The Effect of State Legislative Term Limits on Voter Turnout
Author(s): Kimberly Nalder
Source: State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer, 2007), pp. 187-210
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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TheEffect
ofStateLegislativeTermLimits
on VoterTurnout
Sacramento
KimberlyNalder,CaliforniaState University,
ABSTRACT
thatthereform
wouldrevitalize
theelectorate
andspur
Term
limits
advocates
argued
twomainmechanisms
increased
voterparticipation.
Theysuggested
bywhichterm
thenumber
wouldincrease
ofopen-seat
limits
woulddo this:( 1) termlimits
races,
andtheincreased
would
whichtendto be morecompetitive,
inspire
competition
ofentrenched
incumbents
wouldinspiremore
morevoting,
and (2) theremoval
voter
enthusiasm
ina more
ingovernment,
trust
andconfidence
thereby
encouraging
all
I
these
turnout
for
races.
evaluate
diffuse
hypotheses
empirically
way,increasing
statelegislative
racesfrom1976to 2004;incorporating
usingdatafromCalifornia
I find
time-series
a variety
ofmethods,
pooledcross-sectional
regression.
including
thereformers'
term
limits
notonlyfailtoachieve
evidence
thatstatelegislative
goals,
voterturnout.
infact,
decrease
butthey,
termssweptthroughtheAmericanstates
a movement to limitlegislative
in theearly-and mid-1990s.Proponentsarguedthattermlimitswouldbe a
panacea formuchof whatailed thebodypolitic,includingtheproblemof
dismalpoliticalparticipation
(Fund 1990;Jacob1994).The factthatscholars
and punditshavebeen bemoaningthedeclinein Americanvoterturnout
forthepast 50 yearsgavethisargumentgreatappeal (Miller 1992; Piven
and Cloward2000).
on theimpactoftermlimitshastendedto focus
Politicalscienceresearch
institutional
on policy,governance,
on thereform's
effects
powerdynamics,
Cain
and
Kousser2004;
and
1999;
behavior,
(Cain
partyleadership
legislative
1998
and
Chi
and
and
Powell
Caress1996;Carey,
2000;
Niemi,
1998).
Leatherby
to theelectoralconsequencesof termlimitshas focused
Scholarlyattention
and competition
on legislative
turnover,
(Daniel and Lott1997;
composition,
Francisand Kenny1997;Moncrief1998;Mondak 1995;Petracca1996;Yang
claimsthattermlimitswouldincreasevoterparticipation
2002). Reformers'
Vol.7,No.2 (Summer
andPolicy
StatePolitics
2007):pp.187-210
Quarterly,
oftheUniversity
ofIllinois
©2007bytheBoardofTrustees
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
l88
NALDER
havelargely
I fillthisgapbyexploring
therelationship
between
goneuntested.
termlimitsand turnoutusingdistrict-level
datafromCaliforniastatelegislativeracesfrom1976to 2004.Contrary
to expectations,
myanalysesshowthat
termlimitshavereducedvoterturnoutin statelegislative
races.
REFORMERS, TERM LIMITS, AND INCREASED TURNOUT
Reformers
termlimitsinitiatives
advocatingthepassageof statelegislative
in the1990ssawa clearlinkbetweenlimitedtermsand increasedvoterparTheseadvocatesarguedthattermlimitswouldrevitalize
a passive
ticipation.
and cynicalelectorate
and bringvotersbackto thepolls.Oustingentrenched
and disconnected
incumbents
wouldpavethewayforcitizen-leglegislative
in thesystem.
We can see
more
citizen
confidence
islators,
thereby
inspiring
thesereformers'
commitment
to thisline of argumentin theirown words,
takenfromvariousarticlesand pamphletssupportingtermlimits:
• "Elections
ofthestatusquo,
resemblesullenratifications
increasingly
ratherthancompetitive
as pubandvoterturnoutis suffering
contests,
licinterest
inpoliticsdeclines. . . Voterturnoutto selectnewoccupants
foropen seatsforgovernor,
U.S. senator,or U.S. representative
is often
muchhigherthanitis forracesin whichan entrenched
incumbentis
running"(Fund 1990,235).
• "Termlimitswillmean
advanopenelectionswithno hugeincumbent
in
most
will
circumstances.
Each
candidate
have
the
same
advantage
tages.Bettercandidateswillbe willingto run.Voterswillwantto be
involvedand participation
willimprove"(Americans
to LimitCongressionalTerms1992,28).
• "Votershavelittlechoiceat the
polls.That'sone reasonvoterturnout
has fallenfrom48 percentin the 1966 congressionalelectionsto 32
percenttoday"(Coyneand Fund 1992,26).
• "The successof termlimitsat thelocal levelis drivenmostoften a
by
desireto rejuvenatecitizenparticipation"(Jacob1994,29).
Wecanseethisargument
mostclearly
inreformers'
official
caseforCalifornia'stermlimitsinitiative,
in
the
state's
1990
Ballot
140,
Proposition
Pamphlet,
whichwasmailedtoallregistered
votersinCalifornia
ofState's
bytheSecretary
office.
Thatpamphletstated:"Whydon'tmorepeoplevote?Becauseincumbentshaveriggedthesystem
intheirfavorso much,electionsaremeaningless.
Eventheworstoflegislators
98 percent
ofthetime.Honest,ethical,
getreelected
trulyrepresentative
peoplewho wantto runforofficedon'tstanda chance"
of State1990,12). Furtherevidenceof thecurrency
of
(CaliforniaSecretary
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SUMMER 2007
/
STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY
189
thisargumentthattermlimitsopponentsdid not disagreethatthereform
wouldincreasepoliticalparticipation;
instead,theyarguedthattermlimits
weresimplya poormeansofachievingthat,or any,ofthereformers'
ultimate
ends(Cain 1994).
HOW MIGHT TERM LIMITS AFFECT VOTER TURNOUT?
we see twomechanismsbywhich
arguments,
Breakingdownthereformers'
voter
term
limits
influence
turnout.First,termlimitsmight
might
legislative
ofelections,particularly
thecompetitiveness
boostturnoutbyincreasing
by
thenumberofopen-seatraces,whicharemorecompetitive
than
increasing
thosewithincumbents(Daniel and Lott 1997; Francisand Kenney1997;
Powell2000). Electoralcompetitionattractscitizensto thepolls (Endersby,
Collettand Griffin
1998;Timpone
Gaiatas,and Rackaway2002; Groffman,
1998),eitherbecauseofa Downsiancalculusshiftand thehigherprobability
theoutcome(Cox and Munger1989;Downs 1957;
ofeachvoteinfluencing
Nicholsonand Miller1997;Pattersonand Caldeira1983) or becauseofthe
and
ofpoliticalelitesintheformofcampaignexpenditures
increasedactivity
othersuchefforts
(Brown,Powell,and Wilcox1995;Cox and Munger1989;
and Hansen1993).l Indeed,
Gilliam1985;Hilland Leighley1993;Rosenstone
California
earlyanalysesfoundincreasedcompetitionin theterm-limited
in particular,
withmoreopen seats,morecandidates,and
statelegislature,
closermarginsaftertermlimits(Clucas 2004; but see themixedresultsin
instateand localracesmoregenerally
Salka2002) and increasedcompetition
Basham
and
Polhill
2005; Francisand Kenney1997).
(Basham2001;
Thesecondmechanism
bywhichtermlimitsmightincreasevoterturnout
and attitudinalchangesthatthereformmight
is throughtheinstitutional
cause (Moncriefetal. 1992;Will1992).Termlimitsmighteliminatesomeof
and frustration
withincummistrust
ofgovernment,
thecausesofalienation,
thatareassociatedwithdepressedturnout(Franklin1996;
bencyadvantages
supportfor
Timpone1998),andtheymightinspireinvotersthesortofdiffuse
The
election
that
(Easton
1965).
politicalparticipation
government generates
in
confidence
the
motives
of
lawmakof citizen-legislators
mightpromote
and opennessencouragecitizens'trustin government
ers,and sincefairness
2004;HibbingandThiess-Morse
(BowlerandDonovan2002;HeroandTolbert
2001,2002; Leviand Stoker2000),termlimitscould thereby
promotesuch
And thereis good evidencethatgreatertrustin government
trustindirectly.
increasesvoterparticipation
1998,1999;Norris1999;Craig
(Hetherington
dreamsofa newageofinvolve1996;Putnam2000).Iftermlimitsproponents'
and thepolitical
betweenvoters,
mentand connection
candidates,
legislators,
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190
NALDER
processdawned(Benjaminand Malbin1992;Carey,Niemi,and Powell2000;
of government
Fund 1990;Jacob1994;Petracca1992),perhapsthedistrust
associatedwithsupportfortermlimits(Karp 1995)wouldbe reversed.
In thisarticle,I testthefirstmechanismdirectly,
by assessingwhether
termlimitsincreasethe numberof open-seatraces,leadingto increased
electoralcompetitionand greatervoterturnout.I do not directlytestthe
secondmechanism,
thattermlimitsincreasevotertrustand confidence
and,
we
if
is
at
this
second
mechanism
work,
However,
thereby,
participation.
shouldfindevidenceofincreasedturnoutaftertheimpositionoftermlimits
forall races,notjustthosewithopen seats.
VOTER PARTICIPATION AND STATE LEGISLATIVE RACES
Whilereformers
arguedthattermlimitswouldincreasevoterparticipation
and revitalizetheelectorate,
thereis good reasonto believethatthereform
far
on
statelegislativeraces,thanon gubernatorial,
have
less
effect
might
or
congressional, presidentialraces.Duringan electionseason,votersare
and thelevelofinforexposedto variousstreamsofcampaigninformation,
mationcomingfromthesestreamslikelyincreaseswiththeprominenceof
racesmay
therace.The influences
fromthemore-visible,
top-of-the-ticket
fromthelower-level
overshadowanyinfluences
races.Thus,whileincreased
in higher-level
evena highly
racesmaystimulate
voterturnout,
competition
statelegislativeracemaynotbe noticedbythemarginalvoter,
competitive
thusfailingto affect
theprobability
thathe or shewouldvote(Jackson1997;
Smith2001).
On theotherhand,some evidencesuggeststhatdown-ballotracescan
influence
turnout.
racescan increaseturnouteven
Competitive
gubernatorial
inpresidential
electionyears(Boyd1986;Wolfinger
andRosenstone1980;Hill
and Leighley1993,1994;Patterson
and Caldeira1983),and mostrelevant
to
thisstudy,
Tucker(1986) foundthatclosestatelegislative
contestscan sometimesincreasevoterturnout.Othersalientand competitive
down-ballot
conlikeinitiative
can
also
boost
Tolbert
and
turnout
tests,
2001;
(Smith
campaigns,
Smith2005). Thus,statelegislative
termlimitsmightincreasevoterturnout,
butthefactthattheraceis fardowntheballotcoulddampenthiseffect.2
EVIDENCE
FROM THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE
To testthereformers'
thattermlimitswillincreasevoterturnout,
hypothesis
I use a datasetcomposed of electoraldata forthe 80-memberCalifornia
and the40-memberCaliforniaStateSenate.The legislative
district
Assembly
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SUMMER 2OO7
/
STATE POLITICS
AND POLICY QUARTERLY
ICI
is theunitofanalysisin thisdatasetforgeneralelectionsfrom1974to 2004.
in a singlestatenecessarily
raisesquestionsofgeneralizTestinghypotheses
butstrongpracticaland theoretical
reasonssupporttheuse ofthese
ability,
Californiadataforthisstudy.First,sinceCaliforniawas one ofthefirst
three
statesto pass a termlimitsinitiative,
it offersmorepost-term-limits
data
thanalmostanyotherstate.Californiais also thenation'smostpopulous
districts
and
state,withextremely
largelegislative
containingexceptionally
diverse
Alvarez
and
But2000,
2002;
(Baldassare
populations
increasingly
terfield
thatof the
2000), and theethnicmixof Californiansapproximates
nationas a whole.Finally,
rather
than
districts,
states,as the
usinglegislative
unitof analysisyieldsa largesamplesize,allowingmoreefficient
statistical
Meier
and
withits
Therefore,
California,
2002).
analysis(Nicholson-Crotty
term
and
diverse
and
of
serves
as a
limits,
population
earlyadoption
large
termlimitson
of legislative
reasonablelaboratoryforexploringtheeffects
voterturnout.
I useseveralmethodstotestthehypothesis
oftermlimits'affect
on turnout.
if
term
should
consistent
limitsare
Thesedifferent
yield
findings
approaches
I
the
of
assess
whether
number
indeedinfluencing
voterparticipation.
First,
oftermlimits.
sincetheimposition
Second,I assessthe
openseatshasincreased
ofanysuchopenseatson electoralcompetition.
effect
Third,I assesswhether
overallturnoutratesaregenerally
higherafterthepassageofProposition140
theirpatternovertime.Fourth,I compareturnoutin open-seat
bytracking
I lookfor
races.Fifth,
racestoturnoutinincumbent-contested
statelegislative
full
of
before
and
after
the
in
turnout
same-district
implementation
changes
cross-sectional
time-series
Andsixth,I estimate
termlimits.
pooled
regression
for
on voterturnoutwhilecontrolling
modelsto look fortermlimits'effects
variables.
otherturnout-associated
TERM LIMITS AND ELECTORAL COMPETITION:
OPEN SEATS
Reformers
arguedthatoustingincumbentsand creatingmore open-seat
and voterturnout.
racesis thefirst
steptowardgreaterelectoralcompetition
Mydatasuggestthattermlimitshaveclearlycausedan increasein open-seat
racesin California.Figure1 showsthepercentageofopen-seatracesforthe
theUnitedStatesHouse
and Senateand forcomparison,
California
Assembly
seatsin Californiaduringthestudyperiod.Notethatthe
ofRepresentatives
percentageof open-seatracesincreasesin all thesechambersfollowingthe
wouldbe
passageofProposition140in 1990,eventhoughno statelegislator
wouldever
termedoutforthreemoreelectioncyclesand no congressperson
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192
NALDER
be termedout. Butthedifference
betweenthestateand federalofficesafter
1990is striking.
Whilethenumberof open-seatracesreturnsto itsnormal
racescontinueto have
lowlevelforHouse racesby 1994,thestatelegislative
a highnumberofopen-seatraceseach year.This increasein thenumberof
effect
raceswithoutincumbentsis theprimaryand moststraightforward
oftermlimits,and itis a likelypreconditionto anyrelatedincreasein comon voterturnout(Moncrief,Niemi,and Powell2003). But
petitionor effect
this
interestingly, risein open-seatracesappearsto be drivenlargelybythe
Much oftheirrise
threatoftermlimitsas muchas bythelimitsthemselves.
came withtermlimits'passage,withlittleadditionalriseafterthe limits
wereactuallyin force.
The questionremainsaretheseopen-seatracestrulymorecompetitive?
candidates
Figure2 depictsthemeanvotemarginbetweenthemajor-party
so thata highernumbermeansa closerrace) in open(coded as theinverse,
Figure1. Open-Seat Races forthe CaliforniaStateAssemblyand Senate and the
fromCalifornia,1972-2004.
UnitedStatesHouse of Representatives
Source:California
ofState,"Statement
ofVote."
Secretary
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STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY
I93
seatand incumbent-contested
racesversusthosein theAssembly.Clearly,
2
shows
that
these
open-seatraceswere,on thewhole,morecompetiFigure
tive.3Thus,thesedata supportthefirstpartof the reformer's
hypothesis,
thattermlimitslead to moreopen seatsand thattheseopen-seatracesare
morecompetitive.
TERM LIMITS AND TURNOUT
Did thosecompetitive
racestranslate
intohighervoterturnout?
A simpletest
of thishypothesis
is whetheroverallturnoutrateshaveincreasedsincethe
inIncumbent-Contested
2. Competitiveness
andOpen-Seat
Races,California
Figure
StateAssembly,
1972-2004.
are theinverseof themeanvotemarginforstatelegislative
Note:Data reported
generalelectionracesin each
electionyear.Highernumbersindicatecloserraces.
Source:California
ofState,"Statement
ofVote."
Secretary
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194
NALDER
oftermlimits.
themeanvoter
turnout4
forallCalifornia
imposition
Tracking
in
districts
elections
that
shows
California
hasfollowed
legislative
general
thenationaltrendofsteadily
withcertain
turnout,
decreasing
exceptional
likethe2004general
election.
thistrendis notquiteas
elections,
However,
as somehaveexpected
(Teixiera
1992).In part,thisisbecause
pronounced
I calculate
as thepercentage
voterturnout
ofregistered
voters
votingin a
rather
thanasthemore-often-used
ofvoting-age
district,
populapercentage
tionvoting(VAP).ButtheVAPturnout
rateis decreasing,
inpart,because
thenumbers
residents
ofineligible
areincreasing,
(non-citizens
especially)
5
in
California
and
2001
avoids
(McDonald Popkin ). Myapproach
especially
ifsomeexogenous
thispitfall.
couldbeproblematic
Admittedly,
mymeasure
suchas theimplementation
ofa "motorvoter"registration
lawartifactor,
in
its
the
number
of
voter
inflated
denominator.
But,
fact,
registraficially
wasaffected
littlebytheNational
VoterRegistration
Act
tionsinCalifornia
voterdatais notavailableevery
(NVRA)in 1996.6Eligible
yearduringmy
in
California
state
therefore,
districts;
calculating
study
period
by
legislative
tovoteisthemostreasonable
measure
voter
turnout
amongthoseregistered
formystudy.
inthemidterm
AsseeninFigure
3,thedownward
slopeisquiteevident
for
a
linear
election
but
follows
less
election
years.7
pattern presidential
years,
inpresidenturnout
between
oscillation
Thedatashowtheexpected
higher
inmidterm
butconsider
tialelection
elections,
any
yearsandlowerturnout
Termlimits
oftermlimits.
inturnout
sincetheinstitution
potential
changes
so wemight
wereenactedin 1990inCalifornia,
expecttoseesomechanges
in
since
voters
invoterbehavior
mayhavebeenawarethat
beginning 1992,
whose
terms
wouldbe oflimited
members
orre-electing
theywereelecting
no dramatic
took
duration.
Butas Figure3 indicates,
changein turnout
term
140
but
before
in
the
transition
after
Proposition passed
years
place
in 1996.No jumpinturnout
is seen
intheAssembly
limitstookfulleffect
in
in 1996orin 1998,whentermlimitsbecameeffectivetheSenate.
either
in 1998
In fact,therewasa decreaseofthreepercentage
pointsinturnout
There
an
in
election
in
1994.
was
turnout
from
theprevious
uptick
off-year
inthepresidential
election
trend
years2000and2004,butsinceno similar
itseemsreasonable
toassume
isfoundinthesurrounding
elections,
off-year
contests
wereresponsible
forthese.
thattheclosepresidential
Whiletheseoverallturnout
ratesdo notseemto havebeenpositively
that
termlimitsproponents'
was
affected
term
recall
limits,
by
argument
thatitwastheincreased
associated
withmoreopen-seat
races
competition
morevoterturnout.
Toevaluate
thatwouldgenerate
thislinkbetween
open
seatsand increased
I pooledall theyearsin thetime-series
and
turnout,
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SUMMER 2007
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STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY
I95
Figure3. Mean DistrictTurnoutin GeneralElectionsforCaliforniaStateLegislative
vs.MidtermElections).
Seats,1976-2004(Presidential
Note:Turnoutis calculatedas thepercentage
of registered
votersvotingin statelegislative
districts
in general
elections.
ofState,"ReportofRegistration"
Source:California
and "Statement
ofVote."
Secretary
calculatedthemeanturnoutforopen-seatracesversusincumbent-contested
races.Figure4 showsthe mean districtturnoutfortheseraceseach year,
thatthesedifferences
wereminimal.Whatis perhapsmost
demonstrating
is
the
of
2
comparison Figure - showinghigherlevelsof competistriking
in
tionin open-seatraces- withFigure4, whichshowsverylittledifference
turnoutbetweenthetwotypesof races.Whileopen-seatracesarecertainly
morecompetitive,
thatcompetitionfailedto translateintoincreasedvoter
turnout.
TERM LIMITS AND TURNOUT: COMPARING THE SAME
DISTRICT ACROSS TIME
thatterm
Perhapsthemoststraightforward
wayto evaluatethehypothesis
limitsincreasevoterturnoutistocompareturnoutinthesamedistrict
before
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RacesversusOpen-SeatRaces
Figure4. DistrictTurnoutin Incumbent-Contested
in theCaliforniaAssembly,1976-2004.
Note:Legislative
district
turnoutis calculatedas thepercentage
of registered
votersvotingin thegeneralelection.
ofVote."
Source:California
ofState,"ReportofRegistration"
and "Statement
Secretary
thehypothesis
and aftertheimplementation
oftermlimits.Specifically,
sugbaseline,turnoutratesshouldbegin
geststhatfroma lowerpre-term-limits
to riseafterthepassageoftermlimits(theelectionsof 1992,1994,and 1996
fortheSenate)and arriveat a new,higherplateauonceall old membershave
beentermedout ofofficeand the"newbreed"oflegislators
takestheirplace
(19968fortheAssemblyand 1998and beyondforbothchambers).
A valid testof thishypothesisis morecomplicatedthanit mightfirst
and
appear.The mostproblematicissue is thedecennialreapportionment
whichprecludesdirectcomparisonof,say,AssemblyDistrict
redistricting,
6 in 1988 withAssemblyDistrict6 in 1992,since the districtboundaries
sincethe firsteleeacrossdecades. Furthermore,
shift,oftendramatically,
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SUMMER 2OO7
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STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY
I97
tion afterthe 1990 redistricting
is also the firstelectionafterthe passage
we
cannot
even
makestraightforward
of Proposition140,
comparisonsof
turnoutin a singledecade.A seconddifficulty
is
pre-and post-term-limits
thenon-comparability
ofpresidential
and midtermelectionvoterturnout,
less meaningful.
rendering
comparisonsat two-yearintervals
after
these
data
Nevertheless, taking
problemsintoaccount,fivepairsof
electionsremainin whicha transitional
periodelection(aftertheadoption,
oftermlimits)can validlybe combutbeforethecompleteimplementation,
with
an
election
for
which
term
limits
had been fullyimplemented.
pared
ThosepairsofelectionsareAssemblyracesin 1992and 1996,and 1992and
2000(presidential
electionyears)and 1994and 1998(midterm
electionyears);
electionyears),and 1994and 1998
Senateracesin 1992and 2000(presidential
(midtermelectionyears).
To the extentthatdistrictcompositionhas not changeddramatically
betweenelections,comparingthe same districtsacrosscomparableelecof termlimitsholds constant
tionsbeforeand afterthe implementation
In
additionto overallturnoutin
factors
that
could
influence
turnout.
many
thathave
theseraces,an especiallygood comparisonwouldbe thosedistricts
limitsyears.Sincethepresenceor
open-seatracesinbothpre-and post-term
a race'scompetitiveness
its
absenceofan incumbentcan affect
and,thereby,
is
enhanced
races.
Therefore,
turnout,comparability
byisolatingopen-seat
thathad open seatsforbothelections
I separately
analyzedthefewdistricts
in a pair.
Tables 1 and 2 displaythesecomparisonsand revealsome surprising
versusfullyterm-limIn particular,
we seethatin everytransitional
results.9
itedracecomparison,turnoutactuallydecreasedaftertermlimitstookfiali
for
themeanturnoutdifference
Thisoutcomeoccurswhenmeasuring
effect.
a
and
the
in a transition
versus
for
all districts
year
full-implementation
year
significant
open-seatpairedsubsets.Theseturnoutdecreasesarestatistically
andconsistently
largerfortheopen-seatpairsthanintheoverallcomparisons
theoverwhelming
(Table1). Table2 showsthatforeachfiveyear-pair,
majorand
94
of
individual
a
districts
65
percent)
registered
ity(between percent
Thiseffect
is more
decreaseinturnoutafterfulltermlimitsimplementation.
electionyearsthanin midtermelectionsand in
pronouncedin presidential
Evenifotherexogenousfactors
theopen-seatpairsthanintheoverallfigures.
influenced
turnoutin anygivenelectionyear,
in theelectoralenvironment
thisconsistent
patternacrosspairsof yearsand in bothchamberssuggests
is in theopposite
voterturnout,
butthiseffect
thattermlimitshaveaffected
advocatesand politicaltheory.
directionfromthatexpectedbyterm-limits
the
One explanationforthisunexpectedresultis thatit simplyreflects
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198
NALDER
Table1. ComparingLegislative
DistrictTurnoutbeforeand aftertheFull
- MeanDistrict
ofTermLimitsin theCalifornia
Implementation
Legislature
TurnoutComparisons
StateAssembly
California
LimitFullImplementation
ChangefromPre-to Post-Term
Presidential
Elections
Meandistrict
turnout
Meanmatchedopen-seatturnout
Numberofopen-seatpairs
92 vs.96
-9%**
-10%**
4
92 vs.00
-3%**
-5%**
12
Elections
Mid-term
94 vs.98
-2%**
-3%**
7
California
StateSenate
LimitFullImplementation
ChangefromPre-to Post-Term
Mid-term
Elections
Presidential
Elections
Meandistrict
turnout
Meanmatchedopen-seatturnout
Numberofopen-seatpairs
92 vs.00
-2%**
-5%**
4
94 vs.98
-3%**
0
inwhichtheseatwasopenin bothelections
1.Matchedopen-seatnumbersarederivedfromonlythosedistricts
beingcompared.
** Foreach
theresults
ofmeanst-test
wasperformed,
and ineveryinstance,
pairofturnoutmeans,a difference
at p < .001.
werestatistically
significant
of termlimits
Note:FortheCaliforniaSenate,no seatswereopen in both1994and 1998.FullImplementation
did nottakeplacein theSenateuntil1998,henceno 92 versus96 fortheSenate.
theUnitedStatesin
turnout
ratesthroughout
generaltrendofdropping
decades.
Butevenifthisistrue,
atthevery
term
limits
havefailed
recent
least,
tostopthatgeneral
slidetoward
lowervoting
rates.
REGRESSION MODELS
Thepreceding
oftheability
ofterm
analyses
painta disappointing
picture
limitsto increase
voterparticipation.
Butperhapsthetrueeffects
ofterm
limitson turnout
areobscured
factors.
Tocontrol
byotherturnout-related
I testedtheincreased-turnout
forsuchfactors,
hypothesis
usinga pooled
cross-sectional
time-series
with
rate
model
district-level
turnout
regression
as thedependent
variable.10
Thedataforthisanalysis
arefromCalifornia
StateAssembly
racesfrom1986to 2004.TheSenateraces
generalelection
arenotincluded
becauseonlyhalfofitsseats(20of40) appearontheballot
inanyoneelection
toofewcasesandpanelproblems.
year,
yielding
I estimatea modelpoolingall yearsin thetime-series
and separate
modelsforpresidential
andmidterm
electionyearssinceturnout
fluctuatesso dramatically
between
them(Jackson
and
1997;Tolbert,
Grummel,
Smith2001). Model 1 in Table3 includesall ofthestudyyears,witha
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STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY
I99
Table2. Comparing LegislativeDistrictTurnoutbeforeand afterthe Full Implementation of TermLimitsin the CaliforniaLegislature- Percentageof DistrictsChanging
TurnoutRate
California
StateAssembly
LimitFullImplementation
ChangefromPre-to Post-Term
Presidential
Elections
92 vs.96
withturnout
% ofdistricts
drop
frompre-topost-term
limits
94%
withturnout
increase
% ofdistricts
frompre-topost-term
limits
6%
with
% ofmatchedopen-seatdistricts
limits 100%
turnout
dropfrompre-to post-term
4
Numberofopen-seatpairs
Mid-term
Elections
92 vs.00
94 vs.98
85%
65%
12%
26%
100%
12
86%
7
California
StateSenate
LimitFullImplementation
ChangefromPre-to Post-Term
Presidential
Elections
withturnout
% ofdistricts
dropfrom
pre-topost-termlimits
withturnoutincrease
% ofdistricts
limits
frompre-to post-term
with
% ofmatchedopen-seatdistricts
limits
turnout
dropfrompre-to post-term
Numberofopen-seatpairs
92 vs.00
Mid-term
Elections
94 vs.98
80%
70%
20%
15%
100%
4
0
arederivedfromonlythosedistricts
inwhichtheseatwasopeninbothelections
1.Matchedopen-seatnumbers
beingcompared.
of termlimits
Note:FortheCalifornia
Senate,no seatswereopen in both1994and 1998.FullImplementation
election
forpresidential
years.Model2 includesonlypresidential
dummy
electionyears.11
Because
electionyearsand Model3 usesonlymid-term
more
models
of
control
variables,
specified
permitting fully
demographic
12
1
were
1
voter
available
for
moddistrict-level turnout,
986-2004, report
I also estimated
themodelswith
forthoseyears.However,
elsestimated
thedemographic
and
a longertimeseries(1976-2004)without
controls,
drawnfromthoseanalyses
those
drawn
thegeneralconclusion
paralleled
here.
fromthemodelsreported
as thenumberof
variableis turnout,
whichis defined
Thedependent
raceinthatdistrict
dividedbythenumberof
votescastinthatlegislative
a percentage).
Notethatthis
voters(multiplied
by100,yielding
registered
of
whocasta
defines
voter
turnout
not
as
the
number
voters
formulation
butasthosewhovotedinthatspecific
race.
ballotinthatelection,
legislative
value
ballot
rolloff
would
decrease
this
relative
to
overall
Therefore,
any
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200
NALDER
turnout.
I usetwovariables
to operationalize
termlimits:termlimits
and
seat.
Term
limits
is
a
variable
coded
0
before
140
open
Proposition
dummy
tookfulleffect
and 1 afterlegislators
out.SinceI am
beganto be termed
to
races,allelections
onlyusingdatafromAssembly
prior 1996arecoded
from1996forward
arecodedI.13Sincetermlimitsleadto
0,andelections
moreopenseats,I includeda dummy
variable,
openseat(coded1 foran
a proxy
testforthisspecific
race),toprovide
open-seat
impactofthereform
whenall elseremainsconstant.
Becauseopen-seatracesbeforeand after
termlimitsmaynotbe comparable,
I alsoestimated
alternate
formulations
ofthemodelswithanopen-seat*term-limit
interaction
term.
Theestimated
coefficient
forthisinteraction
inanymodel,
wasnotstatistically
significant
anditis notincludedinthemodels.
I alsoincludeda variety
ofindependent
variables
to controlforother
and
forces
on
In
turnout.
included
votemargin
(coded
political demographic
as theinverse,
so thathigher
valuesmeancloserresults)
as a proxy
forcomsincecloseelections
aregenerally
associated
withhigher
turnout.
petitiveness,
1
is
coded
for
a
Democratic
and
for
a
0
Winning
party
Republican
victory
inthemobilization
ratesofthe
win;thisvariableshouldpickup variation
Uncontested
isa dummy
foruncontested
races,sincea candimajorparties.
daterunning
isunlikely
torousemuchvoterinterest
(Wrighton
unopposed
andSquire1997).U.S.Senateraceis a dummy
forthepresence
ofa United
StatesSenateraceontheballot.I includethisvariable
sincesuchcampaigns
morevoterinterest
andbringthemto thepolls.Visible
ballot
mayattract
measures
the
number
of
ballot
measures
that
were
familiar
to50
represents
of
the
electorate
in
or
more
the
statewide
Field
Poll
taken
closest
percent
to theelection,14
becausesuchballotmeasures
mightboostvoterturnout
andSmith2005).15
2003;Tolbert
(Nicholson
Thedemographic
control
variables
aremeansforeachdistrict
basedon
UnitedStatesCensusdatafor1990and2000.Thevaluesareassigned
tothe
electionyearin whichthecensuswastakenand thetwoelections
before
andafterit.Education
is operationalized
as thepercentage
oftheover-25
Another
variable
with
population
holdingan Associates'
degreeorhigher.
a strong
theoretical
connection
toturnout,
medianhousehold
was
income,
toohighly
correlated
withthiseducation
variable
toincludeinmymodel.I
usededucation
becauseitislesslikely
tobe distorted
overtime,
bychanges
likeinflation
and shifts
in theeconomy,
whichthecensusdatacouldnot
accountfor.Minority
is a roughmeasureoftheracialcomposition
ofthe
district.
Sinceethnic
werenotconsistent
overthesecensuses,
I use
categories
thenon-white
ofthepopulation.
percentage
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STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY
201
Findings
Themostremarkable
from
thisanalysis
isthat,evencontrolling
for
finding
termlimitscontinue
otherinfluences
on turnout,
to be associated
witha
inthesestatelegislative
decrease
invoterparticipation
races.Notonlydoes
I discussed
thisfinding
confirm
thevariouscomparisons
in previous
secintheregression
italsoproved
tobeextremely
robust
Allthree
models.
tions,
modelsin Table3 exhibit
a negative
between
thetermlimits
relationship
andturnout,
butthepattern
alsoheldforthemanyalternate
measures
conof
the
models
with
a
models
time-series,
figurations model,including
longer
a timetrendwiththeopen-seat
modelsthatincluded
measure,
including
andmodelswithmeasures
ofcompetitiveness
in
expenditures,
campaign
otherraces.16
is estimated
to reduceturnout
overallby1.86
Thetermlimitsmeasure
thefullimplementation
oftermlimits,
pointsafter
by2.21perpercentage
and
.64
in
elections
pointsin midpercentage
points presidential
centage
after
this
result
occurs
even
forthe
termelections.
controlling
Importantly,
This
lends
the
idea
credence
to
ofopenseatson turnout. outcome
effect
not
on theelectoral
environment
do havean effect
thattermlimits
overall,
one
that
this
effect
is
the
that
but
for
races,
exactly
opposite
just open-seat
racesalsoareestimated
tohave
hadpredicted.
reformers
Indeed,open-seat
on
the
coefficients
anindependentbutnegativeeffect turnout;
although
thanthosefortermlimitsitself.
herearesmaller
variables
no surprisforthecontrol
coefficients
Theestimated
present
ofthis
in
the
robustness
of
the
results
confidence
further
es,
strengthening
forces
as
based
anddemographic
model.Thesepolitical
perform expected
withhigher
aboutcitizen
andtheory
onpastresearch
participation
minority
and
races
and
uncontested
districts
turnout,
education,
reducing
population
and
andUnitedStatesSenateraces,visibleballotmeasures,17
presidential
turnout.
closeracesstimulating
CONCLUSION
herethatwaspositedbyreformers
Thus,thecentral
explored
hypothesis
voter
turnout hasbeendisconfirmed
limits
wouldincrease
thatterm
bythe
If
term
limits
did
increase
with
the
reform.
California
political
experience
intomoreenthusiasm
thatittranslated
I findno evidence
trust
orefficacy,
intheaggregate;
infact,
itdecreased,
Turnout
wasnotincreased
forvoting.
a variety
ofcomparisons.
as I haveshownthrough
Furthermore,
myregres-
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Table3. Determinants
State
ofDistrict-Level
Turnoutin California
Races,1986-2004
Assembly
Independent Variables
VariablesofInterest
Term limits
Open seat
All Election Years
Modell
PresidentialElections
Model 2
Midterm Elections
Model 3
-1.864**
-2.211*
-.635*
(.513)
-.963**
(1.00)
-1.254**
(.300)
-.680
(.331)
(.356)
(.520)
Controls
Vote margin (inverse)
.051**
0.58**
.043**
Winning party
(.009)
-1.167**
(.014)
-.723
(.013)
-1.680**
Uncontestedseats
(.334)
-6.058**
(.394)
-5.021**
(.543)
-7.143**
U.S. Senate race
(1.073)
5.867**
(1.405)
6.581**
(1.619)
5.684**
(.582)
.868**
(1.141)
.888**
(.188)
1.100**
(.158)
12.840**
(.332)
(.086)
Visible ballot measures
Presidentialelection year
Minority
(.499)
-.122**
-.135**
-.109**
Education
(.025)
.104**
(.031)
.119**
(.034)
.089**
(.019)
43.769**
(.023)
55.679**
(.028)
42.848**
(1.793)
(2.234)
(2.070)
Constant
N
R2
800
400
400
.77
.62
.60
tests)
**p<.01;*p<.05 (two-tailed
Noie:Thesearepooledcross-sectional
errors(PCSEs)
time-series
modelswithpanelcorrected
standard
regression
in parentheses.
The estimated
areunstandardized.
coefficients
reported
reported
sion analysesshowedthatevenonce a varietyofpoliticaland demographic
controlsare introduced,
we stillfindclearevidencethattermlimitscaused
a decreasein turnoutforCaliforniaassemblyraces.
butveryconsistent,
Whydo we havethesesurprising,
Perhaps
findings?
termlimits'effect
on candidatenamerecognition
to do with
has something
it.Termlimitsbringnewcandidates,incumbents
or not,to votersmorefreraces
after
term
limits
Open-seat
quently.
maypresenta slateofevenless-reccandidates
than
incumbent-contested
elections.
The reducedturnout
ognized
effects
oftermlimitsand openseatsarebothstronger
in presidential
election
yearsthanin midtermelections,supportingtheidea thatthereductionin
turnoutis causedbya lackof namerecognition.
Presidential
electionsbring
moreoccasionalvoterstothepollswhomaybe lesslikely
tocompletetheentire
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SUMMER 2OO7
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STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY
203
turnoutfurther
downtheticket(Jackson2000).Also,
ballot,thereby
reducing
races
take
more
environtop-of-the-ticket may
up
space in theinformation
ment,further
obscuring
messagescomingfromstatelegislative
campaignsthat
voters.(Nicholson2005). Evenin open-seat
otherwisemighthaveattracted
racesbeforetermlimits,
candidatenameswerelikelymorerecognizable,
since
an open seatwouldhavebeenlongwaitedforbypartyleadersand qualified
candidates.
Butundertermlimits,
newcandidatesarecycledthrough
potential
electionsmuchmorequickly(Cain and Kousser2004), and so theremainingcandidatesmaybe evenlessknownto votersthancandidateswerebefore
termlimits.Thus,withno namestheyrecognizeon theballot,votersmayjust
be morelikelyto skipvotingin theraceor votebyusingpartycues almost
and Streb2002).
(Schaffner
exclusively
Thisarticlebeganwitha discussionofthehope,oratleasttherhetoric,
of
movementthatthereform
wouldrevitalize
thepro-term-limits
theelectorand increasevoterparticipation.
Term-limits
ate,sparkcitizenengagement,
and othercommentators
mayhaveexpectedno effect,
opponents,skeptics,
I findthattermlimitsactuallyreducevoter
atworst.Butquiteunexpectedly,
inelections.
Althoughtermlimitsremainpopularwithcitizens,
participation
voterparticipation,
thereformhas
therealityis thatin termsof increasing
failed.
ENDNOTES
I would liketo thankEd Costantiniforgenerouslysharinghis Californialegislativedataset,
upon which I was able to build. In addition to the anonymous reviewers,I would like to
thankSteveNicholson forhis carefulproofreadingand advice.
1. There is some scholarlydebate about theconnectionbetweenelectoralcompetition
and voterturnout.In UnitedStatesSenate races,Jackson(1997) findsthatclosenessitself
Cox and Munger (1989) see closeness as lacking
does not drive turnoutsignificantly.
in explanatorypower aftercontrollingforcampaign expenditures(as a proxyforelite
activity).Also, Hill and Leighley's(1996) analysisof state-levelturnoutfindsthatparty
competitionis a significantpredictorof turnoutforthe poor and workingclass,but not
forthe middle,upper-middle,and upper classes.
2. Futureresearchshould explorethe question of whethervoterturnoutin low-information,down-ballotraces mightbe influencedby expectationsformedby competition
levelsin priorelections(Nicholson and Miller 1997). If so, theremightbe a lag between
the implementationof termlimitsand its impact on turnout.
3. On theotherhand,one recentstudyfoundtermlimitsto be associatedwithdecreased
competitionin open-seat races (Pinney,Serra,and Sprick2004).
4. 1 operationalizeturnoutas the percentageof a district'sregisteredvotersvotingin
a generalelection,which produces a highernumber than using voting-agepopulation
as the denominator.
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204
NALDER
5. Thus, voterturnoutbased on voting-eligiblepopulation (VEP) would be the best
measure formy studybut is unavailable regularlyby statelegislativedistrictduringmy
studyperiod. The only exceptionis a one-time overlayof United StatesCensus data on
the California state legislativemap done by the Instituteof GovernmentalStudies at
the Universityof California,Berkeley,forthe 1990 census. Data in no otherdecades are
available,and even the 1990 data were not updated withinthe decade. Therefore,I was
unable to use a VEP denominator.
6. If NVRA had produced a significantand lastingincreasein the numbersof voters
registeredin California who mightnot actuallyvote (therebyskewingturnoutfigures
calculated as a percentageof registeredvoters),we would expectto see a major jump in
between 1992 and 1996 (comparingpresidentialelectionyears).We would
registrations
to remainlevelor evenincrease(due to risingpopulation)between
also expectregistrations
1996 and 2000. In fact,voterregistrationfellin 19 percentof Assemblydistrictsbetween
fellin 44 percentof districtsbetween 1996 and
1992 and 1996. Furthermore,registration
thefollowingpresidentialelectionyear,2000. In otherwords,in almostone districtin five,
dropped.And eventhoughregistration
despitetheimplementationofNVRA, registration
peaked in a majorityof districtsin 1996,theNVRA phase-inyear,bythenextpresidential
election,registrationhad once again fallenin 44 percentof the districts.This data coincides withresearchshowinglittleimpact of NVRA on statewideturnout(Martinez and
Hill 1999) and with a comprehensive10-year retrospectivestudythat showed limited
implementationof NVRA after1995-96 (Kavenagh et al. 2005).
there
7. This graphpools theCaliforniaAssemblyand Senate races.Graphedseparately,
is littledifferencein theirresults(i.e., a percentagepoint or two higherturnoutforthe
Senate races).
8. In 1996, only Assemblymemberswere fullytermedout; thisdidn't happen in the
Senate until 1998.
9. Raw turnoutpercentagesassociated withTables 1 and 2:
CaliforniaStateAssembly
Meandistrict
turnout
Meanmatchedopen-seatturnout
California
StateSenate
Meandistrict
turnout
Meanmatchedopen-seatturnout
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
67%
67/69%
53%
56%
58%
57%
51%
53%
64%
64%
1992
1994
1998
2000
53%
-
50%
-
66%
64%
68%
69%
10. Pooled cross-sectionaltime-seriesmodels can pose estimationproblemswhenusing
ordinaryleast squares (OLS), due to the likelyviolation of the sphericalerrorassumption. One solution is to create dummy variables forthe yearsand cases to account for
the serial correlationof the errors(Stimson 1985). I have not chosen this method for
two reasons: (1) since the unitof analysisis the electoraldistrict,the numberof dummy
variables required (80) produces insurmountablecollinearityproblems,and (2) serial
correlationhere is unlikelyto be as severe as for,say,measurementsof administrative
budgets taken across time,since the districtsactuallyhave shiftingsets of votersdue to
threetimes
population mobility,individual voterdecisions,and of course,redistricting
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STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY
205
withinthe dataset. Instead, I use Beck and Katz's (1995) approach of using OLS with
panel-correctedstandarderrors(PCSE). For dataseis like mine,thisis the preferredestimation approach.
11. Additionalvariableswere included in earlierversionsof these models, but rejected forvarious reasons.One theoreticallyimportantcontrolvariable could be campaign
betweencandidatesas a proxyforeliteactivity.This variablewas
expendituredifferences
excludedfrommyfinalmodels because reportingof thesedata changedin Californiaafter
1998,creatingcomparabilityproblems.The inclusionof thisvariablewould have meanta
reducednumberof cases (eliminatingtheelectionsin 2000, 2002, and 2004).
significantly
even when it was included in a model withthe remainingyears,my main
Furthermore,
theopen-seatand vote-marginvariremained
unchanged.I also triedinteracting
findings
A variable
due to multicollinearity.
was notstatistically
ables,butthiscoefficient
significant
forthe UnitedStatesSenate race marginwas also considered,but it would have required
excludingyearswithno such race,fullyone-thirdof the data. I also includeda time-trend
variablein some versionsof themodelsthatdid not includethetermlimitsdummy.It had
formidtermelectionmodels,and
butwas onlystatistically
a negativecoefficient
significant
the overallfindingof decreasedturnoutdue to termlimitsremained.
more importantly,
This time-trendvariableis theoretically
desirable,but it presentsmulticollinearity
problems withregardsto the term-limits
dummyvariable.For example,theVIF values forthe
presidentialelectionyearmodelwiththeadditionofthetimetrendare as follows:year-269,
and senaterace-27.Removingthetimetrendreduces
termlimits-191,visibleinitiative-36,
theseto an averageVIF of only 1.65,withthehighestVIF of only2.5.
since
12. Measuringstatelegislativedistrictforthesedemographiccontrolswas difficult,
the Census Bureau does not aggregatethem this way.The InstituteforGovernmental
Studies at the Universityof California,Berkeley,overlaidthe two maps and generously
sharedthe data forthe 1990 and 2000 censuses,but the Institutedid not have a 1980 or
1970 census overlay.Since onlydecennial data are available,the demographicdata from
the 1990 census wereenteredforthe 1990 electionand thetwo electionsbeforeand after
thatyear.The same method was used forthe 2000 census data.
13. 1 also estimatedthe models with a termlimitsvariable that was coded 1 forall
electionsafterthe passage of Proposition 140 (1992 forward).This measure produced
thatwere of smallermagnitudeand not statistically
coefficients
significantforpresidential election years,but of greatermagnitude for midtermelections. However, in each
model, the sign of the coefficientwas stillnegative.This indicatesthatthe reductionin
turnoutbegan whentermlimitswerefirstpassed and thatthisacceleratedonce theywere
implemented.I chose not to focuson the models because thisvariableis concurrentwith
whichmayconfusecausation,and because thefulleffectswerenot feltuntil
redistricting,
all memberswere termedout.
14. The data werederivedfromField InstituteCaliforniaPolls,as reportedin Nicholson 2003. The data for2002 and 2004 come directlyfromField Polls #2146and #2147,
conducted in October 2004 and #2062fromNovember 2002.
15. Otherstudieshave consideredthe impacton turnoutof the numberof ballot measures,ratherthanjust themorevisibleor salientmeasures(Tolbert,Grummel,and Smith
was neverstatistically
2001). I includedthisvariable,but itsestimatedcoefficient
significant
in mymodels,whereasthe visibilitymeasurewas.
16. See previousendnotes fordetails on thesealternativespecifications.
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206
NALDER
in all
17.The visibleballotmeasuresproducefairly
coefficients
largeand significant
areawareaccordmodels.Foreveryinitiative
forwhichatleast50percent
oftheelectorate
and 1.1percent,
Fieldpolls,turnoutincreases
ingto pre-election
bybetween.9 percent
dependingon themodel.The mostlikelyexplanationis thatvisibleballotmeasures
motivated
stimulate
somecitizenswhomaynothavevotedotherwise.
Votersprimarily
toshowup atthepollsbyinterest
ina ballotmeasureortwowillbe forced
toflipthrough
ticket
theentireballotto getto theinitiatives,
or at leastproceedbeyondthetop-of-the
wheretheywillencounter
thestatelegislative
contests,
races,andperhapsbemoreinclined
to casta voteforthoseracesas well.
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