SHOULD VIOLENT OFFENDERS BE FORCED TO UNDERGO NEUROTECHNOLOGICAL
TREATMENT?
A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE ‘FREEDOM OF THOUGHT’ OBJECTION
Petersen, Thomas Søbirk; Kragh, Kristian
Published in:
Journal of Medical Ethics
DOI:
10.1136/medethics-2016-103492
Publication date:
2017
Document Version
Version created as part of publication process; publisher's layout; not normally made publicly available
Citation for published version (APA):
Petersen, T. S., & Kragh, K. (2017). SHOULD VIOLENT OFFENDERS BE FORCED TO UNDERGO
NEUROTECHNOLOGICAL TREATMENT? A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE ‘FREEDOM OF THOUGHT’
OBJECTION. Journal of Medical Ethics, 43, 30-34. DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2016-103492
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Extended essay
Should violent offenders be forced to undergo
neurotechnological treatment? A critical discussion
of the ‘freedom of thought’ objection
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Thomas Søbirk Petersen, Kristian Kragh
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Department of Communication
and Arts, Roskilde University,
Roskilde, Denmark
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Correspondence to
Professor Thomas Søbirk
Petersen, Department of
Communication and Arts,
Roskilde University,
Universitetsvej 1, Roskilde
DK-4000, Denmark;
[email protected]
Received 25 February 2016
Revised 18 October 2016
Accepted 28 October 2016
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ABSTRACT
In this paper we examine one reason for rejecting the
view that violent offenders should be forced to undergo
neurotechnological treatments (NTs) involving such
therapies as psychoactive medication to curb violent
behaviour. The reason is based on the concern that
forced treatment violates the offender’s right to freedom
of thought. We argue that this objection can be
challenged. First, we present some specifications of what
a right to freedom of thought might mean. We focus on
the recently published views of Jared Craig, and Jan
Cristopher Bublitz and Reinhard Merkel. Second, we
argue that forcing violent offenders to undergo certain
kinds of NTs may not violate the offender’s right to
freedom of thought as that right is specified by Craig,
and Bublitz and Merkel. Third, even if non-consensual
NT is used in a way that does violate freedom of
thought, such use can be difficult to abandon without
inconsistency. For if one is not an abolitionist, and
therefore accepts traditional state punishments for
violent offenders like imprisonment—which, the
evidence shows, often violate the offender’s right to
freedom of thought—then, it is argued, one will have
reason to accept that violent offenders can legitimately
be forced to undergo NT even if doing so denies them
the right to freedom of thought.
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INTRODUCTION
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It is now well known that aggressive behaviour is
influenced by our biology, including neuroanatomical abnormalities such as reduced neural tissue and
neural connectivity in areas of the brain crucial for
empathy and impulse control.1–3 Impulsive violence
has been linked to serotonergic abnormalities in
patients and criminals; and studies have shown that
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors can be used,
with some success, in the treatment of aggressive
behaviour.4 5
It therefore seems likely that treatments for
violent offenders involving various kinds of neurotechnology will become increasingly viable, ideally
leading to them rehabilitation in the sense of changing
the
offender
for
the
better.i
Neurotechnological treatments (NTs) may use stem
cell transplants in the brain to compensate for the
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To cite: Petersen TS,
Kragh K. J Med Ethics
Published Online First:
[please include Day Month
Year] doi:10.1136/
medethics-2016-103492
‘Better’ in relation to, for example, becoming a
law-abiding
person.
Rehabilitation
can
involve
interventions like drug rehabilitation, anger management
and work education. See Bennett6 for further details of
penal rehabilitation and the reasons we have for seeking
to influence offenders by using such rehabilitation
programmes.
lack or loss of neuronal tissue. Alternatively, they
might involve deep brain simulation or psychoactive
drugs that alter brain function in a way that reverses
the violent offender’s lack of empathy and limited
impulse control—or, more realistically, improves his
or her empathy and impulse control.7–9 To a certain
extent, the use of NT is already part of rehabilitation programmes.10 In several countries some
violent sex offenders are being offered, for
example, as a condition of parole, testosteronelowering drugs in order to suppress or treat their
problematic sex drives.11 In some US states (eg,
Florida), sex offenders are forced, as part of their
sentence,
to
undergo
testosterone-lowering
treatment.7 8
There is no doubt that these uses of NT raise
many ethical challenges. For instance, are the technologies safe enough to use in a morally acceptable
way?8 12 Do the benefits outweigh the costs? Is it
morally wrong to use these technologies even if
they are being offered to offenders as a condition
of, say, parole?ii Would it be unacceptable simply to
force an offender to undergo NT without offering
reduced parole or some other concession as an
incentive?15 In what follows, we focus on the last
of these ethical concerns. More precisely, we shall
examine the idea that violent offenders should not
be forced to undergo psychopharmacological treatment because this would violate their right to
freedom of thought.
In the section ‘What is freedom of thought, and
does forced use of NT necessarily violate it?’ we
present and critically discuss two specifications of
the phrase ‘a right to freedom of thought’, as a preliminary to asking whether forced use of NT on
violent offenders necessarily violates freedom of
thought. We focus on the recently published views
of Jared Craig, and Jan Cristopher Bublitz and
Reinhard Merkel, on these subjects.16–19 We argue,
first of all, that forced use of NT on violent offenders does not necessarily violate freedom of
thought. However, in section ‘The problem of
inconsistency’ we also argue that the position that
forced use of NT on violent offenders does violate
freedom of thought and is therefore morally wrong
can be viewed as inconsistent if one already accepts
that force can be legitimately used within the criminal justice system. Section ‘Conclusion’ sums up
the findings.
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ii
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See Bomann-Larsen for an affirmative answer to this
question. For a critique of Bomann-Larsen, see Ryberg
and Petersen.14
Petersen TS, Kragh K. J Med Ethics 2016;0:1–5. doi:10.1136/medethics-2016-103492
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Extended essay
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Compared with other kinds of freedom, like freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, political freedom and freedom from
slavery, freedom of thought has until recently been largely
neglected in the academic literature.iii Clearly, we need to
specify the meaning of the phrase ‘a right to freedom of
thought’ if we are to determine when that right is infringed or
violated.iv In what follows we shall critically discuss some recent
specifications of the meaning of a right to freedom of thought
raised by scholars who have participated in the recent debate
over the rehabilitation of violent offenders by forced use of NT.
But first, as a background to this discussion, we will briefly
present and evaluate what seems to us to be a common sense
understanding of the right to freedom of thought.
As an example of a common sense understanding of freedom
of thought we have the following formulation from Wikipedia:
‘Freedom of thought is the freedom of an individual to hold or
consider a fact, viewpoint, or thought independent of others’
viewpoint’.22 v There is something intuitively appealing about
the idea expressed here. You and I should be free to believe in,
for example, atheism or Christianity, and to do so independently of what other people believe. But the problem with this
initial specification is that our views on atheism and Christianity
are presumably always influenced by other people’s viewpoints.
Every time we read a book, talk or argue with another person,
go to the movies, or watch a commercial on television, our
thoughts are influenced by someone else. On this view, then, it
would make little sense to claim that people have a right to
freedom of thought that ought not to be violated, since it in
such a version would be constantly violated. However, as will be
clear in what follows, scholars like Craig, and Bublitz and
Merkel, who try to specify what they mean by freedom of
thought, do not make the mistake of allowing a simple conversation or a mainstream movie to violate freedom of thought.
After a short description of their different clarifications of the
right to freedom of thought, we shall follow up with a discussion about whether the use of NT is necessarily a violation or
infringement of this right.
First, according to Craig the right to freedom of thought—or,
as he calls it, the right to mental integrity, or the right to mental
self-determination—is a moral right that protects an inner
sphere of liberty. According to Craig, this right protects human
agency.19 Some of the core features of human agency that Craig
mentions are autonomy competency, authenticity and selfauthorship. Ordinary conversation, or reading, would not
undermine human agency of this kind. If, for example, we focus
on autonomy competencies such as ‘… the capacity to critically
reflect and to make decision …’,19 it is obvious that an average
conversation with others or watching a movie will not usually
undermine our capacity to reflect critically or to make decisions.
The same point applies to the features of authenticity and
self-authorship.
Second, according to Jan C Bublitz and Reinhard Merkel we
get the following description (embedded in moral concerns):
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First, to raise legal suspicion interventions into other minds must
produce negative effects that substantially undermine mental selfdetermination. More concretely, worrisome interventions are
those that reduce or impair cognitive capacities (eg, memory, concentration, willpower), alter preferences, beliefs and behavioral
dispositions (eg, implanting false or erasing true memories, creating addictions), elicit inappropriate emotions (eg, artificially
induced appetite) or clinically identifiable mental injuries.17
WHAT IS FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, AND DOES FORCED USE
OF NT NECESSARILY VIOLATE IT?
Some of the few exceptions are refs 16–20.
We here follow Kagan21 in his distinction between the violation and
the infringement of a moral constraint. To violate a right in this sense is
morally impermissible, whereas to infringe a right can be morally
justified if enough value (eg, rights, well-being, desert or equality) can
be secured by the infringement.
v
See also ref. 23: ‘Everyone has the freedom of opinion … this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference …’
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So permissible interventions are those, which do not undermine or diminish mental self-control: for example, ordinary
conversation, rational argumentation, observation and the
exchange of information. As examples of impermissible interventions, the authors cite brainwashing, decision manipulation,
indoctrination and non-consensual neuroenhancement of
offenders.vi
However, if we follow Craig, and Bublitz and Merkel, in their
specifications of the right to freedom of thought, it becomes
hard to see, as we shall discuss below, why all kinds of forced
NT of violent offenders should be considered impermissible. To
begin with, as several scholars have argued, NT could either be
imposed without reducing or impairing cognitive capacities like
autonomy competency and authenticity, or it could actually
improve those mental capacities.19 24 First, let us present this
kind of argumentation in relation to autonomy competency.
Imagine that, by forcing a violent offender to take certain psychopharmacological drugs that will curb or silence his urge to
harm other people, we will actually increase the offender’s
ability to think more freely and exercise concentration and willpower. Take, for instance, the sex offender who is obsessed with
sex and for whom it is difficult to think of anything else. He
may even lack the peace of mind that is necessary to think thoroughly about the idea that NT could improve his capacity to
exercise freedom of thought. In addition, such a person may in
fact welcome—at least in the long run—the fact that his
thoughts have been changed so that he is freer to think about,
and concentrate on, things other than sex.vii
Second, in relation to authenticity in having more control
over his life, the violent sex offender will come to lead a life
that may well be more authentic than before the intervention
with NT: more authentic, that is, because he now lives a life in
which it is easier to live in compliance with his true self, or at
least with his own ideals about how he wants to live his life.viii
It could, for example, be a way of life where he does not need
to harm children in order to feel satisfaction. Instead he could
be living the life he really prefers, one in which he can enjoy
beer drinking, tennis and card playing, or take pleasure in
nature or a non-violent sex life, rather than constantly thinking
about violent sex. So, if what you are concerned about, when it
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vi
See also Bublitz (ref. 16, p. 22) for a further comment on what is in
focus of our paper ‘… due to its absolute nature [the right to mental
self-determination], such interventions [coerced use of pharmaceuticals
on offenders, defendants or witnesses] are not even allowed for highly
laudable goals such as ‘moral enhancement’’.
vii
See ref. 25 for the related view that forcing drug addicts to undergo
treatment does in fact lead to an increase in autonomy competency for
some offenders.
viii
For more detailed discussion of the term ‘authenticity’ see example,
ref. 26 in which the authors make a distinction between essentialist and
existentialist specifications of authenticity, which is only hinted at in the
above-mentioned text. According to the essentialist interpretations, the
main idea is that a person is authentic if he does not himself depart
from (or, by others, is made to depart from) who he truly is. However,
on an existentialist interpretation, we do not have a true or fixed self
but our self is created by our own ideals and life plans.
Petersen TS, Kragh K. J Med Ethics 2016;0:1–5. doi:10.1136/medethics-2016-103492
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Extended essay
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comes to the use of forced NT, is freedom of thought (at least
in the sense of autonomy competency and authenticity), you
have good reason to be open to the possibility that the use of
even forced NT on violent offenders may protect their freedom
of thought, and improve it by enhancing the offender’s ability
to exercise that freedom.
We should here be aware that although it may be true that
forcing violent offenders to undergo certain kinds of NT will
not necessarily violate the offender’s freedom of thought, it
may very well be the case that other kinds of forced NT will do
so. Where, as a result of NT, the offender is unable to think at
all, or where his capacity for critical thinking and decision
making has been largely destroyed, his right to freedom of
thought is indeed violated.ix Once we have specified the right to
freedom of thought, it is an empirical question whether a
certain use of forced NT will be neutral, or impede, or promote,
an offender’s enjoyment of freedom of thought.
However, although forced use of NT, all things considered,
may not decrease (and could indeed improve) the offender’s
core human agency or mental self-determination, it can still be
argued that the mere fact that force is being used to change an
offender’s mind is enough to show that the offender’s right to
freedom of thought has been violated. As mentioned earlier,
Bublitz and Merkel believe that forced use of NT on offenders is
an impermissible intervention because it violates the offender’s
freedom of thought.x In the next section, we will critically
discuss the views of Craig, and Bublitz and Merkel, and argue
that even if forced NT on violent offenders is used in a way that
violates freedom of thought, such use can be difficult to
abandon without falling into an inconsistent position.
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THE PROBLEM OF INCONSISTENCY
290
Imagine that you are not a punishment abolitionist: you already
accept some forms of traditional state punishment like imprisonment for violent offenders. Accept, furthermore, the plausible
claim that the prison environment of violent offenders often
impedes the offender’s capacity for core human agency or selfdetermination—and thereby limits their freedom of thought.
There is at least some empirical support for this claim. Studies
by Craig Haney have shown that violent offenders confined to
prison suffer from an inability to initiate activity, chronic depression, loss of a sense of reality, hallucination and so on.27 xi It
therefore appears that violent offenders confined to several
years in prison will, as a result of their confinement, be unable
to live, for example, an authentic life.
So on what basis could one accept forced imprisonment of
violent offenders that violates freedom of thought, but reject
forced, rehabilitative NT, which similarly violates freedom of
thought? One could of course oppose any form of imprisonment of violent offenders that will threaten or impede their capacity for agency or their chances of living an authentic life, and
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ix
From a historical point of view, lobotomy seems to be a clear example
of such an intervention.
x
Craig on the other hand, does not seem to believe that forced use of
NT on violent offenders is always morally wrong when he on page 113
says that: “Weighing and balancing the effects of DBIs in relation to the
alternative prospect of incarceration might suggest that the net result of
effects on human agency could be positive or negative.”19
xi
However, see ref. 28 for a critical discussion of Haney’s conclusions.
See also ref. 29 for a study of 23 000 inmates that show that
approximately 4% of the prison-population suffer from schizophrenia
and 10% from severe depression, which is more than twice as much as
the numbers for the non-prison population.
Petersen TS, Kragh K. J Med Ethics 2016;0:1–5. doi:10.1136/medethics-2016-103492
at the same time be in favour of other forms of imprisonment
that do not have these negative effects. This view is consistent:
the endorsed form of imprisonment is not at odds with forced
used of NT on violent offenders, as only the latter, but not the
former, violates offenders’ freedom of thought. But as violent
offenders are often imprisoned for many years, it may well be
impossible for even the most humane kind of imprisonment to
live up to the claim that offenders do not have their freedom of
thought violated. So let us accept that the worry about inconsistency must, at least initially, be considered seriously. However, if
one could argue convincingly in favour of a moral relevant difference between forced imprisonment of violent offenders and
forced use of NT on them, a consistent view might be established. In what follows we shall therefore present and critically
discuss several attempts that have been made—first by Craig,
and then by Bublitz and Merkel—to establish a morally relevant
difference between these two non-consensual practices that can
justify a difference in their moral assessment.
Craig argues, that even though what he calls DBIs (direct
brain interventions)xii like the use of psychotropic drugs “… are
proven safe and effective, there are significant …” ethically relevant differences between the effects of DBIs and incarceration.19
For a start, Craig mentions that “… some potential ethically
relevant differences” are “… the difference in the degree, speed
and permanence of the effects DBIs have on core features of
human agency”.19 However, when it comes to the specification
of these differences, and to an explanation of why such differences are morally relevant, Craig remains almost silent. This is
unfortunate, for several reasons. First, as we have already seen,
it is far from obvious that forced use of NT will have a more
damaging effect on core features of human agency than incarceration. Second, if the focus is on rehabilitation, we have good
reasons not to give a violent offender an indirect intervention
(incarceration) if that will not rehabilitate the offender, instead
of pursuing a direct intervention, such as NT, that will rehabilitate the person in a ‘… proven safe and effective’ way. Finally, it
is far from obvious why we would wish a violent person to have
a slow recovery (instead of a speedy recovery) and rehabilitation,
especially if the intervention, following Craig’s reasoning, has
been proven to be safe and effective. One could here argue that
something of value is lost if the offender drops out of the
process of rehabilitation and instead, so to speak, jumps to a
state where he is rehabilitated by means of NT. But the view is
problematic. It may not be possible to rehabilitate the offender
by, for example, psychological therapy, or he may not want to
participate, or it may be that the only way to make the offender
attend psychological therapy is by first forcing him to undergo
NT. So the features of degree and speed as formulated by Craig
do not seem to be good candidates for establishing a morally
relevant difference between the use of force in imprisonment
and the use of force in NT.
However, when it comes to the permanence of the effects that
DBIs have on the right to mental integrity, and therefore on
core features of human agency, Craig does appear to have a
point: there does seem to be a morally relevant difference
between the use of force with DBIs and with imprisonment.
The argument goes like this: even though we know that
imprisonment (like the use of DBIs) can permanently change
core features of human agency, Craig claims that because the
effects of imprisonment “… have been studied and are better
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xii
DBIs are drugs and devices that fit well with the specification we have
given of NTs.
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Extended essay
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understood” than the effects of DBIs, this difference speaks
against the use of DBIs.19 However, this argument is problematic for a number of reasons. First of all, we should again note
that some kinds of DBI do not permanently change the core of
human agency. Typically, psychotropic drugs and deep brain
stimulation (DBS) are used in a way that does not permanently
alter the treated individual’s core of human agency; they bring
about alterations only when they are actually in use.25 So these
interventions are not ruled out by Craig’s argument. Second, in
support of his claim that the effects of imprisonment are better
understood than those of, for example, antidepressive medicines
or DBS, Craig refers only to studies which reveal knowledge
about the prison environment impact on inmates. But this is not
fair, if we want to make the comparative claim Craig wishes to
make. Although many DBIs are relatively new technologies,
several studies have offered an understanding of the use of psychotropic drugs as well as DBS, and Craig does not refer to
these or otherwise take them into account.25 30 So in order to
assess the claim that we know more about the effect of imprisonment than the effect of NT—Craig needs to compare what is
actually known about these interventions. It is not enough
simply to refer to the fact that we know something about the
impacts of imprisonment on offenders, and to stipulate that we
know more about these impacts that we do about those associated with DBIs.
Furthermore, even if we do know more, in terms of effects,
about imprisonment than we do about DBIs, the important
thing, in considering the use of a technology, is whether we
have enough knowledge to be sure that its use is proven safe and
effective, as compared with other alternatives. Finally, Craig’s
whole argument here seems to be misplaced. Recall that Craig’s
point of departure was to point out morally relevant differences
between the incarceration of offenders and the use of DBIs in
cases where the use of NT has been proven safe and effective.
However, if DBIs are proven safe and effective this can only be
because we have studied their effects, and understood them, at a
level where the impact and safety of NT has already been
proven. So, Craig’s way of reasoning is here literally a
non-starter.
We turn, then, to the views of Bublitz and Merkel. Bublitz
and Merkel distinguish between direct and indirect interventions
in order to argue for the view that it is morally wrong to force
violent offenders to undergo NT but morally acceptable to
imprison them. Direct interventions ‘are those working directly
on the brain (eg, psychoactive substances) …’,17 as NT typically
does. Indirect interventions, by contrast, involve ‘stimuli which
are perceived sensually (ie, heard, seen, smelled, felt)’.17 The
prison environment is a good example of this second kind of
intervention. It is clear that this distinction is intended to have
moral significance. For example, Bublitz and Merkel write:
“Legitimately changing opinions requires a particular modus—
presenting reasons and evidence, in short: argument.” Direct
“interventions which are clearly not interested in the level of
argument… should disqualify as legitimate means to change
another’s opinion” and “… it would run against the essence of
freedom of thought if direct interventions into thought processes were permissible”.17 Moreover, it is clear from their
paper that the authors would consider non-consensual NT on
violent offenders (a direct intervention) to involve a rights violation that should be punished by the criminal law.17
But Bublitz’s and Merkel’s view on forced use of NT seems to
create at least two challenges. First, they claim that direct interventions through, for example, pharmacological means are negative, because they encompass ‘…the lowering of mental
4
capacities and changes of preferences’,17 and therefore violate
the right to mental self-determination. But again, this does not
seem to fit very well with certain types of NT. Instead, as we
argued in the section ‘What is freedom of thought, and does
forced use of NT necessarily violate it?’, forced NT can be used
to change an offender’s preferences (eg, to increase the individual’s control over his aggressive impulses, or to lower his
sexual desires in a way that reduces the likelihood of recidivism),
and such applications of NT can repair or improve the mental
self-determination of the person receiving treatment. There is
even the possibility, as we mentioned above, that an offender
will become more open to indirect interventions, like argumentation and rational thinking, after receiving forced NT. Bublitz
and Merkel could, of course, still claim that the individual’s
freedom of thought has been violated, and that this, looked at
in isolation, is wrong. But if the key concern is about freedom
of thought, and it is possible to improve a person’s freedom of
thought overall by violating it once, it is not obvious that such
violation is morally problematic. And it may be consequentialist
who on these grounds could argue in favour of forced use of NT.
A deontologist of a moderate kind (or a non-absolute version of
deontology) could accept that if enough is at stake, the constraint against violating a person’s freedom of thought can be
relaxed and overtrumped. This could, for example, be the case
if the enforcement of NT on a violent offender would increase
the offender’s ability to exercise his right to freedom of
thought, and secure the freedom of thought of those who will
potentially fall victim to an offender if no treatment is given.
On the other hand, if the forced use of NT would have less
beneficial effects, like those just mentioned, one could, as a
moderate deontologist, claim that the threshold for morally
acceptable violations of the right to freedom of thought has not
been reached or transgressed. However, although the challenge
of identifying and arguing for the proper threshold to be
applied in our case needs to be worked out in detail, in what
follows, in order to have a well justified and moderate position
of deontology, we shall focus on Bublitz’s and Merkel’s position
on these matters.
We can begin by noticing that if freedom of thought is an
absolute right, the forced use of NT on violent offenders would
always be morally wrong. Initially, Bublitz and Merkel do not
appear to believe that freedom of thought is an absolute right in
the sense that such a right should never be trumped, since they
accept that forced psychiatric interventions on non-autonomous
patients can, as a last resort, be morally justified.16 17 xiii
However, as already noted, Bublitz and Merkel, do seem at
times to say that forced use of NT on offenders must never be
violated. If this is their view, they should not be interpreted as
consequentialists, nor should they be read as moderate deontologists, when it comes to moral discussion of whether the state
ought ever to force violent offenders to undergo NT. It appears,
therefore, that Bublitz and Merkel would not accept that we
should maximise freedom of thought by means of one violation
of the freedom of thought.
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Depending on how one defines an absolute right, Bublitz’s and
Merkel’s view of the right to freedom of thought can be defined as an
absolute right in the sense that people have a right to freedom of
thought except in certain circumstances A and B (eg, if they are mentally
ill and dangerous to themselves and others), but that people have that
right in an absolute sense (it is always morally wrong to violate the
right) in all other circumstances C, D and E, and so on. See, for
example, Shafer-Landau31 for this and different ways to understand
what is meant by an absolute right.
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Extended essay
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The second challenge is that advocates of an absolutist view of
the right to freedom of thought will be obliged to accept implications of their view which we have good reason to conclude are
morally objectionable. For instance, if Bublitz’s and Merkel’s
absolutist view is combined with their understanding of freedom
of thought, it will follow that it is morally more important that a
violent offender does not have, say, his memory, or concentration
or willpower eroded, than it is to limit his will to act on violent
urges by treating him with NT. However, it is unclear why we
should accept that it is always morally wrong to limit an offender’s freedom of thought, even somewhat, by non-consensual
NT. Suppose, a serial killer, after receiving NT against his wishes,
no longer has the will to kill people, and that everything else is
equal. In this situation, it seems plausible to say that it is morally
more important to protect a number of potential victims (and the
offender himself) from his violent behaviour than it is to sustain
his willpower at a level that facilitates his homicidal preferences.
As we cannot always do both, we ought to do the former. Here,
one could argue that the means of protecting innocent victims
from a violent offender could just as well be forced imprisonment
rather than forced NT. But this is not a convincing argument,
since violent offenders can, and often do, harm other people
during imprisonment: prison guards, co-inmates, teachers, visitors, and so on.32
We submit, then, that Craig, and Bublitz and Merkel, have
not presented a plausible, morally relevant difference between
forced imprisonment and forced use of NT—one that shows
why only the former is morally acceptable.
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CONCLUSION
We hope to have shown that if we follow Craig, and Bublitz and
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violent offenders to undergo certain kinds of NT will not necessarily violate the offender’s right to freedom of thought. Instead,
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