550403
esearch-article2014
BBSXXX10.1177/2372732214550403Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain SciencesGlaser et al.
Justice
Policy Insights from the
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
2014, Vol. 1(1) 88­–94
© The Author(s) 2014
DOI: 10.1177/2372732214550403
bbs.sagepub.com
Racial Bias and Public Policy
Jack Glaser1, Katherine Spencer1, and Amanda Charbonneau1
Abstract
This article explores psychological science on race bias and its implications in several domains of public policy, with special
attention paid to biased policing as an illustrative example. Race bias arises from normal mental processes, many outside
our conscious awareness and control. This research directly applies to public policy, especially where concerned with
regulating behavior and managing uncertainty. Research links both implicit and explicit racial bias to behavior, and uncertainty
exacerbates the influence of bias in decision-making. Sample policy domains—where psychological research, race bias, and
public policy intersect—include education, employment, immigration, health care, politics/representation, and criminal justice.
Psychological research informs policy by documenting causes and processes, by expert testimony in court, and by generating
and evaluating interventions to reduce race bias.
Keywords
bias, prejudice, stereotyping, criminal justice, policing
Tweet
Psychological science reveals how race bias operates, with
policy applications to law, jobs, school, and health.
Key Points
•• The psychology of race bias documents roles for categorization, stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination,
and subtle biases.
•• Relevant policy domains include criminal justice,
employment, education, and health care.
•• Racial bias in policing provides an illustrative case.
•• Psychological research can inform policy by documenting causes and processes, by expert testimony in
court, and by generating and evaluating interventions
to reduce race bias.
Introduction
The End Racial Profiling Act (ERPA) has been introduced
during almost every U.S. Congress since the year 2001. It is a
reasonable piece of legislation, with a cogent definition of
racial profiling, an unambiguous (if not enforceable) ban on
the practice, prescriptions for relevant data collection, and
provision for block grants to support departments working to
ameliorate biased policing. Although racial profiling is widely
condemned, and ERPA has many co-sponsors in the House
and the Senate, the bill has yet to even receive a floor vote.
Racial profiling—the use of race, ethnicity, or national
origin by law enforcement officials in deciding whom to
stop, search, or detain—particularly illustrates the usefulness
of the psychological science on race bias for public policy.
Policing is perhaps the most concrete domain of public policy: Laws meet citizens with often life-altering results. Racial
profiling has been well documented in many jurisdictions in
the United States (Glaser, 2014). Universally condemned
and generally taboo, racial profiling has been statutorily
banned (but with little in the way of enforcement mechanisms) and/or relevant data collection has been mandated in
most U.S. states. The Department of Justice (2003) has
banned it in federal law enforcement. A nationally comprehensive and enforceable policy, however, appears beyond the
will of the U.S. Congress, highlighting the crucial interplay
of American politics and policy: Concerns over security and
public attitudes impede efforts to mitigate racial bias.
This article aims to summarize some central aspects of
the psychology of racial bias (e.g., categorization, stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination, subtle forms of bias) and
to sample relevant policy domains (e.g., criminal justice,
employment, education, health care). These illustrate how
and why psychological science can inform public policy in
race-related domains. The particularly potent case of race
bias in policing affords an exploration of opportunities for
translating the basic science of psychology into policy
practice.
1
University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
Corresponding Author:
Jack Glaser, Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California,
2607 Hearst Ave., Berkeley, CA 94720-7320, USA.
Email: [email protected]
89
Glaser et al.
Psychology of Racial Bias
Although it may be tempting to pathologize prejudice, psychologists have determined that intergroup biases arise from
normal mental processes. This does not mean that bias and
any resulting discrimination are desirable. Bias typically
comes from our strong, innate tendencies to (a) categorize
objects and people into groups (Allport, 1954; Bruner, 1957),
(b) prefer things (and people) merely because they are familiar (Zajonc, 1980) or because they belong to our group
(Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963), (c) simplify a complex world (e.g.,
with stereotypes; Fiske & Taylor, 1991), and (d) rationalize
inequities (Eagly & Steffen, 1984). Although most people
shun racial bias, racial discrimination remains prevalent
because prejudice can influence our judgments and behaviors in subtle, unexamined ways. Most biases can operate
outside of conscious awareness and control, nevertheless distorting our judgments and making discriminating all the
more difficult to avoid (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
Racial Bias and Public Policy: The Role
of Uncertainty
Racial bias can be implicit (relatively unconscious) or
explicit (conscious; see Blair, Dasgupta, & Glaser, in press,
for a review). Both implicit and explicit biases are widespread and lead to powerful, negative outcomes. At the
explicit level, for example, one need only to enter the phrase,
“Why are [insert group label here] people . . .” into a Google
search bar and scan the suggested topics to see that racial
stereotypes are alive and well, and often disparaging.
Psychological research has also demonstrated that cultural
stereotypes are ubiquitous, and this explicit knowledge is
independent of prejudice level (Devine, 1989). That is to say,
one does not need to be explicitly prejudiced (harbor negative feelings) against a racial or ethnic group to be influenced
by the stereotypes about that group.
Racial attitudes have steadily become less negative over
the last century, and attitudes toward race- and policy-relevant issues (e.g., integrated neighborhoods and schools,
interracial marriage) have become much more tolerant
(Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997), with increasing
willingness to vote for a Black candidate for president (Roper
Center, 2011), culminating in the actual election of Barack
Obama in 2008. However, as substantial research shows,
implicit bias is ever-present. People associate racial groups
with specific attributes (e.g., crime, weapons, simply “goodness” or “badness”) outside of conscious awareness and control. Such associations are separate from explicit attitudes,
though typically correlated (Nosek et al., 2007). Even people
committed to being egalitarian can and likely do still harbor
racial bias implicitly (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams,
1995; Plant & Devine, 1998).
Attitudes and beliefs predict behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein,
1977; Fredricks & Dossett, 1983). More specifically, in
response to racial outgroups, explicit attitudes predict verbal
treatment (such as conversation length and quality) and
deliberative responses (such as juries’ decisions). In contrast,
implicit associations predict non-verbal behavior (such as
body language and interpersonal distance; Dovidio,
Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson,
Johnson, & Howard, 1997) and they have been shown to
influence important judgments and behaviors (see Greenwald,
Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Jost et al., 2009, for
reviews). Both channels can cast a chill over high-stakes
encounters. These insights can have implications for public
policy, which often seeks to regulate consequential
behavior.
Policy analysis and practice is also about managing uncertainty. Policymakers manage by estimating uncertainty—
placing probability estimates on outcomes and “confidence
intervals” (margins of error) around costs and benefits, and
they seek solutions that maximize net benefits and minimize
uncertainty. However, policymakers never have complete information that will fully determine predictions. Consequently,
most policy decisions occur under uncertainty and ambiguity.
Furthermore, individual decisions by government officials or
with government oversight (e.g., police decisions to stop or
use force, prosecutorial decisions, national security decisions,
health care decisions) are made under uncertainty and often
with time pressure and distraction.
One of psychology’s established influences on public
policy is the understanding that decision-making under
uncertainty is often irrational (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
Contrary to economic theory’s prevailing assumption that
people rationally maximize utility, psychological research
has shown otherwise. Particularly under uncertainty, people
engage in heuristic processing, using cognitive shortcuts to
make judgments (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty
& Cacioppo, 1986). Stereotype-based judgments are a common heuristic, conserving mental resources when judging
other people, who present overwhelming, but incomplete
information (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). For example, when people’s cognitive resources are constrained (e.g., they are tired
or distracted), their judgments of others tend to be more stereotype-influenced (Bodenhausen, 1990). This is one reason
for a special relationship between psychology and public
policy, particularly in the domain of judgments regarding
social groups. Psychological science offers empirically
derived insights about decision-making and behavior under
uncertainty, both at issue in interracial encounters, both difficult to predict, but both central to public policy.
Sample Policy Domains Where Race Matters
Race bias and policy intersect in several key domains, areas
where race bias is particularly consequential and where relevant research findings are already available—education,
employment, immigration, health care, political representation, and criminal justice.
90
Education. The American Psychological Association, Presidential Task Force on Educational Disparities (2012) recently
found racial disparities in outcomes at all educational levels,
partly due to some groups experiencing specific types of
bias. Two examples are teacher expectancy effects and stereotype threat.
Students demonstrably perform to their teachers’ expectations, even if the expectations are randomly manipulated and
students do not know what they are (Rosenthal, 1991).
Teachers tend to underestimate the abilities of minority students, and these expectancies perpetuate inequality in education (Weinstein, Gregory, & Strambler, 2004).
Another contributor to racial disparities is stereotype
threat, which occurs for individuals from stigmatized groups
in situations where a stereotype applies. These individuals
then experience distraction related to the applicable stereotype, and often underperform as a result. Stereotype threat
has been implicated in academic underperformance for many
groups, the most common being women and African
Americans (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999; Steele &
Aronson, 1995). Stereotype threat has direct policy implications: (a) Women and minorities are underperforming on
standardized testing, and therefore being underrepresented in
high-status fields and positions, and (b) psychological
research has identified easy interventions to reduce the
effects, such as educating students about stereotype threat
(Johns, Schmader, & Martens, 2005), changing students’
theories about the malleability of intelligence (Aronson,
Fried, & Good, 2002), or self-affirmation (Cohen & Garcia,
2014).
Employment. The American Sociological Association found
that “race and ethnicity play significant roles in determining
job placement and career opportunities” (Spalter-Roth &
Lowenthal, 2005, p. 1). In addition, race-based disparities
occur in employment and unemployment rates, industry
type, job type and position, and pay. Successful lawsuits
demonstrate that claims of bias were warranted. Pepsi Beverages Company, Yellow Transportation Company, Albertsons
LLC, and Abercrombie and Fitch Stores, Inc. are just a few
major companies successfully sued in the last 10 years for
systemic discrimination (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Eradicating Racism and Colorism From
Employment, 2013). Furthermore, randomized audit experiments demonstrate biased responses of real firms to identical
resumes sent by ostensibly Black and White job applicants
(Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; see also Pager, 2003).
Psychological research helps explain why race matters to
employment. Implicit biases lead to disparities in employment
recruitment and hiring recommendations (Jost et al., 2009).
Experiments also demonstrate how racial bias can operate in
the workplace. In one study (Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974),
White participants sat farther away, made more speech errors,
and spent less overall time interviewing Black applicants compared with White applicants. In a follow-up study, some White
Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1(1)
participants—those who were treated like Black applicants
from the first study—were judged less adequate for the job
and more nervous than those who were treated like the White
applicants.
The current jurisprudence on employment discrimination
requires, in most cases, evidence of intent to discriminate.
The likelihood that much discrimination results from implicit
biases and is therefore not intentional at the individual level
has led legal scholars to call for changing how discrimination
cases are litigated and adjudicated (e.g., Krieger, 1995).
Immigration. Attitudes regarding race, ethnicity, and nationality play a central role in the immigration policy domain. As
one study demonstrated, the ethnicity of research participants and of those they judged predicted attitudes toward
immigration policies and hypothetical immigrant families,
even controlling for economic and legal concerns (Lee &
Ottati, 2002). Immigration policies often reflect these attitudes. Naturalization laws dating back to 1790 established
limitations on the immigrants from particular countries,
often reflecting shifts in xenophobic attitudes among U.S.
citizens (LeMay & Barkan, 1999). In 1882, the Chinese
Exclusion Act barred Chinese immigrants (Calavita, 2000).
More recently, Arizona’s SB 1070 requiring law enforcement
officers to determine immigration status during routine civilian stops arguably results in racial and ethnic discrimination
(Campbell, 2011), and research showing that famous White
foreigners are implicitly associated more strongly with being
American than famous non-White Americans are (Devos &
Banaji, 2005) indicates that racial or ethnic minority status is
a risk factor for discriminatory immigration enforcement.
Health care. Racial disparities in health outcomes and health
care delivery in the United States have been well documented
(e.g., Pamuk, Makuk, Heck, & Reuben, 1998). Psychologists
and medical researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that
one factor contributing to poor health outcomes is perceived
racial discrimination itself, which is a psychosocial stressor
that can lead to a number of harmful physiological responses
(Clark, Anderson, Clark, & Williams, 1999; Flores, Tschann,
Dimas, Pasch, & de Groat, 2010; Williams, Yu, Jackson, &
Anderson, 1997). Physicians’ treatment decisions present
another important pathway through which racial attitudes
may affect patient health outcomes. Physicians’ implicit
racial biases have been shown to predict their treatment decisions (Green et al., 2007); the strength of physicians’ implicit
anti-Black bias was negatively associated with their likelihood of prescribing the warranted treatment for Black
patients and positively associated for White patients.
Politics/representation. Minorities are underrepresented at virtually every level of governance, but this disparity is perhaps
most apparent at the national level. Hispanic citizens make
up 16.8% of the U.S. population, yet only 6.0% of Congress
self-identifies as Hispanic. Similarly, African Americans
Glaser et al.
occupy only 8.0% of the seats in Congress, despite making
up 14.1% of the U.S. population (Helderman, 2013; U.S.
Census Bureau, 2012). Racial bias likely accounts for part of
this underrepresentation. Data from the American National
Election Studies collected during the 2008 U.S. presidential
election revealed that explicit and implicit anti-Black biases
reliably predicted the tendency to vote for the White candidate, John McCain, and against the Black candidate, Barack
Obama (Finn & Glaser, 2010; Payne et al., 2009).
Racial Bias in Policing: An Illustrative Case
Psychological research has shown that some policing decisions are affected by racial bias. Reflecting concerns about
wrongful police shootings of unarmed Black men, a batch of
studies demonstrated that people implicitly associate Blacks
with weapons (Payne, 2001), will recognize weapons sooner
if they are paired with subliminal images of Black men
(Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004), and are faster to
shoot Black men holding guns than White men holding guns
and more likely to erroneously “shoot” unarmed Black than
White men in a simulation (Correll, Park, Judd, &
Wittenbrink, 2002). This shooter-bias is related to the
strength of one’s implicit associations between Blacks (vs.
Whites) and weapons (Glaser & Knowles, 2008).
The relevance of these findings to policing is not purely
speculative: The weapon-recognition finding replicates with
a sample of police officers, and police officers were more
likely to focus their gaze on a Black face compared with a
White face if they had been subliminally primed with crimerelated concepts (Eberhardt et al., 2004). Shooter-bias, too,
has been replicated with multiple, large samples of police
officers (Correll et al., 2007; see also Peruche & Plant, 2006).
Racial bias in police use of lethal force appears to be a real
and pronounced phenomenon with dire consequences for
affected victims, families, communities, and departments.
Bolstering this evidence is the finding that, in 10 known incidents of off-duty officers being fatally shot by on-duty officers, 9 of the victims were Black or Hispanic (New York
State Task Force on Police-on-Police Shootings, 2010).
Far more common than shooting or even using non-lethal
force is the decision about whom to stop for investigatory purposes. For the same reasons that activating thoughts of crime
causes police officers to look at Black people (Eberhardt et al.,
2004), police are more likely to conduct discretionary stops
and searches on Black and Hispanic people (Glaser, 2014). In
decisions made by law enforcement officers to stop and question civilians, policy guidance coming from command staff is
likely to be influential to the extent that supervisors expect a
large number of stops. This will require officers to stop people
at lower levels of suspicion.
The evidence from New York City’s Stop & Frisk program
is telling. For much of the last decade and a half, the New
York Police Department (NYPD) was stopping hundreds of
91
thousands of pedestrians annually, peaking at nearly 700,000
in 2011. Whites who were stopped and searched in the years
studied yielded contraband and weapons at higher rates than
did Blacks and Hispanics (Jones-Brown, Gill, & Trone,
2010). From the framework of outcome test analyses of racial
profiling (e.g., Knowles, Persico, & Todd, 2001), this is evidence of biased policing—White suspects probably have to
present with greater suspiciousness to get stopped.
Given the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Bill of Rights, racial profiling is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the policy direction delivered by the courts has allowed
officers a great deal of discretion, rendering racial profiling
an ineffective criminal defense. In Terry v. Ohio (1968), the
Supreme Court set a “reasonable suspicion” standard for
“pat-downs” of civilians (p. 8), resulting in the colloquial
term Terry stop for such interactions. They extended this
logic to vehicle stops, essentially ruling that racially biased
stops are permissible provided there is a race-neutral pretext
(Whren v. United States, 1996). However, in a few civil cases
the courts have agreed with legal scholars about the unconstitutionality of stops based on driver race or ethnicity. Some
of these cases, such as the Oakland, California, “Riders”
civil rights lawsuit, have resulted in court-administered consent decrees that include orders to cease and desist in biased
practices and require data collection by officers on all stops.
Despite the permissive nature of the Supreme Court’s rulings in cases alleging racial profiling, some state legislatures
have enacted laws banning the practice. According to the
Northeastern University Data Collection Resource Center, as
of 2011, 28 U.S. states had enacted laws relating to racial
profiling.
At the federal level, despite years of effort, the long and
dogged pursuit of a national policy on racial profiling has yet
to yield fruit. The executive branch has been somewhat more
successful in enacting policies related to racial profiling, but
they typically affect only federal law enforcement.
Although most states have banned racial profiling or
mandated relevant data collection, none have articulated
effective enforcement mechanisms. Perhaps the most traction in racial profiling policy is at the agency level. Police
chiefs’ views on profiling have evolved substantially over
recent decades, moving from a tendency toward denial to
open recognition of the problem. Departments that do not
take proactive steps run the risk of lawsuit and federal
investigation. The Center for Policing Equity, a consortium of scores of North American police chiefs and social
scientists working to reduce racial bias in policing, is in the
process of developing a national database of police stops
in an effort to better understand and mitigate racially
biased policing.1 Psychological measures will play a prominent role in this effort. In the absence of effective federal
or state regulation, agency leaders are taking initiative to
implement policies and practices to reduce the impact of
racial bias.
92
One policy recommendation for reducing racial bias in
policing, which should apply well across other domains, is to
limit the discretion that officers (or other decision-makers)
have in making their judgments. Higher discretion means
judgments made with greater uncertainty. Uncertainty invites
bias. Officers who are exhorted to make a lot of stops, and
who know that any stop with a valid pretext is permissible,
will be more likely to have race-crime stereotypes influence
their judgments. Reducing discretion should reduce racial
disparities.
Helping to Improve Public Policy With
Psychological Science Insight
Psychological research can help improve public policy relating to race bias in at least three ways. First, psychological
science reveals causes and processes. This is due largely to
experimental methods in psychology. The relationship
between cause and effect is best understood when the cause
can be directly manipulated rather than merely observed.
Identifying the actual cause for an unwanted effect is central
to creating policy to address such an outcome. A century of
psychological research has identified the core mechanisms
by which racial bias distorts our judgments and behaviors.
The relatively new recognition that much racial bias operates
outside of conscious awareness and control has critical
implications for policy. Krieger’s (1995) seminal legal scholarship applying research on implicit social cognition to
employment discrimination can serve as a model for considering how to enforce non-discrimination when conscious
intent is not a necessary condition. One approach may be to
hold decision-makers (e.g., personnel managers, admissions
staff, physicians, police officers) to an intent to not discriminate standard instead of the judicial standard of merely lacking an intent to discriminate. The courts have not yet been
willing to do this, but agency leaders (e.g., police chiefs)
have the latitude to apply such standards.
Second, psychological scientists can provide expert testimony in policy-relevant cases. Because much relevant policy is adjudicated in courts, appropriate research should be
represented there. However, providing expertise to lawmakers and executives, as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), is another plausible way for psychological
researchers to affect policy. To date, much of the social science advisory capacity to government has been from the
field of economics, in part because economists can effectively forecast fiscal outcomes, but they extend their expertise far beyond that. Psychologists offer unique and
well-established perspectives on racial bias, decision-making, and behavior.
Third, psychological research can generate and evaluate
interventions for reducing racial bias and its effects. The
example of stereotype threat, discussed previously, is one
research domain in which several interventions have been
identified and tested (Cohen & Garcia, 2014; Schmader &
Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1(1)
Hall, 2014). A more general bias-reducing intervention is
intergroup contact, where simply having contact with outgroup members dramatically decreases intergroup prejudice
(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Educating the public about diversity has also been empirically found to affect long-term
thoughts, feelings, and abilities regarding outgroup members
(Kalinoski et al., 2013). Intensive counter-attitudinal or nonstereotypic training can decrease bias in hiring (Kawakami,
Dovidio, & van Kamp, 2005). Psychological research on
race bias is broad and deep, and can be a resource for
policymakers.
Conclusion
The intersection of race bias and public policy resonates
deeply with Western values. Much of the story of American
history reflects a slow but steady march from racial oppression to high acceptance and tolerance, including the election
of a Black man to the presidency. Complacence, however,
would be ill-advised. Spontaneous social categorization,
automatic preference for one’s own group, stereotyping, the
need to rationalize inequities, and other psychological processes imply that race bias is normative. The mere knowledge of stereotypes, even with conscious repudiation, is
sufficient to cause discrimination. That these stereotypes
reside beyond conscious access but nevertheless bias our
judgments indicates that merely not intending to discriminate is insufficient. Policymakers will do well to pursue
methods to mitigate the unintended effects of race bias.
Note
1.
The first author on this article is a principal investigator on the
national database project.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
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