Philosophical Materialism
Author(s): Colin McGinn
Source: Synthese, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Jun., 1980), pp. 173-206
Published by: Springer
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COLIN
PHILOSOPHICAL
McGINN
MATERIALISM
a regimentation
to sharpen
of
ideas, that we have devised
Suppose,
to
vernacular
mental
into a first-order
discourse
According
theory.1
some acceptable
semantics
for this theory, its singular terms (includ
mental
from the
objects
ing variables) will be assigned
appropriate
these objects will comprise
and various
intended domain:
persons
events
sorts of mental
and states such as sensations,
and
thoughts
thus
objects
of the original
theory, on the other hand,
to the objects
attributed
actions.
The
ontology
to and quantified over make up the
discourse.
The predicates
of the
will be interpreted as expressing
properties
in the domain of the theory.2 The intuitive
referred
mental
sentences
of mental
notion of the 'subject matter'
is then to be
of objects
in terms of such an assignment
and properties
understood
to terms and predicates
of the regimented
theory. Now consider a like
of
discourse
regimentation
physical
relating to the body and brain,
extant and future. The ontology
scientific
of
vocalulary,
containing
and physical
events
this physical
and
theory comprises
organisms
states - neural and behavioural
let us suppose - while
its predicates
are taken as attributing
to such physical
entities. Then,
properties
as to the relation between mind and
all this, the question
supposing
in two parts: (a) what is the relation between
body can be formulated
the respective
in what kind
of the mental and physical
theories? and (b)
ontologies
of relation do the properties
ascribed
by the theories
stand? In this paper I shall offer some considerations
in favour of the
answers
to this pair of questions:
are iden
mental objects
following
tical with (or are composed
and mental
of) physical
proper
objects,
to physical properties
nor (in
reducible
ties are neither nomologically
a sense to be explained)
them. This com
with
lawfully correlated
as
is familiar
from the writings
of Donald
thesis
Davidson
posite
anomalous
considerations
will
be
less
my
monism;3
supporting
familiar.
a word
Before
these considerations,
is in order on the
presenting
on
status of these claims.
It is commonly
epistemological
supposed,
the model
of
theoretical
identification
in science,
that materialist
Synthese 44 (1980) 173-206. 0039-7857/80/0442-0173 $03.40
Copyright
?
1980 by D. Reidel
Publishing
Co., Dordrecht,
Holland,
and Boston,
U.S.A.
174
COLIN
McGINN
have the status of scientific
hypotheses:
of a posteriori
by means
they
procedures,
of a psycho-physiological
investigations
specifically
experimental
or rejection of anomalous
sort.4 On that view acceptance
monism will
a
the
such
of
wait
upon
researches;
perforce
prosecution
philosopher
can only distinguish
the possible outcomes
and indulge in more or less
The contrary view, which
unfounded
I wish to
speculation.
empirical
a
and
is
that
of
admit
resolution
and
endorse,
(a)
(b)
questions
priori
theses
(and their negations)
are to be decided
of the philosopher
the province
strictly within
(hence
of
difference
view can be brought out
This
my title).
methodological
as follows. Suppose
that you have resolved,
by the usual criteria, that
a certain
creature
of
with
is endowed
the
(or species
creature)
a
of
human
and
that
person,
you
typical
psychological
properties
fall
therefore
mental
know the creature's
But suppose
also
complete
description.
that you know next to nothing of the physical properties
of the bodily
for' its mental activity: perhaps
is 'responsible
it is some
organ which
us
or
of
extra-terrestrial
unlike
person
totally
species
physically,
are
was
the
in
the
human
back
before
sensorium
days
perhaps you
identified
and
of a
you are enough
Nevertheless,
investigated.
to believe
there to be such an organ and that there are
materialist
events
between
in it and mental
other
relations
a
to
You
wonder
how exactly
in
the
are,
then,
position
phenomena.
in
and
invoked
mental
of
the
your
objects
properties
description
a
creature
and
of
relate to the physical
the
theory
objects
properties
would
creature's
introduce. You wonder,
in par
organ of mentation
can
are
the
be
and
whether
whether
identified
there
ticular,
ontologies
Now
those
who
think
the
laws.
mind-body
problem,
psychophysical
to be empirical or scientific
in my bipartite way,
construed
in charac
at all to pronounce
ter would claim that so far you are in no position
causal
and
truth of this pair of theses;
you do not, in the
certainly
state
have
rational
of
any
ground for accepting
ignorance,
specified
If you are to have any justified opinion on the
anomalous
monism.
matter,
you must undertake
research,
empirical
delving
appropriate
for psychophysical
mental
into the creature's
organ and hunting
To suppose otherwise
is to be guilty of 'apriorism' of the
correlations.
upon
the
to this, that you already
to claim, in opposition
kind. I want
answers
to
to these
return
rational
sufficient
possess
knowledge
an
can
reasons
for
you
produce
accepting
identity
questions:
good
as well as for doubting any nomological
theory for mental particulars,
worst
MATERIALISM
PHILOSOPHICAL
175
is
That
and physical
mental
between
properties.
correspondence
admit of (and I think
in which
the questions
the sense
(roughly)
I shall
the arguments
resolution.
Accordingly,
require5) a priori
of
and
of
mental
features
concepts
physical
general
exploit
produce
And just because
which we can be credited with implicit knowledge.
are thus metaphysical
in character
they are avail
my considerations
able to one in the state of psycho-physiological
ignorance I described.
n
that
have recently claimed, very plausibly,
A number of philosophers
natural kind terms
terms of our language - the so-called
certain
a characteristic
dis
features which
of semantic
syndrome
display
labelled
nominal.6
them from certain
other
terms, aptly
tinguish
related
list of such features,
is a summary
Here, by way of reminder,
for membership
in various ways:
(i) our initial criteria of recognition
naive
in the kind are epistemically
(ii) our original
contingent;
of revision
into natural kinds are susceptible
of objects
classifications
of the kinds; (iii) there is the
to scientific
in response
investigation
natural kind terms in
of eliminating
language)
(ordinary
prospect
drawn from a scientific
favour of nomenclature
theory of the kinds;
into a given natural
relation that collects objects
(iv) the equivalence
'Twin
kind is a theoretical
relation;
(v) we can construct
plausible
of a natural kind
earth' cases for natural kind terms; (vi) the extension
with the term
associate
term is not fixed by the concepts
speakers
terms
exhibit a
are not in the head');
(vii) natural kind
('meanings
a
causal-historical
of linguistic
labour; (viii)
high degree of division
seems applicable
to natural kind terms; (ix) the
theory of reference
fixed by ostensi?n
of a natural kind term is typically
extension
some
are
It is not to my
in
terms
indexical
(natural kind
way).7
or
what
I want to note
to scrutinise
defend these theses now;
purpose
source
I think, in
is the source of the claimed features. Their
resides,
a conception
realist:
of natural kinds appropriately
i.e.,
designated
a natural kind of object
is what
constitutes
about what
realism
our acknowledgement
of the asso
of the listed features
underlies
a natural kind as
terms. For we
determines
think of what
ciated
it is fixed, rather, by
of our conventions
and knowledge:
independent
of a hidden real essence
term) or nature
(to use Locke's
possession
176
COLIN
McGINN
it is the business
of empirical
science
whose
proper characterisation
that generates
to labour to discover.
It is this realist idea, I suggest,
of features
is simply
the syndrome
that,
(i)?(ix).8 The basic point
terms
natural
determined
introduced
kinds
being
by nature,
by
to denote
such kinds do not carry in their sense a charac
speakers
the denoted
in the world constitutes
kind. This real
or may not be discoverable
but it is
by speakers,
in their ordinary use and mastery
of the term.
certainly not comprised
of a natural kind is real not nominal.
The essence
Now,
turning to the realm of the mental, we are driven to enquire
are natural kind terms in the foregoing
whether
mental
predicates
sense. The issue is significant
the nature of mental
for determining
a
or
of
the
of psychology,
and
science
(hence)
shape
properties
of what
terisation
constitution
may
to divide
whether
indeed there can be such a thing. It will be useful
to the type of mental
term in
the enquiry
into two parts, according
are of two broad cate
of mental
The objects
discourse
question.
as sensations
I shall distinguish
and thoughts
(or
gories, which
and propositional
attitudes). We are to take
equivalently,
experiences
or states)
as mental
(events
instantiating
objects
particulars
as
or
the
of
them
kind
which
sensation
qualify
specific
properties
- as a
thought they are
particular pain or thought that the sky is blue,
kinds thus circumscribed
The mental
for example.
appear to enjoy
of a
sorts of essence. Roughly
it is of the essence
different
speaking,
to have a characteristic
quality;
phenomenological
(type of) sensation
the concept of such a mental
and there is no grasping
type otherwise
and sufficient
than ostensively:
being felt in a certain way is necessary
for being an instance of that sensation
type.9 On the other hand, a
rather
its essence
consists
thought does not appear to be thus defined;
a
content:
relation to
in a certain psychological
specific propositional
these
a matter of undergoing
what
it is to have a thought is not (essentially)
a particular kind of qualitative
(I shall say more on the
experience.10
and thoughts
features
of sensations
distinctive
later; these remarks
are intended as a crude delineation
of territory.) So we now ask: are
to these categories
of a real
the mental
kinds belonging
possessed
reply, concen
paper11 I argued for a negative
states
the
brain might
that
of
the
trating
suggestion
physical
on
real essence.
The argument
the underlying
constitute
converged
between
relation
from two directions:
the
this conclusion
firstly,
brain states seems to be con
mental
and their correlated
properties
In an earlier
essence?
on
PHILOSOPHICAL
MATERIALISM
177
a natural kind and its
the relation required between
tingent, unlike
to our understanding
real essence;
attention
and use of
secondly,
terms fails to disclose
the syndrome
mental
of semantic
features
listed above,
instead a quite different
revealing
family of charac
the picture seemed unaltered
teristics. Moreover,
by the postulation
of some
real essence:
immaterial
still the mental
suppositious
as they would
were
to behave
refused
if the supposition
concepts
true. I will not repeat these arguments
here-the
reader can probably
get the drift of them by reflecting
whether
they apply to his mental
the contrast with natural
confirming
a Putnamian
Twin earth example
sations or thoughts.12
(i)-(ix) and asking himself
it may be worth
concepts-but
kind terms by trying to construct
terms for sen
involving mental
upon
- one on
two linguistic
communities
earth, the other on
Imagine
Twin
earth-whose
the
terms
'the
contain
languages
'pain' and
that
the
and
them
is
blue',
suppose
thought
sky
equally
ignorant of
on
terms
the
the
of
the usual
neurophysiology.
They apply
strength
behavioural
and introspective
evidence. Now
suppose that the mental
states denoted by these terms are (as Putnam would allow) differently
of the people on earth and on Twin
realised
in the neurophysiology
not then say
earth, but that they have no inkling of this. We would
terms are ambiguous,
that the mental
extensions
in the
distinct
having
two communities;
and the reason
the commonsense
is that meeting
criteria for possession
of a mental
state like pain or the thought that
the sky is blue cannot come apart from possession
of those states.
The case is unlike terms for substances,
the hidden
e.g. 'water', where
nature of the denoted
substances
fixes extension
of the
independently
to apply the terms to presented
In the
speakers' dispositions
samples.
case of different
it is no mistake
to apply the
realisations
physical
to people
as it is for
terms indifferently
in the two communities,
speakers on Twin earth to apply their term 'water' to H20 given that it
refers to a chemically
distinct
substance XYZ. The point is
actually
that
chemical
which
may
not
are constituted
substances
be manifest
in casually
by an underlying
detectable
features
are not so constituted
nature
of the
properties
by a
may come thus radically apart from our ordinary
tests for applying
them. (Try to conceive
of two communities
whose
use
to
one
the
word
coincided
but
of
in
which
the
dispositions
'pain'
word
did not denote
some
at
other
sensation
all,
denoting
pain
whereas
substance,
hidden nature which
mental
178
COLIN
McGINN
a Twin earth example
for mental
instead.) So one cannot construct
between underlying
and
in a case of divergence
properties:
properties
surface features
the mental kinds go along with the surface features.
of mental
terms is determined
As Putnam would put it, the extension
by the concepts
mental
terms are
of nominal
family
If this
paradigm.
to natural
peculiar
them-the
associate
with
of
speakers
meanings
to the
'in the head'.
In this respect
they belong
terms of which
'bachelor'
is the hackneyed
is right, it is easy to see that the other features
kind terms will be absent from our mental vocabu
to natural kinds is
that the sort of realism appropriate
lary. It follows
not in place with respect to mental kinds. In short, they have no real
essence.
Now
this contention
is apt to meet with resistance,
and reasonably,
on the basis of a certain conception
of what
it is to be a particular
can be formulated
as a general metaphysical
entity. This conception
about particulars
of the pre
which would,
independently
principle
our assent
command
and which
reflections,
ceding
apparently
has not, to
conflicts with my doctrine on mental kinds. The principle
been explicitly
enunciated
but I think it has
my knowledge,
before,
informed philosophical
enquiry on various topics, including the nature
is this:
of the mental.13 A bald statement of the principle
(P)
Every
particular
is of some
natural
kind.
- that
import of (P) is that any entity that qualifies as a particular
of that notion, as an entity located in
is, on the traditional explication
and endowed
with
space and time, a potential
object of ostensi?n,
causal powers - any such entity must be a possible
subject of empiri
cal enquiry
like this sense: it has some intrinsic nature
in something
a
this nature can be given some theoreti
of
qua member
kind, where
a science.
a
In
cal description
in
of what
is recognisably
department
of
to belong to the extension
other words,
(P) requires any particular
some predicate
of fea
the characteristic
which
syndrome
displays
tures set out above. The motivation
behind
of such a
acceptance
The
realism about the notion of a
is again, I think, a certain
as
to conceive
of particulars
We are prone, realistically,
and
of our concepts
of an intrinsic nature
independently
possessed
we think of them as classifiable
into kinds such that terms
knowledge;
the
have
definition. We
for those kinds do not admit of nominal
term which
under some general
picture of bringing each particular
principle
particular.
PHILOSOPHICAL
MATERIALISM
179
in something
the possession
of which
consists
stands for a property
which further investigation,
typically of a scientific character, will, we
reveal. That is, all particulars must have a nature
hope, eventually
some
is not already comprised
in the content of the
kind which
qua
we
which
under
commonsensically
bring them: they have an
concepts
This realist view
surface appearance.
'inner constitution'
transcending
a
view
also
certain
of particulars
is
assumed by
(broadly nonHumean)
at
most
the
level
of
fundamental
scientific
of causality.
Save perhaps
(if there is such a level), we expect to be able, in respect
explanation
to supply an answer
of any observed
causal nexus,
(or at least we
to the question
in virtue of
that there should be an answer)
nexus
in particular how and why the cause
what the causal
obtains,
some
brought about the effect: we take it, that is, that there exists
believe
account
whose
for the brute
causal mechanism
underlying
operations
we
causal relation
have observed.14
is the explanation
(An example
event of salt dissolution
chemistry
might give for why a particular
was caused by immersion
And
what is thus respon
in boiling water.)
nexus
of
the
causal
sible for the observed
is, precisely,
particulars
seems
to
nature
This
of the particulars
intrinsic
involved.
imply, given
are causally active,
that every particular
has the sort
that particulars
some kind, which we saw to be demanded
by
above. Nor is this surprising
articulated
realist view of particulars
their causal powers:
scientific description
of particulars
explains
real essence
furnishes
required by realism will just be that which
If we wish to preserve
causal mechanism.
this picture
explanatory
status and causal powers
of particulars,
the metaphysical
then
to (P). Since
to accept
must
assent
I am inclined
this view
at large, it may now seem that I am embarrassed
by
particulars
of real essence
qua
the
if a
the
the
of
we
of
an
in my views. Before
this seeming
conflict,
discussing
inconsistency
us
see
to
let
how
classes
of particulars.
however,
(P) applies
specific
The principle
of the
is straightforwardly
satisfied by particulars
sorts:
terms
that
and
mineral
the
natural
kind
animal,
vegetable
to
restrict these general
any
sorts-'horse',
'cabbage',
'gold'-apply
of those general categories;
it is thus easily verified
that
particular
are
some
such particulars
natural kind. Abstract
always of
objects,
are the exception
such as numbers,
that proves the rule: their proper
but then they are not particulars.15
ties are not natural kind properties,
The category
of artifact particulars
is instructive.
the class
Consider
of clocks
events
and the Chronometrie
and states associated
with
180
COLIN
McGINN
are certainly
them. These
yet the clock kind is not a
particulars,
come
clocks
natural
in
kind:
various
indefinitely
physical
to function.
and the class is defined nominally
mechanisms,
according
in conformity
with (P); for (P) does
clocks are still clearly
However,
that every kind or class
to which
a particular
not say, absurdly,
is natural - it says only that there must be at least one such.
belongs
do fulfil this condition,
And plainly artifact particulars
because
they
are always made up of some material
or kind of object for which
(P)
a real
holds. So each artifact particular will possess
straightforwardly
some description,
nature under
but not under
the description
by
which we initially classified
it, e.g. 'clock'. (Actually artifacts do call
to allow for the
of (P), hitherto
for a minor modification
suppressed,
relevant
in other connexions
also, that the individuation
possibility,
effected by the artifact term not be matched
by any natural kind term
a crown of diamonds
to the particular:
is
thus, for example,
applicable
not itself a diamond. To take care of such cases,
let (P) be disjoined
to have parts of some natural
with a condition
allowing
particulars
kind.)
to (P) seems to collide with my
As observed
just now, adherence
that the mental
claim about mental kinds, for that claim was precisely
fall are not natural kinds.
under which mental
particulars
properties
Must we then infer that either my claim or (P) is false? The case of
to reconcile
is needed
the
artifacts
should teach us otherwise. What
two claims is some description
not itself men
of mental
particulars,
a natural kind. And one view of mental particulars
tal, which denotes
that delivers
the needed natural kind is the token identity theory: for
if each mental particular
is identical with (or possibly
is composed
of)
some physical
some physical
then each will
instantiate
particular,
kinds
kinds) clearly do
(e.g. neurophysiological
physical
(P). As with artifacts, mental
granted a token iden
particulars,
but yet satisfy
(P) as initially classified,
tity theory, will fail to meet
- which ensure their
to
other predicates
conformity
namely physical
the principle.
that a type identity theory does not reconcile
(Notice
to the thesis that mental
the claims,
kinds do
since it is tantamount
real essence.)
that a token identity
have a physical
So it appears
kind-and
fulfil
allow us to preserve
and
the realist view of particulars
theory would
as a consequence,
the materials
for a satisfying
would,
supply
of the causal transactions
into which mental
particulars
explanation
terms do not
not going back on the claim that mental
enter; while
denote
natural
kinds.
MATERIALISM
PHILOSOPHICAL
181
as a token identity theory, can, then, reconcile
Anomalous
monism,
two claims that seemed
and in tension. But I
individually
plausible
a sound argument
that we can construct
to suggest,
want
further,
from them to it, as follows:
(la)
Every
(2a)
Mental
(3a)
Mental
particular
kinds
is of some
are not natural
natural
kind
kinds
So
must
be of some nonmental
kind; by
particulars
be physical;
which
is to say
this kind must
elimination
are identical with physical particulars.
mental particulars
are met: first,
is good if (and only if) three conditions
This argument
are intrinsically
of them
neither
the premisses
second,
plausible;
a
the
and
in
conclusion
contains
way;
third,
already
question-begging
of reconciling
anomalous
monism
is uniquely
them, thus
capable
to
at (3a). I think it is reasonable
the step by elimination
permitting
I
these three conditions.
does indeed meet
claim that the argument
are
that
taken
have
and
contended
(la)
(2a)
plausible
already
considered
to engender
doubts
and begin
only when
separately
seems
the
second
neither
On
requirement,
premise
together.
to presuppose
the conclusion.
Premise
(2a) clearly does
obviously
of
did not speak explicitly
not. Nor, I think, does (la): its motivation
tan
have held views
the physical,
and indeed some philosophers
tamount to the claim that mental
real
have an immaterial
particulars
essence
to
the
What
leads
with
is
(2a)).16
(incompatibly
physicalism
two
to
the
it
be
of
the
As
third
claims.
may
condition,
conjunction
nonmental
mental
that
might
satisfy
descriptions
objected
particulars
Even
which are not yet strictly physical,
e.g. functional
descriptions.
the argument
would
that possibility
still be interesting,
allowing
or a functionalist
in effect either a physicalist
identity theory.
showing
does not in fact block the argument,
since func
are
almost
natural
kind pro
not,
properties
paradigmatically,
the
And
in
of
artifacts
absence
here).
(compare
perties
plausible
to physical
natural kinds,
the elimination
alternatives
step seems
In sum, anomalous
monism-or
rather its monistic
legitimate.
part
seems derivable
So the
invoked to reconcile.
from the claims it was
But
the suggestion
tional
ontology
of mental
physical
ontology,
discourse
chiefly
can be
comprising
identified with a subset of
events
in the brain.17 And,
the
as
182
McGINN
COLIN
are of an a
the considerations
this identification
implying
promised,
on
the
features
of
very
character,
only
general
relying
concepts
priori
can be seen
The generality
in this, that the reasons
concerned.
across
token identity are completely
actual and
general
supporting
so
are
as
not
endowed
and
creatures,
confined,
mentally
possible
would be, to psychological
researches
inductive psycho-physiological
creatures
constitution.
of a specific physical
m
of the argument
just advanced was this. The objects of
a certain
to have properties
between which
seemed
and as such must
tension exists: on the one hand, they are particulars
to that status; on the other, they are
fulfil the conditions
attaching
and
those
of
mental
kinds
kinds do not fulfil the required
objects
to relieve
the felt tension by letting
The solution was
conditions.
des
other
mental
descriptions,
namely
satisfy
physical
particulars
on
to
meet
the
allow
them
stated
conditions
which
parti
criptions,
The
mental
structure
discourse
to another pair of
I shall draw attention
section
an analo
to
which
between
mental
concepts,
particulars,
applicable
be
that
treated
and
resolution
it
in
tension
gous
exists,
suggest
cularhood.
In this
similarly.
Thomas
on what
he calls
the
has written
Nagel
illuminatingly
to
that
In
is
his
idea
of
conscious
brief,
subjectivity
experience.18
an
to
like
the
it
is
there
for
is
be
something
for
undergo
experience
of this something
is such
and the concept
subject of the experience;
own
that it can be grasped
subjective
only by a being whose
That is to say,
that of the given experiencer.
matches
phenomenology
can be comprehended
what
it is to enjoy a given type of experience
by being
only from a single (type of) point of view, that conferred
This feature of
such (or similar) experiences.
visited with
oneself
since physi
for physicalism,
poses, he thinks, a problem
experiences
sense
that
the
in
cal facts are essentially
they can be
objective
of the specific
any point of view
irrespective
own
Thus Mar
the
understander's
experiences.
phenomenology
our
own may
are
different
from
modalities
tians whose
very
sensory
nature
the
of
of
from forming an accurate
be prohibited
conception
to their
our experiences,
obstacle
but there is no such principled
understood
from
of
PHILOSOPHICAL
MATERIALISM
183
of our brains.
of the physical workings
full comprehension
achieving
of the mental and
the subjectivity
between
This categorial difference
it hard to see, Nagel
the objectivity
of the physical - makes
suggests,
the 'real nature' of conscious
how states of the brain could constitute
these subjective
states.19 Yet, as he also acknowledges,
particulars
world
the
of physical
also find their place in
things: they are
objective
causal
and
and they enter
into relations,
entities
spatio-temporal
a
we
in
which
There
is
sense, then,
other, with physical
particulars.
can conceive
and objective
from both the subjective
of experiences
of accessibility.20
If so,
they seem to enjoy both modes
standpoints:
some
sort
must
have
of
this,
objective
aspect. But, recognising
they
we
a tension between
two theses about these mental parti
generate
are
culars: that they
and that they have some
essentially
subjective,
to reconcile
how
and integrate
then, is
aspect. The question,
objective
one way
these two ways of conceiving
Well, predictably,
experiences.
to bear again: mental
be to bring anomalous
would
monism
parti
the subjective
and objective
culars have a foot
in both
spheres
that satisfy both mental
and physical
des
because
they are entities
qua mental and objective
qua physical.
criptions:
they are subjective
Put differently,
is always under a description:
accessibility
epistemic
a
we put ourselves
we
mental particular
when
conceive
subjectively
we
we
it objec
conceive
can) into the subject's
(if
position; when
order, we take
tively, as an item in the all-inclusive
spatio-temporal
of our own phenomenology
up a standpoint
by supposing
independent
some
to
In this way, then,
the particular
satisfy
physical
description.
can explain
the dual status of subjective
anomalous
monism
parti
culars.
run up against Nagel's
that the
this reconciliation
denial
or
can
essence
nature
the
of
the
constitute
No,
physical
subjective?
because
and anomalous
that is a thesis about mental
properties
to physical
it
monism
is so far silent on their relation
properties;
a
asserts only that any particular
mental
satisfies
satisfying
predicate
- it does not
a (nontrivial)
say that the latter gives
predicate
physical
the essence
of the former,
indeed it denies as much.21 Not being a
not
it
reductive
thesis
does
the subjective
to the
try to assimilate
Does
objective.
It is natural now to wonder
can be converted,
along the
reconciles
them, as follows:
whether
the principles
thus reconciled
lines of ?11, into an argument
for what
184
COLIN
(lb)
Every
(2b)
Mental
(3b)
Mental
particular
kinds
has
McGINN
some
are essentially
objective
aspect
subjective
So
must have some nonsubjective
descrip
particulars
this must be physical; which
is to say
tion; by elimination
are identical with physical
mental particulars
particulars.
on the success of such an argument:
Again there are three conditions
must be individually
the premisses
they must not be ques
plausible;
must
be
reconciled
and
uniquely
by a token iden
tion-begging;
they
me
seems
to
not
to suppose
It
these
entirely outrageous
tity theory.
met. I have given reasons,
endorsed
conditions
by Nagel,
apparently
the tension Nagel himself hints at.
for accepting
(lb) and (2b)-hence
that either premise
to the
Nor is it at all obvious
is trivially equivalent
of
This is plain for (2b), and (lb) says nothing explicitly
conclusion.
that
the
the physical - indeed someone might
suggest
required objec
relate to some underlying
tive description
immaterial substance.
This,
seems to conflict with
it
however,
(2b), since, like type physicalism,
an
One
would
that
have
nature.
subjective
objective
imply
properties
of such a substance
do not
try to claim that the properties
might
nature
of
the
but
constitute
this
just
exactly
subjective
properties,
to the already mysterious
idea of an objective
adds an extra mystery
seem to point to a
But the suggestion
does
substance.
immaterial
*
that all objec
the
viz.
weakness
in
its
argument,
assumption
possible
are physical. Though
I cannot prove this assumption,
tive descriptions
to construe
and so am inclined
I find it prima facie
plausible,
as a genuine
At the least, these considerations
argument.
(lb)-(3b)
an attractive
make anomalous
monism
theory of mental
particulars.
can be increased
force of the above argument
by
persuasive
one
a
the
and
between
it
connexion
(la)
noting
previous
employing
a point of contrasting
the usual theoretical
and (2a). Nagel makes
directed
reductions,
upon natural kinds, with a putative
physicalist
The
the relation
the contrast concerns
of subjective
properties;
case of a
the
two
In
the
and
in
cases.22
appearance
reality
reduction of a natural kind we have the following
theoretical
picture:
to us results jointly from its
the kind is presented
in which
the manner
of perceptual
intrinsic nature and our mode
e.g. in the
receptivity,
case of heat. The reduction consists
in prescinding
from its manner of
reduction
between
PHILOSOPHICAL
MATERIALISM
185
to us, assigning
that to our sensory
and
peculiarities,
a
a
more
to
suitable
scientific
objective
conception,
developing
intrinsic nature of the kind-where
this
theory, of the independent
to
of
in
available
sufficient
is
in
any being
principle
conception
seems
this
in
observes,
But, Nagel
exactly wrong
picture
telligence.
we
even
cannot
kinds:
of
(or
respect
subjective
correctly
coherently)
to us in introspection
as the
of appearance
conceive
of their mode
an
our
own
of
mental
and
reality
joint upshot
peculiar
independent
appearance
to it, in such a way
that the essence
of the
receptivity
would
be
revealed
the
ap
accurately
by bracketing
experience
to the physical
correlates
of
moving
pearance.23 On the contrary,
nearer
us
essence
not
but
further
takes
from
the
of
away
experience
the subjective.
That is precisely what
is meant by saying such states
are essentially
Now
then, if we agree that a kind is a
subjective.
natural kind only
if it admits of this sort of distinction
between
- and this seems
and
the
realist
view of
appearance
reality
required by
seen
to
natural kinds adumbrated
in ?11-then
is
entail
(2b)
(2a); for
a
an
natural
consists
in
nature.
kind
just
being
objective
possessing
With respect to (la) and (lb) we get an entailment
from the former to
mode
of
the latter, since again to be of a natural kind is to have an objective
(la) had. Indeed, one
aspect. So (lb) acquires whatever
plausibility
to coincide,
that meet those two conditions
would expect the properties
as indeed they do under anomalous
it is true,
monism. We cannot,
the
first
the
second
from
derive
(nor the first
argument
straightforwardly
from the second), but putting both together yields a more comprehen
in the light of which the attractiveness
sive picture of mental particulars
enhanced.
is significantly
of anomalous monism
IV
on
It is time to make
(what has no doubt by now dawned
explicit
some
that
the
reconciliations
and
resultant
tensions,
readers)
of ?11 and ?111 instantiate a pattern whose original is due to
arguments
He enunciated
three apparently
inconsistent
theses relat
Davidson.24
to
events
how
mental
and
showed
anomalous
monism
could
ing
an
he
the
reconcile
theses
for
then
converted
into
them;
argument
that theory. The theses were:
events
mental
interact
with
(i)
causally
physical,
(ii) causal
relations
are backed
by
laws,
(iii) there
are no
186
COLIN
McGINN
laws. The argument
psychophysical
proceeds
by requiring mental
events
to have a certain property - that they be governed
by laws
and then claiming
that they fail to have that property
qua mental.
and
They must, then, have the property under some other description,
the argument
is under way.
The
structural
between
this
parallel
and my
earlier
is most
reasoning
arguments
clearly
exposed
by
Davidson's
argument
reformulating
and (ii) into a single thesis, thus:
in two premisses,
(lc)
is of some nomological
Every mental
particular
a strict law under some description)
instantiates
(2c)
Mental
kinds
the mental)
are not nomological
kinds
(i)
collapsing
kind
(i.e.
(i.e. anomalism
of
So
(3c)
are of some nonmental
particulars
nomological
so mental
that kind is physical;
elimination
kind; by
parti
culars are identical with physical
particulars.
Mental
now to spell out some connexions
between
this argument
of ?11, and to offer some considerations
argument
against
of psychophysical
laws.
possibility
to begin with,
is the connexion
between
the requirement
What,
mental
be of some natural kind and the requirement
particulars
kind? The connexion
resides
in
they be of some nomological
to be a natural kind is to be such that there are natural
principle:
I want
my
of the kind. That is, articulating
definitive
the stuff
natural kinds involves
settling upon a system of
kinds identified play a systematic
role.
explanatory
for any natural kind there are laws that determine
of the kind: nothing could qualify
identity conditions
of the world
laws in which
This implies
and
the
that
that
this
laws
into
the
that
the existence
and
as an instance of
to the prevailing
the kind and fail to conform
laws of the kind.25 (Note
that this is not to say that every law applying
to a given natural kind is
thus definitive
of its identity.) So mental particulars,
since they are of
some natural kind, must
to the
laws whose
instantiate
applicability
is constitutive
of its being of that kind. Thus it is that (la)
which
is
in view of the scientific
(lc),
implies
hardly
surprising
realism about natural kinds we accepted
earlier. Now
if (la) requires
status under which
there to be laws of that constitutive
mental
then
the
for
relevant
the
fall,
question
particulars
deriving
identity
particular
PHILOSOPHICAL
MATERIALISM
187
mental
feature
in such laws. For, if
theory is whether
descriptions
to satisfy
will be constrained
they do not, then mental
particulars
and the argument will be set to go through.
nonmental
descriptions,
con
to the question whether
This amounts
universal
generalisations
are
terms
mental
with
necessary.
So,
taining
metaphysically
respect
to psychophysical
the
singular causal statements, we enquire whether
is of the required status
corresponding
psychophysical
generalisation
for
noncausal
correlation
(and similarly
statements).
psychophysical
And, as I argued in my earlier paper on the basis of some claims of
and Putnam
it seems that no psychophysical
(among others),
Kripke
thus
statements
is
mental
necessary:
generalisation
relating
- sensations
or
the brain are metaphysically
properties
thoughts-to
the mental kinds can exist in worlds
in
contingent.26 Since, therefore,
not
fall under those laws, mental
which
do not
they do
descriptions
of mental kinds. Accordingly,
mental particulars
yield laws definitive
must belong to other kinds whose
laws do thus define them, and then
seems
token physicalism
of David
this account
inescapable. What
can succeed
even
son's principles
brings out is that his argument
some
to
possess
allowing
psychophysical
generalisations
degree of
what matters
is that this does not measure
up to what
nomologicality;
we are entitled to expect. However,
that said, I do not myself
believe
the implied concession
be
for I think there are good
should
granted;
reasons for denying
that psychophysical
statements
have the charac
teristics proper to genuine
laws of any degree of nomologicality.
To
the elucidation
and defence
of this claim I now turn.
has argued that, because
Davidson
of the distinctive
character
of
mental
cannot
con
and physical
there
be nomological
concepts,
nexions
between
mental
and physical
either
lawlike
properties,
or causal laws. His official reason for this claim is that the
correlations
and description
schemes
of explanation
mental
and physical
operate
under 'disparate commitments':
by
'physical change can be explained
laws that connect
it with other changes
and conditions
physically
whereas
is answerable
to 'the
described,'
explanation
psychological
constitutive
ideal of rationality'.27 The basic idea here is that physical
and aims in which
under constraints
the notion of
theory proceeds
no
rational
has
this controlling
ideal of psy
place:
intelligibility
has proper application
only to the explana
chological
interpretation
tion of behaviour,
and finds neither foothold nor echo in the descrip
a
tion of
brain. In consequence
Davidson
feels able to say
person's
188
COLIN
McGINN
of the workings
of body and brain would not
'complete understanding
I think it is fair to
of thought and action'.28
constitute
knowledge
have been perplexed
report that many philosophers
by this reasoning
the perplexity
be expressed
in the following
of Davidson's;
might
that mental
afford a
way. Suppose we agree with Davidson
concepts
so
not supplantable
by physical
concepts,
species of understanding
to
that psychological
is not reducible
theory, being thus sui generis,
and physical
should it then follow that mental
theory. Why
physical
cannot be lawfully correlated:
why should they not occur
properties
that are confirmed
and support
in generalisations
by their instances
and explanation
of
claims,
thereby allowing
subjunctive
prediction
should
the fact that mental
mental
events? Why,
in other words,
cannot be reductively
entail
by physical
concepts
concepts
explained
trace the felt
that the two cannot be in lawlike relation? One might
on the phrase
here to an equivocation
non-sequitur
'tight connexions'
as it occurs
in Davidson's
claim that there are none of those between
mental and physical
points may indeed show
properties.29 Davidson's
in the sense of nomological
that there are no 'tight connexions'
without
and descrip
explanatory
reducibility
entailing
replaceability
follow
that there are no 'tight
tive loss, but it does not obviously
I
and projectible
correlations.
in the sense of confirmable
connexions'
makes
the first of these senses of the claimed
think that Davidson
us
but that he does not present
slack' very plausible,
'nomological
a
sense.
to the second
the inference
with
notion of law that warrants
that the correct conception
of law does
I want to suggest
However,
corroborate
Davidson's
though I have no direct evidence
position,
can come at the
to this conception.
We
that he in fact subscribes
matter by turning to an analogous
claim made by Nagel.
to what I am calling thoughts; Nagel's
himself
addresses
Davidson
finds a feature of the attribution
is with sensations. Davidson
the constraint
of rationality - which
of thoughts
governs
namely
of such psychological
and
another by means
concepts,
understanding
involved
in understanding
cannot be extracted
from concepts
which
for sen
for his part, finds in concepts
the world physically.
Nagel,
concern
a formally
feature
in physical
itself not capturable
analogous
- and which
com
therefore
subjectivity
precludes
the character of another's
by way of physical
experiences
prehending
to
concepts. The claimed features are different, but both are exploited
can constitute
know
of physics
warrant
the denial thaf knowledge
sations
terms-namely
PHILOSOPHICAL
MATERIALISM
189
and experiential
in its attitudinal
departments,
ledge of psychology,
of psychophysical
reduc
that is, to deny the possibility
respectively;
to ask how the truth of such a claim for
tion. But now one wants
related to the physical,
in
could show them anomalously
sensations
or causal laws.
the sense that there are no such lawlike correlations
that he does regard the categorial
Some remarks of Nagel
suggest
as reason to rule out psychophysical
he discerns
laws of
difference
than Davidson
but he is more explicit
about what notion
sensations,
to justify this consequence.30
The idea at which he
of law is needed
counts as a law just if either
is roughly this: a generalisation
gestures
or it can be
of necessitation
it is itself an intelligible
principle
of that property.
by some other generalisation
possessed
explained
of lawhood
in two respects:
is radically nonHumean
This conception
it requires that a law state necessary
connexions
(of some strength),
that the necessary
be themselves
and it requires
connexions
in a
or explicable.
are
two characteristics
The
certain way
intelligible
it will present
is thus intelligible
in that if a generalisation
related
A soberer statement
itself to the intellect as affirming a necessitation.
of the idea is this: a law must be backed with a theory.31 Now suppose
we
this view of the nomic, and ask whether
accept
psychophysical
to it. Then it seems, granted the irreducibility
conform
generalisations
as might be
that such uniformities
theses of Davidson
and Nagel,
research
into psychophysical
do
disclosed
correlations
by empirical
one does not see how,
not have this property of intrinsic intelligibility:
are so cor
the mental
and physical
by what mechanism,
properties
of
the categorial
between
difference
mental
related.32 Because
or thoughts) and physical
one is at
(for sensations
concepts
concepts
a loss properly
to explain the observed
correlations:
they remain, in a
to project
certain sense, brute. Even
if we are prepared
the general
the necessity
isation over some range of creatures and circumstances,
that sustains
this is visibly
This
(or invisibly)
opaque.
apparent
would
of the concepts
if, per im
incommensurability
disappear
the mental were physically
reducible; but the whole point is
possibile,
that it is not. So if psychophysical
laws require theoretical
explana
then the im
tion, and theoretical
requires
explanation
reducibility,
of reduction
implies
laws. My suggestion
chophysical
needed by Davidson
(and Nagel);
one.
attractive
independently
possibility
the unavailability
of genuine
psy
is that some such view of laws is
the view seems to me an
moreover,
190
COLIN
McGINN
law that it meet
Once we demand of a putative
this condition
of
we establish
an intimate connexion
intrinsically
intelligible necessity,
between
laws and natural kinds. For,
the underlying
that
theory
renders the necessity
of the law transparent will concern
itself pre
the real internal essence
of the kind of which
the law
cisely with
treats. What
the necessity
of the law is just the theoretically
exhibits
nature
of the kind
in question.
So
if nomologicality
then the kinds lawfully related will be natural
requires explicability,
kinds in our original
of mental
sense.33 But then the nomologicality
the falsity of the consequent
kinds would
imply their naturalness;
of the mental.
yields the anomalism
This position
is open to challenge
by anyone who sees fit to reject
articulated
A Humean
the notion of law it presupposes.
about laws, taking them
as mere
will dispute
de facto
the need for (indeed
uniformities,
we
sort
of
the
of)
above; he may even
required
intelligibility
possibility
I would
the very idea of natural necessity.
reject the latter
dispute
an
but
intermediate
occupied
by a more
outright,
position
position
moderate
Humean
calls for comment.
I envisage waives
The position
the requirement
of intrinsic intelligibility
but accepts
that laws involve
form of necessity
is thus taken as brute and
the accepted
necessity;
I am not myself
attracted by this idea of opaque neces
inexplicable.
we
can still exclude
but it is worth
whether
sitation,
enquiring
of what it is to be
laws a priori under that conception
psychophysical
a law. It is clear right away that the necessity
could not be absolute
creatures
in all possible
for reasons
worlds)
(hold for all possible
of species-specific
laws true in a proper
but what
already
given;
worlds?
As
far as I can see, no a priori
subset of all possible
can confute
sen
in respect of primitive
this hypothesis
arguments
sations such as pain, but I think that thoughts can be argued to fail of
even in this attenuated
with
the physical
mode.
lawlike correlation
is the (or a) reason.
about belief
the following
Consider
platitudes
as a representative
that we attribute
example,
Here
attribution.
Suppose,
a belief
to someone
is seedy' on the
'Hollywood
content
is given by the sentence
tantamount
to that
utterance
of a sentence
basis of the person's
street. Allow
content
sentence made while
standing on a Hollywood
that the belief was formed, and the utterance
by the impact
prompted,
of various
stimuli received
sensory
by the person under these con
to a second who
invites the
this first person
ditions. Now
compare
whose
PHILOSOPHICAL
MATERIALISM
191
to
same belief attribution on the basis of utterances made
in response
over
Los
Or
from an aeroplane
observations
flying
Angeles.
again
a third person whose
that Hollywood
belief
is seedy
is
compare
derived from perusal of travel books or by talking to acquaintances.
the belief is formed the input to
Let us call the condition under which
state. Then what
these examples
the resulting belief
platitudinously
- the same
show is that the same belief can be possessed
thought
indeed disjoint,
entertained - under quite dissimilar,
input conditions.
for other kinds of
For beliefs
about concrete
(and perhaps
objects
a
we
can
the
of
idea
introduce
physical mode of presen
entity too)
tation of an object to a person at a time. This corresponds
(roughly)
and it can be explained
to the notion of a perspective,
in various
I shall define it as a pattern of (physical)
stimulation
ways.
impinging
as
a
on a person's
result
of
which
sensory receptors,
(in conjunction
a specific belief
no doubt with many other factors)
is formed. The
to the intermodal case: the same belief is very
idea can be generalised
the modes
of presen
in circumstances
in which
attributed
senses. What
the object(s)
concerned
relate to distinct
is
clause
that identifies
the belief
notable
here is that the content
is
to these variations
in input conditions.
We
find such
insensitive
on the output side too; the behaviour we take
physical heterogeneity
can itself be indefinitely
as expressive
of a given belief
various.
commonly
tation of
the physical modes
of acquisition
and manifestation
of a
Moreover,
are often
the
and
correlated:
belief
circumstances
systematically
manner of manifestation
of the belief can depend upon its conditions
that Everest
of acquisition.
Let one man believe
is hard to climb as a
result of viewing
it from its north side, and another form the same
to
belief by surveying
its south side. The first man may be disposed
that it is the
the climb from any other side (not realising
attempt
same mountain),
to
and similarly for the second man: their readiness
undertake
the climb in certain circumstances
the
mode
depends upon
of presentation
of the object at the time the belief was formed. And
about the mountain
their pattern of assent to sentences
will likewise
to their different
of presentation.
modes
So it is
vary according
that the same (type) thought can be had under very different
evident
of input and output. Now ask yourself whether
conditions
it
physical
to suppose
that what
is plausible
within
the
transpires
physically
person
particular
in the
formation
of
of
the
properties
the belief
input and
is itself
output
of the
independent
associated
with
it. It
192
COLIN
McGINN
seems
to me extremely
to hold that the internal physical
implausible
that realise the belief miraculously
coincide
in these different
the
of
the
internal
events occurring
Rather,
properties
physical
in the same-believers,
from the afferent
tracts to the central locus of
to the efferent
realisation
in the brain and thence
will
pathways,
the
reflect
of
modes
and
manifes
perforce
particular
presentation
the formation
tation surrounding
of the belief.34 It follows
that the
same belief can be realised by quite different
states
in the
physical
human brain. And
this conclusion
has been arrived at, not by any
method
of direct
of the person's
cerebral
states, but by
inspection
armchair reflection on our ordinary practice of belief attribution.
(The
same point carries over to other propositional
attitudes
inasmuch as
a belief component.)
they incorporate
states
cases.
now be made.
observations
the con
may
First, we have
are
so
states
of
that
belief
associated
with
sequence
loosely
physical
of the brain as not to be correlated with them in any way
properties
that deserves
the name of lawlike; and the symptom
of this is that
Two
of the realising physical
state of a certain belief in a given
knowledge
us to project
creature will not dispose
the same physical
realisation
onto other creatures
same
to
on
have
the
belief,
judged
pain of
can
same
that
the
belief
in
different
denying
ways.
people
acquire
this radical anomalism
of belief with respect to the
Second,
accepting
seems to make Davidson's
for token identity go
physical
argument
no
matter
how
relaxed
one's
notion
law is. For, singular
of
through
statements
causal
and
events
have no
relating
thoughts
physical
a
chance
of being backed
law
sort
that
of
mental
by
containing
so
if
what
I
have
been
the
is
description
just
saying
right;
thought
event will be constrained
to satisfy some other description,
and token
are thus
results. But now
if some mental
physicalism
particulars
we
seem
to
that
conclude
all are,
demonstrably
physical,
compelled
no matter what degree
of nomologicality
their mental
descriptions
to allow that some mental
for surely it is intolerable
events
exhibit,
are physical while some are not. (An analogous
observation
applies to
or other real
the corollary
thesis
that thoughts
have no physical
I conclude
that Davidson's
basic position on psychophysical
essence.)
can
laws and anomalous
monism
be vindicated,
and by a number of
on
different
the
volunteered.
concessions
strategies depending
MATERIALISM
PHILOSOPHICAL
193
V
to compare psychological
It is instructive
reality with the realm of the
to
of
their
the
semantical
relation
apropos
physical world. We find on
the one hand an analogy,
and on the other a possible
connexion.
and
informal
Consider
semantical
discourse,
formal, relating words
as a first-order
to the world. Construing
and sentences
such discourse
a
we
will
of
discern
semantical
stock
notably
theory
predicates
an ontology
over which
of entities
'true'-and
'refers',
'satisfies',
are defined: these entities will include various object
these predicates
of such, and extra-linguistic
utterances
objects
language expressions,
matter
of
the object-language
the
and
subject
expressions
comprising
utterances
thereof. Set over against this semantical discourse we have
a portion of physical
and explaining
the physical
theory describing
facts somehow
involved
in language use: neurophysiological
descrip
and
tions of the brain states of speakers as they utter and understand,
between
the
relations
and
tokens)
(or expression
physical
speakers
areas
two
these
of.
Given
of
discourse
extra-linguistic
objects
spoken
we
and physical
of
raise the question
can, as with mental
discourse,
their relation, and the various options present themselves with respect
to the terms and predicates
to the objects and properties
of
assigned
the theories.
I want to claim that my earlier discussion
of the mental
can be recapitulated,
of propositional
mutatis
attitudes)
(specifically
me
of
the
To
let
in
semantical.
avoid
mutandis,
tedium,
respect
just
to be favoured
how
this would
is
summarise
go. The doctrine
anomalous monism
to which
about semantical
facts: thus the objects
semantical properties
and relations are attributed are physical objects,
are anomalously
while the semantical
themselves
related to
properties
for the claim of token identity will
physical
Arguments
properties.
about
mental
in ?11 and ?IV: every
parallel my arguments
particulars
some
or
of
natural
semantical
is
kind, but
particular
nomological
are
nor
so
seman
semantical
natural
neither
properties
nomological,
are constrained
to satisfy other nonsemantical
tical particulars
des
have mental
If these objects
then the earlier
criptions.
descriptions,
of
will
entail
token
arguments
plus transitivity
identity
physicalism
to semantical
with respect
Of course, philosophers
have
particulars.
as to suppose that there is a distinct
not typically been so extravagant
of semantical
them to be
ontology
particulars
they have assumed
- so the above
or psychological
either clearly physical
for
argument
194
COLIN
McGINN
It is therefore of more
conclusion.35
identity has an unsurprising
to address
over which
the question
of properties,
there has
been greater dispute. How
then do semantical
relate to
properties
physical?
It is plain straight off that no physicalist
type identity theory of
can
creatures
be
correct:
of diverse
semantical
physical
properties
be
should
describable
in
semantical
terms, and so the
make-up
cannot possess
real essence.
semantical
any physical
(This
properties
token
interest
terms of the syndrome
from semantical
would explain the absence
of
of natural kinds.) Nor
features (i)-(ix) that we saw to be characteristic
do semantico-physical
laws seem in prospect.
Semantical
concepts
to their own distinctive
conform
with
the
(interlocking
principles
no
seems
to
and
there
of
these
chance
psychological),
reducing
not
of
could
constit
concepts:
knowledge
physics
plausibly
physical
and physical
ute knowledge
semantical
of semantics.36 Connectedly,
a
as
to
in
such
seem
way
preclude
concepts
incongruous
intelligibly
as between
the two sorts of
necessitations
any putative
explaining
of seman
fact; and this again seems owed to the nominal character
our
on
lawhood
does
Neither
conditions
tical predicates.
relaxing
as
(weakly)
nomological.
qualify
semantico-physical
generalisations
made
toward
the end of ?IV
For we can repeat the observations
the kind and amount
concerning
tolerated
in our ordinary
practice
to ascribe
the same
prepared
utterances
of physical
variation
implicitly
we are
of semantical
attribution:
to
semantic
property
speakers'
as
circumstances,
heterogeneous
physical
under
quite
Such
the same object is referred to from different perspectives.
of
evident
under
the
standard
also
theories
is
variation
physical
and
the
reference:
the causal-historical
theory (or picture),37
descrip
when
theories allow that the reference
tion theory.38 Thus causal-historical
related by quite diverse
relation may hold between
of
objects
pairs
source
and
This is also
causal chains, of varying
mechanism.
length,
the
formed
from
clear for one-place
semantical
predicates
two-place
this
'refers' by closing up the second place, as in 'jc refers to Everest':
can
be
whose
satisfied
(or expression
tokens)
by speakers
predicate
to the object of reference
of differences
in the
relation
is, because
And
if
relevant
causal-historical
chains,
heterogeneous.
physically
one characterises
the causal chain in psychological
vocabulary,
using
the concept of intention say, then the heterogeneity
of the chains that
the physical
sustain the given semantical
property will ramify with
195
MATERIALISM
PHILOSOPHICAL
attitude at suc
in the states that realise that propositional
to description
remarks
links in the chain. Parallel
apply
in
of physical
theories. One dimension
reference,
say in
diversity
a
that
the
fact
is
different
of
proper name,
by
respect
generated
or the same speaker
at different
times, may
bring off
speakers,
means
different
satisfied
of
beliefs
reference
by the
by
descriptive
will
have
and
these
distinct
of
beliefs
reference,
physical
object
variation
cessive
the diversity,
variable physical
But further, compounding
to ramify
of the same belief will cause the heterogeneity
realisation
a given descriptive
So on both sorts of theory of
within
belief.
lie
and relations will
reference
the underlying
properties
physical
as
with
this
athwart the semantical properties
belief,
they realise; and,
in
laws is already embedded
consideration
against semantico-physical
our ordinary practice of semantical
description.
now the possible
the analogy;
connexion.
That was
Hartry Field
a
to a
the
idea
that
relation
belief
is
has suggested,
motivated
by
correlates.
in a system of internal represen
(or sentence
analogue)
we
of two
construe
the
that
belief
relation as a composite
tation,
other relations,
thus:
sentence
x believes
that p iff there is a sentence
that p.39
S and S means
believes*
S
such
that x
to much
is subjected
but Field's
basic
refinement,
analysis
we
a
account
of
the
that
materialistic
believes*
is
give, first,
proposal
relation and, second, materialistically
relations
explain the semantical
to
the
second
This
in
latter, according
Field, is to
conjunct.
implicated
take the shape (in part) of a Tarskian
of
truth
for
the inner
theory
a
a belief
thus
content
of
5
the
of
which
is
sentence;
language
giving
a materialist
a matter
account
of materialistically
becomes
charac
a
the
such
semantic
relations
introduces.
This
theory
terising
implies
that the physical
basis of a specific belief state, canonically
specified
term of the belief
relation with a 'that'
by closing up the second
a
of
the
will
be
bases of the
function
clause,
(inter alia)
physical
This
inner sentence
S stands to extra
as to the
that
the
in
turn,
linguistic
reality.
question
implies,
same
to
of
attitudes
reduces
basis
the
question
physical
propositional
about
the relation
semantics
(plus, of course,
expressed
by 'bel
this
about
the
conclusions
connexion,
ieves*'). Granting
nomologi
of semantics
go over to the case of belief. So if
cality or otherwise
semantic
relations
in which
This
the
196
COLIN
McGINN
are
of belief, and if you
inclined to agree with Field's
analysis
to denying
laws, then you are committed
semantico-physical
laws for beliefs. And I suspect that many people are
psychophysical
more prepared
to accept
the anomalism
of the seman
antecedently
if so, Field's connexion
tical than that of the psychological;
advances
I should
In both areas
of
say that it is the property
my cause.
that is operative
content
in fixing our view of how
representative
facts relate to physical. For this reason alone it
mental and semantical
is good to have a theory that integrates
attitude psy
propositional
you
reject
chology
and semantics.
VI
I have
above of physical
(or state types) realising
properties
In this final section
to
I want
(or state types).
properties
three issues bearing on this relation. They concern
address
(i) realism
about mental
and conditional
facts,
(ii) realisation,
supervenience
of
monism
laws, and (iii) the impact upon anomalous
psychophysical
the thesis that mental
content
is (in part) fixed by the environment,
is apt to hold that there is
(i) Anyone who calls himself a physicalist
a sense in which
the physical
facts about the world determine
all the
other
facts.
In consequence,
the physicalist
to
will be reluctant
the reality of alleged facts for which no physical
basis can
recognise
be found. That is, physicalism
on a
the following
condition
imposes
realist view of a given class of statements:
the truths they express
must not be independent
of the truths of physics.
I have denied
that
mental
facts are physicalistically
reducible. This denial may prompt
spoken
mental
the physical
to some sort of anti-realist
realist to suspect commitment
or instrumentalist
of the mental;
and this he may regard
conception
we need to answer
The question
is then
(rightly) as unacceptable.
this: how is it possible
to combine
the irreducibility
thesis and the
on realism with acceptance
condition
of a realist view of
physicalist
can be assuaged
the suspicion
by distinguishing
a property can be said to have a physical
'basis':
as between
the word
is ambiguous
reduction
and physical
physical
realisation.40 We can deny that mental properties have a physical basis in
the first sense, but that denial is consistent
with affirming the physi
calist's nonindependence
condition as formulated
in terms of the second
the mental?
two senses
I think
in which
PHILOSOPHICAL
MATERIALISM
197
that all genuine
have a physical
the requirement
properties
to satisfy the demand
for complete
is, I suggest, enough
on what realises
since a property
supervenes
physical determination,
the causal-explanatory
role of mental
it (see below).
In particular,
facts is, by virtue of physical
upon the exis
realisation,
predicated
tence of some underlying
of physical
facts appropriately
system
formulable
related to the causal explanation
in mental
vocabulary;
and the truth of mental
attributions
their mere
in
(as against
strumental
will
usefulness)
imply the truth of some corresponding
a physical
'basis' for these features
attribution.41 Requiring
physical
sense:
realisation
so
of mental
does not then imply physical
concepts
reducibility;
with what has gone
realism about the psychological
is compatible
before.
the thesis of supervenience
formulates
in these
(ii) Davidson
'it is impossible
words:
for two events
states) to agree in all
(objects,
... and to differ in their psychological
their physical
characteristics
as 'strongly dependent'
he speaks also of the mental
characteristics';
on the physical
the former.42 His
and of the latter as 'determining'
seems best captured by means
of a condition
formulation
containing
two occurrences
of a necessity
thus: necessarily,
for any
operator,
at a time, there is a
mental
instantiated
by a creature
property
the creature
such that, necessarily,
if
instantiates
property
physical
that physical
then it instantiates
instantiates
any creature
property,
that mental
property. That is to say, every mental
property must be
true supervenience
and there are necessarily
realised,
physically
whose
antecedents
such realising properties
conditionals
and
express
whose
the supervening
mental
It is
express
consequents
property.
natural now to ask whether
the kind of determination
affirmed by
such supervenience
conditionals
is lawlike. One might be tempted to
think so by the following
line of reasoning:
'There are no ft/con
ditional psychophysical
laws because
variable physical
of
realisation
we expect of a
mental
is incompatible
with the necessity
properties
- from
to mental-is
conditional
law; but the converse
physical
expl
a
icitly formulated
using
operator
necessity
(the second one in our
formulation
the lawlikeness
of
above), and so any reason for denying
on
conditionals
three comments
lapses'. I shall make
supervenience
this reasoning. The first is that we are accustomed
to laws providing
some sort of general answer to the question why a certain property
is
instantiated
to
other
by an object at a time, an answer
applicable
198
COLIN
McGINN
the property
is exemplified,
but super
in which
and as such is compatible
with there being no such
of why
the supervening
is instantiated
property
general explanation
when
it is. A second (and related) point is that, as insisted in ?IV, the
con
and physical
in a supervenience
mental
properties
expressed
are categorially
in a way
that precludes
different
ditional
genuine
of the former by the latter. And
third the necessity
explanation
of supervenience
in
in the formulation
is not nomological
intended
on
areas
other
from
reflection
in
which
This
is
evident
purport.
circumstances
alone
venience
theses have been maintained:
the moral on the des
supervenience
on the actual,
on
the
the
modal
the
the
aesthetic
physical,
criptive,
on the psychological,
and so forth. The notion of deter
semantic
and this is con
intended here is clearly not nomological;
mination
here claimed do not have
nected with the point that the necessitations
we demand of a genuine
law of nature.
the intelligible
transparency
too that the sort of physical
determination
in
envisaged
or
a
from
far
reduction.
is
cry
?VI(ii)
nomological
conceptual
as the thesis
is defined by Putnam
(iii) Methodological
solipsism
so
the
existence
of
that 'no mental
state, properly
called, presupposes
state
to
that
the
whom
other
than
is
individual
ascribed'.43
any
subject
to an analogous
thesis about meaning:
that
Putnam
is himself opposed
no meaning
fixed by the
and identity conditions
has its existence
of that meaning
(a Fregean
thesis). But he ap
(actual) extension
mental
like
holds
that
intentional
states,
belief, do fulfil the
parently
content
of the
their
is
thesis of methodological
solipsism:
independent
the
belief
is
of the objects we would
about.44
existence
say
normally
seems committed
to the claim that (for example)
the sense
So Putnam
utterance
the
is fixed
of a demonstrative
(in part) by
object(s)
of a demonstrative
but that the content
is not
demonstrated,
belief
One
sees
the belief
is demon
by the identity of the object(s)
to
content
the
semantic
The
contributes
environment
about.
stratively
content
of thoughts.
This
but not to the intentional
of sentences
to
content has seemed unacceptable
divided account of representative
on
to
have
extend
Putnam's
observations
and
many;
they
preferred
similarly
fixed
account
the extended
content.45 Under
seeming
as can be
for real sameness,
is not sufficient
a Twin
the
earth example
in which
by constructing
appreciated
are
here
intuitions
belief
distinct.
of
external
(Our
depend
objects
as well as
bearers of truth-value,
upon our taking beliefs as essentially
meaning
sameness
to mental
of
belief
PHILOSOPHICAL
MATERIALISM
199
The slogan suggested by the
of behaviour.)
internal states explanatory
states are not (wholly)
is then that mental
in the head: the
extension
external environment
does its bit in fixing the content of a thought.
of the nature of thoughts raises two questions
This conception
for
are the implications
us: first, what
for our view of the relation
are the im
between
and physical
mental
second, what
properties;
a
we
the
for
About
token
first
question,
identity theory?
plications
seem
to acknowledge
(what Brentano
long ago urged) that
compelled
of mental
them to be
the representative
character
makes
properties
from
thus
the
different
fundamentally
physical properties,
underlining
the
be
difference
insisted upon earlier
connexion
(note
categorial
on mental
tween
constraint
states and their being
the rationality
to present
the con
concerns,
But, more
germane
truth-bearers).
a
our
of
the
for
account
of
calls
in
tribution
environment
widening
we
now
see
that
for
of
co-satisfaction
realisation
and supervenience:
nonrelational
intrinsic physical
does not entail co-satis
properties
as will be evident
mental
from
faction of (intentional)
properties,
on
a
Twin earth example. We shall have to go outside of the
reflection
in our
individual and incorporate physical
relations to external objects
a
a
a
at
for
of what
realises
time.
person
given belief
description
on now
what
the belief
includes
extra-in
supervenes
Conversely,
dividual
factors.46 This pretty much alters the traditional
picture of
what a psychophysical
would
look like, and introduces
correlation
into the physical
correlates
of belief, given that
further heterogeneity
sameness
of belief content
is compatible
with variation
in physical
to the objects
of belief - variable
is now, so to
relations
realisation
look even
connexions
less
speak, out in the open. Nomological
than before on this conception
of propositional
feasible
content.47
a nonsolipsistic
The second
is whether
view of token
question
with physical
their identification
I shall
particulars.
permits
that
but
it
that
another
does
relation
not,
though tentatively,
can serve
and physical
mental
the ends of
particulars
to
a particular
well.
set
the
materialism
that
stage,
equally
Suppose,
a
a
about
certain
is
in
person
thought
object
prompted
by the
thoughts
suggest,
between
a
of energy emanating
from that object,
this causing
impingement
sen
of
events
the
in
sequence
person's
body leading from
physical
to cerebral
interior. Call the external
sory periphery
'o', the
object
internal brain event correlated with the onset of the thought V,
and
o and e '/?'. Now
the physical
relation between
the token identity
200
COLIN
McGINN
that the prompted
theorist proposes
thought is identical with cerebral
event e. It is then objected
that there is a prima facie difficulty about
this identification,
in the shape of a violation of the indiscernibility
of
to modal
identicals with respect
it
that
the
For,
appears
properties.
about o but that e is only contingently
thought is essentially
particular
to o ; the existence
of the thought thus depends upon the existence
of o, but the existence
of e seems independent
of the existence
of o.
are correct,
If these appearances
then Leibniz's
law tells us that the
are
the internal brain event. Here
thought cannot be identical with
some ways
an identity
to
theorist might
these
intuitive
respond
R
claims.
He might
of R and try to face up to the
(a) accept the contingency
that the thought
about o: both the
is not essentially
consequence
aboutness
relation and its physical
in R are contingent
realisation
(or
seems to me pretty implausible:
relations. This response
it
nonrigid)
seems evident
to me that thoughts can no more vary in their content
How
could a particular
than lecterns can vary in their composition.
a
that
table
is
have
been
that
dirty
thought that that chair is
thought
are
the
table
and
the
Yet we
chair
distinct
objects)?
dirty (where
e
we
to
to
have
that
that
if
allow
could
have
take
consequence
appear
it is related by R
been in some relation R' to the chair though actually
to the table, for in that circumstance
the thought would have had the
intuitions will want to avoid
chair in its content. Those with unwarped
to
the necessity
of
tries
this consequence.
(b)
respect
Response
as
non
content
of
R:
the
the
by asserting
contingency
just
thought
about o, so e is necessarily
caused by o - hence
thought is necessarily
the thought and e will exist in the same possible worlds.
This claim
of e may be motivated
about the existence
conditions
by the rather
In
that (token) events have their causes essentially.
plausible doctrine
not denying
that thoughts have their content essentially
this response
seems preferable
to (a), but it is still unsatisfying.
For it does
certainly
to the physicalist
not I think speak to the real objection
identification,
a
sense
the
external object enters into or
which
that
there
in
is
namely
to the
it is extrinsic
the content of the thought, whereas
constitutes
their being
of the brain event,
(perhaps)
rigidly
identity
despite
so
the
is built into the thought;
related.
Intuitively
object
speaking,
to that
law recurs with respect
from Leibniz's
the original objection
if the
this intuition:
relation. Response
(c) aims to accommodate
not
the
out
the
then
make
in
is
itself
world,
why
thought
partly
PHILOSOPHICAL
MATERIALISM
201
itself partly outside
it is identical
of the
with which
some
with
be
let
the
identical
More
thought
exactly,
person's body?
e
o
the
of
and
the
like
(and possibly
aggregate
consisting
thing
of
this
is
The
merit
intermediate
that,
proposal
events).48
physical
does depend upon
of the physical
the existence
aggregate
plausibly,
of its member
the existence
components,
just as the thought depends
- and there is a clear sense in
actual
for its existence
its
upon
objects
physical
object
the
of the aggregate are built into it. However,
the components
a
the
has
the
for
is
flawed:
aggregate
thought
property
proposal
related parts, e
into extrinsically
to lack, viz. it is divisible
appears
one does not want
to divide up the thought
in this
and o, whereas
no
autonomous
and
that
is
The
is
there
way.
conceptually
prior
point
which
to
the external
with
event which
combines
internal mental
object
a
a
event
the
is
of
brain
thought possessed
specific content, yet
yield
seem
its causes.
So thought
and aggregate
thus separable
from
with respect to their mereological
discernible
properties.
A way
of
idea seemed
the aggregate
Nevertheless,
promising.
law
would
be
the
and
from
Leibniz's
it
objections
evading
preserving
to forego
in its stead some other
suitably
identity and introduce
a
natural
this lead, is that
relation:
suggestion,
following
physicalist
stand in a relation
the thought and its associated
aggregate
physical
closer
to be called
That relation deserves
composition.49
an entity (wholly)
to characterise
it is reasonable
as itself a physical
and the
of physical
entities
entity,
to
relation
is an indiscernibility
relation with
respect
to that of
because
physicalist
composed
composition
many kinds of property
(position, causality, mass, chemical make-up,
But
is not an unrestricted
since
etc.).
indiscernibility
composition
to find all properties
of the obligation
of
relation we are relieved
common.
not
and
in
this
may
aggregate
Though
suggestion
thought
remove all puzzlement
about how thought content and the associated
I think it stands a better chance of being
facts fit together,
physical
correct than any of the other three proposals
and seems to
reviewed
to the problem.
of a solution
achieve what we demanded
If it is
on
then
the
of
earlier
sections
theses
mental
particulars will
accepted,
not identify
have to be recast in terms of composition
by the physical,
with it; this seems neither difficult nor importantly
Let
concessive.50
me end by mentioning
com
three outlandish
the
of
consequences
dualist about mind and body
position view. First, even an ontological
a nonsolipsistic
to admit,
will have
if he accepts
of
conception
202
COLIN
McGINN
are partly composed
that mental
of physical
particulars
the thought
i.e. those upon which
is directed.51
Second,
one's own or those of others
thoughts about other mental particulars,
a kind of hierarchy
latter can enter content)
of
generate
(if these
about
another
must
be
my
aggregates:
thought
thought
physical
a sub-aggregate
of an aggregate
that
containing
composed
composing
second thought, and so on. Third, the totality of thoughts entertained
thoughts,
entities,
of the whole world,
since
by an omniscient
being would be composed
for any object he (or she) has a thought whose
content
includes that
seem indicated when
object. These bizarre-sounding
contemplations
once we
to integrate
the need
a
take seriously
with
physicalism
of
conception
thought.52
nonsolipsistic
College
University
London
NOTES
1
The
clearest
of first-orderness
is not
supposition
to keep straight on the distinction
way
is essential
2
We
need
assignment
means
of
properties
to what
to what
essential
between
objects
but
follows,
and properties,
it is the
and
this
follows.
as consisting
of predicates
semantic
in
interpretation
we can interpret
to the predicates;
them
properties)
no singular
the usual disquotational
terms
satisfaction
axioms
in which
so removes
occur.
to take property
the temptation
distinctness
Doing
not
of
construe
entities
an
the
(viz.
by
for
as
ontologically
significant.
3
See his 'Mental Events',
eds. L. Foster
and J. Swanson
in Experience
and Theory,
et. al., eds., Logic,
in P. Suppes
Material
London,
Mind',
1970), The
IV
and Philosophy
(North-Holland
Publishing
Methodology
of Science
Company,
as Philosophy',
ed. S.C. Brown
in Philosophy
1973),
of Psychology,
'Psychology
(Duckworth:
to anomalous
endorsed
close
monism
is tentatively
1974). Something
(Macmillan,
by
74 (1965).
The Philosophical
Review
Thomas
in 'Physicalism',
Nagel
4
a Brain Process?',
U.T. Place,
'Is Consciousness
in The
See, for example,
reprinted
ed. V.C. Chappell
Inc., 1962).
(Prentice-Hall,
Philosophy
of Mind,
5
and familiar,
observed
correlations
I say this for two reasons.
First,
psychophysical
not establish
and so could
with
monism.
would
be consistent
dualism,
nomological
the empirical
method
of seeking
correlations
Second,
if true, since it is true just on condition
unknowable
The mind-body
it yields
results.
negative
problem
some other way.
6
and Natural
See the collection,
Necessity
Naming,
Press,
1977) for some key papers.
University
7
is a somewhat
eclectic
list of theses:
This
(i) and
would
make
anomalous
monism
that the only means
of establishing
had better,
then, be decidable
Kinds,
ed. S.P.
(ii) are associated
Schwartz
chiefly
in
(Cornell
with
Saul
PHILOSOPHICAL
MATERIALISM
203
eds. D. David
in Semantics
Languages,
of Natural
'Naming and Necessity',
Kripke's
son and G. Harman
in 'Natural
1972); (iii) is suggested
(Boston: Reidel,
by W.V.
Quine
ed. N. Rescher
in Honour
in Essays
Reidel,
Kinds',
(Dordrecht:
of Carl G. Hempel,
can be found
of "Meaning"
'The Meaning
in Hilary
Putnam's
', in
1969); and (ivMix)
and Reality
Press,
1975).
University
(Cambridge
Dummett's
of natural
kinds fits Michael
charac
in this view
implicit
see his Truth and Other Enigmas
of realism
in general:
terisation
(Harvard University
a view realist
that the
if it allows
That characterisation
decrees
Press,
1978), passim.
of natural
The
facts
be (possibly)
in question
recognition-transcendent.
conception
Mind,
8
The
Language
realism
kinds
sketched
world
text makes
natural
in the
conditions
upon
taxonomy
depend
one
our epistemic
such a conception
On
capacities.
transcending
of the fundamental
about our knowledge
kinds of
rise of scepticism
- run
about natural
kinds and the associated
themes
realism
scepticism
in the
possibly
the
anticipates
nature.
Both
through Locke's
Essay
9
Cf. Kripke,
op. cit.,
Human
(1690).
Understanding
Concerning
'Ostensive
Terms
and M.T. Thornton,
and Materialism',
p. 339,
TheMonist 56 (1972).
10
I do
possessed
not, of course,
of both enjoy
component,
and
essentially
11
'Mental
distinct
mean
that thoughts
and sensations
in a creature
a thought
existence.
Sensations
may acquire
be qualitatively
they are I think
tinged. Nevertheless,
to
a totally
may
thoughts
kinds of mental
suggest
insulated
state, contingently
and Psychophysical
co-possessed.
in Proceedings
Laws',
of the
Aristotelian
Supp. Vol. LII (1978).
Society,
12
account
See Putnam,
for a more detailed
these examples
of what
op. cit., pp. 223-7,
involve.
13
some such principle
seems
to operate with
cf. n.8 above.
Locke
in the Essay;
14
Powers
R. Harr?
in Causal
and E.H. Madden,
(Basil Blackwell,
1975), seem to have
heart
their
this connexion
15
Of course
take
But
16
Natural
States,
in the right place on this issue, but they
and neglect
also to discuss
the nature
these
nominalists,
to fulfil
objects
I am not now
See
credited
17
Two
Locke's
with
kinds
Kinds
of mental
esp.
that
at
stronger
III,
6,
in
causation
causation.
say), will
(inscriptions,
be of some natural kind.
numbers
with particulars
identifying
case all entities would
(P); in which
advancing
Essay,
event
underestimate
thesis.
3: both
an underlying
knowledge-transcendent
of mental
persons
namely
particular
and material
spiritual
modus
operandi
and
substance
are
or real essence.
- seem
actions
less
intentional
to establish
For it
their identity with physical
argument
particulars.
is of some natural
is easy to appreciate
that each person
kind, e.g. human
(biological)
and that each action
of the body,
of some
is (in part) a movement
and hence
being,
in being physical
kind. Thoughts
and sensations
differ
hidden
physiological
particulars
in need
of elaborate
(in part: see ?VII (iii)) within the body.
18
See
his
'What
is it like to be a Bat?',
'Panpsychism',
and
'Subjective
and Objective',
all inMortal Questions (CambridgeUniversity Press, 1979).
19
In fact, as Nagel
sometimes
and Objective',
op. cit., p.
suggests
(e.g. in 'Subjective
the problem
acute
is equally
for Cartesian
since a mental
substance
dualism,
the same difficulty.
The difficulty
be stated dilemmatically:
either
present
might
201),
would
we
try
to explain
subjective
case
in which
substance),
properties
we
falsify
(in terms
objectively
or we
their nature;
of
a physical
their
admit
or mental
sut
generis
COLIN McGINN
204
to the objective
world.
If so,
case we cannot
their relation
in which
character,
explain
afflicted
is not distinctively
by the fact of subjectivity.
physicalism
20
Cf. Nagel,
ibid., p. 201.
21
in addition
to the physicalist:
does not have,
'if experience
puts this question
Nagel
from many
nature
an objective
that can be apprehended
to its subjective
character,
that a Martian
then how can it be supposed
my brain might
investigating
points of view,
which were my mental
be observing
(as he might observe
processes
processes
physical
bolts of lightning),
which were
only from a different
point of view?'
processes
physical
between
the distinction
'What is it like to be a Bat', op. cit., pp. 173-4. Care about
a physicalist
he can
must
and what
and properties
accept
helps us see what
objects
have no
from the fact that subjective
in this: for it does not follow
properties
reject
that a Martian
cannot observe
in my
objects
physical
physiologist
since he need not be investigating
with mental
particulars,
the nature of
i.e. investigating
of subjective
instances
properties,
real essence
objective
are in fact
brain which
identical
as
those physical
objects
those properties.
22
See Nagel,
ibid., pp. 173-4.
23This is in effect another
way of stating Kripke's point about the difficulty of
cor
the impression
of contingency
associated
with mental-physical
away
explaining
see Kripke,
relations:
op. cit., pp. 339-40.
24
See the papers of his cited in n.3.
25
'Is Semantics
and David
Cf. Putnam's
op. cit., pp.
Possible?',
140-1,
Wiggins,
and Identity',
23 (1974), pp. 55-6.
'Essentialism,
Continuity
Synthese
26
and our Mental
See Kripke,
op. cit., pp. 335ff and Putnam,
Life',
op. cit.,
'Philosophy
p. 293.
27
'Mental Events',
op. cit., pp. 97-8.
28
'The Material
op. cit., p. 715.
Mind',
29
'Mental Events',
of the claim.
See
op. cit., p. 98, for this formulation
30
See his 'Panpsychism',
op. cit., pp. 186-7.
31
The
follows William
view
of laws here advocated
Kneale's
sound
and
(I think)
sensible
??13-20.
32
This
discussion
in Probability
and
Induction
(Oxford
University
Press,
1949),
from Nagel,
op. cit., p. 187. One might
'Panpsychism',
are not
claim that 'mental and physical
predicates
made
for one another',
'Mental Events',
op. cit., p. 93.
33
- for
that since the explanation
of laws must
Someone
may object
stop somewhere
- it is left
more
not all laws can be made
laws
fundamental,
open
by other,
intelligible
detect
last formulation
a related
point
is taken
in Davidson's
that psychophysical
laws to possess
laws should be thus primitive.
I reply that I expect
such fundamental
a degree
not exhibited
of intrinsic
by psychophysical
intelligibility
ad hoc to claim
that such
correlations
(if there are any), and that it seems
absurdly
laws of nature,
in view of their manifest
correlations
could rank as basic
friability.
34
remarks
that the variation
and effects
in the causes
In 'Physicalism',
op. cit., Nagel
of
'intensional
improbable.
of
feature
mental
It is worth
states'
noting
renders
that my
their
own
lawlike
relation
argument
to physical
states extremely
text relies upon a special
that their
attitudes,
namely
in the
of propositional
the causes
(and effects)
content
is mediated
of presentation
of the
modes
by causally
representative
operative
the attitude
is about.
objects
35
an ontology
Note
of semantic
that I am here discussing
utterances,
particulars
PHILOSOPHICAL
inscriptions
and
possibly
One would
introduced
the
I am
like.
by
semantical
on
putting
discourse
to adjoin nominalism
on the more
I am engaged
need
205
MATERIALISM
one
-
about
side
of
the question
expression
semantics
types,
to make
abstract
intensions
all
entities
and
semantical
so on.
entities
limited
enterprise.
to
Field's
of reducing
semantics
project
of Truth',
69 (1972). Putnam
Journal
Theory
of Philosophy
a theoretical
to
of the reference
reduction
relation analogous
physical;
36
conclusion
This
is at odds
with
Hartry
see his 'Tarski's
physics:
Field as proposing
glosses
see Putnam's
that proper
to natural kinds, e.g. 'water is H20':
and the Moral
Meaning
and Kegan
Sciences
Paul,
1978), p. 17. If I am right, this has to be the wrong
(Routledge
to another
model.
defer a fuller discussion
of the matter
however,
(I must,
occasion.)
37
See Kripke,
op. cit., pp. 298ff, for a sketch of this sort of 'theory'.
38
See Michael
Dummett,
(Duckworth,
1973), passim.,
Frege:
Philosophy
of Language
for a systematic
defence
of such a theory.
39
See Field's
'Mental Representation',
Erkenntnis
I am not
because
convinced
do
is wrong);
neither
40
A famous
remark
afforded
intentional
importance
intentional
by
I wish
13 (1978). I say 'possible'
is right
language of thought hypothesis
to subscribe
to Field's
of physicalism.
version
that the
of Quine's
blindness
encourages
the Brentano
'One may
accept
either as showing
the indispensability
realisation:
idioms]
of an autonomous
idioms
and
the
to
the
intermediate
thesis
of
[the
intentional
connexion
(nor that
it
position
irreducibility
idioms and
of
the
or as showing
the baselessness
science
of intention,
of
of a science
of intention.'
Word
and Object
emptiness
baselessness
is not entailed
p. 221. (Physical)
by irreduci
Mass.,
1960),
(Cambridge,
Determination,
bility. In 'Physicalism:
Ontology,
72 (1975), G.P. Hellman
and F.W. Thompson
and Reduction',
Journal
of Philosophy
a rigorous model-theoretic
account
offer
of the notion
it compatible
of physical
with
the denial
of
determination,
showing
reduction.
physical
41
an argument
construct
of sorts to physical
One might,
realisation
from the
indeed,
states must
mental
be construed
in view
of their
following
premisses:
realistically
construed
it has a physical
unless
role; no state can be realistically
causal-explanatory
basis.
42
See 'The Material
op. cit., p. 717.
Mind',
43
'The Meaning
of "Meaning"
', op. cit., p. 220.
44
Ibid., pp. 223ff.
45
See my
and Belief,
Journal
74 (1977), where
'Charity,
Interpretation,
of Philosophy
the extension
is proposed.
46
in 'Mental States, Natural
and Psychophysical
Kinds,
op. cit., p.
My assertion
Laws',
on behaviour
of mental
was
facts
is supervenient
therefore
214, that the ascription
states subsisting
it applies
in the head, such
inaccurate;
strictly
only to mental
wholly
as sensations.
For nonsolipsistic
states one has to reckon
mental
the external
in
objects
with
the behaviour.
47
Multiplying this source of anomalism by that identified toward the end of ?IV cuts
belief properties
loose from physical
yet further
properties.
48
The kind of notion
I want
is explicated
in Tyler B?rge,
'A Theory
of Aggregates',
11 (1977), though I need to let events
Nous
and states be components
of aggregates
the
other
components
of which
may
be continuant
particulars.
Invoking
aggregates
instead
206
COLIN McGINN
or sequences
of physical
has (at least) two advantages:
first, we do
particulars
introduce
abstract
entities
into the ontology
of mental
problematic
physicalistically
we naturally
we
the locutions
in which
second,
preserve
discourse;
speak of various
as caused
events
by beliefs.
49
to apply
too. An
There
is reason
this idea to actions
seems
intentional
to
action
event
both an internal mental
involve
and an external
(a 'willing')
essentially
physical
of
sets
not
event
it cannot
be identified with
either event
alone. A natural
movement);
is that the action
of both events
is a composite
taken together.
was
for earlier
called
used
on, at two points. We
it, first, to
composition
as natural kinds, but whose
to particulars
not themselves
classified
sortally
(a bodily
suggestion,
50
In fact,
(P)
apply
then,
be so classified.
And
it seems
to amend Davidson's
reasonable
second,
a law (under
that all causally
some
related
events
instantiate
requiring
to allow
that the sortal predicates
in the required
laws
occurring
description)
covering
be satisfied
of the events
since not all of our
only by constituents
identified,
initially
of individuating
events will be mirrored
in the relevant
scientific
laws.
ways
51
it is perhaps
not surprising
In the light of this point,
that Cartesian
have been
dualists
parts
may
principle
to methodological
prone
solipsism.
52
at
written
I was
This
while
paper was
substantially
visiting
at Los Angeles.
I am very grateful
for the stimulation
California
received
from the people
there, and from those at the University
fornia.
the University
and hospitality
of Southern
of
Cali
I