Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey
Author(s): Feroz Ahmad
Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Jan., 1991), pp. 3-21
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Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey
Feroz Ahmad
Until the founding of the Turkish Republic in October 1923, the principal
component in the ideology of the former Ottoman regime was Islam under
the Sultan-Caliph, who was both the temporal and the spiritual ruler.
Mustafa Kemal Pasha, later Atatiirk, and his supporters decided to adopt
secular nationalism as the ideology of the new state, hoping in time to
relegate Islam to the sidelines. The aim in adopting secularism was to create
a modern, rational state with institutions and laws which would facilitate
the development of capitalism in Turkey. The Kemalists did not want any
opponents to their grand design to use religion as barrier to the changes
they envisaged. Thus, having learned the lesson of the second constitutional
period (1908-18) they tried to remove Islam from political discourse,
though not always successfully. Turkish society as yet undifferentiated in
terms of classes and deprived of other means of expressing disaffection by
the single-party regime, tended to use Islamic discourse to challenge the
legitimacy of the state. The state responded by limiting the space in which
this discourse took place by extending secular laws and becoming more and
more militant against Islam.
This was, in fact, the continuation of the contest for the state which
began soon after Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) was forced to restore
constitutional government in July 1908. The state retained its Islamic
character, with Islam specified as its official faith and the Sultan-Caliph
as its head. Nevertheless, after the election of the Chamber of Deputies
in December 1908 and with the secret Committee of Union and Progress
(CUP) exerting influence from behind the scene, the power of the sultan
was no longer as absolute as it had been. Needless to say, Abdulhamid was
not happy with his new role and would have liked to restore the status quo
ante as he had done once before in 1878.
The restoration of the constitution was also marked by a struggle for
power between various factions within what may be broadly described as
the Young Turk movement. These factions had been united in opposition
to Hamidian autocracy but they had very different visions of a reformed
empire. The two principal groups were the Liberals and the Unionists.
The former under the leadership of men like Prince Sabaheddin spoke
of a decentralised empire enjoying close tutelary relations with Europe,
especially Great Britain. While they were modernisers and reformists, they
did not visualise a social revolution which would lead to power shifting to
those below them. That is where they came into conflict with the Unionists
who saw themselves as the Jacobins of the constitutional revolution.
The Liberals, though modernisers, were more conservative than the
Unionists. They were far more westernised and secular in their daily lives
than the Unionists. But because of their political conservatism they were
married to the 'Millet system' which guaranteed each religious community
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4
MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES
(the principalones being the Muslim, the Greek, the Armenian, and the
Jewish) a great deal of autonomy.The Christianmillets also enjoyed the
protectionof the GreatPowers.The Unionists,on the otherhand,favoured
the creationof a centralisedstate which meant erodingthe power of each
millet- includingthe Muslim- and that of its Great-Powerpatron. In this
struggle,the Liberals,despitetheirpersonalattachmentto secularism,were
not averseto the use of religionas a politicalweapon.
The first challengeto the constitutionalregime, however, did not come
from the Liberals, who were confident of winning power legally in the
coming elections, but from the reactionaries.It came in early October
1908 during Ramazan, on the heels of the Bulgarian declaration of
independence,the Austrianannexationof Bosnia and Herzegovina,and
the Greekannouncementof unionwithCrete. Kor(Blind)Ali, the miezzin
of a mosque in the Fatih districtof Istanbul,a districtstill famous for its
Islamicconservatism,led a crowdto the Sultan'sresidencein YildizPalace.
There he demandedthe end of constitutionalrule on the groundthat the
shariaordersthat the 'flockbe led by its shepherd'.He also demandedthat
drinkingplacesandtheatresbe shutdown, Muslimwomennot permittedto
appearin publicunveiled, and picturesnot printedin newspapers.1
There were demonstrationsin other parts of Istanbul against the
constitution,all led by imamsfrom local mosques. Apart from demanding
the restorationof the sultan's absolute authorityin the name of Islamic
solidarityagainstan aggressiveChristianworld, they also called for a jihad
in orderto resolve the externalcrisis.The Unionistpresswas quickto note
that the 1876 constitutionhad fallen victim to the Russo-Turkishwar of
1877-78 and issued a warning against history being allowed to repeat
itself.2
The Young Turks,Liberaland Unionist, took great care not to become
embroiled in foreign adventure which could threaten the regime. The
religiousdemonstrationswere crushedand theirleaderspunished,Kor Ali
being put to death. These demonstrationswere poorlyorganised,the work
of a few mosqueofficialswho, accordingto a palaceofficial, had mobilised
only the poor and the unemployed.Moreover,the Young Turkshad been
unitedagainstreaction.Thatwas no longerthe case afterthe CUP election
victoryin December, and especiallyafterthe fall of the pro-British,Liberal
grandvezir, KamilPashaon 13 February1909. All opponentsof the CUP
now came togetherin an effort to overthrowthat body. The outcome was
the counter-revolutionof 13 April 1909 known in Turkishhistory as the
'31 MarchIncident'.
Again Islam provided the rhetoricalammunitionwith which to attack
the Committee.The oppositionwas led by a hurriedlyorganisedpolitical
group known an the MuhammadanUnion (ttihad-iMuhammadi)and its
mouthpiece was Dervish Vahdeti's newspaper, Volkan (the Volcano).
Little is known about Vahdeti. He was born in Cypruswhere he become
a hafiz and, at some point, joined the Naqshbandiorder. In 1902he moved
to Istanbuland foundedthe newspaperVolkanin December 1908.Initially
its politicalposition was liberal and humanistic,supportiveof libertyand
the constitutionalorder. At the same time, Vahdetiwas anti-Unionistand
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MODERN TURKEY
5
a supporterof KamilPasha's'Englishpolicy'. But afterthe foundingof the
MuhammadanUnion on 5 April when Volkan became its official organ,
its tone changed dramatically.At this point, Vahdeti began to receive
subsidiesfrom a numberof anti-Unionistsources:some Liberals,a group
in the Palace, and possibly the British embassy.3Volkan abandonedits
liberalism and adopted Islamist polemics, denouncing the Unionists as
freemasons,a code word for the anti-religiousand the secular.
The counter-revolutionof 13 April was not the workof a few hojas;this
time virtuallythe entire ilmiye class allied with the troops of the Istanbul
garrisonand non-academytrainedofficers (the alayli) joined forces. They
were supportedby the Naqshbandiorder,the mostextensiveandinfluential
sufi orderin the late Ottomanperiod. The Bektashishad been crippledby
Sultan Mahmud II (1808-39) because of their ties with the Janissary
corps whose power he broke. Bektashirevivalbegan only after the fall of
Abdilhamid.4As a partof his Islamistpolicy, Abdiilhamidhad patronised
the sufi orderspopularin the Arab provinces.But the Naqshbandis,well
knownfor their loyalty to the dynasty,also receivedhis patronage.
Volkan attacked the constitutionalregime for bringingwith it tyranny
(zilum) and the 'age of devils' ({eytanlardevri). The Ottomanswere now
in a sad state, everywherethere was hunger and poverty. Thanks to the
importingof westernvalues, generalmoralitywas in decay and the empire
crumblingas a result. Volkanclaimednot to be opposedto the constitution;
on the contraryit was a supporterprovided'the constitutionwas made the
guardianof the sharia'.However, 'fouror five people ardentfor European
morality'couldnot undertakesucha task. Thiscouldbe undertakenonly by
the armyin alliancewith the ilmiyeclass. The soldiermustknowsoldiering
andremaina soldier;the armymustthereforewithdrawfrompolitics.In the
Assembly,the sourceof law must be the shariaof Muhammad;laws which
did not complywith the shariacould not be consideredlegally binding.5
Judgingby the views expressed in Volkan, its supporterswould have
liked to set up a theocraticmonarchywith legislativepower in the hands
of the ulema. But had the insurrectionsucceeded and the Liberalscome
to power, it is doubtful if they would have implementedVolkan'sideas
for they too believed in reformand westernisation.They would have been
satisfied to see the fall of the CUP and the establishmentof a mildly
reformistconstitutionalmonarchywith power restrictedto the old elites
in the Palace and the bureaucracyof the SublimePorte.
The insurrectionwas crushedby the modern, academy-trainedofficers
of the army(the mektepli),men who were commitedto savingthe empire
throughconstitutionalismand reform. The CUP, which shared the same
ideology, continuedto operatefrom behindthe scene untilit seized power
in January1913. During these years, the Unionists came to understand
the importanceof Islamicdiscoursefor their very survival;first, it helped
protect their flank from the rightand facilitatedthe legitimisationof their
policies;and second, Islamicsolidaritybecamemuchmore importantafter
the loss of the mainlyChristianBalkansin 1912-13.
As earlyas 1912,the Unionist-controlledAssemblyhad strengthenedthe
constitutionalposition of the ruler, Mehmed V, now that they no longer
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6
MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES
fearedhim. FromJune 1913to January1917,the Ottomangovernmentwas
led by the Egyptianprince,SaidHalimPashawho was an Islamistreformer.
Despite the existenceof a strongTurkistfactionin the CUP, the policiesof
the regime until the very end continuedto be essentiallyIslamist.It is no
accidentthat even after defeat, the armythat Enver Pashaled againstthe
Bolsheviksin Turkistanwas called 'the Army of Islam'.
The Ottomandefeat andthe dissolutionof the CUP in 1918left a political
vacuumwhichwas filled by the restorationof the Sultan-Caliph'sabsolute
power under a full-blownIslamicideology. In the years 1919-22, during
the strugglefor independenceagainstthe West and the civilwar againstthe
sultan'sregime, the nationalistswere forced to use Islamicpropagandain
orderto counterIstanbul'spropagandaagainstthem. The strugglehascome
to be describedas 'national';at the time most people saw it as a religious
struggle,the struggleof the Muslimmilletfor its very survival,thus milli
mucadele. The confusion is caused by the fact that milli came to mean
nationaland milliyetnationality,this througha process of evolution. But
the root for the modernTurkishwordfor nationalismis in itself instructive.
At the time, it did not take muchingenuityon the partof the Kemaliststo
present their struggleas a jihad, especiallywhile the Sultan-Caliphwas a
captivein British-occupiedIstanbul.Even Islamistreactionarieslike Said-i
Nursi joined the 'national struggle'.6Furthermore,Sultan Vahdettin's
willingnessto collaboratewiththe Britishdiscreditedhimtotallyin the eyes
of Islamistsengagedin the war of liberation.Manynow becameconvinced
that the sultanatecouldbe abolishedand a constitutionalsystemessentially
Islamicin charactermaintainedat the same time.
Advocatesof such a systemliked to arguethat the 1876constitutionhad
allowed the Ottoman empire to be converted into the sultan's personal
estate by recognisinghis absolutepower. This was contraryto the sharia,
andcouldbe rectifiedwiththe abolitionof the sultanateand the unification
of religious and political power in the Grand National [Millet]Assembly
where, in the earlytwenties,the ulemaand theirsupportersconstitutedthe
majority.They saw the Caliph as the naturalfocus of power and argued
that there could not be a Caliphatewithoutgovernment,independence,or
libertyand that the Caliphwas the naturalpresidentof the Assembly. He
would exercise the functionof ratifyingall legislationpassed by the mejlis
dominatedby the ulema,guaranteeinglawsthat did not violate the sharia.7
The Kemalists, confronted with this alliance between Islamists and
conservativewesterniserswhichwould have killed all possibilityof radical
reform, decided to abolish the Caliphate. The historic debate on the
abolition of this institutionis well known and need not be recapitulated
here.8 All we need to note is that this act and the radicalprogrammeof
reformthat followed cut the state's formalties with Islam and the Muslim
world. But it shouldalso be noted that the articlewhichdescribedIslamas
the religionof the state was retaineduntil 1928.
As Kemalist Turkey became more secularised, the bonds of Islamic
identityand solidaritywhichhad boundMuslimsbelongingto other ethnic
groupsto the state loosened. The ShaykhSaid revolt of February-March
1925 manifestedthe alienationof one such group, the Kurds.There may
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MODERNTURKEY
7
have been a strong nationalist element in this rebellion as Martin van
Bruinessensuggests. But the terms in which the rebellion was launched
and sustainedwere entirelyreligious.The shaykhsof the Naqshbandiorder
played a crucialrole in providingan organisationalframework.Not only
was the authorityof these shaykhs religious in nature but the peasants
who joined the movementrespondedonly to religioussymbolsand slogans
thoughthey hadplentyof secularmotivesas the lootingandburningof land
and debt registersdemonstrated.The shaykhsdeclaredtheir rebellion to
be a jihad in whichwhoever was killed would be a martyr(shahid)and go
straightto paradise;'ShaykhSaid styled himselfemir-elmucahidin.'9
The Kemalistsalso recognisedthe significanceof religionin the Kurdish
revolt and the vital role playedby popularIslamin the lives of the masses.
They respondedby abolishingthe sufi ordersand closingdown theirlodges
(30 Nov. 1925), forcingthe shaykhsand their devotees to go underground.
The 'Law for the Maintenanceof Order', which was rushed throughthe
Assemblyin March,gave the governmentabsolutepowersthroughthe use
of martiallaw to crushdissent. The ProgressiveRepublicanParty,the only
oppositionthere was to the RPP, was closed down and all opponentsof the
regime dealt with by the newly-establishedIndependenceTribunals.This
markedthe end of politicsfor the next 20 yearsand, for the time beingwhat
politicalprotest there was could be expressedonly in Islamicterms.
The ruling party recognised the dilemma and tried to reduce political
tensionsin the countryby permittinga tame oppositionpartyto be formed
from within its own ranks. As a result the Free Republican Party was
foundedby Fethi Okyar,Atatiirk'sclose friend,in August 1930. However,
oppositionto the regime coalesced round the new party and attackedthe
reforms and the secular policy of the government.The ruling elite was
alarmedand therefore decided to dissolve the party on 17 November. A
month later, there was a violent incident in the town of Menemen, near
Izmir, which shocked the secular military-bureaucratic
group which had
been in power since 1923.
A small congregationled by a Dervish Mehmed left the mosque after
morningprayerand marchedto the town squarewhere they called for the
restorationof the sharia and the Caliphate.Dervish Mehmed, a member
of the Naqshbandiorder, claimedthat he was the Mahdi.A reserveofficer
in the local gendarmerie,a primaryschool teacher by the name of Hasan
FehmiKubilay,was sent with a few men to quell the disturbanceand arrest
the demonstrators.He was seized by Dervish Mehmed and beheaded;his
head was then placed on top of the staff of a green flag and paradedin the
town. Two watchmenwho intervenedwere also shot and killed.10
This incident, in itself minor, nevertheless proved traumaticfor the
secular regime. Later investigationsshowed that it was the only uprising
among 18 studied by the Historical Division of the Turkish General
Staff which took place in western Turkey, the most advanced region
of the country.1 Also, as President Mustafa Kemal, who still used the
Islamic title Gazi, wrote to his army chief: 'This is a shameful incident
for all republicansand patriotsbecause some of the people of Menemen
But Yakub
applaudedand encouragedthe savageryof the reactionaries.'12
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MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES
Kadri[Karaosmanoglu],author,diplomat,and an articulateand eloquent
spokesmanfor Kemalism,capturedthe sense of anger and dispairwhich
this incidentarousedin the elite:
It's as thoughnothinghas happenedall these years, as though ... the
idea of anyof our radicalreformshas alteredanythingin this country.
. . Who were the passive,silentobserversof this tragedy?Citizens
of this secular, contemporaryRepublic of Turkey. That is the true
calamity.
It meansthatthe climateandenvironmentthere, the moralclimate,
the moral environmentwas not that of the revolutionary,republican
and patrioticTurkishyouth; it was the climate and environmentof
DervishMehmed,a devotee of the NaqshibandiOrderwhichwe have
describedwith such adjectivesas "rebellious","brutal","thieving",
and "reactionary".Had it not been so, this mancould not have found
20 minutesto finishhis work ...
ShaykhMehmedis just a symptom,a shadow.13
Yakub Kadri'sanalysisof the situationwas shared by the rulingparty.
It was obvious that the secularreformshad not taken root and the state's
liberalapproachto the practiceof personalIslamhadproveda failure.This
approachoughtthereforebe abandonedfor a moremilitantsecularism.This
became the policy of the thirties. The idea of carryingout a reformation
in TurkishIslam was consideredand quicklyabandoned. Instead, it was
decided that nationalismwould be used as a substitutefor religion. This
would prove only partiallysuccessfulbecause the state lacked the schools
necessary to teach its ideas beyond the small elite. A positivistic and
rationalapproachto Islam, whichhad been fostered by some intellectuals
in the twenties, was adopted and encouragedby Ataturkhimself. It soon
found its way into school textbooks. The new mood of militantsecularism
was reflected in the words of Ministerof the Interior, iikrii Kaya who
told the Assembly with great confidence: 'Religions have fulfilled their
purposeand their functionsare exhausted;they are institutionswhichcan
no longer renew their organismsor revitalisethemselves.'14For the time
being, Islam was removed from political discourseonly to returnin 1945
when competitivepartypoliticswere restored.
Despite the RepublicanPeople's Party's attachementto the principle
of populism, its policy towards Islam alienated it from the masses. Had
there been great materialprogresswhose benefit the people also felt, this
alienation might have been compensatedfor. But this was not the case.
Therefore,populardisaffectioncontinuedto smoulderduringthese years,
only to burst into flame after the war. As no ideological alternativewas
offered to the voters when politicswere restored,they could expresstheir
hostilityto the governmentonly in termsof religiousfreedom.
In the yearsafter 1945the idea of democracybecameextremelypopular,
almost a fetish, in the minds of ordinarypeople. Everyone professed to
be commited to it. In this climate, the Islamists were able to present
secularismas anti-democraticbecause the freedom of conscience of the
Muslimmajoritywas being violated. Islamicpolemicists,at least the more
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MODERN TURKEY
9
sophisticatedones, did not callfor an end to secularism;they simplyclaimed
that true secularismhad never been practiced in Turkey and what the
countryhad experiencedwas a 'religioussystem tied to the state'. Such a
systemwas 'alien to democracy,to secularism,and to Islam'.15
This argumentbecame fundamentalto Islamistdiscourse.Islamistsalso
noted that for Turks religion and nation were totally integratedand that
religiousobligationswere, at the same time, national.The secularpolicies
of the republic had created religious amnesia and ignorance among the
people and the countrywas in a state of confusion as far as its religious
identity was concerned. It was sufferingfrom an acute shortage of men
of religion who could provide guidance and that had nothing to do with
secularism.On the contrary,in genuinesecularstatestherewerefacultiesof
divinityin virtuallyevery universityand the biggestinstitutionsof learning
restedon religiousfoundations.In orderto rescuethe moralityof the youth
of Turkeyit was vital to reconcilethis generationwith Islam.16
The Islamistscriticisedthe governingparty'spracticeof secularismfor
crushingthe 'nationalconscience' for 20 years by not giving importance
to the teaching of Islam. The factor of Cold War anti-communismwas
added to the charge sheet when the journal Sebilurrepadnoted that 'the
Republican People's Party's religious policy had brought about certain
undesirableresults. The path taken by this party has led to communism.
For the past 20 years, the RPP, wittinglyor unwittingly,had served the
principles of communism . . . These actions of the party were politically
reactionary.'17
Even though there was no internal communistthreat in Turkey after
the war, the Islamistsarguedthat in order to establishitself in a country,
communismtook the path of eliminatingnationaland religioussentiment.
The enemies of Islam in Turkeyhad facilitatedthis with their reforms.In
the contemporaryworld, only the 'fortressof Islam'stood in the pathof the
The RepublicanPeople'sParty,as rabidly
growingpowerof communism.18
anti-communistas anyIslamist,madeno attemptto refutethese arguments;
in fact it began to accomodatethem.
Sebilurresadasked President Ismet Innii to alter his party's attitude
towards Islam if he wanted to regain the people's sympathy. The RPP
understoodthis well after the setbacksit met in the 1946generalelection.
Therefore a number of significant concessions were made to Islamic
sentiment in order to to regain popularitybefore the election in 1950.
Neither the Islamists- nor the voters, it turned out - were appeasedby
these concessions;they stated categoricallythat 'it is impossiblefor it [the
RPP] to be reconciledwith Muslimsociety'.19
This irreconcilabilitywas not merelya questionof sharedreligiousideas
and ideals but more a question of social class and culture. The Islamists
despisedthe Republicansas the 'partyof the westernised'and this is also
how the people saw them, as membersof a new ruling class with whom
they shared nothing in common. They saw them only from a distance in
their furs and modern dress enjoying the alien cultureof the concert hall
of which the masses had no understanding.Politically, the RPP was the
partyof the bureaucracyand the gendarmerie,both of which were hated
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10
MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES
by the masses, urbanand rural.
The attitude of the recently formed Democrat Party towards Islam
remained ambiguousand failed to win the trust of the Islamists.This is
not surprisingas the four founders of the party - Celal Bayar, Adnan
Menderes, Fuad Kopriilu, and Refik Koraltan- had all been prominent
membersof the RPP. Theyhadallsupportedthe party'spolicyof secularism
and Kopriiluhad even been in chargeof a commissionwhose task was to
devise the reformationof TurkishIslam. The Islamistsknew all this and
concluded prior to the 1950 election that 'the Nation Party is the party
which defends a religiouspolicy which a Muslimsociety can identifywith.
The Nation Partyis the party which will bring Turkeyto true secularism
and preventa slide to atheism.'20
The multi-partyperiodended the phase of militantsecularismin Turkey
in deed if not in word. In opposition, the RPP used secularismas a stick
with which to beat the government, constantlychargingthat Kemalism
was being betrayed by the Democrat Party. But the end of militant
secularismdid not mean the triumphof the Islamists.The RPP lost the
election becausevotersassociatedit with the long nightmareof mono-party
despotism.The Democratswon becausethey promisedto slay this dragon
and put it to rest for ever. The party which had the total confidence of
the Islamistpress, the Nation or Millet Party, was an electoral flop and
was no threat to the Democrats. Nevertheless,throughoutthe fifties, the
liberal attitudetowardsIslam encouragedan Islamicreassertion(marked
by increasedmosque building,for example)whichwas essentiallycultural
in nature.
The argumentsfor reassertingIslamictraditionspretendedto be democratic,or rather'majoritarian',in essence. They were used for the firsttime
in June 1950 when two DP deputies proposed ending the prohibitionon
the call to prayer,the ezan, in Arabic. They claimedthat this prohibition
preventedMuslimsfromworshippingin the way they wantedandtherefore
violated their freedom of conscience. Since [Muslim]voters had given the
majorityto the Democrats,the nationalwill (milli irade)obligedthe latter
to end this prohibition. No one challenged these argumentsand even
the Republicansvoted for the proposal which was accepted by a large
majority.21
Islamicopposition and reassertionhave been describedas responsesto
reforms imposed by an autocraticstate on the people. The concessions
made after 1945 by various governmentswere in part recognitionof this
and an attempt to restore confidence between state and society. But the
Democrats who ruled throughoutthe fifties were not about to permit
anything resembling a counter-revolution,that is to say even a partial
returnto Islamiclaw.
The sufi orders which had gone undergroundbegan to reappearand
attackedthe Kemalistreforms.The firstsuchorderwhichmadeits presence
felt was the Tijaniyya,whichresembledother orderslike the Naqshbandis
and the Kadirisin organisation.Its roots go back to eighteenth century
North Africa though if was broughtto Turkey only in 1930 by a lawyer
namedKemalPilavogluwho was given permissionby a shaykhto set it up.
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MODERNTURKEY
11
The Tijanis rejected the reformsas atheisticand morallycorrupting,and
describedAtatiirkas diabolical(mel'un). His statues and busts, which are
found everywhere,were seen as idols whichMuslimswere being forced to
worship.Therefore,the Tijanisbeganto smashthem at every opportunity.
They also claimed the right of rebellion since the state did not recognise
Islamwhichthey wanted to restoreto its formerglory.22
In the fifties, the religiousordershad become active once more though
there is no way of measuringtheir influence. The Democrats took them
seriously enough and found it expedient to cultivate them though never
to the extent of toleratingtheir extremism.The Tijaniswere punishedfor
their anti-Atatiirkoutragesand KemalPilavogluwas given a jail sentence
of 15 years. This was especially true after the 1957 election when the
DP's position began to erode. The various orders with their shaykhs,
often landlords or their allies, were particularlyinfluential in eastern
Anatolia where they controlled the 'vote banks'. Their importance in
winning elections could no longer be discounted or taken for granted;
the shaykhs, themselves demanded quid pro quos in return for their
support.
The Democratscultivatedthe goodwillof Said-iNursi and his followers,
the Nurists. The Nurists were really a school and not a sufi order simply
because there could be no successor to Said-i Nursi who saw himself
as a kind of a saint. He claimed to interpret the Quran in the light
of twentieth century conditions and these interpretationswere collected
and distributedin the form of short treatisesor risale, known collectively
as Risale-i Nur.
The Nurists rejected rationalismand materialism,defending the transitorynatureof this world and the truthabout the hereafter.Said-iNursi's
Risale claimed to provide the knowledgeto resolve all the contradictions
in one's daily life and thereby cope with the moral disorderof the age.
He was naturallyhostile to secularismand wanted to see the restoration
of a theocraticstate. Turkey, he said had just emergedinto the light after
a long period of darknesswhen atheismhad ruled;his task was to save the
moralsandfaith of the people. Thatcould be accomplishedby the teaching
of Nurismthroughoutthe entire community(millet)and the Nuristsbegan
to set up schools in mosques. Said-i Nursi even wrote to Prime Minister
Menderesproposingthat his treatisesbe taughtin all schools. He hoped to
unite underthe umbrellaof Nurismall Muslimswho sharedthis common
ideal.
The Nuristmovementexpandedand won new adherentsuntil it became
a nation-wideorganisation.The adherentscalledthemselvespupilsof Light
(Nur Talebeleri)and described themselves as the Party of the Quran
(Hizb-ul Kur'an).Withina shorttime, Nuristgroupshad been established
abroad,in SaudiArabia,Pakistan,andeven Germanywherethe 'Islamisch
TheologischesRisale-i Nur Institut'was set up in Berlin. It was clear that
there was foreignmoney and supportbehindthe Nuristmovement.
The political liberalisationafter 1945 and the Islamic reassertionthat
accompaniedit provide only a partial explanationfor the emergence of
orders and movements like the Nurists. Another explanation may be
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12
MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES
found in the 'economicrevolution'whichthe Democratscarriedout. They
came to power with the promiseof completingthe Kemalistrevolutionby
creatinga commercialand industrialbourgeoisie.They did this by opening
up the countrysidewith roads and buses, tractorsand credits, and created
a nationalmarketfor foreigngoods. Initially,the peasantrybenefitedfrom
the high prices generatedby the KoreanWar boom. This was reflectedin
the 1954 election which the Democratswon even more convincinglythan
in 1950.But the liberalisationand the prosperityof these years, not equally
shared, increasedpoliticisationamongthe masses. If this was not checked
in time, the masseswouldseek politicalalternativeswhichwouldchallenge
the establishedorder.
Islamic discourse during these years played a role in slowing down
the process of politicisationthough it could not arrest it. The Islamist
worldview, as preached by the Nurists (and other orders) encouraged
political quietism by teaching that this world was a field to be sown for
the next. Here, people sowed and reaped accordingto their God-given
talents. This world being transitorywhere wealth had no value, they
would harvest the real crop in the world to come. What was important
was to strive for the wealth of paradise. Said-i Nursi wrote: 'Every soul,
from the richestto the poorest, recognisesthe realitywhile fastingduring
the month of Ramazan, that he is not the master but the slave, that he
is not free but enslaved ...
grateful'.23
and that one's true obligation is to be
How effective is such propagandain discouragingpolitical activism?
There is no simple answerto this question. But there is no doubt that such
talk does createa state of mindwhichhelpspeople to accepttheirlot in this
world.People also tend to thinkin termsof theirreligiousassociationrather
in termsof the classto whichthey belong. The Islamists,awareof the threat
of class consciousness,attackedclass as devisiveof the Muslimcommunity
and thereforethe instrumentof 'godlesscommunism'.
By the time the Democratswere overthrownby a militarycoup on 27
May 1960, Turkeyhad experienceda thoroughtransformationin virtually
every sphere of life except politics. The economy was rapidlychangingits
characterfrom being predomonantlyagrarianto one in which commerce
and industrywere becomingdominant.This metamorphosisproducedpew
social groups which had little in common with the old Kemalistmilitarybureaucraticelite. Such people tended to be technocratsand managers.
Their backgroundtended to be provincialwhich was reflected in cultural
values which were neither as western nor as cosmopolitanas those of the
elite. Such people felt quite comfortablewith Islam which had remained
a living traditionin their daily lives despite the militantsecularismof the
mono-partyperiod. The wordsof SuleymanDemirel, who enteredpolitics
in the early 1960s, reflectedthis aspectclearly. He told his partycongress:
'I am not a mason;I was bornin a familythat does not sit downto breakfast
untilthe Quranhas been read.'24It is difficultto imaginemanytop leaders
in the RPP or the DP who could say that! The closure of the Democrat
Partyand the banningfrom politics of formerDemocratsopened the way
for these new men.
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MODERN TURKEY
13
The military regime carried out the political transformation which the
Democrats had failed to do. The 1924 constitution was replaced by a totally
new one which liberalised the entire system. The 1961 constitution declared
Turkey a social state responsible for each citizen's welfare. It recognised
classes implicitly and permitted the formation of a party which openly set
out to represent the working class, the Workers' Party of Turkey (WPT).
Workers were permitted greater freedom to organise and were given the
right to strike. Students were able to form independent associations out of
which emerged left-wing 'opinion clubs' (fikir kulubu) where politics were
discussed and alternatives proposed.
The Islamists (and the establishment) took note of all these changes
and responded accordingly. Communism in the forties was described as
an external threat posed by Moscow which would find fertile ground in
a society devoid of Islamic values. In the sixties, communism, though
still outlawed, was viewed as an internal threat to which Islam was the
antidote. As the leftwing critique of society attracted a political following
so the Islamist invective against the left became more bitter. The Workers'
Party of Turkey, before and after the 1965 general election, became
the target of red baiting in which Islamic rhetoric played a prominent
role.
This role was bolstered by a new Islamic internationalism fostered by
Saudi Arabia in the mid-1960s through the Rabita't ul-Alam ul-lslami
(the Union of the World of Islam) which it financed. This Islamist anticommunism became more pronounced after the Cyprus Crisis of 1964 and
Johnson Letter which further inflamed the growing anti-Americanism.25
This aspect of Islamic discourse, though interesting, is not particularly
original and therefore need not detain us here. But during the same
period another facet was beginning to emerge created by the social and
economic developments of the sixties. It found expression first in the
National Order Party (NOP) in 1970, then in the National Salvation
Party (NSP) in 1973, and finally in the Welfare Party (WP) in 1983. Their
analysis of Turkey's problems (and solutions to them), though cloaked in
Islamic terms, was very different from the discourse of the fifties. Gone
was the quietism of the religious orders with rewards offered in the next
world for patience in this one. Instead there was a call for activism.
These parties led by the same group of men represented the declining
petty bourgeoisie of Anatolia which wanted material salvation here and
now.
The 1960s witnessed an accelerated process of change with rapid growth
and industrialisation. This caused great dislocation throughout society
marked by mass immigration to the cities, and even an exodus to Europe,
where these people settled in ugly shantytowns and ghettos. Importsubstitution industries, controlled by a few major holding companies,
undermined the competitiveness of the small enterprises scattered throughout the country. This situation was aggravated by the world economic crisis
of the seventies which hit Turkey earlier than other capitalist countries and
has plagued it ever since. As early as 1969, Necmeddin Erbakan, who
became the leader of this movement, noted:
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14
MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES
The economicmechanismworksin favourof the merchantsof the big
cities and the merchantsof Anatolia are simply their step-children.
The lion's share of import quotas is saved for the merchantsof
three or four cities. The deposits in Anatolian banks are made by
the people of Anatolia but go as credit to the merchantsof the big
city. The Union of Chambersworks completely as the instrument
of a comprador-freemasonminority. This huge organisationis in
the control of compradorcommerce and industry.In that case, we
said let's get onto the administrativeboard and turn the Union of
Chambersinto somethingwhich serves the Anatolian merchantand
industrialist.26
The political consequencesof the transformationand the world crisis
were dramatic.The JusticeParty(JP), the rulingpartysince 1965 and the
principalpartyof the Right, was fragmented,and the old RPP was forced
to a social democraticprogramme,abandoningits links with the militarybureaucraticelite. Disgruntled elements representingthe merchantsof
Anatolia had complainedto SiileymanDemirel, the JP leader. When he
gave no satisfaction,they took their supportto smallsplintergroupswhich
promisedredress.As a result, no less than six new partieswere formedto
cope with this crisis. The were the Democtatic Party (conservative),the
NationalistAction Party(NAP: neo-fascist),the NationalOrderPartyand
the NationalSalvationParty(both Islamist),the RepublicanRelianceParty
(conservative-Kemalist),and the Unity Party of Turkey (secular, left-ofcentreand representingthe Alevi community).We need concernourselves
only with the Islamist parties because they alone used the language of
religionconsciouslythoughthe NAP did so from time to time.
The Islamistslaid great stresson moralregenerationand the restoration
of religiousvalues if Turkeywas to be saved. They asked that Turkstake
pridein theirgloriousOttoman-Islamicheritageand traditionsandclaimed
that their partywas in this very tradition.They had a preferencefor words
of Arabic origin, words which had been replacedby others no less alien
to Turkishduringthe Kemalistlanguagereform. But the use of 'Arabic'
words, totally integratedinto Turkishand whichonly the educatedwould
recogniseas being of Arabicorigin, also appealedto those who had never
felt comfortablewith the new secular culture which they found artificial
and alien.27They were happy to see their own culture being reasserted
and thereforesupportedthe Islamists.
From the very beginningof his political career in 1969, when he was
elected independent member of parliamentfrom Konya, Erbakan had
criticised the West's hegemony over the Turks. He observed that this
dominationhad begun in the nineteenthcenturyand the Ottomanruling
class had responded in 1839 with a programmeof blind copying which
had continued to the present day. In his 'Declarationto the Religious
(mukaddesatfi)Turk'Erbakanwrote:
'Thus the European, by makingus copy him blindly and without any
understanding,trappedus in this monkey'scage and, as a result, forcedus
to abandonour personalityand nobility. That is to say, he was successful
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15
MODERN TURKEY
in this becausehe used agentsrecruitedfromwithin,who felt [inferiorand]
disgustedwith themselves,bringingto his knees the Turkwho for centuries
could not be defeated by the crusadesand externalblows.'28
This was language every Turk understood especially at a time when
relationswith the West were not smooth owing to the situationin Cyprus.
Erbakanpromisedpolicies which would 'bringthe nation happinessand
security, via moral and material progress'. He promised to guarantee
'the rights and freedoms of man ...
as well as internal peace within a
democraticregime- based on a moraloutlook that postulatesthe need for
a virtuoussociety'.29
These professionsof commitmentto democracyand freedom were of
great significanceto a people who were living througha period of severe
repressionandtortureunderthe regimeof 12 March1971.The Salvationists
themselvesneeded democraticfreedomsbecausetheirpartywasthreatened
with closure under Article 163 of the penal code which proscribedparties
commited to a religious state. The NSP's precursor, the Order Party,
had been dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 1972. Would the
Salvation Party meet the same fate? Erbakanwas aware of the danger
and was therefore cautious about the statementshe made. Nevertheless,
his commitmentto democracywas ambiguousas this quotationsuggests:
'It was also asserted that God ordered us to rule accordingto the
Holy Book, not our own judgement. If mankind could be ruled
according to votes, men would not need revelation. In societies
where affairs are run according to the votes of ordinarypeople,
Islam degenerates. Democracy is a Western plot to rule ignorant
people accordingto Western and Christianways. It is a victory of
Christianityover Islam .. .'.30
Was Erbakancommited to restoringthe sharia? Again his statements
are ambiguous;moreover, the statements quoted below were made for
consumptionabroadandreachedTurkeyindirectlyandwere initialydenied
by Erbakan.The interviewhe gave to a Germanjournalistwhile he was
Deputy Prime Ministerin the coalition governmentled by Biilent Ecevit
in 1974bears quotingfor the insightsit provides:
'Minister,Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, introducedmodern laws which were in use in Switzerland,Italy, and Germanyin
place of sharialaws. Now, are you tryingto turnback the clock?'
'That is a question worth ponderingover. It should be said that
there are fewer thefts in Saudi Arabia than anywhere else in the
world. As far as I know, there wasn't a single theft in Saudi Arabia
last year. The reason for this is the harshnessof the laws.'
'Well then, can you think of Turkeyin our day and age with the
sharialaws prevailing?'
'Well, that's possible in theory. There are countries which have
retained the sharia and are happy, but the decision rests with
parliament.'
'What will be the situation of women? They say that there are
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16
MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES
people in your party who want women to wear the veil (pefe) again?'
'Everyonemust be able to dress as he/she wishes. We have great
respectfor women who want to wear the veil.'
'That'sto say everyonewill dress as he/she wishes?'
'Yes, on conditionthat it does not go againstmorality.'
'Duringthe first few days in government,you said that mini-skirts
wouldbe lengthened.It seems thatyou were not successful.I saw lots
and lots of mini-skirts[in Turkey].'
'As we were in a coalition, unfortunately we could not get
everythingpassed.If we hadhadthe finalword,skirtswoulddefinitely
have become longer. However, we insisted on having the skirts of
hostesses in TurkishAirways lengthened by 15 centimetres. So we
had some successesand we believe that we are on the rightpath.'31
However,Erbakanwaspromisingthe countrymorethanmoralregeneration; he was promisingto create a modern, industrial,prosperousTurkey
with social justice and democratic rights for all; a Turkey no longer
'enslavedby the West' but one whichwas independentand playedthe role
of leaderin the Muslimworld.Thatis why he opposedTurkey'sassociation
withthe EuropeanEconomicCommunitybecauseTurkeycouldonly be the
'gatekeeper'(kapici)livingin the basementwhile the Europeansoccupied
the floors above.32
The Salvationists'socio-economicanalysisof Turkey'ssituationreflected
the tensions within the Turkishbourgeoisie. Erbakanwas 'declaringwar
on behalf of the nationalist,Islamistmerchants[the petty bourgeoisieof
Anatolia]againstthe cosmopolitanrenegademinority(donmeazinlik)and
the freemasons.'33The latter 'hated their own culture'and sufferedfrom
a sense of inferiorityvis-a-visthe West whose agent they were. In such a
situation,it was incorrectto talkin termsof a Left and a Right, in fact there
were three streamsof thought:Communism,CosmopolitanFreemasonry
and Zionism,andNationalismandIslamism,describedas mukaddesatfilik.
In the 1960s there had been a threat from the Left but measures had
been taken to curb it. There was now a need to open a second front
against 'masons, cosmopolitansand Zionists.' Just as the Turkishnation
had pushed communismwithin its own bounderies, it would also purge
the masons, Zionists, and the cosmopolitanelements from its body and
restrictthem to their own borders.'34
Erbakan'spoliticalidiom caused considerableconfusion. He supported
capitalismyet attacked monopolies, not as monopolies but as the institutionsof 'freemasonsandJews'. He attackedthe Left but supportedsocial
justice and democracyboth of which were associatedin Turkeywith the
Left, especialythe new social democraticRPP. This mixtureof radicalism
and Islamsuited the mentalityof the petty bourgeoisieand his is how they
saw him: '. . . a Rightist who can say without being a reactionary "I am
a Rightist!Such a Rightist that if you heard his economic views without
knowinghis name, a Rightistyou could call a Leftist".'35
Throughoutthe seventies, the discoursethat came to be associatedwith
Necmeddin Erbakanand the NSP became standardfare for mainstream
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MODERNTURKEY
17
Islamists.The abilityto face left andrightat the sametime enabledthe NSP
to form a coalitionwith the social democratsin 1975and, when that failed,
join the Nationalist Front coalition with the Justice Party, the party of
'freemasons,Zionists, and cosmopolitans',and the neo-fascistNationalist
Action Party. These coalitions gave the NSP legitimacy,a foot inside the
state, and patronagewith which to supportand cultivatetheir clients, the
religiousordersand their off-shoots.
Erbakan'srelationswith the ordersbeganearlyin his life. He claimsthat
he 'came under the influence of some membersof certain orders' in his
youth. It is not clear how strongthis influencewas though, as a practicing
Muslim,one may assume that he remainedin contact throughouthis life.
However, when the National Order Party was being formed in 1969-70,
the active supportof the religious orders was enlisted. It did not matter
whether they were Nurists, Naqshbandis, of Siileymanists,the party's
line was moulded to suit that particularorder. Local religious leaders
- miezzins, imams, or wandering preachers - were used to carry out
the party's propagandain homes, mosques, and villages.36These very
people benefited materially when the NSP entered government in the
seventies, as they did whenever other political parties which had their
supportwere in power. Islam and political patronagenow went hand in
hand.
What was the true significanceof Islamic discourse for the National
SalvationParty?A scholar who has carriedout a content analysisof the
party'snewspaper,Milli Gazete, suggeststhat
'The quantitativeemphasison religionin 1973may have emergedfrom
the need to delineatethe ideologicalidentityof the NSP. Once thishadbeen
achieved, however, day-to-daypolitics apparentlypushed religiousissues
to the background.This developmentraisesan importantquestion:If that
trend had lasted long enough, could the NSP have become a 'practically
secular'party,retainingits religiousrhetoricon the one hand, and tryingto
cope with daily secularpoliticallife on the other? It seems quite probable,
as the day-to-daypolitical needs of a relativelyurbanized,educated and
industrializedcountry like Turkey may place certain limitationsupon a
purelyreligiousapproach.'37
The problemof delineatingan ideologicalidentitywas a real one when
almost all the parties of the Right were presentingan Islamicface. Their
leaders-Demireland Turkes (who even went on a pilgrimageto Mecca)
- professed to be practisingMuslimsand their parties also cultivatedand
providedpatronageto religiousorders.Apartfromthe intra-rightstruggle,
supportfor the religiousorderswas also seen as a wayto checkpoliticisation
in the countryand underminethe growinginfluenceof social democracy.
The sufi orderswere able to take religion (and politics) to the grass-roots
and counter the influence of secularparties. It is worth emphasisingthat
in the seventies it was social democracy- not Islam- whichwas the strong
ideological current making headway in Turkey. This was demonstrated
by spectacularelectoral victories in 1973 and 1977 which broughta new
level of hope not witnessed in Turkey since the 1950s. The very success
of social democracymade it imperativefor the Right to destroy it. That
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18
MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES
is preciselywhat terrorismin the second half of the seventies was able to
achieve.
The militaryregime which came to power on 12 September 1980 put
an end to political activityfor the next three years. All the parties were
dissolved and the countryunderwentanother period of repression.The
youth, especially the leftists, bore the brunt of the repression and the
outcome was a demoralisationand alienationfrom left-wingpolitics. The
Left had failed yet again!That was the verdictof manydisillusionedleftist
youths. Some of them became apolitical;others turnedto Islam especially
after the success of the 'Islamic revolution' in overthrowingthe shah's
regimein Iran. But in the 1980s,Islamalso became a vehicle for the youth
to protest againstthe militaryregime, especiallyin a period when politics
were forbiddento students.This partiallyexplainsthe growthof religious
influencein the schools and universities.
Muchhas been made of female studentsbecomingIslamistsandinsisting
on wearingthe headscarf(turban)in the classroom.This act was first and
foremost a protest againstthe new 'HigherEducationLaw' of November
1982whichendeduniversityautonomyandtreatedstudentslike childrenby
legislatinga dress code. Far from being Islamistsin the traditionalmould,
many in the movement who supported the headscarf campaign were
'Islamicfeminists'who wanted to use Islam to liberate themselves from
the oppressionof theirpatriarchialsociety. Thiswas an urbanphenomenon
amongstwomen who are sufficiently'traditional'to describethemselvesas
primarilyMuslim,but who wantedto play an activerole in society because
they either wanted to work in order to fulfil themselves or had to work
because of economic necessity. It was also a revolt against the drudgery
of housework,especiallyonerous in Turkey.38It will be interestingto see
how the Islamicpoliticalmovementwill cope with this phenomenonas its
male membersare alreadyup in armsagainstthe women'sdemands.
After the militarycoupof 1980,Islamicdiscoursehas essentiallyfollowed
the lines establishedand developed since the 1950s. The militaryregime,
despite its claim to restore 'true Kemalism',which would mean enforcing
strict secularism,was also willing to use religion to arrest politicisation
amongthe young.Therefore,it permittedreligionto be taughtmorewidely
in schools and allowed the influenceof the sufi ordersto expandthrough
their Quranicschools and students'hostels. Only when there were reports
that some orderswere even penetratingmilitaryschoolswere there criesof
alarm.Suchis th expansionof the influenceof these ordersthatthe Istanbul
dailyMilliyet(13 January1987)reportedthatthe Nurists,the Naqshbandis,
and the Siileymanistshad partitionedAnatolia amongstthemselves.
The influence of religion and therefore of these orders was bound to
grow once politics were restoredin the springof 1983 and newly formed
partiespreparedfor elections.For a while, the MotherlandPartyclaimedto
unite all the politicaltendenciesthat had been representedin the dissolved
partiesand was supportedby factionsfrom these parties. It had inherited
the mantle of the NSP with Turgut Ozal, a defeated NSP candidate, as
its leader. Other membersof the defunct partywere influentialas policy
makers.
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MODERNTURKEY
19
In time, however, the MotherlandPartywas challengedby the Welfare
Partywhichhad a betterclaimto be the truesuccessorto the NSP. After the
referendunof September1987, whichended the ban on formerpoliticians
imposedby the junta, there could be no doubt;NecmeddinErbakantook
over the leadershipof the Welfare Party. But this partyfared so badly in
the elections of 29 November 1987 that none of its memberswere able to
enter parliament.Ozal, with his comfortablemajorityand with the next
election five years away, is no longer as dependenton his Islamicwing as
he used to be. He may thereforecut back on the religiousrhetoricwhich
was so prominentin his first government.
The Islamists, after their dismal electoral performance,are in crisis.
Some like OguzhanAsiltiirk, a prominentSalvationist,talks of continuing
the political struggle from outside parliamentas they no longer have a
presence within. The Welfare Party did well in Diyarbakirwhere it was
seen as the most 'leftist' party. It had emphasised 'the struggle against
feudalism, imperialism,and fascism', sugesting that such rhetoric might
be more profitablethan pure Islamicsloganeering.Ali Bula~, one of the
stars of the Islamist daily Zaman, the paper which has been trying to
reach the intelligentsia,says that the Islamistshave to redefine terms like
'Rightism, nationalism,and conservatism'before they can move ahead.
Edip Yiiksel, leader of anotherIslamistfaction, says that since Islam can
have no partythe strugglehas to be waged from the mosque.39This is the
'Iranianformula'whichCemaleddinKaplan,a Turkishclericin Germany,
has been proposingfor some years.40Turkey is not Iran, however, and
such a strategy is unlikely to bear fruit in Turkey's political culture.
Meanwhile, we can expect Islamists in Turkey to try new approaches
in order to make the political breakthroughwhich has so far eluded
them.
NOTES
1. See SinaAk§in,Jon Tiirklerve Ittihatve Terakki(Istanbul,1980),pp.91-3.
2. Tanin,26 Sept. 1324/9Oct. 1908and the Istanbulpressfor this period.
3. Sina Aksin, IstanbulHiikumetlerive Milli Micadele (Istanbul,1976), pp.37-8; Feroz
Ahmad, The YoungTurks(Oxford, 1969),pp.40-3.
4. John Kingsley Birge, The Bektashi Order of Dervishes, reprint (London, 1965),
pp.78-81.
5. TarikZ. Tunaya,Isl&mclhkCereyan=l
Istanbul,1962, pp, 120-1 and passim.This book
is a mine of informationon the role of Islamin twentieth-century
Turkey.See also Sina
Aksin, 31 MartOlayi(Ankara,1970),pp.66-7
6. NecmeddinSahiner, BilinmeyenTaraflariyleSaid Nursi (Istanbul, 1979), pp.236-49.
Cetin Ozek, Tiirkiye'deLaiklik (Istanbul, 1962), p.19, n.4; Idem. Tiirkiye'deGerici
Akimlar(Istanbul,1968), pp.64-6.
7. Ozek, Akimlar, pp.77-83; Tunaya, Islamcilik, pp.149-58. Niyazi Berkes, The
Developmentof Secularismin Turkey(Montreal,1964), pp.443ff.esp. 453-4.
8. Berkes, Secularism,pp.446ff;BernardLewis, The Emergenceof ModernTurkey,2nd
ed. (London 1968). A detailed accountin Turkishmay be found in MahmutGologlu,
Halifelik(Ankara,1973).
9. Martinvan Bruinessen,'Vom Osmanismuszum Separatismus:religioseund ethnische
HintergrundederRebelliondes ScheichSaid'inJahrbuchzurGeschichteundGesellschaft
des VorderenundMittlerenOrients1984.Thema:IslamundPolitikin derTurkei,Jochen
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20
MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES
Blaschkeand Martinvan Bruinessen(eds.) (Berlin, 1984),pp.109-65.
10. KemalUstiin, MenemenOlayiveKubilay(Istanbul,1981),pp. 20-25.
11. See Mete Tunqay, Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti'ndeTek-Parti Yonetimi'nin Kurulmasi
(1923-1931)(Ankara,1981),p.127.
12. Ibidp.293.
13. YakupKadri'sarticlewas publishedin HakimiyetiMilliye,30 Dec. 1930and is givin in
Ustiin, Kubilay,pp.40-41.
14. TBMMZabitaCeridesi,Oturum:3 Aralik1934,vol.24, p.77 quotedby Dogu Perincek,
'puttu,yuk oldu' in Ikibin'eDogru, 22-28 Feb. 1987,p.7. The cover story of this issue
is entitled 'Atatiirkve Allah' and Atatiirk'spositivisticviews on the subjectof religion
are publishedfor the firsttime.
15. Ali FuadBasgl, Din ve Laiklik(Istanbul,1962),pp.145-50.
16. The argumentsfrom Selamet, Nov-Dec. 1947 are taken from Tunaya, Islamcilik,
pp.202-3 and ff.
17. Sebiliirrelatquotedin Tunaya,Isldmcilik,p.204, n.l.
18. Tunaya,Isldmcllik,pp.210-11.
19. Tunaya, ibid., p.205, ns.1 and 2; see also the chapter on 'Islam aRd Politics' in
Feroz Ahmad, The TurkishExperimentin Democracy1950-1975 (London, 1975),
pp.363-88.
20. Tunaya,Isl&mcdllk,
p.205, ns.4 and 5 wherehe quotes articlesfromSebiliirrelat.
21. Ibid. p.226
22. Ibid. pp.220-23 and p.231;Ozek, Akimlar,pp.177-8
23. On the Nuristssee Ozek, Akimlar,pp.180-94; Sahiner,SaidNursi;Tunaya,Islamcilik,
Said Nursiund die Mechanikder
pp.232-9; and SerifMardin'sarticle"'Bediuzzaman"
Natur'in Blaschkeand Bruinessen(eds.), pp.197-232.
24. Quotedin Cumhuriyet,29 Nov. 1964,quotedin Ahmad(n.19), p.235. It is worthnoting
that despite his religiousbackgroundSuleymanDemirelis a sufficientlyliberalMuslim
to celebratethe 39th weddinganniversarywith champagne.See Cumhuriyet,13 Dec.
1987, p.12. The same is true for PrimeMinisterTurgutOzal who has also performed
the pilgrimageon a numberof occasionsand whose 'Islamist'credentialsare therefore
even stronger.
25. See the chapteron 'ForeignPolicy' in Ahmad (n.19), pp.405ff.;and on the Saudirole
on TurkeyUgur Mumcu,Rabita,Istanbul,1987, passim.This is an excellent piece of
investigativejournalismwhichsheds light on religion,politics, and the externalfactor.
See also Necdet Onur, ErbakanOlay; Istanbul, n.d.[1974?], pp.86-9 for Erbakan's
views.
26. Quoted in Ali Ya§arSaribay,Tiirkiye'deModernlesmeDin ve Parti Politikasi:'MSP
OrnekOlayi'(Istanbul,1985),pp.98-9.
27. Prof. Jacob Landauin his excellent articleon the NSP exaggeratesthe significanceof
the use of Arabicwordsby the partyin its literature,as do hardlineKemalists.While
discussingthe party'sprogramme,he pointsout that ahlakandfazilet are 'both Arabic
termswith an Islamicflavour',as are ictimaiadaletwhichare used insteadof 'the newly
coined "sosyaladalet"'.These termswouldnot have an 'Islamicflavour'for a Christian
ArabbecauseArabicis his secularlanguage.The samewastrueforTurkishbeforescript
andlanguagereformsbeganin 1928but remainslargelytrueeven todayfor mostTurks.
In Prof. Landau'sexampleahlak and adalet(both of Arabicorigin) have continuedto
thrive despite the reforms.Who uses their modernTurkishequivalentstore and tiize?
Faziletand ictimaiare still alivethoughnot as widelyused. Only the educatedare aware
of the etymologyof wordsand that is a small minorityin Turkeytoday. See JacobM.
Landau,'TheNationalSalvationPaartyin Turkey'in AsianandAfricanStudies,vol.11,
no.i, 1976,p.9, ns.22 and 23.
28. Prof.NecmeddinErbakan,'Mukaddesat1i
Tiirk'eBeyanname'in Salname1390,Istanbul,
1970,p.196.
29. Cited in Landau (n.27), pp.8-9; for a more detailed discussionsee Saribay(n.26),
pp.89ff.;and BinnazToprak,Islamand PoliticalDevelopmentin Turkey,Leiden, 1981,
pp.96-104.
30. TiirkerAlkan, 'The NationalSalvationPartyin Turkey'in Metin Heper and Raphael
Israeli(eds.) Islamand Politicsin the ModernMiddleEast, London, 1984,p.83.
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MODERN TURKEY
21
31. Interview in Onur (n.25), pp.92-4.
32. On Erbakan's views on the Common Market see Ahmad (n.19), pp.382-3; and Saribay
(n.26), pp. 127-9
33. See M. Aytug Goknur's article in Salname 1390, p.303.
34. Prof. Necmeddin Erbakan, 'Gayemiz' in Salname 1390, pp.186-7
35. Aksam (n.d.) quoted in Salname 1390, p.262.
36. Onur (n.25), p.15 and pp.102-5.
37. Alkan (n.30), p.86.
38. See cover story 'Turbaned Feminists' in Nokta (Istanbul), 20 Dec. 1987.
39. See the cover story on 'Islamists in Crisis' in Yeni Giindem (Istanbul), 13 Dec. 1987.
40. Mumcu (n.23), pp.9-68 and passim. Mumcu interviewed Cemaleddin Kaplan at length
and concludes this brand of militant Islam need not be taken very seriously in Turkey.
He also makes some fascinating observations on Islamic discourse among a variety of
Islamists he encounters during his investigations.
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