ISSN 1321-1560
Copyright Commonwealth of Australia 1994
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ra
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8
10
This Current Issues Brief provides the reader with a basic outline of
Rwanda's location, geography, economy, people and history, and aims
to provide a context in which to understand the human catastrophe
that has engulfed this central African nation.
The paper outlines United Nations (UN) efforts to establish a
mediatory presence in Rwanda and notes other international reactions
to the civil war. Particular note is taken of the UN-US disagreement
over the nature of the proposed UN mission. The final sections
examine international responses to the crisis, particularly the reaction
of the Australian Government to UN requests for military assistance
in Rwanda.
Background'
The Republic of Rwanda gained its independence from Belgium in
1962. It is a land-locked nation in Central Africa, sandwiched between
Zaire in the west, Tanzania in the east, Burundi in the south and
Uganda in the north. The nation has a land area of 26 338 square
kilometres and has an estimated population of 7.53 million.2 The
population is divided into two major groups: the Hutu (85-40 percent
of the population) and the Tutsi (9-14 percent). There is also a small
community of Twa (a pygmoid people).
Rwanda is a unitary republic, with political power concentrated in the
riational capital, Kigali. The current Rwandan constitution was
enacted in June 1991 and is derived from both Belgian law and the
earlier Rwandan constitution of 1978. Economically, the World Bank
estimates that Rwanda's GDP grew at an annual average of 4.7 percent
in real terms between 1970-1980 and 0.6 percent between 1980-1991.
Per capita GNP was estimated t o be $US270 in 1991, placing Rwanda
on the list of the fifteen poorest nations in the world. Neighbouring
Burundi shares a similar level of poverty. Rwanda's principal exports
in 1992 were coffee and tea.
1, The principal source for this section is the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU),
Country Profile: Rwanda, Burundi, 1993-94,London, 1993.
2.
This population figure is based upon a mid-1992 estimate. The latest census
figure of 7.16 million was recorded in August 1991, Economist Intelligence Unit
(EIU),Country Profile:Rwanda, Burundi, 1993-94,London, 1993: 2.
hermore, Brussels made a number of changes to native
society in the colonies during the mid-1920s9which served to increase
Tutsi political power and Hutu resentment at the local level to an
rld War, Belgium was
unprecedented e ~ t e n t .A~
ce democracy t o the
pressured by the United
colonies. Dissatisfied with the Belgian progress to this end, it was
decided to send a UN mission there in 1957, significantly raising the
level of political reform.
Relations between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes have been strained since
the Tutsi arrived in the area and gradually subjugated t
forcing them into a lord-vassal relationship. Tutsi power was
the possession of cattle and a more advanced knowledge of
The Tutsi remained the dominant group in Rwanda until
Despite the traditional tensions, the cultures o 0th tribes have been
largely integrated, with the Tutsi adopting the ntu (Hutu) language
and the Hutu kinship and class system deriving from Tutsi culture.
ent
et
The current conflict in Rwanda is neither an isolated nor totally
unexpected incident. Wanda's strife is als profoundly intertwined
with the racial viole e in neighbouring urundi and the south
estern region of Uganda.*
uring colonial times the minority Tutsi, wh.
in Rwanda and Burun society, were favoure
at the expense of the utu people. In the
3,
ositions of power
Economist Intelligence Unit: 3.
Dowden, 'Hate erupts in land of vol
11 Apr. 1994:
for Burundi.6
Tutsi-Hutu violence continue throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
A R ~ E H ~ Twon
U local elections in 1960 leading to further vi0
In late 1961 the Hutu-based PARMEHUTU party toppled the
monarchy, a power shift legitimised by the 1963 legislative elections.
ndi during the 1960
The influx of Tutsi refugees from
rnment's anti-Tutsi
had the effect of increasing th
policies.
~ ~ U T
didUnot
Though formed by a prominent
favour all Hutu but mainly those
hengeri in the nor
er of Hutu lords (leaders
1 groupings) had
the new adrninist
ot occur, violence flared
would return their ancestral land
again and in 1973 Major General Habyarimana (a Hutu lord) staged
a successful coup, forming a new government and banning
. In 1975 President Habyarimana established the
olutionnaire National pour le Developpernent (MRND)
blished civilian rule under one-party government. In
a legislature, although true power continued
to reside with the
Central Cornrnitt ee .
In response to growing domestic and international pressure, the
Rwandan President allowed the creation of other political parties in
1991, Dozens emerged but the most ~rnportantof these was the
emocratique Republica
draws its political
an association with the former
EHUTU. In mid92, after considerable political tu
sengiraremye) emerged as Prim
5,
John Che
Fron tlin%
East african crisis: ~ w a n d aand Burundi spill blood',
994: 57, 60.
c o n o ~ i sIntelligence
t
Unit: 4.
s
also threatene
r location). This
nched a new offensiv
gali and was only halt
country and others congregated in overcrowded camps, surviving on
international aid.
The Tanzanian government and the rganisation of African Unity
4 August 1993 the
(OAU) mediated in peace negotiations an
wandan government
Arusha Peace agreement was signed between
ndi, Kenya, Uganda,
and the RPF. The agreement was backed b
number of observer
and Zaire. It was also supported by the U
states, namely Belgium, France, ~ e r m a n yand the U
agreement allowed for the RPF to enter an enlar
government, for the two opposin
refugees to return prior to elections in 1994.
The
is
FVhile 'the roots of the present conflict in wanda can be traced to the
* catalys to the current round of
upheavals of the 1 9 6 0 ~ ' , ~the
violence was the deaths of the Rwandan and urundi presidents in a n
aircraft crash on 6 April 1994, It has been rep
Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President
of Burundi were returning with a comprehensive peac
by renegade troops o
7.
Many of the rebels actually served with the Ugandan a m y while in exile but
deserted in order to continue fighting in Rwanda. See: Jeffrey Bartholet and
e Oct.
e ~ 1990: 85.
Ruth Marshall, 'A RRbellion in the Heart of Africa', ~ e w ~ w 16
8.
Robert Block, 'Caught in tribal crossfire', Canberra
ha is the only solution',
10. John Cherian: 60.
mes, 9 Apr. 1994: 15.
15 Apr. 1994: 6 .
In the afterrnath of th
96 hours of the ceasefire, the establishment of a tribunal to investigate
and bring the killers to justice, delivery of humanitarian aid and
international monitoring of the arrangement.
'*
irnultaneously with the unfoldi
eset by violence as Tutsi an
planned coup in urundi was uncovered on 25 April but a bloodbath
on a scale of that in Rwanda was only averted by the decision of some
elements in the army not t o support a planned coup?
F ceasefire in Rwanda appears to have failed from the outset,
continued almost unabated and by 1 ay rebels had close
oops fled in the face
of the RPF advance??'
er neither into negotiations nor
a truce with government forces until his troops had gained control over
gali and other overnment ~trongholds.
ternent it was re rted that the rebels occupi
11. John ~ h e ~ a60.
n:
ull troops out of Rwanda',
13. Aidan Hartley, 'Rwandan ceasefire
1994: 5.
r.
14.
Burundi bloodbath fears end coup bi
er',
were within 8 lometres of the ~apita1.l~ Two or three days
subsequent to this announcement, RPF forces were engaged in heavy
fighting in areas to the southwest and northwest of Kigali. By 14 May
media reports from Rwanda were claiming that the
occupied all of northern Rwanda with the exception of a 1
of the road leading into Kigali? As at the end of May the RPF has
occupied more than two-thirds of the country, including most of Kigali,
and appear set to take the headquarters of the Rwanda government at
Gitarama. l9
Six weeks after the present war began, the death toll has been put at
anywhere between 250 000 and 500 000 - the majority of them Tutsi
according to the United Nations. In all likelihood, however, the true
death toll may never be known.
Responses to the
The United Nations
The United Nations deployed an observer force to Rwanda in June
1993 t o 'monitor the Ugandamwanda border [and] verify non-transit
of military* assistance t o Rwanda'.20 This involvement in what
became known as the UN Observer Mission Ugandamwanda
(UNOMUR) was located on the Rwandamgandan border. A second
operation was subsequently established in Kigali in October 1993 to
monitor the August 1993 peace agreement: it became known as the UN
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The UN intended to
merge UNOMUR with UNAPVIIR but on 20 April 1994 the UN
announced that it had decided to reduce its 2500-strong UNAMIR
contingent by 500, removing all non-essential forces from the
country.21 Two days later (22 April) the UN voted to withdraw all
but 270 UNAMIR personnel, leaving an infantry company of 150
troops as well as some military observers and civilians.22 This action
was prompted by several instances where rebel and government troops
17. 'No peace deals, vows rebel chief, Sunday Herald Sun, 8 May 1994: 27.
18. 'Thousands flee rebel advance', Canberra ?times, 14 May 1994: 9,
19. 'Rwanda: the art of death', The Economist, 28 May 1994: 39-40,
20. Gareth Evans, CooperatingforPeace, Allen & Unwin, 1993: 102.
21. Anthony Goodman, 'Rwanda death toll may be 100 000, UN told', The Age, 21
Apr. 1994: 1.
22. 'UN to pull troops out of Rwanda',
kend Australian, 23 Apr. 1994: 18.
wanda had been deploy
ace a ~ e e m e n rather
t
e intention of
withdrawal as 'in
community gener
hundreds of tho
troops as a dete
leader argued that troops could be landed a t the airport and from there
aid could be distributed t o the interior of the country.
Boutros-Ghali's proposal met with opposition from the United States
which argued that the U contingent should undertake a less
ambitious mission,
viding instead 'safe' areas on the Rwandan
borders where the
million refugees of the civil war could be
provided with aid. Under the American proposal the UN forces would
not attempt to intervene in he conflict tween the Rwandan
government and the rebels.
ut one observer has criticised this
strategy, pointing out that the UN has been unsuccessful in
maintaining the 'safe areas' in the Bosnian ~ o n f l i c t .Washington's
~~
cool response to Boutros-Ghali's proposal, and its more modest
intervention strate
in line with the Clinton
Administration's ru
involvement in U
should be determined by a set of cr
a, including natio
ay it was agreed that the
ould send 5500 African troops
to Rwanda but the UN and the US continued to differ as to where the
arthy, 'Despair €or Rwanda as nations dither', Sydney
24. Renee Slarna and Serge
12 May 1994: 10.
5. Phillip
old, 'Call for Rwanda eace force', The Australian,
s has baulked a
d vehicles an
ed to supply
Rwanda *27
The Rwanda
*
ng directly involved
*
some aspects of the dilemma of
efforts. This is the subject of a
aper The United
the
ithin ten days of the renewed violence in Wanda, the Australian
government responded with A500 000 in aid for civilians dispossesse
the Australian
his funding was distri
evelopment Assi~tance
B) and included
medical and other emergency assistance.28 Two weeks later, as the
extent of the tragedy became known to the outside world, Australia
committed a further $A1 million in aid to the people of Rwa
nisations. The Unit
funding was divided between three
CR) received $A700 000 for the
High Commissioner for Refugees (
coordination of international relief to Rwanda.
was provided to World Vision Australia to assi
relief kits for families, while Communi
id Abroad also received
$A100 000 to provide water, sanitation
helter for refugees who
have fled into neighbouring
ustralian nongovernment organisations (NGOs) are also contributing to relief
nd 5500 more troops to Rwanda', The Sydney
7. 'Clinton limits military help', Canberra !Times; 30
28. 'New talks planned, but Rwandan fighting goes on', Canberra !Times; 17 Apr.
1994: 6.
29,
da
autious about
about the aims of the proposed operation
increasing calls (notably from former Prime
ere are no
Estimates Committee hearing that:
We expect there to be a clear m ion, clearly established timetable and politi
le resolution. None of these currently
processes put in place for a PO
There were probably two broa
ns put to the United Nations and they
chosen a middle course probably taking the worst aspect of both plans. We do
not find that very encouraging at the moment. Given the circumstances you
[Senator MacGibbon] have accurately described, one of the paramount matters
on my mind is that befor
it any Australians to that area I must
protect their security, If I
ot be assured of protecting their security we do
not commit.34
ustralian government has decided to keep its Rwanda options
open until the U agrees upon a set of mission objective
has, however, indicated that it would be prepared to assist with the
protection of refugees that have fled into surrounding countries.35
30. Ian McPhedran, 'Aid sought for Rwanda', Canberra Times, 10 May 1994: 7. Also
see CARE Australia, 'Rwanda - CARE flies in more aid to Tanzania', Press
Release, 10 May 1994. CARE announced that it was flying in $A 600 000 in aid
to Rwandan refugees in Tanzania.
31. Testimony of Senator Robert Ray, Estimates Committee B, E s t i m a t ~
C o ~ ~ i t~ t e ~ a24 May ~1994: 28,~
~
,
32. Cameron Stewart, 'Rwanda: UNI asks for troops', The Australian, 16 May 1994:
1.
33* D.D. McNicoll, 'Send aid not troops: Fraser', The Australian, 17 May 1994: 6.
34.
5.
testimony to Estimates Committee B, 24
o troops to Rwanda if at
gara in Tanzania, is the
The 300 000-strong Camp
largest refugee camp in the world, though it is only one of a number
of camps now catering to displaced Rwandans. Care Australia is
providing much-needed food and medical supplies to one third of the
camp.36 The work done in these camps is essential to the survival of
thousands of refugees but their creation adds to the disturbing number
of camps that already exist throughout Africa.
The war in Rwanda is not the consequence of a set of short-term
factors but has its origins in decades of inter-tribal tension. Nor is the
Tutsi-Hutu tribal cleavage peculiar to Rwanda but also complicates the
security of Burundi and the south-western part of Uganda. Given the
long-term nature of the problem, it would seem that a peace
enforcement mission would be little more than a stop-gap measure.
Furthermore, it could well be a n expensive venture given that both
warring factions in Rwanda have warned that UN troops will be
regarded as hostile forces.
Western states are cognisant 'of the fact that once the United Nations
has Committed troops to Rwanda it may be difficult to withdraw. This
is reflected in Washington's insistence that any UN operation should
focus on the provision of safe areas on Rwanda's borders rather than
a more ambitious peace enforcement effort, or a relief program located
at Kigali airport. Canberra, too, is aware that there must be a political
solution t o the Rwanda conflict before troops are committed, or else
the operation could degenerate into a problem without end such as
would appear to be the case in Somalia.
There appears to be increasing international support for the supply of
aid simultaneously with diplomatic efforts to negotiate a feasible peace,
rather than deploying troops in to what might well become a quagmire
for the UN.
36. Ian McPhedran, '50,000 more Rwandan refugees found', Canberra Timeq 24
May, 1994, p.2.
TANZANIA
ZAIRE
Roads
- internattonal boundaries
@
0
Prov I nc i a i bound a r I es
Airports
km
40
miles
25
1
r
0
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