PRIVILEGE SPEECH OF REP. UMALI (R.)
REP. UMALI (R.). Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker and distinguished Members of this august Chamber, it was December 3, 2013 when
I last delivered a privilege speech, entitled: ―The Clear and Present Danger of Judicial
Despotism,‖ to address the issue of judicial tyranny. Today, I stand before you, my distinguished
colleagues, to take another step in my advocacy for judicial reform––a fearless crusade that I
began from the moment I assumed office as a neophyte Congressman of the Fifteenth Congress
and have stayed faithful to until today.
Let me recollect to you my arduous journey in furtherance of this crusade. On September 2010, I
delivered my first privilege speech, entitled: ―The Fallacy of Judicial Intervention in
Impeachment Cases,‖ in reaction to the TRO issued by the Supreme Court enjoining the House
Committee on Justice from hearing Ombudsman Gutierrez’s impeachment complaint because it
has always been my position that impeachment cases are beyond the subject of judicial review.
Rightly so, the high court dismissed the Petition for Certiorari of former Ombudsman Gutierrez,
—an event that eventually paved the way for her resignation the following year and the needed
reforms in the Office of the Ombudsman. Presumably, the renewed trust and confidence in the
Ombudsman is one of the reasons that emboldened Benhur Luy et al., and thereafter Ruby
Tuason and Dennis Cunanan, to come forward as state witnesses and/or whistleblowers.
In pursuit of my crusade, I prime-moved two other impeachment cases which were initiated in
the House of Representatives, the case of Associate Justice Mariano Del Castillo for betrayal of
public trust and the landmark impeachment case against then Chief Justice Renato Corona, a
case which is now immortalized in the pages of our history as the first instance of a successful
removal from office of an impeachable government official with the help, of course, of the
―small lady.‖ I thought this momentous event would also engineer the desired reforms and
changes in the Judiciary, but I was wrong.
My dear colleagues, it seems that the road to judicial reform is a long and difficult one. The
struggle is far from over. It appears that the remnants of the old ways remain in the halls of the
Supreme Court which continues to bully its co-equal branches of the government. Although it
holds neither the power of the purse nor the power to execute, the Judiciary, headed by the
Supreme Court, is now acting like three branches of the government rolled into one, usurping the
powers of its co-equal branches, the Legislative and Executive. Let me enumerate the ways:
First, in the case of Francisco vs. House of Representatives, which involved the impeachment
case against former Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr., the Supreme Court infringed on the
impeachment powers of Congress, in contravention of the latter’s constitutional mandate as the
body which has the sole power to hear and decide all impeachment cases filed against then Chief
Justice Davide. Unfortunately, this august Body allowed itself to be bullied by the Judiciary;
thus, an unwarranted precedent of judicial bullying in impeachment cases was established which
gave birth to, borrowing the words of an illustrious lawyer, Atty. Estelito Mendoza: ―xxx the
amusing spectacle of persons walking up early to file an impeachment complaint in the House of
Representatives to preclude the filing of an impeachment complaint with a period of one (1) year
thereafter.‖
Second, expectedly, because of this incident in the Francisco case, history repeated itself when
the Supreme Court, unmindful of the respect due a co-equal branch, railroaded the issuance of an
en banc resolution directing the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives to observe
a status quo in the impeachment proceedings of Ombudsman Gutierrez, notwithstanding the fact
that some Justices had not even received a copy of the Petition for Certiorari, thereby infringing
again upon the impeachment powers of Congress. Rightly so, the Fifteenth Congress, of which I
was a proud Member, did not allow itself to be bullied. Rightly too, the certiorari petition of
former Ombudsman Gutierrez was dismissed. Unfortunately, the high court did not take the
opportunity of resolving what Fr. Joaquin Bernas opined in his article, entitled: ―Echoes from
Corona Impeachment,‖ which appeared on the 27 January 2014 issue of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer as the ―grand ambiguity in the apparent conflict between the expanded power of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII, Section 1 and the exclusive power of the Senate in Article XI,
Section 3(6).‖ And like Fr. Bernas, ―I do not believe that it would be in the best interest of the
nation for the Supreme Court to initiate a head-on collision with the Senate x x x.‖
Corollarily, I have to disagree with the opinion of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago that the
high court can revisit the Corona verdict on the ground of extrinsic fraud, particularly the alleged
bribery of Senators, because the language of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous, that the
Senate has the sole power to hear and decide impeachment cases which, I repeat, is beyond the
power of judicial review.
Stated differently, there is no ambiguity in the language of the Constitution pertaining to the sole
power of the Senate to hear and decide on impeachment cases, and I cannot imagine any other
interpretation without courting a constitutional crisis. Verily, it is imperative for the high court to
revisit the Francisco ruling, to clarify once and for all the legal issue which falls squarely within
the ambit of a political question defined in the leading case of Tañada vs. Cuenco, and I quote:
x x x the term ―political question‖ connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum, it refers to ―those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or Executive branch of the government.‖ It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Third, not content with its unwarranted intrusions on various HRET cases in the past, the high
court now continues with impunity to bully this august Chamber by emasculating the
constitutional mandate of the HRET. In utter disrespect for the separate and independent power
of Congress, the high court in the Regina Ongsiako Reyes vs. COMELEC overturned the
prevailing jurisprudence on HRET jurisdiction, unmindful of the legal absurdity it will create as
pointed out by one of its members, Justice Brion. Mr. Speaker, should we allow ourselves to be
bullied anew? Shall we wait for the time when the high court in the guise of judicial review will
again dictate on who will sit as Members of Congress like how it is now happening when a
petition for mandamus has been filed against our colleague, the Hon. Regina Ongsiako Reyes?
Fourth, let us be reminded that in the case of Belgica vs. Executive Secretary, the Supreme Court
also emasculated, if not usurped, the prosecutorial powers of the Executive Department by
directing all prosecutorial organs of the government to investigate and accordingly prosecute all
government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the
irregular, improper and/or unlawful utilization of all funds under the PDAF. This is not to
mention the many other issues that fall within the ambit of a political question that the High
Court intruded into such as what I earlier mentioned in the Francisco case.
Fifth, finally, the High Court remains oblivious to the fact that while it recently declared
unconstitutional the use and purpose of lump-sum funds like the PDAF, the Malampaya Fund
and the Presidential Social Fund, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court continuously
administers, allocates and disburses the Judiciary Development Fund or JDF exclusively, which
fund is not even recorded and/or accounted for in the National Treasury. Is there a different
standard of justice for the Judiciary versus the Legislative and Executive departments with
respect to the administration and/or disbursement of funds?
Mr. Speaker, my colleagues, first and foremost, as duly elected Representatives of the people, we
have the responsibility to defend and uphold the fundamental laws of the land and to protect the
rights of the people we represent. We cannot keep on closing our eyes to the Judiciary’s
tyrannical ways and allow our great institution to be bullied. If no one else rises against the
despotic ways of the Justices of the Supreme Court, then allow me, my distinguished colleagues,
to champion this cause.
Now, we are rich in contradicting jurisprudence because it seems that those sitting in the plush
seats of the supposedly inviolable tribunal can bend the laws at their whim, hence, the birth of
the phrase, ―flip-flopping decisions.‖
Mr. Speaker, this is very worrying because judicial ―flip-flopping‖ has a serious cost. I do not
merely speak in financial terms. I am also talking about its cost on the fundamental principles of
due process of law and jurisprudence for violating the doctrines of immutability of decisions,
stare decisis, and res judicata, for emasculating the powers of the HRET and for infringing on the
separate and independent powers of co-equal branches of the government, which bears on the
judicial and political system of the country.
Yes, the judicial elasticity of the High Court takes a toll on the judicial system, as well as the
whole political system as manifested in the constitutional dilemma the country is facing today.
The Supreme Court is supposed to be the last bastion of justice. Its ideal role can be likened to a
mother from whom a wounded child can seek compassion and true justice. As the highest
tribunal in the land, the Supreme Court should be the stronghold of integrity and impartiality.
Yet, how can we trust a Supreme Court that changes its mind whenever such change appears to
be convenient? How can we believe in a Supreme Court that cannot even make up its mind on a
single issue? How can there be justice when the Supreme Court has a malleable concept of
justice and fairness?
So today, I take another leap in my advocacy to reform the Judiciary as I illustrate the many
instances of judicial flip-flopping.
Let me refresh you of my earlier privilege speech last December covering the unusual case of
Cong. Regina Ongsiako Reyes, where the Supreme Court unwarrantedly emasculated the power
and jurisdiction of the HRET. Indubitably, it has created a legally absurd situation as pointed out
by Associate Justice Brion in that the HRET cannot acquire jurisdiction until 12:00 noon of June
30, 2013, and yet, the HRET rules require the filing of a petition within 15 days from
proclamation of the candidate. And, if I may add my own version of another legal absurdity
resulting from the Reyes ruling, there is now created two classes of Congressmen—neophytes,
like Congresswoman Reyes who is not a sitting Member of the House because she can assume
only at noontime of 30 June 2013; and, a second termer like me, who is a sitting Member until
June 30, 2013 because I am a Member of the House. Interpreting the High Court’s decision,
therefore, the Reyes ruling will apply to first termers and not to second or third termers. Mind
you, Mr. Speaker, these legal absurdities did not exist prior to the Reyes ruling. So, as the saying
goes, why fix it when it is not broke?
As a consequence of the foregoing legal absurdities, the High Court wreaks havoc not only on
the justice system but on the political system of the country. So, I ask, Mr. Speaker and
distinguished colleagues, is this not judicial legislation and a clear violation of the principle of
separation of powers? Should we allow the powers of the HRET to be defined and limited by the
Supreme Court as it sees fit?
―Unusual‖ was how Justice Brion described this case, and a ―reckless and an obvious rush to
judgment in view of the gravity of the issues presented and the potential effect on jurisprudence‖
was how he called the outright and immediate denial that is within 18 days of the petition of
Congresswoman Reyes. More, Justice Brion described the majority’s ruling that the jurisdiction
only begins after the candidate has assumed office on June 30 as a complete turnaround from the
court’s prevailing jurisprudence and constitutes a major retrogressive jurisprudential
development. He also pointed out that the majority’s ruling is contrary to the HRET rules and
would affect all future proclamations. To my mind, Mr. Speaker, said ruling smacks of clear
favoritism and even cronyism.
Indeed, the doctrine of immutability of judgment and stability of long-established and settled
jurisprudence is in jeopardy. In fact, the House leadership is now confronted with the amusing
spectacle of a lawyer, of a former Congressman disrespecting this august Chamber by issuing a
demand letter dated January 20, 2014, entitled: ―FINAL NOTICE AND DEMAND TO
VACATE OFFICE‖ and threatening to file criminal and administrative cases against a sitting
Member. Would you like that to happen to you? As you very well know, a great majority of the
Members of the House of Representatives numbering 171 have signed House Resolution No.
597, entitled: ―URGENT RESOLUTION REITERATING ADHERENCE TO THE TIMEHONORED PRINCIPLE ON THE EXCLUSIVITY OF JURISDICTION OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) OVER ALL CONTESTS
RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF ITS MEMBERS
TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY, DIGNITY AND REPUTATION OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND ITS MEMBERS.‖
How do we now reconcile the position of 171 Members representing the great majority of this
House versus the flip-flopping decision of the Supreme Court which recognizes COMELEC
jurisdiction instead, apparently to favor a kin of one of the sitting magistrates? Shall the court
now cite in contempt of court 171 Congressmen who disagree with the erroneous Supreme Court
ruling? Constitutional dilemma or crisis, yes, this is the cost of judicial bullying and elasticity.
Mr. Speaker, distinguished colleagues, a recent development has further complicated the
situation. A few days ago, I received information that former Representative Velasco has filed a
Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Injunction, which seeks to compel the Speaker of the House, the Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr., to
administer the oath of office in his favor, and to direct and command the Secretary General of the
House of Representatives to remove the name of Representative Reyes from the roll of Members
of the House of Representatives and register his name instead.
Again, why is it that the mandate of the High Court is implored on an issue which clearly falls
within the jurisdiction of the constitutionally mandated HRET? Why should the High Court
allow itself to be used by one litigant, a losing candidate at that who happens to have a father in
the same court, at the expense of a constitutional crisis, and/or risk of impeachment? Is the
interest of one person more important than the interest of the country and of this institution?
The petition directly accuses the Speaker of deliberately refusing to administer the oath in
petitioner’s favor and the Secretary General of refusing to register his name and delete the name
of Representative Reyes in the roll of Members, despite the ruling of the Supreme Court in the
Reyes case. Petitioner, thus, charges Speaker Belmonte of unlawfully neglecting the performance
of his ministerial duty to administer the oath of office in favor of Velasco, and unlawfully
excluding Mr. Velasco from the enjoyment of the right to hold office. But how can the Speaker
be accused of committing these unlawful acts when, in fact, there has been no writ of execution
issued by the court in relation to the Reyes case? Since when have Supreme Court decisions per
se become self-executory without the need of remanding to the court of origin for the issuance of
the necessary writ of execution? And now, as basis for a demand letter from a litigant, former
Representative Velasco repeatedly referred in his petition to the several letters he wrote to the
Speaker, the Secretary General and even to Representative Reyes, imploring them to recognize
his authority to sit in Representatives Reyes’ stead.
Again, it must be pointed out that these letters are not official orders or writs from the
appropriate court or tribunal. They have no legal or compelling effect. Would it not be
tantamount to a brazen act of emasculation of the House of Representatives if we are to
acknowledge mere letters to vacate from private counsels? Must we, as a Body, be bullied by an
ordinary man who seeks to compel us to act on the basis of his mere orders?
Indeed, it makes me wonder what other bemusing spectacle will this august Body be subjected to
in the near future. Will our leadership be held liable for remaining steadfast in upholding our
constitutional powers? Will the Velasco camp find a way via a court order to send a sheriff or
some deputized law enforcement official to bodily carry out of these halls a sitting Member of
the House?
Surely, a full-blown constitutional crisis will ensue at a huge cost to our political system on
account of a flip-flopping, albeit, unwarranted decision of the High Court to favor a son of a
sitting magistrate which, I submit, constitutes betrayal of public trust, a clear ground for
impeachment. Thus, I am in a quandary as to why a former Chief Justice of the High Court can
find nothing questionable about the Reyes decision. I am referring to former Chief Justice
Panganiban who, in his newspaper column, entitled: ―Disagree, but not disobey,‖ which
appeared in the January 26, 2014 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, defended the recent
decision of the Supreme Court and even belittled the concerns of the House by asking why such
a decision, that in effect emasculated the HRET, ignited a congressional conflagration,
suggesting that we can only disagree with the Supreme Court’s decision but never disobey. After
all, we can always impeach the magistrates.
Yes, I agree that we could only disagree, but never disobey decisions of the High Court no
matter how erroneous; that Congress is not helpless because we have the power to impeach
Justices. My question, however, is why must we wait until we reach the point of filing an
impeachment complaint against sitting justices? Impeachment is an ordinary remedy intended by
the Constitution to be the last resort to remove incorrigible and erring impeachable officials,
including justices of the Supreme Court. To my mind, the best working democratic government
is one where people are satisfied because problems are addressed at the earliest possible time,
thus, averting a constitutional dilemma and/or public restiveness, and/or calls for civil
disobedience. It is in this light that I hope our criticisms and calls for action are taken.
Further, I find it difficult to understand how the former Chief Justice can be so cavalier about
flip-flopping decisions of the court which has happened too many times in the past to go
unremarked. While justices may err and not be impeached for their errors, they also cannot
whimsically and capriciously flip-flop to the point of violating established principles of law and
jurisprudence, and of due process, and infringe on the doctrine of separation of powers, thereby
fomenting a possible constitutional crisis. Be it remembered that when the Supreme Court errs,
this error becomes part of the law of the land even if it diminishes the powers of co-equal
branches of government, just like what happened in the Francisco ruling and in various HRET
cases, including the Reyes ruling which was unwarrantedly intruded into by the High Court.
Therefore, justices must be the embodiment of justice and fairness, and their reputation ought to
be free from even the mere appearance of partiality and moral corruption. This is the essence of
my advocacy for judicial reforms.
Mr. Speaker and distinguished colleagues, we have seen other instances of judicial ficklemindedness and elasticity in the cases of League of Cities vs. COMELEC wherein the high court
reversed its previous ruling, declaring the cityhood bills of 16 municipalities invalid and
unconstitutional, and eventually ruling the same cityhood bills as valid and constitutional,
notwithstanding the underlying inconsistency of such bills in the Local Government Code
prevailing at the time. The Supreme Court, in this case, reversed itself three times before finally
deciding to uphold the validity of the cityhood bills even if it is contrary to the provisions of the
Local Government Code.
Thus, Mr. Justice Antonio Carpio succinctly stated in his dissent that the SC decision declaring
the 16 cityhood laws unconstitutional had already become final, particularly after the denial of
two motions for reconsideration filed by the 16 municipalities. He also pointed out that not only
was an entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009; the decision was already executed when the
Department of Budget and Management issued Local Budget Memorandum No. 61 on 30 June
2009, providing for the final Internal Revenue Allotment for 2009 due to the reversion of the 16
newly created cities.
In addition, Mr. Justice Carpio also noted that 14 Congressmen, having jurisdiction over the 16
respondent municipalities at that time, filed House Bill No. 6303, seeking to amend Section 450
of the Local Government Code, as amended by R.A. No. 9009. The proposed amendment was
intended to correct the infirmities in the cityhood laws as cited by the Supreme Court in its 18
November 2008 decision.
However, to the surprise and alarm of the legal community and the public in general, the court
re-opened the case despite its finality and rendered three more decisions, three reversals in a row:
21 December 2009, declaring cityhood laws constitutional; 24 August 2010, declaring the
cityhood laws unconstitutional; and lastly, on 15 February 2011, declaring the cityhood laws
constitutional.
Clearly, there were three reversals or flip-flopping in this case.
Not surprisingly, then Associate, now Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, in her dissenting
opinion raised concerns over ―highly irregular and unprecedented‖ acts of entertaining several
motions for reconsideration, as well as, the effects of the ―flip-flopping‖ decisions on the Court’s
role in our democratic system and its decision-making process. Thus, Mme. Chief Justice
distinctly warned that ―the public confusion, sown by the pendulum swing of the Court’s
decisions, has yielded unpredictability in the judicial decision-making process and has spawned
untold consequences upon the public’s confidence in the enduring stability of the rule of law in
our jurisprudence.‖
How this turn of events happened remains unexplained to this day. Even veteran litigators were
shaking their heads in disbelief. Again, whispers circulated even in these august halls that the
IRA or the internal revenue allotments of local government units were set aside for purposes of
ensuring victory of either side. Until today, what happened is still a mystery, clouded in mist and
ambiguity. So I urge again, the ―small ladies‖ and/or even ―small boys‖ to heed to the President’s
call towards ―daang matuwid‖ and come forward to unfold the mystery. I will protect your
identity the way I did during the impeachment trial of Corona to the small lady.
No wonder, even one of the foremost legal luminaries in the country, Atty. Estelito Mendoza, in
his letter to the undersigned, expressed his concern over the League of Cities decision. He
suggested that Congress needs to, and I quote:
x x x examine the power of the Supreme Court to declare laws unconstitutional and the way it
has done so as now reflected in the proceedings involving the constitutionality of the 16 cityhood
laws. Enactment of laws is the principal function of the Legislative department, more vital than
its power of impeachment when its authority to enact laws is undercut by an undue expansion of
the power of judicial review that strikes at the very core of the function of the Legislative
Department.
Let me also illustrate the case of FASAP vs. PAL where the Supreme Court rendered a decision
finding PAL guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered the same to reinstate the cabin crew
personnel who were covered by the retrenchment. PAL filed a motion for reconsideration which
the Supreme Court’s Special Third Division denied with finality. Perplexingly, the Supreme
Court’s Second Division still entertained the second MR of PAL unlike in the Congresswoman
Reyes case where the High Court denied the second MR for being a prohibited pleading. Worse,
the SC reopened the entire case anew on the merits, rendering ineffectual the final ruling of the
Supreme Court’s Special Third Division only to eventually deny the second MR of PAL.
Shockingly, the SC en banc recalled the ruling of the Supreme Court’s Second Division and
ultimately modified the same to favor the Philippine Airlines. Why all of these unusual
circumstances surrounding the FASAP case happened is the one dollar question? Pero dahil po
sa inflation ngayon siguro mas magandang tawagin ito na million-dollar question?
Illuminating is the observation of then Associate, now Chief Justice Sereno in her Dissenting
Opinion, and I quote:
If this Court is to adhere to its character as a court of last resort, it must stop giving never-ending
refuge to parties who obstinately seek to resist execution of our final decisions on the sole
ground of their counsel’s creativity in relabeling a prohibited second motion for reconsideration,
or the changing of composition of the three divisions of the Court.
How much shorter can our memory get?
The FASAP case has since become infamous for having been reopened by the Supreme Court
when the decision dismissing it had already become final and executory, based only upon a letter
from counsel of the respondent. At that time, there was widespread talk among those in the know
in the legal circles of monetary considerations making it all the way to the hallowed halls of
justice in Padre Faura. And may I also cite another illustrative case, this is the damming case of
Keppel Cebu Shipyard, Inc. vs Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation. The case stemmed
from the accidental burning of a WG&A Superferry ship in 2000. After a protracted litigation, a
decision became final on November 4, 2010 and was recorded in the book of Entries of
Judgments. However, on November 23, 2010, Keppel Shipyard, without leave of court, filed a
motion to reopen proceedings and motion to refer to the court en banc, claiming that the Court
gravely erred in failing to consider that both Pioneer and KCSI were guilty of negligence. Again,
in another motion, supplemental motion, KCSI alleged that it was denied its substantive right to
due process when the court declared invalid the limitation-of-liability clause under a Ship Repair
Agreement between the two parties.
Lo and behold, on June, 7, 2011, the case was strangely reopened, presumably to modify the
previous decision, by ordering Keppel to pay Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation the
amount of P50 million plus interest, or P279 million less than the final judgment of P329 million,
on the basis of a clause in the agreement involved in this particular case that was earlier declared
invalid in the earlier decision, but subsequently, declared valid by the same court.
In effect, Mr. Speaker, the Supreme Court en banc set aside the unanimous decision of a division
of the court which had previously and unanimously denied the first and second motions for
reconsideration that followed, and proceeded to reopen the case anew for a review on the merits
based on a third motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading. Dahil po tumitindi
ang inflation, I would now like to call this the $6-million question.
As aptly observed by Mr. Justice Brion:
In acting as it did, the Court violated the most basic principle underlying the legal system—the
immutability of final judgments—thereby acting without authority and outside of its
jurisdiction.‖
It grossly glossed over the violation of technical rules in its haste to override its own final and
executory ruling.
The principle of immutability of judgments which is the basic principle that supports the stability
of a judicial system as well as the social, economic and political ordering of society, is a decision
that has acquired finality, and has become immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of law
or of fact and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the
land.
In the face of this kind of assault on a final judgment, all the High Court can do and should have
done is merely to note the motion, and it did not even have to deny the motion for
reconsideration because it was filed way beyond the reglementary period under the Rules.
Lamentably, no one can reverse the High Court’s decision and say that it is acting without
authority and outside of its jurisdiction. The Court’s error is the law.
Thus, Mr. Justice Brion bewailed the dangerous effect of such unsettling action by the Supreme
Court as he explained the very purpose of a Supreme Court:
It exists in a society and is supported by that society as a necessary and desirable institution
because it can settle disputes and can do this with finality. Its rulings lay to rest the disputes that
can otherwise disrupt the harmony in society.
This is the role that courts generally serve; specific to the Supreme Court—as the highest court—
is the finality at the highest level that it can bestow on the resolution of disputes. Without this
element of finality, the core essence of courts and of the Supreme Court in particular completely
vanishes.
Now, because of its own action, Justice Brion sadly noted that the High Court:
xxx has established that judgments can no longer achieve finality in this country, xxx. At the
very least, the Court loses ground in the areas of respect and credibility, xxx. And what results is
a monumental imbalance in the legal structure that the Constitution and our laws could not have
intended.
Yes, such apprehension is already manifesting not only in this august Chamber, but also among
the general public. Allow me to quote an excerpt from a Philippine Daily Inquirer editorial as
cited in Marites Vitug’s book ―Hour Before Dawn‖ questioning the multiple somersaults of
Supreme Court decisions, thus:
This unfortunate series of events can only erode the people’s confidence in the rule of law, and
undermine the credibility of the court. If there is no such thing as a final and executory ruling,
can there be an end to legal and judicial controversies? If the Supreme Court declines to respect
its own jurisprudence, can anyone expect the ordinary citizen to respect the court’s rulings? If
sheer majority rule determines the decision of the Supreme Court, can the public stop itself from
treating justices as politicians they have become?
For how else can an ordinary person understand why such a long-standing and settled rule can be
so blatantly and brazenly disregarded by the High Court justices at their convenience? If the
Supreme Court does not respect the finality of its own judgment and even allows concessions by
breaking its own procedural rules in relation to cases already adjudged final and executory, is it
not high time that we question why this is so?
Are we to be rendered powerless by these justices and be left at the mercy of their ingeniously
crafted decisions? Are we to be rendered insecure of our rights by the unending numbers game in
the highest chamber where lies the limit to judicial elasticity?
These cases I have mentioned should make us all wonder: What made the Supreme Court change
its mind in each of these cases? Discerning minds would question the motives behind these ―flipflops.‖
Mr. Speaker, and distinguished colleagues, I submit that the court’s move in the Reyes case to
negate the HRET jurisdiction, despite the clear and unequivocal mandate of the Constitution as
the sole judge established by previous jurisprudence, is a clear betrayal of public trust. Yes,
encroaching on the powers of a coequal branch of government is a serious breach of the principle
of separation of powers upon which our whole republican system of government rests is a
ground for impeachment.
The added fact that the Reyes case was motu proprio decided in record time of 18 days without
even requiring the respondent to comment, when there is a backlog of 7,000 cases, makes such
haste a clear favoritism, bias and prejudice to favor a kin of one of the sitting magistrates. Note
that each year, the Supreme Court receives 4,000 cases into its already clogged dockets. How
then could a case filed on June 7, 2013 be decided in 18 days when on any given year, the
Supreme Court has to deal with 11,000 cases?
Thus, even one of its members noted and bemoaned the undue haste with which the court
dismissed outright the petition before it with apparent disregard to delicadeza as the court, in
effect, underhandedly promulgated a favorable decision benefitting a son of an incumbent
justice.
Could it be that there exists a clandestine express lane for cases in the Supreme Court? Who has
actual access to this ―swift justice lane‖?
It is very unusual how the Supreme Court was able to decide on the Reyes case so swiftly, when
some, if not most, cases remain for years in the court’s dockets despite its mandate under the
1987 Constitution to resolve cases within 24 months from the date of submission. Is this not a
form of judicial bullying? Is it not the existence of bad faith and favoritism manifested in this
form of conduct? Does this brazen act of bullying, favoritism, and perhaps even cronyism, not
constitute a betrayal of public trust?
Then again we see the spectacle of the High Court betraying public trust by practicing double
standards of justice by remaining oblivious to the possible evils of its own judicial pork barrel at
the expense of its coequal counterpart.
Yes, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) was created pursuant to PD No. 1949, presumably
to exact support, if not allegiance, and to consolidate all powers legislative, judicial, including
military, in the Executive at that time.
Mr. Speaker, distinguished colleagues, may I remind everyone that the JDF is and remains to be
a fund that does not go to the national coffers and does not form part of the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). It goes directly to the Supreme Court, managed solely by the Chief
Justice, and that is about it. So, let me ask, who guards the guard? With our silence so far, no one
has stood up against judicial bullying in the guise of the power of judicial review. No one has
questioned how the JDF is being spent owing to the high court’s self-serving insistence on its
fiscal autonomy, realizing that the said fund is not even in the GAA and not accounted for in the
Treasury.
It was the Supreme Court in its latest decision which scrutinized the purposes for which certain
lump-sum funds were intended. Is it not high time now to look at this old decree that established
the JDF and examine the purposes for which it was created and the manner in which it is
currently being administered?
Let us remember that the rest of the budget of the Judiciary is sourced from national coffers and
goes through the usual budget process. In fact, the House Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance, and both Houses of Congress as a whole, always pass the
proposed budget of the Judiciary without cuts or amendments as courtesy to a coequal branch in
order to preserve its fiscal autonomy and harmony. Surely, the adoption of a similar process for
the budgeting of the JDF will also be valid and should not be considered as infringing on the
independence of the Judiciary.
Mr. Speaker, distinguished colleagues, let me emphasize that this crusade is not about pork
barrel, nor is it about Representative Reyes. This is in pursuit of my advocacy for judicial reform
and in defense of the Constitution and this great institution which had been severely
disrespected, and its powers and prerogatives gravely encroached upon and emasculated by a
coequal branch of government, under the guise of the power of judicial review.
As I undertake this difficult and lonely battle, my sole motivation is to protect the sacred virtue
of justice, for at the end of the day, justice is the best gift that we could secure for our people.
I do not wish to reduce the powers vested by the Constitution upon the highest tribunal. But we
now need to check and to balance the abuses of coequal branches of government to avoid further
travesty or miscarriage of justice brought about by willful errors of judgment, desecration of the
Constitution via the emasculation of constitutional mandates of constitutional bodies and
intrusion into separate and independent powers of coequal branches of government under the
despotic notion of power of judicial review by some judicial misfits whose claim to fame and/or
ascent to the highest post in the Judiciary is not by reason of merit, but by their closeness to the
powers that be.
Batu-bato sa langit, ang tamaan, huwag pong magagalit. Kaya sa mga mahistrado ng Korte
Suprema na aking tinutukoy, alam ko na alam ninyo kung sino kayo. Magkusa na sana kayong
magbitiw para hindi na tayo umabot sa masalimuot na remedy na impeachment na itinadhana ng
Saligang Batas para tanggalin ang tiwaling miyembro ng Korte. Alang-alang sa ating mga
kababayan at para sa kapakanan ng bayan, mahabag naman po kayo.
Kung kayo po ay nasisiyahan sa sistema ng hustisya sa ating kapuluan at sa pamamalakad nito
ng ating Korte Suprema, kung kayo po ay naniniwala na ang patuloy kong pagbubusisi sa mga
gawain at desisyon ng Korte Suprema ay mali at dapat nating hayaan ang paulit-ulit na
pagpapalit-palit ng Korte ng desisyon na hindi naaayon sa batas o Konstitusyon, ay ako na po
ang magpapakumbaba at ititigil ko na po ang aking adbokasiya at krusada na ireporma ang
sistema ng hustisya sa bansa. Ngunit kung kayo po naman ay naniniwala sa aking krusada ay
hinihikayat ko po kayo at ang buong sambayanan, lalo at higit ang mga kapatid ko sa propesyon,
na samahan ninyo po ako for I will not be afraid to champion the cause of judicial reform.
It is our sworn duty as Representatives of the people to uphold the Constitution, and as Members
of this Chamber, to defend this great institution called Congress against judicial bullies and
despots. If past Congresses allowed the Judiciary to emasculate the separate and independent
powers of its coequal branches of government, we should no longer allow these unwarranted acts
of judicial bullying and elasticity.
As I look around this august Chamber, I see many of my colleagues here who, like this
Representation, are also members of the Bar. My colleagues, it could not have escaped your
attention that over the years, the reputation of the judges and justices even in the highest tribunal
has been tainted by serious charges of corruption. Thus, some retired justices I have spoken to,
with my observations—and they agree with my observations—and lament this deterioration of
the integrity of the judiciary. So, I ask my esteemed colleagues, most especially my brothers in
the legal profession, are we to continue to remain silent against judicial despots and bullies who
continue to emasculate our constitutional mandate? When it seems that in the practice of law
today …
.
.
.
REP. UMALI (R.). Thank you, Mr. Speaker, distinguished colleagues.
So, I ask my esteemed colleagues, are we to continue to remain silent against judicial intrusions,
against these judicial despots and bullies that continue to emasculate our constitutional mandate,
when it seems that in the practice of law today how well one knows the law is often trumped-up
by how well one knows the judge or justice?
Should we be resigned to the mute witnesses in the face of this open but unspoken truth about the
corruption that plagues the Judiciary? Must we continue to do nothing as our country languishes
from corrupt ways in the Judiciary?
My dear colleagues, now I call upon you to join me in my crusade for judicial reform. This
would be a big step in putting finis to what I consider judicial bullying, judicial elasticity,
judicial favoritism and cronyism, that is now wreaking havoc on the judicial and political
systems which will exact a heavy cost on our democracy.
Nais ko rin pong manawagan sa ibang mga whistleblowers na may nalalaman sa mga
nangyayaring katiwalian sa Hudikatura na lumantad at magbigay patunay sa mga anomalyang
ito. Bukas po ang aking tanggapan upang pakinggan at ipaglaban ang inhustisya na inyong
nararanasan sa kamay ng Hudikatura. Katulad ng ginawa ni Mrs. Ruby Tuason na matapang na
bumalik sa bansa at buo ang loob na lumantad upang isiwalat ang kanyang mga nalalaman,
huwag po kayong matakot. I will protect your identity as I did to the ―small lady.‖
Ituloy po natin ang krusada ng ating Pangulong Aquino upang ating makamtan ang tunay na
―daang matuwid‖ sa Hudikatura. Let us always bear in mind that a legitimate justice system
should entertain no bullies. It should eschew favoritism. Judicial administration should not be
reduced to a mere numbers game of magistrates who should never bend to the clamors of the
powerful and the favored few.
One final note, to those who wish to join me in this crusade, let me reassure you with the words
of the great Martin Luther King Jr.: ―The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards
justice.‖ Let me also remind everyone that there is a tremendous cost to our silence. As aptly put
by the political philosopher Edmund Burke: ―All that is necessary for evil to triumph is for good
men to do nothing.‖
Maraming-maraming salamat po, Mr. Speaker, at sa aking mga kasamahan dito po sa Mababang
Kapulungan.