo of the CPS.
Until 2008 projects were mainly funded with remaining money from the CPS fund. The
budgets at the beginning of the year were very low and were only increased in several
steps throughout the year. Many partner organisations had to wait until mid-year until they
could apply for project funding. After that they had to hurry spending approved funds until the
end of December. Since 2009 more money for project funding has been allocated in the
72
initial budget (for DED-CPS in Cambodia: Euro 357.000 in 2010). However, the "vorläufige
Haushaltsführung", i.e. the restrictions for DED to spend money until the final budgetary
decision of the German government, lead to a situation where sums approved at the
beginning in the year could only disbursed in small shares and often with delays.
Due to existing ceilings on the salary for EFKs there is insufficient flexibility to award highly
qualified and/or high performing EFKs and prevent them from leaving a partner organisation
(sometimes in the middle of a project). An increasing mismatch between the required level of
qualification and the CPS pay level is also evident.
CPS experts have a dual loyalty towards CPS and partner organisation. However, different
rules and procedures apply and it is not always clear which set of rules takes priority.
While English reports from partner organisations are available for all projects, overall most
CPS reporting is conducted in German and therefore inaccessible for partner organisations.
This is especially a problem if CPS expert/DED reports are critical of partner organisations
and the partner is not given the opportunity to respond and tell their side of the story.
However, this does not apply to EED whose partner organisations had been given the
opportunity to submit detailed final reports on CPS interventions in response to any critical
remarks of the CPS experts.
Preliminary Findings on Relevance
The previous CPS programme (2001–2006) had a holistic approach by addressing a multiple
set of challenges to peacebuilding. While most, if not all, interventions were relevant to the
country context, the CPS’s specific value added to the management or resolution of the
specific conflict area was not always clear and individual CPS experts/ interventions were not
well linked up.
In the current programme (2007–2010), the KRT is a very suitable entry point for CPS
because the KRT has a) high priority for peacebuilding; b) CPS is known and respected for a
high level of expertise based on the ‘German experience’. Of the four KRT-linked focal points
– outreach, victims participation, mental health, remembrance (‘memory culture’) – the last
three may not have been addressed without CPS’s involvement. Overall, the CPS in
Cambodia clearly fills a gap that is not covered by TA and FA.
Sending European CPS experts (as compared to other instruments and strategies) is still
highly relevant. According to a typical local stakeholder quote, “Without the CPS expert's
expertise the project would not have been conducted. Although information about mediation
and conflict management can be obtained from books and the internet, an expert was
needed to help achieving a high level of knowledge and know-how.” Almost all current and
former partner organisations expressed this or a very similar view. For the foreseeable future
CPS experts are needed for capacity building and skills transfer and cannot yet be replaced
by local experts or other instruments on a large scale
The exclusive focus of the KRT prevents the CPS to get involved in (or continue with) other
pressing issues such as land conflict, gender-based violence, governance, anti-corruption
etc. that are not related to KRT. However, this is an either or decision. The current clear
focus is still better than a more diverse spectrum of activities, and despite the strong
concentration a good diversity of activities within the focus area has been achieved.
The relevance of victim support and memory culture could be further strengthened if more
donors got involved. However, donors differ in their perception of the relevance of the KRT.
Preliminary Findings on Effectiveness
In the current programme phase all interventions are based on impact chains and are guided
by clearly defined indicators. “theories of change” are translated into well-defined objectives,
results and – in most cases – a process design. Indicator-based monitoring/surveys takes
73
place regularly at output level (deliverables to beneficiaries). The CPS workshops on
monitoring and lessons learned workshops have strengthened the approach to monitoring.
While outcome indicators are clearly defined, in many cases achievements cannot be directly
attributed to CPS (difficulty in relating indicators to specific CPS intervention). For example,
according to one indicator “By the end of 2009 more than 4,000 surviving victims of the KR
regime have filed complete information forms to the Victims Unit (VU) of the ECCC”. While
this has been achieved and there is some probability that this result is indeed somehow
attributable to CPS, more thought should be given to the ‘attribution gap’ in
project/monitoring docs.
Despite growing project ownership of partner organisations (due to increasing local capacity
and expertise), project initiation and strategic planning is still predominantly CPS-driven.
Most NGOs respond to donor interests and do not take a pro-active approach to the planning
of interventions)
Anecdotal evidence reveals important outcomes of the 2001–2006 CPS phase: for example
‘legal handbook’ – developed for ‘Critical Legal Thinking’ intervention is still authoritative
source for legal training in Cambodia. However, outcome and impact of completed
interventions are no longer systematically monitored. We therefore recommend that outcome
monitoring should continue beyond the life time of a project
Preliminary Findings on Impact
Due to the CPS’s heterogeneous approach to peacebuilding of the 2001–2006 phase, it is
impossible to assess the overall impact of the programme or individual interventions to
peaceful conflict resolution and the strengthening of political participation (‘citizens voice’) as
the main objectives during the phase. While several interventions achieved demonstrable
outcomes, relative impact is difficult to quantify due to the involvement of a multitude of
donors in each intervention area.
As for the current programme, surveys such as the Berkley Study39 (part-funded by CPS)
and the IRI Survey40 provide sound empirical evidence that progress has already been made
towards achieving the stated long-term impact (both overall and regarding the four
programme focal points). The strong KRT focus of the current phase and the
initiator/leadership role of DED-CPS on victim participation and memory culture make it
probable that these achievements can – to a sizable degree – be attributed to CPS
interventions. But (like in the case of outcome monitoring), DED and partners should give
some thought on how impact can be assessed.
Preliminary Findings on Efficiency
The CPS programme is well managed and administered in Cambodia. There can be little
doubt about the strong leadership and vision of both the CPS coordinator and DED country
director.
The clear focus of the 2007–2010 programme has resulted in strong synergies among
interventions which are also due to the coordination and cooperation efforts among CPS
experts.
The successful and ongoing move from mainly ‘bilateral programme management’ (CPSindividual partner organisation) to a more ‘multilateral’ approach (CPS group of partner
39
Human Rights Center, University of California Berkeley 2009): So We will Never Forget. A
population-based Survey on Attitudes about Social Reconstruction and the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia, January 2009.N THOF CAMBODIA
40
International Republican Institute (2009): Survey of Cambodian Public Opinion, January 27 –
February 26, 2008; and July 31-August 26, 2009.
74
organisations) has provided additional feedback loops, increased transparency and
strengthened networking among partner organisations.
The evaluation found an advanced approach to results-based monitoring (jointly with partner
organisations), but there is continuous need for capacity building on monitoring. However,
there are no formal structure and procedure in place yet to fund capacity building. It is
assumed that this happens informally almost as a matter of course as the result of a CPS
expert’s involvement with a partner organisation. It is recommended that the facilitation of
capacity building is included in CPS expert job descriptions and formalised in relations
between DED and partner organisations. This does not only apply to capacity building on
monitoring but also other areas such as grant proposal writing, report writing, fundraising etc.
Delays in the disbursement of funds and transfer of funds by instalments cause delays in the
implementation of projects and negatively impacts on staff motivation at partner
organisations (see also 26).
The lack of involvement of partner organisations in selection of CPS experts limits the
participatory approach of the CPS in general.
There is a need for a centralised documentation system (for example a website) for all docs
on CPS interventions that allow CPS experts and partner organisations instant access to
information (particularly in provinces). This would also contribute to the strengthening of
coherence of the CPS programme. It should be considered to make a more basic, scaleddown version of the website (comprising just the key documents) available to the general
public.
Preliminary Findings on Sustainability
No systematic and institutionalised approach to achieving and increasing the sustainability of
interventions has so far been put in place yet. The general observation is, “when the funding
seizes, the NGOs move on to the next donor-driven project”. The current KRT interventions
offer a good chance for sustainability due to a) the integration of individual projects into a
coherent programme and b) the strong coalition of donors and NGOs that has been created
under the leadership of DED. Victims associations – which are currently being established in
a bottom-up, grassroots approach – may contribute to sustainability.
However, there is no explicit post-KRT strategy. What happens to the psycho-social support
of Khmer Rouge victims and Cambodia’s memory culture once the KTR’s mandate has
ended and/or donor support seizes? This question should be urgently addressed in a broad
discussion between DED and partner organisations and between DED and other donors.
While the CPS tries to prevent the sidelining or downplaying of local expertise by European
experts, CPS experts often unwillingly find themselves in a leadership and decision-making
position because the partner organisation wants them to play such a role. CPS experts are
often looked up to and there is still no widespread confidence of local stakeholders in their
own knowledge and skills. This is – at least partly – the result of the total donor dependence
of NGOs and contradicts all efforts at creating sustainability.
Preliminary Findings on Coherence, Coordination, Complementarity
Individual interventions of the 2001–2006 phase were relevant and achieved some important
outcomes but the CPS programme as such was incoherent and few synergies existed
among projects.
In the current phase regular workshops involving several partner organisations and their CPS
experts and EFKs have strengthened coherence of the current programme. The current
programme is also highly complementary with other donors’ support for the KRT as it was
the first – and still is the core – intervention that addresses victim support and
remembrance/memory culture.
75
The evaluation did not find any evidence for formal coordination between DED and EED on
the CPS in Cambodia in recent years. At the same time, the EED share has been very small
and the need for coordination was minimal. However, a formal approach to DED-EED
coordination should be considered if EED-funded CPS experts are deployed in Cambodia in
the future. In 2002–2004 DED and EED had one CPS expert each at the Khmer Institute of
Democracy (KID) within the context of the same intervention who largely coordinated
themselves.
Coordination with KAS (journalist training at the Department of Media and Communication,
Royal University of Phnom Penh) and with GTZ and InWEnt respectively on KRT
interventions works well and has been complementary; some problems have recently
occurred in coordination between DED and IFA regarding one partner organisation (Youth for
Peace/YFP) when IFA changed its funding priorities and an anticipated large grant for the
partner organisation did not materialise.
Preliminary Recommendations
Overall recommendation: CPS to be continued in Cambodia
To the BMZ
•
It is positive for the CPS when the deployment of CPS experts can be seconded by midlevel funding of projects from PT (Projektträger) and EO (Einheimische Organisation).
Otherwise, those projects developed with the contribution of the experts cannot be
implemented because of the lack of funding. The new practice of allowing higher CPS
country budgets at the beginning of a fiscal year (based on substantiated needs) should
be continued.
To DED on project planning, implementation and management
•
More explicit and comprehensive consideration of risk in project planning
•
Clearer distinction between outputs and outcomes in project planning and design (results
chains)
•
Consider putting formal procedures for capacity building in place. Xper cent of budget
should be allocated to capacity building of partner as a matter of course. Capacity
building takes place but on an informal basis. However, it should also be clarified in
relations between CPS and partner organisations that the latter share the responsibility
for providing appropriate training for EKs. Capacity building cannot and should not be the
sole duty of CPS.
•
Also, use existing knowledge among own local staff for capacity building: there is no
need for a total reliance on donors anymore as far as capacity building is concerned
•
More reporting in English (for the sake of the partner organisation and international
monitors/evaluators)
•
‘knowledge management’: set up a website for CPS stakeholders (as a one stop
resource centre) and a more general website for beneficiaries (it will only be a matter of
time before most people in Cambodia will have access to the internet.
•
Explicit strategies for reaching women may need to be improved/more targeted.
To DED on selection, training and role of CPS experts and local experts
•
Stronger participatory approach in CPS-partner relations: more involvement by the
partner organisation in the profiling and selection of the CPS expert
•
Junior experts should get the same preparatory training as senior CPS experts
76
•
Clarify the role and status of EFKs. Unlike in other country contexts (for example Latin
America), in Cambodia they seldom work as the CPS expert’s direct counterpart. The
status of the EFKs ranges from project assistants to programme managers.
To DED on sustainability
•
More targeting of multipliers in activities: teachers, councillors etc. (involvement of monks
is a good start) Create more initiatives/materials for outreach to grassroots level and the
general population
•
Set up donor/partner working group on post-KRT strategy
77
Annex 7: Interview guide CPS evaluation Cambodia case study
This is a general interview guide for all groups; however, some questions only apply to certain groups and have been adapted for other groups before
interviews.
Phases of
Interview
Phase I: Welcome
Key questions
•
•
Phase II:
Introduction
•
•
•
•
Phase III:
1.Political situation
•
2. Information on
partner
organisation
•
Possible follow-up questions or relevant information
The interview partners know to whom
they are talking
Welcome and thanking for readiness for
cooperation with evaluation mission
Presentation of the mission members and
interview partners
Introduction to the evaluation mission
background + objectives
Explanation of the objectives of this
specific interview
Explanation of the proposed main
structure of the interview (see right-hand
side points)
Guarantee of anonymity (the list of
interview partners will be put in the
mission report annex, however the people
interviewed will not be quoted in the
report)
How does the interview partner assess
the political situation both in Cambodia
and in their area of work?
Can you give us a briefing on your
organisation? (if not partner; Do you know
of organisation ‘X’ and its activities in this
specific area?)
Expected results
Political Situation and peacebuilding in the area and other
actors
Information on partner organisations
Information on main activity lines and projects (one part with
and one part without CPS expert contribution)
Changes as identified by interviewees
DED/EED and CPS specific issues and management issues
(only with management level) without CPS expert
contribution
The interview partner is informed about
the objectives of the interview and
those of the evaluation in general as
well as for Cambodia (CPS expert
knows that there is a part of interview
with and without her/his contribution) =>
openness for interview created
•
•
•
•
Main issues
Positive developments
Main challenges/problems
Future trends
Information on how interviewees
perceive the political situation;
Further data collection for area-specific
situations
•
•
•
•
•
Organisational structure
Staffing
Main activity lines in peacebuilding
Other activities besides peacebuilding
CPS support, timeline of support, and relevance for
organisation
Other support (donors, funding etc.)
The mission understands the
organisation structure (or how the
organisation is seen by others), its
activities, and the relevance of CPS
support for the organisation’s projects
•
•
•
•
•
•
78
Phases of
Interview
3. Information on
main activity lines
projects
Key questions
•
What are the main activity lines of the
partner organisations?
4. Changes
achieved?
•
What kinds of changes have you seen
since activity/activities have started?
With regard to closed projects, are there
on-going activities that have been started
under the CPS?
How do you monitor these changes?
•
•
5. CPS issues
DED/EED and CPS-specific issues on
effectiveness:
•
What is the role of CPS experts within the
organisation?
•
What type of funding do you get?
•
-What type of administrative and financial
procedures do you face? What are the
challenges associated with these
procedures?
•
What is the role of CPS coordinators?
Possible follow-up questions or relevant information
Expected results
When have activities been started and why?
What peacebuilding needs do these activities address?
How are other needs addressed (or not), and why?
How do the theories of change fit into your activities? What
did you expect to change and how?
•
What are the mains challenges of project/activity design?
•
How are the issues of sustainability integrated into the
planning?
•
How is the gender issue dealt with?
•
How is conflict sensitivity dealt with?
•
Who else is working in the field of peacebuilding? How are
you linked?
•
Further case-specific questions could be asked if needed
•
What are the perceived levels of change with regard to
issues like reconciliation, the creation of a culture of peace
and justice, as well as mitigating the consequences of past
violence and the possible reduction in and prevention of
violence?
•
In which phases of the conflict are project activities most
effective?
•
What is the impact of these changes?
•
What are the monitoring measurements used (baselines,
indicators, issues)?
•
How do you capitalise the learning experience?
•
What does a partner organisation need to fulfil its activities?
•
Is external support needed? If yes, what type of support?
•
Who supports the partner organisations and how?
•
What role does the CPS support play?
•
How and why has engagement in the field started?
•
How does engagement look like?
CPS expert--specific questions
•
What do CPS experts do? What have CPS experts done?
•
What is the status of CPS experts within the organisational
structure?
•
What are/have been the main CPS expert contributions?
•
What are the Pros and Cons of CPS expert placement?
•
What are the main challenges to CPS expert placement?
•
What are the alternatives to CPS expert placement?
Management-specific questions
Relevance, sustainability, and
effectiveness of activities; genderspecific structures or activities, ‘do no
harm’ approach, 3C approach, etc.
•
•
•
•
79
Effectiveness and sustainability of data
is assessed; triangulation of project
documents’ data with that of partners,
CPS experts, target groups and others
is possible
Relevance, Effectiveness, efficiency,
sustainability, and cooperation of CPS
experts and other CPS support is
assessed. The interview is threefold; a
part assesses the CPS expert
contribution, a part focuses on
management only, and a third part on
the totality
Phases of
Interview
Key questions
Possible follow-up questions or relevant information
•
•
•
•
•
•
Phase IV:
End of interview
•
•
•
Greeting and thanking
Information on follow-up
Interview partner is asked if he/she has
more to add or if he/she has any
questions to the evaluation team
•
What are the Pros and Cons of administrative and financial
procedures
With whom do you deal in case of questions/issues?
How do you see the role of CPS coordinators?
How is learning capitalised?
What type of cooperation and exchange is established
within the CPS group?
What type of cooperation and exchange is established with
other peacebuilding organisations?
Information on the process, i.e. info on next steps how the
results of the evlaution are being shared with interviewees
(Debriefing Workshop, draft report for comments, etc.)
80
Expected results
•
•
Open questions
Good atmosphere created