DOES TENSION MAKE GREATER
INTEGRATION POSSIBLE IN THE COMMON
FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION? AN ANALYSIS
THROUGH THE KOSOVO CONFLICT
İNCİ NUR ÖZBIYIK
M.A in International Affairs
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF PARIS
2012
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to Jean Monnet Scholarship Programme for providing me such an
extraordinary opportunity to study at AUP in Paris. I also would like to thank to the
wonderful faculty and staff at AUP, especially Professor Hall Gardner for his valuable
comments and guidance during my study.
Table of Contents
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..1
1. Theoretical Debates on European Foreign Policy……………………………………4
a. Realism and EFP…………………………………………………………………….5
b. The EU as a Civilian Power………………………………………………………...8
c. Integration Theories and EFP……………………………………………………..10
d. Europeanization and EFP…………………………………………………………14
2. The Kosovo Conflict and the CFSP…………………………………………………..20
3. The European Foreign Policy Behavior: Is There a Trend?......................................34
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………...43
Annex……………………………………………………………………………………...46
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………...52
ii
Introduction
It has been two decades since the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was
included in the European Union (EU) as one of the policy areas.1 Since then, the debate
regarding the achievement of the CFSP continues among scholars as well as policy makers
mainly due to the lack of coherence within the EU in response to the various crises in the
world. In addition, the limited role of EU institutions derived from the intergovernmental
feature of the CFSP is also contributing to the ongoing debate.
As an intergovernmental policy area2, CFSP’s achievement mainly depends on the
coherence among its creators, namely the Council representing national interests, and the
EU institutions in the field of the CFSP. The disagreements among member states and the
increasing weight of the European Parliament make this area even more complex. In such
a political environment, tension inevitably appears in the European Foreign Policy (EFP)3
behavior. Most observers call this tension an obstacle to the functioning of the CFSP.
However, although tension has been introduced as an obstacle for EFP behavior, it is also
possible to see it as a force for the EU to reach greater integration, which can be traced
down through various cases along with the historical development of the CFSP. Therefore,
it is argued in this thesis that since the adoption of the CFSP, each foreign policy issue
among various actors within the EU results in tension as well as debate, an eventual EU
reform and, finally, a new level of integration.
For those who argue that the CFSP will fail because of its limited competency, it is
discussed in the following chapters that this perception is due to the state-centric approach
of these observers. The EU is not a sovereign-state and therefore, its foreign policy
1
See Annex for the Historical Development of the CFSP.
According to Article 31 TEU , The Council can only act by qualified majority in cases where a former decision
has been based on a unanimous vote.
3
In the literature, foreign policy of the EU is mostly referred as European Foreign Policy (EFP), even though
the latter also covers non-EU European States as well as EU member states. However, growing complexity
makes it almost impossible to distinguish EFP from EU foreign policy. Also, although EFP covers other
policy areas such as EU’s economic relations, or foreign policies devoted to specific issues or regions, the
focus has been given to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in this thesis. Therefore, the CFSP
and EFP are used interchangebly.
2
1
behavior is naturally different from that of sovereign-state. However, during its
development in the course of time, the CFSP has also started to cut to the heart of the
sovereignty similar to the Community areas, which gradually places the CFSP in between
intergovernmental and supranational4 levels of the EU.
In the literature, there are plenty of attempts from scholars to examine EFP, even though
there is no one grand theory. Also, there is no consensus either on the concepts or on the
definitions among the scholars. Most of the theories are mono-causal or mono-systemic
approaches focusing on one specific feature of EFP behavior. Moreover, theories mostly
focus on the effectiveness of EFP, rather than its functioning. Therefore, in the first
chapter, the arguments of International Relations (IR), Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and
European Integration approaches are introduced in the context of the argument.
In the second chapter, since the main argument of this thesis requires attention to the
functioning of the CFSP rather than its effectiveness in the international politics, the
Kosovo conflict, which represents a milestone in the field, is selected and discussed
accordingly. Firstly, Kosovo confirmed that the EU was not capable of providing security
even in its own vicinity and therefore led to a debate, which brought the hard power issue
on the EU’s agenda. Secondly, lack of coherence on the status of Kosovo at the EU level
presents another tension, which directed the EU to more pragmatic solutions on the way of
integrating the region into the European project. Although parties have not reached any
resolution until recently, the EU gained an evolving CSDP, a security strategy, civilian
crisis management capabilities, as well as experience as the main facilitator in this specific
conflict.
During this conflict, the new EU policies regarding the region have been criticized due to
their potential effects such as the military component on the EU’s civilian status, EU’s
relations with NATO, the US, and Russia as well as financial pressure on national budgets.
4
Although there are several views on what makes a system supranational, they usually include the capasity for
autonomous decision making, the capacity to adopt legally binding rules by qualified majority voting,
judicial enforcement mechanisims and parliamentary control as well as financial autonomy. See: Claudia
Major, “Europeanization and Foreign and Security Policy – Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State?”,
Political Studies Association, Vol 25 (3), (2005): 242.
2
Although Kosovo caused tension and debate among the CFSP actors, namely EU
institutions as well as member states, it also contributed to the EU’s integration through
the application of the CFSP instruments and creation of new policies. Therefore, Kosovo
represents an important case full of tension as well as opportunities for greater integration.
In the last chapter, the existing theoretical arguments in the EFP literature are revisited to
clarify the main argument of this thesis, which is that tension in the field of the CFSP
results in debate, an eventual EU reform and, finally, a new level of integration that is
inherent in the EFP behavior.
The methodological challenge for this thesis is to define and isolate the functioning of the
EU from other domestic or global influences impacting upon the CFSP.5 To attempt to
meet this challenge, equal attention is paid to the each theory regarding EFP. Therefore, in
this thesis, several approaches are introduced along with both endogenous and exogenous
influences that can be competing or mutually reinforcing.
5 Claudia Major, “Europeanization and Foreign and Security Policy – Undermining or Rescuing the Nation
State?”, Political Studies Association, Vol 25 (3), (2005): 183.
3
1. Theoretical Debates on European Foreign Policy
It has been challenging for the scholars to categorize EFP behavior as the EU is neither a
state nor a non-state actor and not a conventional international organization nor an
international regime.6 According to Smith, while Westphalian model nation-state is
defined by concentration of power, hierarchy, sovereignty, and clear-cut identity, the EU
resembles a neo-medieval empire with overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty,
diversified institutional arrangements, and multiple identities.7 Thus, while the nation-state
pursues national interests, which are known as possession goals, the EU mostly pursues
milieu goals that focus on long term achievement of its foreign policy ideals as a result of
its given instruments.8 Due to its particular identity derived from its historical evolution,
the EU became a hybrid polity having a distinctive international identity.9 Theorists,
trapped with this challenge, mostly discussed whether to approach EFP from different
perspectives, which provide a fruitful but also an eclectic area of study.10
Since the emergence of FPA in 1950s, there has been relative consensus about the central
objects of this area, which are the state, its external relations, and multitude of actors in its
external environment.11 In the post-Westhephalian world, there are several actors at
different levels in IR namely state actors, intergovernmental organizations and actors
below the state.12 However, there is no conceptual work to define these new units apart
from state as well as no post-FPA either.13 This situation has directed some others to a
6
Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher, “International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and
Security Policy,” World Politics, Vol 63 (3), (July 2011): 552.
7
Karen Smith, “The European Union: A Distinctive Actor in International Relations”, The Brown Journal of
World Affairs, Vol IX (2) (2003):104.
8
Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press,1962): 73-6 quoted in Karen Smith, “The European Union: A Distinctive Actor in
International Relations”, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol IX (2) (2003):107.
9
Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, JCMS, Vol 40 (2), (2002): 252.
10
Michael E. Smith, “Researching European Foreign Policy: Some Fundamentals,” Political Studies
Association, Politics Vol 28(3) (2008): 177.
11
Henrik Larsen, “A Distinct FPA for Europe? Towards a Comprehensive Framework for Analyzing the Foreign
Policy of EU Member States”, European Journal of International Relations, (February 2009): 543.
12
Ibid, 543.
13
Ibid.
4
large definition. For instance, Hill defines the units of foreign policy as independent
actors, but usually the state.14
Yet, a new type of state emerged on the basis of international law in the post-Westphalian
world. The new state should be both effective and answerable with three additional criteria
namely political mandate, the rule of law and accountability.15 Since these new criteria
bring a control mechanism of authorized international institutions, it posed a challenge to
the concept of sovereignty.16
Following the end of Cold War, the actor-specific theories appeared as a result of great
uncertainty in the international system.17 However, FPA mainly focused on the decisions
that result in a specific foreign policy, rather than long term, indirect, and structural
effects, which point to the importance of socialization processes such as Europeanization,
Brusselization, and others.18 Therefore, in this chapter, following approaches from
different schools are introduced in order to clarify the main characteristics of EFP.
a. Realism and EFP
Following the cold war, realists assumed that European integration would recede and
power competition would return to the European Continent in the absence of a common
threat namely the Soviet Union.19 However, as the EU integration continued during 1990s,
realists argued that cooperation in the CFSP is due to a potential security dilemma, which
is based on binding Germany into a European security institution as well as the need to
decrease EU’s reliance on the US.20 Following the slow progress in the CFSP, the realist
14
Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 2002), 3.
Adam D. Rotfeld, “The Process of Transforming Foreign and Security Policies”, American Foreign Policy
Interests, 29, (2007): 60.
16
Ibid.
17
Valerie M. Hudson, Christopher S. Vore, “Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow”,
Mershon International Studies Review, Vol 39 (2) (October 1995): 229.
18
Michael E. Smith, “Researching European Foreign Policy: Some Fundamentals,” Political Studies
Association, Politics Vol 28(3) (2008): 182.
19
Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher, “International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and
Security Policy,” World Politics, Vol 63 (3), (July 2011): 557.
20
Ibid, 558.
15
5
approach also argued that the EU should craft its foreign policy on the basis of the
common interests of its Member States rather than pursuing normative or ethical crusades
in order to become a credible international actor.21
On the other hand, structural realists argue that states pursue not only power politics but
also distinctive normative agendas in response to their domestic politics, which creates an
incentive to cooperate on a shared agenda such as proliferation, regional conflicts and
failed states.22
As Morgenthau puts it, political realism requires a sharp distinction between the desirable
and the possible.23 This helped to open a discussion regarding the EU’s capabilities in the
CSFP.24 Realists mainly argue that although CSDP was supposed to be a tool to remedy
capability-expectation gap in the CFSP, there has been a lack of pooling military
capabilities and coherence to launch such operations as well as to use non-violent
coercion.25 In most cases, Member States could have merely agreed on not to jointly
cosponsor a resolution on a third state.26 As a result, this led realists to debate on the
achievement of the CFSP while underestimating the EU’s civilian power as well as the
institutional development in this field, which has been the case during and following the
Kosovo conflict since the late 1990s.
On the other hand, while realist intergovernmentalists place the sovereign-state at the
center of the EFP behavior arguing that the EU is not a state and therefore it does not have
actorness, neorealist intergovernmentalists accept the EU only as a forum for Member
21
Adrian Hyde-Price, “A tragic actor? A realist perspective on ethical power Europe”, International Affairs 84: ı
(2008): 36.
22
Ibid, 31.
23
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.13 quoted in Adrian Hyde-Price, “A tragic actor? A realist perspective
on ethical power Europe,” International Affairs 84: ı (2008): 29.
24
Christopher Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role,”
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 31 (3), (September 1993): 318.
25
Adrian Hyde-Price, “A tragic actor? A realist perspective on ethical power Europe,” International Affairs 84:
ı (2008): 38.
26
Karen Smith, “The European Union: A Distinctive Actor in International Relations”, The Brown Journal of
World Affairs, Vol IX (2) (2003): 106.
6
States to negotiate on certain issues to enhance their interests and power.27 Neorealist
intergovernmentalists add that state actions are directed toward achieving institutionally
ordered objectives, which makes the EU not only a periodic but also an advanced forum
with its intergovernmental conferences.28
Contrary to realist or neorealist intergovernmentalist perspectives, the EU has been more
than a forum with its supranational institutions in crafting and facilitating compromises as
well
as
managing
daily
EFP
processes.29
Therefore,
to
Gingsberg,
realist
intergovernmentalism disregards why, how, and when national interests converge and to
what extent they are shaped by domestic and international politics and the ethos of
community membership.30 On the other hand, while liberal intergovernmentalism sees
sovereign-state as the principle source of integration, it also emphasizes the constructive
role of supranational institutions in cooperation.31
Although the interstate bargaining represents an explanation for the EFP behavior, it
underestimates other factors such as the impact of shared history of war on decision
making, continuity of EU institutional cooperation, and external stimuli.32 In the Kosovo
conflict, the EU has been more than an intergovernmental forum as the EU participated in
negotiations as a facilitator and launched its rule of law mission based on both
international law and the EU Treaties. Moreover, during the conflict, the CFSP actors
found a way to compromise their distinct national foreign policies in order to implement a
common approach toward Balkans.
27
Alfred Pijpers, “European Political Cooperation and the Realist Paradigm”, in M. Holland (ed.) The Future of
European Political Cooperation: Essays on Theory and Practice, New York: St. Martin’s (1991):31 quoted
in Roy Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the
Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 13.
28
Roy Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical
Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Fall (1999): 13.
29
Roy Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical
Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Fall (1999): 13.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid, 14.
7
b. The EU as a Civilian Power
While acting as a force for good, the EU has been called first a civilian then a normative
power among both idealist and realist scholars.33 The term civilian power was suggested
by Duchéne, who basically defined it long on economic power and relatively short on
armed forces.34 In theory, Twichett and Maull have identified three necessary features for
a civilian power: economic power to achieve goals, primacy of diplomatic cooperation to
solve international problems, and turning to legally binding supranational institutions to
achieve international progress.35 Although defined differently, both the concepts of
civilian and soft power underline attributes other than conventional military power.36
Following, the term normative power became popular among the scholars, especially for
Manner, who argues that both civilian and military power concentrates on the EU as if it is
a state, while normative power shifts the analysis to cognitive processes with substantive
and symbolic components.37
While criticizing EU's normative power, Hedley Bull argued in 1980s that the EC's
civilian power was conditional to the military power capabilities of Member States and
suggested that the EU should turn into a military power.38 However, 1990s made a change
in the perception and EU's civilian power became equally important as traditional military
power.39 At the end, both Bull and Duchéne approach to the EU’s civilian power on the
basis of sovereign-state framework.40
33
Adrian Hyde-Price, “A tragic actor? A realist perspective on ethical power Europe”, International Affairs 84: ı
(2008): 30.
34
François Duchêne, “Europe’s Role in World Peace”, in R. Mayne, (ed.) Europe tomorrow: sixteen Europeans
look ahead (London: Fontana, 1972): 32-47 quoted in Adrian Hyde-Price, “A tragic actor? A realist
perspective on ethical power Europe”, International Affairs 84: ı (2008): 30.
35
Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, JCMS, Vol 40 (2), (2002): 236-237.
36
Alistair J. K. Shepherd, “A milestone in the history of the EU: Kosovo and the EU’s international Role”,
International Affairs, 85 (3), (2009): 521.
37
William Trot, “An Analysis of Civilian, Military and Normative Power in EU Foreign Policy”, POLIS
Journal, Vol 4, (Winter 2010): 13.
38
Hedley Bull, “Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 21
(2) (1982):149-64 quoted in Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal
of Common Market Studies, Vol 40 (2) (2002): 236-237.
39
Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies,
Vol 40 (2) (2002): 236.
40
Ibid, 238.
8
However, the conflicts at the heart of Europe following the dissolution of Yugoslavia
along with the development of the CSDP have proved that the EU has agreed to be both a
civilian and a military power. Although Zielonka argues that militarization weakens the
civilian power identity, Smith believes that this basically represents a state-building
capacity.41 Others argue that although there is progress in the CSDP, the questions of
defence and nuclear capability still remain the concern of NATO, which makes the EU
still a civilian power.42
Although realists point out the capabilities-expectations gap while they underestimate
EU's civilian power, Hill, for instance, also emphasizes EU's contribution to international
security, which he describes as an intellectual impact of a new model of interstate
relations.43 Indeed, the EU, as a new unity, may minimize power politics, spread
regionalism44 and thus support new security architecture in today's highly diverse world.
Realists also argue that cosmopolitan approach, which basically assumes harmony of
interests at the international level, is not new and common interests have been the idea of
dominant groups during the history.45 To realists, the anarchy rather than hierarchy in the
international structure makes it problematic to follow an ethical foreign policy agenda as
unintended outcomes could be likely. In addition, each international actor has different
visions of the good life, which compete with each other.46 However, realists do not totally
deny the liberal ideals. They mainly say that for ideals to be on the agenda the vital
41
Jan Zielonka, Explaining Euro-Paralysis: Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics,
(Basingtoke:Mcmillan: 1998):229 quoted in Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in
Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 40 (2) (2002): 237.
42
Karen Smith, “The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern,” International
Spectator, Vol 23 (2), (2000): 11-28 quoted in Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in
Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 40 (2) (2002): 237.
43
Christopher Hill, “European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Model – or Flop?” in Reinhardt Rummel
(ed.), The Evolution of an International Actor: Western Europe’s New Assertiveness (Boulder: Westview,
1990): 43 quoted in Karen Smith, “The European Union: A Distinctive Actor in International Relations”,
The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol IX (2), (Winter/Spring 2003): 108.
44
Karen Smith, “The European Union: A Distinctive Actor in International Relations”, The Brown Journal of
World Affairs, Vol IX (2) (Winter/Spring 2003):108.
45
E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York:
Palgrave, 2001):71.
46
Adrian Hyde-Price, “A tragic actor? A realist perspective on ethical power Europe”, International Affairs 84: ı
(2008): 33.
9
interests should be at stake.47 The Kosovo conflict is a good example of EU’s pursuing an
ethical foreign policy agenda even though the distinct national interests of the Member
States were at stake.
c. Integration Theory and EFP
From an institutionalist perspective, Smith explains how European integration could
happen despite the question of sovereignty and while avoiding the transfer of control over
foreign policies to Brussels.48 Smith’s explanation combines various institutionalist
approaches, which concludes that integration in the field of CFSP occurs due to the
institutionalization of habits and patterns of cooperation, consultation, and consensus
building.49 While institutionalization covers two mechanisms; preemption and elite
socialization, cooperation historically developed in three stages; intergovernmental
European Community stage, transgovernmental European Political Cooperation network,
and finally, deepening and institutionalization process, which included the emergence of
rules and norms.50 Although institutions evolve gradually, in the EU case, it has been long
periods of statis interrupted by relatively brief periods of major change.51 On the other
hand, resembling other approaches on EFP, institutionalization explains certain aspects of
the EU, while it is endogenous to other factors as well as internal dynamics that enhance
cooperation.52 Yet, the institutionalist explanation of EFP might help to analyze how the
EU could adopt common policies and approaches during the Kosovo conflict and
therefore, how a conflict gradually leads to institutional changes.
47
Ibid, 39.
Michael E. Smith, “Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation, and European Foreign Policy Cooperation”,
European Journal of International Relations 10 (1) (March 2004): 95-136 quoted in Ulrich Krotz and
Richard Maher, “International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and Security Policy”,
World Politics, Vol 63 (3), (July 2011): 561.
49
Ibid, 562.
50
Ibid, 563.
51
Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher, “International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and
Security Policy”, World Politics, Vol 63 (3), (July 2011): 565.
52
Ibid, 564.
48
10
On the other hand, focusing on common values rather than rules and norms,
Constructivists basically argue that as EFP developed beyond current roles and
capabilities of the CFSP institutions, there is a need for member states to agree on the role
of the EU as well as shared interests, values and priorities, which are seen necessary to
develop and consolidate.53 Based on this main argument, Meyer discussed the importance
of strategic culture in European cooperation and defined it as comprising deep-seated
norms, beliefs and ideas about a state’s role in the world.54 However, according to surveys
regarding a European Strategic culture, only narrow or thin strategic culture has been
found.55
According to other constructivist views, international institutions are social environments
and creates socialization for participants both individuals and states. While they have
constraining effects on participants, they have also constitutive effects.56 According to the
findings of various case studies, it has been acknowledged that socializing within the EU
institutions is weak and a post-national identity still does not exist.57 Yet, in the Kosovo
conflict, the lack of strategic culture or weak post-national identity did not prevent the EU
to develop a perspective, adopt certain policies and implement its decisions in the region
as well as to make contribution to the NATO’s military operation.
Regarding the debate on EU's actorness which is discussed by both idealists and realists,
many scholars argue that as a result of its internal development, the EU has developed a
considerable presence in international affairs.58 Yet, some argues that this presence has not
been translated into an actorness, which is described as functioning actively and
deliberately like a sovereign-state. Among those, Smith points out two main reasons for
53
Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher, “International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and
Security Policy”, World Politics, Vol 63 (3), (July 2011): 565.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid, 567.
56
(eds)Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, European Identity, (2009): 5 quoted in Ulrich Krotz and
Richard Maher, “International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and Security Policy”,
World Politics, Vol 63 (3), (July 2011): 569.
57
Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher, “International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and
Security Policy”, World Politics, Vol 63 (3), (July 2011): 569.
58
Roy Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical
Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 3.
11
lack of actorness.59 First one is the complexity of EU decision-making machinery stems
from the separation between policy areas. Secondly, the EU Member States have to agree
that the EU should act in a given instance of international relations.
In response to these arguments, first of all, there is no evidence that commitment to shared
values and principles is a precondition for the EU to act in world affairs.60 Likewise, it is
not clear why the legitimacy of decision processes is required for EU’s actorness, while a
nation state is no less a foreign policy actor when its actions lack legitimacy.61 If the
problem is the absence of one formal actor that represents the Union for instance a
Minister for Foreign Affairs, such a post may not be necessary for the EU’s actorness
either as long as no internal actor interferes with the Union's foreign policy agenda.62 In
addition, recognition by others does not present a condition for actorness considering the
examples of Hamas and Hezbollah, which lack formal international recognition. Mayer,
on the other hand suggests that since the outside world believes in EU’s actorness, the real
problem is to bring it about.63 While Mayer’s approach focuses on the effectiveness of the
EU in the CFSP, the main problem for this thesis is what happens in terms of integration in
the EU following a CFSP case, such as the Kosovo conflict.
Hill contributes to the debate on EU’s actorness adding that true actorness requires the
practical capabilities as well as a clear identity to have effective policies.64 Therefore, Hill
defined this as a Capabilities-Expectations Gap, implying that the EU does not have the
capabilities to match the expectations of both insiders and outsiders in the world scene.65
However, if the problem stems from the negotiation capacity and policy instruments of the
59
Karen Smith, “The European Union: A Distinctive Actor in International Relations”, The Brown Journal of
World Affairs, Vol IX (2) (Winter/Spring 2003):105.
60
Charlotte and Vogler Bretherton, The European Union As A Global Actor, (London: Routledge 1999) quoted
in Daniel C. Thomas, “Still Punching below its Weight? Actorness and Effectiveness in EU Foreign Policy”,
UACES 40th Annual conference, (September 2010): 3.
61
Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63
Erik Jones and Saskia van Genugten, “Guest Editorial: The Future of the European Foreign Policy”,
European Integration, Vol 30 (1), (March 2008): 2.
64
(ed.) Christopher Hill, The Actor’s in Europe’s Foreign Policy, London: Routledge (1996) quoted in Roy
Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical
Capability-Expectations Gap,” Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 20.
65
Christopher Hill, “Capabilities-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role”, Journal
of Common Market Studies, (September 1993): 318.
12
EU in the CFSP, it has been furnished with both soft and hard power instruments,66 which
are enhanced especially following the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Yet, the notion of presence is
welcomed among scholars as it allows researchers to think beyond the terms sovereignty
and supranationality.67 However, there is a risk that the notion of presence may lead the
debate to a point where there is no EFP.68
The theory of power avoidance attempts to analyze EU’s actorness regarding the changing
nature of the Member States, According to Laidi’s theory of power avoidance, EU’s
foreign policy is characterized by power avoidance meaning that the EU does not seek to
become a super power or a great power. To Laidi, the EU’s use of military capabilities has
been for the pursuit of civilian goals and the historic raison d’etre of the EU has been the
eschewal of power politics.69 Based on this theory, Gingsberg argues that the CFSP has
been developed because EFP serves as a tool that allows Member States to adjust their
relative inactivity in shaping the direction of international politics where the goal is not
power but power avoidance.70 While focusing on power from a different perspective from
realists, this theory introduces the unwillingness of Member States to play a leading role
on world politics.71
Structural realists such as Posen and Jones argue that despite Laidi’s power avoidance, the
CSDP developed in response to the US unilateralism following the Cold War, whereas
liberals such as Manner suggests that power avoidance appeared in the Europe due to the
legacy of the WW Second.72 However, these explanations seem insufficient to explain the
66
Daniel C. Thomas, “Still Punching below its Weight? Actorness and Effectiveness in EU Foreign Policy”,
UACES 40th Annual Conference, (September 2010): 4.
67
Roy Gingsberg, Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical
Capability-Expectations Gap, Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 21.
68
Ibid.
69 Christopher J.Bickerton, “Europe’s Comprimising Union: an introduction”, the Workshop on Sovereignty and
the European Integration, (May 2009):10.
70
Christopher J. Bickerton, “Functionality in EU Foreign Policy: Towards a New Research Agenda?”, Journal
of European Integration, 32 (2), (March 2010): 215.
71
Ibid.
72 Chris J.Bickerton, “Europe’s Comprimising Union: an introduction”, the Workshop on Sovereignty and the
European Integration, (May 2009):11.
13
development of the CFSP, which really began in 1970s in contrast to the successful
establishment of the European Communities in 1950s.73
d. Europeanization and EFP
Europeanization means a process by which the CFSP moved closer to EU norms, policies,
and practices without becoming supranationalized.74 According to Smith, the CFSP has
developed in a certain way, by trial and error and by permitting and legitimizing the
involvement of the EU actors and processes. As a result, informal CFSP norms and EU
procedures changed the CFSP from a forum to a more institutionalized, collective,
binding, and community sensitive system.75 This new system caused Member States to
change their attitudes and preferences despite the absence of enforcement mechanisms; in
other words, the CFSP has changed the ways Member States pursue their national
interests.76 As a result, Member States’ foreign policies became more transparent with
respect to each other and how they considered other members’ foreign policies.77
Europeanization of foreign and security policy can therefore be considered a learning
process about good policy practice for elites for which the EU sets the scene, offering a
forum for discussion and a platform for policy transfer.78 Thus, despite the fact that the
CFSP has not been thoroughly communitisized, social integration nevertheless takes place
and has actually brought European integration forward in this area.79 At the same time, the
impact depends on the area and the states in question.80
73 Ibid,11.
74
Roy Gingsberg, Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical
Capability-Expectations Gap, Journal of Common Market Studies, Fall 1999, 15.
75
Ibid, 16.
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
78
Claudia Major, “Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy – Undermining or Rescuing the Nation
State?”, Political Studies Association, Vol 25 (3), (2005): 186.
79
Claudia Major, “Europeanization and Foreign and Security Policy – Undermining or Rescuing the Nation
State?”, Political Studies Association, Vol 25 (3), (2005): 186.
80
Henrik Larsen, “A Distinct FPA for Europe? Towards a Comprehensive Framework for Analyzing the
Foreign Policy of EU Member States”, European Journal of International Relations, (February 2009): 538.
14
The
Europeanization
perspective
has
brought
a
wider
understanding
than
intergovernmentalist approach to explain cooperation in the CFSP domain.81 Yet, its focus
on policies/decisions downloading from the EU to the Member State level or uploading
from the Member States to the EU level or even both of them makes it a shorthand way to
examine EFP because of its little relevance on the cause and effect relationship, which
involves the creation of a new policy space in a larger context over time.82
Apart from Europeanization, scholars used the term politics of scale to explain benefits of
acting together in the international politics for Member States83 The EU has an important
impact on the interests and fates of many states with close ties to Europe as well as
international platforms when it acts as a unit. Gordon and Jorgensen argue that when the
EU acts as a unit, the gain is much bigger than the cost of losing sovereignty.84 According
to Hill, the CFSP is a good base or maybe a mask to pursue their national foreign policy
ideals within the European scale and this can be the case for small Member States as well
as big ones.85 Although researchers such as Allen question the existence of an EFP that is
independent from external stimuli or Member States’ national interests, there exists an
EFP on EU’s own internal dynamic such as special partnerships, pursuit of human rights,
and support for the creation of civil society.86
In addition to aforementioned perspectives, Consociationalism has been also used by
some scholars to explain EFP behavior, although it has been found highly controversial.87
Suggested by Weiler and Wessels, it points out a political system dominated by elites who
make decisions based on consensus where the outcome of such policy mostly represents
81
Roy Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical
Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 17.
82
Michael E.Smith, Researching European Foreign Policy: Some Fundamentals, Political Studies Association,
Vol 28 (3), (2008):182.
83
Roy Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical
Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 9.
84
Ibid, 10.
85
Roy Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical
Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 9
86
Roy Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical
Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 11.
87
Ibid, 12.
15
the lowest common denominator.88 Some scholars such as Hill expressed discomfort as
this concept disregards EU’s democratic institutions and merely focuses on the elite
factor.89 Pjipers, on the other hand, did not find consociationalism suitable to analyze EFP
behavior, as the EU is neither a state nor a defence actor.90
To Gingsberg, a sound understanding regarding EFP should be based on both
neofunctional and liberal intergovernmental approaches in a balanced way. He, therefore,
suggests a two-tier bargaining approach as an ideal way to understand EFP.91 Based on
the distribution of power and decision making between two-tiers of governance that are
state and the EU, this approach enables researchers to conceptualize EFP as part of a
political system and see the CFSP at the same tier with the EC, which may help to
understand how EFP functions.92 This has been the case in the Kosovo conflict as many
instruments related with security lies within the European Commission. On the other hand,
Smith argues that the CFSP administrative structures consisting of both national and EU
experts are designed in a way to limit the bargaining and dominate everyday EFP decision
making and therefore making two-tier bargaining less applicable.93
88
Michael E.Smith, “Researching European Foreign Policy: Some Fundamentals”, Political Studies
Association, Politics: Vol 28 (3), (2008): 183.
89
Christopher Hill, “Closing the Capability-Expectations Gap?” in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds.) A Common
Foreign Policy for Europe?:Competing Vision of the CFSP, (London: Routledge, 1998): 322 quoted in Roy
Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical
Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 12.
90
A. Pijpers “European Political Cooperation and the Realist Paradigm” in M. Holland (ed.) The Future of
European Political Cooperation: Essays on Theory and Practice, (New York: St.Martin’s 1991): 16 quoted
in Roy Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the
Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 13.
91
S. Bulmer, “Analyzing European Political Cooperation: The Case for Two Tier Analysis” in M. Holland (ed.)
The Future of European Political Cooperation: Essays on Theory and Practice, (New York: St.Martin’s
1991) quoted in Roy Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing
the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 14.
92
S. Bulmer, “Analyzing European Political Cooperation: The Case for Two Tier Analysis” in M. Holland (ed.)
The Future of European Political Cooperation: Essays on Theory and Practice, (New York: St.Martin’s
1991) quoted in Roy Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing
the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 15.
93
Michel E. Smith, The Europeanization of EPC, (Berkeley: 1996): 9 quoted in Roy Gingsberg,
“Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical CapabilityExpectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 15.
16
According to output-oriented approaches, outputs are what make the EU an international
actor.94 Outputs such as civilian foreign policy actions are controversial among scholars,
as realists and liberals tend to see it from different perspectives. Yet the enlargement, as an
output, became a real success.95 Enlargement has been a catalyst for either the creation of
new or the reform of existing foreign policy making procedures, mechanisms, meetings,
and institutions as the EU is forced to adjust to the impact of its larger size.96 However,
guided by the question of effectiveness in the absence of appropriate measurements,
output-oriented approach takes the external impact of the EU as a starting point, which
disregards its functioning.97
The sources of EFP behavior such as external stimuli, the logic of collective action,
national actors, and European interests have also caught scholars’ attention.98 As a
neofunctional concept, externalization explains how the outside world presses the EU to
act as a unit.99 Although to realists, neofunctionalists assume the transfer of sovereignty
from state to Union in EFP, some neofunctionalists favor a center that includes national
governments and EU institutions sharing authority, with majority voting as an essential
component.100 By contrast, realists raised issues such as the persistence of
intergovernmentalism, interstate bargaining or political choice.101
Contrary to neofunctionalists arguing shared authority as well as realists arguing interstate
bargaining, some scholars developed tools for the analysis of EFP in the context of
governance, by focusing on the larger institutional framework in which these various
94
Roy Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical
Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 19.
95
Roy Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical
Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 17.
96
Roy Gingsberg, The Impact of Enlargement on the European Union’s Role in the World in J. Redmond and G.
Rosenthal (eds.) The Expanding European Union: Past, Present, and Future, Boulder: Rienner (1997)
quoted in Roy Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the
Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 19.
97
Christopher J. Bickerton, “Functionality in EU Foreign Policy: Towards a New Research Agenda?”, Journal
of European Integration, 32 (2), (March 2010): 213.
98
Roy Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical
Capability-Expectations Gap, Journal of Common Market Studies”, (Fall 1999): 8.
99
Ibid.
100
Ibid, 9.
101
Ibid.
17
elements are embedded such as the European Council, the Commission as well as
processes and networks.102
Although these areas are separated, the EFP governance is linked.
103
This implies that
whether a case is under one of those structures, it still needs to take into account the
others, which resembles Gingsberg’s approach of two-tier bargaining to a certain extent
while bringing the CFSP closer to the Community area.
As a conclusion for this section, the study of EFP clearly demonstrates the limits of global
systemic or structural approaches of different schools.104 Some of these concepts may help
to overcome the limits of traditional approaches, but if a grand theory of EFP is expected,
there will be disappointment.105
Although it is likely for liberal IR theory to explain how societal coalitions,
interdependence or values shape state preferences,106 realists, functionalists as well as
institutionalists have developed most of the critique regarding EFP. IR perspectives mainly
focus on the external factors, which would be misleading taking into account the EU’s
complexity as a polity with both internal and external factors.107
FPA, on the other hand, mainly focused on the decisions that result in a specific foreign
policy, rather than long term, indirect, and structural effects, which point to the importance
of socialization processes such as Europeanization, Brusselization, and others.108
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
Michael E.Smith, “Researching European Foreign Policy: Some Fundamentals”, Political Studies
Association, Vol 28 (3), (2008): 183.
Henrik Larsen, “A Distinct FPA for Europe? Towards a Comprehensive Framework for Analysing the
Foreign Policy of EU Member States”, European Journal of International Relations, (February 2009): 540.
Michael E.Smith, “Researching European Foreign Policy: Some Fundamentals”, Political Studies
Association, Vol 28 (3), (2008): 178.
Roy Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical
Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 23.
Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher, “International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and
Security Policy”, World Politics, Vol 63 (3), (July 2011): 571.
Michael E.Smith, “Researching European Foreign Policy: Some Fundamentals”, Political Studies
Association, Vol 28 (3), (2008):182.
Michael E.Smith, “Researching European Foreign Policy: Some Fundamentals”, Political Studies
Association, Vol 28 (3), (2008):182.
18
Regarding the EU’s identity, there is little consensus on how to analyze EU’s soft power
aspects such as the EU’s so-called normative, civilian, ethical, or cosmopolitan power.109
Another discovery of the EFP literature is that most arguments tend to adopt a zero-sum
form in which cooperation derives from a specific source. In reality, there are obviously
more variables than that, which also interact with each other.110
In the next chapter, the Kosovo conflict is introduced as a case study to see whether
tension among the CFSP actors leads to a new level of integration in the EU. Among many
results of the Kosovo case both for the region and the world, the important ones for this
thesis are how the EU as a whole reacted during the conflict and what reforms in the field
of the CFSP took place.
109
110
Ibid, 185.
Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher, “International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and
Security Policy,” World Politics, Vol 63 (3), (July 2011): 571.
19
2. The Kosovo Conflict and the CFSP
Based on the 1974 Constitution, Kosovo was an autonomous region in Serbia, which is
one of the six republics of Yugoslavia.111 According to demographic features, Kosovo is
apparently Albanian, while Serbians believe opposite due to historical and cultural
reasons.112As a constituent part of Serbia, Kosovo was also named as autonomous
province of Yugoslavia, which allowed Kosovo full power of self governance. Even
though the Albanians in Kosovo were the third largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia, in the
constitution they were referred as nationality113 while Serbs were nation, which was the
only group that had the right of self-determination.114
Following the death of Tito in 1980, the tension between Yugoslavian ethnic groups
increased.115 In 1989, Milosevic regime abolished the autonomous status of Kosovo and
implemented discriminatory policies against the Albanians.116 In the roots of the conflict,
nationalism was replacing the communism as the primary legitimating ideology, on which
Milosevic had built his regime.117
In 1991, four of six nations of Yugoslavia demanded independence namely Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia which caused the dissolution of the
Yugoslavian state. At the same time, Kosovo Albanians held a referendum on
independence but it was ignored by Yugoslavia, which was consisting of Serbia and
Montenegro as of April 1992. Under the authority of the police state of the Milosevic
government in Serbia between 1992 and 2000, Albanians, who used to exercise high level
111
NATO’s Role in Kosovo, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (accessed, August 5, 2012).
Dunja Duic, “Analysis of the International Community Influence on Kosovo Independence with Emphasis
on the EU Role”, Review Paper UDK:321.011(497.115):061.1EU, (2011): 145.
113
In 1974 Constitution, ten minorities in Yugoslavia are registered as nationalities of Yugoslavia, namely
Albanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Gypsies, Italians, Romanians, Ruthenians, Slovaks and Turks,
who are not granted republic status. See: http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm16-eng.asp (accessed
September 12, 2012).
114
Dunja Duic, “Analysis of the International Community Influence on Kosovo Independence with Emphasis
on the EU Role”, Review Paper UDK:321.011(497.115):061.1EU, (2011): 146.
115
European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, Kosovo, http://www.europeanforum.net/country/kosovo
(accessed August 5, 2012).
116
Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane (ed.) ESDP: The First Ten Years, (Paris: EUISS, 2009)
(http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf (accessed August 5, 2012).
117
Andrew Cottey, “The Kosovo War in Perspective”, International Affairs, 85 (3), (2009): 594.
112
20
of autonomy, held a secret referendum and had parliament as well as government
institutions, while conflict mounted.118
In 1996, the conflict in Kosovo turned into a civil war between then Yugoslavian forces
and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).119 Based on the concerns of the international
community, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1160 was adopted in
May 1998, which called for negotiation and condemned violence on both sides as well as
imposed arm embargo on Yugoslavia.120 First talks between the parties took place in May
1998 but could not proceed due to the increasing tension. Thus, in September 1998,
UNSCR 1199 was adopted condemning violence to both parties while warning Yugoslav
government for additional measures against it if it fails to comply.121
Not being prepared, the EU’s failure to play a significant role in both Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina conflicts proved that these crises were different than those of the cold
war era and backing Serbians against a united Germany in search for a balance of power
in Europe would have only exacerbated the crisis.122 Based on this perception, especially
France and UK hoped for a more active EU during the Kosovo conflict.
Therefore, in 1998 at St. Malo Summit, France and UK were discussing an increase in
defense spending, which would give them the credible military means while transforming
the EU’s international role.123 Although these two countries were hoping mutually a PanEuropean intervention force, there has been a great divergence of views among others. For
instance, while France supported a European force, Spain would push this idea as it might
be deployed in its own land. On the other hand, the British view has been to delegate the
118
Dunja Duic, “Analysis of the International Community Influence on Kosovo Independence with Emphasis
on the EU Role”, Review Paper UDK:321.011(497.115):061.1EU, (2011): 147.
119
Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane (ed.) ESDP: The First Ten Years, (Paris: EUISS, 2009)
(http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf (accessed August 5, 2012).
120
UNSC Res 1160 ( 31 March 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1160, http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1160.htm
(accessed August 5, 2012)
121
UNSC
Res
1199
(
23
September
1998)
UN
Doc
S/RES/1199,
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm (accessed August 5, 2012).
122
Elizabeth Pond, “Kosova: Catalyst for Europe”, Washington Quarterly, Vol 22 (4), (Autumn 1999): 77.
123
Alistair J. K. Shepherd, “A milestone in the history of the EU: Kosovo and the EU’s international Role”,
International Affairs, 85 (3), (2009): 517.
21
military job to NATO rather to create a European force while keeping the decision making
within the EU. Quite differently, Germany’s position has been in between based on a
steering mechanism where the EU takes the daily decisions on the operation and NATO
provides the logistics, planning and transportation, which at the end sorts the job between
the EU and the NATO.124
During the Kosovo conflict, while France and UK were focusing on the military
capabilities, Finland and Sweden stressed the importance of the civilian aspects of the
conflict management, which was reflected to the 2000 Feira European Council agenda,
outlining four priority areas; police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil
protection.125
Although member states had different approaches on how to handle the conflict, they
agreed to prepare a first common strategy to Western Balkans in the framework of the
CFSP at the Vienna European Council in December 1998 that point out the need of
compliance by both parties with UNSCRs in order to achieve a peaceful settlement.126
While NATO was threatening both parties with air strikes, the Contact Group meetings
took place with the participation of the states interested in Balkans including the US,
Russia, France, Germany, UK, and Italy as well as Serbia and KLA to reach a peace
agreement.127 Also, the EU Presidency, EU Council and European Commission (EC)
without being members of the Contact Group, attended the meetings.128
In February 1999, negotiations ended by proposing the Rambouillet Accords, which
proposed giving Kosovo’s autonomy back with a strong NATO presence in the region as
well as foreseeing an international conference to decide the status of Kosovo in three
124
Elizabeth Pond, “Kosova: Catalyst for Europe”, Washington Quarterly, Vol 22 (4), (Autumn 1999): 82.
Civilian Crisis Management, EEAS, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/civilian-crisismanagement?lang=en (accessed August 6, 2012).
126
The
EU
Council,
Presidency
Conclusion,
11/12
December
1998,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00300-R1.EN8.htm
(accessed
August 6, 2012).
127
NATO’s Role in Kosovo, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (accessed, August 5, 2012).
128
Marc
Weller,
Negotiating
the
final
status
of
Kosovo,
(Paris:
EUISS,
2008)
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp114.pdf (Accessed August 5, 2012).
125
22
years.129 Although Albanians signed the accords, Serbians claimed that NATO’s presence
in Kosovo would violate their sovereignty. Following Yugoslavian forces’ attack on
civilians in Kosovo violating UNSCR 1199, NATO launched air strikes against Yugoslavia
without a legitimate mandate of UNSC where China, Russia and India opposed.130
In the meantime, two statements regarding the Kosovo crisis were adopted in the Berlin
European Council in March 1999. First one was condemning the failure of the peace talks
while accusing the political leadership of Yugoslavia, namely Milosevic.131 While drawing
the picture of Milosevic regime in Kosovo including crimes against humanity as well as
refugee problems, the second statement was on the conditionality of NATO attacks, which
would stop in case that Milosevic stops the military action against Albanians.132
After the bombing had started, in April 1999, the EU launched the Stability Pact (SP) a
regional approach for South Eastern Europe with a perspective of EU membership.133 SP,
which was founded on the UN Charter had three working tables on democratization and
human rights, economic reconstruction, cooperation and development in addition to good
neighborly relations in the region.134
While bombing Serbia, NATO’s target was not the country itself, but Milosevic and the
objective was to put an end to his killing of Albanian Kosovars. As German Diplomat
Zimmermann argues, “Diplomacy without force becomes an unloaded weapon, impotent
and ridiculous”. This means when force is used, it must relate to political ends. In this
case, the power of air strike was limited and for a permanent resolution Russian
129
Rambouillet Agreement, 1999, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html (accessed
August 6, 2012).
130
Abrahams, Fred , Under order ( War Crimes in Kosovo) (Human Rights Watch, New York 2001): 59 quoted
in Dunja Duic, “Analysis of the International Community Influence on Kosovo Independence with
Emphasis on the EU Role”, Review Paper UDK:321.011(497.115):061.1EU, (2011): 150.
131
Berlin
European
Council
Presidency
Conclusions
on
24-25
March
1999,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFB2.html (accessed August 6,
2012).
132
Ibid.
133
Common Position of 17 May 1999 concerning a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31999E0345:EN:HTML (accessed August 6, 2012).
134
Common Position of 17 May 1999 concerning a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31999E0345:EN:HTML (accessed August 6, 2012).
23
participation was needed. Germany has been one of the few NATO countries to realize the
importance of attempting to include Russia in major transatlantic security challenges.135
The Cologne European Council held in June 1999 emphasized the EU’s commitment to
regional stability and welcomed the progress made towards the SP emphasizing the need
for the adoption of a UNSCR authorizing the creation of the international security force
and the setting up of the provisional international civil administration in Kosovo.136
In June 1999, NATO called off the air strikes along with the adoption of UNSCR 1244,
which was ending the violence and providing withdrawal of Yugoslavian military and
police forces from Kosovo as well as placing Kosovo under UN Interim Administration
Mission (UNMIK) and the deployment of NATO-led international peacekeepers Kosovo
Force (KFOR).137
UNMIK was established on four pillars, which the tasks were divided among UN, OSCE
and the EU. The EU focused on reconstruction and economic development through EU
Commission that covers central bank and other financial agencies.138 While playing this
role, the EU became the largest donor and 1.8 billion Euros were spent in providing
assistance in Kosovo. In this period EU became more active while issuing the European
Perspective for Kosovo in Thessaloniki and with numerous of joint reports by then HR for
the CFSP Javier Solana and then EU’s Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn.139
Meanwhile, political situation and dynamics changed in Balkans as well as in the world.
Following the 2000 elections defeat, Milosevic was arrested in June 2001 and transferred
135
Carlo de Hennin, “Second Thoughts at Winning Ugly”,NATO WATCH Comment, (2011),
http://www.natowatch.org/sites/default/files/Second_thoughts_at_winning_ugly.pdf (accessed August 5,
2012).
136
Cologne
European
Council,
Presidency
Conclusions,
3-4
June
1999,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm> (accessed August 6,
2012).
137
UNSCR 1244 (1999), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?
OpenElement (accessed August 6, 2012).
138
UNMIK Mandate and Structure, http://www.unmikonline.org/Pages/about.aspx (accessed August 6, 2012).
139
The Speech of EU Commissioner Rehn, “The Future of Kosovo and the Role of the EU, 28 March 2007,
Brussels, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_6910_en.htm (accessed August 7, 2012).
24
to the International Tribunal in Hague for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia.
Serbia and Montenegro established a new Union and signed a Constitutional Charter in
March 2002, which clearly indicated Kosovo as part of Serbia.140 Further, Serbia signed
an energy pact with the Russian energy giant Gazprom seeking to strengthen its economic
ties with Russia, who has been Serbia’s main supporter in the Kosovo conflict.141
The Feira Council in June 2000 confirmed the objective of fullest possible integration of
the Western Balkan Countries to the Europe concerning all Balkan states as potential
candidates.142 Within this framework, the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP)
was formulated at the Zagreb Summit in November 2000.
SAP aims to help economic and political transformation of a country towards an EU
membership, which would increase security in EU’s backyard, namely Balkans.143 Since
SAP is for states only, EU launched SAP Tracking Mechanism for Kosovo in 2003
including a forum participated by UNMIK, Provisional Institutions of Self-governance
and the Commission.144
However, Member States alike, the EU institutions’ approach on the status of Kosovo was
not uniform. According to EP, status of Kosovo should be solved within two years, while
the Thessaloniki European Council in June, 2003 affirmed that the Balkan countries will
become an integral part of the EU once they meet the established criteria, which are the
promotion of peace, stability, rule of law, democracy, respect for human and minority
rights as well as the necessity of fundamental reforms such as combating organized crime
140
International Crisis Group, Still Buying Time, Montenegro, Serbia and the EU, Balkans Report No: 129,
Podgorica/Belgrade/Brussels, 7 May 2002, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/Montenegro
%209.pdf (accessed August 7, 2012).
141
Lee Hudson Teslik, “After Kosovo’s Seccession”, http://www.cfr.org/kosovo/after-kosovos-secession/p15481
(accessed August 7, 2012).
142
Council Regulation of 22 March 2004 on the establishment of European partnerships in the framework of the
stabilization and Association, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:086
:0001:0002:EN:PDF (accessed August 9, 2012).
143
EU Office in Kosovo, EU Special Representative in Kosovo, Stabilisation and Association Process,
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/eu_kosovo/political_relations/stabilisation_and_assocation_process
/index_en.htm (accessed August 9, 2012).
144
Balkans
Briefing,
ICG,
Sarajevo/Brussels,
20
June
2003,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/Serbia%20Thess%2029, (accessed August 9, 2012).
25
and corruption, developing a modern market economy and improving regional
cooperation. 145 Yet, reactions of the EP and EC proved that the EU was planning to have
an increased role in Kosovo’s future, although there was no consensus on the status of
Kosovo among the CFSP actors.146 In the mean time, the European Council also agreed on
the European Security Strategy (ESS), which draws the direction of the Union in the
CFSP as well as the security challenges that the EU confronts.147
In 2003 at Le Touquet summit, France and UK realized the neglected component of the
crisis management. This meant smaller rapid response elements available and deployable
at very high readiness. Therefore, the Battlegroup Concept was developed in 2004.148
Due to the outbreak of violence in Kosovo in March 2004, the Brussels European Council
in March 2004 called on all leaders to take responsibility for the situation and put an end
to the violence including loss of life, damage to property, and destruction of religion and
cultural heritage.149 It was also emphasized that there is shared interest in making sure that
Kosovo does not become a black hole in the middle of South Eastern Europe, where
organized crime and ethnic division flourish.150 At the end, the crisis was resulted in an
increase in the number of troops under the KFOR without any settlement by the parties.151
In January 2006, the Council of the European Union issued a decision on the principles,
priorities and conditions contained in the European Partnership with Serbia and
145
Thessaloniki European Council Presidency Conclusion, 19-23 July 2003, http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/76279.pdf, (accessed August 9, 2012).
146
The RT Hon. Chris Patten Commissioner for External Relations Kosovo Plenary EP Strasburg, 30 March
2004, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/04/166&format=HTML&aged=
1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, (accessed August 9, 2012).
147
European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12 December 2003, Brussels,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, (accessed August 9, 2012).
148
Alistair J. K. Shepherd, “A milestone in the history of the EU: Kosovo and the EU’s international Role”,
International Affairs, 85 (3), (2009): 518.
149
Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions, 25-26 March 2004, http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/79696.pdf (accessed August 10, 2012).
150
Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions, 25-26 March 2004, http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/79696.pdf (accessed August 10, 2012).
151
The Evolution of NATO’s Role in Kosovo, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm, (accessed
August 11, 2012).
26
Montenegro, which was also including Kosovo.152 In this Partnership it was decided that
Kosovo needs to fulfill both UN standards and Copenhagen Political Criteria in the longer
term to reach the way for a status settlement through strengthened the Kosovo’s structures
for European integration.153 In Brussels European Council in June 2006, the readiness of
the EU to enhance its role in Kosovo following a status determination was emphasized, in
particular in the areas of police, rule of law and the economy.154
While the negotiations were continuing between the parties, the union between Serbia and
Montenegro came to an end after Montenegro’s formal declaration of independence in
June 2006, which was followed by Serbia’s formal declaration of independence.155 The
new constitution of Serbia was adopted in September 2006, stating that Kosovo is an
autonomous province of Serbia with significant autonomy, which was opposed by
Kosovars.156
Negotiations regarding the Kosovo’s status were ended up UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari’s
proposal in March 2007, which is known as the supervised independence of Kosovo.157
While Serbia rejected the proposal and demanded new mediator as well as further
negotiations, Kosovo endorsed the proposal.158 The EU gave full support to President
Ahtisaari’s proposal, which was based on the condition of the acceptance of the EULEX
152
Council Decision of 30 January 2006 on the principles, priorities, and conditions contained in the European
Partnership
with
Serbia
and
Montenegro
including
Kosovo,
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:035:0032:0056:EN:PDF (accessed August 6,
2012).
153
Summary note on the joint report by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, and Olli Rehn,
EU Commissioner for Enlargement, on the future EU Role and Contribution in Kosovo, MEMO/o6/286 of
June
17
2006,
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/286&format=
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, (accessed August 10, 2012).
154
The
EU
Council
Presidency
Conclusions
15-16
June
2006,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/90111.pdf, (accessed August 10,
2012).
155
KIM Info Newsletter, 01 October 2006, http://www.kosovo.net/news/archive/2006/October_01/2.html
(accessed August 10, 2012).
156
Commission Staff Working Document, Serbia 2006 Progress Report, 11 November 2006, Brussels,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/sr_sec_1389_en.pdf (accessed August 10,
2012).
157
UNOSEK, The Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement, Report of the Special Envoy,
http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html (accessed August 10, 2012).
158
Letter dated 26 March 2007 from Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a54bc360.html (accessed August 11, 2012).
27
as a rule of law mission.159 According to the proposal, International Civilian
Representative (ICR) will be appointed by International Steering Group (ISG) including
Russia, US, and NATO.160 In March 2007, the EP adopted Resolution on the future of
Kosovo and the role of the European Union in parallel with the proposal.161
In June 2007, the Council of the EU reaffirmed its support to the proposal underlying that
the EU stands ready to play a significant role in the implementation of the status
settlement.162 Meanwhile, a new round of talks launched by UN Secretary General in
August 2007 which was led by Germany, representing the EU, Russia and United
States.163 Acting on the basis of UNSCR 1244, Troika agreed on New York Declaration in
September 2007, which was rejected by parties.
The EU Council in its Conclusions on Western Balkans in November 2007 confirmed that
the EU stands ready to play a significant role in Kosovo in the future and was prepared to
do so accordingly.164 The EU Council held in Brussels in December 2007, agreed that the
status-quo in Kosovo is unsustainable and, thus, stressed the need of a Kosovo settlement,
which is essential for regional stability and underlined its conviction that resolving the
pending status of Kosovo constitutes a sui generis case that does not set any precedent for
separatist movements elsewhere, because in 1999, with Russian support, the United
Nations was given authority to decide the future of Kosovo.165 This was a reaction to
repeated Russian statements and concerns that Kosovo case would set a precedent in
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
Jacques Rupnik, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp126-The_Western_Balkans_and_the_EU.pdf
(accessed, August 11, 2012).
Marc
Weller,
Negotiating
the
final
status of
Kosovo,
(Paris:
EUISS, 2008)
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp114.pdf (Accessed August 5, 2012).
European
Parliament
Resolution
on
Kosovo
and
the
Role
of
the
EU,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B6-2009-0063&language=EN
(Accessed August 7, 2012).
Council Conclusions of 18 June 2007 on the Western Balkans [2007] Council Doc 10583/3/07,
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st10/st10946.en07.pdf, (accessed August 11, 2012).
First face-to-face talks between Belgrade and Pristine Delegations’ on 28 September 2007, http://www.euun.europa.eu/articles/en/article_7337_en.htm (accessed August 12, 2012).
Council Conclusions of 19 November 2007 on Western Balkans, http://www.euun.europa.eu/articles/en/article_7519_en.htm (accessed August 13, 2012).
Richard Holbrooke, “Russia’s Test In Kosovo”, The Washington Post, (13 March 2007) quoted in Benedikt
C. Harzl, “Conflicting Perceptions: Russia, the West and Kosovo”, Review of Central and East European
Law, 33 (2008): 508.
28
international law and serve as an example for similar regions all around the world.166 The
European Council also invited the General Affairs and External Relations Council
(GAERC) and the HR to determine the modalities for the mission and when to launch it in
coordination with the authorities in Kosovo and the UN.167
In January 2008, GAERC issued a Conclusion on Western Balkans in which it proposed a
political agreement between the EU and Serbia, providing a framework for making
progress on political dialogue, free trade, visa liberalization, and educational co-operation,
to be signed on February 7, 2008.168 In the mean time, the EU also decided to review the
ESS and a report was released confirming the original direction of the Union in 2003.169 In
2008 report it was emphasized that one of the main security threats comes from failed
states.170 Therefore, while supporting the EULEX, the member states were also following
their security strategy, which they adopted in 2003 and reviewed in 2008, following the
two enlargements in 2004 and 2007.
When the EU launched the EULEX in February 2008, Russia opposed it as mission was
launched without the mandate of the UNSC and was not covered in UNSCR 1244.171
Russia as well questioned the legality of EU or NATO forces operating in an independent
Kosovo without explicit authority from the UNSC.172
166
The
EU
Council,
Presidency
Conclusion
on
14
December
2007,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf (accessed August 13,
2012).
167
The
EU
Council,
Presidency
Conclusion
on
14
December
2007,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf (accessed August 13,
2012).
168
The EU Council Conclusions on on Western Balkans on 28 January 2008,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/98460.pdf (accessed August 14,
2012).
169
Report on the Implementation of the ESS – Providing Security in a Changing World,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf (accessed, August
14, 2012).
170
Ibid.
171
UNSC Report No.5, 18 February 2008, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D274E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20S%20PV%205839.pdf (accessed August 17, 2012).
172
Lee Hudson Teslik, “After Kosovo’s Seccession”, http://www.cfr.org/kosovo/after-kosovos-secession/p15481
(accessed August 17, 2012).
29
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo Assembly adopted a resolution declaring Kosovo
independent and stated that Kosovo is a special case arising from Yugoslavia’s nonconsensual break up, which is not a precedent for any other situation, clearly as a response
to numerous statements made by Serbia, Russia and other states.173 Serbia’s reaction was
to request an emergency meeting of the UNSC, which was held on February 17, 2008.
The Brussels European Council on February 18, 2008 adopted a Conclusion on Kosovo in
which it reaffirmed its commitment to fully and effectively support the European
perspective for the Western Balkans while leaving to decide whether to recognize Kosovo
to each member state.174 By October 2009, twenty-two EU member states, all Balkan
states except Bosnia, because of the Bosnian Serb veto, recognized Kosovo’s
independence while five Member States including Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia
and Spain opposed.175 Main reason for them is that Kosovo could become a precedent for
other “frozen conflicts”. While divisions among the 27 EU Member States were obvious,
Brussels was trying to cover them up, not only because it wanted to mislead the public but
also to disarm Russia, which openly opposed the approval of new resolution on Kosovo
based on Ahtisaari’s plan.176
The Kosovo conflict gained a new dynamic at the end of July 2010 when the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) gave an advisory opinion on Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of
independence on the request of Serbia. ICJ concluded that it was not in violation of
international law as the representatives of the people of Kosovo were not bound by the
Constitutional Framework or by UNSCR 1244 that is addressed only to UN Member
States and organs of the UN.
177
173
174
175
176
177
Kosova
Declaration
of
Independence
on
17
February
2008,
http://www.genevaacademy.ch/RULAC/news/declaration-indipendence.pdf (accessed August 18, 2012).
European
Commission
Implementing
Decision,
28
November
2011,
Brussels,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/kosovo/ipa/2011/2_en_act_part1_v2.pdf (accessed August 7, 2012).
Gjeraqina
Tuhina,
“Divided
EU
Stalls
Debate
on
Kosovo”,
9
May
2007,
http://kosovo.birn.eu.com/en/1/70/2889/?tpl=30> (Accessed, August 30, 2012).
Gjeraqina
Tuhina,
“Divided
EU
Stalls
Debate
on
Kosovo”,
9
May
2007,
http://kosovo.birn.eu.com/en/1/70/2889/?tpl=30> (Accessed, August 30, 2012).
ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf (accessed August 30,
2012).
30
Although it is legally binding, this opinion of the ICJ did not change the political situation
for those who were decided to wait for the ICJ’s opinion such as Spain.178 Following the
ICJ’s opinion, Serbia submitted another draft resolution to the UN, requesting new
negotiations. The EU tried to block this attempt and a Common EU-Serbian Resolution
accepted by the UN with the lowest common denominator, a call for a facilitated dialogue
which by itself would be a factor of peace, security and stability in the region.179
Although the EU is still divided on Kosovo, it launched a feasibility study in 2012 to look
at the possibilities for Kosovo to join the EU. In July 2012, The European Council
President Herman Van Rompuy praised Kosovo's progress towards EU membership and
stated that much work still needs to be done by the authorities of Kosovo, especially in the
field of rule of law and in solving the crisis in the north of Kosovo, where the Serbs are
the majority.180
After NATO intervention, NATO’s actions lacked clear cut political goals as well as a
clear exit strategy. In the aftermath, it is still not certain how the general map of the
Balkan region is to be formed. Also problematic is NATO’s relationship to Serbia and the
future political situation of Kosovo.181 If the EU would be the center of a Euro-Atlantic
security structure, then this will be decided within a system led by the EU.
As of today, legal framework of Kosovo is UNSCR 1244 and UNMIK mandate coexists
with the EULEX deployed in Kosovo and started its mission in the area of rule of law,
police, justice and customs mainly on the technical issues on the basis of a bottom-up
approach due to the distinct approaches of member states.182 However, both KLA and
178
Veton
Surroi,
The
ICJ Advisory
Opinion
on
Kosovo,
(The
EUISS,
2010),
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/The_ICJ_advisory_opinion_on_kosovo__the_beginning_of_a_new_road_01.pdf (accessed August 30, 2012).
179
Veton
Surroi,
The
ICJ Advisory Opinion
on
Kosovo,
(The
EUISS,
2010),
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/The_ICJ_advisory_opinion_on_kosovo__the_beginning_of_a_new_road_01.pdf, (accessed August 30, 2012).
180
European
Council
The
President,
Statement
by
Hermen
Van
Rompuy,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131811.pdf (accessed August 15,
2012).
181
Hall Gardner, (ed.), Central and Southeastern Europe in Transition: Perspectives on Success and Failure
Since 1989, (Westport, Greenwood, 2000):175.
182
UNMIK Mandate and Structure, http://www.unmikonline.org/Pages/about.aspx (accessed August 7, 2012).
31
other Albanian parties have been reluctant to dissolve power structures, whereas Serbian
leaders proved reluctant to participate in the new institutionalized structures of
government and multiethnic power-sharing arrangements.183 Moreover, EULEX was
questioned by both parties regarding its role. While Albanians see EULEX related with
Ahtisaari’s plan that respects Kosovo’s Constitution, Serbs see it under the UN auspices,
not related with the Ahtisaari’s plan.184
In 2012, because of the security situation in the north of Kosovo, where Serbs are the
majority as well as the election of the nationalist government in Serbia, the relationship
between two parties is unlikely to improve.185 However, Serbia is under pressure of the
EU to choose between Kosovo and the EU while EU’s common position on Kosovo is
status neutrality.186 Moreover, relations between Serbia and the West have been
constrained by war crimes as well. The implementation of the EU programs became
conditional to Serbs’ full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY).187
At this point, while the official policy of the European Commission is to separate the
status of Kosovo from Serbia’s EU integration process, several EU countries including
Germany have indicated that Serbia has to solve the Kosovo issue before becoming an EU
member, due to the lesson learned from the Cyprus Case since the enlargement in 2004.188
As a conclusion for this chapter, since the outset of the Kosovo conflict, the EU faced with
several coherency issues regarding the development of the ESDP, the NATO’s
humanitarian intervention, the status of Kosovo as well as the EU enlargement towards
183
Hall Gardner, (ed.), Central and Southeastern Europe in Transition: Perspectives on Success and Failure
Since 1989, (Westport, Greenwood, 2000):175.
184
Alistair J. K. Shepherd, “Amilestone in the history of the EU: Kosovo and the EU’s international Role”,
International Affairs, 85 (3), (2009): 527.
185
David
Bokhorst,
“Kosovo”,
European
Forum
for
Democracy
and
Solidarity,
http://www.europeanforum.net/country/kosovo (accessed August 28, 2012).
186
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp126-The_Western_Balkans_and_the_EU.pdf (accessed, August
27, 2012).
187
Andrew Cottey, “The Kosovo War in Perspective”, International Affairs, 85 (3), (2009): 595.
188
David
Bokhorst,
“Kosovo”,
European
Forum
for
Democracy
and
Solidarity,
http://www.europeanforum.net/country/kosovo (accessed August 28, 2012).
32
Balkans that led to tension and debate between the CFSP actors. In the next chapter, EFP
behavior will be analyzed through Kosovo conflict in order to see whether the coherency
issues or tension led to any integration.
33
3. European Foreign Policy Behavior: Is There A Trend?
The Kosovo conflict, a milestone in the history of the EU, resulted in at least the
development of two important policies; the ESDP189 and the SAP.190 The Kosovo conflict
highlighted the EU’s shortfall in military capabilities, while the UK argues that NATO is
the main platform to provide security of the EU, France, Germany and some other
member states had different motivations such as seeing the ESDP as the part of European
integration.191 Therefore, when France and the UK met in St. Malo in 1998, they had
distinct motivations but one common goal, to develop credible military forces that are
required for the autonomous action of the EU. As a result, regarding realist debate on the
Capabilities-Expectations Gap, both the Kosovo conflict and the post-conflict period
made the EU a more capable and comprehensive security actor as the ESS made it clear in
2003 and 2008.192
In fact, the need for military capabilities of the EU was a debate before the Kosovo
conflict. However Kosovo became a trigger and flamed up the debates among the CFSP
actors. In addition to the conflicts in Yugoslavia based on nationalism, the debate among
the CFSP actors was also affected from other endogenous and exogenous influences that
can be competing or mutually reinforcing, namely the notion of responsibility to protect,
post-cold war geopolitical transformations, the new US foreign policy, the completion of
economic and monetary union, bureaucratic pressures within the EU, changes in UK and
French foreign and security policies and the demands of the European defence industry.193
Therefore, it is not merely a debate on the status of Kosovo, which searches for
compromise among the CFSP actors; it also presents a debate on the future of the CFSP or
the direction of the EU.
189
The ESDP was renamed as the CSDP following the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.
Alistair J. K. Shepherd, “Amilestone in the history of the EU: Kosovo and the EU’s international Role”,
International Affairs, 85 (3), (2009): 513.
191
Ibid, 516.
192
Ibid, 514.
193
Alistair J. K. Shepherd, “Amilestone in the history of the EU: Kosovo and the EU’s international Role”,
International Affairs, 85 (3), (2009): 515.
190
34
Since the European project is based on human rights, rule of law, democracy promotion as
well as free trade since the outset, the Kosovo conflict clearly violated these values and
challenged the EU’s international liberalism. The interests of France in the Arab and
African worlds, of Britain in the Falklands, of Italy in the Mediterranean, and of everyone
in the Balkans, have remained too diverse until Kosovo to combine in any agreed
purpose.194 The motivation of the EU did not emerge from an interest of a specific party
but the doctrine of humanitarian intervention based on the security of peoples as well as
states.195 This has been the case, which is contrary to the realist argument that sees
national interests as the main motivation of any foreign policy behavior in an anarchical
international environment.196 Therefore, the EU including even its neutral members
suddenly required for the first time in its history to approve a NATO military operation
prior to a UNSCR.197
However, at the background of NATO’s interest to the Balkans, there was the newly
unified Germany, who was seeking a secure buffer from the potential instability expected
from the Eastern Europe.198 Along with such forces and lost in terms of both mission and
vision following the cold-war, NATO redefined collective security to mean the collective
defence of interests involving an unclear mix of geostrategic and humanitarian concerns,
which may not incorporate the interests of the world outside of NATO including Russia
and China.199 Therefore, Germany derived benefit from the politics of scale as well as
power avoidance while reaching its foreign policy goal using both the NATO and the
EU.200 As a result, NATO also found itself drawn into East-Central and Southeastern
Europe in the effort to protect Germany and other NATO members from feared instability
194
Elizabeth Pond, “Kosova: Catalyst for Europe”, Washington Quarterly, Vol 22 (4), (Autumn 1999): 77.
Alistair J. K. Shepherd, “Amilestone in the history of the EU: Kosovo and the EU’s international Role”,
International Affairs, 85 (3), (2009): 516.
196
Roy Gingsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical
Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Fall (1999): 13.
197
Elizabeth Pond, “Kosova: Catalyst for Europe”, Washington Quarterly, Vol 22 (4), (Autumn 1999): 85.
198
(ed.) Hall Gardner, Central and Southeastern Europe in Transition: Perspectives on Success and Failure
Since 1989, (Westport, Greenwood, 2000):151.
199
Ibid, 175.
200
Christopher J. Bickerton, “Functionality in EU Foreign Policy: Towards a New Research Agenda?”, Journal
of European Integration, 32 (2), (March 2010): 215.
Roy Gingsberg, Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical
Capability-Expectations Gap, Journal of Common Market Studies, (Fall 1999): 9.
195
35
from the east.201 Yet, despite the unified Germany’s national security interests, the EU’s
common approach towards Balkans resulted in greater integration in the CFSP.
Regarding the military intervention to Serbia, the two principles of the UN namely
self-
determination and state-sovereignty were conflicting each other, which member states
took different positions.202 The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia brought up the fact
that crime against humanity could never be purely internal matter, which fitted easily with
the EU’s multilateral internationalism.203 In addition, even though some Member States do
not recognize Kosovo, the EU could design, adopt and implement policies specific to the
Balkans including the EU membership perspective for both parties.204 This is an important
political commitment of the EU, who has so far no legal relationship with the independent
Kosovo.
Even though some member states are close to Serbia, and was backing Serbia at the
beginning or at least some of them are still against the independence of Kosovo, they have
participated in the debate at the CFSP institutions including the Commission, the EU
Council and the EP, with a common sense that is totally different from what liberal
intergovernmentalists suggested. The EU also launched the biggest civilian mission under
the CSDP, the EULEX, which has been responsible of promoting rule of law despite some
member states’ opposition to Kosovo’s independence.205 Even though Kosovo is defined
as an unfinished state, which is not eligible to join the EU, it was offered potential
candidate status by the EU, divided on Kosovo, following the common decision of its
Member States.
201
(ed.) Hall Gardner, Central and Southeastern Europe in Transition: Perspectives on Success and Failure
Since 1989, (Westport, Greenwood, 2000):179.
202
Alistair J. K. Shepherd, “Amilestone in the history of the EU: Kosovo and the EU’s international Role”,
International Affairs, 85 (3), (2009): 517.
203
Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the EU, 54-5, quoted in Alistair J. K. Shepherd, “A milestone in the
history of the EU: Kosovo and the EU’s international Role”, International Affairs, 85 (3), (2009): 516.
204
Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane, ESDP: The First Ten Years (1999 – 2009),
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf (accessed August 23, 2012).
205
Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane, ESDP: The First Ten Years (1999 – 2009),
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf (accessed August 23, 2012).
36
In general, Member States divide into three groups on foreign policy issues; the Atlantists
such as Britain, the Europeanists such as France and Germany and the neutralists such as
Ireland and Austria.206 The main argument between those groups was whether NATO or
the EU was the appropriate organization for improving military capabilities.207 France’s
re-integration into the NATO command structure in 2009 could also be an important
development regarding the intra-European grouping. While this gives France a word on
the major decisions within the Alliance from the outset, it also affects the NATO acts in
accordance with French and European interests.208 In cases where the US opts out, the
Europeans could act with the help of pooling European military resources. Therefore, the
debate between Atlantists and Europeanists moves on the transatlantic agenda as well,
which also opens up the debate on the future of the CFSP.
At the time of the Kosovo conflict, the EU Parliament appeared as a new actor and
participated in the debate on the status of Kosovo, urging Member States to recognize
Kosovo as well as welcoming the EU candidacy of Serbia.209 Taking its power from the
EU citizens and the EU Treaties, which gave parliament relative weight in the decision
making through the years, it proved that in the years ahead, the European Parliament will
have more words to say on foreign policy issues, where the legitimacy of the EU policies
are more controversial.
Therefore, If the argument of the more divided the EU is, the less EFP will have influence,
is put aside, then a trend towards integration could be seen. Further, some EU officials
insist that Europe is not as disunited as it looks. To those, Member States were merely
debating, rather than being divided on Kosovo,210 where, the EU opted for a bottom-up
206
Andrew Cottey, “The Kosovo War in Perspective”, International Affairs, 85 (3), (2009): 598.
Alistair J. K. Shepherd, “Amilestone in the history of the EU: Kosovo and the EU’s international Role”,
International Affairs, 85 (3), (2009): 516.
208
Hall Gardner, “Prospects for the Transatlantic Relationship under the Obama Presidency: Towards a
Transatlantic Strategic Council”, CICERO Foundation Great Debate Paper, No:09/02,
http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Hall_Gardner_Transatlantic_Security_Council.pdf>
(accessed
September 14, 2012).
209
http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_5610_en.htm (accessed August 15, 2012), also
http://setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2010/07/09/feature-01 (accessed,
August 17, 2012).
210
Gjeraqina
Tuhina,
“Divided
EU
Stalls
Debate
on
Kosovo”,
9
May
2007,
http://kosovo.birn.eu.com/en/1/70/2889/?tpl=30 (accessed, August 30, 2012).
207
37
approach, which has been implementing the agreed EU policies first. The value of this
approach is that it at least provides communication between parties on technical issues
such as customs while preventing any disintegration.211
In Kosovo case, the discrepancy between the CFSP and the ESDP became quite clear and
put the EU’s most ambitious mission EULEX in a position which undermines the mission
for good as the mission focused primarily as a technical fix of an unsolved political
problem. 212 However, although the problem still exits, the EU, in time, developed a twotrack approach, which functions simultaneously and aims to bring parties together under
the EU. As both parties, namely Serbia and Kosovo, are well aware of the future
membership offer, the EU could manage the tension in the political domain and focus on
its rule of law mission, which seems more urgent than any other issues in the cooperation
with the UN.213
While an operation like EULEX marks a change of gear in the CSDP due to its context
and size, it is legitimate to wonder whether such change of gear will prove sustainable in
terms of procurement and mission support, personnel requirements or planning and
conduct structures. Therefore, the question is whether the EULEX experience will help
trigger the structural consolidation of civilian CSDP capabilities, or whether this mission
will remain the only one of its kind for the foreseeable future.214 In response to this
argument, it would be useful to remember what civilian crisis management capabilities the
EU had before Kosovo. If the EU developed those in a turbulent political environment
regarding the status of Kosovo, it would also do in the future.
211
212
213
214
Jacques
Rupnik,
“The
Challenges
of
EU
Enlargement
in
the
Balkans”,
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp126-The_Western_Balkans_and_the_EU.pdf (accessed, August
28, 2012).
Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane, (eds.), ESDP: The First Ten Years (1999 – 2009),
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf (accessed August 29, 2012).
Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane, (eds.), ESDP: The First Ten Years (1999 – 2009),
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf (accessed August 29, 2012).
Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane, (eds), ESDP: The First Ten Years (1999 – 2009),
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf (accessed August 29, 2012).
38
It was also recognized in the Kosovo conflict that separation of civil and military
authorities such as UNMIK and KFOR could not help in conflict areas. In order to
overcome this, the EU, when took over the mission from KFOR in 2008, followed a more
comprehensive approach, which would be useful for the EU in its future initiatives.215 On
the other hand, even under the EU authority, different contributions to the mission from
different sources including NGOs caused coordination issues that could be a challenge to
the effectiveness of the efforts that aim to transform the region into multicultural,
multiethnic democracies.
In general, the involvement of an EU Member State is usually considered to be a powerful
element of EU influence in the region. However, in some cases, it can become an
impediment, when there are unsolved problems between members and candidates like
Cyprus issue, which was included to the Eastern enlargement of 2004 at the insistence of
Greece, while the assumption in the EU was that accession to the Union would be
conditional on ending the partition of the island in accordance with the UN plan.216
Therefore, Cyprus issue has become a major lesson for the future in dealing with the
Western Balkans. On the other hand, following the enlargement of the EU, the new
member states were confronted with the requirement of defining their policies toward the
world outside the EU, not just toward neighboring countries,217 meaning not only the
Member States shape the CFSP, the CFSP shapes the Member States national foreign
policies.
In fact, the paradox of the CFSP is its mandate to blend traditional foreign policy content
with a rather unique form of common foreign policy making.218 Thus, using a non-state
methodology, the CFSP represents post-Westphalian policy practices but due to its innate
national composition, cannot prevent displays of sovereign truculence, which creates
215
Robert Cooper, “ESDP Goals and Ambitions”, Remarks to the USEU-POLMIL Conference, quoted in
Alistair J. K. Shepherd, “Amilestone in the history of the EU: Kosovo and the EU’s international Role”,
International Affairs, 85 (3), (2009): 520.
216
Jacques
Rupnik,
“The
Challenges
of
EU
Enlargement
in
the
Balkans”,
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/EU_enlargement_in_the_Balkans.pdf (accessed August 29, 2012).
217
Adam D. Rotfeld, “The Process of Transforming Foreign and Security Policies”, American Foreign Policy
Interests, (2007):29
218
Amelia Hadfield, “Foreign Policy and Dyadic Identities: The Role of the CFSP”, Geopolitics, 11, (2006):
677.
39
tension, a necessary force for greater integration.219 Therefore, the EU, divided on
Kosovo, managed to implement two strategic approaches in the region, which are moving
from crisis management to Europeanized protectorate and overseeing the transition of
Kosovo from international protectorate to a potential EU candidate state. Moreover, the
EU is directly involved for the first time in the creation of its future Member States,
namely Serbia and Kosovo.220
Although the CFSP is an intergovernmental policy area, it has been also a forum for
increasingly supranational coordination of all member states on EU third-party issues that
has bestowed a quality of actorness upon the EU, which the national and transnational
tensions are inherent in EU foreign policy making.221 The Central and Eastern European
Countries’ willingness, for instance, to adapt to European practices and norms is the extent
to which the EU offers the opportunity successfully to pursue their concerns to the
European level.222 This is important where the relations with Russia and Ukraine and the
role of the NATO as well as the US need to be sorted out at the EU level.223
Another finding regarding the CFSP is that the lack of political will in developing the
CFSP is not evenly spread across the EU’s Member States. Some of them such as Belgium
and Luxemburg are more ready to consider a genuine, deeper pooling of sovereignty,
while others such as Greece are much less ready to contemplate on independent foreign
policy making.224 While became a success of EFP, enlargement increased the diversity of
foreign policy interests, analyses, and approaches. Forging a consensus on priorities
between Northern and Southern member states is obviously difficult.225 Therefore, these
characteristics of the CFSP prove that tension is inherent in the CFSP since its
219
Ibid.
Jacques
Rupnik,
“The
Challenges
of
EU
Enlargement
in
the
Balkans”,
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/EU_enlargement_in_the_Balkans.pdf (accessed August 29, 2012).
221
Amelia Hadfield, “Foreign Policy and Dyadic Identities: The Role of the CFSP”, Geopolitics, 11, (2006):
676.
222
Geoffrey Edwards, “The New Member States and the Making of EU Foreign Policy”, European Foreign
Affairs Review, 11, (2006):145.
223
Ibid, 161.
224
Kirsty Hughes, “European Foreign Policy Under Pressure”, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol IX (2),
(Winter/Spring 2003):126.
225
Kirsty Hughes, “European Foreign Policy Under Pressure”, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol IX (2),
(Winter/Spring 2003):129.
220
40
development. Thus, EFP represents a distinct area of interstate behavior that has arisen out
of post-Cold war circumstances blending national and supranational decision-making in
new and unpredictable ways.226
Although the CFSP is an intergovernmental area, the member States are obliged to act
loyally and to cooperate. The loyalty obligation involves both positive and negative
dimensions. While the positive obligation asks Member States to actively work together to
enhance and develop EFP, the negative obligation requests Member States to refrain from
any action which run counter to the interests of the EU or which is likely to infringe its
effectiveness.227 In the Kosovo case, Member States followed the negative loyalty and
although they are not united on the status of Kosovo, they, at least, did not block any
policy development regarding the region itself.
Although the European project is based on pooled sovereignties, which stand for peace
through institutionalized interdependence since the World War Second, a recent return of
identity politics and the rise of national populist forces on issues related to immigration
and integration gives Balkans wrong messages in their fight against ethnic partition.228
Therefore, the risk for the European project does not stem from the coherency issue,
which Brussels seems capable of handling; in fact, it results from lack of debate among
the parties involved. The more debate on EFP among CFSP actors would also provide the
more democracy at the EU level.
Therefore, tension presents a force, which results in debate and debate is the environment
that creates cooperation as well as integration. This is also an argument in response to the
member states who argue that enlargement would bring more tension and coherency
issues. Parallel to this, Turkey’s membership in the EU and permanent cooperation with
Russia on Euro-Atlantic security issues would do nothing but contribute to the EU’s
226
227
228
Amelia Hadfield, “Foreign Policy and Dyadic Identities: The Role of the CFSP”, Geopolitics, 11, (2006):
679.
Claudia Major, “Europeanization and Foreign and Security Policy – Undermining or Rescuing the Nation
State?”, Political Studies Association, Vol 25 (3), (2005): 250.
Jacques Rupnik, The Western Balkans and the EU: The Hour of Europe, (EUISS, Paris, June 2011)
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp126-The_Western_Balkans_and_the_EU.pdf> (accessed, August
27, 2012)
41
integration as well as security in the region.229 If the EU would integrate further, then the
Member States should take into account the non-EU countries for both the development of
the CFSP as well as the international policy implementation.230 For instance, Russia
should not only be treated as a gas exporting country but also awarded a political role in
terms of Euro-Atlantic security issues.231
At the end, even though the EU could not present a united position in the Kosovo conflict,
the EU became a more capable crisis management actor with its ESDP, political and
military decision making structures, security strategy, force catalogues, and European
Defence Agency (EDA) as well as SP, EP and new financial assistance tools.232 More
important than those, the Kosovo conflict proves that tension and debate within the EU,
which sooner or later leads to greater integration.
229
Treaty of Nice (2003), which was desinged to adapt the EU to the new unified Germany, presents a good
example of this argument. At the end, Nice not only brought reforms regarding Germany’s situation, but also
led to a new level of integration in several areas.
230
Benedikt C. Harzl, “Conflicting Perceptions: Russia, the West and Kosovo”, Review of Central and East
European Law, 33 (2008): 513.
231
Ibid, 514.
232
Alistair J. K. Shepherd, “Amilestone in the history of the EU: Kosovo and the EU’s international Role”,
International Affairs, 85 (3), (2009): 529.
42
Conclusion
There has been always tension among the CFSP actors during EFP behavior due to their
different approaches on foreign policy issues. Tension, which appears in the CFSP, seems
to prevent cooperation and integration. In fact, tension has been a constitutive element,
which the Kosovo case clearly demonstrates. According to this thesis, tension, which is
inherent in the EFP behavior, caused integration through opening up the CFSP issues into
discussion within the EU.
Even though the CFSP actors have distinct foreign and security policies, crimes against
humanity in Kosovo challenged the EU’s main values and forged the CFSP actors to
implement certain policies together. From the outset, each policy on Kosovo has witnessed
certain degree of debate among the CFSP actors before they were adopted. In most cases,
the EU institutions also acted independently. At the end, the main polarization occurred
between the Council and the other EU institutions namely the Commission and the
Parliament.
Once the security framework is established in Kosovo, then the disagreements among
CFSP actors came onto the surface of EU’s daily politics, in this case the decision on the
status of Kosovo. However, tension regarding the status of Kosovo did not block any
policy initiative; rather it triggered several initiatives including membership perspectives
for the unfinished states, namely Serbia and Kosovo.
Among many results of the Kosovo case both for the region and the world, the important
ones for this thesis are how the EU as a whole reacted during the conflict and what
reforms in the field of the CFSP took place. First of all, the EU presented an actorness,
implemented common policies but could not be uniform on the status of Kosovo.
Although this seems like a failure to several approaches analyzing EFP such as FPA,
realism, intergovernmentalism, actorness, integration theory, it also points out that there is
a trend in the EFP behavior. In Kosovo, the EU pursued a milieu goal, which was to build
security in the Europe through integrating Balkans sooner or later into the European
43
Project through its enlargement instrument. Further, the EU reached greater integration
gaining certain crisis management capabilities and instruments during the conflict, which
represents the main focus of this thesis. During the Kosovo conflict, the EU has also
discussed its identity, enlargement policy, main threats, military capabilities as well as the
CFSP institutions, which were also improved in the following Treaties.
While the debate regarding both EU’s actorness as well as the achievement of the CFSP
continues among scholars as well as politicians, the question of how the CFSP functions
presents a challenge to the existing literature. The meaning of the Kosovo conflict in terms
of EU functioning and how tension triggers greater integration are systemic questions that
require involvement of several variables while analyzing the EFP behavior.
At the end, contrary to realists, who disregards why, how and when national interests
converge and to what extent they are shaped by domestic and international politics and the
ethos of community membership, the EU crafted an active foreign policy in the Kosovo
conflict on the basis of common values while remaining politically neutral on Kosovo’s
status. Therefore, interstate bargaining or pursuing national interests remain insufficient to
explain the EFP behavior where the impact of shared history of war on decision making
and continuity of EU institutional cooperation as well as the importance of socialization
processes such as Europeanization and others are also at play.
This proves that even though there are different interests, EU ideals lead to common
policies, where the EU integrates further, through tension and debate. Therefore, the
Kosovo war is not merely a debate on the status of Kosovo, which searches compromise
among the CFSP actors; it also presents a debate on the future of the CFSP or the direction
of the EU.
As conclusion, alike Kosovo, each foreign policy issue brings tension among CFSP actors
in an enlarging EU, which seems necessary in order to trigger greater integration.
Considering the EU as a distinct polity, which is neither state nor an international
organization, EU’s functioning does not present a coherency issue rather involves a trend,
44
which starts with tension, develops with debate and results in an EU reform as well as
greater integration that is inherent in the EFP behavior. Hereby, more research that would
focus on the functioning of the EU rather than its effectiveness is needed to enlighten the
principles of this trend.
45
ANNEX
The Historical Development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU
European Defence Community
- French Prime Minister René Pleven’s Plan
(October, 1950)
- a measure of control over German rearmament
- basis of EPC, including a common foreign policy
European Political Community (EPC)
- aimed to coordinate and create a joint military
(1953)
- signed by six but rejected at the French Senate
Western European Union (WEU)
- Including Germany and Italy, the Brussels Treaty Organization transformed into the
(1955)
WEU
- formulated Petersberg Tasks in 1992
Fouchet Plans (1961-62)
- initiated originally by De Gaulle to create the Europe of States
- aimed foreign policy coordination among EC Member States
- no agreement reached due to some MSs’ sovereignty concerns
European Political Cooperation (EPC II) - initiated by Pompidou due to the increasing need of foreign policy coordination
(1970s)
- the predecessor of European Council
- created summitry
- structurally follows organization of Council of Ministers (Coreper, shared President etc)
- required at a minimum biannual meetings between heads of Government
- formally resided outside of the Rome Treaties
46
- completely intergovernmental
Single European Act (SEA) in 1970s
- provided a treaty base for EPC for the first time
- “…Member States should endeavor jointly to formulate and implement a EFP” on a
voluntary and non-binding bases...”
- stayed out of the Treaties because of some MSs’ rejections
- associated the European Parliament closely with European Political Cooperation.
- established a small but permanent secretariat for EPC based within the headquarters of
the Council of Ministers in Brussels
- remained intergovernmental
Maastricht Treaty (1992)
- transformed the EPC into the CFSP
- established the CFSP as the second pillar of the EU
- kept the CFSP formally distinct and separate from the Rome Treaties
- associated the Commission fully with the CFSP
- opened the door to security policy:
“…Systematic cooperation between member states on any matter of foreign or security
policy that is of general interest...Where necessary the European Council shall, by
unanimity, define formal common positions to which member states are expected to
conform...the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead
to a common defence…”
47
- recognized the WEU as an integral part of the development of the Union
- the European Council was given a formal role in outlining the principals for CFSP
including an agenda
- the EU Council was given the responsibility defining common positions and decide on
joint actions with decisions on implementation open to QMV
- made QMV possible only for follow-up decisions in some instances, in implementing
what had been agreed before by a unanimous vote or consensus.
- enhanced the role and tasks of the Council Presidency
- the Commission was given the formal right to initiate in the CFSP
- required that the EP be consulted (no longer just “closely associated”) while the
consultation remained still advisory
- remained intergovernmental
Amsterdam Treaty (1997)
- extended QMV to some instances in the CFSP
- created the post of High Representative for CFSP
- established a Policy Planning and Early Warning (PPEW) Unit within the Council
Secretariat, where the Council could appoint special representatives with a mandate in
relation to particular policy issues.
- Petersberg Tasks were incorporated within its domain.
St. Malo Declaration (1998)
- British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac met in
St.Malo
- led the inclusion in the Union's legitimate competences of a common security and
48
defence policy namely the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
– according to the joint declaration; “…the Union must have the capacity for
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to
use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises…”
- shows the EU's acquisition of strategic responsibility in post-Cold War crises
management
The Cologne European Council
- the ESDP was formally adopted
(June 1999)
- HR of the CFSP was appointed
The Helsinki European Council
- the Helsinki Headline Goals were adopted, pledging member states to constitute a
(December 1999)
European Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 troop deployable within 60 days by 2003.
Nice Treaty (2000)
- aimed to give the EU an overall crisis management and conflict prevention capability in
support of the objectives of the CFSP
- established the ESDP to strengthen the EU's contribution
- introduced QMV for the appointment of the HR for CFSP as well as the appointment of
special reps
- “closer cooperation” renamed as “enhanced cooperation”, which will not relate to
matters having military or defence implications due to some MSs’ sovereignty concern
- kept MSs’ right of veto in decision making in the CFSP
The European Convention
- to overcome the disastrous appearance of the EU during the Iraq conflict
(2002 – 2003)
- MSs’ representatives, the EP, National Parliaments, and the EC participated.
- came up with a “Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”, which became a
49
basis for the IGC
Intergovernmental Conference IGC
(2003 – 2004)
Brussels European Council
- reached a consensus on the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”, which was
rejected in the referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005
- European Security Strategy (ESS) was agreed
(December 2003)
European Council
(June 2004)
European Council
- Headline Goal 2010 was adopted which focus on the qualitative aspects of capability
development, in particular interoperability, deployability and sustainability.
- Civilian Headline Goal 2008 was adopted
(December 2004)
- envisaged the deployment of civilian ESDP capabilities within 30 days of the decision to
launch a mission. Examples of activities the civilian operations should carry out
include security sector reform and support to disarmament and demobilization
processes
Intergovernmental Conference IGC
- drawed up a new Reform Treaty
(2007)
- significant changes were made in the area of the CFSP, even though the results of
referenda were not related
Lisbon Treaty
Background
50
(2007 – 2009)
- IGC in 2007 came up with the Lisbon Treaty that was entered into force on 1 December
2009
- removed the pillar structure and established a legal personality for the EU
- established two EU Treaties: TEU and TFEU
- set out the CFSP in the TEU
- maintained the unanimity voting with some exceptions
- maintained the exclusion of the CFSP from the jurisdiction of the ECJ
- the post of HR for the CFSP merged with the European Commissioner for External
Relations and was renamed “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy”
- established a European External Action Service, originally a German initiative, which
will assist the HR and increased the number of staff in comparison to the Policy
Planning and Early Warning Unit.
- EEAS comprises of officials from the Council Secretariat, the Commission, and the
detached staff from the national diplomatic services.
- as regards the EU capabilities in civilian and military crisis management, permanent
structured cooperation was provided for MSs whose military capabilities fulfill higher
criteria and have willingness to do so
- a mutual defence clause was introduced in the treaty text
- renamed the ESDP to the CSDP
51
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