J.O. Maos, M. Inbar and D.F. Shmueli (eds.), 2004: Contemporary Israeli Geography
(Special Issue of Horizons in Geography, vol. 60-61), 333-343
The Role of Demography and Territory in Jewish-Arab
Relations in Israel
Arnon Soffer
Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Haifa
e-mail: [email protected]
This article deals with the role of demography and territory in Jewish-Arab relations in Israel
(within the Green Line boundary, including the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem) and, in
effect, in the entire Middle-East region. The terms "demography" and "territory" are significant
in a regional context under the following assumptions:
1. The State of Israel can exist only as a Jewish, Zionist and democratic state (in that order);
2. The Arab-Muslim world, in particular the Palestinians, resolutely refuses to (and perhaps
cannot) reconcile itself with the legitimacy of the Jewish State of Israel and its implications.
If we accept these assumptions, it follows that the gap between the Jewish and Arab positions
cannot be bridged and that the only interim solution is in attempting some kind of coexistence
without definite settlement of the conflict. Another important conclusion is that the conflict will
not be solved by gestures of the sort that prevail in the internal Israeli dialogue or in Israeli-Arab
propaganda which cite "neglect" of key issues as the root of all evil. Gestures alone are not the
solution to a conflict, although they are part of reasonable conduct in everyday life.
Territory is the essence of the conflict at the national and regional levels, regardless of whether
the whole Middle East is involved or the space called "Western Eretz Israel" (Palestine, or the
British Mandate area from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River), "Israel within the Green
Line borders", or such sub-regions as Wadi Ara, the Galilee and the northern Negev, or smaller
areas, such as East Jerusalem, the Old City, the Temple Mount, or even the Western Wall. In
all cases, the struggle is over territory, and apparently only by ruling it will national or religious
appetites be satiated (Gottman 1973, 1-2).
Vasquez (1990) summarizes his book The War Puzzle by stating that whether or not we agree
that the human being is a territorial creature and that his or her tendency to fight for territory
is a genetically inherited trait, the majority of wars are related to territory. Accordingly,
geographical factors play a critical role in the behavior of nations. He thereby positions himself
in support of Robert Ardrey's theory (1978) that the territorial imperative is a built-in human
drive (Soffer 1998).
The Israeli-Arab territorial struggle is on the of the most complex and irreconcilable of such
struggles. From the Arab point of view the colonialist Jewish population's penetration is
threatening this space with its religious difference, its nationalist ambitions, its economy, and
last but not least, its Westernized culture. The fact that Israel constitutes a geographical divide
between the western part of the Arab-Muslim world (Egypt and the Maghreb countries) and
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the eastern part (Jordan, Syria and Iraq) exacerbates Egyptian and pan-Arab antagonism towards
Israel. The bitterness of the conflict is in no way lessened by the fact that the territory involved
is so small. Even though it revolves around a miniscule area of only 27,000 square kilometers,
the fact that this is among the most densely populated Western world countries, makes a
territorial compromise all the more difficult.
The Jewish-Palestinian conflict, the violent expressions of which began in the early 1920s, is
above all a territorial dispute. Even then the Arabs of the Land of Israel (Palestine) understood
the nature of the conflict and its roots, and did everything they could to disrupt Jewish settlement
the occupancy of the land by Jewish settlers. This was the case before Israel's 1948 War of
Independence, as well as after it.
The demographic aspect of the conflict has a symbiotic connection with territory. Demography
is politically significant only in a territorial context. In Arab, as well as in Israeli leftist circles,
the demographic subject is shunted aside with the argument that it emits a racist odor. In rightist
Israeli circles the subject is untouchable because it contradicts the dreams about the Greater Land
of Israel (Palestine), while Israeli moderates are mostly indifferent about the roots of the conflict.
Avoiding the demographic issue obscures one of the root causes of the Arab-Israeli conflict
as it extends beyond the local level to the Middle East in general. The fact that rates of natural
increase are among the highest in the world, add immense complexity to an understanding
and resolution of the long-standing war between the two people and their respective religions
(NIC 2000; 2001 PRB; Sofer 1988, 2003; Sarig 2002).
Effect of territory and demography on Jewish-Arab relations
High natural increase
The natural increase of the Arab population in the Middle East in 2002 amounted to 2.0-2.5
percent per year. While the natural increase of Arabs in the Levant is 2.5-3.0 percent a year,
that of Arabs living in the Western Land of Israel (Palestine) is an astounding 3.5-4.5 percent
annually (PRB 2001; Soffer 2003).
This rapid natural increase is occurring in the Middle East at a time when in the Western world and
in the former Soviet bloc natural increase has been decreasing to zero or even below. Especially
in Western Europe the aging population may cause an ethnic revolution, as the region finds
it necessary to import workers from North Africa, Turkey, and the Middle, South and Far East.
The population in the Middle East doubles every 15-30 years, and this rapid increase only produces
poverty, hunger, despondency and frustration. Concomitant with these conditions the importance
of Islam is bound to grow in its extreme fundamentalist forms (NIC 2000). In this respect one
should listen closely to Arab experts who deplore the unique natural increase of Arabs in the
Middle East, which is blamed for taking the Arab nation down to the depths of poverty and gloom
(Haaretz 2001: "When Will We Stop Multiplying Like Rabbits"; United Nations 2002; 2003).
As for Israel, demography has become a dominant factor in recent years in determining JewishArab relations. In 2002 Jews constituted only 48.5% of the entire population residing in all
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of the historic Western Land of Israel (Israel, Gaza and the West Bank), while in the State of
Israel itself they constitute 72% of the total population. These statistics indicate a trend to a
bi-national or multi-national state within the boundaries of Israel. According to forecasts for
2020, Jews will constitute only 39% of the population of the Land of Israel (Palestine), and
64% of that of Israel itself (Table 1), or 71% of the entire populace, if foreign workers and
illegal residents are excluded from the calculation.
Economics and spread of Arab settlements
The aforementioned high natural increase of the Muslim Israeli Arabs, has far-reaching
implications for Jewish-Arab co-existence, which is already fragile because of religious,
nationalistic, ethnic, linguistic, economic, and cultural differences. The large number of children
and the fact that most women are unemployed - either because they are traditional homemakers, or because they cannot find outside employment - reduces the number of breadwinners
per household, decreases family income and increases poverty. Low income weakens the tax
base and aggravates the financial situation of Arab municipal authorities.
These disadvantages notwithstanding, Arab settlements have been spreading out across large
areas (Figure 1). The excessive dispersion of built-up areas in Arab settlements weighs heavily
on municipal systems and causes their breakdown. Magnifying the problem are the spacious
houses built in many villages since the establishment of the state of Israel, which lack adequate
infrastructure or roads, sidewalks, parking areas, water, sewerage, electricity, etc. There is,
furthermore, a chronic shortage of classrooms and basic social and health services (a third of
all Israeli children belongs to this sector, which accounts for only 19% of the total population!).
Large families living under conditions of retardation produce social problems. No wonder then
that the rate of crime in the Arab sector is the highest in the country.
Moreover, a clear correlation exists between Israeli settlements defined by the National Insurance
Institute as poverty-afflicted, in which natural increase exceeds 2.5%, be they Jewish BetarIlit, Arab Sakhnin, or Bedouin Rahat (Figure 2).
High natural increase does not go hand in hand with the standard of living that the Western
world, Israel included, is aiming at in the 21st century. The anger and frustration engendered
by poverty and the breakdown of settlement systems are directed at the Israeli government in
both the Muslim and Orthodox Jewish sectors, instead of the religious leaders who encourage
unlimited natural increase.
Diffusion at the national level
Thus far we have discussed the relationship between high natural increase and the Arab village
culture. At Israel's national level, this issue is amply manifested in Jewish-Arab co-existence.
The rapid sprawl of Arab settlement has created extensive built-up areas with thousands of
local residents that encroach over many square kilometers, like the Nazareth, Shfar'am, or
Wadi Ara metropolitan areas (Figure 3). Against the background of the Jewish-Arab conflict
such contiguous areas generate irredentist processes, since there are almost no Jews in these
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Table 1: Composition of population in Israel itself and in the entire Land of Israel (Eretz Israel)
in 2003 and forecast for 2020 (in thousands)
Population Groups
Israel citizens (total)
Jewish
Druze
Arabs (total)
Arab Christian
Arab Muslims (total)
Arab Muslim Bedouin (south Israel)
Legal Arab population in Jerusalem
Other Israeli citizens
Christian non-Arab
No recorded religion
Illegal Arabs in Israel*
in Jerusalem
among the Bedouins
In Galilee and Triangle Settlements
Foreign Workers**
legal
illegal
Total population in Israel
Non-Jews in Israel (Total)
Percentage of Jews in Israel
Total population in the Palestinian Entity***
Gaza Strip
Judea and Samaria
Arabs in Eretz Israel (Total)****
Total population in Eretz Israel
Total Percentage of Jews in all Eretz Israel
2003
6,748.3
5,161.3
110.0
1,190.5
120.0
1,070.5
150.0
250.0
286.5
40.0
246.5
220.0
100.0
25+14
81.0
440.0
240.0
200.0
7,408.3
2,247.0
3,500.0
1,300.0
2,200.0
4,910.5
10,908.3
2003 %
100.00
76.60
1.60
17.60
4.20
2020
8,900
6,300
160
2,000
170
1,830
350
380
440
2020 %
100.00
70.80
1.80
22.50
5.90
440
500
69.60
100.00
47.30
9,660
3,360
6,200
2,600
3,600
8,540
15,860
65.00
100.00
39.70
Sources: Israel Statistical Bureau 2003. Forecast for 2020 according to Prof. de la Pergula, Y. Ravid.
*
According to Y. Gemesin and A. Soffer for 2001, 2003.
** According to the Ministry of the Interior.
*** Palestinian Sources, CIA, PRB. World Bank. According to Israeli sources the total population is
only 3.1 million as a result of outmigration of 400,000 Arabs
**** The number of Palestinians in the Kingdom of Jordan is 3.5 million. In 2020 it will be about 4.5
million. The total number of Palestinians on both sides of the Jordan river was thus 8.1 million
in 2002, and will reach 13 million in 2020.
spaces, and strong nationalist Arab feelings. Such awareness, combined with frustration, due
to poverty and deficient services, serves as a breeding ground for extremist religious and
political movements, including groups that are sometimes prone to acts of violence. Geographic,
educational, religious, social, and political segregation starts there. The demographic development,
for its part, radicalizes relations between the two groups because, on the Arab side, it increases
feelings of power, manifested in the verbal extremism of this sector's representatives in the
Knesset (Israel’s Parliament) as well as in all areas of law enforcement in the country
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Kafar Kara: 12,000 inhabitants
Yokneam: 13,500 inhabitants
Beitar Ilit: 12,000 inhabitants
Jewish settlement s
Arab settlements
Ar'ara: 13,000 inhabitants
built-up areas
roads
0
1
2 km
Figure 1: Comparison between built-up areas of Jewish and Arab towns with equal population.
at large. Overt actions by a strong Israeli Arab irredentist movement, could threaten the
interconnections between Jewish settlement clusters and the Israeli ecumene, and endanger
the territorial integrity of the State as a whole (Figure 3).
On the Jewish side there is consequently a felt need for creating a continuous "Jewish territory"
wherever possible. The "Judaization" of the Galilee, the Triangle (a conglomeration of Arab
villages in the central coast), Jerusalem, and the northern Negev are examples of such initiatives,
whose common denominator is the feeling that there can be no Israeli sovereignty where no
Jews live. The "Judaization" process met with sweeping antagonism from the Arab side, which
views Jewish penetration into the region as a provocation. Similar phenomena are known to
have happened in other places around the world where different nationalities and minorities
live close by. Examples are Kosovo and other parts of former Yugoslavia, Corsica, Ireland,
Quebec and the Kurdish regions in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran.
Core and Periphery as key issue in the socio-economic conditions of the Arab sector
A spatial element that magnifies the demographic-territorial conflict stems from core-periphery
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Poorest Arab settlements
Poorest Jewish settlements
LEBANON
Most affluent settlements
SYRIA
Cities
0
10
20 km
n Se
a
Haifa
Med
iterr
anea
Tiberias
Beit Shean
Tel Aviv
JORDAN
G
A
ZA
Dead Se
a
Jerusalem
Beer Sheva
EGYPT
Figure 2: Dispersion of poverty in urban settlements in Israel, 2001.
339
SYRIA
Mixed cities
Dispersed Bedouin settlements
Dense Arab population
Green Line
National Boundary
Main roads
0
10
20
LEBANON
Acre
30 Km
Safed
Haifa
Tiberias
Med
iterr
anea
n Se
a
Nazareth
JORDAN
Natanya
Nablus
Tel Aviv-Jaffa
Lod
Ramla
G
A
ZA
Hebron
Dead Sea
Jerusalem
Jericho
Beer Sheva
EGYPT
Dimona
Figure 3: Spread of the Arab and Beduin population in the Land of Israel
340
relationships. Many researchers who deal with issues of equality and deprivation, are unaware
of the clear connection between these issues and geography. High demographic growth and
dwelling in peripheral areas (especially mountainous or desert regions) are deterministic factors
for poverty and neglect, especially in the modern era (Soffer 1993).
Throughout the world there are gaps between the rich centers and the poorer peripheries. The
cores usually contain centers of culture, communication, and education, which are all but
missing on the periphery. The Center offers more opportunities and profitable enterprises, and
higher employment rates than the Periphery. This situation is true for the United States, France,
Britain, Brazil, China, Canada, and all Middle Eastern countries, as it is for little Israel.
The neglect of distant and topographically high Arab and Druze settlements is comparable to
the neglect that Jewish settlements suffer in the same region (Figure 4). By the same token,
the condition of the Bedouin is no different from conditions in urban Jewish towns, established
for immigrants in the years immediately after Independence, such as Yeruham, Dimona, and
Mitzpe Ramon. All the resources allocated to these localities, or even to municipalities, such
as Safed or cooperative Moshav villages in the Galilee, were unable to make these settlements
take off socially and economically.
The Bedouin
The dispersion of the Bedouin in the northern Negev is another problematic and sad example
of geographical determinism (Figures 3, 4). Involved here are nomadic tribes that wandered
in the desert for ages and, owing to the transition to modern circumstances, were forced to
move into permanent settlements and change their way of life. The Bedouin of the Negev are
in many ways different from the Arab farmers or town dwellers in the north of the country,
and their denomadization process is quite similar to that of the Bedouin in Jordan, Egypt, Syria,
Iraq, the Maghreb countries, the Arabian Peninsula, or that of the nomadic Kurdish and
Turkomen tribes in Iran and Turkey.
Ironically, the problems of the Israeli Bedouin are aggravated by government welfare policies,
which encourage multiplicity of children. The Bedouin father does not beget children, he
"produces" them with the aid of 2-4 wives, whom he acquires in the areas of Mt. Hebron (West
Bank) Gaza, or southern Jordan, increasing thereby his personal allowance form the social
service with each additional child. This anomaly is without precedent, and one that bears a
high cost to the Bedouin themselves, to the future of the Negev, and to Israeli society in general.
The Bedouin population is growing at a rate of 4-8% annually; its dispersion is rapid. In a
perverse way, the chances of solving the problems of the Bedouin are diminishing, as are
prospects for removing them from the cycle of poverty and from the planning chaos that
precludes a solution to their permanent settlement problems.
Conclusions
We have surveyed the decisive impact of the combined territorial-demographic aspects on the
problematic condition of the Arabs of Israel in the shift from a peasant-nomadic society to
341
LEBANON
SYRIA
Safed
Med
iterr
anea
n Se
a
Haifa
Tel Aviv
JORDAN
Ga
za
Dead Sea
Jerusalem
Beer Sheva
Dimona
EGYPT
Negev
Israels’ core area
Core vs. periphery
Mountain area
Desert area
Green Line
National Boundary
Figure 4: Core-Periphery relations in Israel
342
Western life styles. The territorial struggle in the small country of Israel is central to JewishArab relations, and for a century it has stymied harmonious co-existence. The high natural
increase of the Arab population is another barrier that prevents Israeli Arabs from integrating
into Western society.
We have discussed the fact that Israeli Arabs reside mainly in peripheral areas of the country.
The more a population dwells in the periphery, particularly mountainous or desert areas, the
wider the gap of neglect when compared with the core of the country.
On top of the Bedouin’s marginal conditions in the Negev, they are afflicted by some of the highest
natural increase rates in the world and by the fact that their nomadic culture delays their incorporation
into a modern economy. Similar cases around the world, demonstrate that these phenomena are not
unique to the Israeli-Arab sector.
Nonetheless, the territorial-demographic factors cannot entirely explain the gamut of problems
and existing tension between Arabs and Jews in the Land of Israel, which are based not only
on cultural differences and on economic starting points. The Jews who began to arrive in Israel
around 1900 had Western concepts of culture and economics, whereas the Arabs engaged
mainly in subsistence farming for another half century. The Jews of Eretz-Israel (Palestine)
obtained considerable assistance from world Jewry, while almost nothing comparable in
economic terms took place in the Arab sector. With the outbreak of the Jewish-Arab conflict
these gaps widened, and not in favor of the Arabs.
Given the intensity of the Middle East conflict and Israel's economic problems, the outlook
is not encouraging. As in the past, territory will continue to be a disputed issue, and with
growing population pressure (an addition of three million people in the next 20 years in Israel,
or an additional 5.5 million people in all the Land of Israel) this issue will become increasingly
important. In such a critical situation the regular citizen must seek co-existence at the everyday
level in order to make life bearable for both sides.
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