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Japanese Security Policy: Military Crises, Threat Inflation and Security Policy Development
Bhubhindar SINGH
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore
In contrast to the Cold War period, it is widely recognized that in the post-Cold War period
Japan’s security posture has gradually expanded both in terms of military strength as well as
its contribution to the regional and international security environment.1 Japan has
incrementally carved out a security role in three main ways.
First, Japan developed a role in international peace cooperation activities, that
includes the participation in humanitarian and disaster-relief activities, and peacekeeping
duties following the passing of the ‘Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations’ (also known as the International Peace
Cooperation Law (IPCL)) in 1992, which authorized the deployment of Japan’s Self-Defense
Force (SDF) to United Nations-mandated peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs). After the first
successful deployment to Cambodia in 1992, SDF missions have increased in frequency,
become more complex in terms of duties and spanned a wider geographical area.
Moreover, Japan joined other concerned states in combating the rise of piracy incidents in
the Gulf of Aden – another component of the international peace cooperation activities. It
deployed Maritime SDF (MSDF) destroyers off the coast of Somalia to guard vessels from
Japan and other countries under maritime police action provision in the SDF Law. To
support the MSDF’s long-term commitment to this mission, the Japanese government has
set up a base in Djibouti – its first full-scale overseas base.
Second, Japan deepened and widened the responsibilities of the SDF in the context
of the US-Japan defence cooperation. This has come in the form of a greater
institutionalization of the US-Japan security relationship, which signaled the expanded
functional and geographical scope of the most important bilateral relationship in East Asia.2
The outcome of this development has led to alliance assuming not only regional duties but
also global ones following the global war on terror.
Third, Japan expanded its strategic partnerships outside of its alliance with the US. It
has signed strategic partnerships with the Australia, India, Philippines and Vietnam. These
partnerships have resulted in joint security declarations and even actions plans to
operationalize the security cooperation, namely with Australia and India. The security
cooperation has advanced through a range of measures, namely regular ministerial
meetings, including the ‘Two-plus-Two Meeting’, the exchange of personnel from the
R. J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Cornell, Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2007; K. B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose,
New York: Public Affairs, 2007; C. W. Hughes and E. S. Krauss, ‘Japan’s new security agenda,’ Survival, Vol.
49, No. 2, 2007; C. W. Hughes, Japan Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power, Oxford University Press
for International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Oxford 2004: C. W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarization,
Oxon: Routledge for International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), 2009.
2 See Samuels 2007; Hughes 2004.
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militaries and other security-related agencies, and joint exercises. These strategic
partnerships stressed the importance of bilateral cooperation on regional and global
security challenges that include transnational crime, terrorism, non-proliferation, disasterrelief and humanitarian issues, peace operations, exchange of strategic assessments and
information, and maritime and aviation security.
The question this paper aims to address is how these changes to Japan’s security
policy came about in light of the domestic constraints against an activist security policy in
regional and international affairs. The paper focuses on the period starting from the onset
of the post-Cold War period to the end of the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) rule in
September 2009, even though the crisis variable could be used to explain Japan’s security
policy changes over different historical periods. The reason for this focus is to account for
the notable incorporation of a military dimension into Japan’s contribution to global
security affairs and how this development occurred in spite of the presence of the social
and legal constraints.
The paper is structured in the following manner. The first section of the paper
addresses the alternative explanations to the research puzzle focusing on their strengths
and weaknesses. The second section introduces the argument of the paper, that is, external
military crises are important determinants of change in Japanese post-Cold War security
policy. It offers a theoretical discussion on the crisis variable and introduces the crises
chosen for this study. The final section is a detailed discussion of how the crises selected for
this study caused change in Japanese security policy.
Realism’s Weaknesses
This shift in Japanese security policy has been captured by the accounts of the neorealists
and neo-classical realists in the extant literature. Relying on the variable of the international
structure, the neorealists argue that Japan would have been expected to adopt a more
active security policy due to the instability of US unipolarity and the shift in the East Asian
balance of power during the post-Cold War period. They believe Japan will strengthen the
full spectrum of great power capabilities, including the development and possession of
nuclear weapons so as to become a great power.3 The neoclassical realists rely on variables
at the international and domestic levels. The combined effect of Japan’s economic
stagnation, the East Asian balance of power unfavourable to Japanese national interests,
the shift in the balance of power within the Japanese political system, the rise of
nationalism in Japan and the generational change within Japanese society explains Japan’s
security policy expansion in the post-Cold War period. A culture of strategic realism has
emerged in Japan, while its pacifism has gradually eroded, signaling a ‘long-term structural
change’ towards Japan becoming a ‘normal’ state. 4
K. N. Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1993;
‘Structural realism after the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2000; C. Layne, ‘The Unipolar
Illusion: Why Great Powers will Rise’, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1993.
4 M. J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power, Palgrave
and Council on Foreign Relations: New York, 2003; Hughes, 2004 and 2009; Samuels 2007.
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Though the neorealists and neo-classical realists have rightly captured the trajectory
of Japanese post-Cold War security policy, these analyses fall short in two ways. First, these
analyses do not clearly highlight what has changed about Japanese security policy. More
precisely, whilst explicit in arguing that Japanese security policy has expanded, they do not
identify which aspects/characteristics/features of Japanese security policy have changed
and how these new developments affect the traditional features of Japanese security
policy.
Second, these analyses do not capture the determinate cause of the shift in
Japanese security policy posture. That is, they do not offer a cogent explanation of the
specific causes of change but only the context within which Japan is permitted to
incorporate a greater military dimension into its security policy.
This context is understood in relation to changes at the international and domestic
levels. At the international level, the context changed with the onset of the post-Cold War
period. The uncertainties of the ‘new’ security environment increased pressure on Japan,
both from the outside and inside, to assume a more responsible role in maintaining the
peace and stability of the security environment - challenging the entrenched
characterization of Japanese security policy in the Cold War. Though the uncertainties in the
security environment are not a post-Cold War environment-specific phenomenon, the
intensity of the security challenges markedly increased in East Asia due to the proximity of
the main security concerns to Japan, namely North Korea’s unpredictable behaviour and
China’s economic and military ascendancy. The increased threat to Japan’s national security
from these aforementioned concerns, coupled with the perceived reduction of the US
military presence in Japan and East Asia (especially during the early 1990s), led not only to
the emergence of a national debate on security issues but also a re-socialization of the
Japanese policymakers’ approach to security issues, away from the traditional minimalist
role to one that has shown a greater willingness to make a ‘human contribution’ in support
of efforts to maintain regional and global security both in the context of the US-Japan
alliance and outside of the alliance relationship.
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At the domestic level, several developments contributed to the change in the
context for Japan to implement a more active security policy in the post-Cold War period.
Two of these developments that directly influenced the security policymaking process
deserve mention here. First, the prolonged economic recession has led to Japan’s inability
to continue its economics-based foreign policy. Japan has been forced to review this
approach and pursue a foreign policy that goes beyond its economic interests. This review
has also led to the incorporation of foreign policy tools, which go beyond the distribution of
Official Development Assistance (ODA). The new development has been the despatch of
SDF troops overseas.
The importance of the interaction between the international and domestic levels on a state’s security
policy is highlighted here. The changes in Japanese security policy in the post-Cold War period can only be
understood if the combined effect of both levels is incorporated in the analysis. See P. Gourevitch, ‘The
Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,’ International Organization, Vol.
32, No. 4, 1978, pp. 881-912.
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Second, there is a shift in the balance of power within the Japanese domestic
political environment. The post-Cold War environment saw the demise of the Japan
Socialist Party (JSP) as a political force from 1995 and its traditional position as the main
opposition party. As a result, the Japanese security policy debate became concentrated
within the conservative camp of the LDP. The place of the Socialist Party as the main
opposition party was taken over by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), whose position on
security issues resembled the LDP’s position, thus weakening the opposition within the two
Houses against the LDP’s security policies. Within the conservative camp, the pragmatists
(mainstream conservative), supporters of Japan’s minimalist security policy, have seen their
dominance over the security policymaking process taken over by the revisionist (military
realist) politicians.6 Prominent figures from the pragmatist camp, such as Miyazawa Kiichi,
Gotōda Masaharu, Kaifu Toshiki, Katō Koichi, Kōno Yohei, Koga Makoto, and Nonaka
Hiromu, have experienced either a severe reduction of influence within the LDP and in the
security policy-making process or have since departed from the political scene.7 This shift in
the balance of power from the pragmatists to the revisionists within the Japanese political
system began during the onset of the post-Cold War period and ended with the collapse of
LDP rule in August 2009 and the rise to power of the DPJ. The ‘rise of the revisionists’ is
reflected by the accession to power of prime ministers Hashimoto Ryūtarō, Mori Yoshirō,
Koizumi Junichirō, Abe Shinzō and Aso Taro.
The revisionist politicians demonstrated a strong political will in raising the profile of
the Japanese military as a tool of security policy and expanding the SDF’s security role in
international security affairs. They have repeatedly pushed for the expansion of Japan’s
security role in regional and international affairs by re-negotiating the social and legal
constraints that preclude such a military involvement. Not only have they pushed the social
and legal boundaries, but this group has also called for a revision to Article 9 of the Peace
Constitution. During the Koizumi Junichirō and Abe Shinzō governments, the debate on
Article 9 revisions advanced to a discussion surrounding the constitutionality of the SDF’s
existence and authorization of the overseas despatch of the Japanese military to contribute
to the peace and stability of the regional and international security environments in both
collective security and collective defence efforts. The consolidation of power and control of
the revisionist politicians over national security policy and their ability to incorporate a
military dimension into Japan’s security policy has been facilitated by institutional and
administrative reforms that have strengthened the position of the leaders not only within
the party and in government, but also in the policy-making process.8
Needless to say, the international and domestic variables applied in the extant
literature are important in explaining the shift in Japanese security policy in the post-Cold
War period. However, it is argued in this paper that the extant literature does not push
their analyses further, especially towards understanding the processes that allowed
Japanese security policy to change. These analyses do not disclose the mechanisms, which
the policymaking elite rely on to negotiate the social and legal constraints on implementing
J. P. Boyd, and R. J. Samuels, (2005), Nine Lives?: The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan (Policy
Studies 19), Washington: East West Centre, pp. 29-30. Also see M. M. Mochizuki, M. M., ‘Japan’s search for
strategy’, International Security, vol. 8, no. 3, 1983/84, pp. 152- 179.
7 Boyd and Samuels, pp. 27-41.
8 Boyd and Samuels, pp. 36-38.
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a more active security policy in the context of the post-Cold War security environment.9 As
a result, these analyses suffer from weak determinacy.10
Change, Crisis and Japanese Security Policy
Like the above-mentioned works, this paper is based on the premise that Japanese postCold War security policy has changed compared to the Cold War period. To clarify these
changes, the discussion below proceeds in two parts – both addressing the respective
weaknesses of the alternative explanations described in the previous section. The first part
focuses on what has changed in Japanese security policy, comparing between the Cold War
and post-Cold War periods and the second on what caused the change in Japanese postCold War security policy.
Changes in Japanese Security Policy
To address the first weakness in the extant literature outlined above, this paper argues that
the change in Japanese security policy is reflected in an altered approach towards security
issues held by those responsible for the security policymaking process which led to the
introduction of a greater military role in Japan’s post-Cold War security policy. It is
encapsulated by changes to the following three features of Japanese security policy:
(1) Definition of National Security (in military terms): This refers to whether the security
policymaking elite applied a narrow (self-defence) or wide (self-defence plus regional and/or
international security) definition in formulating Japanese security policy. During the Cold
War, Japan’s security policy was formulated based on a narrow definition of national
security, which resulted in Japan’s minimalist security policy designed to defend only its own
national borders and economic-based interests.
In the post-Cold War period, however, there is an increased recognition within the
Japanese security policy-making elite that the country’s national security is tied to the larger
stability of the regional and international security environment. Hence, the defence of
Japan’s national security is seen as involving the defence of the larger regional and
international security environment.
For the social and legal constraints on Japanese security policy, see T. U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan, Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1998; A. L.
Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice, Stanford University Press:
Stanford, 2008; P. J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms & National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan,
Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY, 1996; G. D. Hook, ‘Militarization and Demilitarization in
Contemporary Japan, Routledge: London, 1996.
10 One attempt to provide a more determinate analysis has been made by Paul Midford, who introduced
the balance of threat variable supplemented by strategies of assurances to explain the shift in Japanese
security policy in the post-Cold War period. Though more determinate compared to the neorealist and
neo-classical realist analyses explained earlier, Midford faced problems with the contemporary
developments in the East Asian post-Cold War environment. In pushing for an expanded security role,
Japan, particularly during Koizumi Junichirō’s government, did not pursue reassurance strategies in
response to concerns expressed by its neighbours. This period in fact saw the worst deterioration of
Japan-China and Japan-South Korea relations in the post-Cold War period. (P. Midford, ‘The Logic of
Reassurance and Japan’s Grand Strategy’, Security Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2002).
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(2) Contribution to Regional/International (Military) Affairs: This refers to the extent to
which Japan’s SDF was active in regional and international affairs in military terms. Due to
this narrow focus of Japan’s security policy, the SDF’s main objective focused on national
defence with minimal involvement in external security affairs apart from those defined by
its economic objectives during the Cold War period.
In the post-Cold War period, Japan displays an enhanced role in regional and
international security affairs. This has come in the form of widened security role for the SDF
both within its alliance with the US and outside of the alliance relationship, namely in
international peace cooperation activities.
(3) Agency in Policymaking: This refers to the extent to which the Japanese security
policymaking elite has control over its security goals/objectives and the policymaking
process. During the Cold War period, the economics-based ministries and the Yoshida
School adherents leaving little or no room for an active military policy controlled Japan’s
security policy. Any attempt to break from the self-defence focus (to add a regional or
international dimension) to the security interests came after intense pressure from the US.
In this instance, the policymaking process was mired in immobilism and institutional
rigidities, and susceptible to external pressure, namely from the US.
In the post-Cold War period, Japan has displayed an enhanced recognition that it is a
constitutive member of the international community, instilling a greater sense of agency
and willingness to participate militarily in regional and international security affairs, and
supported by a greater command on the formation of its own security goals and security
policy-making process. The Japanese security policymaking process is less constrained by in
immobilism and institutional rigidities, and less susceptible to US pressure.
External Military Crises
To rectify the second shortcoming of the extant literature, the paper’s argument
incorporates the ‘external (military) crisis’ variable as a way to promote a deeper
understanding of change in Japanese security policy. In short, the argument is that external
military crises were important determinants of change in Japanese post-Cold War security
policy. The threat elements from an external military crisis as directly affecting both the
international community and Japan’s national security allowed the security policymaking
elite to overcome the social and legal limitations on enlarging Japan’s security role in
military terms in the post-Cold War period. In this sub-section, three questions are
answered: what is a crisis?; which crises were chosen and why?; and what about the crisis
variable explains Japanese security policy development?
What is a crisis?: The concept of crisis has been analyzed quite extensively in the literature.
This paper relies on the definitions used by Michael Brecher and his colleagues at the
International Crisis Behaviour (ICB) Project based at McGill University, where the concept is
approached in a bifurcated way – at the macro level (international/system) and micro level
(state/actor).11 The macro level refers to an international crisis and the micro level refers to
Both the systemic and actor levels have a complementary role in the crisis definition for the ICB Project.
While the international level concentrates on actions and events per se, the actor level focuses on how
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a foreign policy crisis.12 An international crisis is defined as having the following two
necessary and sufficient conditions: (1) a change in type and/or an increase in intensity of
disruptive, that is, hostile verbal or physical, interactions between two or more states, with a
heightened probability of military hostilities; that, in turn, (2) destabilizes their relationship
and challenges the structure of an international system – global, dominant, or subsystem. At
the state/actor level, a crisis, essentially a foreign policy crisis, is a situation with three
necessary and sufficient conditions deriving from a change in the state’s external or internal
environment. It becomes a foreign policy crisis when the highest-level decision makers of
the state concerned perceive the following three conditions: (1) a threat to one or more
basic values; (2) an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat; and (3) a
heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities.13 Both types of crises are
studied in this paper.
The definitions above require some modification. Though they provide a universal
template to distinguish a crisis situation from a non-crisis one, these definitions have to be
modified in order to take into account Japanese conditions. The ‘heightened probability of
military hostilities’ (Condition 1 of international crisis) and ‘heightened probability of
involvement in military hostilities’ (Condition 3 of foreign policy crisis) are not applicable to
Japan. It is not possible to relate war involvement with Japan’s security policy due to the
strong influence of Article 9 (that renounces war). The presence of the Peace Constitution
precludes Japan from assuming an active role in a crisis. Instead, Japan has always been an
‘outside participant’ or at best participating in the form of a peacekeeping force or carrying
out minesweeping duties after the termination of the crisis. Further, a ‘foreign policy crisis’
refers to the intense debates within Japan during a military crisis. In response to
international pressure, these debates focus on the kind of security role Japan could adopt in
resolving a military crisis. These discussions are between the government (proponents of an
active security response) and those who oppose the government’s active military response
(opposition parties, individuals from the ruling party, and civil society groups who support
the continuation of Japan’s minimalist security policy).
Which crises were chosen and why?: The paper focuses on the interaction of Japanese
security policy with the following five military crises: the 1991 Persian Gulf War, 1994 North
Korean Nuclear Crisis, 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1998 Taepodong Crisis, and the September
11 terrorist attacks on the US including the subsequent Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Out of the five crises mentioned, four were
international crises that became foreign policy crises for Japan (the 1991 Persian Gulf Crisis,
1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis, 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis, and the US-led war on terror
comprising of OEF and OIF) and one was a foreign policy crisis for Japan alone, which did
not escalate into an international crisis (1998 Taepodong Crisis).
leaders as participants perceived the state’s involvement (James, P. 2004, ‘Systemism, social mechanisms,
and scientific progress: a case study of the International Crisis Behaviour Project’, Philosophy of Social
Sciences, vol. 34, no. 3, p. 358; Brecher, M. and Harvey, F. P. 1998, ‘Conflict, crisis and war: cumulation,
criticism, rejoinder’, in Conflict in World Politics: Advances in the Study of Crisis, War and Peace, eds. F. P.
Harvey and B. D. Mor, St Martins Press: New York, p. 8).
12 Both the international and foreign policy crises are closely connected. Each international crisis begins
with a foreign policy crisis that is made of one or more foreign policy crises.
13 M. Brecher and J. Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis, University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 1997, pp. 4-5.
Emphasis from original.
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The aforementioned crises were the first five military crises Japan faced in the postCold War period. These crises, as argued in the paper, defined the post-Cold War security
environment for Japan and challenged the principles of its minimalist security policy
practiced during the Cold War. Though there were other crises after the September 11
attacks, their impact did not challenge the fundamental principles of Japanese security
policy as did the five aforementioned ones. Their impact was to reinforce the changes that
were triggered by the first five military crises. It is important to note that the impact of the
five crises was far from uniform, as will be made evident below. However, all crises
collectively contributed to the gradual expansion of Japan’s security role in regional and
international security affairs.
We briefly introduce the crises under study and their importance to Japan below.
1991 Persian Gulf Crisis:
What happened? The 1991 Persian Gulf Crisis was an international crisis as it involved an
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, which directly challenged the widely accepted international norm
of sovereignty. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait challenged the ‘new world order’ that was ushered
in by the end of the Cold War and in turn, the US-led unipolarity. To force Iraq’s exit of
Kuwait, a multinational coalition force led by the US engaged in a combined land, air, and
sea attack against Iraqi forces.
Importance: In spite of the geographical distance, the Persian Gulf Crisis was important in
influencing Japanese security debates beyond its dependence on Middle Eastern oil. This
crisis not only raised the debate about the kind of role that Japan/SDF could assume in the
multinational effort to free Kuwait from Iraqi control but also a broader debate on the kind
of security role Japan could and should play in post-Cold War security affairs. Since the
military remained an important factor in the resolution of the Iraqi crisis, Japan became
aware that it had to contribute to global security affairs not only through economic means
but also through military means as well.
1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis:
What Happened? The North Korean Nuclear Crisis was an international crisis as it
introduced the threat of war (particularly for South Korea) following North Korea’s
withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The crisis was resolved when
the US brokered a deal that involved the dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear programme in
exchange for a multilateral agreement (including South Korea, Japan and the European
Union) to provide two light water reactors and heavy oil to North Korea.
Importance: Though it mainly involved South Korea and the US, this crisis had region-wide
implications, especially related to the issue of a nuclearized Korean Peninsula, as well as the
threat of nuclear proliferation for international security. Apart from the regional
perspective, this crisis subsequently became important for Japan during its negotiations
related on the reaffirmation of the US-Japan security relationship and the revision of the US-
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Japan defence guidelines which led to a more active military support role for the SDF in
assisting the US military during regional crises.
1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis:
What Happened? The Taiwan Strait Crisis was another international crisis. In response to the
growing perception of the Chinese leadership that the independence movement led by Lee
Teng-hui was gaining strength in Taiwan, Beijing deployed ground, air and naval forces to
conduct a series of war games, live exercises and missile tests around Taiwan from July 1995
to March 1996. The conclusion of the crisis was aided by the deployment of two aircraft
carriers to the Taiwan Strait by the US.
Importance: This crisis showcased to Japan the kind of threat China could pose to regional
security. The missile exercises were not only a display of China’s advancements in its missile
technology and arsenal but also China’s potential to destabilize regional security for its own
security goals. Like the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, the Taiwan Strait Crisis also was
important for Japan during the negotiations on the recalibration of the US-Japan security
relationship in the post-Cold War period, especially for expanding the SDF’s support role of
the US military during regional contingencies.
1998 Taepodong Crisis:
What Happened? On 31 August 1998, North Korea fired a multi-stage rocket (believed to be
long-range missile) that flew over Japan’s landmass. This test was carried out without prior
warning and parts from the rocket fell into the Sea of Japan.
Importance: This was not an international crisis but was a foreign policy crisis for Japan. It
accentuated Japan’s vulnerability of being geographically close to North Korea. North
Korea’s suspected missile launch over Japan’s landmass was said to have breached Japan’s
airspace and hence its sovereignty. It also disclosed the advancement in North Korea’s
missile programme and the extent to which North Korea could threaten Japan’s security.
The Japanese leadership framed the incident as a crisis and subsequently behaved like it
was a security crisis. Attempts to escalate the crisis to an international crisis failed however,
as the US and South Korea did not approach the incident as such.
11 September attacks on New York and Washington:
What Happened? On 11 September 2001, the US came under attack by a series of four
coordinated terrorist attacks: two groups of terrorists hijacked and rammed two airliners
into the two World Trade Centre (WTC) towers in New York; another plane, which took off
from Dulles International Airport in Washington, was hijacked and crashed into the
Pentagon building (US Department of Defence headquarters): a fourth hijacked airliner took
off from Newark and crashed in western Pennsylvania after a reported struggle between the
passengers and the hijackers. In response, a US-led international coalition launched military
strikes against Afghanistan, known as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), targeting AlQaeda and the Taliban. The American-led war against terrorism was extended to Iraq on
the basis that Saddam Hussein had established links with Al-Qaeda and was harbouring
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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which could be sold to international terrorists. OIF
commenced on March 2003 and was officially declared won by President Bush on May 2003
following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Importance: It was an international crisis as it raised the level of threat posed by
international terrorism to the international community. It changed the conventional
understandings of warfare as the September 11 attacks showcased the ability of non-state
actors to implement acts of mass destruction. These attacks justified an international effort
to launch OEF to dismantle the Taliban regime, and more controversially, the OIF, which was
designed to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime based on the suspected connection
between international terrorism and his regime’s quest for WMD. For the September 11
attacks, Japan did adopt a crisis-like position and it manifested in the quick passage of the
Anti-Terrorism Measures Special Measures Law (ATMSL) in the Diet before the despatch of
the SDF to the Indian Ocean. A similar position, but more controversial, was adopted during
debates related to Japan’s support and participation in the OIF at the request of the UN. For
Japan, the war on terror was an opportunity for Japan to overcome the humiliating
experience of the 1991 Persian Gulf Crisis when Japan failed to make a human contribution
to the international effort.
What about the crisis variable that explains Japan’s security policy development?: Though
the crisis literature is extensive, the focus in this paper relates to the danger and
opportunity dimensions of crisis.14 In arguing that the crisis variable proves to be an
important trigger of change, the paper will show how the Japanese security policy-making
elite draws on the danger element(s) of a crisis to legitimize the strengthening or expansion
of its security policy and behaviour (opportunity). The basic premise is that crises can be
real but also have a large subjective aspect in how states perceive those crises. This is an
important point for this paper. State decision-makers have the ability (in the right
conditions) to attach crisis-like conditions to non-crisis situations or to not attach crisis-like
conditions to situations that were perceived by others as crisis. The relationship between
external military crisis and the Japanese security policy development is elaborated by the
introduction of the threat construction/inflation mechanism or process.
To elaborate the threat construction process, the following five questions are posed:
who is responsible for the threat construction process; when are the threats constructed;
why is the threat construction process related to the crisis variable important; what kinds of
threats are constructed; and finally, how are the threats from the crises constructed?
Who:
The threats are constructed by the policy-making elite, which is responsible for the
formulation, implementation, and operationalization of Japan’s security policy. This would
include the Prime Minister, officials of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the Cabinet
Secretariat, the Chief and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries, the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
the Director-General of the Defence Agency (now Minister of Defence), high-ranking
See E. Herring, Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes, Manchester
University Press: Manchester and New York, 1995; Z. Maoz, National Choices and International Processes,
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1990.
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officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Japan Defence Agency (JDA, now
Ministry of Defence), and officials from other governmental organizations such as the
Cabinet Research and Information Office (CRIO). This group also includes the views of the
high-ranking officials from the LDP and other political parties that have contributed
significantly to the evolution of Japanese security policy in the post-Cold War period, as well
as academics.15
When:
States are constantly engaged in threat construction processes as threats determine and
reinforce the interests of the state and its security policy. Threats are constructed from
events, speeches, history, the behaviour of others, and many other sources. However, this
paper narrows its analysis of the threat construction processes related to external military
crises, namely during the crisis and the post-crisis periods. The only difference in the
everyday threat construction processes and those associated with crises is the degree of the
threats perceived. The threat perceived or constructed from a crisis has a higher level of
danger, urgency, and ability to convince others, both internally (those within the state and
society that are opposed to the security policy-making elite’s threat construction process)
and externally (states/institutions that are suspicious of the intentions/behaviour of the
security policymaking elite), that the representation(s) from the threat construction process
reflect(s) ‘reality’ and requires action as suggested by the security policy-making elite. The
more the security policy-making elite aims to win over the support of those in the opposing
camp, the higher the threat level (or the anticipated loss of values or assets) constructed.
Why:
Why are the threat construction processes related to the external military crises important
to explain the expansion/strengthening of Japan’s security policy development? There are
essentially two reasons to explain their importance. First, although ‘anarchy is what states
make of it’, the absence of a Leviathan in the governance of international relations is
accepted as a condition that all states cope with in international relations. Such a condition
fuels uncertainty as peace and stability requires the effort of the entire international
society. Japan, like any other state in the security environment, is always faced with the
possibility of instability initiated by actors dissatisfied with the status quo. Japan supports
the current US-led international order and hence, it would be sensitive to any form of
change. This means constant vigilance is required on the part of those people who are
responsible for Japan’s national security. An external military crisis destabilises the US-led
international and regional security environment and, in turn, Japan’s national security.
Second, Japan does not react to an unstable external unstable environment in the
same way as other states would. This is due to the unique nature of its culture of antiWithin the security policy-making elite and the members of the ruling party, there are unquestionably
competing views for the threat construction processes based on what would be the best course for
Japanese security. Such competing threat construction processes will be illuminated in the case study
chapters. Despite the presence of competing threat construction processes, it is important to note that all
members within the security policy-making elite support Japan’s strengthening/expansion of its security
policy.
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militarism, which has become part of the identity held by both the Japanese state and
society. Japan implements a more active security policy only during a period of necessity.
This necessity is experienced during a period of an enhanced sense of threat through the
occurrences of crises. The construction of threat/danger by the Japanese government
circumvents the domestic legal restrictions and political immobilism related to security
issues that have traditionally prevented an enhanced security role. Such an image of
external threat to Japanese national security is spread to the public, which is ‘convinced’ of
the ‘reality’ of the threat and thus, legitimizes the Japanese state to take the necessary
measures to make Japan safer. Apart from the Japanese public, the security policy-making
elite’s threat construction processes accompanying military crises are also targeted at
Japan’s Asian neighbours that have traditionally expressed suspicion and mistrust over an
expanded security role for Japan.
What:
What kinds of threat are constructed? The ‘threats’ that result from the threat construction
process occur at two levels: at the national level (threats are constructed around the subject
Japan) and at the international level (threats from the crisis are connected to the regional
and international security environment). The justification for the national level in the threat
construction process is obvious as the connection of the threat to the Japan’s national
security suggests a necessary response from the Japanese leadership to enhance the state’s
security. The international level in the threat construction process is important for Japan’s
security policy for three reasons. First, recognising itself as a constitutive member of the
regional and international security environment, the concept of national security in Japan’s
security policy language has expanded to incorporate the larger regional and international
security environment. Second, Japan’s security policy in the post-Cold War period entails
being a responsible member of the international community; hence the recognition that
Japan has to participate in the collective protection of the peace and stability of the regional
and international security environment. Third, the international dimension of the threat
construction process is likely to reduce the suspicion and fears of Japan’s neighbours of its
intentions.
The security policy-making elite’s threat constructions at the international level were
both general and specific. At the general level, examples include ‘fluidity/uncertainty in the
post-Cold War security environment’, ‘threat to the peace and stability of East Asia’ and
‘threat to regional and international security’. The specific threat elements at the
international level mentioned specific actors, but only when there was international
consensus that they were ‘dangerous’ to the international community. This is in special
reference to the North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Japan’s involvement in OEF and OIF. The
threat construction process for the 1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis focused on the
international impact of ‘North Korea’s insincere behaviour’ and its ‘nuclear weapons and
ballistic missile programmes’. The threat constructions related to the War on Terror made
references to specific issues, such as ‘international terrorism’ and ‘WMD’, and subjects too,
such as ‘Iraq’. The threat construction related to OEF was ‘the ‘grave threat’ posed by
international terrorism’ and for OIF, it was the ‘relationship between international terrorism
and Iraq’s secret possession of WMD and chemical weapons’; ‘Iraq’s insincere behaviour’;
and ‘the consequences of Iraq as a ‘failed’ state’.
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The threat constructions at the national level were more complex and they involved
three kinds of threat elements. The first kind involved a direct impact of the military crisis on
Japan’s national security. These include tying Japan’s national security to a particular
military crisis; highlighting the threat to Japan’s national security based on its close
geographic proximity to the crisis; and the vulnerability of the Japanese territorial state and
society from the threat posed by the crisis or issues such as international terrorism, North
Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes, and Japan’s dependence on
Middle East oil. The second kind of threat had a direct focus on the behaviour of the crisis
initiator. These include such constructions as China’s use of force; China’s missile inventory;
China’s intentions; and North Korea’s belligerent behaviour described as ‘insincere’ or
‘irresponsible’. The final kind of threat element relates to issues that were indirectly
implicated by the crises but have a direct impact on Japan’s national security. These include
the issue of Japan being internationally isolated due to Japan’s passive response to a crisis
and its resultant impact on the US-Japan security relationship; the danger of WMD falling
into the hands of international terrorists if the international community (including Japan)
did not extend the war on terror to Iraq; and the drawing of linkages between OIF and North
Korea.
How:
How are the threats from the military crisis constructed? This process of analysing the
Japanese threat construction process in relation to an external military crisis can be divided
into four inter-related and simultaneous phases:
First, a crisis occurs that threatens the peace and stability of the
international/regional security environment, and in turn, be it real or imagined, Japan’s
national security.
The second phase involves the reaction of the Japanese government to a crisis. The
Japanese leadership feels compelled to show active participation in the resolution of the
crisis resulting from the pressure from the other members of the international community
and the collective security norms. However, Japan’s response is restricted by the peacebased security policy coupled by its institutional and societal anti-militaristic structures and
norms. The security policy-making elite constructs a relationship between the occurrences
of a crisis and Japan’s national security. The relationship is obviously negative as the focus is
on threat. The negative relationship is represented at two levels: the national level (how the
crisis exposes a threat towards Japan’s national security and, in turn, how Japan’s minimalist
security policy is inadequate to deter that threat) and the international level (how the crisis
destabilizes the peace and stability of the regional security environment).
In this third phase, the government’s representation of the crisis is intensively
debated between the government and groups opposing the government’s representation.
The basis of the opposing voice is the entrenched culture of anti-militarism and Japan’s
identity as a ‘peace-state’. The other groups/institutions in focus in this paper include
opposition parties, non-governmental organisations, and civil society. This phase is defined
by the ‘foreign policy crisis’ explained earlier.
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Fourth, the government’s representation of the crisis, though gradually, becomes
the dominant representation in its national security discourse related to a particular military
crisis. This representation determines the government’s behaviour to devise ways to
implement policies that aim at protecting Japan’s national security and strengthening
Japan’s security policy.
Impact of Crises on Japanese Security Policy Development
To show the causal mechanism, two processes that form the essence of the relationship
between the external military crises and the expansion/strengthening of Japan’s security
policy are highlighted – the military crisis-threat construction and the threat constructionsecurity policy development.
Crisis-Threat Construction Relationship
First, there must be a relationship between the military crises and the threat construction
processes. The threat construction process exposes the threat elements of the external
military crises at two levels – threat(s) posed to Japan’s national security (national level) and
threat(s) posed to the peace and stability of the regional and international security
environment (international level). As will be evident in the case study chapters, the threat
elements associated with the military crises studied here show diversity at both the national
and international levels. Despite the diversity, two main points are common for all threat
construction processes of the military crises: first, the threat construction process at the
national level exposes Japan’s vulnerability to the threat posed by the military crises; and
second, the threat construction process at the international level reveals the uncertainty of
the security environment, which in turn, exacerbates Japan’s vulnerability. Japan’s enhanced
vulnerability represents a Hobbesian interpretation of the regional and international
security environment.
The threat elements at both the national and international levels for all of the five
crises are summarized as follows:
National Level:
1991 Persian Gulf War: The group that supported Japan’s overseas despatch of the SDF
raised several threat elements that were perceived to affect Japan’s national security. The
first element was the uncertain future of the US-Japan security relationship during the early
post-Cold War period. This threat stemmed from concerns of a possible US military
withdrawal from East Asia, including Japan, and the US’s disappointment at Japan’s lack of
contribution to the Persian Gulf effort. The issue of Japan suffering from ‘international
isolation’ and its negative repercussions were also raised as a challenge to Japan’s security.
The security policy-making elite directly connected the events in the Gulf to Japan’s national
security exposing its negative impact due to Japan’s inability to contribute to the
international crisis.
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1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis: For this crisis, the Japanese security policy-making elite
focused on the elements exposed by North Korea’s actions, namely the threat from North
Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes, and North Korea’s
‘unpredictable’ behaviour.
1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: Japan’s threat construction process focused on China’s
demonstration of force and the uncertainty surrounding the unintended consequences of
China’s military exercises as a result of the use of live ammunition. This was an issue for
Japan because of the proximity of the exercises to Japan’s islands. China’s behaviour during
the Taiwan Strait Crisis introduced related ‘dangers’ that also played a crucial role in shaping
Japan’s perceptions of China following the crisis. Some of the threat elements expressed in
Japanese policy circles were related to China’s missile inventory and the lessons learned
from China’s behaviour during the Taiwan Strait Crisis for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
territorial dispute.
1998 Taepodong Crisis: The threat elements from this crisis were based on the ‘direct’
nature of the threat to Japan’s national security. The main threat element from North
Korea’s ballistic missiles was the vulnerability of Japan’s territorial state and people. The
Japanese security policy-making elite maintained the position that the object fired was a
missile test in spite of countering evidence. The threat construction process also included
North Korea’s ‘advanced’ missile development programme; North Korea’s ‘insincere’ or
‘irresponsible’ behaviour; and North Korea’s nuclear threat against Japan as threat elements
directly related to Japan’s national security.
OEF: The threat element from this crisis was the ‘direct’ nature of the threat to Japan’s
national security (Japan regarded the fight against terrorism as its own challenge). The
direct nature of the threat was expressed in the material and human damage Japan suffered
from the 11 September attacks and the possibility of Japan being a target of terrorist
attacks.
OIF: The threat elements related to OIF at the national level were diverse in nature. They
included effects from the danger of WMD falling into the hands of international terrorists.
Also, the direct impact of the instability in Iraq on Japan due to its extensive reliance on the
Middle East for 90 per cent of its crude oil and energy was also highlighted. Due to the lack
of support from the Japanese public, the security policy-making elite escalated the threat
posed by North Korea, so as to highlight the importance of the US for Japan’s national
security.
International Level:
1991 Persian Gulf War: The threat element was the fluidity/uncertainty of the early postCold War security environment, described as undergoing a ‘tremendous upheaval’ due to
the occurrence of the Persian Gulf Crisis.
1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The threat elements at the international level were
similar to those at the national level, namely North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic
missile programmes and its ‘unpredictable’ behaviour.
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1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: The security policy-making elite highlighted the implications from
the rise in tensions on the Taiwan Strait to the peace and stability of East Asia.
1998 Taepodong Crisis: For the Taepodong Crisis, the threat elements at the international
level were the negative repercussions from WMD and missile proliferation.
OEF: The security policy-making elite stressed the ‘grave threat’ posed by international
terrorism from 11 September attacks, as witnessed ‘real-time’ by the international
community, including Japan.
OIF: As with the national level, the threat elements used by the security policy-making elite
were diverse. They included the dangers from the escalation of the threat from
international terrorism after the September 11 attacks due to the relationship between
international terrorism and Iraq’s secret possession of WMD and chemical weapons, Iraq’s
‘insincere’ behaviour; and finally the consequences of Iraq as a ‘failed’ state to the
international community.
Threat Construction –Security Policy Development Relationship
The second half of the causal process is defined by the relationship between the threat
elements of the threat construction processes and Japanese security policy development.
The cases demonstrate how the military crises facilitated the development of Japanese
security policy in each of the features discussed earlier. Whilst the first case (1990-91
Persian Gulf War) will illustrate how each feature emerged in Japan’s security debates, the
remaining of the cases illustrate how each of the areas were strengthened following the
military crises, thereby strengthening Japan’s security policy. This is summarized as follows:
1991 Persian Gulf Crisis:
Feature 1: The Persian Gulf Crisis introduced the expanded definition of national security
into Japan’s security discourse. This crisis expanded Japan’s concept of national security,
which involved tying Japan’s national security to the larger peace and stability of the
regional and international security environment, forcing Japan to look beyond its borders.
Feature 2: The Persian Gulf Crisis introduced the policy of international contribution (in
military terms) to the regional and international security environment into Japan’s security
policy. Japan’s experience in the Persian Gulf Crisis underscored the need for Japan to
contribute to the formation of the new world order as challenged by the Gulf Crisis through
international contribution. Since the military remained an important factor in shaping
international relations, Japan had to expand its contribution not only in the economic area
but also in military affairs. Japan’s security role expanded under the aegis of the UN (passing
of the IPCL in 1992), which legitimised Japan’s military contribution to UNPKOs.
Feature 3: Like Features 1 and 2, the Persian Gulf Crisis also introduced greater agency
(control) over Japanese security policymaking processes. Though this feature was still weak
during this period, the Japanese leadership was able to carve out a ‘new’ security role for
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the SDF that respected constitutional constraints. As a result, the Japanese security policymaking elite created a context that permitted an expanded security role for Japan in the
area of UNPKOs.
1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis and 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis:16
Feature 1: Both crises strengthened Japan’s expanded concept of national security through
accepting ownership of the regional (East Asia) security environment that had direct
implications on Japan’s national security.
Feature 2: These crises stressed to Japan that the mission of the SDF would no longer be
defending Japan alone but also ensuring the peace and stability of its surrounding security
environment. This development occurred with the institutionalization of US-Japan defence
cooperation through the 1996 US-Japan Joint Declaration and the 1997 Guidelines of USJapan Defence Cooperation. These agreements authorized the SDF to provide military
support to the US military with the goal of maintaining the peace and stability of the
regional security environment.
Feature 3: While the sense of agency was lacking during the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, it
was strengthened during the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis under the leadership of Prime
Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō. During the Taiwan Strait Crisis, PM Hashimoto was deeply
concerned about not repeating Japan’s lack of contribution to the US-led efforts to resolve
the Persian Gulf Crisis and North Korean Nuclear Crisis. The security policy-making elite,
from the onset, revealed their commitment to reaffirm the US-Japan security relationship
and identified areas where military cooperation between the two countries did not violate
constitutional constraints. The security policy-making elite also played a crucial role in
disassociating Japan’s military assistance to the US from the constitutional restrictions, as
Japan’s role bordered on breaching the constraints related to collective self-defence efforts.
1998 Taepodong Crisis:
Feature 1: This crisis further broadened Japan’s concept of national security. It stressed to
Japan that its defence could no longer be assured solely through the traditional concept of
national defence that involved defending Japan’s national territory from a direct attack.
Instead, Japan had to extend its national borders in the name of national defence.
Feature 2: This crisis further expanded the SDF’s mission of defending Japan through greater
participation in efforts to ensure the peace and stability of its surrounding security
environment. This occurred through greater institutionalization of US-Japan defence
cooperation (passing of the guidelines bills in 1999); and the US-Japan agreement to pursue
cooperation in the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) project, when realized, would protect the
East Asian security environment from the threat of ballistic missiles. Japan also
strengthened its air defence capability.
The impact of each crisis on Japanese security policy is discussed individually except for the North
Korean Nuclear Crisis and the Taiwan Straits Crisis. It is proposed here that both crises were valuable to
the Japanese security policymaking elite to bring about the reaffirmation of the US-Japan security
relationship in 1996 and groundbreaking revisions to the US-Japan defence guidelines in 1999.
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Feature 3: The Taepodong Crisis enhanced Japan’s profile, as it raised the threat from North
Korea’s behaviour at several international forums so as to garner international opinion
towards pressuring North Korea to halt its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons
programmes. The Taepodong Crisis also raised the sense of defence consciousness among
the Japanese state and society, which supported the decision to deploy its indigenous
reconnaissance satellites and inculcate a greater sense of independence for intelligence
information that would be crucial for Japan’s national security.
OEF and OIF:
Feature 1: Japan’s participation in OEF and OIF expanded the SDF’s mandate to participate
in international efforts in the Middle East in the name of national security.
Feature 2: Japan strengthened its responsible role in the regional and international security
affairs through proactive participation in international efforts to ‘eradicate international
terrorism’. Japan’s participation in these operations strengthened US-Japan defence
cooperation and arguably participated in an incipient collective self-defence role. The
measures taken by Japan to support an expanded security role included: the revision of the
SDF Law so that the SDF could defend US bases in Japan against terrorist attacks; the
passing of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML), which permitted Japan’s
military to assist the US and other military forces overseas in OEF in providing non-combat
rear-area support; and the passing of the Law Concerning Special Measures on
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq in July 2003 designed to provide
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, leading to the despatch of troops to Iraq at the
request of the UN.
Feature 3: The Japanese security policy-making elite demonstrated a proactive desire to
participate in these international efforts. This was represented by the quickness and
decisiveness of the Japanese leadership in designing Japan’s response (both Bills for OEF and
OIF were passed with surprising swiftness) and by the concept of ‘manufactured gaiatsu
(external pressure)’, where Japan urged US officials to apply ‘pressure’ so as to legitimize its
active military participation in OIF.
Conclusion
The paper introduces external military crisis as a determinant to understand changes in
Japanese post-Cold War security policy. Overcoming the weaknesses of the existing
explanations, the argument here is that the external military crises have been the major
determinants of change in Japanese post-Cold War security policy. The special feature of
the crisis variable is the threat and opportunity elements. These elements have facilitated
attempts by the security policymaking elite to bring about an expanded military
contribution to regional and international affairs. Theis argument is explicated through
analyzing the impact of five military crises on Japanese security policy behavior and
principles - 1991 Persian Gulf War, 1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis, 1996 Taiwan Strait
Crisis, 1998 Taepodong Crisis, and the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US including
the subsequent Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The
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reliance on the external crisis variable offers a pioneering way to understand the change in
Japanese security policy. There are two main advantages of relying on this variable. First, it
provides a more determinate analysis compared to the structural transformation and the
shift in the East Asian balance of power variables. Second, the external military crises
approach incorporates the importance of the domestic normative and legal structures that
directly affect Japanese security policy and Asian countries’ concerns towards Japan’s
expanded security role factors in explaining Japanese security policy. The Japanese security
policymaking elite negotiated these constraints by relying on the threat
inflation/construction process during the external military crises. For each of these crises,
this paper demonstrated how the security policymaking elite perceived these incidents as
crisis-like; what were the threat elements that were inflated; and what the resultant effect
of this threat construction to Japanese security policy development was.
As the analysis shows, Japan’s security policy development has been incremental
and the three features gradually/incrementally strengthened following each military crisis.
As the features strengthened, Japan’s security policy also incrementally became more active
in military terms in regional and international security. Japan’s lack of action or participation
during the first two military crises (1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1994 North Korean
Nuclear Crisis) could be attributed to the weaknesses of these features and the continued
dominance of the features associated with Japan’s Cold War peace-state identity in shaping
Japan’s response. However, Japan’s response to the subsequent military crises displayed a
more proactive response due to the gradual strengthening of the new features and the
simultaneous weakening of the minimalist security policy. As the altered security approach
strengthened, Japan exhibited a widened understanding of the concept of national security;
a more proactive posture as a result of heightened willingness to contribute to the efforts to
resolve the military crises; an expanded role in the managing of security affairs in the
regional and international environment; strengthened US-Japan mutual security
cooperation; reduced political immobilism within the government structure in relation to
the passage of security bills; and heightened defence consciousness within Japanese state
and society.
Finally, the change that is argued for in this paper – an expansion of Japan’s
military role in regional and international affairs – through the US-Japan alliance
relationship and outside of the alliance does not amount to Japan’s remilitarization. The
social and legal provisions within Japanese state and society that constrain its security
behavior are still in place, though weakening. Instead, the change in Japan’s security
policy presents a picture of an evolution of Japanese security policy that is pragmatic
and reactionary in terms of the demands of the post-Cold War security environment.
The collective idea of ‘peace’ remains strong within Japanese state and society.
However, the means towards achieving ‘peace’ involves a greater involvement of Japan’s
military in Japan’s post-Cold War security policy. These activities have provided Japan’s
military with new means to play a responsible role in regional and international
security affairs and strengthen its role in national defence but still in a defensive
manner.
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