Faultless disagreement and the determination of contextual
parameters
Patrick Munoz
SWAMP 2015 — October 31, 2015
1
Introduction
1.1
Faultless disagreement
(Kölbel 2004: 53-54):
A faultless disagreement is a situation where there is a thinker A, a thinker B, and a proposition
(content of judgment) p such that:
(a) A believes (judges) that p and B believes (judges) that not-p;
(b) Neither A nor B has made a mistake (is at fault).1
This notion has played a pivotal role in recent debates over the semantics of taste predicates such as tasty,
which apparently license faultless disagreement, as in simple assertion-denial pairs like (1).
(1) John: The chili is tasty.
Mary: No, the chili is not tasty. (Lasersohn 2005: 649)
The intuition: where p =ˆthe chili is tasty, John expresses belief in p, Mary in not-p, and neither is at fault
in the sense that neither has said something false.
The proposal:
Faultless disagreement is a semantic epiphenomenon that, given a Lasersohnian treatment of
utterance context, we should expect to arise and already have the machinery to handle. Further,
it is a general phenomenon that arises from a single source, and is not restricted to taste predicates
specifically.
1.2
Relativism
Cases like (1) have been partially responsible for a new wave of semantic relativism (Kölbel 2002, Lasersohn
2005, MacFarlane 2014 i.a.).2
The relativist thesis:
1. Relative to a Kaplanian (1977) context c, the utterance of a sentence conveys a propositional content
p;
1 In what follows I will assume with Kölbel and relativists generally that (semantic; see below) disagreement is a matter of
conflicting doxastic attitudes, and that disagreement in conversation is disagreement derivatively, in that it reveals commitments
to these conflicting attitudes. See also Huvenes (2014) for an argument that non-doxastic attitudes are also relevant for
disagreement.
2 While the proposal that follows is couched in a relativist framework, it also has affinities to what MacFarlane (2009) calls
nonindexical contextualism.
1
2. p is a function from indices of evaluation, which are tuples of parameter values provided by c, to
truth values;
3. Among the parameters present in the index of evaluation is a judge or standard of taste j;
4. Propositional content expressed by sentences containing taste predicates are judge-sensitive in their
truth value: their content is a potentially non-constant function from judges to truth values.
Thus there may be two judges j1 and j2 such that Jthe chili is tastyKc,w,j1 6= Jthe chili is tastyKc,w,j2 . Truth is
in this sense relative to judges (individuals or standards of taste), even when the world of evaluation w is fixed.
Disagreement: John and Mary espouse contradictory propositional contents: these contents cannot both
be true at any single index of evaluation.
Faultlessness: Neither John nor Mary has said something false, because evaluated relative to his or her
own standard of taste, the espoused propositional content is true.
2
Kinds of disagreement
2.1
Semantic disagreement
A problem: who cares if there’s a new parameter that the truth of propositional content is relative to? That
already happens with worlds of evaluation.
(2) John: This chili contains pork.
Mary: No, this chili doesn’t contain pork.
(2) has no taste predicates, so the propositional contents are judge-insensitive. Yet evaluated with respect
to different indices, their truth values can still change. In other words, there are worlds w1 and w2 such that
Jthis chili contains porkKc,w1 6= Jthis chili contains porkKc,w2 .
If the relativist account explains why (1) is faultless, why doesn’t it overgenerate and ‘explain’ also why
every disagreement over a contingent matter of fact is also faultless?
First, note that all doxastic attitudes must be held only relative to some index:
(3)
Mary thinks that there are hobbits.
If Mary is reasonable, and well-versed in Tolkien’s mythology, is (3) true or not? That depends: interpreting
the doxastic attitude as relative to an index containing the actual world, it isn’t; but relative to one containing the fictional world of Middle Earth, it is.3
So the answer: (2) is faulty because John and Mary intend their espoused propositional contents to be
evaluated with respect to the same index of evaluation: where just worlds are relevant, the actual world.
(2) is faulty because it is a case of semantic disagreement.
Semantic disagreement:
Agents A and B semantically disagree relative to an index of evaluation i and propositional
content p just in case A believes p is true relative to i, and B believes not-p is true relative to i.4
All cases of semantic disagreement so defined are faulty.
3 For this reason, Lasersohn (e.g. 2009: 365) takes verbs like ‘believe’ to be three-place predicates that take an argument for
an agent, proposition, and a context (the latter of which effectively determines an index of evaluation relative to which that
belief is held).
4 Note that because our agents are generally non-omniscient, i will not technically be a precise tuple of values, but rather
will act as a tagged ‘stand-in’ for whatever those values happen to be: e.g., ‘the actual world,’ ‘Middle Earth,’ etc. Thus, one
generally holds that p is true in the actual world, not that it is true relative to some specific, complete world-state w. In fact, if
these values had to be exactly determined, one’s semantic competence would be sufficient to sort out whether any belief were
true.
2
2.2
Metasemantic disagreement
But if (2) is faulty, then why is (1) not? The claim: (1), unlike (2), is not a case of semantic disagreement
with respect to p. The disagreement is metasemantic. That is, it concerns issues of establishing the machinery of semantic interpretation in a given speech situation, and in particular establishing the value of
contextual parameters, which in turn provide the values for the index of evaluation.
Metasemantic disagreement:
Agents A and B metasemantically disagree with respect to a speech situation s and a contextual
parameter cx just in case A believes that the value of cx in s is x1 and B believes that it is x2 ,
where x1 6= x2 .5
In other words, semantic disagreement occurs when two agents hold conflicting beliefs relative to a single
index; metasemantic disagreement occurs when two agents have conflicting beliefs about the contextual
parameters, and hence the index of evaluation, that a certain speech situation determines.
2.2.1
Metasementic disagreement in Lasersohn
Lasersohn (2005) is committed to the position that cases like (1) are cases of metasemantic disagreement
with respect to cj . First, he notes that semantic interpretation assumes a single value for each contextual
parameter, including the judge:
The formalism developed above required that for any context c, there must be a unique individual
j(c), the judge of c. That is, it was stipulated that the context uniquely determine a judge.
(Lasersohn 2005: 669)
Second, he notes that interlocutors in cases of faultless disagreements with taste predicates evaluate with
respect to different contexts, and in particular, relative to contexts that determine different judges for the
index of evaluation. In (1), for example, both John and Mary evaluate the propositional content autocentrically (see ibid. 670), meaning they take the judge value of the index of evaluation to be themselves, or
their own standard of taste. Since this value is determined by cj , they therefore disagree on what value of
cj the speech situation determines: John thinks it’s his standard, while Mary thinks it’s hers.
Thus both John and Mary are forced by the language’s semantics to choose a single context for generating
content, and so a single index for evaluating it; and in their assertion-denial pair in (1), they demonstrate
that they have conflicting beliefs about what this context, and so index, are.
Even so, they may not semantically disagree as to p = ˆthe chili is tasty: both may have the exact same
opinions about whether chili is tasty relative to each of their taste standards. The disagreement takes place
at another level, regarding how the content of what they say is to be formed and evaluated.
3
Undetermined contextual parameters
But again, who cares? Metasementic disagreement can also be faulty:
(4) John: The party was yesterday.
Mary: No, the party was not yesterday.
If both John and Mary are in agreement on all the relevant worldly facts about when the party happened
(they think it happened on Monday), then this is a metasemantic disagreement over the time parameter:
5 This entails that metasemantic disagreement occurs only relative to concrete speech situations. If as claimed below, faultless
disagreement is merely a form of metasemantic disagreement, this means that fautless disagreement, against MacFarlane (2007)’s
characterization, can only happen relative to speech situations. Semantic disagreement generally requires only conflicting beliefs,
even without conversational interaction.
3
they disagree about what day it is.6
Either the party happened yesterday or it didn’t: depending on which is true, either Mary or John is right,
the other wrong. So why is (1) in particular faultless?
The critical move:
If we are to retain this feature of the formalism, therefore, we must conclude that the objective
facts of the situation of utterance do not determine a context. This need not bother us if we
remember that “context” is a technical term in our theory, for objects which play a specific
role in the formalism. That is, we may think of contexts simply as formal objects which fix
values for parameters such as the agent, judge, etc., rather than directly identifying them with
concrete situations of utterance. As long as we have some explanation of how formal contexts
relate to such situations, there is no reason for a direct identification, or even for assuming a
1-1 correspondence. In fact I think we may claim that any concrete situation of utterance will
determine as many different contexts in our technical sense as there are individuals — one for
each potential judge. (Lasersohn 2005: 669, my emphasis)
To summarize:
1. The (concrete) utterance situation s is the set of facts (physical, social, discursive, etc.) attending
a speech act;
2. The (formal, abstract) utterance context c is a semantic object, a tuple of parametric values;
3. Though the two are not identical, the former influences the latter;
4. But the former does not necessarily determine the latter: one utterance situation may be linguistically
compatible with multiple utterance contexts.
We now have a characterization of faultless disagreement: it is metasemantic disagreement with respect to
an undetermined contextual parameter.
Faultless disagreement
Agents A and B faultlessly disagree with respect to utterance situation s and contextual parameter cx just in case:
(a) A and B metasemantically disagree with respect to s and cx ;
(b) cx is undetermined with respect to s, with x1 and x2 both being parametric values that are
members of an utterance context compatible with s.
With respect to (1):
Disagreement: As before, John and Mary espouse contradictory semantic contents, that cannot be true
with respect to any index. Further, the semantics forces them to evaluate with respect to one single context,
meaning their assertions are incompatible.
Faultlessness: John and Mary have chosen different contexts to form and evaluate propositional content
with respect to; but linguistic conventions do not mandate the use of one context over the other, and so each
is just as licensed as the other to pick that context. Thus, neither makes a mistake, and says something true
with respect to the chosen context.
6 Note that in this respect every metasemantic disagreement does entail some corresponding semantic disagreement: in this
case, disagreement about whether e.g. ‘It’s Tuesday’ is true relative to the index provided by the actual world and time.
Nonetheless, this disagreement is not about the asserted content (there is no semantic disagreement about what time the party
occurred).
4
4
Faultless disagreement as a general phenomenon
For Lasersohn, the underdetermination of the utterance context by the utterance situation always affects
the judge, and only the judge.
But note that in some cases, the judge is in fact determined, as in so-called exocentric evaluations of taste
predicates:
(5) John: This cat food is tasty.
Mary: No, that cat food is not tasty.
If John and Mary are shopping for food for their cat, and thus a standard of taste consistent with the cat’s
likes and dislikes is explicitly made the subject of discussion, this disagreement is faulty because the concrete
speech situation does determine a judge (the cat, or a standard of taste consistent with the cat’s tastes).
The cat’s gustatory reaction determines whether John or Mary is right.
Suppose then that not just the judge, but all contextual parameters are potentially undetermined with
respect to some utterance situations. It follows that faultless disagreement should be possible with respect
to every contextual parameter in some certain situations. This move seems to be justified, as its prediction is
borne out. Thus, faultless disagreement is a general semantic epiphenomenon with a single common source.
An example for each commonly accepted contextual parameter follows.
4.1
Faultless world disagreement: parallel fictions
Situation: Peter Parker is a Marvel comics character who exists simultaneously in two alternate fictional
universes. In one continuity, he is still alive as Spiderman; in another, he is dead, and someone else has
taken his place as Sipderman.
(6) John: Peter Parker is dead.
Mary: No, Peter Parker is not dead.
Faultlessness: The utterance situation does not mandate that either one of these alternate fictional continuities serve as the relevant world parameter, and so John and Mary are equally justified in their utterances,
although they contradict with respect to any index. John and Mary may agree semantically with respect to
Peter’s status at every index.
4.2
Faultless time disagreement: time radii
Situation: Bill left the building twenty minutes ago. Sarah enters the room and asks John and Mary where
Bill is.
(7) John: Bill left just now.
Mary: No, Bill did not leave just now.
Faultlessness: The utterance situation does not mandate that the time parameter to which ‘now’ is sensitive
either extend, or not extend, to include twenty minutes ago. Even if John and Mary agree about exactly
when Bill left, they dispute faultlessly as to whether twenty minutes ago is still included in ‘now.’
4.3
Faultless location disagreement: location radii
Situation: Bill is coming to visit. His flight has come in, and Sara is going to pick him up at the airport.
Mary is eager to see him.
(8) John: Bill is already here.
Mary: No, Bill is not already here.
Faultlessness: The utterance situation does not determine whether the radius outward form John and
Mary’s location should extend to include e.g. the entire city, and thus the airport, or only their immediate
environs. John and Mary can disagree in this respect even if they agree exactly as to where Bill currently is.
5
4.4
Faultless author disagreement: ghost authors
Situation: Mary is releasing an autobiography, ghost-authored by Bill. Mary has given Bill an outline and
made clear her intentions, but Bill writes the text itself. The autobiography lists Mary as the sole author,
with Bill’s role covert. Against Mary’s wishes, Bill writes (truly of Mary) in the autobiography, ‘I smoked
marijuana in college.’ John read this startling passage.
(9) John: You said that you smoked marijuana in college.
Mary: No, I did not say that I smoked marijuana in college.
Fautlessness: The author parameter is sensitive to a number of facts, which here are mixed and distributed
between Mary and Bill. Even if John knows Bill is the ghost author and agree on all the relevant facts,
neither Mary nor Bill can be faulted for claiming that Bill or Mary respectively is the author of ‘I smoked
marijuana in college.’
4.5
Faultless addressee disagreement: unspecific commands
Situation: A father enters the room of his two children, John and Mary, and says, ‘Clean the toilet,’ before
leaving. This is a job that a person has to do alone (and the father knows this), yet it is unclear who the
father was addressing, and he himself had no specific intentions to make either John or Mary specifically do
it.
(10) John: You have to clean the toilet.
Mary: No, I do not have to clean the toilet.
Faultlessness: The utterance situation did not determine who the addressee of the father’s command was,
yet there was some such command, which surely binds at least one of them: John and Mary both faultlessly
claim that the command had the other as the addressee. (This is disagreement over what the father said).
4.6
Faultless measurement standard disagreement: positive form vague dimensional predicates
Situation: John is used to hanging around basketball players, and Mary is used to hanging around jockeys.
Bill is 5’10”.
(11) John: Bill is short.
Mary: No, Bill is not short.
Faultlessness: Though John and Mary may agree exactly on Bill’s height, they evaluate faultlessly relative
to different standards of measurements or cutoff points for ‘short,’ and the utterance situation does not
determine which ust be used for the utterance context. (cf. Barker (2013) i.a.).
—
References: Barker, C. 2013. Negotiating taste. Inquiry 56(2-3): 240-257. | Huvenes, T. T. 2014. Disagreement without error. Erkenntnis 79(1): 143-154. | Kaplan, D. 1977. Demonstratives. In J. Almog, J. Perry,
& H. Wettstein, eds., Themes from Kaplan, 481-563. Oxford University Press. | Kölbel, M. 2002. Truth
Without Objectivity. Routledge. | ———. 2004. Faultless disagreement. Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 104(1): 53-73. | Lasersohn, P. 2005. Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of personal
taste. Linguistics and Philosophy 28(6): 643-686. | ———. 2009. Relative truth, speaker commitment, and
control of implicit arguments. Synthese 166(2): 359-374. | MacFarlane, J. 2007. Relativism and disagreement. Philosophical Studies 132(1): 17-31. | ———. 2009. Nonindexical contextualism. Synthese 166(2):
231-250. | ———. 2014. Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications. Oxford University
Press.
6