Though a wide body of research studying legislatures in the United States has analyzed
the determinants of selection to committees, the literature has only begun to devote proper
attention to the study of committee selection in legislatures elsewhere. That research which has
examined legislatures elsewhere has been confined to single-legislature case studies. Moreover,
comparative studies, to date, have been rare.
Perhaps just as problematic as the lack of attention to committee selection outside the
United States has been the lack of attention to one of the more prominent theories of committee
selection: the distributive model. According to distributive theory, representatives seek out
committee assignments that allow them to represent their constituents’ particularistic interests,
which in turn increases representatives’ potential to build personal votes and improve their
chances of re-election. Though some research examining legislatures outside the United States
has tested distributive theory (Ciftci, Forrest, and Tekin 2008; Yordanova 2009; Fujimura 2012;
Raymond and Holt, 2013), the coverage of countries testing the implications of distributive
theory for committee selection leaves much to be desired. Moreover, and as a consequence, there
remains considerable work to be done to examine whether/why the effects of distributive
pressures differ from one legislature to the next.
This paper examines the impact of distributive pressures on committee selection in
comparative perspective. Specifically, the analysis examines the impact of constituency
pressures related to agricultural interests and the selection of representatives to committees
whose remit includes agricultural issues. This comparative focus allows for an analysis of several
factors influencing the degree to which distributive pressures impact committee selection in
several legislatures around the world. Specifically, this paper focuses on three sets of factors –
institutional, organizational, and macro-distributional – potentially conditioning the effects of
1
distributive pressures. Because this paper presents the first (to the author’s knowledge)
comparative study of committee selection, the results have important consequences for research
on selection to committees and the generalizability of distributive effects.
In the next section, I elaborate on distributive theory and its predictions regarding
selection to committee. Following that, I outline several hypotheses regarding variables that
might condition the effects of distributive pressures on committee selection. After that, I discuss
the details of my research design before proceeding to a discussion of the results of my empirical
analysis. A final section concludes with a discussion of the implications for future research.
Theories of Committee Selection
There is a large body of literature on committee selection in legislatures in the United
States. Much of this literature revolves around determining whether there is evidence that those
with distinct preferences for a committee are selected to that committee. One theory supporting
the idea that representatives with distinct preferences and/or facing constituent pressures are
likely to be successful in their efforts to reach committees is known as the distributive theory of
committee selection. Distributive theory is based on a view of politics as essentially focused on
distributive policies, which views politics – especially in legislatures – as essentially clientelistic
affairs where economic groups seek particularistic benefits from public policy (Wilson, 1885;
Lowi, 1964, 1971; Shepsle, 1978; Shepsle and Weingast, 1981, 1995). To facilitate the
procurement of particularistic benefits, distributive theory holds that elected representatives play
a major role in pursuing and securing such benefits on behalf of their constituents. According to
this view, representatives are most concerned with enhancing their personal prospects of reelection in order to maintain the benefits of office, which in turn motivates them to assist
constituents seeking particularistic benefits, as doing so improves their prospects of re-election
2
(Mayhew, 1974).
Key to securing particularistic benefits for one’s constituents is the work that takes place
on committees in legislatures. Committees are important because committee work allows
members the opportunity to shape the direction of legislation. The ability to affect the
development of legislation offers members the opportunity to express their constituents’
particularistic interests and secure particularistic benefits. In addition to their other efforts to
advertise their own names, if members are able to successfully claim credit for securing these
benefits, or at the very least are able to use their committee positions to take positions favorable
to their constituents’ particularistic demands (Mayhew, 1974), then representatives are more
likely to develop personal votes among their constituents (e.g. Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina,
1987), which in turn increase their chances of winning re-election. Given these incentives,
distributive theory predicts that members will seek appointment to committees that allow them to
pursue their constituents’ particularistic interests.
In contrast to distributive theory, two theories predict that those with distinct preferences
are not likely to be successful in their pursuit of committee assignments that further their
personal ambitions. One is informational theory, which is based on the idea that legislatures will
take steps to ensure they receive the most accurate information possible in order to produce good
policies (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990; Krehbiel, 1991). Because legislatures value accurate
information, they will be wont to select members with distinct preferences to committees
because such members are more likely to provide the legislature as a whole with biased
information serving their own interests (as opposed to the interests of the legislature). The
second theory predicting that members with distinct preferences will not be successful in their
efforts to reach their desired committee is cartel theory (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). Cartel
3
theory acknowledges the incentives facing parties not to promote such committee-seeking
behavior. Because parties have incentives to protect the collective image of members conveyed
by the party label, party leaders will serve as gatekeepers to committees, preventing members
with distinct preferences from being selected to their preferred committees lest these members’
pursuit of re-election through representation of distributive interests damage the party brand.
Most empirical analyses of committee selection have been conducted using data from
American legislatures, though some comparative research is starting to emerge. Though some
research finds that members with distinct preferences are not selected to their preferred
committees (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Groseclose 1994; Maltzman 1995; Poole and Rosenthal
1997), particularly when measuring preferences using ideology scales based on roll call voting
behaviour (Krehbiel 1990, 1991; Overby and Kazee 2000; Overby, Kazee, and Prince 2004;
Prince and Overby 2005; Battista, 2006), other research focusing on distributive features of the
members’ constituencies finds evidence that members with distinct preferences are more likely
to be selected to committees that serve those interests (Rohde and Shepsle, 1973; Shepsle, 1978;
Weingast and Marshall 1988; Hall and Grofman 1990; Londregan and Snyder 1994; Rundquist
et al., 1997; Sprague, 2008; Carroll and Kim 2010; Lewis, 2014). This is particularly the case
when research operationalizes distributive pressures by using measures of constituency
characteristics (Adler and Lipinski 1997; Adler 2000; Frisch and Kelly, 2004). Though party
leaders outside the United States generally have more tools at their disposal to enforce discipline,
which should lead to fewer members with distinct preferences serving on committees according
to cartel theory, committee selection in other countries provides evidence in favour of
distributive theory (Ciftci, Forrest, and Tekin 2008; Yordanova 2009; Hansen, 2010; Fujimura
2012; Raymond and Holt, 2013; however, see McElroy, 2006). Thus, there is reason to believe
4
that distributive pressures may affect selection to committee cross-nationally. This leads to our
first hypothesis:
H1: Representatives from constituencies with greater distributive pressures are more likely to be
selected to committees with distributive potential than representatives facing weaker distributive
pressures.
In seeking to expand the focus on distributive pressures affecting committee selection to
legislatures cross-nationally, one issue that remains to be addressed regards the institutional,
organizational, and macro-distributive features that promote or inhibit such distributive effects.
Do certain contextual factors allow for distributive effects in American legislatures and not in
others? Towards this end, the next section outlines several such features and outlines their
hypothesized conditional effects on the way in which distributive pressures impact committee
selection.
Factors Influencing Committee Selection
When examining selection to committee in comparative perspective, there are a range of
variables one needs to consider that might condition the degree to which distributive pressures
are able to influence committee selection. In particular, this paper is concerned with the effects
of three types of macro-level variables: those pertaining to the institutions regarding the selection
of members in each legislature and the institutional incentives to represent constituency interests;
those pertaining to the organization of committees themselves; and finally, the overall size of the
distributional potential available to members nationwide. In this section, I outline hypotheses
associated with all three types of conditioning variables.
5
Given the development of the literature related to the impact of electoral systems on
members’ behavior, the most obvious set of variables relate to differences in electoral systems.
One variable is district magnitude. Knowing that members from constituencies with higher
district magnitudes are less constituency oriented than those from single-member districts
(André, Freire, and Papp, 2014; André, Gallagher, and Sandri, 2014; Heitshusen, Young, and
Wood, 2005; see also Carey and Shugart, 1995), those from higher-magnitude constituencies
may be less motivated to seek committee assignments that allow for constituency representation
because they face weaker distributive pressures.
H2: Distributive effects weaken as district magnitude increases.
Alternatively, it may be that the real difference between electoral systems is between
majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. In addition to electoral systems with higher
district magnitudes, several countries use mixed-member proportional representation systems to
promote multiparty representation. Drawing from previous research showing that members
elected from proportional representation tiers of mixed-member systems are less constituency
oriented than those elected in single-member districts (André, Freire, and Papp, 2014; Stratmann
and Baur, 2002), it may be that members elected under proportional representation are less
constituency oriented and therefore less likely to seek selection committee in order to represent
distributive pressures.
H3: Distributive effects are weaker in proportional representation electoral systems than
majoritarian electoral systems.
6
Members may also be influenced by two other variables related to the electoral rules. One
regards the use of preferential ballots while the other refers to multiple rounds of balloting (i.e.
two-round majoritarian systems). Relative to plurality rules, members elected in single-member
districts may be less constituency oriented because both systems often involve vote transfers to
second preferences (explicitly so in preferential systems like the single-transferable and
alternative vote systems, in the second round of voting in two-round systems). As a result,
legislators elected under such rules may not be as constituency oriented because their political
careers may not be as dependent on personal votes.
H4: Distributive effects are weaker in two-round majority and preferential vote electoral systems
than in plurality systems.
Turning to organizational factors, one set of variables that might affect the degree to
which distributive pressures impact committee selection relate to the remit of committees. One
factor that might increase the desire of representatives to seek selection to committees might be
the strength of committees relative to the government. In their role of providing oversight,
committees may be more powerful if their jurisdictions match those of the government ministries
they are tasked with overseeing: closer correspondence to the jurisdictions of the ministries they
oversee means committees have the full jurisdictional oversight of the ministry and do not have
to share oversight responsibilities with other committees. This, in turn, makes these committees
more attractive to representatives than committees with only partial oversight responsibilities
because it gives members more responsibility. This greater responsibility increases the
opportunities for credit-claiming (or at least position-taking), thereby increasing the likelihood of
distributive effects on committee selection.
7
H5: Distributive effects are stronger when the committee’s remit matches the jurisdiction of the
government ministry for which it is tasked to provide oversight.
Moreover, committees may be more attractive to representatives if their remits are more
limited than if their jurisdictions are overly expansive. When committees’ remits are focused on
a specific, particularistic interest, this increases the focus on this one topic and, in turn, the
opportunities to credit claim; when committees’ jurisdictions include multiple interests, those
concerned with one distributive interest have to compete with those concerned with other
distributive interests, which decreases the chances that representatives will be able to steer
discussions towards their preferred interest (and, in turn, decreases the opportunities for credit
claiming).
H6: Distributive effects are weaker when the committee’s remit includes several issue areas
under its jurisdiction.
In keeping with partisan model of committee selection, another organizational factor
relates to the particular need for parties in government to control the selection of members to
committees. Because parties leaders seek to protect the party brand from damage caused by
members seeking their personal electoral interests by preventing the selection of members with
outlying preferences to committee (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 2005), this model predicts that
distributive effects on committee selection will be weak. However, given that the threats of
distributive effects are most consequential to governing parties, such effects should be
particularly weak among members belonging to parties in government.
8
H7: Distributive effects are weaker among members belonging to parties in government.
Finally, distributive effects may be conditional on the size of the distributive potential
nationwide. With more distributive potential available nationwide, more members may seek to
represent the distributive concerns of their constituents. Given the cooperative behavior of
members sharing particularistic interests (Mayhew, 1974), one might expect stronger distributive
effects in contexts with more members seeking to represent these constituent interests in order to
enhance their re-election prospects because members with shared personal interests (which often
conflict with the goals of their parties) will work collectively in pursuit of those interests.
H8: distributive effects are stronger in countries/regions with more constituents belonging to the
particularistic group in question.
Research Design
To test these hypotheses, I collect a data set consisting of individual members from a
wide range of legislatures around the world at both the national and regional levels for which
appropriate data were available. By this, I mean that information regarding individual members
and their committee assignments was available, as was information regarding constituency
characteristics. To simplify the data collection process, this data collection process was limited to
the most recent election in which the necessary information was available.
To facilitate comparisons across legislatures, the analysis below focuses on committees
dealing with agricultural issues. Focusing on committees dealing with agricultural issues has
several important advantages that make them ideal for examining distributive effects. First,
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committees dealing with agriculture have been the most likely to produce evidence of
distributive effects in previous research. If distributive theory is to be of any use explaining
committee selection cross-nationally, then distributive effects should be present on committees
dealing with agriculture. In this way, focusing on committees dealing with agriculture presents a
critical test of distributive theory. If distributive effects do not emerge in examining these
committees, then it would be doubtful that distributive theory would be of much use in the crossnational study of selection to other committees. Second, and most important, is the fact that
focusing on committees dealing with agriculture facilitates precise measurement of constituency
preferences (discussed in the paragraph below). The resulting list of legislatures and committees
dealing with agricultural issues appears in Table 1.1
To measure constituency pressures on representatives, I follow the approach of Adler and
Lapinski (1997; Adler, 2000). This approach measures constituency preferences using districtlevel census data taken from each country’s census or national statistics office. In this case, I
measure the percentage of representatives’ constituent workforces employed in agriculture,
forestry, and fishing. Distributive theory would predict that representatives from constituencies
with more people employed in agriculture would face greater pressures from constituents to seek
assignment to agriculture committees in order to represent their distributive concerns and seek
particularistic benefits. When referring to representatives’ constituencies, I measure the
percentage employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing according to the electoral tier in which
representatives were elected.2 In most cases, this is the single- or multi-member constituency in
1
In the case of the Canadian House of Commons, members representing constituencies with
more people employed in fishing industries may also have sought appointment to the Fisheries
and Oceans Committee. Including membership on this committee does not change the results
presented here.
2
In the Netherlands, this variable is measured as the percentage of the provincial population
employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing. This is because while members of the Tweede
10
which representatives were elected. In the case of mixed-member proportional electoral systems
like New Zealand, where some members are elected in list tiers representing national
constituencies, I treat the nationwide percentage employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing as
the measure of constituency preferences because the country as a whole is considered to be the
representatives’ constituents. To reduce the impact of outlying values, I use the natural logarithm
of constituency preferences in the analyses below.
To test hypotheses 2-8, I include separate variables measuring each hypothesized
moderating variable and interact these variables with constituency preferences. Details for the
moderating variables associated with each hypothesis are presented below:
H2: I include a variable - Log(M) - measuring the (logged) district magnitude of the constituency
in which members were elected.
H3: I include a dummy variable - PR - coded 1 for members elected under proportional
representation (PR) - whether as part of a fully proportional or in the party list tier of a mixedmember proportional electoral system - and 0 for all other representatives.
H4: I include a dummy variable - Preferential Systems - coded 1 for members elected under
either a two-round majority or preferential (single-transferable vote or alternative vote) electoral
system, and 0 otherwise.
Kamer are elected in a single nationwide constituency, candidates are selected according to
province and are viewed as representatives of their provinces. Recognizing the difference in
definition of constituency, as well as the difference in the denominator of this variable, I reestimated each model by dropping the Netherlands in order to ensure the robustness of the
findings. The results dropping the Netherlands are substantively equivalent to those presented
here.
11
H5: I include a dummy variable - Ministry Overlap - coded 1 for legislatures where the
agriculture committee’s remit overlaps with the jurisdiction of the ministry it oversees, and 0
otherwise.
H6: I include a dummy variable - General Remit - coded 1 for legislatures where the agriculture
committee’s remit includes issue areas beyond agriculture and agriculture-related issues, and 0
otherwise.
H7: I include a dummy variable - Government MP - coded 1 for members belonging to one of
the parties in government, and 0 otherwise. In the case of coalitions, members of parties
supporting - but not members of - the coalition are treated as not being members of the
government because their parties are not formally part of the government.
H8: I include a variable - Total Potential - measuring the percentage of the workforce in each
legislature’s aggregated population employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing. Data for this
variable are taken from each country’s census or national statistics office.
Summary information for each variable, broken down by legislature, is presented in Table 2.
To account for differences in the baseline probabilities of being selected to agriculture
committees, I include two control variables. One variable measures the number of seats on the
agriculture committee. As the number of seats available on the committee increases, the
probability of being selected to committee increases. The second variable measures the total
number of seats in the legislature. As the number of seats in the legislature increases, the
12
probability of being selected to any committee decreases because larger numbers of
representatives competing for committee positions means it is more difficult to be selected to any
committee.
To estimate the impact of distributive pressures on selection to agricultural committees, I
use a multilevel logistic regression model. This allows us to account for the fact that
appointments to committee are nested in different countries. Given this, using a multilevel
logistic regression model allows us to estimate the effects of the moderating variables that are
measured at the country level properly.
I estimate a total of eight models. To facilitate tests of each hypothesis, I estimate models
corresponding with each numbered hypothesis. For instance, because H1 focuses only on the
effect of distributive pressures on committee selection, this model focuses solely on the effect of
this variable (plus controls); in contrast, model 2 tests H2 by including Log(M) and the
interaction with constituency pressures as well. The one deviation from this pattern is model 4,
which includes the variable measuring PR systems and the interaction with constituency
pressures in order to isolate the effects of preferential systems relative to plurality systems (as
per H4).
Results
The parameter estimates for each model are presented in Table 3. To see the substantive
effects of distributive pressures more clearly, Table 4 presents the predicted probabilities of
being selected to committee at the lower and upper quartiles for the variable measuring the
percentage employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing. Separate probabilities are generated at
different levels of the moderating variables in order to demonstrate what effects, if any, these
variables have on the appearance of distributive effects. In each instance, the two control
13
variables are held at their median values.
Beginning with the results from model 1, we sent that there is considerable support for
H1. The coefficient for the variable measuring the percentage employed in agriculture, forestry,
and fishing is positively and significantly signed. In line with H1, this indicates that those
representatives facing pressures to seek assignments to committees representing these issues are
more likely to be selected to these committees. The predicted probability of being selected to
committee when the constituency preference variable is set to its lower quartile is 0.034; this
increases to 0.076 when set at the upper quartile (a difference of 0.042). Consistent with previous
research noting that high demand preference outliers are not automatically selected to their most
preferred committees (e.g. Frisch and Kelly, 2004), the change in probability observed in Table 4
is not overwhelming. That being said, the fact remains that representatives facing distributive
pressures from constituents are significantly more likely to be selected to agricultural
committees than those not facing such pressures. Rather than being limited to the handful of
legislatures in which distributive effects have been studied, the results from model 1 suggest that
distributive effects on committee selection may be part of a broader cross-national phenomenon.
Turning to the three hypotheses regarding the impact of electoral systems on the
appearance of distributive effects on committee selection, the results in models 2-4 provided
support to H2, but not H3 or H4. In model 2, the coefficient for the interaction between
constituency preferences and logged district magnitude is negative and statistically significant.
At the lowest levels of district magnitude (where Log(M) = 0, or where district magnitude = 1),
the difference in probabilities between the lower and upper quartiles of the constituency
preferences variable is 0.046. This difference in probabilities decreases to 0.032 in constituencies
where Log(M) = 1.79 (roughly equal to a district magnitude of six). In line with H2, this
14
indicates that higher levels of district magnitude weaken the effect of constituency preferences
on selection to committees. Though the coefficient for the interaction between constituency
pressures and PR systems is also negatively signed, this coefficient is not statistically significant;
thus, there is insufficient evidence in favor of H3. Similarly, though the coefficient for the
interaction between two-round and preferential electoral systems is negatively signed in model 4
as predicted, this coefficient is not statistically significant; thus, there is insufficient evidence to
support H4.
There is considerable evidence in favor of two of the organizational hypotheses.
Regarding the impact that a committee jurisdiction overlapping with the portfolio of a ministry
has on distributive effects, the coefficient for the interaction between constituency pressures and
overlapping jurisdictions is positive and statistically significant. For legislatures in which there is
little overlap in the jurisdictions of committees and the ministries they oversee, the difference in
probabilities between the lower and upper quartiles of the constituency preferences variable is
0.035. For legislatures where there is considerable overlap in the jurisdictions of committees and
ministries, the difference in probabilities between the lower and upper quartiles increases to 0.05.
In line with H5, this suggests that distributive effects are stronger on committees with
jurisdictions overlapping with those of the ministries they are designed to oversee because such
committees give representatives greater power over policy, which in turn increases the
representatives’ chances of delivering distributive goods to their constituents.
The results in model 6 also provide support to H6. Here, the coefficient for the interaction
between constituency pressures and the dummy variable measuring committees with general (as
opposed to distributive-specific) remits is negatively signed and statistically significant. For
committees with jurisdictions specifically focused on agriculture, the difference in probabilities
15
between the lower and upper quartiles of the constituency preferences variable is 0.05; for
committees with jurisdictions including other issues in addition to agriculture, this difference is
only 0.035. This suggests that, in line with H6, that distributive effects on committee selection
are weaker for committees with jurisdictions covering a range of issues because these provide
less ability to focus on distributive concerns and greater competition for access to the issue
agenda once selected to committee - as well as in terms of the likelihood of being selected to
committee.
The results provide less support to the third organizational hypothesis. Though the
negative coefficient for the integer action between constituency pressures and representatives
belonging to parties in government is in keeping with the expectations of H7, this effect does not
reach statistical significance. Thus, there is not enough evidence to suggest confidently that
distributive effects are weaker among government representatives than representatives in the
opposition parties.
Finally, the results in model 8 also fail to confirm the hypothesis regarding the
nationwide distributive potential of committee assignments. In line with H8, the coefficient for
the interaction between constituency pressures and the percentage of the national population
employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing is positively signed. However, this coefficient fails
to reach statistical significance, and thus there is insufficient evidence to suggest that greater
nationwide distributive potential increases the strength of distributive effects on committee
selection.
Conclusion
This paper has analyzed distributive pressures on committee selection and the impact of
variables that potentially moderate distributive effects in a broad range of legislatures around the
16
world. Two sets of conclusions can be drawn from the findings presented above. First, the results
presented here provide evidence of distributive effects on committee selection in a wide range of
legislatures. Examining selection to committees with clear distributive potential - committees
tasked with handling issues regarding agriculture, forestry, and fishing - across a range of
legislatures, the results show that representatives from constituencies with more people
employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing are more likely to be selected to these committees
than representatives from constituencies in which smaller percentages are employed in these
industries. Rather than being limited to the handful of legislatures in which distributive pressures
on committee selection have previously been studied, the findings presented here show that
distributive effects can be seen on committee selection in legislatures around the world. This
provides considerable support for the notion that distributive theory has important implications
for the operation of legislatures and the behavior of members cross-nationally.
Second, the results provide evidence suggesting that the degree to which distributive
effects appear on selection to committees may be conditioned by institutional and organizational
factors related to the legislature. Three particular conditional effects were seen here. First, the
results suggest that electoral systems may impact the degree to which distributive effects appear
on committee selection. As predicted by previous literature relating to the incentives for
members to act as individual representatives for their constituents, distributive effects weaken as
district magnitude increases. Second, the results suggest that distributive effects are more
powerful when committees’ jurisdictions overlap with the ministries they oversee - which gives
them more power. Third, the results suggest that distributive effects are weaker when
committees’ jurisdictions are less clearly defined than when committees’ jurisdictions are more
clearly defined. Collectively, these results demonstrate that while distributive effects on
17
committee selection may be part of a cross-national phenomenon, such effects may be
strengthened or weakened by the institutional and organizational features of the legislatures in
which members seek to express distributive pressures.
Though this study presents several interesting findings, there remains much more work to
be done in the study of committee selection from a distributive perspective. For one, because this
study was limited to committees dealing with issues relating to agriculture, forestry, and fishing,
future research will need to expand the focus to examine distributive pressures on committees
dealing with other issues. Though this limited focus was necessary to simplify the tasks of data
collection, such limitation necessitates that future research expand the focus to committees
dealing with other types of issues in order to ensure that the results presented above are part of a
broader phenomenon of distributive effects on committee selection that are not limited to
agricultural issues alone. Additionally, while this study has focused on several macro-level
factors that may influence the impact of distributive pressures on committee selection, this paper
has focused less on individual-level properties potentially affecting the translation of distributive
pressures into committee selection. Because the number of representatives facing distributive
pressures from agricultural interests is likely to be larger than the number appointed to
committee, it will be important in future research to explore some of the individual-specific
factors conditioning the impact of distributive pressures on committee selection.
Moreover, there is need in future research to examine which legislatures have institutions
promoting distributive potential and why this happens. For instance, future research is needed to
understand why some legislatures feature committees offering opportunities for representatives
to pursue distributive policies (like committees devoted to agricultural issues) whose remits are
clear and overlapping with government ministries whilst others do not. It may be possible that
18
distributive pressures lead parties and/or individual representatives to prefer institutions that
allow for the expression of these particularistic interests. Such a finding drawing from evidence
collected from a wide body of legislatures would help to refine and elaborate on distributive
theory.
19
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23
Table 1: List of Each Legislature and Committee Examined
Legislatures
Assemblée Nationale (France)
Assemblée Nationale (Québec)
Bundestag
Dáil Éireann
House of Commons (Canada)
House of Commons (United Kingdom)
House of Representatives (Australia)
House of Representatives (New Zealand)
Legislative Assembly (British Columbia)
National Assembly (Wales)
National Council (Switzerland)
Northern Ireland Assembly
Parliament of South Australia
Parliament of Victoria
Parliament of Western Australia
Queensland Parliament
Scottish Parliament
Senate (Australia)
Storting (Norway)
Tweede Kamer (Netherlands)
Committee (Year of Previous Election)
Economic Affairs (2012)
Agriculture, Fisheries, Energy and Natural Resources (2014)
Food and Agriculture (2013)
Agriculture, Food, and the Marine (2011)
Agriculture and Agri-Food (2011)
Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (2015)
Agriculture and Industry (2013)
Primary Production (2014)
Public Accounts (2013)
Environment and Sustainability (2011)
Economic Affairs and Taxation (2015)
Agriculture and Rural Development (2011)
Environment, Resources, and Development; Natural Resources (2010)
Environment, Natural Resources, and Regional Development (2010)
Economics and Industry (2013)
Agriculture and Environment (2015)
Rural Affairs, Climate Change, and the Environment (2011)
Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation (2013)
Business and Industry (2013)
Economic Affairs (2012)
24
Table 2: Characteristics of Each Legislature and Its Members
Variables
Log(M)
Preferential
Ministry
General
Government
Total
Legislatures
(PR?) 2
Systems 3
Overlap 4
Remit 5
MP 6
Potential
Assemblée Nationale (France)
1.05 (1.17)
0 (0)
1
0
1
0.55
1.07
Assemblée Nationale (Québec)
2.31 (2.93)
0 (0)
0
0
1
0.56
1.41
Bundestag
1.03 (0.74)
3.07 (0.54)
0
1
0
0.80
1.09
Dáil Éireann
5.16 (4.26)
1.37 (1)
1
1
0
0.62
4.22
House of Commons (Canada)
3.60 (4.64)
0 (0)
0
1
0
0.54
3.11
House of Commons (United Kingdom)
1.09 (1.60)
0 (0)
0
0
1
0.51
0.49
House of Representatives (Australia)
1.17 (1.84)
0 (0)
1
0
0
0.60
1.16
House of Representatives (New Zealand)
6.37 (5.21)
1.65 (0.42)
0
1
0
0.49
5.5
Legislative Assembly (British Columbia)
3.94 (4.16)
0 (0)
0
0
1
0.57
2.41
National Assembly (Wales)
1.82 (2.32)
1.01 (0.34)
0
0
1
0.48
1.72
National Council (Switzerland)
3.53 (2.17)
2.49 (1)
0
0
1
0.84
2.44
Northern Ireland Assembly
2.23 (1.91)
1.79 (1)
1
1
0
0.94
2.24
Parliament of South Australia
1.80 (2.89)
0 (0)
1
0
1
0.57
1.80
Parliament of Victoria
1.13 (2.11)
0 (0)
1
0
1
0.49
1.07
Parliament of Western Australia
2.80 (5.98)
0 (0)
1
0
1
0.67
1.18
Queensland Parliament
1.33 (2.31)
0 (0)
1
0
0
0.49
1.28
Scottish Parliament
1.75 (2.07)
0.85 (0.44)
0
1
1
0.53
1.66
Senate (Australia)
1.37 (0.47)
1.72 (1)
1
0
1
0.43
1.16
Storting (Norway)
2.64 (1.85)
2.29 (1)
0
0
1
0.46
2.44
Tweede Kamer (Netherlands)
1.02 (0.44)
5.01 (1)
0
0
1
0.51
0.95
Notes: 1 The values in this column reflect the mean (standard deviation) of the variable measuring the percentage employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing in
members’ constituencies. 2 The first value represents the mean (logged) value of district magnitude, while the number in parentheses represents the proportion of
members elected under proportional representation. 3 1 for legislatures in which members are elected under STV, AV, or a two-round majority electoral system,
and 0 otherwise. 4 1 for legislatures in which committees’ jurisdictions overlap with those of the ministries they oversee, and 0 otherwise. 5 1 for legislatures in
which committees’ jurisdictions are general, and 0 for committees with specific jurisdictions focused on distributive issues. 6 The values in this column reflect the
proportion of members affiliated with a party in government. Entries in the “Total Potential” column are the percentages of the total population in each territory
employed in agriculture, forestry, or fishing.
Preferences1
25
Table 3: Multilevel Logistic Regression Estimates of Selection to Agricultural Committees
Model
Variables
1
2
3
4
5
Log(Preferences)
0.473**
0.518**
0.520**
0.566**
0.361**
Log(M)
0.027
× Preferences
-0.096*
PR
-0.032
-0.055
× Preferences
-0.193
-0.176
Preferential Systems
-0.226
× Preferences
-0.118
Ministry Overlap
-0.427
× Preferences
0.366**
General Remit
× Preferences
Government MP
× Preferences
Total Potential
× Preferences
Committee Seats
0.044**
0.044**
0.044**
0.047**
0.045**
Total Seats
-0.004**
-0.004**
-0.004**
-0.004**
-0.004**
Constant
-2.454**
-2.424**
-2.385**
-2.314**
-2.414**
σ Constant
0.114
0.079
0.086
0.080
0.157
n (Legislatures)
20
20
20
20
20
n (Total)
4075
4075
4075
4075
4075
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests. Entries are multilevel logistic regression coefficients.
26
6
0.694**
7
0.493**
8
0.408**
0.435+
-0.327**
0.069
-0.032
0.043**
-0.004**
-2.791**
0.143
20
4075
0.044**
-0.004**
-2.493**
0.114
20
4075
-0.307**
0.054
0.042**
-0.004**
-1.768**
0.062
20
4075
Table 4: Predicted Probabilities of Being Selected to Agriculture Committees
Variable
Log(Preferences)
Values of Log(Preferences)
Lower
Upper
Quartile
Quartile
0.034
0.076
Log(M)
Log(M) = 0
Log(M) = 1.79
0.032
0.039
0.078
0.071
PR Systems
Non-PR Systems
0.038
0.034
0.067
0.081
Preferential Systems
Preferential Systems
Non-Preferential System
0.034
0.030
0.088
0.065
Ministry Overlap
No Overlap
Overlap
0.042
0.020
0.077
0.070
General Remit
General Remit
Specific Remit
0.041
0.020
0.076
0.070
Government MPs
Government MP
Opposition MP
0.035
0.032
0.077
0.074
Total Potential
Lower Quartile
Upper Quartile
0.041
0.026
0.089
0.065
PR
Entries are the predicted probabilities of being appointed to the agriculture committee, conditional
on the specified values of the moderating variables and holding the controls at their median values.
1