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Migration and Multicultural Contention
in East Asia
a
Hyuk-Rae Kim & Ingyu Oh
a
a
Sociology at Yonsei University
b
International Business at Solbridge International School of
Business
Version of record first published: 30 Sep 2011.
To cite this article: Hyuk-Rae Kim & Ingyu Oh (2011): Migration and Multicultural Contention in East
Asia, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 37:10, 1563-1581
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Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
Vol. 37, No. 10, December 2011, pp. 15631581
Migration and Multicultural
Contention in East Asia
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Hyuk-Rae Kim and Ingyu Oh
Japan, Korea and Taiwan have experienced rapid and dramatic demographic changes
during the last three decades. In all three countries, changes of fertility decline, ageing
and sex imbalances preceded massive increases in international marriages and labour
migration. In this article, we analyse how these demographic and social transformations
affect policies of migration and integration in this region. Demographics are changing
with the integration of foreign brides and professional migrants and with declining
fertility rates. Despite this, the magnitude and speed of change within the policy
provisions for migration and integration are still very limited and slow*Japan, Korea
and Taiwan, for instance, all maintain ‘assimilationist’ or ‘passive multicultural’
migration and integration policies.
Keywords: Demographic Change; Labour Migration; International Marriage; Contested
Governance; Multiculturalist Policies
Introduction
People residing in Japan and Korea have traditionally considered their nations to be
homogenous (see, inter alia, Lie 2001; Sawada 2008; Tamura 2003). The existence of
the Ainu (an indigenous Japanese ethnic group), together with a sizeable Korean and
Chinese population, did not meaningfully challenge Japan’s notion of homogeneity.
The myth of homogeneity in Korea also conveniently overlooked the presence of
various ethnic groups*Chinese, Manchurians or Japanese, for example*who had
migrated into the peninsula at different historical junctures. The situation in Taiwan
was not substantially different from that in Japan or Korea. Although Taiwan openly
acknowledged the existence of aborigines and other ethnic minority groups,
Hyuk-Rae Kim is Professor of Sociology at Yonsei University. Correspondence to: Prof. H.-R. Kim, Graduate
School of International Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea. E-mail: [email protected]. Ingyu Oh is
Associate Professor in International Business at Solbridge International School of Business. Correspondence to:
Prof. I. Oh, Solbridge International School of Business, 151-13 Samsung 1-dong, Dong-gu, Daejeon 300-814,
South Korea. E-mail: [email protected].
ISSN 1369-183X print/ISSN 1469-9451 online/11/101563-19 # 2011 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.613332
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1564
H.-R. Kim & I. Oh
nationalists have encouraged citizens to embrace the concept of the single-nationstate principle since the birth of the Kuomintang government in 1949. This nationalist
doctrine tenaciously held that the majority Han Chinese were a homogenous people
devoid of multi-ethnic or multicultural heritages (Yang et al. 2006).
In the postwar development period, three broad demographic changes provide the
context for a significant influx of international labour migrants, followed by so-called
marriage migrants. Firstly, the fertility decline has progressed to a point where the
conventional level of population growth*i.e. at least replacement level*is no longer
tenable. Secondly, the rapidly ageing population in each country has dramatically
increased the population dependency ratio (i.e. the total population divided by the
total economically active population).1 Finally, Korea and Taiwan, in particular,
experienced a skewed sex ratio in favour of male babies at birth in the early 1990s,
although the tendency subsided in the 2000s. Japan, on the other hand, has just
exhibited a low sex ratio beginning in 2010. The Korean sex ratio at birth in
fact reached 116.5 male per 100 female babies in 1990 (Korea National Statistical
Office 2008), which is a rare phenomenon in other parts of the developing world.
These demographic changes in the 1980s and the 1990s were accompanied by a
massive immigration of foreign workers and brides.
Aside from the general demographic changes, the burgeoning number of migrant
workers in the three countries is attributed to concerted efforts by governments and
businesses to deal with the presumed labour shortage in the 3-D and smalland medium-industry (SMI) sectors of the economy.2 Migrant workers primarily
arrived from China, South-East, South and Central Asia, and South America. Korea
and Japan actively sought ways of incorporating their ethnic descendants from China
and South America, respectively. Moreover, the income disparities in the region have
intensified intra-Asian migration within the last three decades (Kim 2004; Martin
et al. 2006). The increasing level of education and income among native workers,
coupled with the declining number of economically active people, exacerbated the
labour shortages in the 3-D and SMI sectors.
International marriages quickly became the second most significant factor of
international migration that began to destabilise the homogenous East Asian family
structure (Constable 2005; Douglass 2008; Drumm 2001; Kim 2009). For instance, in
2006, international marriages constituted 6.1 per cent of the total registered marriages
in Japan. In Korea, the rate of international marriages increased from 3.7 per cent in
2000 to 13.6 per cent in 2005, while it reached 15.5 per cent in Taiwan in 2004 (Korea
Immigration Service 2006; Ministry of Internal Affairs 2006). A main pull factor for
accepting marriage migrants is the dearth of domestic brides, particularly in rural
areas, due to the exodus of young women to urban areas, and urban women
migrating to foreign countries for study, work or marriage. In Japan many women
elect to remain unmarried until their late 30s and 40s (Chung and Das Gupta 2007;
Kim and Shin 2008; Okushima 2008; Sha 2008). Despite the significance of labour
and marriage migrants who enter and remain in the host countries as legal residents
and eventually as citizens, a considerable proportion of international migrants either
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Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
1565
enter the countries unlawfully or become unauthorised residents for a variety of
reasons. Currently, Korea has over 1.5 million documented and undocumented
foreign residents; Japan accommodates around 2.5 million documented foreign
residents; and Taiwan has close to half a million documented migrants (Korea
Immigration Service 2008; Ministry of Internal Affairs 2008). An unforeseen
consequence of the influx of these migrant workers and brides is that they bring
their cultural traditions and practices with them, thus challenging the host society’s
age-old beliefs about ethnic homogeneity and transforming the social and cultural
fabric of these Asian societies.
The increasing significance of multicultural families and international migrants in
avowedly homogeneous Asian societies prompted the governments to devise policies
pertaining to migration, social integration and multiculturalism. New needs of
multicultural governance for diversity policies led to a series of experimental
programmes in multiculturalism, including multicultural centres for migrant workers
where they can learn the host language and receive counselling on ways of adapting to
local customs (see Joon Kim, this issue). Unfortunately, the content and framework
of education and counselling remained basically assimilationist. Thus, foreign brides
are expected to conform to the cultural norms of the host society, rather than the
latter being expected to embrace multiculturalism as an evolving process of accepting
international migrants. Even though migrant workers and foreign brides are
increasingly important for economies and communities across East Asia, they
continue to face institutional discrimination, human rights violation and exploitation
in workplaces, communities and households (Lee 2006; Lee 2008; Liem 2007; Lim
2003; Narayan 2006). Despite efforts to promote multiculturalism, the programme
content is rooted in the principle of cultural assimilation.
In this paper we examine the linkages between salient demographic changes and
the social factors affecting international migration patterns. Moreover, we seek to
explain the areas of convergence and divergence in regards to diversity policies in
three East Asian countries, in order to highlight the varied forms of multicultural
governance. In what follows, we analyse the demographic changes occurring in these
countries, offer explanations on the changing dynamics of migration arising from an
increasingly transnational workforce and bridal population, compare and contrast
multicultural governance structures and diversity policies in the three countries, and
suggest future policy implications for the challenge of transnational migration and
multicultural governance in East Asia.
East Asian Patterns of Demographic Change
East Asian demographic changes during the postwar years can be traced back to
the countries’ phenomenal development success, touted as a rare case of a regional
economic miracle (see, inter alia, Clark 1989; Kim and Song 2007; Oh 1999; Vogel
1979). Simultaneously, Japan, Taiwan and Korea all experienced a series of social transformations that continue to challenge important areas of their traditional
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1566
H.-R. Kim & I. Oh
societies. The demographic transformation is clearly one of the most significant
changes in recent decades.
Aggregate demographic changes first appeared in Japan, although they quickly
followed in the ensuing years in Korea and Taiwan. For example, the precipitous
decline of the fertility rate and rapid ageing first occurred in Japan, notably in the
1980s, while a similar pattern occurred in Korea and Taiwan a decade later. Due to a
general rise in living standards and the move of job preferences away from the 3-D
and SMI sectors, the prevalence of labour shortages in these occupations created an
impetus for both governments and businesses to search for alternative sources of
labour. The exodus of young women from rural areas to cities also exacerbated the
shortage of brides in rural areas (Das Gupta and Bhat 1997; Edlund 1999; Hesketh
and Zhu 2006; Park and Cho 1995).
According to the United Nations (2007), Japan became an ‘aged society’ in 1994,
with more than 14 per cent of the population in the age bracket 65 years and over,
whereas Korea and Taiwan became an ‘ageing society’ in 2000, with more than 7 per
cent of the population in the senior bracket. As shown in Table 1, Korea and Taiwan
are projected to take only 18 and 15 years, respectively, to move from an ageing to an
aged society*much faster than the experience of other developed nations.3 By 2050
all three countries will have a similar population structure, with the highest
percentage of elderly population in the world.
It is worth noting that Korea experienced the quickest decline in total fertility rate
among the three countries*from 6.2 children per woman in 1960 to 1.6 in 1990
(Korea National Statistical Office 2008). The country reached the world’s lowest
fertility rate of 1.08 in 2005, which is much lower than the 2005 OECD average of
1.56 and substantially lower than the minimum 2.1 needed to maintain the current
population level. The figures for Japan and Taiwan were 1.25 in 2005 and 1.18 in
2004, respectively. Although Korea and Taiwan have emulated the Japanese
demographic pattern, the speed of catching up has been much faster than other
countries. Significantly low fertility rates imply an exponential increase in the
population dependency ratio in the future. In the case of Korea, for example, the core
Table 1. Changes in age structure: Korea, Japan and Taiwan (%)
Age group (years)
1960
1980
014
42.3 (K)
30.0 (J)
34.0 (K)
23.5 (J)
1564
54.8 (K)
64.2 (J)
62.2 (K)
67.4 (J)
65 2.9 (K)
5.7 (J)
3.8 (K)
9.1 (J)
2000
21.1
14.6
21.2
71.7
67.9
70.2
7.2
17.3
8.6
(K)
(J)
(T)
(K)
(J)
(T)
(K)
(J)
(T)
2005
19.2
13.7
18.7
71.7
65.8
71.6
9.1
20.1
9.7
(K)
(J)
(T)
(K)
(J)
(T)
(K)
(J)
(T)
2018
2030
12.7 (K)
11.1 (J)
13.0 (T)
72.9 (K)
60.3 (J)
72.3 (T)
14.3 (K)
28.6 (J)
14.7 (T)
11.4 (K)
9.7 (J)
12.0 (T)
64.4 (K)
58.5 (J)
64.0 (T)
24.3 (K)
31.8 (J)
24.0 (T)
2050
8.9
8.6
10.0
53.0
51.8
54.1
38.2
39.6
35.9
Source: Korea National Statistical Office (2008); Ministry of Internal Affairs (2008); Shajinken (2010).
Notes: K Korea; J Japan; T Taiwan.
(K)
(J)
(T)
(K)
(J)
(T)
(K)
(J)
(T)
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Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
1567
age group of economically active population (2554) has been dropping rapidly since
2005.
Table 1 provides us with another demographic implication. Not only are these
countries experiencing one of the most rapid transformations from ageing to aged
societies globally, but Korea and Taiwan are also going through the world’s fastest
transition from industrial to post-industrial stages of demographic development,
which shows a clear sign of severe workforce depletion in the 3-D and SMI sectors.
Ageing and low fertility rates combined are undoubtedly the most significant factors.
One could argue that the overall workforce size may be unaffected by the acute
fertility decline, primarily due to the increasing number of senior members of society.
However, it is equally likely that the ageing population does not meaningfully search
for and compete in 3-D occupations, such as mining, construction, shipbuilding,
long-distance trawling and nightshift nursing.
Finally, a skewed sex ratio at birth is the third aspect of population dynamics in
this region, as Korea and Taiwan experienced temporary but serious sex ratio
imbalance. Japan, on the other hand, is continuously experiencing a declining sex
ratio disparity. Both Korea and Taiwan demonstrated an imbalance between the
1980s and the 2000s, although the pattern has gradually ameliorated. The preference
for sons was facilitated by the introduction of pre-natal sex-detection technology
during the early stage of pregnancy. As Table 2 shows, Korea was particularly adept in
the technology, which had the effect of radically increasing the sex imbalance in 1990,
despite the fact that the practice was outlawed in 1987.4 Male preference at birth
obviously impacts on the overall female population, which eventually affects the
availability of marriageable women as they come of age (Das Gupta and Bhat 1997;
Edlund 1999; Hesketh and Zhu 2006; Park and Cho 1995). The extreme sex
imbalance of the mid-1980s contributes to the current bridal shortage, as male babies
born during that time are now in their mid-20s. Since 2000, however, a steady decline
in the overall sex imbalance has been duly observed (Chung and Das Gupta 2007).
Taiwan also banned gender detection during pregnancy, albeit not until 2002 and
with many loopholes in the legislation (Department of Health 2010). Since couples
could find alternative ways of detecting foetal sex, the imbalance peaked in 2005. The
Japanese trend indicates a low level of sex imbalance at birth that can be traced back
to the 1970s (Yô et al. 2007). The reverse sex imbalance is also widely noticed in the
Table 2. Sex ratio at birth per 100 female babies
Korea
Japan
Taiwan
1981
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2020
2025
107.2
106.0
106.7
109.5
105.6
106.5
116.5
105.4
108.0
113.2
105.2
108.8
110.2
105.8
109.0
107.7
105.3
109.5
108.2
98.8
108.5
106.4
98.3
106.7
106.0
98.2
106.2
Source: Kim (2009); Korea National Statistical Office (2008); Ministry of Internal Affairs (2008); Shajinken
(2008).
Note: Peak figure in bold.
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1568
H.-R. Kim & I. Oh
US, Canada, Denmark, Holland and the UK (Nonaka 2000). Attempts to nail down
the causes of the sex ratio decline fail to produce definitive results, although it is clear
that urban areas in Japan experience the greatest reverse sex imbalance. Many factors,
including environmental influences such as pollution, are thought to be linked to the
decline of sex ratios in Japan, although there is no definitive evidence (Yô et al. 2007).
Rapid ageing, low fertility and sex imbalances do not necessarily, in and of
themselves, present a direct threat to current labour shortages. However, the recent
demographic changes coincide with government policies that continue to favour
importing labourers from overseas in select industries and facilitating international
marriages. The mass media and policy-makers alike tend to propagate the idea that
demographic changes are linked to labour migration, although we find no causality
between the two. Be that as it may, migrant workers are mostly concentrated in the 3D and SMI sectors.
Labour Migration
Managing the flow of migrant workers is an important policy concern in all three
countries. Over the years, Korea has shifted its policy from inviting only industrial
trainees on a rotation basis to further opening its borders to Korean descendants
from China and Central Asia as guestworkers (Lee and Park 2005). Taiwan
maintained the largest number of unskilled migrant workers on a quota system.
However, there are fewer undocumented migrant workers than in either Japan or
Korea. Japan’s approach has been to concentrate on professional migration initially in
order to bolster its weak IT and digital technology industries and, later, to expand its
stock of multilingual foreign staff for multinational corporations (Yamanaka 1993;
Yorimitsu 2003). As can be calculated from the figures in Table 3, professional
migrants in 2007 made up 30.6 per cent of the total migrant workforce in Japan,
compared to 5.3 per cent in Korea and 4.0 per cent in Taiwan.
Japan is one of the few non-Western countries that has accepted a large influx of
migrant workers since the 1970s. Beginning in the 1980s, Japanese factories and
construction sites were supplemented by labourers from all over Asia and South
Table 3. Foreign workers by status
Professional
Unskilled
Undocumented
Year
Korea
Japan
Taiwan
Korea
Japan
Taiwan
Korea
Japan
Taiwan
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
20,809
24,105
27,585
30,816
33,929
82,490
88,281
103,040
113,814
130,474
13,499
11,409
14,014
15,085
15,384
230,671
289,477
232,538
253,050
467,084
121,689
132,432
105,595
109,450
125,075
302,741
313,201
319,612
337,380
352,263
138,056
187,946
180,792
211,988
223,464
220,552
219,418
207,299
193,745
170,839
17,160
21,086
24,316
28,463
18,264
Source: Hômushô Nyûkoku Kanrikyoku (2008); Korea Immigration Service (2006, 2008); National Immigration
Agency (2008).
Note: Figures in bold denote largest number of each type of worker.
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Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
1569
America. As Table 4 shows, Japan’s overarching policy toward migrant workers has
been threefold. Firstly, the government discouraged the employment of unskilled
foreign workers in order to close its borders to Chinese and other migrant workers
(Yamanaka 1993). Second, the government set a policy guideline with which to allow
firms to recruit professional migrants from the developed world and/or Englishspeaking countries. Finally, the government allowed firms in the 3-D and SMI sectors
to begin hiring overseas Japanese from South America, and strictly monitored the
inflow of other foreign workers by establishing a so-called ‘trainee system’ that
prevented the permanent settlement of migrants who worked primarily in the 3-D
sectors (Sano 1996; Yoshida 2006).
Korea and Taiwan began replicating the Japanese model in the late 1980s. SMI and
3-D firms urged the government to initiate a guestworker programme that would
alleviate the presumed labour shortage, opening the doors to migrant workers from
China and South-East Asia (Cheng 2003; Kwon 2004; Park 1994; Se et al. 2007).
Although it is difficult to prove that maintaining homogeneity was the principal
reason for providing temporary work visas to the Japanese-Brazilians (in Japan) and
the Korean-Chinese (in Korea), both governments made a special effort to recruit
overseas co-ethnics over other international migrant workers. The respective
percentages of Brazilians and Korean-Chinese were 14.7 per cent in 2007 and 27.9
per cent in 2008 (Table 5).
Taiwan and Korea, however, showed a difference in how each attempted to manage
the flow of 3-D migrant workers. Taiwan, for instance, utilised bilateral agreements
with supplier countries, while Korea adopted the Japanese system of worker rotation
by issuing short-term job-training visas that were administered through private
manpower-recruiting agencies (Sano 2004). Because these private companies, in
many instances, misrepresented the terms of employment*such as working
conditions and wages*many trainees left the companies to which they had originally
been contracted (Kim 2003).5 As Table 3 shows, Taiwan had fewer undocumented
workers, whereas Japan and Korea struggled to deal with the ballooning number of
unauthorised workers who entered the countries on trainee visas. Unlike Japan,
neither Korea nor Taiwan initiated temporary-worker programmes for professionals
(Sano 2004). Indian professionals in Japan, however, have been noticeable in recent
Table 4. Labour migration patterns in Japan, Korea and Taiwan
Japan
Korea
Taiwan
Principle
Border control
Border control
Status control
Unskilled
Japanese descendants from
Brazil; trainee rotation &
other work permits
Korean descendants from
China; trainee rotation &
other work permits
S-E Asian migrants on
bilateral quotas &
other work permits
Skilled
Many
Few
Few
Many
Few
Undocumented Many
1570
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Korea
2003
Japan
2008
Koreans
Chinese
237,497
Korean-Chinese
Japanese
42,504
559,771
325,976
377,616
299,384
32,544
1,332
Brazilians
US citizens
106,390
Vietnamese
24,908
Filipinos
32,451
Thais
27,545
Mongolians
16,824
Indonesians
31,475
125,436
8,870
78,948
44,526
50,192
33,810
45,959
30,405
34,470
15,477
25,722
21,512
2003
2007
613,791
14,152
462,396
73,598
593,489
23,882
606,889
141,845
274,700
790
47,836
316,967
903
51,851
36,860
185,237
55,571
202,592
20,319
41,384
25,620
Indians
Total
Taiwan
20,589
560,031
1,352,461
1,915,030
2,152,973
2003
2007
2,820
1,122
2,792
1,006
10,321
5,737
9,710
5,456
10,243
4,469
101,468
57,051
81,299
78,098
108,446
104,283
9,994
4,992
95,735
59,324
82,595
79,969
88,998
84,514
64,778
53,520
1,244
674
405,284
116,685
108,521
1,406 750
433,169
H.-R. Kim & I. Oh
Table 5. Foreign residents by nationality (workers in italics)
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Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
1571
years due to the new Japanese initiative of attracting English-speaking, computerdriven information technology (IT) workers from India (over 20,000 in 2007).
The ethnic composition of international workers by country and occupation
reflects, in part, the volatility of political relations between countries and cultural
preference in certain areas of employment. Taiwan’s migrant workers mostly come
from four South-East Asian countries: Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and
Vietnam. Vietnamese workers are preferred for their Confucian heritage, whereas
Filipina domestic workers are favoured for their English proficiency, deemed
invaluable for the education of Taiwanese children (Cheng 2003). Thai and
Indonesian male workers are mostly hired for construction sites in Taiwan (Se
et al. 2007). The reliance on these South-East Asian migrant workers for the 3-D job
sector derives from the policy directive of the Democratic Progressive Party
(Minchindang), led by the former President Chen Shui-bian. The goal of the policy
directive was to (a) ‘de-Sinicise’ the Taiwanese national and cultural identity, and (b)
search for a new Taiwanese identity based on its long tradition of multi-ethnic and
multicultural heritage (Chu and Lin 2001; Ho 2006). However, this policy directive
was met by severe opposition from nationalists and China (Chu 2004; Chu and Lin
2001).
Tables 3 and 5 confirm one recent change*Japan, Korea and Taiwan are now
hosting a large number of migrant workers from diverse ethnic and national
backgrounds. Even though Japan has set the precedent in this region, Korea and
Taiwan have quickly emulated the Japanese experience, despite some nuanced policy
differences. The historico-political ties with China remain a big hurdle for Taiwan,
whereas Japan and Korea face an upsurge of Chinese migrant workers in their
societies.
International Marriages
Japan, again, is the leader in the region when it comes to international marriages. The
dearth of marriageable women in rural areas and the tendency of urban women to
remain single largely explain the proliferation of such marriages.6 In addition, many
Japanese women elect to go overseas for university study or to find a foreign groom.
In Korea and Taiwan, the main reasons for international marriage are similar to
those in Japan. Additionally, the sex imbalance at birth within the last two to three
decades in Korea and Taiwan has led to a decline in the total number of marriages as
well as to bridal shortages in both rural and urban areas. As a consequence, Korea
(13.6 per cent in 2005) and Taiwan (15.5 per cent in 2004) experienced a sudden
increase in the number of international marriages compared to Japan (Table 6). Also,
as Table 7 shows, the abrupt increase in international marriages in Korea and Taiwan
can be attributed to the diversification of marriage partners from South-East Asia.
In Korea, marriages with a Japanese spouse declined significantly from 18.2 per cent
in the 1990s to 4.7 per cent in 2008 (Kim 2009). On the other hand, the percentage of
1990
1995
2000
2004
2005
2006
International marriages
Korea
Japan
Taiwan
4,710 (1.2)
25,625 (3.5)
13,494 (3.4)
27,727 (3.5)
12,319 (3.7)
36,263 (4.5)
21,338 (11.7)
35,447 (11.4)
39,511 (5.5)
20,338 (15.5)
43,121 (13.6)
41,481 (5.8)
13,808 (9.8)
39,690 (11.9)
44,701 (6.1)
9,524 (6.7)
Foreign wives
Korea
Japan
Taiwan
619
20,026
10,365
20,787
7,306
28,326
19,062
25,594
30,907
17,567
31,180
33,116
11,121
30,208
35,993
6,816
Foreign husbands
Korea
Japan
Taiwan
4,091
5,600
3,129
6,940
5,015
7,937
2,276
9,853
8,604
2,771
11,941
8,365
2,687
9,482
8,708
2,708
Source: Korea Immigration Service (2008); Korea National Statistical Office (2008); Tôkeijôhôbu (2008); Ministry of Internal Affairs. (2008).
Note: Figures in parenthesis are percentages.
H.-R. Kim & I. Oh
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1572
Table 6. International marriages, 19902006
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
1573
Table 7. International marriages by nationality (2005 or 2006)
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Korea
Korean
Chinese
Japanese
American
Vietnamese
Cambodian
Indonesian
Filipino/a
Mongolian
Uzbekistani
Thai
British
Brazilian
Peruvian
Others
Japan
Foreign
wives
Foreign
husbands
41,118
7,145
567
7,426
4,670
596
604
37
3,811
1,270
896
1,447
11
121
25
21
20
141
2,968
2,117
Taiwan
Foreign
wives
Foreign
husbands
Foreign
wives
Foreign
husbands
6,066
11,644
2,087
1,015
614
14,619
1,314
183
1,153
177
1,551
75,732
4,508
25,711
5,699
142
357
382
6,463
2,963
4,225
4,641
10,242
187
1,637
59
311
121
2,859
60
343
261
123
2,738
Source: Korea Immigration Service (2008); National Immigration Agency (2008); Tôkeijôhôbu (2008).
Note: ‘Chinese’ for Korea includes the Korean-Chinese. Marriages with the Korean-Chinese were not included in
Table 6 for Korea. Figures are for 2005 except for Taiwan, which are for 2006.
foreign brides from the Philippines and Vietnam grew to 4.6 and 20.4, respectively, in
2008 (Korea National Statistical Office 2008).
Despite diversification, Chinese women (including ethnic Koreans from China, or
joseonjok, who are listed as Chinese nationals) represent the largest group of
international brides for Korean and Japanese men. This pattern remained unchanged
in Korea, since marriages with joseonjok constituted 31.4 per cent of total
international marriages, whereas marriages with the Chinese stood at 25.2 per cent
(Korea Immigration Service 2008). Table 7 shows, however, that Taiwanese men
prefer Vietnamese women.
The future marriage trend is unclear, although we are no longer witnessing spikes
in international marriage rates. The demographic impact of sex-ratio imbalance in
Korea and Taiwan is expected to decline in the long run, except for the rural and
urban poor, who will continue to experience difficulty finding brides as young
women tend to avoid marriage partners from this socio-economic group. The
relatively lower levels of sex imbalance witnessed in Japan may not solve the bridal
shortage in the rural communities and among the urban poor.
We find that East Asia is now full of migrant workers and foreign brides who chose
this new destination for socio-economic reasons. We also find that the governments
in Japan, Korea and Taiwan have considerably eased the process of contracting
international marriages and obtaining work visas (see also Seol 2005; Sha 2008).
Increasing population diversity in East Asia has brought about changes in local
multicultural policies in order to allay ethnic tensions between newcomers and host
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H.-R. Kim & I. Oh
societies. Policies of diversity in Japan, Korea and Taiwan have targeted these various
groups of migrant workers and foreign brides, including offering them free languagelearning services and counselling. However, we also find that East Asian governments
are still reluctant to provide these migrants with genuine multicultural care (Kim and
Shin 2008; Lee 2003; Se et al. 2007; Seol 2005).
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Policies of Diversity
Although Taiwan (Hoklo, Hakka, Waisheng ren and aborigines), Korea (Koreans,
Manchurians, Chinese and Japanese) and Japan (Japanese, Ainu, Koreans and
Chinese) have been multi-ethnic societies for centuries, policy-makers have only
recently explicitly articulated in the public discourse the concepts of tolerance,
diversity and multiculturalism. Given the apparent lack of multicultural experience
among the population in these countries, it is not surprising that international
migrant communities and their advocates express discontent toward these diversityrelated policies. Because of the ethnic tension between international migrants and
host societies, the countries’ governments have put in place policy measures in order
to alleviate the problem. Generally, four types of diversity policy are possible:
assimilationist, preparationist, passive multicultural and active multicultural (Bleich
1998: 83).
Non-multicultural policies may be termed assimilationist or preparationist. The
goal of assimilationist policies is to subsume minority groups into the dominant
society. The intention of preparationist policies is to expel or deport migrant workers
once they outlive their usefulness. On the other hand, multicultural policies include
passive and active multicultural standpoints. The passive standpoint merely tolerates
diverse cultural expressions that do not threaten the social boundary of a
homogeneous society, whereas the active multicultural policy intentionally incorporates the perspectives and cultures of minority groups, thereby transforming
important social institutions.
Based on this conceptual map, we find that East Asia as a whole grapples with the
prospect of multiculturalism in varied forms. Diversity policies include nonmulticultural and multicultural types, and those that implement multicultural
policies tend to be passive, rather than active. In analysing these diversity policies, we
compared the three countries based on the following factors: public education and
awareness campaigns on multiculturalism, mass media programmes, and legislation
that prohibits ethnic and racial hatred in the workplace (see Table 8).
Among the three policy areas of diversity, multicultural education has been a
thorny issue in the three countries. Even Taiwan*a leader in this area, with its long
historical heritage of multiculturalism and diversity*maintains passive multicultural
policies with regard to its educational reform (see also Chen 1996). Multicultural
curricula, pedagogical training and textbook development are virtually absent in
Japan and Korea, even though Japan has a significant number of ethnic minorities
who have lived in the country for generations*the Ainu, Koreans and Taiwanese.
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
1575
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Table 8. Diversity policies
Policy areas
Japan
Korea
Education
reform
Mass media
campaign
Anti-hatred
legislation
Assimilationist or
preparationist
Assimilationist or passive
multicultural
None or preparationist
Assimilationist or
preparationist
Assimilationist or passive
multicultural
None or preparationist
Taiwan
Passive multicultural
Assimilationist or passive
multicultural
None or preparationist
Neither the Korean nor the Japanese governments formally acknowledged educational diplomas conferred by their ethnic schools.
The mass media is the only area where the multicultural campaign has been
vibrant in all three countries. Foreigners are often shown on television programmes
to illustrate their integration into society. In Japan, foreigners appear on television
shows or news press as cultural assimilators, singing Japanese enka (traditional
Japanese soul music for the elderly) or cooking Japanese food while speaking in fluent
Japanese. At other times, however, they are portrayed as unwanted foreigners
disrupting Japanese civilisation and homogeneity (Sawada 2008). Recently, TV
programmes have been showing heated debates between foreigners and influential
Japanese celebrities over the issue of the separatist or racist tendencies of Japanese
people, culture and education. In Korea, foreign brides appear on television to
explain in fluent Korean how they are assimilating into Korean culture. These
programmes contain high emotional content, especially when the foreign bride’s
family members, who were flown to Korea to meet their daughters, appear by
surprise on the stage. A recent Taiwanese TV show featured a panel of journalists who
bad-mouthed foreigners by citing (mainly fabricated) horror stories about them.
These anecdotes provide indirect evidence that the underlying intention of massmedia activism toward multiculturalism is not yet actively multicultural.
Given the nascent status of diversity policies in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, it is
natural to expect that the governance of migration will continue to be contested by
various migrant groups in these countries. Japan, for example, reintroduced fingerprinting in 2008, an egregious reminder of the preparationist policy that had
continuously beleaguered foreign residents until the early 1990s. Koseki, or family
registries, still document the individual marriage and naturalisation records of
foreign residents, in tandem with legal pressure on these foreigners to change their
last names to Japanese-sounding ones. The third and fourth generations of Korean
Japanese are not allowed to adopt Japanese citizenship if any of their ancestors or
relatives had any criminal record (Oh 2012). The issue of human rights abuses of
foreign brides and migrant workers continues to be the topic of social outcry in
Japan, too (Ajia Josei Shiryô Senta- 2008).
In Korea and Taiwan, human rights abuse is a common problem when it comes to
the unfair practice of migration governance. Instead of promoting multiculturalism,
these societies as a whole tend to pressure foreign brides to adopt traditional
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H.-R. Kim & I. Oh
Confucian family roles within the rural farming areas. Poor working conditions and
low wages are not complemented with a social safety-net for workers who are either
injured or laid off. The process of naturalisation is very slow and involves layers of red
tape, which prevents permanent settlement. In all three countries, discrimination
against their own co-ethnics from Latin America and China is an intriguing
phenomenon seldom observed in the British Commonwealth or the EU. The
trafficking of women for prostitution is also rampant near the US military bases in
Korea and in urban back-alleys in Taiwan (Sawada 2008).
Amid the injustice and unfairness so prevalent in migration governance, the
involvement of non-governmental organisations in restoring the human rights of
international migrants has led to mixed results. Starting in Japan in the 1980s and
spreading rapidly into Taiwan and Korea in the 1990s and 2000s, many civil-society
movements started to tackle the ill-treatment of foreign migrant workers and brides.
The topic of finger-printing, discrimination against non-white husbands who
married Japanese women, and the human rights abuse of foreign brides was the
central discourse among civic organisations and NGOs in the 1980s (Ajia Josei Shiryô
Senta- 2008; Lie 1986). Since the early 1990s, migrant workers in Korea have relied
upon NGOs as a source of empowerment in the protest against ill-conceived
government policies. In parallel with civic activism, migrant workers also set up
grassroots organisations, such as the Migrants’ Trade Union (MTU), founded on 24
April 2005 (Kim 2003, 2005; Liem 2007; Lim 2003).
Despite these efforts, Japan, Korea and Taiwan have yet to adopt legislation that
prohibits anti-immigrant crimes and violence. The only visible reform concerns the
laws regarding domestic violence against wives. In Japan and Korea, these laws are
now amended to include foreign wives (Asis 2004; Lee 2008). Attempts were made to
prosecute those who verbally abused migrant workers with racial slurs in Korea,
although these did not lead to the enactment of hate-crime laws (Lee 2008). As Table
8 indicates, the overall diversity policy in this region remains in limbo between the
non-multicultural and the multicultural, even as the presence of international
migrants, brides and the children of mixed ethnic heritage is clearly on the rise and
the impact, particularly on rural communities, is quite significant.
Discussion: The Contested Governance of Migration
Our analysis of demographic changes, migration patterns and policies of diversity
leaves us with one lingering policy-related question: is there any structural reason
why governments in East Asia remain either passive multicultural or assimilationist?
We believe the answer is related to the changing demographic structure and illusive
government policies to deal with increasing dependence on foreign labour, and
brides, who are progressively challenging the homogeneous social structure of these
countries.
The demographic changes and their projected future ramifications have been
alarming policy-makers in this region. Accepting labour and marriage migration was
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Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
1577
a policy measure aimed at deflecting some of the foreseeable catastrophes that
demographic transformations might bring about, such as an acute shortage of labour
in the 3-D and SMI sectors and brides for the rural and urban poor. Whether planned
or unplanned, the overarching migration pattern of the three countries in our study
does not pose a palpable threat to their socio-political or socio-economic status quo.
The majority of migrant workers and foreign brides are culturally and ethnically
similar groups of Chinese (in Korea and Japan) and Vietnamese (in Taiwan).
Furthermore, all three countries accept a large number of migrants of their own
ethnic descendance from China (Korea and Taiwan) and South America
(Japan). Therefore, it stands to reason that policy-makers prefer the assimilationist
policy with a mixture of passive multiculturalism. Policies designed to implicitly
foster assimilation, rather than hastily spread the morals of multiculturalism, reflect
the perception that international migration could be managed better through
absorption than through changing the mindset of the majority population.
Despite the governments’ assimilationist stance, the overall situation in East Asia
shows increasing ethnic diversity and a rising level of contestation over migration
governance. Japan’s situation demonstrates conflicting stories of progress and
regression in regard to its diversity policy. Public idols like Yû Darvish, who
represented Japan in the 2008 Olympics and the 2009 World Baseball Classics, enjoy a
high degree of fame and wealth despite the fact that, in Yû’s case, his biological father
is Iranian. However, a Mongolian sumo champion, Yokozuna Asashôryû, faced the
cold shoulder from the hosting Japanese, despite his high level of linguistic and
cultural assimilation into the mainstream. Yokozuna’s fate was to rise to the pinnacle
of sumo wrestling, but be obliged eventually return to Mongolia after retirement.
This alone makes it difficult for us to predict that Korea and Taiwan will fare better
than Japan in terms of assimilation or political empowerment among new migrant
groups. Falling short of government expectations, even co-ethnics from China (Korea
and Taiwan) and South America (Japan) fail to assimilate culturally; thus the
contested governance over international migrants is expected to continue into the
foreseeable future.
Conclusion
This article has compared Japan, Korea and Taiwan in order to explore some of the
theoretical and policy implications of their rapid demographic change and the
attendant policies pertaining to international labour and marriage migrants. Ageing,
fertility decline and sex imbalances have progressed simultaneously over the last three
decades, with Japan the leader in setting the trend. We have dealt carefully with
the thorny issue of whether these demographic transformations were linked to the
subsequent migration explosion in East Asia in the last 20 years. Again, Japan paved
the way for international marriages and labour migration. We found that the shortage
of labour in the 3-D and SMI sectors was exacerbated by rapid changes in ageing and
fertility. We also found that the bridal shortage was particularly salient among the
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H.-R. Kim & I. Oh
rural and urban poor, a pattern which was also aggravated by ageing and fertility
decline.
We then put these findings into theoretical and policy contexts to determine how
these demographic changes and migration patterns might have influenced policies of
diversity in this region. We found that Japan, Korea and Taiwan exhibited differences
in diversity policy and are still struggling to cope with troubling cases of human
rights abuse, trafficking and racism in their efforts to institutionalise multiculturalism. We conclude that the new ethnic composition in East Asia after
migration still favours assimilationist policies, because the main axis of new migrants
is ethnically and culturally close to local hosts.
Future studies could implement both quantitative and qualitative research on the
relationship between ethnic composition and policies of diversity. They could
measure the impact of ethnic and cultural distance on policies of diversity and
attempt to forecast the magnitude and degree of contestation against migration
governance. We recognise that there is a clear need to address the problem of
identifying factors which impede or facilitate mitigation during the process of
assimilation or transition to multiculturalism between similar ethnic and cultural
groups on the one hand and different ones on the other.
Acknowledgements
We thank Emiko Hatayama, Will Brett and Joon Kim for valuable assistance and
suggestions.
Notes
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
For a discussion about the relationship between an economically active population and
fertility decline, see Das Gupta and Bhat (1997), Edlund (1999), Hesketh and Zhu (2006)
and Park and Cho (1995).
‘3-D’ refers to those ‘dirty, dangerous and difficult’ jobs in manufacturing, agricultural and
service sectors which native workers generally shun. The SMI sector is defined by the number
of workers and the volume of production and capital. Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) member-countries established slightly varying standards for each country in each
industry. For Korea, manufacturing companies with fewer than 300 workers are considered
to be small and medium businesses. Japan and Taiwan have similar standards.
According to the Korea National Statistical Office (2008), France took 115 years*from an
ageing society in 1864*to become an aged society in 1979. Italy took 61 years, Germany 40
and Japan 24; the US is projected to take 73 years (see Kim 2009).
The Korean government increased penalties for doctors convicted of performing foetal sex
detection and suspended the medical licences of eight physicians. The law was further
strengthened in 1994, allowing the revocation of medical licences and even prison terms
(EastWest Center 1995).
Low wages and inadequate labour protection were the key issues. In order to address flaws in
the system, the Japanese government established the Japan International Training Cooperation Organization (JITCO) in 1991 and launched the Technical Internship Training Program
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
[6]
1579
for Foreigners (TITP) in 1993. These systems were temporary guestworker programmes
based on the principle of rotating workers every two to five years.
The high divorce rate among middle-aged Japanese couples due to extramarital relationships, the husbands’ long-term foreign assignments and other socio-economic reasons has
also boosted the trend of second marriages between divorced Japanese men and young
foreign brides (Takeshita 2000).
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